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The goal of this dissertation is to discuss the assertion that “the unexamined life is not 
worth living” (Apology, 38a). We will start by considering how, according to the Apology, 
such a life is marked by false knowledge claims, self-neglect, drowsiness and a merely 
apparent happiness. Then, we will extent this analysis to the whole Platonic corpus, in order 
to better understand the implications of this perspective. This extension will include four 
moments. 
First, we will analyze Plato‟s conception of philosophical examination. Although it 
may seem there is no unitary conception of examination in the corpus (especially because of 
the difference between a negative and a positive kind of examination), we will see that 
philosophical examination is always directed at views or beliefs. We all possess a complex 
system of beliefs, and these beliefs may contain many errors and distortions, which are bound 
to vitiate any positive examination. Consequently, we must first verify the beliefs we already 
have, and only then can we search for new views.  
Second, we must consider the inner constitution of our being (i.e., of our ροπή) and 
see how it determines the general structure of each particular life (αίμξ). The ροπή has a 
complex cognitive structure, and it is essentially marked by the pursuit of a superlative good. 
A αίμξ is thus a system of practical tensions, directed at the superlative good, and based on 
our views of the good and of how to attain it. Moreover, the ροπή is marked by three 
constitutive drives (love of gain, love of honor, and love of knowledge – θζθμζμθία), and 
these drives try to control the pursuit of the good, are always in a particular relation of forces, 
and also contaminate or transform each other – which means, among other things, that our 
entire ροπή and our entire life are deeply marked by love of knowledge. 
Third, we will describe the constitution of the unexamined life on the basis of the 
structures previously identified. We will see that although there are many modalities of 
unexamined life, they all have a similar constitution. They are characterized by the rule of a 
non-philosophical drive and by a weak love of knowledge, and this in turn constitutes a 
practical system and a cognitive system that are marked by many defects.  
Fourth, we will reconsider Plato‟s assertion in light of all that was seen. We will show 
that the unexamined life is constitutively defective or bad because it is ruled by a drive that is 
unfit to rule and its way of seeing things is severely distorted. This prevents the ροπή from 
attaining the knowledge and the superlative good it desires. Hence, the unexamined life 
should be rejected and we should devote ourselves to philosophical examination, in order to 
attain truth and the superlative good. However, philosophical examination can have different 
outcomes and it faces several risks. Thus, we will close with the discussion of whether or not 
these variables may affect the imperative of philosophical examination and the rejection of 
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O objectivo desta dissertação é discutir a declaração de que “a vida não-examinada 
não é digna de ser vivida” (Apologia, 38a). Começaremos por considerar o modo como na 
Apologia tal vida está associada a falsas pretensões de saber, à auto-negligência, ao torpor e a 
uma felicidade meramente aparente. Em seguida, alargaremos a análise à totalidade do 
corpus platonicum, de modo a compreender melhor o que está implicado em tal perspectiva. 
Este alargamento inclui quatro momentos. 
Em primeiro lugar, analisaremos a concepção platónica de exame filosófico. Embora 
possa parecer que não há uma concepção unitária de exame no corpus (especialmente por 
culpa da diferença entre um tipo negativo e um tipo positivo de exame), veremos que o 
exame filosófico tem sempre como objecto teses ou convicções. Em geral, todos possuímos 
um complexo sistema de convicções e estas convicções podem conter muitos erros e 
distorções, os quais acabam por viciar qualquer exame positivo. Logo, temos de começar por 
verificar as convicções que já temos, e só então poderemos procurar novas teses. 
Em segundo lugar, consideraremos a constituição interna do nosso ser (i.e., da nossa 
ροπή) e veremos o modo como ela determina a estrutura geral de qualquer vida em particular 
(αίμξ). A ροπή tem uma estrutura cognitiva complexa e é essencialmente caracterizada pela 
procura de um bem superlativo. Um αίμξ é, portanto, um sistema de tensões práticas dirigido 
ao bem superlativo e baseado nas nossas convicções sobre o que é o bem e sobre como o 
alcançar. Além disso, a ροπή define-se por ter três pulsões constitutivas: o amor ao ganho, o 
amor à honra e o amor ao conhecimento (θζθμζμθία). Estas pulsões tentam controlar a 
procura do bem, têm sempre uma determinada relação de forças, e além disso contaminam-se 
ou transformam-se mutuamente – o que significa, entre outras coisas, que toda a nossa ροπή e 
toda a nossa vida estão marcadas pelo amor ao conhecimento. 
Em terceiro lugar, trataremos de descrever a constituição da vida não-examinada com 
base nas estruturas previamente identificadas. Veremos que, apesar de haver muitas 
modalidades diferentes de vida não-examinada, todas elas são todas caracterizadas pela 
prevalência de uma pulsão não-filosófica e por um fraco amor ao conhecimento – o que 
constitui sempre um sistema prático e um sistema cognitivo marcados por muitos defeitos. 
Por fim, reconsideraremos o enunciado de Platão à luz de tudo o que foi visto. 
Mostraremos que a vida não-examinada é constitutivamente defeituosa ou de má qualidade, 
visto que é governada por uma pulsão que não tem qualificações para governar e por ter uma 
perspectiva gravemente distorcida. Isto impede a ροπή de alcançar o conhecimento e o bem 
superlativo que ela deseja. Por conseguinte, a vida não-examinada deve ser rejeitada e 
devemos consagrar-nos ao exame filosófico, com vista a alcançar a verdade e o bem 
superlativo. Contudo, o exame filosófico pode ter diferentes resultados e enfrenta vários 
riscos. Terminaremos por isso a análise com a discussão do modo como estas variáveis 
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1. The radicalism of Socrates’ assertion about the value of an unexamined life and the 
problem of its meaning, foundations and validity  
 
 The problem to be discussed is raised by one of the most well-known assertions in the 
Platonic corpus, often used as a slogan for philosophical activity in general. The Apology of 
Socrates lets us know that “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being”.
3
 It is 
not clear whether the historical Socrates ever said such words or whether they are a perfect 
expression of his beliefs. Nevertheless, the assertion expresses in a compact and incisive 
manner a perspective on human life that is at the center of Plato‟s interpretation of the figure 
of Socrates. It is patent throughout the Apology and the more Socratic moments of Plato‟s 
writings, but it is not confined to those moments. The entire Platonic corpus can be read as a 
discussion of this assertion or as an extensive presentation of the case against the unexamined 
life. The criticism of the unexamined life and the appeal to examine oneself, others and life in 
general is a central moment of Plato‟s thought. 
 It is important to bear in mind from the start that these words are not uttered in 
ordinary circumstances. According to the Apology, Socrates is at risk of being sentenced to 
death for his dedication to examining himself and the others around him. Many had come to 
regard this form of constant examination as harmful to life and to the πόθζξ, and wanted to get 
rid of it. Socrates, however, does not falter. Instead of abandoning his ways, he remains 
faithful to the idea for which he lived and is ready to die for it. He also does not compromise. 
He does not try to convince others that his activity is harmless and that they should tolerate a 
certain degree of it in their lives. Instead, he turns his defense into a praise of his form of 
                                                 
2
 See F. SCHLEGEL, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol. 18, München/etc., Schöningh, 1963, 37. 
3
 Ap. 38a5-6: “(...) ὁ δὲ ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ μ὎ αζςηὸξ ἀκενώπῳ (...).” For now, we will follow T. West‟s 
translation of the passage (see T. WEST, Plato’s Apology of Socrates. An Interpretation, with a New 
Translation, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1979), but later we will consider its wording and meaning 
in more detail. See Chap. 3, Sect. 2.  
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examination (which we may call philosophical examination) and declares it the greatest good 
for any human being.
4
 At the same time, he counterattacks and reverses the accusation, 
thereby turning his ἀπμθμβία into a ηαηδβμνία. He opens a second trial – the trial of the 
unexamined life. Instead of letting it be, he identifies, isolates and questions such a life. And 
he does not stop here. He presses charges against it. The unexamined life is defective, 
inferior, undesirable, something to be avoided. It stands in absolute need of philosophical 
examination in order to overcome its defects and become a good life. Examination is thus an 
absolute value or at least the source of all value. Socrates is fully convinced of it and 
therefore he cannot compromise. He would rather die than accept a life deprived of 
philosophical examination. And this has nothing to do with a personal taste. His 
condemnation of the unexamined life is valid not only for all jurors and all Athenians of his 
time, but for all human beings. Socrates‟ words resonate through the ages and denounces all 
those who fail to examine themselves. 
 It is true that Socrates assertion has been read in different ways. It is often watered 
down and reduced to a call for more reflection, more critical thinking, and a more rational 
life. Such a version is relatively easy to subscribe to. However, it overlooks the fact that 
Socrates is saying more than that. He is making a radical claim, which he himself recognizes 
as surprising and hard to believe.
5
 As we will see, he is talking of an extreme form of 
philosophical examination, which may consume one‟s whole life (as it did his own), and 
which we not only do not perform, but would hardly accept performing. But he says we must, 
because without it life is not worth living. So one could borrow Callicles‟ words in Gorgias 
and say to Socrates that “(...) if you are in earnest, and these things you‟re saying are really 
true, won‟t this human life of ours be turned upside down, and won‟t everything we do 
evidently be the opposite of what we should do?”
6
 Socrates‟ view in the Apology is indeed 
counterintuitive and seems to be refuted by the facts. Many lead lives that are not dedicated 
to philosophical examination and there seems to be no problem with that. By criticizing those 
lives, Socrates can easily strike us as extremist, inflexible, intolerant and fanatic – even if we 
                                                 
4
 He says this precisely before passing judgment on the unexamined life. See 38a2-5: “(..) ηοβπάκεζ ιέβζζημκ 
ἀβαεὸκ ὂκ ἀκενώπῳ ημῦημ, ἑηάζηδξ ἟ιέναξ πενὶ ἀνεη῅ξ ημὺξ θόβμοξ πμζε῔ζεαζ ηαὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ πενὶ ὧκ ὏ιε῔ξ 
ἐιμῦ ἀημύεηε δζαθεβμιέκμο ηαὶ ἐιαοηὸκ ηαὶ ἄθθμοξ ἐλεηάγμκημξ (...)”. 
5
 See 38a6-8: “(...) ηαῦηα δ᾽ ἔηζ ἥηημκ πείζεζεέ ιμζ θέβμκηζ. ηὰ δὲ ἔπεζ ιὲκ μὕηςξ, ὡξ ἐβώ θδιζ, ὦ ἄκδνεξ, 
πείεεζκ δὲ μ὎ ῥᾴδζμκ.” 
6
 Grg. 481c: “εἰ ιὲκ βὰν ζπμοδάγεζξ ηε ηαὶ ηοβπάκεζ ηαῦηα ἀθδε῅ ὄκηα ἃ θέβεζξ, ἄθθμ ηζ ἠ ἟ι῵κ ὁ αίμξ 
ἀκαηεηναιιέκμξ ἂκ εἴδ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ ηαὶ πάκηα ηὰ ἐκακηία πνάηημιεκ, ὡξ ἔμζηεκ, ἠ ἃ δε῔;” I follow D. Zeyl‟s 
translation (see PCW). 
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happen to have philosophical interests. A good life does not seem to depend exclusively (and 
not even primarily) on the kind of examination Socrates had in mind.  
 But is it possible that Socrates knows something that we normally do not? Is there any 
truth to what he says? What is really the value of an unexamined life? And what need do we 
have for philosophical examination? This is the problem we must discuss. We must see what 
exactly does Socrates mean, what are the grounds for his judgment and whether it is valid or 
not. In other words, we must grab the Socrates of the Apology by the arm and force him to 
render an account of his assertion. In fact, we will try to grab Plato by the arm and force the 
Platonic corpus to render an account of this judgment of the unexamined life and of 
philosophical examination. But before considering how we plan to approach the corpus, it is 
important to develop a greater sensibility to the problem as such, to avoid handling it as a 
distant and abstract question, that concerns only what some ancient philosopher said.  
 
2. The relevance of the problem for human life 
 
 The problem concerning the value of the unexamined life and the need for 
philosophical examination is far from being irrelevant. It affects us very closely. It is an 
intimate problem of ours and we always have some relation to it (even if we hardly ever can 
formulate it as such). In a sense, the problem of the unexamined life is actually at the center 
of human life.
7
 We can better understand it if we briefly consider some aspects of our 
immediate understanding of the terms “life” and “examination”.  
Life as we experience it is a domain that encompasses everything that appears to us, 
but it has at its center a particular being that relates itself to itself, is interested in itself and 
wants the best for itself. This being (which we could also call the self) is not a mere spectator 
of his destiny. It must rather make its own path in life, and it is faced with many junctures or 
crossroads. In other words, it has always many possibilities to choose from. It does not matter 
here whether this choice is fully conscious and fully free or not. One must nevertheless define 
one‟s life at each step of the road, one must take a stance, and refusing to do so is already a 
form of defining one‟s life.  
                                                 
7
 The problem we will consider not only helps describe the kind of being that we are (namely, a being that is 
fundamentally faced with this problem), but its solution also determines the kind of being that we should be or 
what we should do with our life. In this sense, it is a fundamental problem of philosophical anthropology 
understood not in its usual strict sense (corresponding to a very particular discipline founded in the 20th 
century), but in the broadest sense possible, as the general consideration of the Kantian question “Was ist der 
Mensch?”, which may well be the basis of all other philosophical disciplines (or at least it may strongly 
influence them).  
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 Now, any decision we make is determined by our views or beliefs, but these are not 
infallible. They may contain many limitations, blind spots and distortions. In fact, we all 
made the experience of discovering defects in our views when we were fully convinced of 
them. This experience can in turn give rise to doubts and to the anticipation of further defects. 
But we are not condemned to accept our cognitive defects or our doubts without being able to 
do something about them. We can interrupt the regular course of life and dwell on things, 
review them, question them, or put them to test. In short, we can examine them or examine 
our views of them. We are aware of the possibility of examining things, we often embrace it 
and we know it has a certain degree of efficiency. It allows us to accelerate discoveries that 
would only be made later (perhaps at a much greater cost), or not at all. We can use it to 
overcome perceived limitations of our way of seeing things or even to confirm that there is no 
problem and we are seeing things correctly. Examination can thus help us make better 
choices in life and live a better life.  
 However, while we are examining, we cannot do other things and move on with our 
life. We cannot do everything at the same time, so if we examine, we end up losing other 
possibilities. We have to choose and this is in fact a fundamental juncture. At each moment, 
we must decide between acting based on our views or reviewing them. This applies both to 
any particular situation and to the whole of our life. We must decide between living an 
unexamined or an examined life, and in a way all other possibilities (all other junctures) 
depend on this one. Before deciding what to do or what to choose, we must decide whether or 
not we will examine our views of what can be done or how it can be done. If we do not 
examine, then we proceed according to our views and may regret it. If we do decide to 
examine, we may make a better choice or we may even end up redefining the practical 
juncture we had before us. But we always have to decide one way or the other. 
 To be sure, we do not expressly think about this alternative at all times nor are we 
usually aware of it as such. We tend not to think about it at all. But this does not mean we do 
not decide anything. Our decision is automatic or tacit. We have something like a 
predetermined strategy of examination, which is itself based on our own views. This strategy 
establishes that we do not need to carry out all possible examinations. Usually we only need 
to examine things when we are faced with strong doubts in an important matter and have time 
to examine. Our examinations are very restricted and this means our views, as well as our life 
in general, are mostly unexamined. We are concerned with many other things (namely, with 
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the practical junctures of life) and do not even think about whether we should examine 
everything or not. 
 It is thus difficult to realize that we are always taking a stance on whether we will 
examine or not and on whether we will live an unexamined life or not. However, even if we 
become explicitly aware of it, it is still not guaranteed that we will regard it as a serious 
problem and understand what is really at issue. We can conceive the terms of the alternative 
in light of the beliefs we already have and never truly examine what these beliefs imply. In 
other words, the problem can be posed and solved without ever leaving the unexamined life. 
It is in fact highly probable that, when faced with the question, we will settle it quickly and 
rashly, thereby solving all tension and difficulty it might involve.  
 Indeed, at first sight there seems to be no need of any intense form of examination. 
Life works just fine and the usefulness of examining things is very limited. We may perhaps 
recognize that it helped our personal development and the development of culture at some 
points, but that is mostly in the past. Now we do not need it anymore. If we were to start 
examining everything, it would only invade our life and prevent us from acting. More than 
that, it could even attack our practical beliefs (i.e., the beliefs that guide our life) and the 
meaning of everything. We could become entirely rudderless. But why should we put 
everything in question? It seems better to limit examination to those particular circumstances 
in which we have some important doubt (which is what we already do, anyway). 
 However, when we think like this, we probably assume that our practical beliefs are 
fundamentally sound. Our life is meaningful, its meaning is firm, and it will not collapse by 
itself. There is no serious defect that would call for a serious examination of our life and 
everything in it. Additionally, even if there was some defect, it is not clear for us that 
philosophical examination would bring a better life. It is not even clear it can produce any 
result. It can very well be an endless process. So why should we fully dedicate ourselves to 
it? For all the reasons just considered, an exacerbated form of examination seems rather 
useless and even harmful.  
However, we may question these reasons. Nothing guarantees that the most important 
examinations are already made, that examination cannot bring something better, or that the 
unexamined life is intrinsically meaningful and firm. The adoption of an unexamined life and 
the rejection of philosophical examination may be based on naive and unexamined 
assumptions about them. But the same may happen when we agree with Socrates, as we saw. 
We may do it based on a naive understanding of the problem and of what is implied in his 
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view. In sum, the fact that we have an immediate view on the matter does not mean we have 
solved it in a satisfactory manner – and it also does not mean that Plato does not have 
anything important to teach us. Socrates may be saying something less innocuous than it 
seems and his view may have the potential to unsettle our way of seeing things and our way 
of living. Therefore, we should not immediately reject (or accept) his assertion. It is 
important to dwell on it, try to find the best or strongest interpretation of it, and determine the 
arguments that could justify it.
8
 We need to see how it can put us and our whole lives in 
question. In other words, we need to examine Plato‟s assertion in such a way that at the same 
time we will be examining ourselves, our life and the role philosophy or philosophical 
examination may play in it.   
The importance of discussing the problem and considering Plato‟s treatment of it is 
thus a result of the problem‟s importance for our life. We need to decide between examining 
or going on with our life, and we will have to live with the consequences of what we decide. 
When we realize what we should have done, it may already be too late to do it. Or we may 
never discover it and lead a worthless life (even if we do not realize it). Given our interest in 
ourselves and in our own life, we do not want to make the wrong choice. Hence, we need to 
examine the question concerning the value of the unexamined life and of its opposite, for 
only so can we make an informed decision and be sure that we are not missing anything 
important. 
  
3. Scope and itinerary of the investigation 
 
 In order to discuss Socrates‟ assertion and the understanding of life it expresses we 
will start by considering what is said in the Apology of Socrates about the value of the 
unexamined life and the possible need for philosophical examination. Socrates‟ assertion 
represents the culmination of the arguments presented by Socrates during his three speeches 
and its meaning becomes clearer when we consider it in its context. In interpreting the 
Apology, we will not concern ourselves with the historical Socrates and with how faithful 
Plato‟s portrayal of him might be. We will simply consider the arguments put forward in the 
text and their relevance for understanding the perspectives underlying Socrates‟ assertion. As 
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 In other words, we need to apply the so-called “principle of charity” to it, and doing so is not just a matter of 
being respectful or fair to Plato, but is also something we should do in our best interest. We need to find the 
strongest arguments for Plato‟s case, so that we may benefit as much from its discussion as we can.  
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we will see, these arguments will provide us some important insights, but they also raise 
many questions for which we find no sufficient answer in the Apology. 
 However, the problem concerning the value of the unexamined life is not confined to 
this text, but rather pervades the entire Platonic corpus. It is particularly manifest in the 
moments when Socrates‟ trial is foreshadowed or when Plato presents the idea of an accurate 
judgment of our life.
9
 Yet, the question is present even when there is no explicit reference to 
judging the value of a life. The corpus is indeed full of examinations that try to oppose the 
general tendency of the unexamined life (which presupposes a certain appraisal of it) and 
many of them are directly relevant for determining the essence and value both of the 
unexamined life and of philosophical examination. The whole corpus can thus be read as a 
discussion in many voices of unexamined life and its opposite, or as we could also say, it 
presents a much longer version of the trial of the unexamined life. Throughout the texts many 
relevant testimonies are introduced and discussed, and their interaction results in a much 
more elaborate condemnation of the unexamined life and a much stronger appeal to 
philosophical examination. Our task then is to collect and order the testimonies scattered 
throughout the dialogues, in order to see in what way the unexamined life is not worth living, 
according to Plato.  
Thus, after considering the discussion of the problem in the Apology (Part I), we will 
divide it in four groups of questions and consider them in turn. For each question we will try 
to combine the relevant passages in the corpus and see what results from their combination. 
In Part II we will consider the conception of philosophical examination that is presented in 
the corpus. There are several discussions of it and some of them very different from one 
another, but we will try to organize them into a single project. In Part III we will determine 
the basic structures of our being (or of our life), which are what enables both the unexamined 
life and its opposite. In Part IV we will consider the unexamined life as such and see how it is 
formed and what characterizes it. We will then have all the elements necessary to properly 
discuss the meaning of Socrates‟ assertion. So in Part V we will consider Plato‟s appraisal of 
the unexamined life and the Platonic arguments for the necessity (or for an imperative, as we 
could also say) of philosophical examination.  
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 We find important references to Socrates‟ trial in Grg. 486a-b, 521b ff., Rep. 517a and Tht. 172c ff. Moreover, 
several dialogues take place immediately before, during or right after Socrates‟ trial, and are thus intimately 
connected with it. As for the idea of an accurate or perfect judgment of one‟s life, Plato tends to present it in 
mythological garments, as in Grg. 522e ff., Rep. 614b ff., Phd. 113d ff., and Phdr. 248c ff. The most “rational” 
discussion of it can be found in Republic IX (580a ff.). In general, the judge considers whether one led a just or 
an unjust life, but as we will see, for Plato the difference between these two kinds of life is intimately connected 
with the difference between a philosophical and a non-philosophical life.  
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4. The elusiveness of Plato, the problematic status of every interpretation and the 
hermeneutical decisions of the following inquiry 
 
Our discussion of the question concerning the value of the unexamined life will make 
constant reference to Plato, but this reference to Plato is far from being clear and 
uncontroversial. It is never easy to determine an author and his thought, but in Plato‟s case 
the interpreters face additional difficulties, which render the task of determining his thought 
almost (if not entirely) impossible. The Platonic corpus has a problematic status and it admits 
of very different readings. Plato‟s interpreters are thus required to decide for themselves how 
the texts are to be read and their decisions are never entirely warranted by the texts. It is 
important to be aware of this and so we will consider which features of Plato‟s writings 
render it so problematic and how this problematicity is reflected in the main currents of 
secondary literature on Plato. Then, in light of this, we will be able to discuss the particular 
decisions that shape the following inquiry and what status it claims for its results. 
 
4.1. The labyrinth of the corpus 
 
 Let us start by considering the main features of Plato‟s writings and the particular kind 
of interpretative problems posed by them. The texts that compose the corpus are not essays or 
treatises. They do not try to communicate the author‟s course of inquiry and his findings as 
honestly and clearly as possible. Plato rather hides himself and does not talk in his own 
voice.
10
 He writes dialogues in which he portrays different characters discussing among 
themselves, examining different questions, putting forward different views and often refuting 
them. But it is never clear how Plato relates to any of this. We do not know exactly what he 
thought. We can only have an indirect access to his mind and this requires us to determine 
how the dialogues and the characters therein are to be regarded. 
 One is naturally inclined to interpret the main speaker in each dialogue (i.e., the one 
that controls and apparently wins the discussion) as a mouthpiece or spokesperson for Plato. 
However, such an approach raises many issues. The main speaker is usually Socrates, but it is 
difficult to determine whether the depictions of him in the dialogues are fully compatible with 
each other or not. Then there is also the problem of how these depictions relate to the 
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 The only significant exception to this is probably the Seventh Letter (whose authenticity, however, has also 
been doubted). In it we find some indications about his life and his thinking (some of which we will consider 
below), but still it is very far from letting us understand what exactly his thought was.  
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historical Socrates. And are they to be interpreted in reference to the historical figure or rather 
in their own right? But putting all that aside, the Socrates depicted in the Platonic corpus is 
not easy to pin down. He does not communicate his views in a direct and straightforward 
manner. In many dialogues he cross-examines other characters and follows their lead. The 
questions and arguments he makes are adapted to these other characters‟ views, and are not 
necessarily an expression of his beliefs. In fact, he is for the most part an ironical or 
dissimulative character. He plays the fool and gives the impression he is hiding something.
11
 
But even when he puts forward views, he tends to add some sort of disclaimer. He says many 
times that they are only provisional claims, and other times he says they are something he 
heard from someone else, something he dreamt or the result of a sudden inspiration.
12
 At 
some points, he does seem to express views he is certain of, but he says that he will present 
only a simplified version.
13
 As a result, it is never completely clear what he thinks. Moreover, 
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 The value of Socratic εἰνςκεία is itself a problem and has given rise to many discussions. But we will not 
enter into that here. For more on the matter, as well as on the meaning of the words εἰνώκ and εἰνςκεία, see O. 
RIBBECK, Über den Begriff des Eiron, Rheinisches Museum 31 (1876), 381-400; W. BÜCHNER, Über den 
Begriff der Eironeia, Hermes 76 (1941), 339-358; R. SCHAERER, Le mécanisme de l‟ironie dans ses rapports 
avec la dialectique, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 48 (1941), 181–209; P. PLASS, Philosophical 
Anonymity and Irony in the Platonic Dialogues, American Journal of Philology 85 (1964), 254-278; Z. 
PAVLOVSKIS, Aristotle, Horace, and the Ironic Man, Classical Philology 63 (1968), 22-41; E. BURGE, The 
Irony of Socrates, Antichthon 3 (1969), 5-17; L. BERGSON, Eiron und Eironeia, Hermes 99 (1971), 409-422; 
W. BODER, Die sokratische Ironie in den platonischen Frühdialogen, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1973; D. ROLOFF, 
Platonische Ironie. Das Beispiel: Theaitetos, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1975; R. BURGER, Socratic Irony and 
the Platonic Art of Writing, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1978), 113-126; G. VLASTOS, Socratic 
Irony, Classical Quarterly 37 (1987), 79-96; D. HYLAND, Taking the Longer Road. The Irony of Plato‟s 
Republic, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 93 (1988), 317-335; S. KIERKEGAARD, The Concept of Irony. 
With Continual Reference to Socrates, transl. by H. Hong & E. Hong, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University 
Press, 1989 (original version: Om Begrebet Ironi med stadigt Hensyn til Socrates, Diss. Kopenhagen, 1841); P. 
GOTTLIEB, The Complexity of Socratic Irony. A Note on Professor Vlastos‟ Account, The Classical Quarterly 
42 (1992), 278-279; M. GELLRICH, Socratic Magic. Enchantment, Irony, and Persuasion in Plato‟s Dialogues, 
The Classical World 87 (1994), 275-307; D. ROOCHNIK, Socratic Ignorance as Complex Irony. A Critique of 
Gregory Vlastos, Arethusa 28 (1995), 39-52; J. GORDON, Against Vlastos on Complex Irony, Classical 
Quarterly 46 (1996), 131-137; A. NEHAMAS, The Art of Living. Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, 19-98; I. VASILIOU, Conditional Irony in the Socratic 
dialogues, Classical Quarterly 49 (1999), 456-72; D. BOUCHARD, L‟ironie socratique, Laval théologique et 
philosophique 57 (2001), 277-289; I. VASILIOU, Socrates‟ Reverse Irony, Classical Quarterly 52 (2002),   
220-230; C. GRISWOLD, Irony in the Platonic Dialogues, Philosophy and Literature 26 (2002), 84-106; J. 
CONSTÂNCIO, Imagens e Concepções da Vida Humana em Platão. Investigações sobre bios e psychē, Diss. 
Univ. Nova de Lisboa, 2005, 34ff.; M. MCCABE, Irony in the Soul. Should Plato‟s Socrates be Sincere?, In: M. 
TRAPP (ed.), Socrates, from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, Aldershot/etc., Ashgate, 2007, 17–32; D. 
WOLFSFORF, The Irony of Socrates, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65 (2007), 175-187; D. 
LEIBOWITZ, The Ironic Defense of Socrates. Plato‟s Apology, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 
2010; M. LANE, Reconsidering Socratic Irony, in D. MORRISON, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Socrates, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 237-259.  
12
 To give a few examples: Socrates admits the provisional character of the inquiries in Men. 86d ff. and Phd. 
107b; his views are attributed to a sudden blow of inspiration in Cra. 396d-e, 399a, 428c-d, and Phdr. 241e ff.; 
he talks of insights that came from dreams in Chrm. 173a, Cra. 439c ff., Tht. 201d ff., and Phlb. 20b; he 
presents views he heard from someone else in Men. 81a-b and Smp. 201d.  
13
 See e.g. Phdr. 246a and Rep. 506d-e. 
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to make matters worse, his whole character is mysterious and full of apparent 
contradictions.
14
 It is not easy to comprehend why he does what he does and says what he 
says. The Socrates of the dialogues is completely ἄημπμκ, both for the other characters and 
for the reader. 
 These problems are less accentuated in the case of the other main speakers (namely, 
the Visitor from Elea, Parmenides, Timaeus, Critias, the Athenian), though they are also 
somewhat ironical or dissimulative, and the views they put forward are also sometimes 
accompanied by disclaimers.
15
 But even if in some cases they present definite or settled 
views, we still cannot be sure that these are the views held by Plato. Moreover, we may take 
the views of the dominant speakers more seriously, but we cannot simply assume that all 
other views put forward by the non-dominant figures in the dialogues are to be disregarded as 
mere foils to the dominant views. They may very well contain important insights and we 
should not promptly dismiss them. Consequently, Plato‟s voice seems to become lost in a 
complex choir of dissonant views. We cannot immediately identify what he thinks, and it is 
perhaps best to try a different approach: instead of identifying Plato with any particular 
character, we should shift our attention to the interplay of views – i.e., to the conversation 
proper – and what results from it. We may then try to bring the different dialogues and their 
different moments together, in order to see what they say as a whole.
16
 But such an endeavor 
also faces many problems.  
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 There are many examples of this. For instance, he often declares he knows nothing (see e.g. Ap. 21d), and yet 
he seems to have very strong beliefs. Moreover, he claims not to know what ἀνεηή is (see e.g. Ap. 20b-c), but he 
seems to be portrayed as its perfect embodiment. His behavior in general is often a source of            
astonishment – especially the serene way in which he accepts his condemnation to death as a kind of “martyr” of 
philosophical examination. Ιn this respect, it is also important to bear in mind the explicit description of 
Socrates‟ strangeness (ἀημπία) made by Alcibiades in Smp. 215a ff. 
15
 Parmenides‟ long discussions are only meant as exercises (see Prm. 135c ff.). Timaeus offers no more than a 
plausible argument (εἰηὸξ θόβμξ – cp. 29b-d). The Visitor in the Sophist and the Statesman presents many 
different views on the same thing, though there seems to be some progress. It is also relevant that Socrates is 
present in some of these dialogues as a mostly silent character, which suggests that something else could be said 
or that the views put forward could perhaps be further examined. The Laws is perhaps the only exception, but 
the nameless Athenian is also mysterious and it is not clear if he says all that he (or the author) thinks about the 
matters at hand, or if he is only presenting a more popular version of his ideas. 
16
 This is not an easy task. One could say of it what Socrates said of Heraclitus‟ book: it requires a Delian 
swimmer in order to be fully understood. Cp. e.g. A. ADLER (ed.), Suidae Lexicon, vol. 3, Leipzig, Teubner, 
1933 (re-ed. Stuttgart, Teubner, 1967), Γ.400. Hamann, referring to this remark of Socrates, further elaborates 
the idea in his Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten by saying: “Ein Zusammenfluß von Ideen und Empfindungen in 
jener lebenden Elegie vom Philosophen machte desselben Sätze vielleicht zu einer Menge kleiner Inseln, zu 
deren Gemeinschaft Brücken und Fähren der Methode fehlten.” See J. HAMANN, Sämtliche Werke.  
Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, edited by J. Nadler, vol. 2, Wien, Thomas-Morus-Presse im Verl. Herder, 1950, 
61. The same applies to the Platonic corpus. The dialogues lack a specific order and so they are like an 
archipelago of scattered islands with no communication between them.  
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First, it is not clear that the dialogues themselves (the interplay of characters) are 
something conclusive and not just a sample of possible philosophical examinations. The 
portrayal of the conversations has indeed some important limitations, which render it rather 
incomplete. The dialogues presented in the texts are only intermediary stations, with 
provisional value. Whether fully fictional or not, they often refer to previous or subsequent 
conversations that are not part of the corpus.
17
 As for those conversations that are actually 
depicted in the corpus, they are also far from being exhaustive. They contain argumentative 
steps that are too quick or possibilities that are opened but not explored.
18
 In addition, some 
of the dialogues are presented as narrations of past conversations, which puts the 
conversation at a greater distance from us and raises the question about the reliability of the 
narrator, since the distance thus introduced may also introduce involuntary (and even 
voluntary) distortions.
19
 We must therefore ask ourselves if we can truly trust these narrations 
and how faithful they are supposed to be.  
To be sure, this is not enough to discredit the main views put forward in the texts, but 
we also come upon serious difficulties when we try to pin down what these main views are, 
since the corpus often provides views on the same topics that are inconsistent or even 
contradictory with one another. This is particularly evident in the aporetic dialogues, where 
all different attempts at answering a question are thwarted and one is invited to examine the 
matter further, either by searching for new solutions or by reexamining the attempts made to 
see if they might be corrected in some way. Something similar happens in the more positive 
(and apparently doctrinal) dialogues, if we consider them all together, in a dialogue of 
dialogues. We would hardly find a claim that is not contradicted somewhere else in the 
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 Sometimes we catch the conversation underway (as it happens in the Philebus and the Meno) and other times 
the characters allude to past conversations (as for instance when they talk about perplexities they have from past 
examinations of the matter – see e.g. Hp. Ma. 286c ff., Phlb. 36e). In some cases, there are parts of the 
conversation missing (as the discussion between Socrates, Aristophanes and Agathon at the end of the 
Symposium or part of the conversation between Socrates and Hippocrates in the Protagoras – see 223c-d and 
314c, respectively). As for the endings, they do not always coincide with a satisfactory resolution of the 
problem. Sometimes the examination must be abruptly interrupted (as in the Lysis or even the Euthyphro) and 
other times the text simply ends without following the conversation through to the end (see the finale of the 
Philebus, or of the Statesman, where the θζθόζμθμξ is still to be defined). All this leads us to realize that what 
we read in the corpus is intrinsically connected with a much vaster set of examinations of which the ones we 
come in contact with are only a small fraction. 
18
 In some cases, the text only provides a short version of an argument, which is promptly accepted or refused, 
without developing it in full. Sometimes there is an explicit reference or an allusion to what is being left aside. 
See e.g. Prt. 357b and Phlb. 33b-c. In other moments there is no reference at all – and it is up to the reader to 
realize that something is missing and to find out what. 
19
 Plato depicts such narrated conversations (which in some cases even took place many years before the 




corpus. Some of these contradictions are easier to spot than others, but an attentive reader 
would see how very different views (and often mutually exclusive) are simultaneously taken 
as correct or plausible in different texts.
20
 We are thus required to examine the views in 
conflict and see if they can be in some way conciliated and, if not, what their respective 
strengths are. As a result, we cannot easily say what exactly is the corpus affirming.
21
  
However, there is still more to be said. Aside from the inconsistencies, it also happens 
that the questions and views presented in the texts often have an unclear or cryptic content. 
There are several reasons for this. First, the characters (especially Socrates) often use images, 
allegories and myths to explain their views and persuade their interlocutors, and this 
introduces a great deal of imprecision.
22
 In fact, the use of different registers of language 
(colloquial, poetical, scientific, and so on) and the constant shift from one to the other renders 
many discussions particularly hard to follow. Another source of difficulties and imprecision 
is the fact that the corpus does not have a fixed terminology. The terms are often ambiguous 
and may be understood in different ways, depending on the context and who is using them. 
They are also frequently used as equivalents, without being clear if they coincide entirely or 
not.
23
 However, even when the mode of presentation and the language are not problematic, 
the views themselves may still be cryptic or insufficiently explained. 
Apart from all this, there is also the problem that many of the arguments defended and 
accepted during the discussions have a very questionable basis. Many arguments are based on 
analogies, inductions, probabilities, common sense or the beliefs of one interlocutor. Other 
arguments seem to misrepresent the views that are being examined and confirm or disprove 
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 Just to name a few examples (some of which we will discuss at a later stage): the soul is said to have parts in 
Rep. 435d ff., but in Phaedo it is said to be simple or non-composite (see 78b ff.); according to Theaetetus, 
when we are born, our soul is an empty receptacle (see 197e), but in Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus and Timaeus we 
are said to have recollections of things we saw before birth; in Crito, Socrates says he must either persuade or 
obey the law (see 51b), but in the Apology he seems to imply that he would never obey a law that would prohibit 
him from examining (cp. 29c ff.); in some texts (such as Cra. 430a ff., Rep. 509d ff., 596c ff., Sph. 234b ff.), 
Socrates criticizes images, but he constantly employs them. Moreover, we find several different (and perhaps 
incompatible) versions of the same “doctrine” (such as the doctrine of ideas, the doctrine of the parts of the soul, 
the doctrine of ἀηναζία) and some of these doctrines even seem (at least at first sight) to be incompatible with 
one another (such as the so-called intellectualism and the tripartition of the soul). These are just a few examples 
of the inconsistencies found throughout the texts, and their number increases if we consider not only the views 
directly stated, but also their presuppositions and consequences. 
21
 Cicero expresses this by saying that in Plato‟s books “(...) nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa 
disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur (...).” See Academicorum reliquiae cum Lucullo, I.12.46, in: 
O. PLASBERG, M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta qvae mansuervnt omnia, Fasc. 42, Leipzig, Teubner, 1922. 
22
 As Thomas Aquinas says, “(...) Plato habuit malum modum docendi. Omnia enim figurate dicit, et per 
symbola docet: intendens aliud per verba, quam sonent ipsa verba (...)”. See A. PIROTTA (ed.), Sancti Thomae 
Aquinatis In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium, Taurini, Marietti, 1925, 31 (liber I, lectio 8, 107). 
23
 This does not necessarily mean that one needs a fully univocal language (which may well be an artificial and 
unfruitful ideal) in order to be clear, but still one must be attentive to the ambiguity of the terms and try to 
account for it.  
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them too easily. At times the arguments seem to rest solely on the ambiguity of words and 
give the impression of being nothing more than word-play. Plato‟s writings are indeed full of 
glaring fallacies, which are in many cases passed off as sound arguments and accepted by the 
characters.
24
 These fallacies may be more or less conspicuous and they make any attentive 
reader wonder whether they are the result of the author‟s carelessness or incompetence, or 
whether they rather serve any particular purpose. Be that as it may, they are particularly 
disturbing and force us to reexamine all arguments that appear to be faulty, in order to see if 
these arguments have some validity after all.
25
 In addition, the fact that some fallacies are 
more evident should be enough to make us wary of possibility that there are other fallacies 
which we do not immediately notice, and therefore we should consider everything that is 
being said with increased attention. 
All these features prevent us from immediately identifying Plato‟s views. He is an 
ironical or dissembling author, who withholds his views and leaves us to wonder what he 
might have wanted to convey with such an elaborate and confusing play of perspectives. But 
this is not all. Even if we are able to bring some order and clarity into this chaos, we still have 
to come to grips with the criticism of the written word in the Phaedrus (274c ff.) and in the 
Seventh Letter (341b ff.). These two passages share many common traits and even a cursory 
reading of them lets us see how they undercut or disavow the corpus in its entirety, thereby 
rendering it even more problematic. 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates considers the value of writing by telling the story of its 
invention by Theuth and the subsequent appraisal of its benefits and drawbacks by the King 
of Egypt. This appraisal is then extended to all those who try to communicate knowledge or 
wisdom (ἐπζζηήιδ or ζμθία) by leaving writings behind. In the Seventh Letter Plato directly 
denies having written a treatise (ζύββναια) about the subjects he studies and he also argues 
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 Much has been written about this. See e.g. R. ROBINSON, Plato‟s Consciousness of Fallacy, Mind 51 (1942), 
97-114; M. COHEN, The Aporias in Plato‟s Early Dialogues, Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962), 163-74; 
R. SPRAGUE, Plato’s Use of Fallacy. A Study of the Euthydemus and Some Other Dialogues, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962; G. KLOSKO, Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the Protagoras, Archiv fur 
Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1979), 125-42; IDEM, Criteria of Fallacy and Sophistry for Use in the Analysis 
of Platonic Dialogues, Classical Quarterly 33 (1983), 363-374; IDEM, Plato and the Morality of Fallacy, 
American Journal of Philology 108 (1987), 612-26. 
25
 These fallacies can be used to quickly refute or confirm some claim. The characters sometimes reject weaker 
versions of claims that are defended – or at least play an important role – elsewhere (such as the definition of 
ζςθνμζύκδ as ηὰ ἑαοημῦ πνάηηεζκ, which is promptly rejected in Charmides 161b ff., but is used as the 
definition of justice, as well as the basis for the definition of ζςθνμζύκδ, in the Republic Ŕ 430d ff.). Plato also 
seems to use arguments that are very weak to establish something. But we should also not reject these claims too 
quickly. We have to bear in mind the so-called “fallacy fallacy”, which assumes that some claim is wrong 
simply because it was defended with the aid of a fallacy. But if a claim is correct and Plato used a fallacy to 
defend it, then it is up to us to find the best arguments to prove it.  
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that no one with knowledge would do so, since “it does not at all admit of verbal expression 
like other studies”.
26
 In both cases, Plato speaks of serious subjects about which one is in 
earnest (especially, what is just, fine, good).
27
 These subjects cannot be entrusted to writing 
because the written word is unable to convey anything clear or certain, as is stressed in the 
Phaedrus.
28
 In the Seventh Letter, besides talking about its unclearness, Plato goes further 
and ascribes the unreliability of writing to the weakness of language (ηὸ η῵κ θόβςκ ἀζεεκέξ). 
Λόβμξ is inaccurate and cannot communicate the essences of things, since it confuses their 
essence with their inessential qualifications.
29
 To make matters worse, writing is lifeless (as a 
painting), unalterable, unable to defend itself, silent when interrogated, and cannot choose 
whom it talks to.
30
 This makes it unable to teach others. If one relies on it, any doctrines will 
be misunderstood, thereby giving rise either to an arrogant semblance of knowledge or to 
unfair criticism.
31
 Therefore one should never entrust serious matters to the written word. The 




If we believe this description, then it seems the entire Platonic corpus can be no more 
than an amusement. It is nothing serious and should not be taken seriously. However, this is 
not the whole story. These passages also suggest that there is something like a serious 
doctrine, whose learning must nevertheless be something other than a direct reception of 
teachings.
33
 It also raises the question of whether written texts (and the dialogues in 
                                                 
26
 See 341c: “μὔημοκ ἐιόκ βε πενὶ α὎η῵κ ἔζηζκ ζύββναιια μ὎δὲ ιήπμηε βέκδηαζ· ῥδηὸκ βὰν μ὎δαι῵ξ ἐζηζκ ὡξ 
ἄθθα ιαεήιαηα (...).” I follow Bury‟s translation, in PLATO, Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, 
Epistles, transl. by R. Bury, Cambridge (MA)/London, Harvard University Press/William Heinemann, 1929.  
27
 Cp. Phdr. 276b-c, and especially Ep. VII, 344c: “δζὸ δὴ π᾵ξ ἀκὴν ζπμοδα῔μξ η῵κ ὄκηςκ ζπμοδαίςκ πένζ 
πμθθμῦ δε῔ ιὴ βνάραξ πμηὲ ἐκ ἀκενώπμζξ εἰξ θεόκμκ ηαὶ ἀπμνίακ ηαηαααθε῔. ἑκὶ δὴ ἐη ημύηςκ δε῔ βζβκώζηεζκ 
θόβῳ, ὅηακ ἴδῃ ηίξ ημο ζοββνάιιαηα βεβναιιέκα εἴηε ἐκ κόιμζξ κμιμεέημο εἴηε ἐκ ἄθθμζξ ηζζὶκ ἅηη᾽ μὖκ, ὡξ μ὎η 
ἤκ ημύηῳ ηαῦηα ζπμοδαζόηαηα, εἴπεν ἔζη᾽ α὎ηὸξ ζπμοδα῔μξ, ηε῔ηαζ δέ πμο ἐκ πώνᾳ ηῆ ηαθθίζηῃ η῵κ ημύημο.”  
28
 See 275c: “μ὎ημῦκ ὁ ηέπκδκ μἰόιεκμξ ἐκ βνάιιαζζ ηαηαθζπε῔κ, ηαὶ αὖ ὁ παναδεπόιεκμξ ὥξ ηζ ζαθὲξ ηαὶ 
αέααζμκ ἐη βναιιάηςκ ἐζόιεκμκ, πμθθ῅ξ ἂκ ε὎δεείαξ βέιμζ ηαὶ ηῶ ὄκηζ ηὴκ Ἄιιςκμξ ιακηείακ ἀβκμμ῔ (...).” 
29
 See 342a-343d, and in particular 342e-343a: “(...) ηαῦηα μ὎π ἥηημκ ἐπζπεζνε῔ ηὸ πμ῔όκ ηζ πενὶ ἕηαζημκ δδθμῦκ 
ἠ ηὸ ὂκ ἑηάζημο δζὰ ηὸ η῵κ θόβςκ ἀζεεκέξ.” For more on this distinction, cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 2.1 below. 
30
 See Phdr. 275d: “δεζκὸκ βάν πμο, ὦ Φα῔δνε, ημῦη᾽ ἔπεζ βναθή, ηαὶ ὡξ ἀθδε῵ξ ὅιμζμκ γςβναθίᾳ. ηαὶ βὰν ηὰ 
ἐηείκδξ ἔηβμκα ἕζηδηε ιὲκ ὡξ γ῵κηα, ἐὰκ δ᾽ ἀκένῃ ηζ, ζεικ῵ξ πάκο ζζβᾶ. ηα὎ηὸκ δὲ ηαὶ μἱ θόβμζ· δόλαζξ ιὲκ ἂκ 
ὥξ ηζ θνμκμῦκηαξ α὎ημὺξ θέβεζκ, ἐὰκ δέ ηζ ἔνῃ η῵κ θεβμιέκςκ αμοθόιεκμξ ιαεε῔κ, ἕκ ηζ ζδιαίκεζ ιόκμκ ηα὎ηὸκ 
ἀεί.” Cp. also Ep. VII 343a: “ὧκ ἕκεηα κμῦκ ἔπςκ μ὎δεὶξ ημθιήζεζ πμηὲ εἰξ α὎ηὸ ηζεέκαζ ηὰ κεκμδιέκα ὏π᾽ 
α὎ημῦ, ηαὶ ηαῦηα εἰξ ἀιεηαηίκδημκ, ὃ δὴ πάζπεζ ηὰ βεβναιιέκα ηύπμζξ.” 
31
 Cp. Phdr. 275a-b, 275e, and especially Ep. VII 341e-342a. 
32
 See Phdr. 276c: “μ὎η ἄνα ζπμοδῆ α὎ηὰ ἐκ ὕδαηζ βνάρεζ ιέθακζ ζπείνςκ δζὰ ηαθάιμο ιεηὰ θόβςκ ἀδοκάηςκ 
ιὲκ α὏ημ῔ξ θόβῳ αμδεε῔κ, ἀδοκάηςκ δὲ ἱηακ῵ξ ηἀθδε῅ δζδάλαζ.” See also 276d-e, and especially 276d1-2: “ἀθθὰ 
ημὺξ ιὲκ ἐκ βνάιιαζζ ηήπμοξ, ὡξ ἔμζηε, παζδζ᾵ξ πάνζκ ζπενε῔ ηε ηαὶ βνάρεζ, ὅηακ δὲ βνάθῃ (...).”  
33
 In the Phaedrus, Plato talks of a different kind of θόβμξ, which is written inside the soul of the learner and 
thus alive. See 276a. The method to impart this θόβμξ is δζαθεηηζηή (the ηέπκδ of conversation), as is said in 
276e. But we must bear in mind that Plato is also very critical of the oral word and its ability to convey truth (cp. 
e.g. Smp. 175d-e). Real teaching implies much study, effort and time. In the Seventh Letter, Plato says that “as a 
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particular) are absolutely useless for learning. Or can they have an indirect usage? The 
passages at issue do admit that written texts can be used as reminders, especially for old age – 
since in this case knowledge is already present in the soul (having been acquired in the past), 
though it is not immediately available.
34
 But more than that, these passages admit that 
writings can help someone who follows in the same track (ἴπκμξ) or “those that are able to 
discover truth with but little instruction” (ἔκδεζλζξ).
35
 Texts can contain traces of truth or 
instructions – some hints, glimpses, enigmas or prophecies that need interpretation. This is 
perhaps what we can find in the Platonic corpus: some indications of Plato‟s thought that still 
need to be developed.
36
  
However, it is not clear whether or not this is the right way of dealing with the corpus. 
The application to the whole corpus of the passages that criticize the written word is 
problematic – not only because they also seem to admit a positive usage of writing, but 
especially because these passages are also part of the corpus and, as such, the criticism also 
applies to them. They put themselves in question and are thus a particular instance of the liar 
paradox. This does not mean we can simply dismiss them, but we cannot accept them at their 
face value either. Consequently, we are left without clear instructions of how to deal with the 
texts. We do not know the author‟s views nor his intentions.
37
 
For all these reasons, we can understand why Plato was compared to an elusive swan 
which the interpreters cannot catch.
38
 His writings are a confusing maze of which we do not 
                                                                                                                                                        
result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it [namely, the knowledge of the 
subjects Plato studies] is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, and 
thereafter it nourishes itself”. See 341c-d: “(...) ἐη πμθθ῅ξ ζοκμοζίαξ βζβκμιέκδξ πενὶ ηὸ πν᾵βια α὎ηὸ ηαὶ ημῦ 
ζογ῅κ ἐλαίθκδξ, μἷμκ ἀπὸ πονὸξ πδδήζακημξ ἐλαθεὲκ θ῵ξ, ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ βεκόιεκμκ α὎ηὸ ἑαοηὸ ἢδδ ηνέθεζ”. It 
also requires a certain character or inner disposition (a ροπὴ πνμζήημοζα, as is said in Phdr. 276e), which 
encompasses both intellectual and moral qualities. See in particular Ep. VII 343e-344b. 
34
 See Phdr. 275d and 276d. In Letter VII, however, Plato says that even that would not be necessary (see   
344d-e). 
35
 See Phdr. 276d: “(...) βνάρεζ (...) ηαὶ πακηὶ ηῶ ηα὎ηὸκ ἴπκμξ ιεηζόκηζ (...)”. See also Ep. VII 341e: “ἀθθ᾽ μὔηε 
ἀκενώπμζξ ἟βμῦιαζ ηὴκ ἐπζπείνδζζκ πενὶ α὎η῵κ θεβμιέκδκ ἀβαεόκ, εἰ ιή ηζζζκ ὀθίβμζξ ὁπόζμζ δοκαημὶ ἀκεονε῔κ 
α὎ημὶ δζὰ ζιζην᾵ξ ἐκδείλεςξ (...).” 
36
 In this sense, we can appreciate the aptness of Antiphanes‟ comparison of the Platonic writings to frozen 
words, which can only be thawed and heard after a long time (i.e., after much examination). See PLUTARCH, 
Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus, in: F. BABBITT (ed.), Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 1, Cambridge 
(MA), Harvard University Press, 1927, 79a 1-8: “ζοιααίκεζ δὴ ηὸ ημῦ Ἀκηζθάκμοξ, ὅ ηζξ εἶπεκ ἐπὶ η῵κ 
Πθάηςκμξ ζοκήεςκ. ὁ βὰν Ἀκηζθάκδξ ἔθεβε παίγςκ ἔκ ηζκζ πόθεζ ηὰξ θςκὰξ ε὎εὺξ θεβμιέκαξ πήβκοζεαζ δζὰ 
ρῦπμξ, εἶε‟ ὕζηενμκ ἀκζειέκςκ ἀημύεζκ εένμοξ ἅ ημῦ πεζι῵κμξ δζεθέπεδζακ· μὕης δὴ ὏πὸ Πθάηςκμξ ἔθδ κέμζξ 
μὖζζκ ἔηζ θεπεέκηςκ ιόθζξ ὀρὲ ημὺξ πμθθμὺξ αἰζεάκεζεαζ βὲνμκηαξ βεκμιέκμοξ.”  
37
 The problem is made worse by the fact that we do not know the author‟s intentions behind writing the 
dialogues – that is, whether they are meant to be ways of promoting or divulging philosophy, preparations for 
philosophical studies, or even a sort of textbooks for the Academy. 
38
 See L. WESTERINK (ed.), Olympiodorus. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, Amsterdam, North 
Holland, 1956 (repr. Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1982), 2.156-162: “πμθθμὺξ ημίκοκ ἐναζηὰξ α὏ημῦ ηαηαζηήζαξ ηαὶ 
πθείζημοξ ὠθεθήζαξ, ιέθθςκ ηεθεοη᾵κ ἐκύπκζμκ εἶδεκ ὡξ ηύηκμξ βεκόιεκμξ ἀπὸ δέκδνμο εἰξ δέκδνμκ 
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have a map nor an overview.
39
 We are lost in the middle of it, trying to find an exit. There is 
no ὁδὸξ ααζζθζηή to the meaning of the corpus. It is not clear what the writings are meant to 
say – and still it is very hard to bring oneself to believe that they are no more than a vain 
amusement (παζδζά). There is always the suggestion of a different meaning, which lies 
elsewhere, and we must exert ourselves, if we want to reach it. In this sense, the texts call for 
and strongly stimulate interpretation or examination.
40
 They require a very particular 
participation of the reader, who is called to decide how things are to be interpreted. We have 
to take part in the dialogues and keep writing them. Although the same could in a way be said 
of all interpretations, it applies in a greater degree to Plato, given the fact of how opaque he is 
as an author and how indeterminate everything becomes as a result of this opaqueness. 
 
4.2. The labyrinth of readings of Plato 
 
 The complexity of the Platonic corpus has given rise to innumerable interpretations. 
Many of these are general interpretations of Plato‟s thinking, others restrict themselves to 
some text or problem – though they may still presuppose a certain understanding of the whole 
and how the part they focus on relates to it. A full enumeration and systematization of the 
manifold understandings of the Platonic corpus is very difficult and we will not undertake it 
here. We will simply consider some of the main currents of interpretation, in order to see how 
problematic the corpus can be. These currents have often been influenced by general 
philosophical tendencies and they have all been object of much criticism, but we will leave 
                                                                                                                                                        
ιεηένπεηαζ ηαὶ ηαύηῃ πόκμκ πθε῔ζημκ πανε῔πε ημ῔ξ ἰλεοηα῔ξ. ὃ ΢ζιιίαξ ὁ ΢ςηναηζηὸξ ἔηνζκεκ, ὅηζ ἄθδπημξ ἔζηαζ 
ημ῔ξ ιεη‟ α὎ηὸκ ἐλδβε῔ζεαζ αμοθμιέκμζξ α὎ηόκ· ἰλεοηα῔ξ βὰν ἐμίηαζζ μἱ ἐλδβδηαὶ ηὰξ ἐκκμίαξ η῵κ ἀνπαίςκ 
εδν᾵ζεαζ πεζνώιεκμζ, ἄθδπημξ δέ ἐζηζκ ἐπεζδὴ ηαὶ θοζζη῵ξ ηαὶ ἞εζη῵ξ ηαὶ εεμθμβζη῵ξ ηαὶ ἁπθ῵ξ πμθθαπ῵ξ 
ἐζηὶκ ἀημύεζκ η῵κ α὎ημῦ, ηαεάπεν ηαὶ η῵κ ὇ιήνμο.” See also L. WESTERINK (ed.),                        
Anonymous Ŕ Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1962, 1.29-35. 
39
 What is said about the course of a particular examination in the Euthydemus (291b7-c2) aptly describes what 
happens when we try to interpret the whole corpus: “(…) ἐκηαῦεα ὥζπεν εἰξ θααύνζκεμκ ἐιπεζόκηεξ, μἰόιεκμζ 
ἢδδ ἐπὶ ηέθεζ εἶκαζ, πενζηάιρακηεξ πάθζκ ὥζπεν ἐκ ἀνπῆ η῅ξ γδηήζεςξ ἀκεθάκδιεκ ὄκηεξ ηαὶ ημῦ ἲζμο δεόιεκμζ 
ὅζμοπεν ὅηε ηὸ πν῵ημκ ἐγδημῦιεκ.” 
40
 In other words, they lead us to perform something and not simply to receive ideas. In Kierkegaardian terms, 
they are not a direct communication of contents, but rather a indirect communication of an art or a     
competence – namely, the art of philosophical examination. They try to awaken us and mobilize us, and in this 
sense Plato himself is also a sort of gadfly. For Kierkegaard‟s notion of direct and indirect communication, see 
in particular his notes for a course with the title “The Dialectic of Ethical and Ethical-Religious 
Communication”, in: S. KIERKEGAARD, Journals and Papers, transl. by H. Hong and E. Hong, vol. 1, 
Bloomington/London, Indiana University Press, 1967, 273-308 (VIII 2 B 79-89). 
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those questions aside and see only the main strategies of interpretation and how much they 
differ from each other.
41
  
The different readings are often organized in main dichotomies, but there are also 
attempts to find middle grounds or “third ways” that may combine the advantages of two 
alternate readings. The major and oldest dichotomy in the study of Plato (and one that shows 
just how ambiguous the corpus is) is the one between the skeptic and the dogmatic reading of 
Plato. The skeptic reading inspired the New Academy, is reflected in Cicero‟s interpretation 
of Plato and has been revived in the last decades.
42
 Based on the problems mentioned above, 
this tradition holds that the Platonic corpus conveys no definite truth whatsoever. It is rather 
supposed to show us our own ignorance and possibly help in one‟s own search for the      
truth – though it may also be interpreted as a defense of the argument that truth is 
unattainable. 
 Plato‟s studies, however, have been largely dominated by the dogmatic reading, which 
defends that the texts put forward clear-cut doctrines and perhaps even a system of 
knowledge. We find this conception already in Aristotle, who refers to the main views of the 
dialogues simply as Plato‟s views, and in other ancient authors (such as Alcinous – or 
Albinus – and Diogenes Laertius).
43
 Since the 18th century there has been a revival of this 
conception and many efforts were made to determine Plato‟s doctrines. However, the elusive 
nature of the corpus has caused many problems and has divided the dogmatic interpretation 
into two camps. On the one hand, there are the unitarians, who defend that the corpus has 
coherent and univocal doctrines, which constitute a single system.
44
 But this does not square 
easily with the disagreements we find through the texts and thus many adopted a 
                                                 
41
 There have been several attempts to systematize the different currents of interpretation. For more detailed 
analyses, see e.g. E. TIGERSTEDT, Interpreting Plato, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1977, G. REALE, Per 





), 31-74; F. GONZALEZ, A Short History of Platonic Interpretation and the “Third Way”, in: 
IDEM (ed.), The Third Way. New Directions in Platonic Studies, Lanham (MD)/London, Rowman & Littlefield, 
1995, and G. PRESS, The State of the Question in the Study of Plato, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 
(1996), 507-532. 
42
 For more on the ancient skeptical interpretation of Plato, see e.g. E. TIGERSTEDT, op. cit., 103-105; H. 
TARRANT, Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge 
University Press, 1985; J. ANNAS, Plato the Sceptic, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. (1992), 
43-72. For recent skeptic readings of Plato, see for instance D. HYLAND, Finitude and Transcendence in the 
Platonic Dialogues, Albany (NY), State University of New York Press, 1995; K. VOGT, Belief and Truth. A 
Skeptic Reading of Plato, Oxford/etc., Oxford University Press, 2012.  
43
 See e.g. P. LOUIS (ed.), Albinos Ŕ Epitomé, Paris, Belles Lettres, 1945, and DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Vitae 
Philosophorum, III (especially III.52 ff.). 
44
 For a defense of the unity of Plato‟s thought, see in particular P. SHOREY, The Unity of Plato’s Thought, 
Chicago, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1903, and IDEM, What Plato Said, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1933.  
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developmentalist approach, according to which Plato changed his mind and his views 
throughout his philosophical career. One would be able to solve many of the inconsistencies 
of the corpus by distinguishing between earlier works (in which Plato was more influenced 
by Socrates), mature works (in which he distanced himself of Socrates‟ views), and later 
works (in which he became critical of his own mature views).
45
 Plato‟s biography and 
especially the chronology of his works thus became very important, since they helped 
determine the precise development of the doctrines. These, however, are very contested 
issues. The knowledge of his life is vague and the order of the texts is very problematic. 
Some scholars tried to solve the latter question once and for all by means of a stylometric 
analysis, whose results have been largely accepted. But it has also been object of some 




 Another question that is particularly important in the context of the developmentalist 
interpretation (though not only in this context) is the Socratic question. Who was the 
historical Socrates, what were his thoughts and his character, and how faithful is Plato‟s 
portrayal of him, especially in the early works, which are supposed to be more strongly 
influenced by the real Socrates? We cannot solve the question based on the Platonic corpus, 
and though we find other portrayals of him in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and the fragments of 
other Socratics, it is in no way easy to infer from these sources who Socrates was and how 
faithful Plato‟s version of him is.
47
 As a result, it is also difficult to determine what 
distinguishes Socrates from Plato and what is specifically Platonic. 
                                                 
45
 For examples of this kind of approach, see e.g. R. ROBINSON, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1953; J. RAVEN, Plato’s Thought in the Making. A Study of the Development of his Metaphysics, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965; J. GOULD, The Development of Plato’s Ethics, New York, 
Russell & Russell, 1972; G. KLOSKO, The Development of Plato’s Political Theory, New York/etc., Methuen, 
1986. The idea that Plato‟s thought had several phases was originally associated with a genetic approach to 
Plato‟s writing, which was mainly concerned with Plato‟s biography and how it related to his writings. For a 
conspectus of such approach, cp. E. TIGERSTEDT, op. cit., 25-51. 
46
 Indeed, the results from stylometric studies of Plato are not entirely unanimous. There is a fixed point (the 
Laws) and then some groups of texts that share similar aspects of style. The groups may be ordered in sequence, 
but the whole analysis is based on several questionable assumptions. For a discussion of the method and for 
criticisms of it, see e.g. H. THESLEFF, Studies in Platonic Chronology, Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 
1982; IDEM, Platonic Chronology, Phronesis 34 (1989), 1-26; G. LEDGER, Re-Counting Plato. A Computer 
Analysis of Plato‟s Style, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989; L. BRANDWOOD, The Chronology of 
Plato’s Dialogues, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 1990; J. HOWLAND, Re-reading Plato. The 
Problem of Platonic Chronology, Phoenix 45 (1991), 189-214; D. NAILS, Platonic Chronology Reconsidered, 
Bryn Mawr Classical Review 3 (1992), 314-27; C. KAHN, On Platonic chronology, in: J. ANNAS and C. 
ROWE (eds.), New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient, Washington D.C., Center for Hellenic Studies, 
2002, 93-127.  
47
 Many attempts were made to determine the views and the way of being of the real Socrates, but the results 
differ greatly. Interpreters often refer to Aristotle‟ differentiation of Socrates and Plato, but it is not absolutely 
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 In sum, both the unitarian and developmentalist orientations are problematic and far 
from being fully persuasive. This lead to some attempts at a conciliation, which talk neither 
of a static system nor of a complete change of views, but rather of an unfolding or deepening 
of some basic ideas and doctrines (although in doing so, these interpretations still assume that 
the corpus has a dogmatic character). Other interpreters, in turn, have departed from the 
dogmatic model and adopted a more skeptic approach, according to which the corpus does 
not aim at conveying a system of doctrines. These approaches, however, vary greatly in the 
way they interpret the corpus and in the results they achieve. Many of them still admit that 
Plato had firm beliefs, doctrines and perhaps even a system – but it is not communicated in 
the corpus (or at least not directly). 
 One of these interpretations was developed mainly by the so-called Tübingen school, 
which holds that Plato had esoteric doctrines which he did not communicate in the corpus 
(the unwritten doctrines or ἄβναθα δόβιαηα mentioned by Aristotle), but were rather 
transmitted by oral teaching.
48
 This makes the inconsistencies of the texts compatible with the 
idea of a Platonic system, insofar as the system is not presented (just alluded to) in the written 
texts. In fact, we find several passages in the corpus in which the characters (especially 
Socrates) explicitly hold something back and there are also the passages in which Plato says 
                                                                                                                                                        
clear whether Aristotle is referring to the historical Socrates or the Socrates from early dialogues. The lines are 
blurred and this allows some to see Plato‟s portrayal as being very faithful and others to regard it as very 
inaccurate. See e.g. S. KIERKEGAARD, The Concept of Irony. With Continual Reference to Socrates, transl. 
by H. Hong & E. Hong, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press, 1989 (original version: Om Begrebet Ironi 
med stadigt Hensyn til Socrates, Diss. Kopenhagen, 1841); H. MAIER, Sokrates. Sein Werk und seine 
geschichtliche Stellung, Tübingen, Mohr 1913; J. BURNET, Greek Philosophy. Part I: Thales to Plato, London, 
Macmillan, 1914, 126-192; A. TAYLOR, Socrates, Boston, Beacon Press, 1951; V. de               
MAGALHÃES-VILHENA, Le problème de Socrate. Le Socrate historique et le Socrate de Platon, Paris, 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1952; G. FIGAL, Sokrates, München, Beck, 1995. For a history of the Socratic 
problem, see e.g. L.-A. DORION, The Rise and Fall of the Socratic Problem, in: D. MORRISON, The 
Cambridge Companion to Socrates, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 2011, 1-23. 
48
 Cp. ARISTOTLE, Physica 209b14f. For some examples of this interpretation, belonging to or directly 
connected with the Tübingen school, see e.g. H. KRÄMER, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles. Zum Wesen und 
zur Geschichte der platonischen Ontologie, Heidelberg, Winter, 1959; K. GAISER, Platons Ungeschriebene 
Lehre, Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1963; H. KRÄMER, Platone e i fondamenti della metafisica. Saggio sulla teoria 
dei principi e sulle dottrine non scritte di Platone, trans. by Giovanni Reale, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1982; G. 
REALE, Per una nuova interpretazione di Platone. Rilettura della metafisica dei grandi dialoghi alla luce delle 
“Dottrine non scritte”, Milano, CUSL, 1984; T. SZLEZÁK, Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie. 
Interpretationen zu den frühen und mittleren Dialogen, Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1985; R. FERBER, 
Die Unwissenheit des Philosophen oder warum hat Plato die “ungeschriebene Lehre” nicht geschrieben?, 
Sankt Augustin, Academia, 1991; T. SZLEZÁK, Das Bild des Dialektikers in Platons späten Dialogen. Platon 
und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie, Teil II, Berlin/New York, De Gruyter, 2004. For other interpretations of 
Plato‟s unwritten doctrines, see for instance L. ROBIN, La théorie Platonicienne des idées et des nombres 
d’après Aristote, Paris, Félix Alcan, 1908; J. FINDLAY, The Written and the Unwritten Doctrines, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.  
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that one should not write down the most serious things (ηὰ ζπμοδαζόηαηα).
49
 If we are to 
understand Plato, we should then read his texts in light of these doctrines, which requires us 
to reconstruct them. The attempts at reconstruction often use other sources. Aristotle provides 
some indications as to what these doctrines might have them, whereas Plotinus and other 
Neoplatonics have been read as a development of Plato‟s hidden doctrines. Some interpreters 
have also tried to use the corpus in this inquiry, insofar as some passages can be taken as 
alluding to these doctrines.
50
 But the precise content of these doctrines is unclear.
51
 The 
reconstructions are vague, their validity and interest is questionable, and some even contest 
the existence of such doctrines. So it is doubtful whether the corpus should (or even could) be 
read in light of them. Moreover, even if such doctrines existed and the dialogues were just 
meant as protreptic or preparatory works, we could still read them by themselves and see 
what we can learn from them. We are not forced to read them in reference to any unwritten 
doctrines. 
 Another very important kind of interpretation of the dialogues is the one that pays 
special attention to the literary form of the dialogues and in particular to their dramatic 
context (the setting, the characters, the situation, and so on). Literary or poetical aspects of 
the text had already played an important role in the old allegorical or figurative reading of the 
dialogues, which was characteristic of Neoplatonic interpreters. It saw many elements in the 
text as symbolic, meant to conceal the real meaning of the texts (i.e., Plato‟s real doctrines) 
from the public.
52
 In modern times, Schleiermacher was one of the first to call the attention to 
how inseparable the form and the content of the dialogues are.
53
 This was developed by 
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several authors, especially in the second half of the 20th century, in ways that greatly differ 
from the old allegorical interpretation. The so-called “Chicago school” is perhaps the main 
exponent of this orientation. Following Leo Strauss‟ example, many interpreters focused their 
attention on the dramatic aspects of the texts and what they can reveal about Plato‟s 
thought.
54
 This line of interpretation is also characterized by the idea that the texts have a 
hidden or deeper meaning, which is not immediately accessible, and thus requires a very 
refined hermeneutical analysis of all these elements. This does not necessarily imply that 
Plato has definite doctrines. Such interpretations can also be skeptic or wholly unconcerned 
with Plato‟s doctrines as such. They can read each dialogue not as a disguised treatise, but 
rather as a literary work in which different characters present different views, according to 
different motivations, and whose interplay leaves open what exactly the solution to the 
presented problems is. 
 Some interpreters have also defended that Plato‟s writings do not put forward 
doctrines, but rather try to point to something that is in itself ineffable or inexpressible. Some 
talk of a non-propositional knowledge or understanding which has more of a practical 
nature.
55
 Others talk of an ineffable experience and develop a more mystic interpretation of 
the corpus.
56
 These are just two examples of a kind of reading which is skeptic about the 
possibility of expressing truth directly (in fact, it even declares it impossible), but still 
believes the corpus communicates some kind of understanding or experience. 
 Other kinds of interpretation could be mentioned, especially in the domain of        
post-modern interpretations of Plato, which are usually more concerned with bringing Plato 
into a dialogue with contemporary thinking.
57
 But the different currents of interpretation 
mentioned are enough to show how difficult it is to determine the best way to deal with 
                                                                                                                                                        
Begränzungen, wie ihn Platon aufgestellt hat, recht zu verstehen.” Cp. PLATON, Werke, transl. by F. 
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Plato‟s writings. In fact, they raise many important questions. To begin, what is the most 
appropriate kind of reading? And what is the criterion to decide which one is best? Can such 
a criterion be established? Is there really a best kind of reading? If so, what does that mean 
for the other readings? Do they still have some interest? And what if no particular reading is 
the best? The answer to such questions is difficult. But, as we saw, the texts come without an 
instruction manual and do not allow us to decide how to read them. This means that none of 
the above interpretations is fully justified or fully excluded by the corpus. Interpreters must 
decide by themselves how they will proceed, based on criteria other than the texts. This does 
not mean that one is completely free to do what one wants with the texts. Interpreters must 
still be faithful to the indications given in the text, as well as to the immanent principles of 
their own interpretation. But as to the principles of interpretation, the corpus offers a great 
degree of leeway. It does not tell us what to do and it does not say how we can be faithful to 
the texts. It rather forces us to decide how we interpret everything in it.  
 
4.3. The procedure and status of the following interpretation 
 
 So how will we proceed in what follows? How will we discuss the problem 
concerning the value of the unexamined life in light of the corpus? How can we best interpret 
the problem in Plato‟s own terms and the full potential of his claim?   
Our approach will differ from the previously considered interpretations in several 
important respects. We will not try to determine whether Plato was a dogmatist or a skeptic. 
In fact, we will not be concerned with the status of Plato‟s writings and how they relate to the 
historical Socrates or to an oral teaching. We will also disregard any biographical question, as 
well as the motivations and intentions behind the texts. Since the texts are not univocal, we 
will not try to determine Plato‟s beliefs and the best way to formulate them. We will thus not 
consider whether there was some development in Plato‟s views or not. Regardless of the 
order of the dialogues and Plato‟s beliefs at the time he wrote them, there are many 
indications, many ideas and even a play of ideas – and this is what we will focus. More 
precisely, we will consider the texts and the ideas expressed therein in light of a problem and 
the questions directly associated with it. We will search for, collect and order any relevant 
indications given in the texts. Some attention will be given to the context of each passage, 
though such a synoptic approach necessarily implies loss of detail. We will try to determine 
how the different indications given by the texts may complement each other. When they are 
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in conflict with one another, we will try to conciliate them or at least determine the basis of 
the conflict. This will allow us to pin down some general tendencies of the Platonic corpus, 
which we will bring together and discuss, thereby producing a certain unification of the texts. 
However, such a unity will not correspond to an absolutely defined system of 
doctrines. It will contain inner tensions, elements that resist the general scheme, and some 
important questions that are left undecided or unjustified. Moreover, the results we will arrive 
at (and which will partially unify the texts) are not to be conceived as the reconstruction of a 
body of beliefs the author tried to communicate to us, but they are rather the product of a 
particular reflection concerning the indications he left behind in his writings. This reflection 
is shaped by the choices of the interpreter (i.e., by a certain selection, ordering and 
development of the passages and ideas in the corpus, as well as by the methodology discussed 
below), and different choices could produce a different final result. Whether any of these 
results correspond to Plato‟s beliefs or not (or to what extent they do) cannot be decided with 
certainty in virtue of all the difficulties considered above. We cannot be sure of what Plato 
had in mind. But this is not all that matters. Even if we knew Plato‟s own views and how 
convinced he was of them, we could still use the corpus and the play of ideas therein as a 
basis for new reflections, which would perhaps not be of historical or doxographical interest, 
but would nonetheless be of philosophical interest, because they would allow us to think 
about things and discover new ways of conceiving them. The corpus and its indications are in 
all cases a catalyst for new perspectives, and the following interpretation is above all 
concerned with the new perspectives we can arrive at with the help from the texts. In this 
sense, it is a philosophical (and not an historical or doxographical) interpretation. So it must 
be judged not by how plausible a reconstruction of Plato‟s beliefs it puts forward, but by how 
faithful it is to the indications found in the texts and how it is able to extract from them a 
complex and plausible discussion of philosophical problems that concern us all. It will not 
simply report what we find in the texts, but it will also not depart completely from them. It is 
a philosophical reflection born from the contact with the Platonic corpus and it intends to 
illuminate both what is said in the texts and who we as human beings are. 
 Finally, it is necessary to remark that some formulations in what follows may be 
misleading. We will often talk of Plato and his conceptions, but “Plato” is to be regarded 
simply as the author of the corpus or, more precisely, as the standpoint that corresponds to the 
play of ideas in the texts. In other others, the name “Plato” and the qualification “Platonic” 
will only refer to the indications that are found in the texts and also, in a secondary sense, to 
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the development of these indications, which is the result of Plato‟s writings and in this sense 
can be attributed to him. We will talk of Plato‟s conceptions, but not in the sense of 
something the historical Plato would undeniably subscribe. As was said, the conceptions we 
will consider are rather conceptions we can extract from Plato‟s writings.  
 
5. The relevance of the problem for the interpretation of the Platonic corpus and for the 
definition of philosophy in general 
  
 The problem concerning the value of the unexamined life lies at the center of the 
corpus. Many passages are more or less directly concerned with the relation between life and 
philosophical examination, and in these passages the characters discuss what characterizes a 
life that lacks examination, as well as what this examination can bring to life and how it can 
change it. Moreover, even when it is not expressly discussed, Plato is still depicting people 
that have different relations to philosophical examination. These relations affect the 
characters‟ lives in different ways and presuppose different views (which may be either naive 
or already examined) about the importance of philosophical examination. Thus the problem 
of the unexamined life is essential to understand not only the figure of Socrates as he is 
presented in the corpus, but also all other characters and the play of thoughts that compose 
the dialogues. In other words, Plato‟s writings are not just a presentation of abstract views 
about different subjects. They depict the examination that leads to these views and how this 
examination relates to the lives of the characters. Plato is very mindful of philosophical 
examination as the instrument and place of thought, and also of how this examination is 
integrated in a particular life and determined by it. The examinations illustrated in the corpus 
are thus associated with a reflection about life‟s structure, what it needs and what role 
philosophy plays therein. In other words, the concern with life and philosophy‟s place in it is 
not just one more aspect or view among others. It is not simply a matter of exhortation to 
philosophy not directly connected with the other views. It is rather something that is at the 
center of the corpus. All other problems and views are, either expressly or tacitly, 
intrinsically connected with the problem we will discuss. Their content and relevance can 
only be fully understood in light of this. Furthermore, many of these other problems and 
views, despite not being directly referred to the structure of life and its need of philosophical 
examination, give important contributions to the discussion of these questions. There is 
indeed a reciprocal relation between the different parts, despite the fact that the problem we 
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will tackle can be seen as a key to understanding what is happening at the corpus. Regardless 
of whether this is the only or the best key, it is definitely an important angle through which 
we can determine the whole. 
The role of the problem in Plato can also be seen as an illustration of how important 
the problem is for philosophy in general. It is not only one possible subject within a field of 
studies, but it has very important consequences for the definition of that field of studies. 
Indeed, philosophy requires an understanding of itself (what is often designated as 
metaphilosophy or philosophy of philosophy) and such an understanding, in turn, defines its 
procedure and results. But the essence of philosophy is far from being completely             
self-evident. There can indeed be different metaphilosophies, and based on Plato (for whom 
there was still no clear paradigm of what philosophy should be) we can understand something 
essential for any metaphilosophical reflection. All philosophy is essentially defined by its 
relation to life – and life itself is defined by how it needs philosophy. Both things are 
constitutively entangled. Therefore, the question of the value of philosophy is a central 
question of philosophy. It determines our relation to any philosophical content. Moreover, all 
philosophical contents are themselves a part of life and somehow integrated in it. As a result, 
their full definition also requires a definition of life‟s structure (in which the need for 
philosophy plays precisely a central role). In other words, both our relation to philosophical 
reflections and the content of the latter presuppose an understanding of the problem that will 
be discussed in the following. In fact, every particular kind of philosophy involves an 
understanding (however tacit) of the importance of philosophy in general – and this raises the 
question of what exactly the role of philosophy in life should be. This, in turn, is also decisive 
to define what philosophy should be.
58
 
Finally, returning to what was said above about the importance of this problem for 
what we might call “philosophical anthropology” (despite the ambiguity of the term, which is 
often understood in a very strict sense), we can now understand the importance of 
philosophical anthropology (as a reflection about what characterizes human life in general) 
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within philosophy at large. Far from being a very confined domain of philosophy, its subject 
matter plays a decisive role in the whole of philosophy. The fact that the definition of human 
life (and of philosophy‟s relation to it) is often neglected does not mean that it is not 
important for philosophy. Rather, this means means that one is normally unaware of one‟s 
views on these matters, and philosophy‟s self-understanding thus tends to be naive. We could 
also say that philosophy tends to be unexamined, which in turn raises the question about the 
value of an unexamined philosophy. 
Although we will not directly tackle these metaphilosophical questions in what 
follows, it is important to have in mind that the whole investigation has important 
consequences for them.  
 
6. Brief survey of the secondary literature on the problem 
 
The problem concerning the value of the unexamined life and all the questions 
involved therein have been object of considerable attention by the interpreters, and they have 
been treated in many different manners. It is not easy to make a full survey of this literature, 
given its extraordinary vastness and complexity. But a simplified version of it, considering 
only some of its main tendencies, will allow us to understand that there are still significant 
gaps. 
To begin, there are several discussions of Socrates‟ assertion in the Apology that leave 
aside everything else that is said in the Apology or the Platonic corpus and just consider the 
possible validity of the statement in itself.
59
 In this case, the assertion is taken as a pretext for 
one‟s own reflection, and the resulting understanding of the problem is usually very different 
from the one we find in the corpus. In contrast, other texts (especially philological 
commentaries on the Apology) discuss the meaning of the statement, although without 
discussing its grounds and validity.
60
 The philosophical commentaries of the Apology, in turn, 
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pay some attention to the grounds of the assertion.
61
 However, for the most part, they tend to 
neglect it. They usually attempt to interpret the Apology as a whole and have therefore many 
different concerns. Moreover, they often place their emphasis on other questions, such as the 
relation between philosophy and politics, Socrates‟ rhetorical strategies, the persuasiveness of 
his arguments or the historical reasons for the process. This prevents them from discussing in 
full what the structure of the unexamined life is and in what sense it lacks examination.  
There are, however, some articles or book chapters that directly discuss Socrates‟ 
views about the unexamined life and the need to examine. F. Gonzalez, for instance, presents 
an interesting analysis of many points in the Apology that are directly related with Socrates‟ 
assertion.
62
 R. Kraut considers the reasons for Socrates‟ assertion in the broader framework 
of the so-called earlier dialogues.
63
 M. McPherran discusses the nature of the duty to 
philosophize, as it is outlined in the Apology. He tries to determine the relation between the 
religious and rational reasons to examine in Socrates‟ case, as well as whether the duty 
applies to everyone or not.
64
 The last question plays indeed an important role in secondary 
literature, especially given the apparent contradiction between the Apology and the Republic 
(where philosophical activity seems to be restricted to a single class). R. Kraut mentions this 
and considers that Plato changed his views later on. R. Hackforth and S. Lublink also 
discussed the question, with different results.
65
 These are indeed the main tendencies in 
interpreting Socrates‟ views about the value of the unexamined life and the importance of 
philosophy. One often considers the relation between the Apology and other works and, in 
doing so, the discussion seems to be confined either to the earlier dialogues or to the 
problems of compatibility between the Apology and the Republic. In sum, the interpretations 
are often dominated by the developmentalist view of Plato and this prevents scholars from 
considering the relevance of later texts for understanding all that may be implied in Socrates‟ 
assertion.   
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Of course, these discussions of the passage in the Apology can be complemented by 
works on other topics of Plato‟s writings that are closely related with it. The presentations of 
the figure of Socrates, usually based on Plato‟s earlier dialogues, often include some explicit 
considerations on why he took philosophical examination to be so important – though they 
tend to focus on other questions (such as Socrates‟ philosophical method, his conception of 
ἀνεηή, his intellectualism and the so-called eudaimonism).
66
 The broader discussions of 
philosophy as a way of life also include important considerations about the meaningfulness of 
such a life, in contrast with other ways of living (even though they normally do not consider 
the constitutive defectiveness of all non-philosophical lives and how this is the basis for a sort 
of “imperative” of philosophy).
67
 In this context, the discussions about what constitutes a 
good life are also relevant, since they discuss the role philosophy should play therein.
68
 
Likewise, the works that consider the question of care and therapy must also consider the 
limitations of our usual way of living, as well as what we must do to correct it and the role 
that philosophical inquiry plays therein.
69
 Particularly significant are the texts that consider 
the different sides of Socrates‟ and Plato‟s protreptics – though they tend to focus on the 
rhetoric strategies for converting someone to philosophy and not so much on the rational 
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arguments that present the need to do so.
70
 In fact, the question of why we need to 
philosophize is often neglected. Many interpreters focus rather on philosophy‟s                 
self-presentation, its practices and methods, as well as on the discussions about what is 
knowledge and truth, rather than considering the importance of philosophy, knowledge and 
truth for human life in general.
71
 There are, however, some exceptions that discuss the human 
need for knowledge and truth, often in relation with Nietzsche‟s own conceptions about the 
will to truth (Wille zur Wahrheit) and will to illusion (Wille zur Täuschung).
72
 
All the questions just mentioned help determine the value of the unexamined life and 
the need to examine and we find in works that study them many important indications for our 
problem. However, we find no detailed description of the structure of the unexamined life as 
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such within the framework of Plato‟s general understanding of human life (which must 
include at its center the analysis of how our life is marked by a constitutive love of 
knowledge or θζθμζμθία). We also do not find an extensive discussion of its constitutive 
deficiencies and of how they render philosophical examination absolutely necessary. 
Moreover, there is also no serious discussion of the possible results and risks of philosophical 
examination as it is conceived by Plato and whether or not they put the need to examine in 
question. The following investigation will precisely tackle these questions and try to supply 
these lacks. 
 
7. Goals and limitations of the investigation 
 
 As was said in Section 4.3 above, this investigation does not have a doxographical or 
historical character. It does not try to ascertain Plato‟s views and doctrines. Likewise, it does 
not try to determine which earlier thinkers influenced Plato or how he influenced later 
authors. The main goal is rather to discuss the value of an unexamined life and whether there 
is something like an imperative of philosophical examination. We will see what is said about 
the matter in the corpus and consider the meaning and plausibility of Plato‟s indications. In 
doing so, we will notice how Plato puts our ordinary way of life in question and also how his 
objections to it cannot be promptly dismissed without careful consideration. 
 However, the fact that this dissertation tries to show the strengths of Plato‟s views (or, 
more precisely, of the views we may develop on the basis of Plato‟s indications) does not 
mean that it simply assumes these views are all valid and it is only necessary to defend them 
and try to convince readers to adopt a philosophical way of life as outlined in the corpus. The 
goal is rather to consider the assumptions and implications of the views outlined or alluded to 
in the corpus and see to what extent they can be questioned. In other words, we must also 
admit the possibility that Plato is wrong in his criticism of the unexamined life or that he did 
not use the best arguments to criticize it. This may then suggest that the investigation actually 
intends to refute or discredit Plato and defend an alternate answer to the problem. But this is 
also false. The investigation has no previous commitment to defend or attack Plato. It intends 
to patiently and openly examine the views put forward or alluded to in the corpus, in order to 
determine as well as possible their strengths and weaknesses. Ideally, after carefully 
examining the problem and what is said by Plato about it, we would find a solution to the 
problem and decide whether what is said or suggested by Plato is correct. But, as we will see, 
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the problem is too complex and the results presented in this investigation are only provisional 
and require further examination. To be sure, the lack of a definite answer can be frustrating 
and discourage the reader. However, provisional inquiries as the one that follows can still 
help us see the questions more clearly and they can likewise contribute to finding better 
answers in the future. 
 But let us consider in more detail the factors that prevent us from achieving a definite 
answer to the problem. First, many of the arguments we will develop based on what is said by 
Plato are based on unexamined or unjustified presuppositions, whose alternatives are not 
considered in full. But there are also limitations in the way the problem will be treated. More 
specifically, we will follow a certain path and, although we will try to consider the corpus as 
a whole, we will inevitably give more attention to certain passages and dialogues in detriment 
of others. However, given the kaleidoscopic nature of the Platonic corpus, it is possible to 
consider the same questions from different angles – and without considering all angles, we 
cannot be sure we found a definite answer to the problem. 
 Moreover, in our treatment of the problem we will give more attention to some 
questions than to others. The most glaring example of this is perhaps the fact that the problem 
will be considered from an individual (and thus universal) standpoint. More precisely, we 
will see how each human being as such relates to the unexamined life and to philosophical 
examination. But Plato‟s thinking is also very sensitive to the political dimension and the 
reciprocal relation between the individual and the πόθζξ. This plays an important role in the 
Apology and it is further developed in other texts – especially in the Republic. But we will 
leave the political dimension of the question mostly in the background and will rather try to 
determine the importance of philosophical examination for any individual. Only at the end of 
the investigation will we briefly consider the question about the role philosophical 
examination should play in the πόθζξ and who should perform it. 
 Finally, there is still one more limitation that we must bear in mind. As was said, the 
whole investigation aims at finding an answer to a problem that is not confined to Plato‟s 
writings, but rather concerns us all. We consult Plato in order to better understand the 
problem and also to find an answer. However, the fact that we restrict our analysis to Plato 
and even formulate the problem in Platonic terms can be regarded as a limitation. It is 
possible to formulate the question and discuss it in other ways. Plato is just one among many 
authors who, in a more explicit or implicit manner, think about the relation between life and 
philosophical inquiry. The history of philosophy provided many other solutions to the 
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problem. Why then should we direct our attention to Plato, especially given how old his texts 
are?  
The answer is complex and will not be given in full here. But there are some 
important reasons for focusing our attention on Plato. He is indeed one of those that explored 
the question more insistently and exhaustively. He considered many aspects from many 
different angles. Moreover, many of the later treatments of the problem are often a reaction to 
what Plato said and try to build on or overturn the ideas we find in his writings. Therefore, 
these writings are the best place to start investigating the problem. It will certainly help us 
better understand our origins (or the origin of many conceptions we still have today), but 
there is also the possibility of learning something important with Plato – something the 
subsequent generations may have failed to understand. Only a patient consideration of the 
texts will tell whether they can reveal something decisive or not.  
However, none of this exempts us from considering other authors – i.e., other 
possibilities of conceiving the same question and other answers. An adequate treatment of the 
problem would require a complete hearing of the history of philosophy, and this could still 
not be enough, since we would also have to see which other relevant positions could be 
conceived apart from the ones that were already defended by someone. Only then could we 
be sure that there were no significant blind spots.
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 The following investigation is very far 
from achieving such a full discussion of the problem, and also for this reason the answer it 
provides can only be provisional and precarious. 
 
8. Methodological considerations 
 
 The content of the analyses that follow is also determined by some methodological 
choices, and it is important to be aware of them and of the reasons behind them, in order to 
better understand the course of the analyses and to better appraise their validity.  
 
8.1. The materials used 
 
 The investigation will deal primarily with Plato‟s writings, but it will not be very strict 
in this respect. Some texts whose authorship is disputed (especially Hippias Major and 
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Alcibiades I) will also be considered at some points. This does not imply the belief that Plato 
wrote these texts. We leave the question open. But regardless of who wrote them, they show 
a clear thematic continuity with the other dialogues and thus allow us to better understand 
aspects that are mentioned in the latter. This is why we will also consider them.  
 We will not enter into the discussions about the fixation of the texts and the authority 
of manuscripts. Although a fully critical reading of Plato should consider these problems, 
they are nonetheless very difficult to solve and the impact of different readings on our 
interpretation would be very small. Therefore, we will simply base our analysis on Burnet‟s 
version of the texts and quote from it.
74
 When citing some important passage in the body of 
the text, we will use an English version of the text and supply the original version in the 
notes. The English renderings will be based on other people‟s translations, though some small 
changes may be made at certain points. The choice of a translation is somewhat random and 
not the result of a careful comparison of all available translations. This is so because 
providing the best perfect rendering of the Greek is not a goal of this work. The Greek 
version is the actual basis of the analysis and the translation is only meant as an indication for 
those less familiarized with Ancient Greek. 
 As for Plato‟s terminology, we will often employ English renderings of the Greek 
terms, though in many cases we will also use the Greek words, to make the connection with 
Plato‟s text clearer. When the term is decisive for the analysis, we will carefully consider its 
usage and meaning in Plato (and often also in Ancient Greek culture). This consideration 
must then be borne in mind every time the term is used. The following investigation will 
indeed pay close attention to the language used by Plato. It will consider the layers of 
meaning of each term and the different intellectual contexts from which they are taken. It will 
also try to be mindful of the often metaphoric nature of this language. In fact, we will often 
consider Plato‟s use of images and myths, and try to determine their philosophical or 
conceptual relevance. At some points we will also reflect about the philosophical meaning of 
some dramatic aspects of the text (such as characters‟ idiosyncrasies or their interaction), 
though we will be very far from exploring all that could be said in this respect. 
 Our analysis will make many references to Plato‟s cultural milieu and the different 
contexts he is in dialogue with (such as literature, science, religion, politics, popular culture, 
and so on). This will help us bridge the cultural gap that separates us from Plato‟s texts and 
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which is always a great obstacle when interpreting them. By better understanding the context 
in which Plato was writing, the ideas he presents will become less strange, and we will be 
able to better see what is implied in them. At some points we will compare the views and 
concepts we find in the texts (or which are suggested therein) with what is said by more 
recent thinkers, but such comparisons are not concerned with outlining a history of ideas. We 
will not try to determine Plato‟s place in the history of thought (neither in general nor with 
respect to any particular question) nor will we try to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses 
of different authors. The references to other authors rather serve the purpose of letting us 
better determine the problems we are discussing and the indications given by Plato. 
 The treatment of secondary literature also requires some remarks. The sheer volume 
of works on Plato and on Greek culture in general is overwhelming. Much can be gained 
from studying these works, but it is probably beyond human strength to read them all (and to 
read them with the attention they deserve). One is then faced with many alternatives, and in 
particular one must choose between concentrating one‟s efforts and attention on a very 
restricted domain (for instance, a particular problem or a particular tradition of interpretation) 
and lose sight of all other relevant elements – or, alternatively, trying to attain some sort of 
overview, reading texts about various problems, from different traditions, in different 
languages, but at the cost of losing depth of analysis in relation to each problem and each 
tradition of interpretation. I followed the latter strategy, aware that many relevant texts were 
certainly left out of consideration. However, I am confident that a broader (though less 
intensive) approach can provide a solid enough basis to consider our main problem from a 
new and interesting angle. For the most part, I avoid entering into direct discussion with the 
secondary literature, since that would make the dissertation even longer and also partly shift 
the focus from the philosophical discussion of the problems. As a result, the access to the 
analyses may perhaps be more difficult for some, since they will not be developed in 
reference to the main debates in secondary literature, but I believe that in most cases my own 
position in these debates can be easily inferred from the course of the analyses. 
 Some bibliographical indications about many important terms and problems will be 
supplied in the footnotes, mostly as a complement to the aspects considered in the text. In 
general, these indications will be just a sample of all that has been written on the topics in 
question. At the end, the reader will find a list of many of the most important works about 
Plato and the aspects of Greek culture more relevant for the questions tackled in the 
dissertation. Some of the bibliographical indications given in footnotes were deliberately 
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omitted from this final list for being too specific and to avoid making the list unnecessarily 
longer. But these are not the only omissions. The list is in fact very far from being complete. 
It is mainly focused on the problems considered in the dissertation and it reflects a particular 
path of exploration. However, many other paths could be followed within the complex 
labyrinth of secondary literature.  
 
8.2. The philosophical and phenomenological character of the interpretation 
 
After determining the content of the investigation and the materials used by it, it is 
also important to consider the fact that our whole approach to the texts and the course of the 
analyses will be shaped by two major concerns. The first was already mentioned. The 
investigation will be philosophical and not doxographical or historical. This means that its 
main concern is to ascertain who we are and what happens to us in our lives. The discussion 
of Plato‟s indications in the corpus will be subordinated to this concern. We will thus not try 
to ascertain which historical circumstances separate Plato from us. We will rather read his 
texts in search of views that are relevant for our own self-understanding and the 
understanding of our circumstances. This requires us to give the benefit of the doubt to 
Plato‟s writings and to seek the arguments that may render the views we find in the corpus 
(or to which the corpus points) as plausible as possible. This does not mean that we will 
consider Plato in light of contemporary debates, since the latter normally imply a way of 
conceiving problems that is already very loaded. We have to let the texts talk and define the 
terms and questions we will use to interpret them, but without forgetting that our interest is to 
ascertaining their relevance for our life. 
 In addition to these philosophical concerns, the investigation will also be marked by 
phenomenological tendencies. The whole approach is inspired by the method elaborated by 
Husserl and, in particular, by the way Heidegger developed it during the 1920s, which 
culminated in the hermeneutical phenomenology presented in Being and Time.
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 But this will 
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not translate into the particular contents of the analysis. Plato‟s conceptions will not be 
compared with Husserl‟s or Heidegger‟s, and for the most part the concepts of these two 
authors will not be used to clarify what we find in the corpus. Phenomenology will rather 
influence the attitude of the analysis and the approach to the problems. A full discussion of 
what constitutes the core of a phenomenological approach would take us very far, but it is 
important to give some (however brief) indications about it, in order to make what follows 
more easily accessible to those accustomed to different approaches. Saying that the analyses 
will be phenomenological means that they will not be primarily concerned with appraising 
the logical validity of arguments, as if the texts were simple theoretical constructions. We 
will rather try as much as possible to refer Plato‟s concepts and arguments back to the “lived 
experiences” (Erlebnisse) of each one of us. Plato‟s views will be considered as a possible 
way of seeing or interpreting what we are always in contact with – i.e., what appears to us 
most immediately or the “phenomena”. However, these phenomena are always invested with 
particular meanings and interpretations, and these meanings and interpretations may block 
our access to Plato‟s interpretation of our experiences. Therefore, it is important to be aware 
of how we most commonly see the phenomena (or how we most commonly interpret our 
experiences), and also of how Plato puts these common views in question and presents 
alternate versions of them, which in addition provides an account for our distorted 
interpretation of what we experience. We must then see whether or not Plato‟s account is 
more faithful to our experience of reality in general and of our own self in particular. 
 The phenomenological tendencies of the investigation are thus intimately connected 
with the fact that the investigation is mainly concerned with what happens with each one of 
us. In phenomenological terms, we are concerned with what we most immediately experience 
(or what most directly mediates and shapes our experience of things). We can understand 
from here how the investigation is simultaneously personal and general – and this is why the 
analyses are often referred to an indeterminate “we” (which is supposed to encompass not 
only myself and the readers, but every other being that resembles us). At first, this usage of 
the first person is meant to call the reader‟s attention to the fact that what is being discussed is 
not something distant. Tua res agitur! But the plural form stresses something more – namely, 
that we will be trying to determine something that characterizes all human beings. But 
nothing guarantees the success of this attempt. In fact, nothing guarantees that at the core of 
our being we are all alike. So all reference to a common or universal experience is only 
hypothetical and every individual must see whether he or she can recognize the description in 
37 
 







The discussion of the unexamined life in the Apology 
 
 
“θέλς δὲ ηαὶ ἃ ἗νιμβέκμοξ ημῦ Ἱππμκίημο ἢημοζα πενὶ α὎ημῦ. ἔθδ βάν, 
ἢδδ Μεθήημο βεβναιιέκμο α὎ηὸκ ηὴκ βναθήκ, α὎ηὸξ ἀημύςκ α὎ημῦ πάκηα 
ι᾵θθμκ ἠ πενὶ η῅ξ δίηδξ δζαθεβμιέκμο θέβεζκ α὎ηῶ ὡξ πνὴ ζημπε῔κ ὅ ηζ 
ἀπμθμβήζεηαζ. ηὸκ δὲ ηὸ ιὲκ πν῵ημκ εἰπε῔κ· Ο὎ βὰν δμη῵ ζμζ ημῦημ ιεθεη῵κ 
δζααεαζςηέκαζ; ἐπεὶ δὲ α὎ηὸκ ἢνεημ ὅπςξ, εἰπε῔κ α὎ηὸκ ὅηζ μ὎δὲκ ἄθθμ πμζ῵κ 
δζαβεβέκδηαζ ἠ δζαζημπ῵κ ιὲκ ηά ηε δίηαζα ηαὶ ηὰ ἄδζηα, πνάηηςκ δὲ ηὰ 
δίηαζα ηαὶ η῵κ ἀδίηςκ ἀπεπόιεκμξ, ἣκπεν κμιίγμζ ηαθθίζηδκ ιεθέηδκ 
ἀπμθμβίαξ εἶκαζ.” 
Xenophon, Memorabilia, 4.8.4 
 
 
Socrates‟ assertion about the unexamined life is the culminating point of an argument 
that is developed during the entire Apology. The question about the value of the unexamined 
life (as well as about the value of philosophical examination) is intimately tied to the figure of 
Socrates and his fate. According to Plato‟s version, Socrates understood how life is 
unexamined and how this is a serious defect, so he assumed examination as his life‟s task. 
Many, however, did not understand why he did what he did and got angry with him, which is 
what ultimately led to his trial. So the trial is not simply a trial of Socrates, but also of 
philosophical examination (i.e., the kind of examination performed by Socrates) and its role 
in the polis and in human life at large. In order to defend himself, Socrates must therefore 
present his understanding of life and of himself – and this means he must discuss the vital 
importance of the examination he performs and with which he is identified.   
We will now try to determine Socrates‟ self-presentation and his understanding of life 
as they are expressed in Plato‟s Apology. We will pay special attention to the aspects of the 
text that are more directly relevant for this. This means the following analysis is far from 
being a full discussion of the Apology and of all the questions that are contained therein or are 
associated with it. Many relevant questions which are often at the center of the text‟s readings 
will be left untouched or will be only superficially considered. For instance, we will not 
discuss the faithfulness of Plato‟s text either to the actual trial or to the historical Socrates in 
general. We will also not try to determine the actual reasons behind the process against 
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Socrates or the reasons that lead Plato to write the Apology. It is very difficult to find a 
satisfactory answer to these historical questions and, important though they are, they are not 
indispensable to our goal of seeing how the unexamined life and its opposite are described in 
the text. All mentions of Socrates will thus refer to the character of Plato‟s text, and not the 
historical figure. We will focus our attention on the understanding of life (and particularly of 
the unexamined life) presented in the text and see what is implied therein. In doing so, we 
will not consider all layers of the text. We will not pay much attention to the rhetoric 
dimension of Socrates‟ speeches and his use of irony, nor to the effectiveness of his defense 
strategy.
76
 Instead of carefully distinguishing the face value and the real value of the 
arguments, we will start by considering the main concepts and ideas of the text and try to see 
how they can best be interpreted. Finally, in keeping with the general approach of the 
dissertation, we will be primarily concerned with the implications of the question for all 
individual lives and only secondarily with its political implications. One could also make a 
more political reading of the text.
77
 Indeed, both questions are deeply intertwined in the text. 
But we will rather try to see how the problem directly affects the life of each and every one of 
us, and how we relate to it as individuals. Whatever else the text may be, it is also an appeal 
to all individuals, and at the end of the analysis we will even try to ascertain the effects the 
text might have on the reader or how it determines our relation to it. But before doing so we 
have to consider what is said in the text. 
 For the most part, we will restrict the analysis to the Apology and avoid comparing it 
with other Platonic texts (though we may occasionally refer to other passages in order to 
clarify some point). We will also try to leave out of consideration the views that are normally 
imputed to Socrates, in order not to read the text in light of them. We will rather follow the 
sequence of ideas in the text and systematize it, in order to see what understanding of life is 
contained therein. By isolating this understanding, we will also be better able to appraise it  
and pin down the questions that are not answered in the Apology and that will guide our 
subsequent consideration of the whole Platonic corpus. 
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The accusations against Socrates 
 
 
“μἴιμζ πανακμίαξ· ὡξ ἐιαζκόιδκ ἄνα,  
ὅη᾽ ἐλέααθθμκ ημὺξ εεμὺξ δζὰ ΢ςηνάηδ.  
ἀθθ᾽ ὦ θίθ᾽ ἗νι῅, ιδδαι῵ξ εύιαζκέ ιμζ, 
ιδδέ ι᾽ ἐπζηνίρῃξ, ἀθθὰ ζοββκώιδκ ἔπε  
ἐιμῦ πανακμήζακημξ ἀδμθεζπίᾳ (...).” 
Aristophanes, Nubes, 1476-1480 
 
 
 In order to determine the understanding of life that is outlined in Socrates‟ defense 
speech, we must begin by considering his analysis (or his understanding) of the accusations 
made against him. These accusations present a certain version of who Socrates is, and 
Socrates goes on to isolate and refute this version, replacing it with his own self-presentation. 
But in order for him to do so, he needs to consider the content and implications of the 
accusations. Though we do not “hear” the prosecution speech, we can get an idea of its 
content from the way Socrates interprets it. This interpretation will also provide us with some 
important indications about the unexamined life, since the accusations are themselves an 
expression of such a life and its reaction against the life that opposes it by dedicating itself to 
the task of examining oneself and others. Let us then see how the accusations are presented 
and interpreted in Socrates‟ speech. 
  
1. The starting-point of the defense speech: the accusations’ mode of presence  
 
 Socrates starts his speech by reflecting about the circumstances or state of mind in 
which the jurors find themselves after hearing the accusations against him. Then, he 
considers the hostile disposition against him that preceded the trial and which is itself the 
effect of a different kind of accusations. He is thus concerned with how his words will be 
received. The jurors may not be impartial. Their relation to the person and to the issue on trial 
is not immediate and simple (as it would be if this were their first contact with Socrates), but 
it is rather determined by the accusations (both those heard at trial and other), and it is 
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important for him and for the jurors to be fully aware of this, in order to come to a just 
verdict. 
 
1.1. The resonance of the explicit accusation. The problematic relation between 
ιόγνο and ἀιήζεηα 
 
 When Socrates starts his defense, the prosecution speech and the portrait it painted of 
Socrates still echoes in the mind of the listeners, and Socrates calls the attention precisely to 
this. He says he does not know how the accusers affected the jurors, but points to the 
possibility that their words may have left a strong impression or feeling (a πάεμξ).
78
 He can 
infer it from his own experience. He admits (even if ironically) that he almost forgot himself, 
which means he was almost persuaded of an interpretation of who he is that is, from his 
viewpoint, entirely false.
79
 So if he, who should know himself the best, almost believed the 
accusation, then it is far more likely that the others will have been persuaded by it. 
 This leads Socrates to reflect about the medium in which the trial takes                 
place – namely, θόβμξ. Λόβμξ (here understood primarily as speech or argument) enables us 
not only to say something that is not true, but also to convince others of it (that is, to entrap 
them in a “logical” fiction, as it were), making them lose sight of the truth – even if this truth 
is something one is frequently in contact with.
80
 However, θόβμξ can also correct one‟s way 
of seeing things and reveal things for what they are. It can do so not only by directly saying 
what things are, but also by rationally discussing a particular matter. So the same             
thing – θόβμξ – can be an agent of truth or of untruth (of ἀθήεεζα or θήεδ). It all hinges on 
how it is used. In Socrates‟ words, one can use it to say what is true (ηἀθδε῅ θέβεζκ) or one 
can be awfully good or clever at speaking (δεζκὸξ θέβεζκ) and use θόβμξ to convince others of 
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 The opening words of the Apology are precisely: “ὅηζ ιὲκ ὏ιε῔ξ, ὦ ἄκδνεξ Ἀεδκα῔μζ, πεπόκεαηε ὏πὸ η῵κ ἐι῵κ 
ηαηδβόνςκ, μ὎η μἶδα (...).”  
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 See 17a: “ἐβὼ δ᾽ μὖκ ηαὶ α὎ηὸξ ὏π᾽ α὎η῵κ ὀθίβμο ἐιαοημῦ ἐπεθαεόιδκ, μὕης πζεακ῵ξ ἔθεβμκ.” 
80
 We find an extraordinary expression of this power of θόβμξ in Menexenus 234c ff. Socrates says that funeral 
orations, by praising people from a certain land, can bewitch people‟s souls to the point that they forget 
themselves (thus thinking they are taller, nobler or more beautiful than they really are) and also the land where 
they live (thinking they live in the Isles of the Blessed). At least this is his own experience, and if some stranger 
is present, he also sees Socrates and the Athenians in a different light. Speech affects people‟s perspectives and 
its effects can last for long. Socrates says that in the case at hand the spell is broken after a few days, and he then 
remembers who he is and where he lives. But it is not necessarily so. A good speech may deeply and 
permanently affect one‟s way of seeing things (especially if it is frequently heard), and Socrates will argue that 
something along these lines happened in his case and determined the way he is seen by others (cp. Section 1.2 





 This essential contrast is at the core of Socrates‟ trial. The accusers (which 
in a way act as representatives of the unexamined life) and Socrates put forward two different 
versions of who he is (and also of what should be the role of philosophical examination in 
life) and only one of these versions can be true. 
  Socrates stresses this conflict of claims and calls the jurors‟ attention to the fact that it 
is not easy to distinguish what is true from what is merely persuasive. Skillful speaking has 
the semblance of speaking the truth, and that is why it can easily persuade anyone of 
something false. But one can be a clever speaker and at the same time tell the truth. 
Moreover, the fact that one is not a good speaker does not mean one is not telling the truth. 
As a result, everybody should be under suspicion and the jurors should be particularly 
attentive to what is said. They must hear every argument with the alternative between truth 
and mere rhetoric in mind, in order to determine who is telling the truth – or, as Socrates also 
stresses, who is telling what is just or right (δίηαζα θέβεζκ).
82
 Indeed, the two different 
versions of who Socrates is are also two versions of justice or what is right (δίηαζμκ), so it is 
not only the truth about Socrates that is at issue, but also justice itself or the correct way of 
living.
83
 The jurors must then be concerned with justice (since that is indeed what constitutes 
the excellence or ἀνεηή of a juror, as Socrates stresses) and in order to decide what is just 
they must be aware of the possibility of someone distorting the truth. In other words, they 
must carefully examine what is said, so that they can avoid any injustice. As for the orator, 
his ἀνεηή consists in telling the truth – and Socrates will take pains to do so.
84
 It is, however, 
difficult to determine what exactly the truth is, and also to say it in a way that allows it to be 
recognized as such and understood.
85
  
 Socrates thus opens his speech with an appeal to examination, truth, ἀνεηή and   
justice – which are all central notions of his defense. The trial itself is a sort of examination. 
It tries to ascertain the truth about Socrates and the examination he carries out. As such, it 
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 Socrates uses these expressions in 17b. 
82
 The idea of δίηαζα θέβεζκ appears in 17c and 18a.  
83
 It is important to bear in mind that the term δίηαζμκ refers broadly to what is fitting, proper, to how things 
should be, and cannot be reduced to a code of laws or even a set of social norms. Here and throughout the 
Apology, Socrates is referring to this broad sense of how we should live.  
84
 Cp. 18a: “(...) ηαὶ δὴ ηαὶ κῦκ ημῦημ ὏ι῵κ δέμιαζ δίηαζμκ, ὥξ βέ ιμζ δμη῵, ηὸκ ιὲκ ηνόπμκ η῅ξ θέλεςξ          
ἐ᾵κ – ἴζςξ ιὲκ βὰν πείνςκ, ἴζςξ δὲ αεθηίςκ ἂκ εἴδ – α὎ηὸ δὲ ημῦημ ζημπε῔κ ηαὶ ημύηῳ ηὸκ κμῦκ πνμζέπεζκ, εἰ 
δίηαζα θέβς ἠ ιή· δζηαζημῦ ιὲκ βὰν αὕηδ ἀνεηή, ῥήημνμξ δὲ ηἀθδε῅ θέβεζκ.”  
85
 Socrates must face this difficulty and this may require him to use elaborate communicative strategies. At 
some points, Socrates even seems to be less than straightforward, and this raises the question of whether he 
remains faithful to his pledge of telling the whole truth (see 17b-c). However, we will not enter into those 
discussions. We will assume that he is saying something meaningful, even if in some cases that may not be 
immediately clear to the jurors or to the reader. 
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requires the jurors to examine the question carefully and to concern themselves with the truth, 
in order to determine what is just and correctly carry out their duties. This may seem obvious, 
but Socrates needs to emphasize it because he has reason to fear that the opposite will rather 
be the case. There is a strong tendency to neglect these things, and such a tendency is in fact 
an essential feature of the unexamined as such, as will be shown. Accordingly, Socrates‟ 
appeals are a reminder that both he and the examination he embodies tend to be judged in the 
context of the unexamined life itself (i.e., a life that does not examine things carefully and so 
can easily accept false views).  
 
1.2. The old accusations as a crucial element in the whole process 
 
 Though Socrates starts by focusing on the effects caused by hearing the prosecution‟s 
case, he immediately goes on to show that the stance of the jurors towards Socrates is in fact 
affected by a stronger and deeper factor. He expresses it by saying that the accusations are 
not simple, but rather twofold. There are the express accusations, brought to court by Anitus 
and Meletus, but there are also other accusations, which are much older. Although the 
accusers did not mention them, they resonate in everybody‟s minds or at least affected the 
way they look at Socrates. Therefore, Socrates must call the attention to these old 
accusations. Despite the fact that the new accusations have just been heard and may still 
affect the emotions and mind of the jurors, their effects are nonetheless smaller than the ones 
from the old accusations, which are the result of a multitude of voices repeating the same 
things during a long time. More precisely, Socrates says that many members of the jury have 
heard slanders (δζααμθαί) against him for a long time and since they were little (i.e., since the 
time when they were most credulous).
86
 The fact that usually no one defended him (i.e., no 
alternate views about him were put forward), and many people did not know him that well, 
made the accusations particularly persuasive.
87
 Moreover, the process of persuasion was 
complex and the first accusers persuaded others.
88
 Soon these accusations were a matter of 
common knowledge – and one no longer could say what their source was.
89
 They were, 
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 See 18c: “(...) ἔπεζηά εἰζζκ μὗημζ μἱ ηαηήβμνμζ πμθθμὶ ηαὶ πμθὺκ πνόκμκ ἢδδ ηαηδβμνδηόηεξ, ἔηζ δὲ ηαὶ ἐκ 
ηαύηῃ ηῆ ἟θζηίᾳ θέβμκηεξ πνὸξ ὏ι᾵ξ ἐκ ᾗ ἂκ ιάθζζηα ἐπζζηεύζαηε, πα῔δεξ ὄκηεξ ἔκζμζ ὏ι῵κ ηαὶ ιεζνάηζα (...).” 
87
 See ibidem: “(...) ἀηεπκ῵ξ ἐνήιδκ ηαηδβμνμῦκηεξ ἀπμθμβμοιέκμο μ὎δεκόξ.” 
88
 See 18d: “(...) ὅζμζ δὲ θεόκῳ ηαὶ δζααμθῆ πνώιεκμζ ὏ι᾵ξ ἀκέπεζεμκ – μἱ δὲ ηαὶ α὎ημὶ πεπεζζιέκμζ ἄθθμοξ 
πείεμκηεξ – μὗημζ πάκηεξ ἀπμνώηαημί εἰζζκ (...).” 
89
 See 18c-d: “ὃ δὲ πάκηςκ ἀθμβώηαημκ, ὅηζ μ὎δὲ ηὰ [18δ] ὀκόιαηα μἷόκ ηε α὎η῵κ εἰδέκαζ ηαὶ εἰπε῔κ, πθὴκ εἴ ηζξ 




therefore, extremely persuasive. Most of the jurors have had some contact with these old 
accusations, and though their presence was much hazier than the speech just heard, they were 
deeply ingrained in how the jurors viewed Socrates. They had grown up believing in this 
version of Socrates. So, in a sense, the trial is already over before it even began. 
 This is very important. By calling the attention to these accusations, Socrates is not 
trying to increase the charges against him, but he rather intends to show the basis for the 
accusations just made. The two layers of accusation are indeed closely connected. The old 
accusations correspond to assumptions (or ὏πμεέζεζξ, in the sense we will consider later) that 
underpin the new accusations.
90
 They caused the latter and they are also what lends them 
strength or plausibility. In other words, the old accusations make the jurors receptive to the 
new accusations and averse to the defense. Socrates‟ words and behavior are simply 
interpreted in light of the prejudices against him.
91
 Therefore, he must first deal with them 
and the resulting background of ill-will (θεόκμξ) and hostility towards him. Socrates must 
render the old charges explicit and try to disarm them. He must show their falsehood and 
their hidden motivations. Only so can his defense be successful. If, on the contrary, he were 
not to mention and face them, the explicit charges would be much more effective, since their 
source would be left untouched. 
But Socrates is also very aware of how difficult it is to refute these old accusations. 
There are mainly two reasons for this. The first concerns the nature of this shared view of 
Socrates. The process that led to it made it not only unquestionable, but also independent 
from any particular accuser, as was noted above. No one can be held accountable, there is no 
one to examine, so Socrates must fight with shadows.
92
 The other reason is the disproportion 
between the time during which the old accusations have been heard (in many cases since 
childhood) and the time Socrates now disposes to try to reveal the truth about himself.
93
 He 
will put forward a θόβμξ and θόβμξ has indeed the power to reveal the truth, but such a power 
can also be limited by other factors, especially time. Socrates does not have enough time to 
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 For the notion of ὏πόεεζζξ in the sense here meant, see in particular Chap. 6, Sect. 1.3a). 
91
 His words and acts thus appear as particularly wilful, haughty or arrogant, and this will also cause heckling 
(εμνοαε῔κ) at some points (cp. e.g. 27b and 30c), which reminds the reader of the jurors‟ ill-disposition towards 
Socrates and how they are not really willing to hear him out. 
92
 See 18d: “μ὎δὲ βὰν ἀκααζαάζαζεαζ μἷόκ η᾽ ἐζηὶκ α὎η῵κ ἐκηαοεμ῔ μ὎δ᾽ ἐθέβλαζ μ὎δέκα, ἀθθ᾽ ἀκάβηδ ἀηεπκ῵ξ 
ὥζπεν ζηζαιαπε῔κ ἀπμθμβμύιεκόκ ηε ηαὶ ἐθέβπεζκ ιδδεκὸξ ἀπμηνζκμιέκμο.” The expression ζηζαιαπε῔κ evokes 
the image of a boxer punching the air and fighting an imaginary opponent (cp. Lg. 830a-c). 
93
 See 18e-19a: “ἀπμθμβδηέμκ δή, ὦ ἄκδνεξ Ἀεδκα῔μζ, ηαὶ ἐπζπεζνδηέμκ ὏ι῵κ ἐλεθέζεαζ ηὴκ δζααμθὴκ ἡκ ὏ιε῔ξ 
ἐκ πμθθῶ πνόκῳ ἔζπεηε ηαύηδκ ἐκ μὕηςξ ὀθίβῳ πνόκῳ.” Cp. also what Socrates says after being found guilty, at 
37a-b: “(...) εἰ ἤκ ὏ι῔κ κόιμξ, ὥζπεν ηαὶ ἄθθμζξ ἀκενώπμζξ, πενὶ εακάημο ιὴ ιίακ ἟ιένακ ιόκμκ ηνίκεζκ ἀθθὰ 
πμθθάξ, ἐπείζεδηε ἄκ· κῦκ δ᾽ μ὎ ῥᾴδζμκ ἐκ πνόκῳ ὀθίβῳ ιεβάθαξ δζααμθὰξ ἀπμθύεζεαζ.” 
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fully examine the accusation and produce his defense. Therefore, he anticipates his failure, 
and at the same time points to the fact that what follows is not his true defense speech, but 
only a very abbreviated version. This raises the question of how then would his real defense 
(as well as the real defense of Socratic examination) look like.
94
 
 But let us look at what Socrates says. Albeit his low expectations, he tries to show that 
these old accusations are false and also that they were deliberately fabricated. He discusses 
their origin and tries to show the motivations behind them – more precisely, he tries to show 
how they are the reaction of people that were examined by him and tried to hide what this 
examination revealed. 
 
2. The content of the accusations and the central role of ζνθία therein 
 
 Socrates carefully considers the content of both kinds of accusation, what is implied in 
them and how they relate to each other. He cites the new accusations, made by the 
prosecution. They run as follows: “Socrates is an offender in that he corrupts the young men 
and does not accept the gods the city accepts, but other novel superhuman beings.”.
95
 Despite 
the problems in translating κμιίγεζκ and δαζιόκζα, which we will leave aside, the content of 
the accusations seems pretty clear (though Socrates will also put it in question and show that 
it contains some inconsistencies). There are two parts: one concerns the effect of Socrates‟ 
activities on the young, the other concerns their effect on the religion of the πόθζξ.  
 Socrates also gives an explicit form to the old accusations. Despite their mostly 
indeterminate source, they have a very specific content, which Socrates formulates in three 
different passages. The two first formulations are the most significant. The first runs as 
follows: “there was a certain Socrates, a wise man and investigator of things both above and 
below the earth, and one who made the weaker argument the stronger”.
96
 The second says: 
“Socrates is an offender and a meddler, in studying things below the earth and in the sky, and 
making the weaker argument into the stronger and instructing other people in these same 
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 In a sense this dissertation is an attempt to reconstruct and present such a defense with the aid of the whole 
Platonic corpus. 
95
 See 24b-c: “΢ςηνάηδ θδζὶκ ἀδζηε῔κ ημύξ ηε κέμοξ δζαθεείνμκηα ηαὶ εεμὺξ μὓξ ἟ πόθζξ κμιίγεζ μ὎ κμιίγμκηα, 
ἕηενα δὲ δαζιόκζα ηαζκά.” I follow M. Stokes‟ translation (see M. STOKES, Plato Ŕ Apology of Socrates, 
Warminster, Aris & Phillips, 1997). 
96
 See 18b-c: “(...) ἔζηζκ ηζξ ΢ςηνάηδξ ζμθὸξ ἀκήν, ηά ηε ιεηέςνα θνμκηζζηὴξ ηαὶ ηὰ ὏πὸ β῅ξ πάκηα ἀκεγδηδηὼξ 





 The two formulations are very similar, though only the second introduces the 
important idea of teaching. They also begin in different ways, and the beginning of the first 
formulation in fact provides an important indication about the whole accusation. It ties the 
figure of Socrates to the notion of ζμθία, and the rest of the accusation is actually a 
breakdown of some of the things usually seen as being implied in the notion. Although ζμθία 
is not reduced to the study of nature and θόβμξ, this is one of the forms it can take. The term 
has indeed different nuances, but here Socrates (or his hypothetical accuser) is referring to a 
rather negative sense of the word, which is associated with the idea of πενζενβάγεζεαζ (i.e., of 
meddling or being a busybody and occupying himself with something that is not his 
business). But the term can also have a positive sense, and in fact these different senses 
determine the meaning of the accusation and also of the defense. ΢μθία is a central concept in 
the Apology and everything therein is connected to it and to the cultural debates it refers to. It 
is therefore important to consider its meaning and associations (which will then help us 
define the figure of Socrates and the kind of examination he carried out).
98
 We will start by 
defining its formal sense and then we will see the discussions in Plato‟s time that were 
associated with the term and help determine the accusations. After doing so, we will finish by 
considering Socrates‟ whole defense strategy in light of this understanding of the accusations.  
  
2.1. The formal notion of ζνθία and the problem of what kind of knowledge 
corresponds to it 
 
 The term ζμθία is very complex. It is one of several terms used to designate forms of 
knowledge and the boundaries between these terms were not always clear (at least until 
Aristotle). ΢μθία, in particular, was associated with several cultural developments and 
changes, and so its meaning took on new nuances. We will start by looking at the older layers 
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 See 19b-c: “΢ςηνάηδξ ἀδζηε῔ ηαὶ πενζενβάγεηαζ γδη῵κ ηά ηε ὏πὸ β῅ξ ηαὶ μ὎νάκζα ηαὶ ηὸκ ἣηης θόβμκ ηνείηης 
πμζ῵κ ηαὶ ἄθθμοξ ηα὎ηὰ ηαῦηα δζδάζηςκ.” For the third formulation, presented when Socrates is explaining the 
origin of these older accusations, cp. 23d: “(...) θέβμοζζκ ὡξ ΢ςηνάηδξ ηίξ ἐζηζ ιζανώηαημξ ηαὶ δζαθεείνεζ ημὺξ 
κέμοξ· ηαὶ ἐπεζδάκ ηζξ α὎ημὺξ ἐνςηᾶ ὅηζ πμζ῵κ ηαὶ ὅηζ δζδάζηςκ, ἔπμοζζ ιὲκ μ὎δὲκ εἰπε῔κ ἀθθ᾽ ἀβκμμῦζζκ, ἵκα 
δὲ ιὴ δμη῵ζζκ ἀπμνε῔κ, ηὰ ηαηὰ πάκηςκ η῵κ θζθμζμθμύκηςκ πνόπεζνα ηαῦηα θέβμοζζκ, ὅηζ „ηὰ ιεηέςνα ηαὶ ηὰ 
὏πὸ β῅ξ‟ ηαὶ „εεμὺξ ιὴ κμιίγεζκ‟ ηαὶ „ηὸκ ἣηης θόβμκ ηνείηης πμζε῔κ.‟ ” 
98
 The consideration of the term ζμθία is also very important given the fact that Socrates describes his own 
activity as a love or pursuit of ζμθία (i.e., as a form of θζθμζμθε῔κ – see 28e, 29c, 29d). The word θζθμζμθε῔κ 
(as well as θζθόζμθμξ and θζθμζμθία) actually plays a central role in the corpus, as we will see. Cp. especially 
Chap. 14 below. 
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of meaning and then we will consider the discussions it was associated with in the 5th century 
BCE (and which are echoed in Socrates‟ trial).
99
 
 Let us begin with the translation of the term. ΢μθία is usually rendered as wisdom. 
Though both terms do not entirely coincide, “wisdom” does express an essential component 
of ζμθία: namely, the fact that it usually designates a superior or superlative form of 
knowledge. But how is this superlative knowledge to be understood? In order to answer this 
question, we may start by considering the earlier uses of the word. We see it applied to many 
different forms of technical skill or expertise. Carpenters, sailors, flute-players, poets, seers, 
generals, statesmen, physicians, car drivers, and others can all be designated as ζμθμί.
100
 
΢μθία is thus close in meaning to ηέπκδ, which designates an expert and productive 
knowledge – i.e., a knowledge that has an insight into a particular domain of reality and is 




 These ηέπκαζ or ζμθίαζ are not something everybody possesses. In fact, most people 
do not have them.
102
 Aristotle expresses this in the Metaphysics by saying that ηέπκδ is 
something that lies πανὰ ηὰξ ημζκὰξ αἰζεήζεζξ.
103
 The ordinary way of seeing things is indeed 
limited in many respects and is very far from being a fully discerning gaze. Σέπκδ or ζμθία, 
however, allow one to have an “extra eye”, which renders us able to see or understand what 
things are. In other words, ηέπκδ and ζμθία give access to a domain that lies beyond common 
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 Our analysis, however, will be very brief. For more on the meaning of the word ζμθία since the Archaic 
period until Late Antiquity, see e.g. B. SNELL, Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der 
vorplatonischen Philosophie. ΢μθία, βκώιδ, ζύκεζζξ, ἱζημνία, ιάεδια, ἐπζζηήιδ, Berlin, Weidmann, 1924,     
1-20; U. WILCKENS, ζμθία, ζμθόξ, ζμθίγς, in: TWNT, sub voce; B. GLADIGOW, Sophia und Kosmos. 
Untersuchungen zur Frühgeschichte von ζμθόξ und ζμθίδ, Hildesheim, Olms, 1965; W. GENT, Der Begriff des 
Weisen. Eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 20 (1966), 77-117; F. 
MAIER, Der ζοθός-Begriff. Zur Bedeutung, Wertung und Rolle des Begriffs von Homer bis Euripides, Diss. 
München 1970; B. SNELL, Wie die Griechen lernten, was geistige Tätigkeit ist, Journal of Hellenic Studies 93 
(1973), 172-184, especially 178-179; G. KERFERD, The Image of the Wise Man in Greece in the Period before 
Plato, in: Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought. Studia Gerardo Verbeke ab amicis et collegis dicata, 
Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1976, 17-28; W. SCHADEWALDT, Die Anfänge der Philosophie bei den 
Griechen, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1978, 178-180; G. WOHLFART, Das Weise. Bemerkungen zur anfänglichen 
Bedeutung des Begriffs der Philosophie im Anschluß an Heraklits Fragment B108, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 
98 (1991), 18-33; H. GOLDMAN, Traditional Forms of Wisdom and Politics in Plato‟s Apology, The Classical 
Quarterly 59 (2009), 444-467. 
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 For a list of occurrences of the terms ζμθόξ and ζμθία in this sense, see e.g. B. SNELL, Die Ausdrücke für 
den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie, 6-7; B. GLADIGOW, op. cit., 9ff.; F. MAIER, op. 
cit., 13ff. 
101
 Aristotle expresses this proximity between ζμθία and ηέπκδ by saying that ζμθία is ἀνεηὴ ηέπκδξ. Cp. Ethica 
Nichomachea, 1141a9-12. 
102
 As Socrates says in Ap. 20c, they are something πενζηηόηενμκ or ἀθθμ῔μκ. 
103
 See Metaphysica 981b13-17: “ηὸ ιὲκ μὖκ πν῵ημκ εἰηὸξ ηὸκ ὁπμζακμῦκ ε὏νόκηα ηέπκδκ πανὰ ηὰξ ημζκὰξ 
αἰζεήζεζξ εαοιάγεζεαζ [15] ὏πὸ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ ιὴ ιόκμκ δζὰ ηὸ πνήζζιμκ εἶκαί ηζ η῵κ ε὏νεεέκηςκ ἀθθ᾽ ὡξ 
ζμθὸκ ηαὶ δζαθένμκηα η῵κ ἄθθςκ (...).” 
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perception – a domain of things that are difficult and not easy to know, as Aristotle also 
says.
104
 For this reason, ζμθία is often considered something more than human, and even a 
divine boon, though it is also frequently regarded as something that can be learned, at least up 
to a point. But let us leave aside the questions of its origin and teachability.  
The problem we must now consider stems from the existence of multiple forms of 
ζμθία. All these ζμθίαζ share the fact that they see or understand something many human 
beings usually do not. But the term ζμθία (unlike ηέπκδ) often implies more than the idea of 
extraordinary knowledge. It also carries the connotation that the knowledge in question is the 
highest or superlative, as we said above. But what can a superlative form of knowledge 
amount to? One possible way of conceiving it is as the sum of all forms of uncommon or 
extraordinary knowledge (i.e., all ηέπκαζ). One would thus possess all ζμθία and be 
πάζζμθμξ. There are indeed several references to this idea and we find echoes of it (even if in 
an ironical tone) in the Platonic corpus.
105
 But regardless of the fact that it is very difficult to 
acquire all forms of knowledge, since each of them requires much dedication and effort, it is 
also important to note that such a conception of a superlative form of knowledge equates all 
forms of knowledge or considers them as having a similar importance or status. However, the 
ζμθίαζ or ηέπκαζ have different degrees of importance, according to their subject matter and 
the role of this subject matter in our life. Some things are trivial, whereas others are of the 
highest importance – and ζμθία tends to be associated with the latter. It is thus regarded as 
something that is not only πανὰ ηὰξ ημζκὰξ αἰζεήζεζξ, but also “πανὰ ηὰξ ηέπκαξ” (or at least 
beyond most of them). 
 What is then the most important (or most noble) subject matter? After Plato and 
especially Aristotle, the term ζμθία came to be used to designate the knowledge of the 
fundamental structures of reality.
106
 But initially it rather denoted a knowledge of how to live 
and how to have a good life (or even the best possible life). Its concern was ε὎δαζιμκία, 
which could not be achieved by chance, but through insight. Practical concerns were at the 
center of ζμθία. This is also valid for many of the uses of the word in Plato. In the Apology, 
for instance, ζμθία is also expressly related to the most important matters (ηὰ ιέβζζηα) at one 
point.
107
 It may not be very clear what these matters are, but given the context we can 
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 See ibidem 982a10-11: “(...)ηὸκ ηὰ παθεπὰ βκ῵καζ δοκάιεκμκ ηαὶ ιὴ ῥᾴδζα ἀκενώπῳ βζβκώζηεζκ, ημῦημκ 
ζμθόκ (ηὸ βὰν αἰζεάκεζεαζ πάκηςκ ημζκόκ, δζὸ ῥᾴδζμκ ηαὶ μ὎δὲκ ζμθόκ) (...).” 
105
 See, for instance, Hp. Mi. 368b, Euthd. 271c-272b, Rep. 596c, Sph. 232e f. 
106
 Cp. e.g. ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nichomachea, 1141a12 ff., where the proper meaning of ζμθία is restricted to 
the knowledge of the first principles (αἱ ἀνπαί). 
107
 See 22d. 
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understand that Socrates has in mind things such as justice, piety, truth, ἀνεηή, the good and 
the “beautiful” – i.e., all that is essential to determine how we should live. But knowledge of 
such matters may still have different sides or even assume different forms. It may correspond 
to something like a ηέπκδ πενὶ ηὸκ αίμκ, which will guide each individual life, or it may 
become a ηέπκδ πμθζηζηή or ααζζθζηή, which will govern the πόθζξ, as well as all the other 
ηέπκαζ that are relevant for it (insofar as they allow us to rule over nature, at least up to a 
point).
108
 In any case, ζμθία in the pre-eminent sense is something that enables one to guide 
life, insofer as it gives insight into how things should be done and how one should live, and it 
will thus guarantee practical success. So we can clearly see then that ζμθία is something 
important for all and not just an abstract problem. It is expected to perform an important task 
(perhaps the most important task) in our lives.  
 
2.2. The ambiguous character of the ζνθία imputed to Socrates. Old and new 
ζνθία. The conflict with the traditional values and the traditional religion 
 
This description lets us understand what ζμθία is supposed to do, but it still does not 
say what the content of ζμθία is – i.e., how we should guide our lives. And this was precisely 
an acute problem in Socrates‟ time and in Ancient culture in general (if not in the whole of 
human history). Several ηέπκαζ claimed to be ζμθία in the sense that they claimed to know 
how we should live, and they were thus involved in a war of ηέπκαζ. We find a meaningful 
allusion to these quarrels in Plato‟s Gorgias, when Socrates refers to the disagreements 
between gymnastics, economy and medicine about how to live, and how rhetoric presents 
itself as yet another ηέπκδ that claims to be able to guide life.
109
 Both traditional and new 
forms of knowledge tried to persuade people of their merits and also to disqualify the other 
forms of knowledge, denying them the title of ζμθία. In other words, ζμθία in the             
pre-eminent sense was first and foremost a problem – and this is decisive to understand 
Socrates‟ trial and his defense. 
 In fact, the situation in Socrates‟ time was even more complex than this. Besides the 
fact that there were several candidates to the title of ζμθία, there was also an intense conflict 
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 We find several references to these ideas in Ancient culture in general and particularly in Plato. For the 
notion of ηέπκδ ημῦ αίμο (or ηέπκδ πενὶ ηὸκ αίμκ), cp. e.g. A. NEHAMAS, The Art of Living. Socratic 
Reflections from Plato to Foucault, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998 and J. SELLARS, Art of 
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50 
 
between old and new ζμθίαζ (or between an old and a new conception of ζμθία and its role in 
life), which was associated with deep cultural, social and political changes. But what exactly 
did this conflict consist in and how is it relevant for the problem of who Socrates is and what 
he does? Let us start with the traditional conception of ζμθία. There were several forms of 
ζμθία that were publicly acknowledged. They helped organize life and the πόθζξ for a long 
time. These ζμθίαζ are also those that Socrates singles out in the Apology, when he describes 
his search for ζμθμί in the πόθζξ. He went to the artisans (whose work helped to control 
nature and protect us from it), the poets (who not only afforded pleasure, but also played a 
central role in education and the transmission of values) and the statesmen (who governed the 
πόθζξ and determined its destiny). The two latter in particular were supposed to possess a 
general outlook on life that allowed them to determine everything – and were in these sense 
ζμθμί in the pre-eminent sense. But without any of these experts, human life would be very 
different. 
The importance of such experts is made manifest in the praises of ηέπκδ or ζμθία that 
were composed usually in the context of sophistry or at least reflected sophistical ideas.
110
 
These praises describe human beings as a sort of invented animal – i.e., an animal whose 
condition is essentially transformed by discoveries, new insights and progress. Originally, 
human nature was marked by lack, frailty and helplessness.
111
 This was to a great extent due 
to the fact that humans lacked discernment or clarity. Things were indistinct or hard to 
distinguish for them, and so they saw without seeing or gazed in vain.
112
 But then a series of 
human discoveries or divine gifts brought discernment and ηέπκαζ, allowing them to improve 
their life. They overcame the previous limitations by creating a new configuration of life.
113
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 See AESCHYLUS, Prometheus vinctus 441-506; SOPHOCLES, Antigone, 332-375 (the so-called “Ode to 
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 In Aeschylus‟ play (granting he is the author), Prometheus speaks of the πήιαηα of mortals (Prometheus 
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that without all good things brought by the ηέπκαζ, life would be too bad and we would not exist (μ὎η ἂκ ἤιεκ ἐκ 
θάεζ, v. 200). In Statesman, Plato describes human beings without ηέπκαζ as “ἀζεεκε῔ξ ἄκενςπμζ ηαὶ ἀθύθαηημζ 
βεβμκόηεξ δζδνπάγμκημ ὏π᾽ α὎η῵κ, ηαὶ ἔη᾽ ἀιήπακμζ ηαὶ ἄηεπκμζ ηαηὰ ημὺξ πνώημοξ ἤζακ πνόκμοξ” (274b-c). In 
Protagoras, human beings are said to be at first “naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed”. See 321c: “(...) ηὸκ 
δὲ ἄκενςπμκ βοικόκ ηε ηαὶ ἀκοπόδδημκ ηαὶ ἄζηνςημκ ηαὶ ἄμπθμκ (...).” I follow S. Lombardo‟s and K. Bell‟s 
translation (see PCW). 
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 In Prometheus vinctus (vv. 447-450), it is said that the original human beings “αθέπμκηεξ ἔαθεπμκ       
ιάηδκ,/ ηθύμκηεξ μ὎η ἢημομκ, ἀθθ‟ ὀκεζνάηςκ/ ἀθίβηζμζ ιμνθα῔ζζ ηὸκ ιαηνὸκ αίμκ/ ἔθονμκ εἰηῆ πάκηα (...).” 
Moreover, Prometheus speaks twice of things difficult to discern (δύζηνζηα – vv. 458 and 486). In Supplices, 
Theseus says that our life was πεθονιέκμξ and εδνζώδδξ (vv. 201f.).  
113
 Euripides uses the expression: “εεμῦ ηαηαζηεοὴκ αίςζ δόκημξ ημζαύηδκ” (Supplices 214f.). Gorgias, in the 
above mentioned fragment, talks of making life “ηεημζιδιέκμκ ἐλ ἀηόζιμο”. Plato uses the verbs 
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Σέπκδ and ζμθία improved human life greatly, and this empire of ζμθία over nature (as 




These praises of ηέπκδ or ζμθία mention many examples of traditional forms of 
knowledge, which already existed for a long time – such as agriculture, weaving, 
architecture, astronomy, the art of sailing, writing, calculus, medicine, divination, military art, 
laws, and so on. But the praises in question are associated with a context that criticized these 
traditional forms of knowledge and tried to establish new ηέπκαζ or ζμθίαζ – and in particular 
a new form of ζμθία in pre-eminent sense. In order to establish this new ζμθία, these 
innovators appealed to the usefulness and prestige of traditional ηέπκαζ and to how they had 
changed human life. Similarly, the new forms of knowledge that Sophists and other experts 
were trying to introduce or divulge would also change life and expand the empire of 
knowledge. 
 These attempts of promoting a new ζμθία were thus in conflict with the traditional 
form of life and the corresponding wisdom. From the vantage point of the old ζμθία, the new 
forms of knowledge were an excess and an invasion of domains in which one had no business 
(and in this sense, they were a form of πενζενβάγεζεαζ as is said in the old accusations against 
Socrates). Life was already ordered, but now some people tried to replace this order with a 
new one. The Sophists in particular defended the need for a new form of education (παζδεία), 
and this affected the core of Greek life. Παζδεία was what allowed one to overcome the 
childish condition and become an adult – or, more properly, a citizen. One had to acquire the 
cognitive competence (i.e., the insight and values) that made one qualified or fit to interfere 
in public life. This was usually transmitted from generation to generation and all members of 
the tribal community (or, more precisely, all citizens) were viewed as qualified to educate the 
young. We see precisely this conception being defended by Meletus in the Apology (24d ff.) 
or Anytus in Meno (92d ff.). However, the Sophists put this model of education in question. 
They denounce traditional education (and the ζμθία it is based on) as insufficient to truly 
overcome the childish condition, to give true insight, and to properly guide the πόθζξ and life 
in general. A new form of παζδεία was necessary – one that even adults and reputed citizens 
lacked. This idea was in a way outrageous, since it meant most people (including those 
aristocratic classes that traditionally held positions of power in the πόθζξ) were not qualified 
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to guide their own lives and the life of the πόθζξ. Only Sophists could provide this 
qualification, and they would provide it not just to aristocrats, but to anyone who would pay 
them. Thus, the Sophists challenged both the traditional ζμθία and but also the traditional 
social order – and hence they were not in the good graces of conservative people, who 
accused them precisely of corrupting the young and thereby the whole πόθζξ.  
These accusations were also motivated by the prominent role of rhetoric in the new 
education and new ζμθία.
115
 People needed to persuade others in trials, assemblies or simply 
in exhibitions of one‟s ηέπκδ, and so the ability to speak persuasively was a valuable asset. 
Teaching it often involved learning to defend both sides of every question, what implied 
learning how to make weaker arguments stronger (ηὸκ ἣηης θόβμκ ηνείηης πμζε῔κ). But from 
a traditional standpoint, this was interpreted as a technique of making the unjust causes 
appear just and thus escaping justice. One could simply serve one‟s self-interest without any 
concern for others or the πόθζξ.
116
 In fact, the Sophists themselves were seen as people that 
served only their self-interest, given their itinerant lifestyle and their lack of ties to the πόθεζξ 
where they taught. So their education was highly questionable in the eyes of most people. 
 But sophistry is not the only source of cultural conflict in the intellectual life at the 
time. The development of natural philosophy was also seen as an attack on traditional life. 
Σhe θοζζμθόβμζ (as Aristotle called them) investigated things that were remote and 
apparently useless for everyday life – such as the celestial bodies (ιεηέςνμζ) and the things 
below the earth. These domains were associated with weather and food, but they were largely 
obscure (ἄδδθα) or unknown, and they were also under the tutelage of the gods. In fact, they 
had a great importance for religion, because one could see signs from the gods in the heavens 
and the dead went to the underworld. These domains seemed therefore to have an invisible 
control over the entire life of the πόθζξ. But now, thanks to naturalistic explanations, these 
domains seemed to be deprived of their divine value. Natural philosophers were indeed 
regarded as atheists, and this was not just a problem of their inner state of mind and private 
relation to the gods. By disturbing traditional religious views, natural philosophers also 
disturbed religious practices and even the κόιμζ of the community (i.e., its way of seeing 
things and its way of living). The whole life of the πόθζξ had a religious foundation and so 
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 This new central role of rhetoric is later highlighted by Dicaearchus, when he opposes the traditional form of 
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naturalistic thinkers threatened public order and the very survival of the πόθζξ. At least this is 
what many thought.  
 We can thus understand why the new forms of ζμθία were regarded as dangerous by 
so many people. They turned everything upside down and, from the traditional standpoint, 
there was absolutely no need for such inquiries. They were wholly superfluous (i.e., a form of 
πενζένβαγεζεαζ). But was it really so? The conflict between old and new forms of ζμθία 
raises the question of their cognitive competence and their credentials to properly govern life. 
Is traditional ζμθία good enough or is there a need for an additional (and superior) ζμθία? 
And do the new ζμθίαζ just considered satisfy this need? It is not easy to answer these 
questions, at least until we find a way of discerning the value of different ζμθίαζ. Moreover, 
this way of framing the question assumes the existence (or at least the possibility) of a 
supreme ζμθία that is able to govern human life, and also that the answer to life‟s problems 
lies on knowledge and insight. But even the Greeks contested the idea that knowledge is able 
to solve all life‟s problems. Sophocles, for instance, stresses that despite all progress brought 
about by the ηέπκαζ, we are not able to defeat death.
117
 Moreover, tragedy also considers our 
expectations and how they may be too great to be satisfied at all. So what can ζμθία really 
offer us? 
These and other questions mark the context in which Socrates‟ life and trial took  
place – and they play a central role in the Apology. They determine the accusations and also 
Socrates‟ defense. Let us see how. 
 
2.3. The meaning of the newer accusations in light of the older ones and Socrates’ 
defense strategy 
 
 We must now consider in more detail the structure of the old accusations, how they 
give rise to the new accusations, what portrait they paint of Socrates and how Socrates tries to 
correct it. As was said, there was a traditional interpretation of ζμθία and also new forms of 
ζμθία, which tried to reconfigure life, and were rather associated with self-interest, amorality 
and irreligion. Socrates‟ examination of others was promptly identified with these new forms 
of ζμθία – and its specificity was not understood. This is the core of the old accusations, 
which in turn were the basis for the new accusations that led Socrates to trial. He was accused 
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 In the above mentioned passage, Sophocles says that human being is “πακημπόνμξ, ἄπμνμξ ἐπ᾽ μ὎δὲκ 
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of corrupting the young (by imparting a defective παζδεία, spreading his ζμθία, and thus 
harming them and making them worse) and also of impiety (of not accepting or honoring the 
gods of the πόθζξ and introducing new ones, which had the strong connotation of not 
believing in the real gods and thus being godless). The precise relation between the question 
of corrupting the young and the question of religious innovation is not clear in the accusation, 
since it is not specified whether the corruption of the young is mainly caused by religious 
teaching or not. Meletus will confirm that it is so at the cross-examination.
118
 But the other 
cultural issues considered above (especially the role of rhetoric and its association with     
self-interest) also seem relevant – although the prosecution could perhaps think there was an 
intrinsic connection between all those issues and religious matters. But regardless of all this, 
the bottom line was that Socrates innovated and attacked the traditions, and at a time of crisis 
his influence became more questionable than ever.
119
 
 What is then Socrates‟ defense strategy given this complex set of accusations and the 
portrait they paint of him? By shifting the focus from the new accusations to the old ones, 
Socrates identifies the center of the accusations and tries not only to refute it, but also to show 
the motivations that lead to it or that made it plausible to many people. In order to refute it, 
Socrates says that he did not teach any students, as the Sophists do.
120
 He was never paid to 
do so, he never promised any teaching, and he talked to everyone in the open (which means 
he did not communicate hidden doctrines in private).
121
 He also says he is no clever speaker 
and has no knowledge of what is the excellence of a human being and a citizen.
122
 He has no 
positive doctrines to impart and no one can come forward and say that he did impart such 
doctrines.  
 Socrates also dissociates himself from natural philosophers by saying he has no 
knowledge of the subject and never talked about it.
123
 Whether this means he never studied it 
or simply never was able to understand it and thus adopt the views of natural philosophers as 
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his own (as is said in the Phaedo) is not important.
124
 He is far from subscribing them and 
being a natural philosopher as depicted in Aristophanes‟ Clouds. This does not prevent him 
from treating them (as well as the Sophists) with some respect, insofar as they are supposed 
to possess some form of ζμθία – even if there are hints of irony in his words, especially 
because he raises the possibility that they do not possess any ζμθία at all.
125
 At any rate, he 
stresses his own ignorance and his inability to replace the values and practices of the πόθζξ 
with new positive values and practices, based on a new sort of ζμθία (at the least in the sense 
of ζμθία just considered). His activity has a different character and a different result, as he 
explains, and by explaining it he is also able to explain how the ill-will and the slanders 
against him came about.  
 But before proceeding to that, it is important to briefly consider Socrates‟ defense 
against the new accusations, since that helps us understand the portrait of Socrates painted by 
the accusation and how Socrates interpreted it. The defense is explicitly undertaken in the    
cross-examination of Meletus (24b-28a). Socrates considers Meletus‟ credentials to make the 
accusations – i.e., his understanding of the matters involved therein and of the accusations 
themselves. First, Socrates asks Meletus about the corruption of the young and also about its 
opposite – their improvement. He wants to know who makes the young better, who can 
educate them, and Meletus ends up affirming that all Athenians do (thus following the model 
of traditional education, in which all citizens were qualified to educate the future citizens).
126
 
Socrates, however, compares the case of human beings with animals and points to the fact 
that there are experts that can make the animals better, whereas most people make them 
worse.
127
 Human beings will also likely require an expert to be improved, but Meletus cannot 
name one, and as a result Socrates accuses him of having neglected the question and only 
pretending to be concerned with it.
128
 Moreover, according to Socrates, Meletus assumes that 
either Socrates knows he is harming the young despite knowing this will cause them to harm 
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him in return (what Socrates declares to be absurd) or he does it unknowingly (in which case 
he says he deserves admonishment and not trial).
129
 Whether the argument is fallacious or 
not, it still points to the matter of Socrates‟ possible motivations and his representation of 
what he is doing, as well as the purpose of the trial. Also in this respect, Socrates exposes 
Meletus‟ lack of knowledge, since the latter cannot explain these questions. As for the 
accusation of religious innovation, Socrates shows the inner contradiction of apparently not 
believing in gods (as he leads Meletus to affirm) and at the same time introducing new ones, 




The refutation of the accusations is not very satisfying and somewhat sophistical. 
Many have indeed discussed the validity of Socrates‟ arguments.
131
 But Socrates at least 
raises a strong suspicion that Meletus is not at all competent in the matters under discussion. 
Socrates considers this kind of defense sufficient (especially given the fact he had already 
attacked the underpinnings of these accusations when refuting the old accusations), although 
he will still put forward other important arguments in the course of his speeches. Socrates 
will explain that instead of harming others, he tried to incite them to be as good as possible, 
and also tried to improve the πόθζξ. Hence, if people were not improved, it is because they 
paid no heed to his exhortations. Socrates also explicitly presents himself as a model of piety 
at several points – both in his behavior in court (for instance, by not being willing to beg and 
do everything to influence the jurors) and in his life at large (by undertaking a divine mission 
and fully dedicating himself to it, even at the risk of his own life).
132
 He clearly believes in 
something beyond himself and beyond his more immediate self-interest, since he guides his 
behavior by an objective standard that was indirectly communicated to him by the god via an 
oracle.
133
 To be sure, he did not believe in the oracle blindly and rather needed to interpret it 
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against Athens. Philosophy on Trial, New York/London, Routledge, 2001, 105ff. 
132
 See in particular 28e f. and 35d.  
133
 Cp. 21b ff. and also Chap. 2 Sect. 1 below, for an interpretation of the passage. 
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rationally – but this was just a necessary requeriment for him to understand what the god 
wanted. 
However, despite all characteristics that differentiate him from the new ζμθμί and 
from the portrait painted of him by the old and new accusations, Socrates still resembles this 
kind of ζμθόξ in some respects, and such a resemblance renders his defense less convincing, 
especially for someone not familiarized with him. Socrates explains how he exposes the 
ignorance of others, which seems to imply the ability to make the weaker arguments stronger, 
and he confesses the young imitate him, which means he does affect them in some way.
134
 He 
also seems to introduce significant changes in the normal understanding of religion. He 
follows a more rational and ethical version of religion, directed at truth, justice and goodness. 
Therefore, his piety seems to imply new practices and values. From his standpoint, he is not 
trying to undermine the old values. Instead, he is trying to show how people fall short of 
them. But still he attacks the usual configuration of life (i.e., the unexamined life) and to this 
extent the accusations seem to have some kernel of truth. He and his philosophical 
examination are removing something and trying to introduce something else. The question 
then is whether the innovations are an improvement of the young and the πόθζξ at large or 
not. He will argue that philosophical examination does not attack ἀνεηή or true 
transcendence, but rather promotes them and is essential to improve life. It is the accusers and 
the citizens at large that corrupt the young (by defending a bad education that fails to promote 
ἀνεηή) and are impious (which implies they do not guide themselves by superior values), so 
they are the ones to blame for Athens‟ debacle. At least this is what Socrates strongly 
suggests. 
                                                 
134









“(...) wohin er seine prüfenden Blicke richtet, sieht er den Mangel der 
Einsicht und die Macht des Wahns und schliesst aus diesem Mangel auf 
die innerliche Verkehrtheit und Verwerflichkeit des Vorhandenen. Von 
diesem einen Punkte aus glaubte Sokrates das Dasein corrigieren zu 
müssen: er, der Einzelne, tritt mit der Miene der Nichtachtung und der 
Ueberlegenheit, als der Vorläufer einer ganz anders gearteten Cultur, 
Kunst und Moral, in eine Welt hinein, deren Zipfel mit Ehrfurcht zu 
erhaschen wir uns zum grössten Glücke rechnen würden.” 





 After considering the structure of the accusations as interpreted by Socrates, it is now 
necessary to consider the core of his defense – namely, Socrates‟ justification of his actions 
and his fame. In order to justify them, he will have to present himself and his activity in a 
new light. He will thus try to convey the “real Socrates” and explain the understanding of life 
that moves him. This self-presentation is composed of two main moments. First, he tells 
about a special episode that left him perplexed, mobilized him to examine its meaning and in 
turn lead him to a clear understanding of himself and of what matters in life. Then he 
describes the way of life he adopted in the wake of this episode (namely, a philosophical life 
or a life essentially marked by philosophical examination) and the values that govern such a 
life.  
 
1. Socrates’ presentation of his own peculiar ζνθία  
 
 Socrates‟ elucidation of his acts and behavior, as well as his understanding of life, is 
based on a particular event that he presents as decisive in his life – namely, the oracle that his 
friend Chaerophon brought from Delphi, which declared that no one was wiser (ζμθώηενμξ) 
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 It is this event that led him to question the wisdom of others as well as his 
own – and provided him with an understanding of what he should do in life. We will not 
discuss how the Pythia could have known, or what kind of oracle this was, or whether the 
episode really took place or is rather an invention either of the historical Socrates or of Plato. 
We will likewise leave aside the questions concerning the role of oracles in Greek religiosity. 
We will only analyze the episode as it is presented. We will see how Socrates reacted, how he 
initially interpreted it and how his interpretation changed. The oracle and the process of its 
interpretation are indeed presented as a turning point in Socrates‟ life and this has originated 
much discussion about whether or not he was already in the habit of examining others before 
the oracle.
137
 Looking at the text, nothing forces us to regard this as an absolute beginning of 
Socrates‟ philosophizing, although it is supposed to have brought at least a greater or clearer 
understanding of the importance of philosophical examination in human life – up to the point 
of defining a mission and outlining a way of life. Thus, regardless of whether or not the 
description of the episode exaggerates its importance (and also regardless of whether or not it 
is just a rhetorical strategy), it nevertheless shows us very important traits of Socrates‟ 
outlook on life and helps us understand the importance of philosophical examination. That is 
why we must carefully consider the terms in which it is presented. 
 
1.1. Socrates’ road to self-understanding. The oracle and the examination 
(ἐμέηαζηο) it generated 
 
 Interrogated by Chaerophon, the god at Delphi declared that no one was wiser 
(ζμθώηενμξ) than Socrates.
138
 This left Socrates perplexed, since he was in no way aware of 
being ζμθόξ – at least in the ordinary sense of ζμθία, according to which it is a positive 
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 See 21a: “(...) ἢνεημ βὰν δὴ εἴ ηζξ ἐιμῦ εἴδ ζμθώηενμξ. ἀκε῔θεκ μὖκ ἟ Ποεία ιδδέκα ζμθώηενμκ εἶκαζ.” 
137
 To be sure, Socrates must have done something that would make him at least as wise as anyone else. More 
precisely, he had to know he knew nothing. Therefore, he must have examined himself to a certain extent, and 
he probably had already examined others. But at what stage of his development was he supposed to be when he 
received the oracle? Was he interested in natural sciences (as is said in Phaedo, 96a ff.) and did the oracle lead 
him to a new kind of concerns and a new kind of examination – or had he already developed it and oracle only 
confirmed it? It is probably impossible to answer these questions based on the Apology. For more on the topic, 
cp. e.g. C. REEVE, Socrates in the Apology. An Essay on Plato‟s Apology of Socrates, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 
Hackett, 1989, 21ff.; S. SLINGS, Plato’s Apology of Socrates, Leiden/New York, Brill, 1994, 78-82; H. 
HEITSCH (ed.), Platon Ŕ Apologie des Sokrates, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002, 197-202.  
138
 It is important to note that the way the oracle is formulated does not logically exclude that others have as 
much wisdom as Socrates, but we will see that in a sense he is actually the wisest. 
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knowledge, of the superlative kind, that can guide life.
139
 But at the same time Socrates could 
not bring himself to admit that the god could make a mistake or tell a lie.
140
 Thus the oracle 
presented itself as a problem that required solution. Its meaning was not univocal and patent. 
As was his custom, the god had talked in an obscure manner or in enigmas (αἰκίηηεζεαζ), and 
his words required interpretation.
141
  
What is then the meaning and importance of the oracle? Before all else, it is important 
to keep in mind that the oracle about Socrates is in keeping with a particular tradition of 
oracular pronouncements which are supposed to reveal some important aspect of human life 
or a certain way of interpreting it. There are many instances of oracular answers declaring 
that someone is the most pious, the most ε὎δαίιςκ or the most ζμθόξ.
142
 These are not only 
judgments that compare two or more people. They provide an indication about what piety, 
ε὎δαζιμκία or ζμθία are, by identifying it with someone who is presented as its emblem or 
quintessence. This indication usually goes against the ordinary conceptions. What ordinarily 
seems to be an inferior state is now declared superior, thus subverting the ordinary 
conception of some important notion and introducing a new perspective on it (and often with 
consequences for our understanding of life as a whole). The new perspective would share the 
main traits of the so-called wisdom of Delphi – namely, the acute awareness of the limitations 
of human nature and the importance of being measured or restrained. The oracle about 
Socrates follows this model. Socrates is very deficient in terms of knowledge – to the point of 
not seeming to be ζμθόξ in any respect. But by declaring him ζμθόξ, the oracle points to a 
new interpretation of the meaning of ζμθία. 
 Socrates does not immediately understand the indication given by the oracle. He must 
investigate and search for the meaning of the oracle he received. Therefore, he decides to go 
to those that regard themselves and are regarded by others as ζμθμί.
143
 Socrates thus follows 
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 Cp. 24b: “πμθὺκ ιὲκ πνόκμκ ἞πόνμοκ ηί πμηε θέβεζ”. The verb ἀπμνε῔κ expresses the lack of resources to 
solve something or come through. One is left paralyzed, without knowing what to do or say. In this case, 
Socrates cannot give a meaning to what the god says, and so he does not know how to react to it. 
140
 See 21b: “μ὎ βὰν δήπμο ρεύδεηαί βε· μ὎ βὰν εέιζξ α὎ηῶ.” 
141
 Cp. 21b: “ηί πμηε αἰκίηηεηαζ [sc. ὁ εεόξ];” This was in fact a common feature of oracles, which is accurately 
expressed by Heraclitus: “ὁ ἄκαλ, μὗ ηὸ ιακηε῔όκ ἐζηζ ηὸ ἐκ Γεθθμ῔ξ, μὔηε θέβεζ μὔηε ηνύπηεζ ἀθθὰ ζδιαίκεζ” 
(DK B93). In other words, the oracle does not directly articulate its meaning, but it does not entirely conceal it 
either. It points in a certain direction, it gives a sign or an indication that must be followed, and as such it gives 
us an indirect access to something that transcends us. But it still requires us to pursue the latter and try to 
understand it. In other words, it is supposed to mobilize us and this mobilization is what can lead us to 
understand what is being said.  
142
 On this matter, see in particular R. HERZOG, Das delphische Orakel als ethischer Preisrichter, in: E. 
HORNEFFER, Der junge Platon. I: Sokrates und die Apologie, Giessen, Alfred Töpelmann, 1922, 149-170. 
143
 Cp. 21c: “ἔδμλέ ιμζ μὗημξ ὁ ἀκὴν δμηε῔κ ιὲκ εἶκαζ ζμθὸξ ἄθθμζξ ηε πμθθμ῔ξ ἀκενώπμζξ ηαὶ ιάθζζηα ἑαοηῶ, 
εἶκαζ δ᾽ μὔ· ηἄπεζηα ἐπεζνώιδκ α὎ηῶ δεζηκύκαζ ὅηζ μἴμζημ ιὲκ εἶκαζ ζμθόξ, εἴδ δ᾽ μὔ.” The claim to knowledge 
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the ordinary understanding of ζμθία and searches for those that are normally seen as 
emblems of ζμθία. In other words, he goes to the main representatives of traditional ζμθία: 
statesmen, poets and artisans. These play a crucial role in Greek public life and are thought of 
as possessing some knowledge other people normally do not have. One could wonder why, in 
this context, Socrates does not consider any other classes – and especially the new forms of 
ζμθία. But these traditional forms of ζμθία are paradigmatic. They will show the cognitive 
state of all citizens or of the whole πόθζξ (and perhaps even of all human beings). 
 Socrates interaction with these reputed ζμθμί will assume the form of an examination 
(ἐλέηαζζξ).
144
 More precisely, it is a threefold examination or an examination that has three 
objects. First, it is an examination of the oracle and of the god at Delphi – or more precisely, 
of the god‟s wisdom. Socrates seeks out those that seem to be able to refute the oracle, 
because that is the best way to put the oracle to the test and see what it means (ηί θέβεζ).
145
 
Second, it is an examination of the alleged ζμθία of the reputed ζμθμί (and thus of the public 
view of ζμθία). Finally, it is an examination of Socrates himself, his self-understanding and 
his own cognitive state. The three examinations are intrinsically connected and together they 
constitute a radical examination of the notion of ζμθία. They will question (and deeply 
change) the usual understanding of it, thereby bringing a new appraisal of everyone in the 
πόθζξ (including Socrates) and even a new conception of life and what we should do in it. 
 The oracle thus directs Socrates to some particular others and sends him on a journey 
(like Ulysses) or on a series of labors (like Heracles).
146
 At the same time, the oracle leads 
Socrates to examine himself. The whole human experience is called into question. But what 
exactly happened during this complex examination and how did Socrates interpret it? 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and in particular to wisdom plays indeed a central role in the Socratic examination, as we will see in the 
following. The examination does not take place in a neutral territory with no particular claim to knowledge, but 
in one that is marked by a claim (which in itself is fallible and may be wrong) of having a perfect cognitive 
access to things. This renders philosophical examination particularly useful, since it allows one to cast away the 
conceit of knowledge. For a more detailed discussion of this question, see Chaps. 5-8. 
144
 He actually uses several terms in this passage to express the idea of examination: γήηδζζξ (21b8), δζαζημπε῔κ 
(21c3), ζημπε῔κ (21c4, e6), γδηε῔κ (22a4), ἐλέηαζζξ (22e6). We can still add δζενςη᾵κ (22b4). Later, in 23b5, 
when he stresses the continuity between the process of deciphering the oracle and what he does afterwards, he 
also uses ἐνεοκ᾵κ, along with γδηε῔κ, to designate what he does. The use of all these terms shows that the 
process Socrates is describing is already identified with what it shall give rise to – namely, the philosophical 
examination Socrates will discuss later. For an analysis of these terms, cp. Chap. 4, Sect. 2.  
145
 See 21b-c: “ἤθεμκ ἐπί ηζκα η῵κ δμημύκηςκ ζμθ῵κ εἶκαζ, ὡξ ἐκηαῦεα εἴπεν πμο ἐθέβλςκ ηὸ ιακηε῔μκ ηαὶ 
ἀπμθακ῵κ ηῶ πνδζιῶ ὅηζ „μ὏ημζὶ ἐιμῦ ζμθώηενόξ ἐζηζ, ζὺ δ᾽ ἐιὲ ἔθδζεα.‟ ” Cp. also 21e6: “(...) ἰηέμκ μὖκ, 
ζημπμῦκηζ ηὸκ πνδζιὸκ ηί θέβεζ, ἐπὶ ἅπακηαξ ημύξ ηζ δμημῦκηαξ εἰδέκαζ.” It may seem that Socrates sets out to 
prove the oracle is wrong and is thus being impious, but Socrates is actually unsure of what to think, as was said 
above, and he only wants to discover the truth about what the god is saying. 
146
 These two figures are especially brought to mind by the reference to πθάκδ (22a) and πόκμξ (22a).  
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1.2. The immediate results of Socrates’ examination of ζνθία 
 
Socrates‟ examination had two immediate outcomes and it is important to consider 
each in turn. On the one hand, Socrates was able to diagnose the cognitive state of the reputed 
ζμθμί. On the other hand, it caused a strong reaction by the latter, which is itself an 
expression of their cognitive state (and, according to Socrates, it is also the ultimate reason 
for the old accusations against him). Socrates describes these two results, and he also 
describes how they led to a reappraisal of his own cognitive state and a revision of the   
oracle – which is thus the ultimate and most important result of the examination undertaken 
by Socrates. But let us start with the more immediate results. 
 
a) The ignorance of the alleged ζνθνί 
 
 Socrates is left very disappointed with the examination of the alleged ζμθμί. He does 
not describe his conversations in detail (though we can imagine he is referring to 
conversations similar to the ones we find in the so-called aporetic dialogues). He says that he 
went to the reputed wise, talked with them (δζαθεβόιεκμξ, 21c5) and interrogated them 
(δζδνώηςκ, 22b4). Their wisdom is thus examined in and through θόβμξ. Any practical 
competence they have and which is the source of their reputation will indeed be based on an 
insight or knowledge, and Socrates will question them precisely about this knowledge. They 
must render it explicit and explain or justify it. If it is actual knowledge, they should be able 
to demonstrate it. However, something else happened when they tried to demonstrate their 
knowledge or ζμθία. 
 Socrates mentions three distinct stages, directed to three different kinds of alleged 
ζμθμί, and he describes what he ascertained in each of these stages.
147
 The first stage was the 
examination of statesmen or public men (πμθζηζημί), who are supposed to have a knowledge 
that enables them to govern the state and human life in general. They should thus have a 
superlative knowledge or a ζμθία in the pre-eminent sense. But Socrates says they possess 
only a claim or a semblance of ζμθία, which coexists with its opposite: the lack of ζμθία.
148
 
Their cognitive state is marked by the contradiction between what one supposes about it or 
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 It does not matter whether Socrates really went about examining the three classes in succession or if their 
examination was somewhat simultaneous. The important thing is how they present three different forms of 
alleged ζμθία, each with its own traits. 
148
 Cp. once more 21c: “ἔδμλέ ιμζ μὗημξ ὁ ἀκὴν δμηε῔κ ιὲκ εἶκαζ ζμθὸξ ἄθθμζξ ηε πμθθμ῔ξ ἀκενώπμζξ ηαὶ 
ιάθζζηα ἑαοηῶ, εἶκαζ δ᾽ μὔ”. 
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what it appears to be (δμηε῔κ) and what it really is (its εἶκαζ). A false appearance hides their 
real state – and this is what is conveyed by the expression μἴεζεαί ηζ εἰδέκαζ μ὎η εἰδώξ 
(21d5). They combine or mix in themselves ζμθία (in the form of a claim) and its       
opposite – ignorance. Though in a way they are similar to Socrates (insofar as none of them 
knows something admirable and good), statesmen are far from recognizing their               
state – unlike Socrates, who has no illusions about himself and, since he does not know, he 
also does not think he does.
149
 
  The second stage of Socrates‟ examination of ζμθία provides a similar outcome, 
though with some different features. Socrates goes to the poets, who have the ability to say 
many admirable things (πμθθὰ ηαὶ ηαθά). In fact, the things they say (their poems) were at 
the time a sort of repositories of culture or a “tribal encyclopedia”.
150
 They expressed the 
general Greek outlook on life and in this sense even the statesmen somehow depended on 
them for their knowledge. However, Socrates realizes by examining them that they have no 
knowledge of what they say.
151
 They cannot interpret and explain their verses, which shows 
that their poetical competence or ability to compose (and thus to say admirable things) does 
not come from actual knowledge.
152
 They do what they do and say what they say in virtue of 
a natural disposition (θύζζξ ηζξ) and because they are inspired or possessed 
(ἐκεμοζζάγμκηεξ).
153
 A divine force operates in the poets and gives them a perspective on 
things that lies beyond the ordinary way of seeing them. Therefore, what the poets produce is 
not the result of their action nor is it under their control. When they compose, they are out of 
their minds and possess no clear understanding or no clear access to what they say.
154
 The 
meaning of their verses transcends them and in this sense they are like prophets (εεμιάκηεζξ 
and πνδζιῳδμί), who do not speak on their own authority, but because some superior entity 
speaks through them and guarantees the validity of what they say. If the poets say something 
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 See 21d: “(...) ηζκδοκεύεζ ιὲκ βὰν ἟ι῵κ μ὎δέηενμξ μ὎δὲκ ηαθὸκ ηἀβαεὸκ εἰδέκαζ, ἀθθ᾽ μὗημξ ιὲκ μἴεηαί ηζ 
εἰδέκαζ μ὎η εἰδώξ, ἐβὼ δέ, ὥζπεν μὖκ μ὎η μἶδα, μ὎δὲ μἴμιαζ (...).”  
150
 This was particularly valid of the Homeric poems, but it applies to a greater or lesser degree to most poetry of 
the time. For the notion of a “tribal encyclopedia”, see E. HAVELOCK, Preface to Plato. Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1963, especially 36-86. 
151
 See 22b-c: “ἀκαθαιαάκςκ μὖκ α὎η῵κ ηὰ πμζήιαηα ἅ ιμζ ἐδόηεζ ιάθζζηα πεπναβιαηεῦζεαζ α὎ημ῔ξ, δζδνώηςκ 
ἂκ α὎ημὺξ ηί θέβμζεκ, ἵκ᾽ ἅια ηζ ηαὶ ιακεάκμζιζ παν᾽ α὎η῵κ. αἰζπύκμιαζ μὖκ ὏ι῔κ εἰπε῔κ, ὦ ἄκδνεξ, ηἀθδε῅· 
ὅιςξ δὲ ῥδηέμκ. ὡξ ἔπμξ βὰν εἰπε῔κ ὀθίβμο α὎η῵κ ἅπακηεξ μἱ πανόκηεξ ἂκ αέθηζμκ ἔθεβμκ πενὶ ὧκ α὎ημὶ 
ἐπεπμζήηεζακ. (...) ηαὶ βὰν μὗημζ θέβμοζζ ιὲκ πμθθὰ ηαὶ ηαθά, ἴζαζζκ δὲ μ὎δὲκ ὧκ θέβμοζζ.” 
152
 At this time the Sophists had developed the practice of rationally interpreting the poems and myths. We see a 
good illustration of this in Plato‟s Protagoras (339a ff.). Socrates must have interrogated poets in a similar way, 
which led him to the discovery of their limited understanding of what they were saying (i.e., of the different 
ideas and even the whole outlook on life expressed in their compositions).  
153
 See 22b-c: “ἔβκςκ μὖκ αὖ ηαὶ πενὶ η῵κ πμζδη῵κ ἐκ ὀθίβῳ ημῦημ, ὅηζ μ὎ ζμθίᾳ πμζμ῔εκ ἃ πμζμ῔εκ, ἀθθὰ θύζεζ 
ηζκὶ ηαὶ ἐκεμοζζάγμκηεξ ὥζπεν μἱ εεμιάκηεζξ ηαὶ μἱ πνδζιῳδμί (...).” 
154
 The idea is developed in Ion. See in particular 533d ff. 
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true, they do it in virtue of a superior authority and not because they possess actual 
knowledge of it. To use an expression from a parallel passage in Meno, they possess no more 
than a correct judgment or opinion (ὀνεὴ δόλα).
155
 This allows them to do something, but 
they have no real control over what they are doing. At the end of the day, one can even 
wonder if they are really inspired or not. But assuming this is the case, their state is still 
defective and corresponds to a mixture between knowledge and ignorance different from the 
one that characterized the cognitive state of the πμθζηζημί. The poets possess correct views, 
but they have no clear insight into them. At its core, their supposed knowledge is affected by 
its opposite, ignorance, and this distorts their whole way of seeing things. Thus, the only 
actual knowledge they have is the knowledge of composition. But according to Socrates, this 
core of knowledge caused them to believe they were ζμθώηαημζ with respect to other     
things – though they were not.
156
 They were not aware of their cognitive boundaries and their 
cognitive state. As a result, they believed they knew everything they talked about in their 
compositions. They thought their θόβμξ was an expression of their knowledge, but it was not. 
And so they too differed greatly from Socrates, who was fully aware of his cognitive 
limitations. 
 Socrates discovers something similar in the third stage of his examination of ζμθία, 
which concerned the artisans (πεζνμηέπκαζ). Socrates recognizes that they possess actual 
knowledge in a particular domain. They see things clearly in this domain (thus surpassing the 
ordinary way of seeing them) and this allows them to intervene in reality and do things. If 
they are inquired about it, they can explain what they do and why (even if they do not know 
everything about physics, biology, or whatever other science is relevant for the things they 
deal with). They are not in a trance. They possess a form of ζμθία, or more precisely a ηέπκδ. 
It is true that this ζμθία is limited to a particular domain – and a modest one at that. It has 
nothing to do with the most important matters of life (ηὰ ιέβζζηα), which are the object of 
ζμθία in the pre-eminent sense. But still they seem to know more than Socrates and thus to 
be in a better than him.  
 However, Socrates noticed that artisans do not see their ζμθία as something limited 
and humble. Because of their limited knowledge, they also fancy themselves wise in other 
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 In Meno, Plato actually compares the statesmen with poets and prophets and say that they all act in virtue of 
divine inspiration (which is what gives them a correct judgment) and not because they possess knowledge. See 
96e ff., and especially 99c-d. For more on this passage and the distinction between ὀνεὴ δόλα and knowledge, 
cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.3 below. 
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matters – and particularly in the most important ones. They thus make the same mistake 
(ἁιάνηδια) the poets did and this fault (πθδιιέθεζα) conceals the knowledge they effectively 
have.
157
 They erroneously think they have a homogeneous understanding of things that 
allows them to govern everything.
158
 In other words, their cognitive state is also a mixture of 
ζμθία with its opposite, which now consists in effectively knowing some things and falsely 
thinking one knows all others, or at least the most important. The structure of this false ζμθία 
is similar to the ones that characterized the poets, though in the latter case the domain of 
knowledge and the domain of ignorance were closer to each other (insofar as their 
compositions, which they did know how to do, talked about things they did not know). Here 
the two domains are more separate and their knowledge is firmer (since it is more 
independent from what they do not know), even if their vain conceit of knowledge is equally 
vast.  
 The result of the examination of ζμθμί is thus very disappointing and turns the 
ordinary appraisal of ζμθία upside down. Those that would initially seem the most lacking 
(ἐκδεε῔ξ) and paltry (θαοθόηενμζ), because they deal only with handicrafts, are in fact the 
wisest within the πόθζξ. They are in a more decent state (ἐπζεζηέζηενμζ) with respect to being 
lucid (θνμκίιςξ ἔπεζκ).
159
 In turn, those that seemed the wisest (because they were primarily 
occupied with the most important matters – particularly the government of the πόθζξ) had 
nothing more than a false knowledge claim. In sum, none of the reputed ζμθμί turned out to 
possess a superlative knowledge (that is, a knowledge in the domain of the most important 
things). The only kind of knowledge Socrates was able to find was very insignificant.  
Moreover, the reputed ζμθμί lacked any idea of their own cognitive state and also any notion 
of what actual knowledge would correspond to.  
 This is what Socrates found by examining those that stand out in the πόθζξ in terms of 
knowledge. But what about the other people in the πόθζξ? Socrates does not say much about 
them at this stage, but we can infer from what was said that they at least think they can 
identify who is wise and has some special knowledge that may guide them in the different 
circumstances of life. Moreover, as will be shown later, they have some general outlook on 
life (even if hazy and received from others). In this sense, the results of Socrates‟ 
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 See 22d-e: “ἀθθ᾽, ὦ ἄκδνεξ Ἀεδκα῔μζ, ηα὎ηόκ ιμζ ἔδμλακ ἔπεζκ ἁιάνηδια ὅπεν ηαὶ μἱ πμζδηαὶ ηαὶ μἱ ἀβαεμὶ 
δδιζμονβμί – δζὰ ηὸ ηὴκ ηέπκδκ ηαθ῵ξ ἐλενβάγεζεαζ ἕηαζημξ ἞λίμο ηαὶ ηἆθθα ηὰ ιέβζζηα ζμθώηαημξ εἶκαζ – ηαὶ 
α὎η῵κ αὕηδ ἟ πθδιιέθεζα ἐηείκδκ ηὴκ ζμθίακ ἀπμηνύπηεζκ (...)” 
158
 This is particularly relevant in the context of Athenian democracy, in which artisans took an important role, 
but Socrates is actually describing something that may apply to all of us. 
159
 See 22a: “(...) μἱ ιὲκ ιάθζζηα ε὎δμηζιμῦκηεξ ἔδμλάκ ιμζ ὀθίβμο δε῔κ ημῦ πθείζημο ἐκδεε῔ξ εἶκαζ γδημῦκηζ 
ηαηὰ ηὸκ εεόκ, ἄθθμζ δὲ δμημῦκηεξ θαοθόηενμζ ἐπζεζηέζηενμζ εἶκαζ ἄκδνεξ πνὸξ ηὸ θνμκίιςξ ἔπεζκ.” 
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examination also apply to them. Socrates discovers something not only about the reputed 
ζμθμί, but about all Athenians and probably all that lead an unexamined life. In general, we 
are all full of false knowledge claims, and the fact that is so is essential to understand the 
importance of philosophical examination. 
 
b) The annoyance of the supposed ζνθνί 
 
 The series of examinations just described revealed to Socrates the state the others 
were in.
160
 But Socrates does not just observe from a distance the bad cognitive state of 
others, without interfering in their lives and affecting them. These people have no idea of 
how far they are from knowing what they believed they knew. So Socrates tries to reveal to 
them their cognitive state.
161
 He tries to wake them up from their false ζμθία. In fact, by 
examining the reputed ζμθμί, Socrates ends up unmasking their false knowledge           
claims – i.e., he refutes, exposes and shames them.
162
 Therefore, his examination is far from 
being innocuous. It is described as infliction of pain on others (θοπε῔κ).
163
 This pain results 
from the fact that Socrates‟ examination attacks something that the others are very fond        
of – to wit, their self-image and their public image. They want to be admired by their 
knowledge and it is precisely their love of honor (θζθμηζιία) that causes them to resent 
Socrates.
164
   
 Being examined by Socrates left them annoyed and irritated. They were not able to 
endure Socrates‟ ways of passing the time (δζαηνζααί) and discussions (θόβμζ). In fact, these 
things became too much of a burden (αανύηεναζ) and the cause of ill-will (ἐπζθεμκώηεναζ).
165
 
Philosophical examination is indeed something very cumbersome and violent, and to make 
matters worse, the young that followed Socrates took pleasure in these examinations and 
started imitating him. They examined other people, who would them blame Socrates and get 
                                                 
160
 The text says that he perceives it (αἰζεάκεζεαζ, 21e3 and 22c5), which expresses how evident the result of 
the examination appears to Socrates. In fact, the examination not only raises suspicion about people‟s 
knowledge claims, but it also renders their lack of knowledge patent – or, as Socrates says in 23d: “(...) 
ηαηάδδθμζ βίβκμκηαζ πνμζπμζμύιεκμζ ιὲκ εἰδέκαζ, εἰδόηεξ δὲ μ὎δέκ.”). 
161
 Socrates mentions several times that he shows or exhibits to others their lack of wisdom. See 21c: “(...) 
ηἄπεζηα ἐπεζνώιδκ α὎ηῶ δεζηκύκαζ ὅηζ μἴμζημ ιὲκ εἶκαζ ζμθόξ, εἴδ δ‟ μὔ.” See also 23b: “(...) ηαὶ ἐπεζδάκ ιμζ ιὴ 
δμηῆ, ηῶ εεῶ αμδε῵κ ἐκδείηκοιαζ ὅηζ μ὎η ἔζηζ ζμθόξ”. 
162
 This is precisely expressed by the term ἔθεβπμξ, which we will consider below (see Chap. 4, Sect. 2.2 and 
Chap. 8). 
163
 See 41e3. 
164
 Socrates briefly refers to θζθμηζιία in 23d, but it is actually a very important constituent of the unexamined 
life, as we will see. 
165
 See 37c: “(...) ὏ιε῔ξ ιὲκ ὄκηεξ πμθ῔ηαί ιμο μ὎π μἷμί ηε ἐβέκεζεε ἐκεβηε῔κ ηὰξ ἐιὰξ δζαηνζαὰξ ηαὶ ημὺξ θόβμοξ, 





 Thus Socrates‟ examination of the alleged ζμθμί became the cause of many 
hatreds (ἀπέπεεζαζ), which he further qualifies as very hard and difficult to bear.
167
  
In Socrates‟ view, these hatreds were the source of the old accusations against him.
168
 
People started saying that Socrates disturbed life and inspired the young to do the same. He 
refuted what seemed the best θόβμζ and rendered the weaker ones stronger. This was taken to 
be a manipulation. Socrates wanted to make others look bad or cause them harm. He declared 
he knew nothing, but those who were refuted thought that he had to have some knowledge 
about the matters being discussed, which allowed him to refute others.
169
 Moreover, he would 
know how to trick others into contradicting themselves, and he would also impart this 
knowledge to the young that followed him. Socrates points precisely in this direction. He 
states that when the people that accused Socrates of wrong doing were inquired about it and 
had to explain who Socrates was and what he knew, they would take refuge in the stock 
accusations against intellectuals (for lack of anything more specific) and say that he practiced 
rhetoric and natural science, and so nothing was sacred for him.
170
 In doing so, they were 
looking at Socrates‟ activity from the outside, and not from the angle Socrates himself 
regarded it.  
But were they all that distant from the truth? As was already mentioned, Socrates‟ 
examination does have some resemblance to rhetoric and perhaps even to natural philosophy. 
It goes against the regular course of life, insofar as it puts everything in question and destroys 
one‟s confidence in the way one was living. It attacks individuals and public life, thereby 
altering the usual configuration of life. In this sense, it is an attack on traditional values, by 
showing that they are based on false knowledge claims. Socrates‟ description of his own 
activity thus seems to confirm the accusation – at least to a certain extent. However, Socrates 
also says that he is accused by others not because he attacks their life, but because he exposes 
their ignorance and they get angry at that. Their true motivations are personal.  
Philosophical examination is indeed difficult to bear when one is full of false 
knowledge claims. Life is under attack and one will inevitably strive to get rid of it.
171
 But as 
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 See 23c. 
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 See 22e-23a: “ἐη ηαοηδζὶ δὴ η῅ξ ἐλεηάζεςξ, ὦ ἄκδνεξ Ἀεδκα῔μζ, πμθθαὶ ιὲκ ἀπέπεεζαί ιμζ βεβόκαζζ ηαὶ μἷαζ 
παθεπώηαηαζ ηαὶ αανύηαηαζ (...).” For more references to this hatred, see 21d1, 21e2 and 21e4. 
168
 See ibidem: “(...) ὥζηε πμθθὰξ δζααμθὰξ ἀπ᾽ α὎η῵κ βεβμκέκαζ, ὄκμια δὲ ημῦημ θέβεζεαζ, ζμθὸξ εἶκαζ (...).” 
169
 See 23a: “(...) μἴμκηαζ βάν ιε ἑηάζημηε μἱ πανόκηεξ ηαῦηα α὎ηὸκ εἶκαζ ζμθὸκ ἃ ἂκ ἄθθμκ ἐλεθέβλς.” 
170
 See 23d: “(...) θέβμοζζκ ὡξ ΢ςηνάηδξ ηίξ ἐζηζ ιζανώηαημξ ηαὶ δζαθεείνεζ ημὺξ κέμοξ· ηαὶ ἐπεζδάκ ηζξ α὎ημὺξ 
ἐνςηᾶ ὅηζ πμζ῵κ ηαὶ ὅηζ δζδάζηςκ, ἔπμοζζ ιὲκ μ὎δὲκ εἰπε῔κ ἀθθ᾽ ἀβκμμῦζζκ, ἵκα δὲ ιὴ δμη῵ζζκ ἀπμνε῔κ, ηὰ ηαηὰ 
πάκηςκ η῵κ θζθμζμθμύκηςκ πνόπεζνα ηαῦηα θέβμοζζκ, ὅηζ „ηὰ ιεηέςνα ηαὶ ηὰ ὏πὸ β῅ξ‟ ηαὶ „εεμὺξ ιὴ κμιίγεζκ‟ 
ηαὶ „ηὸκ ἣηης θόβμκ ηνείηης πμζε῔κ.‟ ” 
171
 At 37d2, Socrates speaks precisely of a γδηε῔κ ἀπαθθαβ῅καζ. 
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Socrates stresses, there is more than one way of releasing oneself from the unpleasantness of 
being examined and having one‟s ignorance revealed. One may get angry at the one doing the 
examination and try to repel it, but Socrates talks of another possibility or a different 
direction for one‟s anger. It can indeed be directed at oneself for being in such a state, for 
which the examiner and the examination are not responsible. In that case, the release from the 
attack requires one to become the best possible (i.e., to find knowledge or at least be aware of 
one ignorance). According to Socrates, this is the most admirable and easiest release 
(ηαθθίζηδ ηαὶ ῥᾴζηδ), whereas the other is not just ignoble, but even impossible, since it is 
no real release.
172
 One will continue in a bad state, even if one has no clear notion of it. In 
fact, one‟s unawareness will precisely contribute to remaining in such a state. 
The alternative between the two attempts at release is very important for philosophical 
examination, but it is not very clear what determines the direction of one‟s frustration or 
irritation. There is indeed some attachment to one‟s knowledge claims (the semblance of 
wisdom) and how we guide our life – and this closes us to philosophical examination. We do 
not admit the possibility that we do not know and thus we are closed to other possibilities of 
seeing things. This being the case, there seems to be only one interpretation or one possible 
reaction to what happens. The examinee thinks there is nothing wrong with him or her (since 
he or she is convinced of knowing all that matters). Any discomfort is therefore the 
examiner‟s fault.  
In sum, the very anger and accusations against Socrates are an expression precisely of 
this and of how strong and stubborn our knowledge claims normally are. If any other reaction 
is to take place, it seems necessary to remove these knowledge claims first. Only then will 
one be flexible enough to search for a different release from the discomfort. But how can they 





1.3. The deciphering of the oracle and the discovery of human ζνθία 
 
As we saw, the oracle declared that no one was wiser than Socrates, but such a 
declaration is far from having a clear meaning. How can there be no one wiser than Socrates? 
What does that say about the others? And what does it say about Socrates? Is he the wisest 
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 See 39d: “μ὎ βάν ἐζε᾽ αὕηδ ἟ ἀπαθθαβὴ μὔηε πάκο δοκαηὴ μὔηε ηαθή, ἀθθ᾽ ἐηείκδ ηαὶ ηαθθίζηδ ηαὶ ῥᾴζηδ, 
ιὴ ημὺξ ἄθθμοξ ημθμύεζκ ἀθθ᾽ ἑαοηὸκ παναζηεοάγεζκ ὅπςξ ἔζηαζ ὡξ αέθηζζημξ.” 
173
 Cp. Chap. 8 below. 
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then? How can this be? How can Socrates be the quintessence of wisdom? How are we to 
conceive this wisdom? According to the ordinary sense of the word (either in the general or 
in the pre-eminent sense), the oracle seemed a nonsense. Socrates has no extraordinary 
knowledge. If anything, he seems to have less knowledge than anyone else. He disavows 
knowledge and has no special knowledge claim. He knows nothing about more trivial matters 
(such as handicrafts) and much less about the most important questions (ηὰ ιέβζζηα). This is 
why he decided to put the oracle to the test by examining the reputed ζμθμί and, after 
examining them, Socrates appears to have continued being as ignorant as before. He acquired 
no expert knowledge of any kind. He only realized the bad cognitive state the others found 
themselves in. And yet he was praised by the god for his ζμθία. 
What does he have that they do not? They all lack superlative knowledge (and the 
artisans even have some expert knowledge). But there is a significant difference: Socrates has 
no claim to ζμθία, no knowledge claim in important matters. In this sense, he is wiser. He 
knows as much as the statesmen and, despite knowing less than the poets and the artisans, he 
does not commit the same error they commit. He is better off, as he says, for having neither 
their knowledge nor their stupidity (ἀιαεία).
174
 Their lack (ἔκδεζα) is greater than Socrates‟, 
since they do not realize what they should realize – namely, that they do not possess 
knowledge of what matters the most. There is an undeniable gain in Socrates‟ condition. 
Despite being a negative state (a state of lack), it has a positive character in comparison with 
the state of the reputed ζμθμί. 
So we begin to understand the new concept of ζμθία the oracle is alluding to. It is 
based on the awareness that there is more than simply knowing and simply not knowing 
something. There are also knowledge claims and the disavowal of knowledge. The former 
can coexist with ignorance, in which case it is an ignorance disguised of ζμθία, and is worse 
than disavowing one‟s knowledge, in which case one is at least aware of one‟s cognitive state 
and also of the fact that something important eludes one‟s grasp. This constitutes still another 
intertwinement of ζμθία with its opposite, but now one is aware of it. The component of 
ignorance is not disguised. 
But can such a state be described as ζμθία? Socrates recognizes that it is a sort of 
ζμθία.
175
 There is something out of the ordinary (ἀθθμ῔μκ, πενζηηόηενμκ) in this awareness of 
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 See 22e: “(...) ὥζηε ιε ἐιαοηὸκ ἀκενςη᾵κ ὏πὲν ημῦ πνδζιμῦ πόηενα δελαίιδκ ἂκ μὕηςξ ὥζπεν ἔπς ἔπεζκ, 
ιήηε ηζ ζμθὸξ ὢκ ηὴκ ἐηείκςκ ζμθίακ ιήηε ἀιαεὴξ ηὴκ ἀιαείακ, ἠ ἀιθόηενα ἃ ἐηε῔κμζ ἔπμοζζκ ἔπεζκ. 
ἀπεηνζκάιδκ μὖκ ἐιαοηῶ ηαὶ ηῶ πνδζιῶ ὅηζ ιμζ θοζζηεθμ῔ ὥζπεν ἔπς ἔπεζκ.” 
175
 See 20d: “ἐβὼ βάν, ὦ ἄκδνεξ Ἀεδκα῔μζ, δζ᾽ μ὎δὲκ ἀθθ᾽ ἠ δζὰ ζμθίακ ηζκὰ ημῦημ ηὸ ὄκμια ἔζπδηα.” 
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one‟s ignorance, or something that lies beyond the common perceptions (ημζκαὶ αἰζεήζεζξ). 
The surplus is actually very small.
176
 It does not consist in any positive knowledge about 
some domain of reality and much less about ηὰ ιέβζζηα. Yet, it allows Socrates to be in a 
better state than everybody else. It may seem absurd to the other Athenians and to us that 
someone who has no real knowledge might be wiser than all others – especially given the fact 
that we tend to believe we and other people know many things. But even if we recognize that 
this is not the case (and even if we acknowledge that the alleged ζμθμί do not know anything 
special), it is still difficult for us to conceive that Socrates is wiser than anybody else, given 
the fact that he repeatedly denies having any special knowledge.
177
 Accordingly, we tend to 
interpret the oracle in a weak sense: everybody knows nothing (i.e., no one is wiser than 
anyone else) and so Socrates is in no better condition than the others. It is indeed difficult for 
us to understand how a conscious lack of knowledge can be a privilege and an extraordinary 
state. 
 But Socrates‟ cognitive state implies a knowledge of his own lack of knowledge – or, 
as we could also say, a ζμθία of his lack of ζμθία. This is not just an increase in               
self-knowledge, but also a negative expansion (to use Kant‟s expression) with respect to the 
things he does not know.
178
 It allows him to somehow overcome his own cognitive limits and 
establish a relation with what escapes him or what is beyond him. This relation is one of 
strong tension towards what one does not know and it is also the closest one can be to ζμθία 
without possessing it. It constitutes a higher degree of lucidity (of θνμκίιςξ ἔπεζκ). It brings 
us closer to the truth and mobilizes us to seek it. 
 In contrast, all other people in the πόθζξ are in a worse state, because they lose sight of 
themselves (viz. their real state) and reality. They have no idea of what true wisdom amounts 
to. They are stagnated, satisfied, and in a state of blameworthy ignorance or stupidity 
(ἐπμκείδζζημξ ἀιαεία). As we will see, the word “ἀιαεία” denotes an exacerbated form of 
ignorance – one that is reproachable because one fails to see something that should be 
entirely within reach. It constitutes a heightened incapacity or inferiority. One should indeed 
know one does not know, but one fails to see it. Socrates then further stresses this by 
qualifying this ignorance (or stupidity) as blameworthy.
179
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 See 21d: “(...) ἔμζηα βμῦκ ημύημο βε ζιζηνῶ ηζκζ α὎ηῶ ημύηῳ ζμθώηενμξ εἶκαζ (...).” 
177
 See 21b, 21d, 22d-e, 23b. 
178
 Cp. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in: IDEM, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, Berlin, Georg Reimer, 
1904, 212 (A256/B312). 
179
 Cp. 29b: “ηαίημζ π῵ξ μ὎η ἀιαεία ἐζηὶκ αὕηδ ἟ ἐπμκείδζζημξ, ἟ ημῦ μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ ἃ μ὎η μἶδεκ;” For more on 
this notion, see Chap. 7, Sect. 1 below. 
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 Socrates‟ ζμθία consists precisely in having no blameworthy stupidity and thus being 
closer to true ζμθία. However, his state is still something other than full-blown ζμθία. It is 
rather a human ζμθία, whereby we have to bear in mind the pejorative sense of ἄκενςπμξ in 
Greek culture. Human beings are frail, exposed to what the day brings (or to fortune), and 
above all mortal.
180
 Likewise, human wisdom is a frail, limited wisdom, and it is contrasted 
to two superior forms: god‟s wisdom (i.e., the wisdom of a perfect, infallible, invulnerable 
being) and the ζμθία that is beyond human measure (or beyond human limits – ιείγςκ ηζξ ἠ 
ηαη‟ ἄκενςπμκ ζμθία), which is how Socrates refers to the ζμθία the Sophists allegedly 
possess, since they claim they know and can teach the ἀνεηή of the human being and the 
citizen.
181
 Whether anyone possesses it or not, Socrates is for sure far from possessing it. His 
wisdom is “worth little or nothing”.
182
 But still, it is a form of knowledge or ζμθία, insofar as 
he knows that he is worth very little or nothing in terms of knowledge. He observes the 
precept βκ῵εζ ζαοηόκ (which is not mentioned, but is implicitly present in the Apology): he 
knows himself and knows his limitations.
183
 The connection between the oracle and the 
wisdom of Delphi is thus once more manifest. Both stress the frailty of human condition. In 
the case of the oracle, as was said, more than comparing individuals in terms of knowledge, it 
says something about human cognitive state – namely, it points to Socrates‟ cognitive 
limitations and exalts them as the highest form of knowledge. It is not clear whether or not 
this is a constitutive limitation of human beings in the sense that no one can ever know more 
than Socrates. The view of the limitation is itself limited. But at least the ordinary 
understanding and appraisal of knowledge is replaced by an acute awareness both of its 
difficulty and of our usual distance from it.  
 No one is wiser than Socrates because no one is as aware as him of our cognitive 
state. So he triumphs over all. But it is important to bear in mind the meaning of this triumph. 
Socrates cannot be satisfied with himself, since he knows nothing. He lacks something 
essential, something we all need and long for. So he cannot govern his life and the life of 
others. He is blindfolded and rudderless. His human ζμθία is a violent and disturbing 
experience. Human ζμθία is not a sustainable state or a final destination. It points beyond 
itself. One may be surprised at this, given Socrates‟ serenity and all his certainties. He is sure 
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 For more on the matter, cp. the introduction to Part II below. 
181
 The wisdom of god is presupposed in 21b and confirmed in 23a. For the alleged ζμθία of the Sophists, see 
20d-e. 
182
 See 23a: “(...) ἟ ἀκενςπίκδ ζμθία ὀθίβμο ηζκὸξ ἀλία ἐζηὶκ ηαὶ μ὎δεκόξ.” 
183
 “Knowing oneself” implied precisely knowing one‟s place, one‟s faults, one‟s limitations, and it was a 
warning against an overestimation of oneself and against overreaching. For more on this, see e.g. E. WILKINS, 
“Know Thyself” in Greek and Latin Literature, Chicago, The University of Chicago Libraries, 1917. 
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about his task and its usefulness. But, at the same time, his words also imply that he is in a 
state of restlessness, marked by a strong desire of the knowledge he does not have. He says 
he is better off, but he never says his state is perfect or easy to be in. It is just preferable to 
others.  
If this is so, we could then wonder whether he is really better off. Is his state 
something desirable for us? This question may be essential for our main problem: the value 
of unexamined life and philosophical examination. The latter is indeed what allows us to 
achieve the state of conscious ignorance – and it may fail to lead to anything beyond it (i.e., 
to an actual knowledge of things). If so, what is the value of philosophical examination? Does 
the answer depend on what comes from it (especially whether or not we can ever attain true 
ζμθία)? Or is its value something unconditional, valid even if we achieve nothing more than 
knowledge of our ignorance? In sum, how desirable is the knowledge of our ignorance and 
what is the criterion that determines its desirability? And assuming we desire it, is this a 
permanent and constitutive desire or can it change (or even vanish) in virtue of some yet 
unspecified factors? 
All these questions are raised by Socrates‟ interpretation of the oracle. He was able to 
give it meaning and render it unattackable or unimpeachable (ἀκέθεβηημξ).
184
 In doing so, he 
developed a new understanding both of knowledge and of human life. But what are the 
consequences of this new understanding, both for Socrates and for us? What does it entail? 
This is what Socrates will go on to explain. 
  
2. Socrates’ way of life and the problem of care  
 
 The episode of the oracle is presented as a defining moment in Socrates‟ life, for two 
main reasons. On the one hand, it is the remote cause of the accusation. His                     
cross-examination was unpleasant and annoyed others, who started slandering him, and then 
the slanders ended up causing the lawsuit. On the other hand, Socrates examination of the 
oracle is used to justify his practice, and the need to persist in it and not to stop examining. 
Socrates understood something essential about himself and human life, and this led him to 
discover his purpose in life – or, more precisely, it outlined a mission and a destiny which 
were essentially tied to the examination of philosophical claims. 
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 In the end, the oracle and its examination gave him a clear indication or guidance 
about how he should live. They produced a way of life entirely dedicated to examining 
himself and others (a αίμξ ἐλεηαζηζηόξ, as it were), and this way of life was based on an 
extraordinary conviction, which resisted even the threat of death. Socrates is convinced of the 
value of philosophical examination, he became the agent of such an examination, and his 
defense is thus a defense of philosophical examination and its importance. The fact that he 
possesses such a conviction may be surprising, given Socrates‟ disavowal of knowledge, 
which should produce a state of disorientation. However, the human ζμθία carries with it a 
certain knowledge of how one should guide oneself in life. This appears to be somewhat 
contradictory and at the end of this Part I we will have to consider it a little better. But first 
we must consider how Socrates explains his way of life and commitment to it in the excursus 
that follows his answer to the old and new accusations.  
 
2.1. The examination (ἐμέηαζηο) as personal mission and destiny 
 
 As was said, in the process of examining and deciphering the oracle, Socrates 
understood something essential about himself and life, and this understanding also gave him a 
clear indication of what to do. More specifically, it showed him the importance of what he 
did to interpret the oracle. Therefore, he kept going through the city searching for and 
examining (γδηε῔κ, ἐνεοκ᾵κ, pursuing) those that he thought might be ζμθμί, he put their 
semblance of wisdom to the test and, in case it failed the test, he tried to show to these people 
that they were not wise, so that he could replace their apparent ζμθία with the human ζμθία 
that was characteristic of him.
185
 The goal is to make them realize the state they are in – since 
this frees them from illusions, and thus brings them to a better state. 
 The task of interpreting the oracle thus becomes a full time job.
186
 Examining is his 
business and occupation, and it takes up all his time.
187
 As he says, he spends his time in this 
pursuit (ἐκ ηαύηῃ ηῶ γδηήζεζ δζαηνίαεζκ, 28c8) and does not stop a minute in life (ἐκ ηῶ αίῳ 
μ὎η ἟ζοπίακ ἤβμκ, 36b6). He promises that as long as he breathes and is able, he will not stop 
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 Cp. 23b: “ηαῦη᾽ μὖκ ἐβὼ ιὲκ ἔηζ ηαὶ κῦκ πενζζὼκ γδη῵ ηαὶ ἐνεοκ῵ ηαηὰ ηὸκ εεὸκ ηαὶ η῵κ ἀζη῵κ ηαὶ λέκςκ ἄκ 
ηζκα μἴςιαζ ζμθὸκ εἶκαζ· ηαὶ ἐπεζδάκ ιμζ ιὴ δμηῆ, ηῶ εεῶ αμδε῵κ ἐκδείηκοιαζ ὅηζ μ὎η ἔζηζ ζμθόξ.” 
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 According to the inner logic of the text, and as was briefly discussed above (see footnote 137), this does not 
mean he did not examine himself and others before. The text does not say it one way or the other. We can 
suppose that he obtained the knowledge of his ignorance by this kind of self-examination. But this did not 
involve a clear notion of what ἀκενςπίκδ ζμθία is and of its value. The examination of the oracle gave him a 
confirmation of his standpoint and of the importance of examination.  
187
 Socrates says it is a πνάβια (20c), an ἐπζηήδεοια (28b), and an ἀζπμθία (23b). 
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doing it (ἕςζπεν ἂκ ἐιπκές ηαὶ μἷόξ ηε ὦ, μ὎ ιὴ παύζςιαζ, 29d4f.). He also qualifies this as 
a πμθοπναβιμκε῔κ (31c5) – i.e., a way of occupying himself with things that do not concern 
him directly or of meddling in other people‟s affairs.
188
 His dedication and commitment are 
absolute, and they outline an entire way of living (αίμξ). He leads a life of philosophical 
examination or a philosophical life. 
 According to Socrates, the need for such a strong dedication to examining others was 
shown by the oracle and, therefore, he sees it as a mission delivered by the god. To examine 
is to obey and serve the god at Delphi.
189
 A transcendent being ordered him to do so and, in 
fact not only via the oracle, but (as he later adds) also through signs such as dreams and other 
forms of divine communication that he leaves unspecified.
190
 The foundation is thus initially 
religious. But Socrates does not follow these signs blindly. He interprets them rationally and 
tries to see the meaning behind them. In doing so, he examines others and also himself – and 
ends up confirming the meaning of the oracle. Likewise, we can also confirm it in ourselves, 
using only rational means. We already saw some features of the unexamined life that 
Socrates recognized and helped him confirm the oracle, and we will consider more. Thus, 
even if Socrates‟ understanding came from a divinity (and a very particular divinity, namely 
the god at Delphi, that stresses the distance between humans and gods), it should still be 
regarded as much more than a private religious experience. Socrates extracts from it an 
understanding of life and, based on it, constitutes a new kind of religion or piety, which is 
ultimately tied to the importance of philosophical examination. He undertakes such an 
examination and tries to spread it to others, who should subject themselves to it and (as will 




One must, however, be careful with this imitation. Socrates provides the example of 
the those that imitate him because they take pleasure in exposing other‟s false knowledge 
                                                 
188
 The word πμθοπναβιμκε῔κ implies that one does things that one was not supposed to be doing, thus invading 
the domain of others. It has strong political connotations. In the mouth of an aristocrat, it designates the 
excessive political ambitions of lower classes. It also designated Athens‟ foreign policy and its constant 
meddling in other state‟s affairs. For more on the matter, see e.g. V. EHRENBERG, Polypragmosyne. A Study 
in Greek Politics, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 67 (1947), 46-67. 
189
 Socrates talks of his activity as service, cult, or assistance of the god. Cp. 23c1 (θαηνεία) and 30a7 
(὏πδνεζία). At 23b7 he describes his activity as a ηῶ εεῶ αμδεε῔κ: assisting or helping the god. The verb 
αμδεε῔κ is used in reference to entities (such as gods or πόθεζξ) that cannot protect their interests in person and 
thus require agents or instruments. In this case, Apollo needs Socrates to be his instrument and divulge the 
understanding of ζμθία and of human life expressed by the oracle. For more on this, cp. e.g. S. SLINGS, op. 
cit., 290. 
190
 See 33c: “ἐιμὶ δὲ ημῦημ, ὡξ ἐβώ θδιζ, πνμζηέηαηηαζ ὏πὸ ημῦ εεμῦ πνάηηεζκ ηαὶ ἐη ιακηείςκ ηαὶ ἐλ ἐκοπκίςκ 
ηαὶ πακηὶ ηνόπῳ ᾧπέν ηίξ πμηε ηαὶ ἄθθδ εεία ιμ῔να ἀκενώπῳ ηαὶ ὁηζμῦκ πνμζέηαλε πνάηηεζκ.” 
191





 Their activity has only an external resemblance to what Socrates does. They do not 
understand the meaning of the activity. What is then a true ιίιδζζξ of Socrates? In fact, such 
an imitation would require the young to become like him. They would have to incorporate his 
attitude and outlook on life. Socrates is not moved by an iconoclastic furor and he is not 
pursuing pleasure. He avoids making any knowledge claims. He is only interested in ζμθία 
and its pursuit. He is dominated by θζθμζμθε῔κ in the strongest sense of the word, which is 
(as we shall see) a strong form of attachment to (or even obsession with) knowledge.
193
 He 
understands that he has no knowledge and needs to have it. He also understands that others 
are full of false knowledge claims, and he wants to show them that they are not in the 
condition in which they think they are. In doing so, he also tries to incite them to pursue 
knowledge. This is Socrates‟ orientation in life or his way of life. He examines himself and 




2.2. The value of examination vis-à-vis the risk of dying because of it 
 
 In 28bff., in order to further elucidate his understanding of human life and of the 
importance of philosophical examination, Socrates imagines the jurors asking him if he is not 
ashamed of having dedicated himself to an activity that may lead him to death.
195
 His 
dedication to philosophical examination is thereby put face to face with the risks that may 
ensue for him – and in fact with what seems to be the highest risk, death, along with the 
shame of being responsible for it and not being able to assist oneself.
196
 The question is thus a 
                                                 
192
 See 23c: “πνὸξ δὲ ημύημζξ μἱ κέμζ ιμζ ἐπαημθμοεμῦκηεξ – μἷξ ιάθζζηα ζπμθή ἐζηζκ, μἱ η῵κ         
πθμοζζςηάηςκ – α὎ηόιαημζ, παίνμοζζκ ἀημύμκηεξ ἐλεηαγμιέκςκ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ, ηαὶ α὎ημὶ πμθθάηζξ ἐιὲ 
ιζιμῦκηαζ, εἶηα ἐπζπεζνμῦζζκ ἄθθμοξ ἐλεηάγεζκ (...).” See also 33c: “(...) ἀημύμκηεξ παίνμοζζκ ἐλεηαγμιέκμζξ ημ῔ξ 
μἰμιέκμζξ ιὲκ εἶκαζ ζμθμ῔ξ, μὖζζ δ᾽ μὔ. ἔζηζ βὰν μ὎η ἀδδέξ.” 
193
 Cp. in particular Chap. 13, Sect. 3.3. 
194
 In fact, such description still fails to account for something that is not very clear in Socrates‟ words – namely, 
how his personal pursuit of wisdom (which would be the natural result of his conscious ignorance) relates to his 
role in the πόθζξ – i.e., with his examination of others. Both things seem compatible and deeply interconnected, 
if only because he may try to learn from others when he is examining them. But in his defense speech Socrates 
does not articulate this interconnection very clearly and rather emphasizes the importance of his activity for 
others and the πόθζξ at large, which is precisely what is at issue in the trial. Therefore, we will likewise leave 
aside the question of how self-examination relates to the examination of others, but we will return to it later. See 
Chap. 19, Sect. 5. 
195
 “Δἶη‟ μ὎η αἰζπύκῃ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ημζμῦημκ ἐπζηήδεοια ἐπζηδδεύζαξ ἐλ μὗ ηζκδοκεύεζξ κοκὶ ἀπμεακε῔κ;” 
196
 We find a more elaborate version of this question in Grg. 486a-c, in a passage that foreshadows the trial of 
Socrates. Callicles asks Socrates: “(...) μ὎η αἰζπνὸκ δμηε῔ ζμζ εἶκαζ μὕηςξ ἔπεζκ ὡξ ἐβὼ ζὲ μἶιαζ ἔπεζκ ηαὶ ημὺξ 
ἄθθμοξ ημὺξ πόννς ἀεὶ θζθμζμθίαξ ἐθαύκμκηαξ; κῦκ βὰν εἴ ηζξ ζμῦ θααόιεκμξ ἠ ἄθθμο ὁημομῦκ η῵κ ημζμύηςκ 
εἰξ ηὸ δεζιςηήνζμκ ἀπάβμζ, θάζηςκ ἀδζηε῔κ ιδδὲκ ἀδζημῦκηα, μἶζε᾽ ὅηζ μ὎η ἂκ ἔπμζξ ὅηζ πνήζαζμ ζαοηῶ, ἀθθ᾽ 
ἰθζββζῴδξ ἂκ ηαὶ παζιῶμ μ὎η ἔπςκ ὅηζ εἴπμζξ, ηαὶ εἰξ ηὸ δζηαζηήνζμκ ἀκααάξ, ηαηδβόνμο ηοπὼκ πάκο θαύθμο 
ηαὶ ιμπεδνμῦ, ἀπμεάκμζξ ἄκ, εἰ αμύθμζημ εακάημο ζμζ ηζι᾵ζεαζ. ηαίημζ π῵ξ ζμθὸκ ημῦηό ἐζηζκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, 
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test of Socrates‟ conviction and of the way he leads his life. Will he carry on examining only 
as long as nothing serious is at stake, as a sort of pastime, and sing a different tune when his 
own life is at risk? No, he says. The risk of dying changes nothing. Socrates does not 
waver.
197
 He faces the risk of dying with confidence and serenity. Later he will also 
emphasize that he will not beg nor do everything to escape the accusations.
198
 He is willing to 
die for the principles that ruled his life (which in fact renders even more pressing the problem 
to which we already alluded, concerning the status of Socrates‟ beliefs). 
 But Socrates does not simply reaffirm his commitment. He also examines (and even 
attacks) what is frequently regarded as one of the greatest fears (if not the greatest fear) in  
life – the fear of dying. We all experience it somehow and it may determine our lives in 
different ways (even if only tacitly). Socrates, however, will introduce meaningful and deep 
changes in our usual perspective on death. These changes are based on the previously 
considered changes in the conception of ζμθία, and they are brought about in two fronts.  
 First, Socrates resorts to the aristocratic categories of honor and shame in order to 
determine what is shameful or not. He starts by distinguishing two kinds of calculation or 
concern (὏πμθμβίγεζεαζ), directed at two different goals, and that may determine one‟s action 
and perhaps even one‟s entire life. On the one hand, one may take into account the risk or 
danger, being thus concerned primarily with being alive and surviving. On the other hand, 
one may observe and examine (ζημπε῔κ) whether what we do is just or unjust, and whether it 
is a deed of a good or a bad man.
199
 
                                                                                                                                                        
“ἣηζξ ε὎θο῅ θααμῦζα ηέπκδ θ῵ηα ἔεδηε πείνμκα”, ιήηε α὎ηὸκ α὏ηῶ δοκάιεκμκ αμδεε῔κ ιδδ᾽ ἐηζ῵ζαζ ἐη η῵κ 
ιεβίζηςκ ηζκδύκςκ ιήηε ἑαοηὸκ ιήηε ἄθθμκ ιδδέκα, ὏πὸ δὲ η῵κ ἐπεν῵κ πενζζοθ᾵ζεαζ π᾵ζακ ηὴκ μ὎ζίακ, 
ἀηεπκ῵ξ δὲ ἄηζιμκ γ῅κ ἐκ ηῆ πόθεζ; ηὸκ δὲ ημζμῦημκ, εἴ ηζ ηαὶ ἀβνμζηόηενμκ εἰν῅ζεαζ, ἔλεζηζκ ἐπὶ ηόννδξ 
ηύπημκηα ιὴ δζδόκαζ δίηδκ.” 
197
 In this sense, Socrates answers to the imaginary challenge of the jurors the same way he answers Crito, when 
the latter tries to convince him to break out from jail. See Cri. 46b-c: “ημὺξ δὴ θόβμοξ μὓξ ἐκ ηῶ ἔιπνμζεεκ 
ἔθεβμκ μ὎ δύκαιαζ κῦκ ἐηααθε῔κ, ἐπεζδή ιμζ ἣδε ἟ ηύπδ βέβμκεκ, ἀθθὰ ζπεδόκ ηζ ὅιμζμζ θαίκμκηαί ιμζ, ηαὶ ημὺξ 
α὎ημὺξ πνεζαεύς ηαὶ ηζι῵ μὕζπεν ηαὶ πνόηενμκ· ὧκ ἐὰκ ιὴ αεθηίς ἔπςιεκ θέβεζκ ἐκ ηῶ πανόκηζ, εὖ ἴζεζ ὅηζ μ὎ 
ιή ζμζ ζοβπςνήζς, μ὎δ᾽ ἂκ πθείς η῵κ κῦκ πανόκηςκ ἟ η῵κ πμθθ῵κ δύκαιζξ ὥζπεν πα῔δαξ ἟ι᾵ξ 
ιμνιμθύηηδηαζ, δεζιμὺξ ηαὶ εακάημοξ ἐπζπέιπμοζα ηαὶ πνδιάηςκ ἀθαζνέζεζξ.”  
198
 See 34c ff. 
199
 See 28b: “(...) ἐβὼ δὲ ημύηῳ ἂκ δίηαζμκ θόβμκ ἀκηείπμζιζ, ὅηζ „μ὎ ηαθ῵ξ θέβεζξ, ὦ ἄκενςπε, εἰ μἴεζ δε῔κ 
ηίκδοκμκ ὏πμθμβίγεζεαζ ημῦ γ῅κ ἠ ηεεκάκαζ ἄκδνα ὅημο ηζ ηαὶ ζιζηνὸκ ὄθεθόξ ἐζηζκ, ἀθθ᾽ μ὎η ἐηε῔κμ ιόκμκ 
ζημπε῔κ ὅηακ πνάηηῃ, πόηενμκ δίηαζα ἠ ἄδζηα πνάηηεζ, ηαὶ ἀκδνὸξ ἀβαεμῦ ἔνβα ἠ ηαημῦ.” It is very important to 
bear in mind that the notions of “justice” and “goodness” do not have a primarily ethical and much less 
normative sense. Their meaning is rather functional. Both terms refer to an inner standard of a particular being, 
which defines how this being should be. As we noted above (see footnote 83), δίηαζμκ designates what is fitting 
or proper, how things should be. Goodness, in turn, is connected with excellence (ἀνεηή) and with fulfilling 




These two concerns may be in conflict at decisive moments of one‟s life, and the way 
one solves the conflict will not only shape one‟s life, but according to Socrates and the 
aristocratic categories he appeals to, it will also determine the value of such a life. The natural 
tendency is to be more concerned with survival, but it is possible to invert one‟s natural 
priorities and shift the emphasis towards what is just and good. Socrates provides the 
example of Achilles, who was given the choice between death and dishonor, and decided to 
die in honor.
200
 This is precisely what Socrates will do. He will behave like one of the most 
admired Greek heroes. Of course, there are marked differences between Achilles and 
Socrates – or between what both take to be just and good. It is not even clear that Achilles 
was moved by the concern with what was best. Rather, his action seems to have been 
motivated by anger or pride. If anything, the comparison with Achilles raises the question 
about what is truly valuable and admirable. For Socrates, what really matters is philosophical 
examination. This is what a good and just human being should do. It is what is truly valuable, 
or at least it is intrinsically referred to what is truly valuable: ζμθία. Therefore, it is not 
shameful, but rather honorable and admirable, to sacrifice everything for it. 
Socrates then uses some military images in order to show the importance of paying no 
attention to danger in certain circumstances. He declares as a rule that one should remain and 
endure where one was ordered to stay, either because one thought that was better, or because 
some superior ordered it.
201
 The verb used is ηάηης, which has the sense of giving an order, 
assignment or post, but also of giving order to something, disposing it in the best way. It is 
part of military language and the comparison with what happens in the army is very relevant 
here. The Greek army‟s strength (and thus the survival of the state) depends on each soldier 
staying at his post. Only so can one secure a free and good life. Socrates is thus referring to a 
kind of duty whose particular content may well be given from the outside (by someone 
superior) or be identified within (what seems better), but is at any rate directed to what is 
good.  
                                                 
200
 See 28c-d: “(...) ὁ η῅ξ Θέηζδμξ οἱόξ, ὃξ ημζμῦημκ ημῦ ηζκδύκμο ηαηεθνόκδζεκ πανὰ ηὸ αἰζπνόκ ηζ ὏πμιε῔καζ 
ὥζηε, ἐπεζδὴ εἶπεκ ἟ ιήηδν α὎ηῶ πνμεοιμοιέκῳ Ἕηημνα ἀπμηηε῔καζ, εεὸξ μὖζα, μ὏ηςζί πςξ, ὡξ ἐβὼ μἶιαζ· „ὦ 
πα῔, εἰ ηζιςνήζεζξ Παηνόηθῳ ηῶ ἑηαίνῳ ηὸκ θόκμκ ηαὶ Ἕηημνα ἀπμηηεκε῔ξ, α὎ηὸξ ἀπμεακῆ – α὎ηίηα βάν ημζ,‟ 
θδζί, „ιεε᾽ Ἕηημνα πόηιμξ ἑημ῔ιμξ‟ – ὁ δὲ ημῦημ ἀημύζαξ ημῦ ιὲκ εακάημο ηαὶ ημῦ ηζκδύκμο ὠθζβώνδζε, πμθὺ 
δὲ ι᾵θθμκ δείζαξ ηὸ γ῅κ ηαηὸξ ὢκ ηαὶ ημ῔ξ θίθμζξ ιὴ ηζιςνε῔κ, „α὎ηίηα,‟ θδζί, „ηεεκαίδκ, δίηδκ ἐπζεεὶξ ηῶ 
ἀδζημῦκηζ, ἵκα ιὴ ἐκεάδε ιέκς ηαηαβέθαζημξ πανὰ κδοζὶ ημνςκίζζκ ἄπεμξ ἀνμύνδξ.‟ ιὴ α὎ηὸκ μἴεζ θνμκηίζαζ 
εακάημο ηαὶ ηζκδύκμο;‟ ” 
201
 See 28d: “μὗ ἄκ ηζξ ἑαοηὸκ ηάλῃ ἟βδζάιεκμξ αέθηζζημκ εἶκαζ ἠ ὏π‟ ἄνπμκημξ ηαπεῆ, ἐκηαῦεα δε῔, ὡξ ἐιμὶ 
δμηε῔, ιέκμκηα ηζκδοκεύεζκ, ιδδὲκ ὏πμθμβζγόιεκμκ ιήηε εάκαημκ ιήηε ἄθθμ ιδδὲκ πνὸ ημῦ αἰζπνμῦ.” 
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Socrates then appeals to his own experience. In the army, he stayed at his post and did 
not leave it. He followed his orders. But he also received an order from a superior authority: 
the god. Guided by the oracle, he understood how life itself required philosophical 
examination and that he should spend life philosophizing and examining himself and 
others.
202
 He must thus obey the god and the understanding of life revealed by his oracle. He 
must pursue ζμθία and examine. This is the supreme value in life and Socrates‟ worth (as 
well as everyone else‟s) hinges on it. It is by examining that one becomes just, good, and 
even pious. Therefore, Socrates does not flinch in the pursuit of it, and the resoluteness, 
persistence and courage (ηανηενία) he shows will actually lend an arrogant tone to his 
defense. He fears nothing more than failing in his fundamental task – and the jurors cannot 
scare him in any way. If he is condemned to death, he has nothing to be ashamed of. On the 
contrary: what is worthless, unacceptable, shameful is a life without examination. By leading 
such a life, he would not be doing what is just or the deed of a good man. The right thing to 
do is to pursue the knowledge one lacks, and this pursuit must determine one‟s relation to 
oneself and to others. Socrates thus redefines the ordinary conceptions of shamefulness, 
justice and goodness. Other people will not examine and they will rebuke Socrates for doing 
so, but they do not realize that examining is the just or good thing to do. They think their life 
is valuable without philosophical examination and that one does not need it to live well. But 
for Socrates it is not so. They all need philosophical examination more than anything else.    
 This is one of the ways Socrates attacks the innate and seemingly obvious conviction 
that makes us fear death and explains why he must perform philosophical examinations. But 
there is another form of attack – which is actually a counterattack of philosophical 
examination. Socrates imagined the jurors, as representatives of the unexamined life, trying 
to cast doubt over the commitment to philosophical examination by invoking his fear of 
dying. But philosophical examination retorts by calling into question the very fear of dying. 
Socrates points out that at the core of this fear is a particular view or knowledge claim (a 
μἴεζεαζ ζμθὸξ εἶκαζ or a μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ) about the value of death (more precisely, about 
death carrying with it the greatest evils – ἔζπαηα ηαη῵κ, 40a8). But this view or knowledge 
claim has no real basis. Though Socrates does not fully explain it here, the value of death 
depends on two things: what happens after death and the value of life. We must have a view 
                                                 
202
 See 28e: “(...) ημῦ δὲ εεμῦ ηάηημκημξ, ὡξ ἐβὼ ᾠήεδκ ηε ηαὶ ὏πέθααμκ, θζθμζμθμῦκηά ιε δε῔κ γ῅κ ηαὶ 
ἐλεηάγμκηα ἐιαοηὸκ ηαὶ ημὺξ ἄθθμοξ (...).” Here, Socrates associates the act of examining (ἐλεηάγεζκ) with 
loving wisdom (θζθμζμθε῔κ), and this is not incidental. As we saw, the examination is a pursuit of knowledge, it 
examines knowledge claims and it wants to find real knowledge.  
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on both, but they are both problematic questions. On the one hand, we have no way of 
knowing what happens after death and so we cannot exclude the possibility of it being a good 
thing or even the greatest good. On the other hand, our life may also be undesirable or not 
worth living (even if we do not realize it) and so one would be better off dying.
203
 However, 
we disregard these problems or rather promptly (and acritically) accept the view that death is 
bad and living is good. This is the cause of our strong feelings about death – and what could 
lead one to feel ashamed for being sentenced to death. Socrates thus questions the views or 
beliefs that underpin the question he just put in the mouth of the jurors, and he goes even 
further. He says that these views or beliefs about death (and about life) constitute a form of 
blameworthy stupidity (ἀιαεία ἟ ἐπμκείδζζημξ), and it is therefore much more shameful than 
running risks whose value we do not know.
204
 So once more Socrates must do what a just and 
good man would do – namely, he must obey god‟s wisdom and, consequently, examine 
himself and others. Socrates commits himself fully to this line of action and he says he would 
not abandon his task even if he had to die many times.
205
 He must obey the god, and be just 
and good. This is his conception of excellence and also of piety, and he lives according to it. 
 
2.3. The introduction of the question of what one cares for (ἐπηκειεῖζζαη) and its 
importance for philosophical examination  
  
 After making clear his commitment to philosophical examination and the way it 
determines his life, Socrates seems to introduce a significant shift in his conception of 
philosophical examination. Hitherto Socrates had only talked of an examination of 
knowledge claims and of the cognitive state of the reputed ζμθμί. Now, however, he begins 
to talk of examining what one cares for. The two versions may not seem immediately 
compatible, but, as we will see, they do not correspond to two different concepts of 
examination. The second version is rather a development of what was said before, and it 
helps us understand the importance of ζμθία and also of philosophical examination. Let us 
then see what is at issue here. 
In 29c7f., Socrates speaks once more for the jurors and imagines them making a 
proposal according to which he will be able to go away unscathed, on the condition that he 
                                                 
203
 In his final speech, Socrates will consider the first of these questions (namely, what may happen after death) 
and he will also allude to the second. Cp. Chap. 3, Sect. 3 below. 
204
 The notion of blameworthy ignorance or stupidity was mentioned above (see Sect. 1.3). For a more detailed 
analysis of it, cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 1 below. 
205
 See 30b8s.: “(...) ἐιμῦ μ὎η ἂκ πμζήζακημξ ἄθθα, μ὎δ‟ εἰ ιέθθς πμθθάηζξ ηεεκάκαζ.” 
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stop spending his time on this pursuit (γήηδζζξ) of his and stop desiring or pursuing ζμθία 
(θζθμζμθε῔κ). 
206
 In other words, the jurors would try to turn Socrates away from his activity 
and make him compromise. Socrates, however, affirms that he would pay no heed to such an 
apotreptic effort and reaffirms his will to continue examining and to do so while he breathes 
and is able.
207
 Immediately thereafter, Socrates describes what he usually says to the 
Athenians and thus summarizes the central points of his conversations and examinations. It is 
precisely at this point that he seems to shift his way of conceiving philosophical examination.  
Socrates states that when talking to the Athenians, he contrasts the reputation of the 
πόθζξ (the greatest and best reputed for ζμθία and strength) with the shame its citizens should 
feel for how they guide their lives and for what their care or concern (i.e., their ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ 
or θνμκηίγεζκ) is directed to.
208
 At the center of everything is thus one‟s act of ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ 
and θνμκηίγεζκ. These words designate the special way in which one cares for (or concerns 
oneself with) something that does not happen by itself or is not guaranteed, and thus requires 
our intervention.
209
 Such a way of caring is also an expression of how we are not indifferent 
to what happens to us. Our life can follow different courses and have different contents. It is 
open and the shape it assumes at any given moment depends on us and what we do. We are 
called to intervene. We may let life continue as it is or try to improve it, in order to make it 
better. This is what we normally do. We try to improve our life.
210
  
However, there can be multiple directions of care. We may care for different things 
and in different ways. In fact, we seem to care for many different things at different times, 
                                                 
206
 See 29c: “(...) ἀθίειέκ ζε, ἐπὶ ημύηῳ ιέκημζ, ἐθ‟ ᾧηε ιδηέηζ ἐκ ηαύηῃ ηῆ γδηήζεζ δζαηνίαεζκ ιδδὲ 
θζθμζμθε῔κ.” 
207
 See 29d: “(...) εἰ μὖκ ιε, ὅπεν εἶπμκ, ἐπὶ ημύημζξ ἀθίμζηε, εἴπμζι᾽ ἂκ ὏ι῔κ ὅηζ „ἐβὼ ὏ι᾵ξ, ὦ ἄκδνεξ Ἀεδκα῔μζ, 
ἀζπάγμιαζ ιὲκ ηαὶ θζθ῵, πείζμιαζ δὲ ι᾵θθμκ ηῶ εεῶ ἠ ὏ι῔κ, ηαὶ ἕςζπεν ἂκ ἐιπκές ηαὶ μἷόξ ηε ὦ, μ὎ ιὴ 
παύζςιαζ θζθμζμθ῵κ ηαὶ ὏ι῔κ παναηεθεοόιεκόξ ηε ηαὶ ἐκδεζηκύιεκμξ ὅηῳ ἂκ ἀεὶ ἐκηοβπάκς ὏ι῵κ (...).” 
208
 See 29d-e: “(...)μ὎ ιὴ παύζςιαζ θζθμζμθ῵κ ηαὶ ὏ι῔κ παναηεθεοόιεκόξ ηε ηαὶ ἐκδεζηκύιεκμξ ὅηῳ ἂκ ἀεὶ 
ἐκηοβπάκς ὏ι῵κ, θέβςκ μἷάπεν εἴςεα, ὅηζ „ὦ ἄνζζηε ἀκδν῵κ, Ἀεδκα῔μξ ὤκ, πόθεςξ η῅ξ ιεβίζηδξ ηαὶ 
ε὎δμηζιςηάηδξ εἰξ ζμθίακ ηαὶ ἰζπύκ, πνδιάηςκ ιὲκ μ὎η αἰζπύκῃ ἐπζιεθμύιεκμξ ὅπςξ ζμζ ἔζηαζ ὡξ πθε῔ζηα, ηαὶ 
δόλδξ ηαὶ ηζι῅ξ, θνμκήζεςξ δὲ ηαὶ ἀθδεείαξ ηαὶ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ὅπςξ ὡξ αεθηίζηδ ἔζηαζ μ὎η ἐπζιεθῆ μ὎δὲ 
θνμκηίγεζξ;‟ ”. It is important to keep in mind that Socrates says this at a time in which the greatness of the πόθζξ 
had apparently vanished, given its very recent defeat and humiliation in the Peloponnesian War (which, as we 
saw, was also one of the motives behind the hostility and the process against Socrates). The πόθζξ had lost its 
empire and had almost been destroyed. The situation was extremely dire, and the claim to greatness was at this 
point no more than an empty claim. Therefore the exhortation to make something about it and care for it is very 
significant. Greatness requires a certain direction of care. 
209
 The idea of care or concern was already implied in what we considered in the previous section. In certain 
circumstances, one must be concerned either with one‟s survival or with justice and goodness. But now Socrates 
will consider it in a more general way, as something that determines our life at every moment. 
210
 The idea of improving one‟s life was already present in the notions of ζμθία (which was defined as a 
knowledge able to guide one‟s life) and παζδεία (which was associated precisely to the idea of improving 
someone). ΢μθία and παζδεία are essential conditions for the improvement implied in ἐπζιέθεζα. However, Plato 
will not expressly focus these links at this point. 
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though usually there is a general direction that coordinates all efforts. Socrates will focus 
precisely on the latter. The general direction of our care is not fixed or pre-determined, and so 
we can change it. But there are only a few general directions to choose from. Socrates does 
not make a long inventory. He organizes and divides all forms of care into two groups, 
thereby emphasizing a single juncture. One may either care for one‟s possessions (πνήιαηα), 
body (ζ῵ια), reputation (δόλα), honor (ηζιή). But one may also care for one‟s intelligence or 
lucidity (θνόκδζζξ), truth (ἀθήεεζα) and the soul being the best possible (αεθηίζηδ,      
ἀνίζηδ) – and thus possessing excellence.
211
  
 By making this contrast, Socrates points to the fact that the decisive factor is whether 
we care for our ροπή or rather neglect it. But what is the ροπή? It is not immediately clear 
what the term means and how it was understood at this time. We will consider its meaning in 
more detail later, but we can anticipate some important aspects of it now.
212
 Ψοπή is often 
translated as mind or soul, but both renderings are one-sided. Mind gives the term an 
excessively cognitive connotation, which applies to some of Plato‟s uses, but is not by itself 
contained in the Greek word (which includes at its center a volitive and an emotional 
component). The term soul in turn seems excessively metaphysical, though it is somewhat apt 
to designate the mystery of our inner being – and that is precisely what is primarily at issue 
here. Ψοπή is the core of our being. It is at the center of our life – and in a way it can even be 
said to be our life as such. As a result, the term raises the question of how it relates not only 
to itself, but also to other things (and what distinguishes it from them). The soul is indeed a 
sort of self, but it somehow pervades all other things and renders them relevant for one‟s self, 
as things of the self or one‟s belongings.
213
 It is, however, difficult to bring the ροπή into 
focus. We all have a good idea of what possessions, the body, reputation and honor are – and 
so it is also clear how we can care for them. But the soul is more difficult to define – and we 
may not even notice it as something distinct from all other things. 
 Socrates, however, tries to call the attention to the ροπή as such and stresses the 
importance of being aware of it. Indeed, the soul or our inner being is not something 
absolutely fixed. It can have different modalities, and these modalities have different values. 
The soul can be bad (ηαηή) or it can be good and even the best possible – i.e. it can have 
                                                 
211
 Socrates formulates the alternative more than once, and not always the same way. See 29d-30b, 36c, and 41e. 
He talks of excellence (ἀνεηή) in 29e5, 31b5, 41e3-5. 
212
 For more on the notion of ροπή, cp. Chap. 10.  
213
 This aspect is clearer in Alc. I, where Socrates distinguishes between the self (α὎ηόξ), the belongings of the 
self (ηὰ ἑαοημῦ – i.e., the body) and the belongings of the belongings of the self (ηὰ η῵κ ἑαοημῦ). See 129c ff., 
and for a consideration of some important aspects of the passage, cp. Chap. 13, Sect. 2.1 below. 
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excellence (ανεηή) or not. This alternative is essential, according to Socrates. We are not 
indifferent to it, because it determines the quality of our life. Moreover, although the soul is 
not necessarily good, it can improve and become better. It all depends on whether we care for 
it or not. The alternative between self-care (or care of the soul) and self-neglect affects our 
whole life. One must make the soul better – and according to Socrates that implies making it 
more lucid and give it a better access to the truth. Our core depends on its cognitive state and 
we must care for it, which we do by performing philosophical examination. The latter is thus 
the way of making us realize the importance of caring for the soul and also the way of caring 
for it. This is why it is so important.  
 This is the gist of what Socrates is saying, but it is important to consider some aspects 
of the question in more detail. To begin, we usually think the quality of our life depends on 
what we have or what go through, and not on our inner self or the modality of our soul. With 
respect to the latter, we tend not to see any alternatives. Life can have different contents, but 
we are always the same. Socrates, however, focus his attention on the soul‟s state, and more 
precisely on whether it is in a state of ignorance, and distorts things or has false knowledge 
claims – or whether it sees things as they are, and has therefore θνόκδζζξ and truth (i.e., 
whether is marked by εἰδέκαζ or ζμθία). This is essentially connected with our caring for the 
soul or not. We can neglect it and its relation with θνόκδζζξ and truth, and so we will steer 
ourselves to something different from θνόκδζζξ and truth. But we can also focus on it and 
turn our attention to it. Socrates does precisely this and tries to steer others in the same 
direction. But people are usually turned in a different direction. Other objects seem             
all-important – such as possessions, body, etc. – and we have no time and no interest to care 
for knowledge. This does not mean we are complete indifferent to θνόκδζζξ and ἀθήεεζα. We 
still need knowledge, but we already have many knowledge claims, and this is why we live as 
we do and care for something the way we do. We do not need to care for θνόκδζζξ and 
ἀθήεεζα because supposedly we already have them. We regard our immediate contact with 
life as clear and evident. We only care for what is beyond this (i.e., that to which our 
supposed θνόκδζζξ and ἀθήεεζα direct us). But this has serious consequences for our life and 
our     soul – and they are revealed by philosophical examination. Our life is characterized by 
a μ὎η ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ ὧκ δε῔ and a μ὎η ὀνε῵ξ γ῅κ – even if we do not realize it. We neglect 
what it important, though we think the opposite. We live in a fundamental state of neglect of 
ourselves, and consequently we are worth nothing (or, as Socrates says, we are marked by a 
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μἴεζεαί ηζ εἶκαζ ὄκηεξ μ὎δεκὸξ ἄλζμζ, 41e7) and our life, as we will see, is not worth living (μ὎ 
αζςηόξ).  
 This is, at least, what Socrates defends. But he also knows that it is very difficult for 
people in general to accept that it is so, and he even describes what he does when others do 
not accept this kind of accusation. When they deny that it is so and say they care for what 
matters, Socrates interrogates them, examines them, and puts them to the test.
214
 This seems 
to be a new kind of examination, no longer of ζμθμί or of knowledge claims. The 
examination is now about one‟s care – i.e., about what matters and what does not matter to 
oneself. In other words, it is now a test of one‟s life (or, as is said later in the Apology, an 
ἔθεβπμξ ημῦ αίμο), which tries to ascertain whether one lives correctly or not.
215
 But this does 
not mean Socrates abandons the examination of knowledge and only focus on what one does. 
These are not two different kinds of examination that have nothing to do with each other. 
They are in fact two sides of the same examination and the new features now introduced are 
just a deepening of the previous description. The two descriptions focus on two important 
elements of life that belong together – namely, knowledge and care. We can infer their 
intrinsic relation from what was said (though it was not clearly stated). On the one hand, care 
depends on knowledge (or one‟s knowledge claims). Our way of seeing things is essential to 
determine how we live and, as we saw, ζμθία (or the claims thereof) is primarily about most 
important things in life (i.e., about what they are and how to reach them). So one tests one‟s 
life (and one‟s way of caring for it) by considering one‟s views or knowledge claims. Indeed, 
practical failure is always connected with cognitive failure. On the other hand, our cognitive 
state depends on care – and not only because practical knowledge is somehow at the center of 
all knowledge (or all knowledge claims). One‟s views (and their quality) depend on what we 
care for. Our caring affects what we see or think, and how we can develop it. There is thus a 
correlation between our cognitive state and our caring (or the way of life that results from it). 
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 See 29e: “ηαὶ ἐάκ ηζξ ὏ι῵κ ἀιθζζαδηήζῃ ηαὶ θῆ ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ, μ὎η ε὎εὺξ ἀθήζς α὎ηὸκ μ὎δ᾽ ἄπεζιζ, ἀθθ᾽ 
ἐνήζμιαζ α὎ηὸκ ηαὶ ἐλεηάζς ηαὶ ἐθέβλς (...).” 
215
 See 39c7, and for a more elaborate description of such an examination of one‟s life, cp. La. 187e-188c: “μὔ 
ιμζ δμηε῔ξ εἰδέκαζ ὅηζ ὃξ ἂκ ἐββύηαηα ΢ςηνάημοξ ᾖ θόβῳ ὥζπεν βέκεζ ηαὶ πθδζζάγῃ δζαθεβόιεκμξ, ἀκάβηδ 
α὎ηῶ, ἐὰκ ἄνα ηαὶ πενὶ ἄθθμο ημο πνόηενμκ ἄνλδηαζ δζαθέβεζεαζ, ιὴ παύεζεαζ ὏πὸ ημύημο πενζαβόιεκμκ ηῶ 
θόβῳ, πνὶκ ἂκ ἐιπέζῃ εἰξ ηὸ δζδόκαζ πενὶ α὏ημῦ θόβμκ, ὅκηζκα ηνόπμκ κῦκ ηε γῆ ηαὶ ὅκηζκα ηὸκ πανεθδθοεόηα 
αίμκ αεαίςηεκ· ἐπεζδὰκ δ᾽ ἐιπέζῃ, ὅηζ μ὎ πνόηενμκ α὎ηὸκ ἀθήζεζ ΢ςηνάηδξ, πνὶκ ἂκ ααζακίζῃ ηαῦηα εὖ ηε ηαὶ 
ηαθ῵ξ ἅπακηα. (...) ἐιμὶ ιὲκ μὖκ μ὎δὲκ ἄδεεξ μ὎δ᾽ αὖ ἀδδὲξ ὏πὸ ΢ςηνάημοξ ααζακίγεζεαζ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ πάθαζ 




In fact, the connection is even more complex, as we will see later, when considering what is 
said in the whole corpus.
216
 
 The important thing here is the fact that we usually neglect knowledge – and thus 
neglect our soul and live incorrectly. Socrates sees this and tries to counteract this movement 
by shifting the direction of our ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ. He tries to awaken in others the desire or pursuit 
of knowledge or ζμθία (i.e., the desire to know or θζθμζμθε῔κ). This depends on 
philosophical examination and it will lead to further examination. Philosophical examination 
is thus at the core of Socrates‟ intervention. It puts one‟s usual life in question and constitutes 
a new way of life. To examine is indeed the way of steering us towards the care of the soul, 
and at the same time it is the way to care for it and to make it as good as it can be. Thus, 
Socrates teaches others to care for themselves, which requires them to imitate him by 
examining knowledge claims and caring for their soul.  
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 See the analysis of αίμξ in Chap. 13, Sect. 6, and especially the analysis of the unexamined life in Chaps. 15 





The value of philosophical examination  
 
 
“Σίξ κοκ ἐζώεδ δζὰ ηὴκ Ἀθελάκδνμο κίηδκ; Σίξ πόθζξ ἄιεζκμκ ᾠηήεδ; 
Σίξ α὏ημῦ βέβμκε αεθηίςκ ἰδζώηδξ ἀκήν; Πθμοζζςηένμοξ ιὲκ βὰν 
πμθθμὺξ ἂκ εὕνμζξ, ζμθώηενμκ δὲ μ὎δέκα [ηαὶ] <μ὎δὲ> ζςθνμκέζηενμκ 
[μ὎δὲ] α὎ηὸκ α὏ημῦ, εἰ ιὴ ηαὶ ι᾵θθμκ ἀθαγόκα ηαὶ ὏πενόπηδκ. Ὅζμζ δὲ 
ζώγμκηαζ κῦκ ἐη θζθμζμθίαξ, δζὰ ηὸκ ΢ςηνάηδ ζώγμκηαζ.” 





 We began by considering Socrates‟ analysis of the accusations, which expressed how 
he was seen by others and how philosophical examination appears to the unexamined life. 
We saw that philosophical examination is basically seen as something superfluous and 
disruptive. Then we considered Socrates‟ self-interpretation, his understanding of 
philosophical examination and the reasons for his dedication to it. Now we have to tackle a 
question that emerges in the final part of the first speech and in the other two speeches. After 
describing his activity, Socrates tries to determine the precise value of philosophical 
examination. This is indeed the central question of his trial, and though Socrates had already 
given some important indications about it, he now brings the question to the forefront and 
tries to discuss it. He does so from two different standpoints: the political standpoint and what 
we could call the anthropological standpoint. In other words, he tries to show how crucial his 
activity is for the πόθζξ and also for all human beings as such. Both domains are deeply 
intertwined, which raises the question about their precise relation. But we will not consider 
this question here, since (as stated above) our goal is only to determine the importance of 
philosophical examination for human life in general – at least to the extent in which it allows 
for a separate consideration.
218
 Many relevant aspects of the question are indeed discussed 
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 See G. ROCHEFORT (ed.), L’empereur Julien Ŕ Œuvres Complètes, vol. 2.1, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1963 
(repr. 2003). 
218
 The arguments in the Apology are actually somewhat vague. Socrates seems to assume an isomorphism 
between the individual and the πόθζξ, and so what is beneficial for individuals is also beneficial for the πόθζξ 
and vice versa. Socrates goes on to stress the political benefits of his activity, but this is influenced by the 
setting. He is, after all, discussing his role in the πόθζξ. However, he talks mostly about things he does in a    
non-political setting. Socrates interacts with individuals and he seems to be equally concerned with all of them. 
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with respect to the entire πόθζξ. In particular, Socrates is adamant that his way of examining 
life brings about the greatest benefits. This implies the admission that his activity has some 
effects, not only on the young, but also on everybody else, and so it somehow disrupts life in 
the πόθζξ. But Socrates will argue that the effects and the disruption produced are not the 
ones the prosecution claims. He is not to blame for the moral decay and the fall of the πόθζξ. 
Philosophical examination is not harmful, it does not corrupt, but is rather a source of 
improvement and perhaps even salvation. It is something good and even the greatest good, as 
Socrates says.
219
 This is valid for everybody. The unexamined life is intrinsically undesirable 
and philosophical examination is absolutely necessary for all of us. This is precisely the view 
we want to discuss in this dissertation, and so we must see in detail the main lines of 
reasoning in the text. 
 
1. The usefulness of philosophical examination (ἐμέηαζηο) to the πόιηο and to every 
individual 
 
 After describing the examination of one‟s knowledge claims and of what one cares for 
in life, Socrates goes on to describe the protreptic side of his activity (which to a certain 
extent was already implied in the passages considered above). He not only examines people‟s 
knowledge claims and sees their lack of knowledge and self-neglect (i.e., their bad inner state 
and lack of ἀνεηή), but he also shows them that they are in such a state and that they need to 
care for θνόκδζζξ and ἀθήεεζα. He tries to persuade them to do so and keep examining.
220
 
But this is not easy. People normally do not see any defect, nor do they see any need to 
change their ways. Therefore, they resist Socrates‟ injunction and try to get rid of him. 
Nevertheless, Socrates persists. As he says, he reproves, insults or offends (ὀκεζδίγεζκ) those 
who neglect what really matters.
221
 He tries by all means to stimulate them to change their 
behavior, so he intensifies the aggression that was already involved in exposing people‟s false 
knowledge claims or in the Socratic ἔθεβπμξ. 
                                                                                                                                                        
In other writings, Plato restricts this concern in virtue of political and psychological considerations. In the ideal 
city of the Republic, for instance, philosophical examination is not for everyone. This raises questions we will 
discuss later (cp. Chap. 19, Sect. 6.1). But for now let us just see what is said in the Apology.  
219
 See 38a: “(...) ηοβπάκεζ ιέβζζημκ ἀβαεὸκ ὂκ ἀκενώπῳ ημῦημ, ἑηάζηδξ ἟ιέναξ πενὶ ἀνεη῅ξ ημὺξ θόβμοξ 
πμζε῔ζεαζ ηαὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ πενὶ ὧκ ὏ιε῔ξ ἐιμῦ ἀημύεηε δζαθεβμιέκμο ηαὶ ἐιαοηὸκ ηαὶ ἄθθμοξ ἐλεηάγμκημξ (...).” 
220
 In 29d5 he talks of exhorting others (παναηεθεύεζεαζ) and in 36d8 of persuading them (πείεεζκ). 
221
 Cp. 29e f., 30e, 39d, 41e. 
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 Socrates thus admits that he tries to affect the lives of the people he deals with (and 
this is quite a large group of people, since he talks with young and old, rich and poor).
222
 His 
philosophical examination is not just a theoretical activity, but it is directly concerned with 
how we live and can deeply affect our life. It shows its deficiencies and tries to change          
it – i.e., it tries to guide our care in a different direction. To this extent, the protreptic 
exhortation is intimately connected with philosophical examination. Since the latter reveals 
false knowledge claims and our distance from excellence or an excellent inner state, it also 
tries to change our ways – which means that it tries to make us realize the importance of 
philosophical examination and that we need to commit to it. 
 In sum, philosophical examination, as Socrates describes it, is not a private matter. It 
is concerned with others and affects them. As was said above, Socrates meddles in other 
people‟s affairs (or is guilty of πμθοπναβιμζύκδ).
223
 He does not mind his own business. 
Instead, he affects others and even takes this as his mission. But what is the value of this 
interference in other people‟s lives? Is philosophical examination in itself something 
detrimental, indifferent, useful, beneficial or indispensable? This is the decisive question in 
Socrates‟ trial, because it determines his role (and consequently the role of philosophical 
examination) in the πόθζξ and human life. What is then the value of philosophical 
examination? 
 By trying to change other people‟s lives and lead them to examine themselves, 
Socrates is assuming philosophical examination is beneficial. But this is not all. He expressly 
states that there is no greater good for the Athenians than his own service to the god.
224
 He 
goes about in the πόθζξ, showing people their ignorance, and trying to persuade others to care 
for their souls – and according to him this is what contributes the most for the individual and 
collective good. But how can this service be the greatest good? Is Socrates exaggerating or 
does he have good reasons for saying such a thing? 
 Everything seems to be based on the diagnosis of the individuals and the πόθζξ. From 
the standpoint of Socrates and his examination, the city is corrupted and he is not the cause. 
He is only calling the attention to the situation and the need to correct it. He tries to improve 
the young, as well as the old and even the entire πόθζξ. But people do not recognize the state 
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 Cp. 33a-b: “(...) εἰ δέ ηίξ ιμο θέβμκημξ ηαὶ ηὰ ἐιαοημῦ πνάηημκημξ ἐπζεοιμ῔ ἀημύεζκ, εἴηε κεώηενμξ εἴηε 
πνεζαύηενμξ, μ὎δεκὶ πώπμηε ἐθεόκδζα, μ὎δὲ πνήιαηα ιὲκ θαιαάκςκ δζαθέβμιαζ ιὴ θαιαάκςκ δὲ μὔ, ἀθθ᾽ 
ὁιμίςξ ηαὶ πθμοζίῳ ηαὶ πέκδηζ πανέπς ἐιαοηὸκ ἐνςη᾵κ, ηαὶ ἐάκ ηζξ αμύθδηαζ ἀπμηνζκόιεκμξ ἀημύεζκ ὧκ ἂκ 
θέβς.” 
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 Cp. 31c: “(...) ἐβὼ ἰδίᾳ ιὲκ ηαῦηα ζοιαμοθεύς πενζζὼκ ηαὶ πμθοπναβιμκ῵ (...).” For more on 
πμθοπναβιμκε῔κ, see footnote 188 above. 
224
 See 30a: “(...) ἐβὼ μἴμιαζ μ὎δέκ πς ὏ι῔κ ιε῔γμκ ἀβαεὸκ βεκέζεαζ ἐκ ηῆ πόθεζ ἠ ηὴκ ἐιὴκ ηῶ εεῶ ὏πδνεζίακ.” 
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they are in, and therefore they cannot see any benefit in what Socrates does. This is what 
Socrates must try to change. He must show people their state, what results from the lack of 
examination and how important it is to examine. He must also explain why people do not 
realize that it is so important and deem it useless and even detrimental.  
In order to do this, Socrates employs two striking images. First, he compares the πόθζξ 
to a magnificent horse (ἵππμξ ιέβαξ ηαὶ βεκκα῔μξ) that is sluggish and dull (κςεήξ) due to its 
greatness.
225
 This means that the πόθζξ (as well as the people in it), despite its potential, is 
benumbed and its faculties are diminished. This is what characterizes the unexamined life at 
large. Therefore, like the horse mentioned needs a sting or gadfly (ιύςρ), the city needs 
Socrates and philosophical examination to awaken from its torpor. By comparing his own 
activity to a gadfly, Socrates establishes an interesting contrast between the magnificence of 
the horse (and also of the πόθζξ) and the insignificance of the gadfly (and of philosophical 
examination). The latter is something of little value, but without it the horse and the πόθζξ 
cannot reach their potential. They need a stimulus. Moreover, by talking of a gadfly, Socrates 
stresses once more how difficult it is to bear being examined by him. If we look at Io‟s 
description in Aeschylus‟ Prometheus Vinctus of the gadfly that torments her, that condemns 
her to roam aimlessly and almost drives her to madness, we understand how violent the 
experience of this examination can be.
226
 The horse (i.e., the πόθζξ) cannot rest – it is 
constantly prodded. But unlike Io‟s case, the gadfly here is not a punishment, but rather a 
divine gift.
227
 The horse needs to be awakened (ἐβείνεζεαζ), needs to obtain awareness of 
things and of itself, it needs to move and to dedicate itself to serious things, needs to take care 
of its soul, and it needs to obtain knowledge. This is what Socrates stimulates, and the 
discomfort he may cause is what allows one to achieve a better (viz. more lucid) state. 
Socrates then further stresses the connection between the aggression and usefulness of 
philosophical examination by using another image. He gives the example of people being 
awakened when they are drowsy or half-asleep (κοζηάγμκηεξ, 31a4). Drowsiness is a form of 
relation to things which is not yet entirely closed off to things around oneself and one‟s 
circumstances, but is already very distracted or inattentive. It is a minimum of awareness, 
marked by inactivity and by the fact that it is progressively letting go of itself and its 
awareness. Socrates says that when people are in that state and someone tries to awaken 
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 See 30e: “ἐὰκ βάν ιε ἀπμηηείκδηε, μ὎ ῥᾳδίςξ ἄθθμκ ημζμῦημκ ε὏νήζεηε, ἀηεπκ῵ξ – εἰ ηαὶ βεθμζόηενμκ    
εἰπε῔κ – πνμζηείιεκμκ ηῆ πόθεζ ὏πὸ ημῦ εεμῦ ὥζπεν ἵππῳ ιεβάθῳ ιὲκ ηαὶ βεκκαίῳ, ὏πὸ ιεβέεμοξ δὲ κςεεζηένῳ 
ηαὶ δεμιέκῳ ἐβείνεζεαζ ὏πὸ ιύςπόξ ηζκμξ (...).” 
226
 See vv. 566ff.  
227
 Socrates expressly calls himself “἟ ημῦ εεμῦ δόζζξ” (30e1). 
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them, they have the impulse to strike (ηνμύεζκ) the one disturbing them since they are 
annoyed by it (ἀπεόιεκμζ).
228
 Likewise, those that are stung by philosophical examination are 
annoyed, irritated and try to answer in the same manner. In truth, despite being a sluggish, 
weakened and poor state, drowsiness also has a certain inertia and sweetness to it. It is 
experienced as something positive, to which we are attached, and it contrasts with the effort, 
hardship and toil of our waking life. A negation of this effort can thus be cherished. The same 
happens with the unexamined life. Socrates tries to awaken people to the need of caring for 
the soul, and this care implies much effort and hardship. But one would rather stay in bed and 
rest. The negative state is experienced as good. One is like a prisoner who does not want to 
leave his or her prison. Moreover, both in the case of drowsiness in general and of the 
unexamined life in particular, one is not fully aware of what one is choosing and why. One 
has a limited awareness of the alternative at the moment of choosing. More specifically, when 
Socrates tries to wake people up and motivate them to examine, they are not clearly aware of 
the defects of their way of life nor of the need to wake up. Otherwise, they would react 
differently. Indeed, although we appreciate resting, we would not want to spend our whole 
lives in bed, sleeping.  
Socrates, however, says that this is what will end up happening without philosophical 
examination. One will spend one‟s life sleeping and fall in an even deeper sleep in Hades.
229
 
Socrates thus associates unexamined life to the life of a shadow in Hades. In a sense, to live 
an unexamined life is a sort of death. One does not really see things as they are, one neglects 
what matters the most and one has no notion that this is happening. One is in a bad state, and 
without Socrates and philosophical examination one will not be able to improve it.
230
 This 
does not mean one will automatically become fully awake (or fully lucid) if one embraces 
philosophical examination. But even if it does not lead to θνόκδζζξ and ζμθία, it still makes 
us aware of how far we are from possessing them – i.e., it provides us with human wisdom, 
which already corresponds to a greater degree of awareness or wakefulness, preferable to 
being full of false knowledge claims or false claims to wisdom. In the latter state, however, 
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 See 31a: “(...) ὏ιε῔ξ δ᾽ ἴζςξ ηάπ᾽ ἂκ ἀπεόιεκμζ, ὥζπεν μἱ κοζηάγμκηεξ ἐβεζνόιεκμζ, ηνμύζακηεξ ἄκ ιε, 
πεζεόιεκμζ Ἀκύηῳ, ῥᾳδίςξ ἂκ ἀπμηηείκαζηε (...).” 
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 See 31a: “(...) πεζεόιεκμζ Ἀκύηῳ, ῥᾳδίςξ ἂκ ἀπμηηείκαζηε, εἶηα ηὸκ θμζπὸκ αίμκ ηαεεύδμκηεξ δζαηεθμ῔ηε ἄκ, εἰ 
ιή ηζκα ἄθθμκ ὁ εεὸξ ὏ι῔κ ἐπζπέιρεζεκ ηδδόιεκμξ ὏ι῵κ.” 
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 At least this is what Socrates says. It is not clear whether Socrates is assuming that only he (or someone like 
him, sent by the god) can release people – i.e., if everybody needs help or if people can also leave the 
unexamined life and alter their state on their own. But given the fact that they are not inclined to do so, they 
seem to need Socrates. And be that as it may, philosophical examination is always needed for us to be released 
or to wake up from the drowsiness of the unexamined life. 
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philosophical examination seems irrelevant, since we think we already know everything, or at 
least we think we know how to guide ourselves in order to have a good life. Indeed, the 
problem is that normally we do not realize or understand any of this. We take our state as 
wakefulness. We see no false knowledge claims (though we may admit the remote possibility 
of some of them being wrong), and we see no important neglect of ourselves or our soul. 
Therefore, philosophical examination is only good to create some discomfort and 
disturbance. It uses elaborate arguments and abstruse inquiries to attack the meaning of things 
and turn it into clouds and smoke. 
In sum, by saying all this, Socrates explains at the same time the usefulness of 
philosophical examination (which implies a different diagnosis of our normal state) and why 
the latter normally does not seem useful. But he says more. Later, in the second speech, 
Socrates again considers the usefulness of his examinations for the πόθζξ. After being found 
guilty, he must say what punishment he thinks he deserves and present it as a counterproposal 
to the death sentence proposed by the prosecution. Socrates discusses several possibilities, 
but the problem is that he does not think he deserves any punishment. In fact, he clearly states 
that he is responsible for the greatest benefaction to the πόθζξ (ιεβίζηδ ε὎ενβεζία) by trying 
to convince others to care for what is essential – namely, the self and the πόθζξ itself, instead 
of one‟s affairs or the affairs of the πόθζξ.
231
 He appeals thus to the same model of center and 
periphery which we saw above with respect to our own being. Socrates pointed out that 
things such as possessions or honor were external and did not determine the core of our 
being. The latter rather corresponded to the soul, which was determined by its ἀνεηή, its 
intelligence or lucidity (θνόκδζζξ), and truth. Now Socrates applies the same distinction to 
the πόθζξ. It talks of things external to it and says that it is essentially determined by its 
relation to ἀνεηή, lucidity (θνόκδζζξ) and truth. It is important that the πόθζξ be the best and 
most lucid possible (αέθηζζημξ ηαὶ θνμκζιώηαημξ) – and that is precisely the concern of 
philosophical examination. 
 In order to emphasize the importance of his benefaction, Socrates goes on to contrast 
his role in the πόθζξ with the role of the winners at the Olympic Games (who are usually the 
highest and most admired representatives of the πόθζξ). The latter make people seem happy 
or make them think they are happy (ε὎δαίιμκαξ δμηε῔κ εἶκαζ). Socrates, in turn, along with 
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his philosophical examination and his exhortations, makes them really happy (ε὎δαίιμκαξ 
εἶκαζ).
232
 At the center of everything is one‟s happiness (ε὎δαζιμκία), which is in fact very 
problematic. One may feel happy or not, but in the context of Greek culture happiness was 
not thought of simply as a subjective state of feeling, but rather as an objectively good state 
(regardless of how one feels and of whether one regards one‟s state as happy or not). The 
dissociation between one‟s apparent state and one‟s real state is crucial here – and that is 
what Socrates is alluding to.
233
 He points once more to the difference between δμηε῔κ and 
εἶκαζ. He had admitted that we may seem knowledgeable or wise without being so. Now he 
admits that we may make a similar mistake with respect to our life. We may have a wrong 
diagnosis of how it is going. More precisely, we can be in a bad state and thus in a state of 
misery without realizing it – as was the case of Oedipus, before discovering who he really 
was.
234
 Our happiness may be illusory and no happiness at all. Our life may have no real 
value and real happiness may correspond to something else. It may even be something which 
we would not immediately recognize as such.  
 Socrates argues that happiness depends on philosophical examination and the 
unexamined life is an unhappy or miserable life. If the latter regards itself as being happy, 
then it is mistaken. It should be rejected and not embraced. Of course this presupposes that 
we want to be really happy. But how undesirable is this state of illusory happiness if we do 
not realize it is illusory? How much do we desire real happiness? And what does true 
happiness amount to? How does Socrates conceive it? From what was said, it seems it would 
require θνόκδζζξ, ἀθήεεζα, and excellence of the soul. In turn, these things require 
philosophical examination, which is essential to reveal ignorance, lack of ἀνεηή, and 
unhappiness – and thus to make us pursue (and possibly attain) knowledge, ἀνεηή and 
happiness. Socrates, however, does not enter into much detail about this. We have to consult 
the whole Platonic corpus in order to find a full explanation of his view. 
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 See 36d-e: “μ὎η ἔζε᾽ ὅηζ ι᾵θθμκ, ὦ ἄκδνεξ Ἀεδκα῔μζ, πνέπεζ μὕηςξ ὡξ ηὸκ ημζμῦημκ ἄκδνα ἐκ πνοηακείῳ 
ζζηε῔ζεαζ, πμθύ βε ι᾵θθμκ ἠ εἴ ηζξ ὏ι῵κ ἵππῳ ἠ ζοκςνίδζ ἠ γεύβεζ κεκίηδηεκ ὆θοιπίαζζκ· ὁ ιὲκ βὰν ὏ι᾵ξ πμζε῔ 
ε὎δαίιμκαξ δμηε῔κ εἶκαζ, ἐβὼ δὲ εἶκαζ (...).” 
233
 For more on the matter, see Chap. 12, Sect. 3.2. 
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2. Socrates’ final verdict about the value of the unexamined life and of philosophical 
examination 
 
 All the questions we considered so far let us better understand why Socrates declares 
that the unexamined life is not worth living. The Apology has provided many indications 
about the meaning and grounds of this assertion. But we still have not considered the 
immediate context in which Socrates pronounces his harsh verdict on the unexamined life. 
This judgment appears in Socrates‟ second speech, where (as was already mentioned) he 
must declare what penalty he thinks he deserves. The prosecution calls for the death sentence 
and Socrates considers different counter-penalties. In doing so, he reveals some other 
important features of his outlook on life.  
 First, he says (for the reasons considered in the previous section) that he does not 
deserve any punishment, but rather a reward (and even a prestigious reward, as being fed in 
the Prytaneum).
235
 Then, he briefly discusses possible penalties.
236
 Imprisonment and slavery, 
as well as a high fine (which would also result in imprisonment and slavery, since he would 
not be able to pay it) are absolutely undesirable. Banishment too would be unacceptable, 
because, according to Socrates, he would be likewise expelled from any other city. His   
cross-examinations would always be difficult to bear, and so he would be condemned to a life 
of endless roaming, without belonging to any community. This is intrinsically undesirable 
(and all the more so because of his old age). All those punishments would indeed prevent him 
from employing his life in doing what is really meaningful – namely, examining himself and 
others. Therefore, they are not preferable to death. 
 After discussing these penalties, Socrates puts once more words in the mouth of the 
jurors and imagines them asking him if he could not stay quiet, instead of examining others 
and meddling in their business.
237
 Socrates says this is unthinkable and explains once more 
why he is so inflexible in his dedication to philosophical examination. The explanation given 
is composed of two different arguments. The first argument is of a religious nature. Socrates 
declares that not examining would be to disobey the god and to act impiously. Therefore, he 
cannot stop examining. But Socrates is aware of how unusual and strange his religious 
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 Thus, he resorts to a second argument, which is secular and rational, but according to 
him still more unbelievable. This argument presents in a concentrated manner Socrates‟ 
understanding of his activity and of human life in general. It is also at this point that Socrates 
passes – in no uncertain terms – his verdict on the unexamined life. He says (or imagines 
himself saying): “(...) that this does happen to be the greatest good for a human being, every 
day to discuss excellence and the other things about which you hear me conversing and 
examining myself and others, and that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human 
being”.
239
 The passage is very compact, but also very meaningful, and therefore we must 
consider the different elements separately, in order to determine their meaning, their possible 
ambiguity and the questions they raise. 
 The first words of the argument immediately underscore that Socrates is not talking 
about something irrelevant. He is revealing what is the greatest good – that is, the best thing 
in life, the thing whose possession will constitute true happiness and to which we are 
therefore the least indifferent. The greatest good is something we deeply desire and to which 
we are always directed. So when Socrates says he will reveal what is the greatest good, he 
has (or at least he should have) our full attention. He does not want to reveal what is the 
greatest good for him personally or for a particular group of people. He is talking about the 
greatest good for the human being as such (and more precisely for the frail and finite being: 
ἄκενςπμξ). For any human being as such, there is something that stands out, that is desirable 
in the highest degree and produces the greatest benefit. This is what Socrates will reveal. The 
matter is thus of the highest importance. But Socrates‟ revelation is far from evident. In fact, 
it is unexpected and even unbelievable. It is completely at odds with the ordinary 
understanding of life.  
 First of all, Socrates affirms that the greatest good consists in conversing or discussing 
(θόβμοξ πμε῔ζεαζ, δζαθέβεζεαζ). It requires one to use words and speech. But this is not 
simply a matter of talking or conveying one‟s views or conceptions and persuading others of 
their validity. The conversations here at issue are rational discussions, which are supposed to 
bring us closer to the truth. As such, one must be aware of the risks of θόβμξ that Socrates 
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ἐλεηάγμκημξ, ὁ δὲ ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ μ὎ αζςηὸξ ἀκενώπῳ (...).” The translation is mine. 
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alluded to at the beginning of the first speech. In order to avoid such risks, these 
conversations require much examination. In fact, Socrates says that these conversations are 
like the ones he has when he examines himself and others. The views of those involved and 
what they care for (i.e., how they live) are subject to examination, in order to find any defects 
and correct them, or at least to mobilize one to pursue what one lacks. 
 But this is not all Socrates says. He also mentions the subject of these conversations 
or discussions. He singles out a topic – namely, ἀνεηή. His conversations examine primarily 
what the good quality of the soul consists in. Socrates had declared that he does not know 
anything about it (unlike the Sophists, who supposedly teach it). But he also said that we need 
to care for it most of all, and conversing about it is precisely the way to care for it. It is in this 
sense that such conversations are the greatest good. They bring us closer to being excellent 
and in doing so they affect our whole life and everything in it. Ἀνεηή is thus at the center of 
the Socratic examination. However, it is not its only topic. Socrates mentions that one should 
also converse about all the other things he usually converses about. This is a vague indication 
and does not specify what these other topics are or how they relate to ἀνεηή. Are they directly 
implied in the latter, are they directly relevant to how we life, or are they simply other 
possible objects of knowledge? We could perhaps be tempted to reduce Socrates‟ 
conversations to strictly practical questions, but it is important to bear in mind that he stressed 
above that ἀνεηή is not just a matter of acting in a certain way. It is intrinsically referred to 
knowledge (or more precisely to θνόκδζζξ and ἀθήεεζα), so it may well require a complete 
elucidation of our situation and all that is relevant in it – i.e., it may require a superlative 
knowledge or ζμθία that goes way beyond the more practical questions.  
It may sound strange that the greatest good consists in discussing excellence and not 
in being excellent. This may mean that Socrates is just referring to what is the greatest good 
given our circumstances. To be absolutely good may not be an immediate possibility of ours, 
since it would require a perfect (i.e., more than human) knowledge, which is something we 
do not have. Since we do not have a full knowledge of things, the best thing to do is to 
examine and pursue ἀνεηή. We must begin by trying to come closer to it, and this implies 
noticing that we fall short of it. The discussion about ἀνεηή thus works both as an exhortation 
and a means to achieve true ἀνεηή. It helps us recognize our false knowledge claims (in fact, 
it may be the only way of overcoming our blameworthy ignorance or our conceit of wisdom) 
and increase our awareness of the state we are in. To that extent, examining ἀνεηή is already 
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a way of increasing it, and it is also a provisional form of ἀνεηή (a human ἀνεηή) – i.e., the 
best thing we can do for now and the best state we may be in.  
 This brings us to another important indication given by Socrates in this passage, 
which concerns the specific temporality of philosophical examination. We are supposed to 
examine every day. It is supposed to become a routine, part of everyday life. It is not done 
once and for all, but it is rather a constant and permanent endeavor that is to be renewed 
every day, and may never be concluded. It is a hard and long task, that implies much more 
than what we would immediately think. It is therefore at odds with the ordinary course of life, 
which is based on the acceptance of our views and on the pursuit of the concrete goals 
established by these views. Philosophical examination is a counter-movement which changes 
our entire existence and constitutes an entirely new way of living – namely, a philosophical 
life, dedicated to examining oneself and others. 
 These are all meaningful indications about how one should live – even if they are still 
imprecise in several respects. After giving these indications, Socrates considers once more 
the kind of life that is opposed to his, and presents a definite appraisal of it. He says: “ὁ δὲ 
ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ μ὎ αζςηὸξ ἀκενώπῳ.”
240
 These words constitute the center of this whole 
dissertation, but we have not yet considered their meaning in detail – so we must do it now 
(whereby we will anticipate some of the analyses we will carry out later).  
 The central term of the assertion is αίμξ. It means “life”, but not in a biological sense, 
as the simple fact of being alive. It rather refers to life in the sense mentioned in the 
Introduction: as something to which we are constitutively related and about which we are 
passionate.
241
 Moreover, it is something open, that may have different contents, and these 
contents as a whole define it in a particular way – as a good or bad life. Any significant 
change in the content may thus change the value of a life. This is not something to which we 
are indifferent. We want to have a good life and this is, in fact, the source of all interest, as 
we will see. In addition, our interest in life and its contents is not the interest of someone who 
cannot but watch it unfold. We can (and actually must) intervene and decide the course of our 
life, both in particular circumstances and in general. This means we must determine our 
behavior, our choices and our ultimate goals. All this constitutes our αίμξ. The term can 
indeed designate all these different aspects, but it is particularly used to denote one‟s way of 
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life as such – i.e., a particular pattern of behavior associated with a certain way of seeing and 
valuing things. A specific way of life is something that may be adopted by several persons, 
but it has particular features that distinguishes it from other possible ways of life. In this 
sense, a αίμξ is often designated by its distinguishing (and often defining) mark.
242
  
Here, Socrates, isolates a particular kind of life he qualifies as ἀκελέηαζημξ. It lacks 
ἐλέηαζζξ. As we will see, this term designates a careful inspection or a review of something, 
as well as a cross-examination of someone. In short, it implies putting something or someone 
to the test.
243
 An ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ is thus a life that lacks this act of testing or examining 
things. It has a distracted relation to things and is therefore exposed to errors and distortions. 
It must also be noted that the verbal adjective ἀκελέηαζημξ is somewhat ambiguous. The 
ending -ημξ can have both a passive sense (thus designating a life that is not subjected to 
examination) or an active sense (which means that the way of life in question fails to perform 
examinations). The difference is not entirely meaningless. The passive sense leaves the 
possibility open that one is guided by someone else when examining, while the active sense 
requires one to take an active role, which implies a greater engagement and ability. 
Moreover, the passive sense emphasizes life (or one‟s way of life) as the primary object of 
examination, whereas the active sense suggests that everything must be examined. As we 
saw, the ambiguity is important in Plato, since the examination is simultaneously an 
examination of knowledge claims and an examination of what one cares for (and thus of how 
one lives). Both things are intimately connected and an ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ is indeed a life that 
has a distracted relation with both of them. It is unexamined and it does not examine. 
 Socrates says about such a life that it is not αζςηόξ. The word αζςηόξ expresses a 
positive appraisal of a life and its contents. They are such that make us accept life as 
something worth living. In contrast, saying of a life that it is not αζςηόξ usually means that 
one cannot (or should not) accept, embrace or endure it (precisely what is expressed by being 
“worth living”), because it is worthless, bad, or miserable – i.e., it does not correspond to 
what we want or falls short of our desires. When that happens, life becomes “intolerable” (to 
use De Strycker‟s and Slings‟ translation) or something that is “not to be lived” (as Kraut 
renders it).
244
 This still does not say anything about the criterion that makes such a life bad or 
miserable. It may be suffering, dishonor or something else. It all depends on what gives value 
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to life. Moreover, the appraisal of such a life is something expressed by a particular subject, 
who has a certain recognition of the value of his or her life. However, as we will see, this 
appraisal also refers to the intrinsic or objective value of one‟s life, and, as such, it is 
something of which one may or may not be aware. In other words, we may not know the real 
value of our life, either because we have a distracted relation to it, or because we are not 
aware of what we truly desire. We may thus think we lead a good and happy life when that is 
not the case. So a life may be “unlivable” or unacceptable without us realizing it. 
 All this is decisive for Socrates‟ argument. He is saying that a life that is characterized 
by the lack of examination (and in particular the kind of examination he performs, which we 
called philosophical examination) is a bad or miserable life. It does not correspond to our 
desires and should be rejected. As mentioned, this is a rather harsh and counterintuitive 
judgment. We normally do not see a life without examination as unacceptable or bad. There 
can be many bad things in life, but failing to examine does not seem to be one of them. It 
does not seem to be a fundamental criterion in the quality of our life. In fact, very few would 
accept a life fully dedicated to examining oneself and others.  
 So what does Socrates mean? What are his reasons? And is he right? If so, why are we 
usually convinced of the opposite? We saw that the Apology presents several arguments in 
defense of this view. Socrates identifies some important features of a life marked by the lack 
of philosophical examination, and they also account for the dissociation between our normal 
appraisal of our life and its real value. We tend to believe we know what matters and also that 
our self is in good state and does not need special care. In many cases we may even deem 
ourselves happy. So from the standpoint of the unexamined life, philosophical examination 
seems useless. But Socrates tries to show that such a life contradicts itself. Its state is very 
different from what it believes – and in fact the reason why it is in such a state and why it 
does not realize it is the same: the lack of examination. 
 We can thus understand why Socrates cannot renounce to philosophical examination. 
From his standpoint, life requires examination. The latter is not just a good thing, but the root 
of all good (and so of all we desire). Without it, life does not just lose one good thing among 






3. The Apology’s concluding remarks about philosophical examination and death 
 
 In his final speech, after being condemned to death, Socrates reflects about the trial 
and its outcome. He addresses the jurors who condemned him and reproaches them. He 
reaffirms that he prefers death to badness (πμκδνία) and to living inappropriately (μ὎η ὀνε῵ξ 
γ῅κ).
245
 Then, talking to those who voted in his favor, Socrates stresses that he would not 
change anything in the way he defended himself, despite the negative outcome. He thus 
confirms not only what he said, but also the need to say it as he did. But what is here of 
particular interest for us is the question of what may follow the trial. By considering his 
future after being condemned to death, Socrates adds some remarks that help us better 
understand the way he lived and the importance of philosophical examination. 
 
3.1. The Socratic version of the Isles of the Blessed 
 
 At the end of the text (40c ff.), Socrates reconsiders the question of death and whether 
it is something good or bad. He had previously said that he would rather die than do 
something unjust or bad, because that would render his life worthless. Now he goes on to 
consider what death might be, and his eschatological reflections are not only an interesting 
illustration of Ancient beliefs about the afterlife, but they also express a certain outlook on 
life and how we should live it – and it is in this respect that it becomes relevant for us. 
 First, Socrates acknowledges his ignorance about the afterlife and distinguishes two 
possibilities: either we have no perception of anything when we die (and then it is a sort of 
dreamless night) or it is a change of abode (ιεημίηδζζξ).
246
 Then he goes on to argue that in 
both cases death would be a gain for him. A dreamless night is devoid of any concerns and 
pain, and, to this extent, it is better and more pleasant than almost all our nights and days.
247
 
In fact, Socrates suggests that such a state would be an absolute gain, which is surprising, 
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ἐκεέκδε εἰξ ἄθθμκ ηόπμκ.”  
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especially since the criterion seems to be solely hedonistic. Besides, Socrates has also just 
criticized a life of drowsiness and sleep. It is true that one will get rid of all the unpleasant 
things of life (especially those concerned with old age), and there is no blame in a state of 
dreamless sleep (i.e., one is not unjust and bad). Still, it is strange that he would not regret 
disappearing. Perhaps he is just trying to convince others that in this case death has a positive 
side. But it is far from being an absolute good.
248
  
 Next, Socrates focuses his attention on the second alternative, and he dwells much 
longer on it, which intimates that this might be his own view or at least the one he finds most 
plausible. As he says, death may be a journey to a different place. In order to imagine this 
other place, Socrates takes refuge in the things normally said about it. This implies restricting 
all the possible conceptions of the hereafter to a certain version of it, which mingles 
representations of the Isles of the Blessed in Homer and Hesiod, representations of afterlife in 
Orphism and the Mysteries, as well some Socratic or Platonic innovations.
249
 In this sense, 
Socrates‟ consideration of the hereafter will be far from exhaustive. Still, it will reveal 
something interesting about Socrates‟ conception of philosophical examination. 
 Socrates expects that those who had a reputation for being true and just judges will be 
there, which suggests that his life will then be properly judged.
250
 In fact, he imagines he will 
meet all the main figures of Greek culture. After the judges, he mentions the poets (Orpheus, 
Museus, Hesiod, Homer), who were for long the epitome of the wise man, and also those that 
were unjustly condemned, such as Palamedes and Ajax, with whom Socrates will be able to 
compare his own sufferings.
251
 He will spend time and talk with all these people, which is 
already enough for him to say that he is willing to die many times if this is what awaits 
him.
252
 But he then adds what would be for him the greatest thing (ηὸ ιέβζζημκ): to wit, he 
would be able to spend his time examining those people and determining who is actually 
ζμθόξ and who has a false claim of ζμθία.
253
 Socrates imagines himself examining 
Agamemnon, Ulysses, Sisyphus and many others, and requiring them to explain and justify 
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the knowledge claims on which their famous actions were based. He mentions some of the 
greatest symbols of Greek culture and says that he would examine all of them (men and 
women) endlessly. In other words, his philosophical examination would encompass all the 
past and also all the future, insofar as he would have all the time to examine all those that 
died and will one day die (but still focusing primarily on all those who stood out and who 
should therefore have the greatest knowledge claims).  
 Socrates says that conversing, associating with and examining these people would be 
an unconceivable happiness – especially since he could no longer be condemned to death.
254
 
In other words, nothing could restrict his examining. And so, even though he admits people 
would also be happier in other respects (alluding probably to the traditional and more 
hedonistic representations of the Isles of the Blessed), his eternal beatitude would be 
intrinsically connected with the apparently endless examination and pursuit of knowledge. 
The characterization of his philosophical examination as endless raises some questions, 
though. In particular, it is not clear whether philosophical examination is happiness itself or if 
is there something else philosophical examinations aims at (such as the contemplation of 
truth), which is what we really desire and what would make us fully or really happy. Here, 
Socrates does not seem to talk of philosophical examination as a means to achieve a better 
state (namely, a state of actual knowledge or actual ζμθία). At least he does not mention it. 
This may imply that this activity would not be aiming at something else and would be 
fulfilling in itself. We (or he at least) would already be happy with the endless pursuit of 
knowledge. But it may also be the case that Socrates is simply not considering it, but rather 
focusing his attention on what we can most easily conceive and what we actually need to do 
in our circumstances (which is precisely what he argues during the whole Apology). It is 
indeed difficult to conceive what lies beyond philosophical examination, so instead he 
imagines death as being subordinated to philosophical examination and integrates everything 
(the whole past and the whole future) in this activity. Everything is conceived as just another 
stage in the extremely long (and potentially infinite) examination of everybody and 
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3.2. The meaning of Socrates’ last words in the Apology 
 
 After reflecting about the outcome of the trial, Socrates closes with an interesting 
remark, which seems to affirm a more skeptical and indeterminate view about what just 
happened, though it can also be read as a final provocation to his jurors and the reader, in 
order to motivate them to further reflect about everything that was said. Socrates says: “But 
now it is the time to depart, both for me who am to die and for you who are to live; and which 
of us goes to the better thing, is unclear to all except the god.”
255
 The unclearness of the 
matter raises the question of what is actually a better lot or destiny – i.e., what is a more 
fortunate or happy (and thus more desirable) possibility. By raising this question, Socrates is 
not only wondering what might be better for him, in his old age. His question concerns the 
intrinsic value of the two possibilities mentioned: namely, life and death. This aspect is 
further emphasized by the reference to the absolute standpoint of the god, who supposedly 
possesses a perfect knowledge of the real value of these possibilities. Their real value is 
precisely what Socrates is referring to, and the answer to this question (which cannot be 
easily decided, as Socrates stresses) is something to which we are not at all indifferent, since 
it concerns the goodness or badness of these two ultimate possibilities. 
 But what can be said about the two alternatives in question? Socrates speaks of going 
to one‟s life and going to one‟s death. Both things seem pretty straightforward. However, the 
alternative is more ambiguous than it may seem. On the one hand, the life Socrates is talking 
about can either be a life like his (dedicated to examining himself and others) or, more 
probably, a life free from Socratic examination – i.e., the unexamined life. Dying, on the 
other hand, is itself defined either as a dreamless night (which would amount to a state of 
non-being) or an endless life of philosophical examination. Therefore, the alternative between 
life and death can have different senses. But what is more interesting here is the contrast 
between the unexamined life and the different possible destinies after death. In that case, the 
alternatives that come to mind are the alternative between the unexamined life and non-being 
and the one between the unexamined life and philosophical examination. Socrates is then 
asking whether the unexamined life is better than nothing and also whether it is better than 
the alternative – namely, an examined life. It may happen that it is the absolute worst of these 
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three alternatives, although it may also be the intermediate one (better than non-being and 
worst than examination) or even the best. 
 Socrates says that the question is unclear to all, that it cannot be decided by him or 
those that are going to continue leading an unexamined life. Perhaps no one will ever be able 
to fully decide it. But how is this to be understood? Is he really skeptical with regard to this 
matter and leaves the answer to god alone (i.e., to a transcendent authority) or is he being 
ironical and concealing his beliefs? His whole life expressed a certain belief about the value 
of the unexamined life and he was not shy about it in court. He declared the unexamined life 
unacceptable and explained his view in detail. Moreover, he also considered the value of 
death and justified his tranquility in face of it. So he does not seem to have any doubt about 
it. For him, death is better than the unexamined life.
256
 But Socrates does not end on such a 
note. He poses a problem and by posing it he incites the jurors and the readers to ask 
themselves once more what exactly do they think about life and death – and specially what do 
they think of an unexamined life and its opposite, a life of philosophical examination. The 
latter may seem at first a sort of death (insofar as it implies a radical change in one‟s life and 
the neglect of everything that seems to matter) and in some extraordinary cases it may even 
lead to physical death (as we see happening with Socrates). But what about the former? What 
is the value of an unexamined life? And what does that mean for us? How should we live 
after all?  
                                                 
256
 This is not very different from what we find in fr. 110 of Aristotle‟s Protrepticus: “ἠ θζθμζμθδηέμκ μὖκ ἠ 
παίνεζκ εἰπμῦζζ ηῶ γ῅κ ἀπζηέμκ ἐκηεῦεεκ, ὡξ ηὰ ἄθθα βε πάκηα θθοανία ηζξ ἔμζηεκ εἶκαζ πμθθὴ ηαὶ θ῅νμξ.” Cp. I. 





CONCLUSION OF PART I 
 
 
1. Some remarks on how to relate to the text. Socrates’ contemporaneity, the inner 
Socrates and the inner πόιηο 
 
 Reading the Apology hardly leaves us indifferent. Although it is possible to read the 
text as an historical document or as a simple sequence of arguments that are more or less 
plausible, it can also have a strong personal meaning. The tragic tone of the speeches can 
deeply touch us.
257
 Moreover, Socrates is presented as a martyr and a philosophical hero. He 
is highly charismatic and the embodiment of an ideal. The reader is thus easily inspired by his 
actions and his words, and led to imitate him. But this does not mean there is only one way of 
being moved by Socrates‟ portrayal. In fact, there are two main ways of being inspired by 
Socrates. We can perhaps best understand them if we consider what Kierkegaard says about 
our ways of relating not only to Socrates, but also to Jesus, since both cases share many 
similar features. Kierkegaard says we can see them as historical characters, and thus as 
something romanticized or an ideal at a distance. We will then understand them as simple 
possibilities, without realizing what coming into contact with them or trying to be them 
would really amount to. But we can also relate to them in the mode of contemporaneity – and 
this is precisely the proper way of relating to them. We will see and understand them as 
something real or actual, with which we interact and to which we must react. It concerns us 
directly and requires something from us. This greatly increases the tension and pressure over 
us. The ideal becomes demanding, frustrating and even violent. One will be accused by it if 
one fails to live up to it – and a merely external imitation is not enough to satisfy its demands. 
One must really come to resemble the persons one is imitating and what they represent.
258
 In 
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the case we are considering, one is required to nurture one‟s inner Socrates – i.e., to embrace 
self-examination and the examination of others. The Socrates presented in the text may well 
be an invention of Plato, but the philosophical examination associated with him is 
nevertheless a possibility of ours and we may feel pressured to adopt it.  
The Socrates we see in the Apology can thus stimulate us to do more than superficially 
adore him. In fact, he can stimulate us to embrace the possibility he embodies – and if we 
look at his words attentively, this is precisely what he demands. However, this demand is not 
easy to fulfill and when we realize the great exertion that is implied in the ideal, we may 
easily side with the jurors and condemn the inner Socrates and philosophical examination to 
death. This is so because we are sensitive not only to Socrates‟ motivations, but also to the 
motivations of the other characters mentioned by Socrates, who in a way are also internal 
characters of our soul. The Apology can thus be read as a particular instance of the 
isomorphism between the πόθζξ and the human soul that is at the center of Plato‟s 
Republic.
259
 All the tensions and interactions Socrates refers to also illustrate our inner 
conflicts. In this sense, Socrates‟ lawsuit is an exacerbated situation that reveals the πόθζξ of 
our inner motivations. When push comes to shove, we are not just partisans of Socrates, but 
also his victims and enemies – and all these facets of our being must debate among 
themselves and decide Socrates‟ worth (and thus the worth of philosophical examination). 
Looking at the text from this angle opens up new layers of meaning. Even if the author of the 
speeches did not have this in mind (and nothing indicates he did), we can better understand 
our relation to text and also to philosophical examination by using Socrates‟ speeches to 
identify and determine our inner πόθζξ and its characters. 
 Let us then briefly consider what the characters in the Apology reveal about ourselves 
and the main characters of our soul. The features Socrates stresses in these characters are of 
different kinds, and so they present different criteria for identifying our inner drives. For 
instance, if we look at the starting-point of the speeches, Socrates calls attention to the inner 
resistance the jurors may feel not only on account of the effects of the prosecution speech on 
them, but also because of the slanders they had heard. The jurors thus represent a part of us 
that is more sensitive to feeling (πάεμξ) and also more credulous (as the children to which the 
old accusers talked).  
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 Then, when he is explaining the slanders against him, Socrates identifies two 
particular kinds of people who can easily be mistaken for him: natural philosophers and 
sophists. The first are concerned with distant matters and the second, although occupied with 
how one should live, think they already possess the knowledge required for it and thus try to 
convey it to others. To this extent, they both differ from the philosophical examination 
Socrates represent, although there are also similarities between them. They all question the 
ordinary practices of the πόθζξ – and are thus contrasted with the traditionalists, who cling to 
those practices and just want to transmit them to the young. These traditionalists, represented 
by Meletus, represent our inclination to follow the views shared by many or the public 
version of truth.   
 Also relevant in this context is Socrates‟ description of the people he examines and 
who are characterized by a claim to traditional ζμθία. These alleged ζμθμί represent different 
relations to ζμθία and also different inner possibilities. The statesmen are concerned with 
guiding the life of the πόθζξ and thus with acting, but they lack proper knowledge to do so. 
They thus depict a tendency to act and live without having the required knowledge. The 
poets, in turn, do what they do out of instinct and inspiration. They conceive themselves as 
having contact with a superior authority that renders what they say true. Likewise, we all can 
believe to have correct views, even if we cannot fully justify and explain them. Finally, the 
artisans (and to some extent also the poets) mistake what they know for what they do not 
think and think they also master the most important matters, thus representing our tendency 
to disregard the boundaries of our knowledge and think we know everything that matters. In 
sum, the three kind of alleged ζμθμί correspond to essential traits of the unexamined life, 
which is precisely at odds with Socrates‟ philosophical life. 
 Beside these characters, Socrates also identifies some groups that are marked by 
particular kinds of motivation. He talks about all those alleged ζμθμί whose ignorance was 
exposed by his examination, got angry at him and, when inquired about this anger, accused 
him of all the usual things intellectuals were accused of. These people were taken by love of 
honor (θζθμηζιία) and did not want to lose face.
260
 One‟s value is indeed put in question by 
Socrates‟ examination and one could react in different ways. By getting angry at Socrates and 
accusing him without fully understanding what he does, people reveal their blind θζθμηζιία, 
which does not seem concerned with true worth, but only with the semblance thereof. 
Socrates also refers to the young that follow him and who examine others only because it is 
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 They are not truly concerned with knowledge, but rather with 
pleasure. In addition, Socrates alludes more than once to those that are so concerned with 
survival (i.e., so taken of θζθμροπία in the ordinary sense) that they will do anything just to 
continue living.
262
 All these figures are based on inner drives of ours and reveal what we 
become when these drives come to dominate us. They are all distinct from and opposed to 
Socrates‟ examination and what it represents – namely our philosophical or           
knowledge-loving drive and its hypertrophy (or πμθοπναβιμζύκδ), which gives rise to a life 
dedicated to philosophical examination or a θζθόζμθμξ αίμξ.  
The Socratic drive is at odds with all the other drives. The Apology not only calls our 
attention to this potential conflict, but it also tries to awaken it and intervene in favor of one 
of the parts. In effect, we always have a certain stance toward philosophical examination, 
which is an expression of the drives that prevails in us. The Apology tries to make us realize 
this and reappraise our position. It also tries to change the balance of our inner drives and 
make us revise our decision about who prevails in our soul and, more specifically, about what 
role the inner Socrates plays within our inner πόθζξ. The outer trial we read about in the text 
should stimulate the inner trial, and lead us to ponder and decide whether we kill the inner 
Socrates or absolve him and let him examine as much as he can. We could perhaps be 
tempted to find some middle ground between the two alternatives, but Socrates stresses that 
there can be no compromise: one either leads an unexamined life (which may indeed include 
some forms of examination, but is not fully determined by them) or one fully embraces 
philosophical examination. These are the terms of an alternative in which we always take 
some stance, even if unconsciously. But if we want to properly decide the question, we must 
determine the true value of the unexamined life and also of philosophical examination. The 
considerations in the Apology help us do that, but given the importance of the matter at hand 
(and also because of our tendency to see the question at a distance), it is important not to 
accept the arguments in the Apology at their face value, but instead we have to examine 
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2. Reassessment of the problem and transition to an analysis of the whole corpus 
 
 Our goal was to discuss the problem raised by Socrates‟ assertion about the 
unexamined life. The text provides us with some important indications in favor of Socrates‟ 
view, although as a whole these indications are still far from a full explanation and 
justification of his assertion. They contain many limitations, and in order to properly identify 
them, we must consider once more some of the most important aspects of Socrates‟ 
arguments. 
 According to Socrates, the unexamined life is essentially characterized by false 
knowledge claims (which are described as a form of blameworthy ignorance) and also by a 
neglect of ourselves and our ἀνεηή. Both these characteristics amount to a state of dozing off 
or sleep, insofar as one is not aware of oneself and the state one is in. Although everything 
may seem fine, one is actually in a bad, unjust and shameful state, which is moreover far 
from any real happiness (even if it does not think so). In sum, even if it appears to be a happy 
state, the unexamined life does not achieve what it desires and it does not possess what it 
thinks it possesses. It is in disagreement with itself, and hence it is not a life worth          
living – even if, because of this life‟s inner constitution, we do not notice it. Philosophical 
examination is thus required both to break the spell of unexamined life and to improve it. In 
other words, it shows us our false knowledge claims and our self-neglect, and allows us to 
search for actual knowledge and thus to actually care for ourselves. To this extent it is the 
greatest good both for any individual, and also for the πόθζξ as a whole. One needs it if one is 
ever to achieve what one truly desires and really be happy. 
 This is the formal structure of the argument, but the concise and dense manner in 
which Socrates presents his ideas leaves many questions open. For instance, it is not clear 
which knowledge claims we may have and how much they may distort our life. It is also not 
clear how they can be examined and what happens when they are revealed as false. In 
addition, the Apology fails to describe the structure of human life in general (apart from some 
generic traits, such as the important role of knowledge, care, and happiness). It also does not 
explain how life in general can be essentially defined by the alternative between the 
unexamined life and its opposite. In fact, the unexamined life itself is not extensively 
characterized and it may be difficult for us to recognize the whole complexity of our 
existence in the brief characterization made in the Apology.  
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 Given all these lacunae and insufficiencies, it is also not entirely plain how 
“unlivable” the unexamined life is and why exactly it is so. Its lack of worth, as well as the 
need to examine, appears to be connected to our need for knowledge, but this need for 
knowledge is itself insufficiently determined. Moreover, the text does not discuss whether the 
outcome of examination affects the need to examine or not. The imperative of examination 
seems to have an absolute value, but Socrates does not go into much detail about it. In fact, 
the status and foundation of the imperative are themselves problematic. It seems to have both 
a religious and a rational basis, but Socrates defines neither the relation between the two in 
his own case, nor the way others may relate to the imperative if they did not go through 
Socrates‟ religious experiences. And the relation with others is the source of still other 
problems. Socrates stresses the importance of examination for life, but he does not talk much 
about the value of self-examination for his own life and why he must also examine others. Is 
this examination of others a necessity for everybody? On what account? Only because a god 
commands it or for some other reason? And what may that reason be? How is it to be 
conceived?  
 Finally, one last example of a problem insufficiently discussed in the Apology results 
from the at least apparent contradiction between Socrates‟ admitted lack of knowledge and 
the strong certainties that he seems to have.
263
 Several of these certainties have a strong 
connection with the question of the importance of philosophical examination. This raises the 
problem of whether philosophical examination and the dedication to it fully depend on these 
particular views. If so, what is then the status of these views? Are they dogmatic and naive, or 
are they provisional and also subject to examination? There is indeed no clear reason for us to 
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ἀνεηή). Cp. 20c, 20e, 21b, 21d, 23a-b. Yet, his behavior shows that at the same time he has strong convictions 
about important matters. For one, he is fully convinced that he committed no wrongdoing. He also believes in 
gods and even has claims about them. He is fully persuaded of his interpretation of the oracle, of the importance 
of his mission and that all people should care for their souls and become as good as possible. He also has very 
strong claims about important matters. In 29b, he says: “ηὸ δὲ ἀδζηε῔κ ηαὶ ἀπεζεε῔κ ηῶ αεθηίμκζ ηαὶ εεῶ ηαὶ 
ἀκενώπῳ, ὅηζ ηαηὸκ ηαὶ αἰζπνόκ ἐζηζκ μἶδα.” In 30b he affirms that “μ὎η ἐη πνδιάηςκ ἀνεηὴ βίβκεηαζ, ἀθθ᾽ ἐλ 
ἀνεη῅ξ πνήιαηα ηαὶ ηὰ ἄθθα ἀβαεὰ ημ῔ξ ἀκενώπμζξ ἅπακηα ηαὶ ἰδίᾳ ηαὶ δδιμζίᾳ”. In 41c-d, he also tries to 
convince the jurors that “μ὎η ἔζηζκ ἀκδνὶ ἀβαεῶ ηαηὸκ μ὎δὲκ μὔηε γ῵κηζ μὔηε ηεθεοηήζακηζ, μ὎δὲ ἀιεθε῔ηαζ ὏πὸ 
εε῵κ ηὰ ημύημο πνάβιαηα.” These are just a few examples of the many assertions Socrates makes in the 
Apology – and we must also include the assertion about the value of the unexamined life. The conflict between 
his ignorance and his strong claims (which is actually not confined to the Apology, but pervades many of Plato‟s 
works) has led many to relativize one side of the conflict. Either he is not truly ignorant and possesses some 
kind of knowledge in a weaker sense, or he is not fully conviced of the views he put forward. But is this really a 
satisfactory solution? For more on the matter, see e.g. T. BRICKHOUSE & N. SMITH, The Paradox of Socratic 
Ignorance in Plato‟s Apology, History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984), 125-131, and C. REEVE, Socrates in 




exempt them from examination. However, in examining them we keep presupposing the 
importance of examination. Hence we can imagine that Socrates would be glad to examine 
them, and adopting them seems to be no more than a provisional act, though one that is 
perhaps required if we are ever to find a firm setting for our life. The problem of Socrates‟ 
coherence may very well be the problem of our life‟s coherence. In order to understand life 
and live well, we must examine, and in order to examine we must have certain beliefs about 
the examination itself. But what exactly are these beliefs, how can we explain and justify 
them, and are they really valid? Our analysis of the Apology gave us some indications about 
these problems, but it still not enough to fully solve them. 
 In sum, the Apology is far from providing sufficient answers to these and many other 
questions it raises. Socrates himself announced at the beginning of his defense speech that his 
time was very limited and he would not be able to adequately defend himself.
264
 Though he 
may be referring mainly to the rhetorical efficiency of the speech, this also applies to its 
content. A perfect defense would also have to contain a full justification of his views on 
philosophical examination and what the lack thereof entails. Therefore, it is up to us to mount 
a complete defense of Socrates and his views, and we can look for such a defense in the 
Platonic corpus as a whole. As we will see, it provides precious indications that help us 
develop a more detailed explanation of the views put forward by Socrates in the Apology, and 
also a better consideration of all the problems raised by them.  
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According to the Apology (and according to Plato‟s writings at large, as will be 
shown), examination (ἐλέηαζζξ) is the factor whose presence or absence decides the worth of 
an entire αίμξ. But what exactly is this activity or operation, which we do not automatically 
perform, and which may be lacking and must be adopted and enacted by us? What is this 
examination, how must it be performed and what is it supposed to achieve? These are the first 
questions we must ask, before trying to determine our relation to examination (or, to be more 
specific, before trying to determine whether we need it or not, and what its effects on our life 
may be). We must begin with an examination of examination itself and of how Plato 
conceives it. 
Examination is not a completely strange concept for any of us. In general, we all have 
a pre-understanding of what an examination in the broadest sense of the word is. This pre-
understanding is enough to perform certain ordinary examinations, but it is in most cases tacit 
and vague. We cannot explain in full detail what examining is, what characterizes the objects 
of examination as such, and how these objects may be affected by the examination. 
Moreover, we do not have a clear notion of all possibilities of examination. Besides ordinary 
examinations, there also other more developed forms of examination. One of these, perhaps 
the most developed of all, is the examination Plato has in mind, which we can call 
“philosophical examination”. This form of examination is the one that can fulfill our potential 
for examination and convert our life into a fully examined life. It is also something we 
usually lack. It is a kind of examination we do not usually perform, of which we may even 
have no idea.
266
 Our regular examinations are just a pale shadow of this Platonic examination. 
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 A. PEARSON (ed.), The Fragments of Sophocles, vol. 1, Cambridge, University Press, 1917, 175. 
266
 This raises the question of how good an understanding of philosophical examination we need in order to 
perform it adequately. Perhaps we do not need a fully developed concept of the operation to perform it (and in 
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The latter is quantitatively and qualitatively different. Through it, one examines much more 
and one examines in a different way. 
How does Plato then characterize philosophical examination, and how does one carry 
it out? If we look at the texts, we find different methodological reflections, which seem to 
point in different directions. In particular, there is a significant difference between a negative 
kind of examination (the so-called ἔθεβπμξ, which refutes someone‟s convictions) and more 
positive kinds of examination (in which one can reach some results and find some answers). 
This partially coincides with the difference between aporetic and doctrinal texts (though the 
status of the supposed doctrine is always dubious, as we saw in the Introduction).
267
 Given 
this diversity, how can we speak of a single conception of philosophical examination? 
Interpreters often tend to solve the tension between the different kinds of examination 
by distinguishing at least two phases in Plato‟s thought: one under strong influence of the 
historical Socrates and another strictly Platonic. However, the emphasis on the negative 
dimension is not restricted to the texts of an early phase (assuming the usual chronologies of 
the dialogues are correct).
268
 This suggests both kinds of examination are more closely 
connected than we may think. We must therefore try to see to what extent they can be 
regarded as two sides of a single process and why so much emphasis is laid in the negative 
dimension. 
Before doing this, it is important to consider the main features of philosophical 
examination as such. More precisely, we have to determine exactly which object is examined 
and what philosophical examination can reveal about it. In order to do this, we must consider 
some important traits of Plato‟s conception of the being that we are and the role knowledge 
plays in our life (thereby anticipating some aspects we will discuss in more detail in Part III). 
This conception differs in many aspects from our usual self-understanding and we must keep 
it in mind if we want to understand the particular kind of examination Plato is envisaging.  
We will collect and organize many elements found throughout the corpus. Some of 
these elements can be seen in the way philosophical examination is depicted in the texts, 
while others are part of explicit discussions the characters have about the meaning of what 
they are doing. For the most part, we will pay little attention to the difference between      
                                                                                                                                                        
the dialogues many characters seem to lack any such concept), but a precise understanding of it allows us to 
better control its execution – and it is indispensable if we want to determine the value of the unexamined life 
and its opposite. 
267
 Cp. Sect. 4 of the Introduction. 
268
 We also find it in the Theaetetus, which shares many features of the so-called aporetic dialogues, and in 
Sophist, where we find the most developed discussion of a negative form of philosophical examination. Cp. 
226b-231b (and for a discussion of this passage, see Chap. 8 below).  
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self-examination, examining others or being examined by them. We will rather focus on the 
general structure examination as such, which may then assume these different configurations. 
It would be interesting to compare Plato‟s conception of philosophical examination 
with other cultural practices of the time that to some extent resemble this kind of examination 
and probably influenced its development. There are indeed many references to other practices 
(such as sophistry, oratory, cosmology, medicine, tragedy, comedy, epic poetry, and so on) in 
the dialogues. But we will restrict our scope and focus only the particular features of 
philosophical examination as it is conceived by Plato, since this is what is more directly 
relevant to our problem. 
We will likewise leave aside the question of whether Plato‟s definition of 
philosophical examination (or, more precisely, the definition we can outline based on his 
writings) is supposed to be a description of what all philosophers do or only the presentation 
of a particular way of philosophizing. The understanding of philosophy and its method or 
methods often changed during the history of philosophy and it would indeed be interesting to 
compare Plato‟s conception of philosophical examination with the ones put forward by other 
authors – especially with respect to the relation between the negative or destructive and the 
positive or constructive sides of philosophy. However, we will only consider Plato‟s 
conception and how his description of the two sides of philosophical examination can be 
integrated in a single project. 
Let us then see which conception of philosophical examination can be found in the 






The images of philosophical examination 
 
 
“Χαθεπόκ, ὦ δαζιόκζε, ιὴ παναδείβιαζζ πνώιεκμκ ἱηακ῵ξ 




We will begin our analysis of the kind of examination Plato has in mind by 
considering the way Plato portrays the act of examining something. Throughout the texts we 
find many images that put before us the outward appearance of philosophical examination. 
This is not surprising. Plato‟s writings are indeed full of images, of very different kinds, 
which are used to present more or less abstract entities. The nature and meaning of this 
device are not immediately clear, but Plato‟s own reflections about the notion of image 




These reflections are very complex and contain many elements that we will not 
consider now.
270
 But restricting ourselves to the bare essentials, we can say Plato defines an 
image as something whose identity (what it itself is, its ὅπεν εἶκαζ) constitutively refers to 
something else.
271
 Its manifestation or appearance is the manifestation or appearance of some 
other being – namely, the thing itself whose image it is (ηὸ α὎ηό).
272
 In order for this to 
happen, an image does not need to closely resemble the thing itself it refers to. It can include 
many defects – and in fact it must always contain some defect and fall short of being the 
thing it refers to (otherwise it would simply be a second thing, equal to the first, and not its 
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 The most relevant passages for Plato‟s notion of image, in which he most explicitly discusses the notion, are 
Cra. 430a ff., Rep. 509d ff., 596c ff., Sph. 234b ff., Ti. 52a ff. 
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 We will consider some aspects of this reflection in more detail below. See in particular Chap. 7 Sect. 2.4, and 
Chap. 16, Sect. 5.2 f). 
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 See in particular Sph. 240a7-8: “ηί δ῅ηα, ὦ λέκε, εἴδςθμκ ἂκ θα῔ιεκ εἶκαζ πθήκ βε ηὸ πνὸξ ηἀθδεζκὸκ 
ἀθςιμζςιέκμκ ἕηενμκ ημζμῦημκ;”  
272
 An image must include this reference to something other than itself, but this does not entail that this other 
being (the thing itself) must actually exist. It can be something fictitious (as a Centaur, for instance). However, 
even in the case of fiction, the reference to something else is an intrinsic component of images, and in fact 





 In this sense, defectiveness is a central feature of an image. An image is different 
from the thing itself and it does not fully contain or present it. However, it does point to this 
thing and it does put us in relation to it. It evokes it or brings it to mind (in other words, it 
produces an ἀκάικδζζξ).   
This relation with the thing itself that is depicted and presented in an image (or to 
which an image is constitutively referred) constitutes both the strength and the weakness of 
an image. It can reveal something that is absent or hidden – but, because of the absence of the 
thing itself, the image can also replace and hide the very thing whose image it is (and 
simultaneously hide its own status as an image). This is the reason for Plato‟s strong criticism 
of the notion of image. An image can cause us to lose sight of the thing to which the image 
refers and mistake the defective presentation of something for the thing itself.     
But if images involve this risk, then why does Plato employ so many images and why 
should we start our investigation about philosophical examination with the images of this 
examination? We seek Plato‟s concept of philosophical examination – i.e., what characterizes 
all occurrences of such an examination and all its images. We seem to require an explicit and 
rational discussion (a θόβμξ) that may grasp what the philosophical examination as such is. 
So why care about images at all? What advantages are there in reflecting about them? Is it 
only a matter of making our analysis more vivid and more pleasant, or does it rather help us 
gain access to the essence of examination? 
As was mentioned, an image has always some relation to the thing itself. It evokes 
this thing. Hence, it can be very helpful. It all hinges on how we experience the image or how 
we relate to it. If we are aware of an image‟s constitutive lack, it not only reveals something 
about an absent object, but it can also awaken a longing for the thing itself.
 274
 An image can 
mobilize us, guide us and put us on the right track. Therefore, we can also learn more about 
something by considering its images. Although they are defective and only provide us a hazy 
access to something, they can be a basis for further developments. They show something in a 
more concrete and immediate manner and allow us to become more familiar with an object 
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 This is expressly said in Cra. 432a-c: “[΢Ω.] (...) μ὎δὲ ηὸ πανάπακ δέῃ πάκηα ἀπμδμῦκαζ μἷόκ ἐζηζκ ᾧ 
εἰηάγεζ, εἰ ιέθθεζ εἰηὼκ εἶκαζ. ζηόπεζ δὲ εἰ ηὶ θέβς. ἆν᾽ ἂκ δύμ πνάβιαηα εἴδ ημζάδε, μἷμκ Κναηύθμξ ηαὶ 
Κναηύθμο εἰηώκ, εἴ ηζξ εε῵κ ιὴ ιόκμκ ηὸ ζὸκ πν῵ια ηαὶ ζπ῅ια ἀπεζηάζεζεκ ὥζπεν μἱ γςβνάθμζ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ ηὰ 
ἐκηὸξ πάκηα ημζαῦηα πμζήζεζεκ μἷάπεν ηὰ ζά, ηαὶ ιαθαηόηδηαξ ηαὶ εενιόηδηαξ ηὰξ α὎ηὰξ ἀπμδμίδ, ηαὶ ηίκδζζκ 
ηαὶ ροπὴκ ηαὶ θνόκδζζκ μἵαπεν ἟ πανὰ ζμὶ ἐκεείδ α὎ημ῔ξ, ηαὶ ἑκὶ θόβῳ πάκηα ἅπεν ζὺ ἔπεζξ, ημζαῦηα ἕηενα 
ηαηαζηήζεζεκ πθδζίμκ ζμο; πόηενμκ Κναηύθμξ ἂκ ηαὶ εἰηὼκ Κναηύθμο ηόη᾽ εἴδ ηὸ ημζμῦημκ, ἠ δύμ Κναηύθμζ; 
[ΚΡΑ.] δύμ ἔιμζβε δμημῦζζκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, Κναηύθμζ.” 
274
 In fact, an image can be defined as a sort of desire or longing for the thing itself. The description of the object 
that provokes an ἀκάικδζζξ in the Phaedo fully applies to Plato‟s notion of image: it wants to be like (αμύθεηαζ 
or ὀνέβεηαζ εἶκαζ μἷμκ) the thing evoked by it, but falls short of it (ἐκδεεζηένςξ ἔπεζ). See 74d-75a. 
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and its essential traits before trying to define it conceptually. Reflecting about the images of 
something can thus help us develop a concept and understand the problems associated with it, 
especially when the concept is neither immediately available nor easy to understand. We start 
with something which is more familiar and clearer to us and, through its consideration, we try 
to arrive at a clear insight into something else.  
We must, however, be aware of the risks of confounding the image with the thing 
itself. In our present inquiry we cannot assume that we will fully know what philosophical 
examination is only by focusing Plato‟s portrayal of it. If anything, this portrayal will actually 
show the impossibility of defining the operation simply by referring to its manifestations. As 
we will see, there are many diverse images of philosophical examination in Plato‟s writings 
and such a diversity makes the question about the unity of them all (a question for which we 
find no answer in the domain of images as such) all the more pressing. 
Let us then consider the images of philosophical examination. They can be organized 
into two groups. The first group comprises the different aspects of the enactment or dramatic 
representation (ιίιδζζξ) of philosophical examination in the dialogues. The second group is 
composed by the terms Plato uses to designate the act of examining. These terms have a 
metaphoric nature and compare philosophical examination to other activities. We will see the 
many images that are contained in both these groups and reflect on the meaning of this 
multiplicity, which will also be a good preparation for the following discussion on the unitary 
concept of philosophical examination. 
 
1. The dramatization of philosophical examination in the corpus 
 
 As was seen in the Introduction, Plato‟s writings are not treatises that put forward the 
author‟s views and the arguments that sustain them.
275
 They rather present many different 
examinations, which are neither in Plato‟s own voice nor anonymous. Plato‟s writings are 
indeed dramatic texts and have a mimetic character. Dramatic ιίιδζζξ is defined in the 
Republic as “likening one‟s self to someone else either in voice or in appearance”.
276
 This is 
precisely what we find in the texts. Plato adopts different voices and behaviors, impersonates 
different persons (some of them fictitious and even nameless) and disappears behind them. 
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 See Section 4.1 of the Introduction. 
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 See 393c: “μ὎ημῦκ ηό βε ὁιμζμῦκ ἑαοηὸκ ἄθθῳ ἠ ηαηὰ θςκὴκ ἠ ηαηὰ ζπ῅ια ιζιε῔ζεαί ἐζηζκ ἐηε῔κμκ ᾧ ἄκ ηζξ 





His texts are theatrical plays (or more precisely, philosophical dramas). As a result, the 
examinations are not simply communicated, but enacted. They are carried out by different 
characters and therefore reflect these characters‟ interests, personalities, states of mind, as 
well as the relations between them.
277
  
Among all characters, one in particular stands out: Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. 
He partakes in almost every discussion and is depicted as unique, outlandish, full of 
contradictions and an almost mythical figure. As was said in the discussion of the Apology 
above, he is the perfect embodiment of philosophical examination and a model which some 
strive to imitate. The other characters, in turn, have other stances towards philosophical 
examination. They can be more or less committed, more or less active, and they react 
differently to what happens during examination. They also have more or less philosophical 
potential, which they can neglect or try to develop. Socrates himself is the extreme case of 
someone who had much potential as a young man and who has developed it to the fullest. We 
see him at different moments of his life and follow this development. This is very important, 
because it shows how his talent for examination is a possibility that does not appear 
spontaneously, but is rather something that must be acquired through training. 
All these and many other aspects characterize Plato‟s ιίιδζζξ of philosophical 
examination. A close consideration of all of them would be too extensive and we will not 
undertake it here. We will rather focus our attention on aspects that let us see some of the 
most important features of Plato‟s understanding of philosophical examination. In particular, 
we will consider the many guises under which philosophical examination appears in Plato‟s 
writings. Philosophical examination has indeed a protean character. It constantly changes 
shape, not only from dialogue to dialogue, but also within the same text. This is a salient 
feature of Plato‟s depiction and it raises some important questions. We will thus collect many 
different elements that are associated with how philosophical examination is enacted in the 
Platonic corpus. This collection will not be complete, but it will give us a pretty precise idea 
of the diversity we find in the texts. We will briefly see many of the different configurations 
philosophical examination may assume, without entering into much detail about their 
                                                 
277
 The characterization of these figures is quite complex. What they say and what they do betrays their 
thoughts, emotions and ambitions. They have different ages, occupations and social standings. They have their 
own way of speaking and thinking. They have their own character (ἤεμξ) and different degrees of intelligence. 
All these idiosyncrasies are relevant. They are reflected in one‟s relation to philosophical examination and show 
how the latter is always integrated in a particular way of life. Furthermore, these characters were for the most 
part public figures and everybody knew how their lives had turned out. Plato integrated the examination 
precisely in these lives, thus making it all very concrete and putting it in direct relation to the good or bad fates 
of these figures. 
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structure or meaning. We will organize them under different headings, which correspond to 
different factors that determine the kind of examination that is employed and thus help us 
understand why the philosophical examination can assume all these configurations.    
 
1.1. The κίκεζηο of the genesis and of the interruption of philosophical 
examination 
 
 Let us start at the beginning. The dialogues often depict and discuss the irruption or 
outbreak of particular examinations. At first, there was no examination and many things were 
left unexamined, then suddenly a particular examination is set in motion. But what does this 
depiction tell us about philosophical examination? 
 The first thing that stands out in this respect is the fact that philosophical examination 
may have many different geneses. Several dialogues begin in the middle of an examination 
and we receive no indication of how it started.
278
 In other cases we follow the shift from a 
trivial conversation to the examination of a matter implied in what someone said. Normally it 
is Socrates who makes this transition, by submitting someone else to examination. He may be 
in some cultural event where someone reads a text or exhibits his intellectual virtuosity and 
Socrates then examines him about what he said.
279
 He can also inquire someone about the 
boys that show intellectual promise and afterwards submits some boy to a test.
280
 Sometimes, 
Socrates crosses paths with some acquaintance of his who is about to do something, which 
leads to Socrates questioning him about the intended action.
281
 Other times, he meets 
someone and questions his usual actions and what they presuppose.
282
 It can even occur that 
Socrates wakes up with someone besides him and starts examining him almost 
immediately.
283
 In some cases, Socrates had arranged a meeting with friends and in this 
meeting he makes the acquaintance of someone, whom he quickly submits to questioning 
with hopes of learning something.
284
 But the examination is not always directed at others. 
Sometimes it is his own circumstances and predicaments (especially when his life is at risk) 
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 This is the case of Meno, Cratylus and Philebus, for instance. 
279
 See the beginning of Hippias Minor, Gorgias, Protagoras and Parmenides. 
280
 This is how the examination begins in Charmides and Theaetetus. 
281
 See for instance the opening of Euthyphro or Alcibiades I.  
282
 Socrates does this in Ion and Hippias Major. In a way, something similar happens in Lysis, since Socrates 
inquires two θίθμζ about the meaning of θζθία.   
283
 This is how Crito and Protagoras begin. 
284
 Cp. the beginning of Sophist and Timaeus. 
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that prompt the examination.
285
 In general, Socrates does not need much to start examining 
something. But he is not the only one that sets examinations going. Sometimes people who 
want to know his opinion or advice start questioning him.
286
 In fact, anyone can cause the 
examination to start and anyone can be submitted to it.  
A quick glance over the starting points of the dialogues thus shows how diverse the 
genesis of examination can be – and although we find many different geneses of examination, 
Plato‟s writings are far from making a full inventory. They provide no more than a sample of 
how philosophical examination can begin and thereby indicate that each moment in life (not 
only cultural gatherings, but also everyday life and difficult or extreme situations) can 
become the starting point of complex examinations. These examinations may take place in 
very different contexts and in very different places in the πόθζξ. There is no typical situation 
(even if some may be more propitious or more suited than others). Ultimately, everything 
depends on one‟s capacity to release oneself from the more immediate concerns and start 
examining. 
Plato, however, not only presents examinations being undertaken one after the other. 
He also shows us their interruption or breakdown. The cause for this may be either extrinsic 
or intrinsic to the examination. At some points, the arrival of a particular person causes the 
examination to stop.
287
 At the end of Symposium Aristophanes and Agathon fall asleep. This 
is an expression of our physiological limitations and of how they restrict our ability to 
examine. Sometimes, a character is otherwise engaged (or so he claims) and has to leave.
288
 
Other times, the examination can also be aborted because a character grows impatient, tired 
or exasperated with it and does not want to continue.
289
 
All this goes to show just how fragile the examination is and how easily it can wither 
down and die. The problem is thus not only about its genesis, but also (and perhaps mainly) 
about its preservation and development. The commitment to examination and value 
recognized in it may vary greatly – and this means the examination can be performed as 
something casual, loose, discontinuous, or as an intensive and global project. Only the latter 
                                                 
285
 The Apology, Crito and Phaedo show precisely this. 
286
 See the beginning of Laches, Hippias Minor and Meno. 
287
 At the end of Lysis, for instance, the boys‟ guardians bring the discussion to a close, whereas in Symposium 
the arrival of Alcibiades prevents Aristophanes from giving a reply to Socrates speech (see 212c ff.). 
288
 It happens at the end of Euthyphro or in Socrates‟ conversation with Cephalus at the beginning of Republic 
(cp. 331d). Even Socrates must at times stop the examination because of other commitments (see the very end of 
Theaetetus). Other times he must stop because his time has run out (as is the case in the Apology and in 
Phaedo).  
289
 A good illustration of this is the conversation with Anytus in Meno (see 94e-95a). 
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truly fulfils the potential of philosophical examination, but it requires great effort and 
dedication. 
The longevity of examination is not the only factor that can vary, though. While the 
examination is being performed, it may follow different paths, according to the views, 
interests, capabilities and difficulties of the interlocutors. These paths may lead to dead ends 
or ἀπμνίαζ and one must start all over again.
290
 The exploration of new possibilities may then 
entail an inversion of roles. The one who was trying to answer may now ask the questions 
and the other has to answer and account for his answers. It may also happen that someone 
that was just listening (and of whom we might not even have been aware) now takes part in 
the dialogue, either because of his own initiative (in order to ask a question, raise an 
objection, express his perplexity) or because someone addressed him.
291
 
Sometimes the search for answers seems to lead to results, but they may be merely 
apparent. It is therefore important not to accept them right away. One must insist and renew 
the examination.
292
 This raises the question of when does it all end – which is a constitutive 
problem of the examination.
293
 One thing is clear, though. Such an examination is not our 
usual position in life. We may examine or not, and when we do, we may examine just a little 
or undertake it as our destiny. But at first we tend to have other engagements. The different 
examinations thus appear as interstices in the middle of life‟s journey and they are not 
something we can easily undertake and maintain. This raises the question about the factors 
that provoke, encourage, sustain and eventually interrupt an examination of something. There 
seem to be several of them, but we will not consider them here.
294
 The important thing for 
now is the fact that philosophical examination may have different possible origins.  
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 This movement of πάθζκ ἐλ ἀνπ῅ξ is a constant feature of the dialogues (see e.g. Euthphr. 11b, 15c, Chrm. 
163d, La. 197e-198a, Men. 79c, e, Euthd. 295e, Grg. 489d, Phd. 88d, Tht. 151d, 164c, 187a-b, 200d, Plt. 264b, 
268d, Prm. 142b). The answers or definitions that were put forward collapse and the interlocutors must make a 
fresh start. Other times Socrates, comparing the examination to a game of πεηηεία, allows someone to remake a 
move (ἀκαεέζεαζ) – i.e., to give a different answer at some of the questions that were raised during the course of 
the examination) and thus open a new line of inquiry. See, for instance, Chrm. 164d, Grg. 461d, 462a, Prt. 354e, 
Phd. 87a. Cp. also Hipparchus, 229e. 
291
 This happens many times. See e.g. Grg. 461b, 481b, Rep. 336a ff., Tht. 168c, 183c ff.. In some cases, the 
defense of a thesis is actually transferred to someone else. In Republic (331d) and Philebus (11a f., 12a, 19a), 
Polemarchus and Protarchus are said to inherit the thesis of Cephalus and Philebus, respectively. 
292
 Socrates often exhibits this capacity of suspecting what was achieved and keep examining. One of the best 
illustrations of this is Ly. 218c, where Socrates says: “ηαὶ δὴ ηαὶ α὎ηὸξ ἐβὼ πάκο ἔπαζνμκ, ὥζπεν εδνεοηήξ ηζξ, 
ἔπςκ ἀβαπδη῵ξ ὃ ἐεδνεοόιδκ. ηἄπεζη᾽ μ὎η μἶδ᾽ ὁπόεεκ ιμζ ἀημπςηάηδ ηζξ ὏πμρία εἰζ῅θεεκ ὡξ μ὎η ἀθδε῅ εἴδ 
ηὰ ὡιμθμβδιέκα ἟ι῔κ, ηαὶ ε὎εὺξ ἀπεεζεεὶξ εἶπμκ· αααα῔, ὦ Λύζζ ηε ηαὶ Μεκέλεκε, ηζκδοκεύμιεκ ὄκαν 
πεπθμοηδηέκαζ.” There are also other characters who are sometimes hard to please with the answers that are 
given and who are commended for it by Socrates (see e.g. Rep. 367e-368a and Phd. 62e-63a). 
293
 For more on this topic, see Chap. 19, Sect. 3.4. 
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1.2. The different modes of relation to philosophical examination and to the 
views being examined 
 
 Another important aspect that varies greatly throughout the corpus is the different 
relation characters have with philosophical examination. It is indeed possible to have 
different degrees of commitment while examining. Someone may regard a particular 
examination (or all examination in general) simply as a game or a contest in which victory is 
all that matters.
295
 But one can also perform the examination in full earnest and be very 
passionate about it. Moreover, examination in general can play different roles in the lives of 
the characters. Some dedicate themselves entirely to it, but for others philosophical 
examination is something occasional, instigated by some particular circumstance or by 
someone. These different relations with examination may be conditioned by one‟s past 
experiences, as some passages expressly point out. If in the past someone hit many dead ends, 
this may cause him to have grown frustrated and skeptic – or affected by misology. If, 
however, one notices progress and is hopeful to find answers, then one‟s motivation is bound 
to be much greater.
296
 
 In the cases in which the characters are committed to philosophical examination, they 
may still have different relations to the views under examination, and this in turn will help 
determine the kind of examination that they perform. Some are examining their own beliefs 
(either alone or with the help of someone else) and so they are fully involved in the 
examination. But the examination may also concern the beliefs of someone else – either the 
interlocutor or someone absent. In the latter case, the characters may examine something 
heard by one of the characters.
297
 However, the views put forward can also be presented as 
the result of a sudden inspirational insight or a dream.
298
 In some cases, there is even a 
complete ignorance about the origin of a thesis – especially when it is shared by most people 
and for a long time, as is the case in the Apology.
299
 The examination may be precisely about 
the views shared by most people or everybody – or it may concern the views of past and 
                                                 
295
 We find a perfect illustration of this in the behavior of the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus 
throughout Euthydemus. 
296
 For a discussion of misology and its opposite, see in particular Phd. 89d ff. 
297
 See e.g. Chrm. 161b and Tht. 201c-d.  
298
 Cp. for instance Cra. 396d, Phdr. 237a, Tht. 201d ff., Phlb. 20b. 
299
 Here Socrates must fight shadows in order to defend himself. See 18b ff. 
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contemporary Greek culture (and in particular famous philosophers and poets).
300
 As a result, 
the ones performing the examination may disagree partially or fully with these views – or 
they may be unsure about their own stance with respect to them (especially after going 
through the examination process). The views examined may in fact be taken as mere 
conjectures, which one regards as more or less plausible. In Phaedo, Socrates even presents a 
hypothetical kind of examination, in which one provisionally accepts what seems to be the 
best view and considers the consequences.
301
 Other times, however, the hypothetical method 
simply considers many or all different alternatives and sees their implications. In this case, 
one may very well not have any particular inclination and it is the examination itself that is 
supposed to reveal what is the correct view.
302
 
In all these cases, one is transparent about one‟s relation to the views being examined. 
But it is not always so. One may also be ironical or dissimulated (as Socrates often is, not 
letting one‟s beliefs transpire).
303
 In some cases, one may even defend views that are the 
exact opposite of one‟s beliefs. One may be wheedling or wily (αἱιύθμξ) and try to obtain 
something by defending a view opposite to one‟s own.
304
 Other times, we see people 
defending a view that is very implausible exclusively (or at least mainly) for epideictic 
purposes.
305
 All these different relations to the views being examined will strongly affect the 
development of the examination and the meaning it has for the ones that perform it. 
 
1.3. The difference between practical and theoretical examinations 
 
 Another factor that determines the different examinations we find illustrated in the 
corpus is the kind of relation the examination has with one‟s own life or how it is integrated 
in it. Some examinations are very close to the practical sphere (here understood in a broad 
sense), while others seem to have a strictly cognitive or theoretical nature and concern some 
                                                 
300
 To name only a few important examples: in the Theaetetus Socrates examines the views of Protagoras (152a 
ff.), in Sophist the Stranger examines Parmenides and the θοζζμθόβμζ in general (237a ff.), while Simonides is 
examined in the Protagoras (349a ff.).  
301
 Cp. 100a ff.  
302
 The hypothetical method is indeed an important device to expand one‟s knowledge, especially when one 
does not happen to have any strong convictions in the matter. For an analysis of this method and its different 
forms in the Platonic corpus, see Chap. 9, Sect. 3.1 below.   
303
 For more on Socrates‟ εἰνςκεία, see Sect. 4.1 of the Introduction. 
304
 See in particular Phdr. 237b.  
305
 For instance, given the negative view of love in Greek culture, the project of praising love in Symposium is 
originally introduced as an epideictic challenge (cp. 177a ff.). The first two speeches in the Phaedrus also have 




abstract matter which, at first sight, may seem to have none or only a few remote implications 
on what one does and how one lives.
306
 This distinction between a practical and a theoretical 
examination seems to be clear, though it is also somewhat artificial, as Plato‟s writings time 
and again show. Any reflection about life implies tackling abstract problems that can have 
great implications in our life, and the discussion of abstract problems often requires one to 
consider not only important questions about the nature of life in general, but also what one 
does and the way one lives. In a sense, each problem is always connected with both domains, 
though one side may be predominant.  
Let us then consider the more practical examinations first. Philosophical examination 
is often concerned with the concrete circumstances in which the characters find themselves. It 
can examine either their actions or their course of life. It may focus on the past and what they 
have done.
307
 Other times, what is subject to examination is one‟s present situation: more 
precisely, one‟s condition, one‟s credentials, one‟s talent.
308
 The examination may also look 
to the future and inspect what one is about to do.
309
 It can even imagine a situation (or make a 
thought experiment) and raise the question of what one would do in such a case. Furthermore, 
this practical examination is not restricted to particular matters and circumstances. One‟s life 
as a whole can also be subject to examination – and even several possible ways of life.
310
 
                                                 
306
 This corresponds in part to the distinction between those who occupy themselves of ethereal and abstract 
matters (which was usually expressed by the figure of the ιεηεςνμθόβμξ, as presented in Aristophanes‟ Clouds 
or in Tht. 173c ff.) and those that considered problems that affect individual life and the political community, 
which according to Cicero was an innovation of the historical Socrates. Indeed, Cicero indeed says in 
Tusculanae Disputationes, V.4: “Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit 
et in domus etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere.” See M. POHLENZ 
(ed.), M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta qvae mansuervnt omnia, Fasc. 44, Leipzig, Teubner, 1918. 
307
 Cp. for instance the end of the Apology (40a ff.), where Socrates examines his defense strategy and wonders 
if it was the most appropriate one. In fact, the whole defense speech itself constitutes a form of examination 
concerning what one has done. We see this model of apologetic examination also in Phaedo. Socrates says that 
he will now defend himself before philosophers and justify the fact that he is not concerned with his imminent 
death. See in particular 63b. 
308
 We see Alcibiades and Socrates examining the state the former is in (cp. in particular Alc. I 118b). In 
Gorgias, Protagoras, Euthydemus and Hippias Major Socrates examines who certain sophists are, what 
knowledge they have and what their credentials are. This also happens in Ion and, in a way, in Laches. Other 
times, Socrates examines the qualities and faculties of a youth – as for instance Charmides‟ ζςθνμζύκδ or 
Theaetetus‟ intellectual talent. In Lysis, the two young boys are examined with respect to their understanding of 
θζθία, which is precisely what characterizes their relationship. 
309
 This is the case in Euthyphro, Crito, Alcibiades I and the beginning of Protagoras. Socrates intercepts 
someone and asks him to justify what he intends to do. In other cases, the reflection about what is to be done 
takes the form of a shared deliberation (as we see in Laches, where the characters deliberate about what 
education Lysimachus and Melesias should give their sons). 
310
 We could perhaps include in these practical examinations many of the myths, since they reflect about how 
we live and how we understand what matters in life. The eschatological myths in the Republic, Phaedrus and 
Phaedo examine the broad context in which our life takes place, what we should concern ourselves with and 
how we should live. For a closer consideration of how it is so, cp. Chap. 16, Sect. 5.1 below.  
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As for the more theoretical and abstract examinations, they usually take place in 
moments of leisure (ζπμθή) and in some intellectual context (schools, symposia, readings or 
any other cultural gathering) in which people are discussing cultural or philosophical 
questions, exploring possibilities, defending positions or just showing off their skills.
311
 
Sometimes well-known sophists or philosophers (such as Gorgias, Protagoras and 
Parmenides, alongside Socrates) take part in the conversation, but even when there are no 
intellectual celebrities and the context is not strictly intellectual, the course of the 
conversation (be it a trivial one or itself an examination of some practical matter) may end up 
leading to these more theoretical questions. These questions may have been prompted by 
something that was said or read. Someone (usually Socrates) is surprised by some thesis or 
assumption and requires a justification.
312
 Other times a character outright inquires another 
about his view on a certain matter.
313
 This can happen either because one wants to stir up a 
discussion or because one is interested in learning something. Furthermore, characters do not 
always proceed immediately to the discussion of a serious question in which they are 
interested. Sometimes they examine something as a form of preparation for further 
examination – i.e., philosophical examination may be an exercise (a βοικαζία or ιεθεηή) to 




1.4. The different modalities of ιόγνο  
 
Another relevant factor of differentiation concerns the modalities of θόβμξ. 
Philosophical examination uses θόβμξ, takes place in it and largely coincides with it. The 
meaning of the term θόβμξ is actually very complex, but we will not enter into a detailed 
discussion of it at this point.
315
 What is at issue is the fact that philosophical examination uses 
speech, but also that it produces a rational discussion, in which one attempts to explain and 
account for one‟s views. In this sense, philosophical examination is “logical”. However, this 
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 In fact, some texts illustrate a very particular intellectual context: namely, that of the ἐπίδεζλζξ, i.e. the 
exhibition or display of one‟s intellectual capacity, with the intention of being admired by the listeners and also 
of seducing others (in particular the young) to become one‟s students and learn one‟s intellectual trade (and 
often with both intentions). The best examples of this are Euthydemus and Protagoras. 
312
 See e.g. Hp. Ma. 286c-e, Prt. 329b ff., and Rep. 331b-c.  
313
 Cp. for instance Hp. Mi. 363a and Men. 70a.  
314
 The exercise may be lighter than the actual examination. One may apply the method to a simple object, to 
illustrate what is supposed to be done. See e.g. Men. 73e ff. or Sph. 218c. In Parmenides, however, the exercise 
is extremely demanding and described as a δζὰ πάκηςκ δζέλμδμξ ηε ηαὶ πθακή (136e) or a swimming across the 
sea of θόβμζ (137a). For a consideration of this difficult exercise, see Chap. 9, Sect. 3.1 c) below.   
315
 For two brief considerations of this notion, from two different angles, cp. Sect. 2.2 of this chapter and 
Chapter 6, Section 1.3 b). 
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θόβμξ can have different modalities – and Plato sometimes calls our attention to an important 
difference between a conversation or dialogue (δζαθέβεζεαζ) and a long monologue or speech 
(ιαηνὸξ θόβμξ).
316
 Let us briefly see what characterizes each one. 
 Characters often examine something during the course of a conversation. But this is 
not just any conversation. It is rather a dialogue in which one guides and asks questions, 
whereas the other must answer, explain his answers, justify them and avoid contradiction.
317
  
This renders the examination particularly personal. It also allows characters to consider a 
view in detail, breaking it into pieces (as is said in Hippias Major) and seeing all its 
implications.
318
 As a result, one‟s relation with the contents of a view becomes more 
demanding than usual, and they must be clear and well grounded. Moreover, this method of 
examination is particularly malleable and unpredictable. The line of inquiry is not 
predetermined, but it depends on what is asked and affirmed by both parties during the 
investigation. The whole process can thus bring to light aspects that were hidden and of 
which one had no idea (especially unexpected implications or internal inconsistencies of 
one‟s views).  
But the corpus is comprised of more than conversations. There are also long speeches, 
in which a particular subject is discussed and a particular view is expounded.
319
 One could 
think that the examination is confined to the strictly dialogical moments, in which two 
characters converse and the views of one of them are examined. Speeches would rather be a 
moment of presenting one‟s doctrine. But speeches are the result of examinations and they 
themselves contain moments in which the orator examines things, confronts or questions 
other views, presents alternatives, explores possibilities, gives definitions, and so on.
320
 It is 
true that the views presented in a speech may be more imprecise than the ones discussed in a 
conversation, since in a speech one is not forced to account for everything being said, but 
                                                 
316
 Cp. in particular Hp. Ma. 304a-b, Prt. 334c ff., Grg. 449b-c, Sph. 217c-218a. 
317
 For more on this kind of conversation or questioning, see Sect. 2.6 below.  
318
 Cp. Hp. Ma. 304a. Frustrated with Socrates questions and objections, Hippias describes them as “ηκήζιαηά 
[...] ηαὶ πενζηιήιαηα η῵κ θόβςκ [...] ηαηὰ αναπὺ δζῃνδιέκα”. He also calls it ζιζηνμθμβία (304b), which has the 
connotation of hairsplitting or being excessively occupied with minutiae, but is actually a suitable designation of 
what we see Socrates doing – especially if we consider that he often begins his inquiries asking about some 
small thing (ζιζηνόκ ηζ or αναπύ ηζ) implied in what someone said. Cp. e.g. Hp. Ma. 286c, Prt 328e. 
319
 This mode of θόβμξ is also referred to in disparaging terms. For instance, it is described as a relaxing the 
reins of θόβμξ (Prt. 338a), a stretching of it (Prt. 335c) or a running away to the high sea of θόβμζ (Prt. 338a), 
with the further implication of being prolix and tedious in doing so. Usually these θόβμζ are pronounced by 
sophists, but we also see Socrates pronouncing them. This is the case in the Apology, Phaedrus and Symposium, 
but also elsewhere, when he needs to explain something in detail or when he tells a myth. Cp. Grg. 464b ff., 
especially Socrates‟ explanation at 465e. 
320
 In some cases, speeches can even resemble conversations, as Socrates‟ speech in the Apology, where he 
imagines questions asked by the jury and answers them. See 20c-d, 28b, 33b-c, 37e. 
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what is lost in detail is gained in amplitude. Indeed, speeches can more easily provide a 
synoptic view of a particular question. In addition, a speech has a more rigid form than a 
conversation, since it is fully controlled by an orator, who can manipulate the presentation at 
his will in order to best instruct (or simply to persuade) the audience. Consequently, it can 
also be a more impersonal form of examination, which hides one‟s own views and does not 
force one to account for them. 
These marked differences do not necessarily mean that one modality of examination is 
better than the other. They are in fact complementary and in some occasions either one or the 
other may be more suitable. Moreover, the opposition between the two modalities is not 
necessarily as absolute as this analysis suggests. There is a certain continuity between them, 
the characters easily transition from one to the other, and sometimes the boundaries between 
them are not very clear. Some speeches are very brief and either the result of a question or the 
cause of further questions, whereas some questions and especially some answers are longer 
than usual. Moreover, some conversations are explicitly used to present doctrines.
321
 
On this topic it is also relevant to consider that long speeches do not need to have a 
strictly rational form. They can assume the form of myths or fables, in which a certain 
fantastic vision of reality is presented at length. Although it is difficult to generalize about 
them, because Plato uses different kinds of myths, with different degrees of complexity and 
different functions, we can nevertheless make some general remarks about their relation to 
philosophical examination. First, they originate in a certain examination of things (or, as 
Aristotle says, in a certain wonder or perplexity about them).
322
 Normally they are connected 
with the conversations or speeches that precede and follow them. They illustrate these other 
θόβμζ, make them more concrete and help us visualize them. In addition, insofar as they are 
questionable and imprecise, they also call for further examination. We can even ask if it is 
possible to fully translate these myths into rational discourse or into a dialectic 
conversation.
323
 But even if that is not the case, myths still allow Plato to handle certain 
themes – especially eschatological questions – that otherwise would be very hard to discuss. 
Myths are thus much more than poetic interludes. They are also part of the project of 
philosophical examination we find in the corpus and must be regarded as such. 
 
                                                 
321
 In the Sophist Socrates seems to assume that the same content could be presented either way. See Sph. 217c. 
322
 See Metaphysica 982b17-19: “[...] ηαὶ ὁ θζθόιοεμξ θζθόζμθόξ πώξ ἐζηζκ· ὁ βὰν ιῦεμξ ζύβηεζηαζ ἐη 
εαοιαζίςκ”. 
323
 Protagoras seems to do this when he answers a question posed by Socrates by telling a myth and then puts 
forward a rational explanation of what was expressed in the myth. Cp. Prt. 320c ff. 
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1.5. The different procedures employed in the corpus 
 
 Regardless of whether the examinations are performed through conversation or 
speeches, we find many different procedures or techniques of examination being employed in 
the texts. Some of these procedures are more direct, others more indirect. The examination 
may focus on a single reality or property, leaving aside everything else. It then tries to 
understand the specific nature, power or properties of its object, considered in itself.
324
 This 
consideration may focus either on the full identity of something or on some particular 
property, to ascertain whether something is characterized by it or not.
325
 The examination 
may also focus on language and the words used to refer to something.
326
 It may try to define a 
particular word, distinguish its different senses (in order to avoid ambiguity) and see if any of 
them is its proper sense.
327
 It may also discuss the origin of these terms and try to explain 
them through alleged etymologies.
328
 
 Very often, however, the devices employed in examining things have a more indirect 
nature. A good example of this indirectness is the procedure employed to determine the good 
in Philebus. Since it is difficult to find it directly, Socrates says that one should first search 
for its home – as when one is searching for a particular person.
329
 In other words, one must 
start by a generic or vague identification of something and then one will add detail and get a 
more precise identification of it. This vague and indirect identification may also be done by 
means of a comparison, a metaphor, or an analogy. Plato frequently employs images of 
                                                 
324
 We find examples of this in the dialogues that discuss a single notion, such as Euthyphro (piety), Laches 
(courage), Charmides (ζςθνμζύκδ), Lysis (θίθμξ). 
325
 In Republic I, for instance, the characters examine the notion of justice, but as Socrates points out at the end 
(354b), their discussion was more about a predicate of it than about the notion itself (see 354b). For more on this 
distinction between the identity of something and its qualifications, see Chapter 6, Section 2.1 below. 
326
 The boundaries between this and the previous procedure, in which a particular reality was focused, is 
sometimes difficult to draw, since the consideration of a word often entails the consideration of the reality it 
refers to. However, some examinations may be more sensitive to questions of language. 
327
 There are many moments in which terms are defined and meanings distinguished – something inspired by 
Prodicus‟ practice of ὀκόιαηα δζαζνε῔κ and the general interest in language at the time. In other cases, the 
discussion is about the proper form of something (i.e., the ὀνεόηδξ of a word) – for instance, what is the proper 
form of θζθμζμθία (a question we will consider in Chap. 14, Sect. 4 below). 
328
 We find many fantastic etymologies in the Cratylus (see 391d ff.), but they also appear in other moments of 
the corpus (e.g. Phdr. 244c-d). It may not be clear how convinced Plato was of their validity, but it is certain 
that he used them at least to clarify the meaning of terms. 
329
 See 61a ff. Socrates uses several metaphors to characterize his approach. When inquiring about the good, 
Socrates speaks of knowing which path to take and where to find it (where it lives, where its home is). See in 
particular 61a-b: “ηαεάπεν εἴ ηίξ ηζκα ἄκενςπμκ γδη῵κ ηὴκ μἴηδζζκ πν῵ημκ ὀνε῵ξ ἵκ᾽ μἰηε῔ πύεμζημ α὎ημῦ, ιέβα 
ηζ δήπμο πνὸξ ηὴκ εὕνεζζκ ἂκ ἔπμζ ημῦ γδημοιέκμο”. Later, in 64c, Socrates will speak of reaching the threshold 
of the habitation of the Good.  
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concrete beings in order to show important traits of more abstract or intelligible entities.
330
 In 
some cases, he resorts to larger entities in order to clarify the structure of smaller entities that 
are structurally similar to the first.
331
  
Another procedure that can be used to examine something is the method of divisions, 
usually in the form of dichotomies. Sometimes the characters distinguish a good and a bad 
form of something (which is connected with the aforementioned analysis of words).
332
 This 
method of distinctions may then be taken to the extreme, in an attempt to define all realities 
within a system of progressive dichotomies, starting from more general determinations 
through to the moment in which no more distinctions can be made.
333
  
 In other cases, the examination assumes the form of a contest (ἀβώκ) between two or 
more alternatives. The examination may even start with the formulation of different possible 
answers and someone is expected to choose between them.
334
 Other times, the alternatives are 
introduced at a later point and in several cases they correspond to different ways of life from 
which one has to decide (ηνίκεζκ) which one is best.
335
 The characters compare the different 
possibilities, which often requires them to better determine their content. 
 The examination may also employ thought experiments, in which the characters 
wonder what they would do or say in a particular situation, which is normally absolutely 
fantasized and sometimes implies the intervention of a deity.
336
 Other times the thought 
experiment consists in the isolation of something that we normally only experience in 
                                                 
330
 Plato discusses the method of comparison (or more precisely, of using a model, πανάδεζβια) and how it can 
help us understand something in Plt. 277d ff. For an inventory of these images or metaphors, see e.g. G. BERG, 
Metaphor and Comparison in the Dialogues of Plato, Diss. Baltimore, 1903, and P. LOUIS, Les métaphores de 
Platon, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1945.  
331
 The best example of this is the whole discussion in Rep. II-X, which is based on an analogy between the soul 
and the πόθζξ (see in particular 368c ff.). 
332
 This thought pattern is already used by Homer and Hesiod – as when the latter distinguishes a good and a bad 
ἔνζξ (see Opera et dies, 11-26). Plato follows this model when he distinguishes, for instance, a good from a bad 
ἔνςξ (Smp. 180c ff.) or a good from a bad ιακία (Phdr. 244a ff., 265a). 
333
 This method is discussed, employed and to a certain extent parodied in the Sophist and the Statesman. For a 
more detail consideration of it, see Chap. 9, Sect. 3.3 below. 
334
 This is the starting point of the examination of ἀνεηή in Meno (70a) and of the correction of names in 
Cratylus (383a-384a).  
335
 It is precisely in these cases that an explicit reference to a contest is made. In the Philebus, Socrates talks 
several times of a contest between the life of knowledge and the life of pleasure (see in particular 11e f., 14b, 
22c ff., 66e ff.). In the Republic, we find a contest between justice and injustice (cp. 360e, 361d, 577a ff.). To a 
certain extent, it is also what we find in Socrates conversation with Callicles in Gorgias, where the political and 
the philosophical life are compared (see 484c ff.). The same alternative appears at the end of Euthydemus (see 
305b ff.). For more on the topic of choosing a way of life, see Chapt. 13, Sect. 6.5 below. 
336
 See for instance Alc. I 105a ff. (where Alcibiades is questioned by a god about his ambitions), Smp. 192d-e 
(where Hephaestus questions two lovers) and Cri. 50a ff. (where Socrates imagines himself being interrogated 
by the Laws of Athens). 
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combination with something else, to see if this thing is desirable by itself or not.
337
 These 
hypothetical and often extreme situations constitute a moment of truth, in which one is forced 
to identify and declare one‟s true views, feelings or desires about something. 
 Finally, one can also imagine what some reality would be or create it in speech, in 
order to better define it or better define something through it.
338
 In the Timaeus, Socrates says 
that he expects to see the theory they discussed in the day before come to live – and this is 
what Critias is supposed to do in the eponymous dialogue.
339
 The abstract is thus made 
concrete, in order to better examine something. 
 
1.6. The different possible results of philosophical examination 
 
One final factor that determines the difference between examinations is the kind of 
results they produce or are expected to produce.
340
 In some cases, the examination may lead 
to a dead end, to a situation of ἀπμνία. One is perplexed and cannot find a definite answer to 
a problem.
341
 In other cases, the characters seem to reach conclusions.
342
 However, the 
positive results can themselves have different statuses – both for the persons examining and 
in themselves. One can be fully convinced of the result and take it for a definite answer, or 
one can conceive of it as something likely or plausible (as the θόβμξ εἰηόξ in the Timaeus).
343
 
Likewise, one can take it as a provisional answer, still lacking development and revision. 
Finally, one can also fail to understand the true nature of the result achieved – in particular, 
one may be convinced that one found the answer when the result is in fact insufficient or 
even erroneous. Therefore, it is important to insist and not be satisfied with the first 
semblance of a solution.
344
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 Cp. Rep. 360e ff., Phlb. 20e ff. 
338
 In the Republic Socrates talks of outlining a city in θόβμξ (548c-d), which is a means to determine what 
justice is. In the Laws, it is rather a matter of shaping or molding it through θόβμξ (712b2). 
339
 See Ti. 19b-c. 
340
 We will consider this aspect in greater detail in Chaps. 8 and 9 below, so at this point we will make only a 
very brief mention of it.  
341
 This is the case of aporetic dialogues such as Euthyphro, Laches, Lysis, Hippias Major, Theaetetus. 
342
 Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Laws are just a few examples of dialogues that seem to reach 
conclusions.  
343
 Cp. Ti. 29b-d.  
344
 Usually Socrates reminds others of this, but sometimes he is not present or fails to do so – and so it is up to 
the other characters and the reader to question any result the examination may have produced. 
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1.7. The problem of the unity of philosophical examination and of the meaning of 
this multiplicity 
 
 As was seen, philosophical examination can vary according to several different factors 
and assume very different configurations. Plato‟s writings give a very complex illustration of 
this. He shows how flexible this examination can be. Philosophical examination is not simply 
a matter of mechanically employing a particular technique or a set of techniques. It is 
determined by the context in which it takes place (the subject matter, the character and 
intelligence of the interlocutors, the situation) and the challenges it faces. 
 This raises the question of what the different forms of philosophical examination have 
in common. Given all their differences, it is not even completely clear whether we can still 
talk of a unitary concept of philosophical examination. At first sight, it is difficult to 
determine which features are shared by all the forms of examination. It is likewise difficult to 
say whether they all have the same status or if some of them are more important than the 
others. The relation between them is unclear. The texts lack a methodological reflection that 
explicitly integrates all these moments in a global project. We cannot immediately locate and 
determine the value of each of these forms of examination. We do not know whether they can 
all be applied to the same topics and we also do not know if they are all equally efficient. We 
also do not have a criterion to determine which form of examination is to be employed in 
which circumstances. It is not even clear whether this is to be determined on the basis of the 
concept of philosophical examination or only case by case, by comparing the results. 
 Another question raised by the multiple modalities of examination is whether or not 
all the modalities are derived from the project of philosophical examination and required by 
it. Is it better to use all these different configurations instead of just one? Is it not possible to 
reduce and replace them all with a simple configuration? And if diversity is important, can 
there still be other relevant configurations that are not contemplated in the corpus? 
These and other questions require the definition of philosophical examination. In other 
words, the way philosophical examination is enacted in the corpus forces us to think about 
the nature and purpose of this examination. But, since we cannot define philosophical 




2. The vocabulary used to convey the notion of philosophical examination 
 
A different set of images of philosophical examination can be seen in the language 
employed by Plato to designate the very act of examining something. Besides the term 
ἐλέηαγεζκ, which is directly connected with the passage about the unexamined life in the 
Apology, Plato uses several other terms with a similar meaning. These terms (ἐλεηάγεζκ 
included) are associated with different everyday contexts and with particular activities or 
even particular forms of examination that have some resemblance with philosophical 
examination. These more familiar activities are thus used as metaphors in order to clarify 
what the characters are doing in the dialogues. Considered by themselves, they show different 




 We can group the different terms according to the main aspects or facets of 
examination they express (although some of them actually express more than one facet). Each 
term has a common usage (which in many cases can also be found in Plato‟s texts) and a 
technical one. The latter is not necessarily an innovation of Plato. Many of these technical 
usages can already found in pre-Platonic literature. However, we will not consider how these 
terms were used outside the Platonic corpus. A brief synopsis of their meaning, with some 
references to their origins, will suffice to see what these terms tell us about philosophical 
examination.  
 Before considering the different groups of terms, we will turn our attention to the term 
ἐλεηάγεζκ – not only because it is directly connected with Socrates‟ assertion about the 
unexamined life, but also because its meaning encompasses several of the different facets of 
philosophical examination we will discuss in the following and, to this extent, it provides us 
an overview of the complexity of the language used to express the idea of examination. 
 
                                                 
345
 This kind of metaphorical language is very common in Plato‟s writings (as was mentioned in Section 4.1 of 
the Introduction). The terms employed are in many cases far from being well-defined and unambiguous. They 
are frequently taken from other areas (such as nature, society, politics, professions, pastimes, other theoretical 
disciples and so on). Moreover, these words are often employed in various senses (sometimes during the same 
discussion) and they are constantly replaced by other words that may contain different associations. This can be 
regarded both as a weakness and a strength of Plato‟s style. Although it introduces imprecision, it also makes 
concepts more intuitive and in some cases almost phenomenological.  
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2.1. The meaning of ἐμεηάδεηλ/ἐμέηαζηο and ἀλεμέηαζηνο 
 
 It has been argued that ἐλεηάγεζκ is etymologically connected with the adjectives ἐηόξ 
and ἐηεόξ (which means “true”, “real”, “genuine”). The prefix ἐη- would then mark the 
accomplishment of a process – in this instance, the complete attainment of what is true or real 
in relation to something.
346
 But regardless of its etymology, ἐλεηάγεζκ always denotes an act 
or effort of ascertaining what some being really is and whether or not this being is as it seems 
or claims to be. In order to do so, one needs to carefully inspect, scrutinize, examine or test 
this being. Only so can one overcome the possible limitations of one‟s first impressions or 
one‟s regular contact with it, thereby forcing it to reveal itself as it really is.  
 The word and the act it designates can in turn be connected with different contexts. It 
is often used in a military sense. ἖λέηαζζξ is a muster, inspection or review of troops, their 
arms, horses, etc. This is an act that is performed before an important event, as a preparation 
for it. One has to gather the different elements of a complex reality and align them, thus 
altering their disposition and one‟s mode of relation to them. In the case of an army, this 
allows one to see whether it is prepared to defend the entire community. An ἐλέηαζζξ can thus 
be decisive before proceeding to the campaigns of practical life. 
 The term ἐλέηαζζξ may also have a more economic usage and emphasize the idea of 
being exhaustive. In this case, it has the sense of enumeration or inventory (for instance of 
possessions). It not only lets us see things that may otherwise escape our notice, but it enables 
one to determine with precision the whole set of things that compose a certain group. The 
term is used in a similar sense in the context of the control of magistrates and their expenses 
during office.
347
 One must verify the way they handled public money. In this case, it also has 
the sense of verifying the honesty and probity of someone. This sense of verification can even 
become predominant in the use of the word.
348
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 Cp. e.g. H. FRISK, “Wahrheit” und “Lüge” in den Indogermanischen Sprachen. Einige morphologische 
Bemerkungen, Göteborgs Hogskolas Arsskrift 41 (1935), 1-35 (especially 16-18); IDEM, Griechisches 
etymologisches Wörterbuch, 3 vols., Heidelberg, Winter, 1960-1972, sub voces ἐηάγς and ἐηεόξ; P. 
CHANTRAINE, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots, 4 vols., Paris, Klincksieck, 
1968-1980, sub voces ἐηάγς and ἐηεόξ; J.-P. LEVET, Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque. 
Tome I: Présentation génerale – Le vrai et le faux dans les épopées homériques, Paris, Les Belles Letres, 1976, 
8; R. BEEKES, Etymological Dictionary of Greek, 2 vols., Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2010, sub voces ἐηάγς and 
ἐηεόξ. 
347
 For more on the control of magistrates, see the discussion of θόβμκ δζδόκαζ in the following section. 
348
 It is in this sense that the word could also be used (at least at a later date) for the verification of citizenship 
claims, just like δμηζιάγεζκ. On this usage of the term, see e.g. A. GOMME & F. SANDBACH, Menander. A 
Commentary, Oxford, University Press, 1973, ad Samia 141. 
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 But perhaps more important is the judicial use of the word. ἖λέηαζζξ denotes a cross-
examination of witnesses (in particular of the plaintiff or the defendant) in a lawsuit. What 
undergoes examination in this case is primarily one‟s version of events (though its 
plausibility is also connected with one‟s character and one‟s reliability). The opponent 
searches for inconsistencies in one‟s testimony, tries to find something that may be hidden 
and bring it to light through the pressure of relentless questioning. This pressure was 
increased by the fact that either party was obliged to answer the questions of the opponent. 
One could not simply say something. One had to stand by one‟s claims and justify them.
349
 
The process of cross-examination is particularly important in a context where 
contradicting claims face each other and threaten the public order. The jury has a deficient 
and indirect access to what happened and an ἐλέηαζζξ is thus (at least ideally) the means to 
verify each version, disarm falsity, reach the truth and pass a fair verdict, thereby restoring 
social order. This is not very far from what we see in Plato‟s dialogues, where ἐλέηαζζξ is 
used as an intense interrogation of different claims or views, often in controversial matters, in 
an attempt to ascertain the truth of these matters, which in turn allows to restore the order in 
the conversation and in the characters‟ minds.
350
  
In sum, ἐλέηαζζξ designates the verification of the quality or worth of something 
through careful (usually exhaustive) inspection. It may be directed at a concrete object (or 
group of objects), a claim or view, and a person (or group of persons). This threefoldness also 
characterizes the Platonic use of the term (as well as of most of the other terms we will be 
considering), and so we shall return to it afterwards.
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 We see an illustration of this in the Apology, when Socrates interrogates Meletus (24c ff.).  
350
 For more on the meaning of ἐλέηαζζξ and ἐλεηάγεζκ, see for instance W. GOODWIN (ed.),          
Demosthenes Ŕ On the Crown, Cambridge, University Press, 1905, ad 173, 277, 310, 320; J. BURNET 
(ed.), Plato’s Eutyphro Apology of Socrates and Crito, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1941, ad 22e6; P. HUART, Le 
vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’ œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, 199; A. GOMME 
& F. SANDBACH, Menander. A Commentary, Oxford, University Press, 1973, ad Samia 141; J.-P. LEVET, Le 
vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque. Tome I: Présentation génerale – Le vrai et le faux dans les 
épopées homériques, Paris, Les Belles Letres, 1976, 8-12, 165-180; A. MAFFI, L‟exetastikon eidos nella 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, in A. PENNACINI (ed.), Retorica e storia nella cultura classica, Bologna, Pitagora, 
1985, 29-43; H. GOLDMAN, Reexamining the “Examined Life” in Plato‟s Apology of Socrates, Philosophical 
Forum 35 (2004), 1-33; P. PONTIER, Trouble et Ordre chez Platon et Xénophon. Paris, Vrin 2006, 200-202; D. 
MIRHADY, The Disappearance and Reappearance of Exetasis, Mouseion, Journal of the Classical Association 
of Canada 8 (2008), 395-408; G. PASINI, The ἐλεηαζηζηὸκ εἶδμξ of the Rh. Al. and Parallels in Aeschines‟ 
Against Timarchus and Demosthenes‟ On the False Embassy, Rhetorica 29 (2011), 336-356. 
351
 See the introductory remarks on Chap. 5 below. For Plato‟s use of ἐλέηαζζξ or any cognate to designate any 
form of philosophical examination, see Ap. 22e, 23c, 24c, 28e, 29e, 33c, 38a, 41b, 41c, Chrm. 167a, 170d, 172b, 
La. 189a, 189e, Cra. 410d, 436d, Prt. 333c, Grg. 495a, 514b, 515b, Rep. 489a, 598d, 599a, Phdr. 258d, 261a, 
270c, 277a, Tht. 154d, 155a, 184c, 210c, Sph. 230b, Phlb. 55c, Ti. 62c, Criti. 107c, 107d, Lg. 685a, 837e, 891c, 
900d. These terms are also used for other kinds of examinations. Cp. Criti. 119d, Lg. 720d, 764a. 
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 Finally, it is also important to make some remarks about the adjective “ἀκελέηαζημξ”, 
which is found in Socrates‟ statement in the Apology (38a) and which is usually translated as 
“unexamined”. As was mentioned above, the word is more complex, since the suffix -ημξ can 
have either a passive or an active force.
352
 Ἀκελέηαζημξ can thus indicate that something or 
someone is not submitted to examination or that one does not oneself perform a particular 
examination. In the occurrences outside of Plato the meaning is usually passive.
353
 ἖λέηαζζξ 
is indeed a means of identifying and preventing the faults of something. Its omission may 
therefore be the cause of limitations and defects. One lets something pass, admits it without 
submitting it to any special demands, and this leaves one exposed to problems. However, in 
the Apology the use of the word is more complex. It seems to have a simultaneously passive 
and active sense, especially given the reflexive character of the object that is supposed to 
undergo the ἐλέηαζζξ. Life (αίμξ) is what must be examined (and what may be left 
unexamined), but in a sense it is also what is supposed to carry out this examination. This is 
the case even when someone is examined by another and seems to be entirely passive. The 
examinee must still give answers, follow what is being said, think about it – and is thus to a 
certain extent active. One could therefore translate ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ as “life without 





2.2. Philosophical examination as a test or assessment of value 
 
 The first facet or side of philosophical examination that we have to consider 
corresponds to an idea that is present in several uses of the term ἐλέηαζζξ, as well as in 
several other terms. Things, persons and views often do not fully reveal themselves as they 
are. Their nature and their worth may remain hidden or they may give the impression (by 
their aspect, their behavior or their words) that they are something they are not. Our access to 
them has limitations and blind spots, which in turn can have serious consequences in our 
actions and our life in general. However, with respect to each being we can either credulously 
accept what it appears to be (i.e., accept what it reveals of itself on its own or what we think 
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 See Chap. 3, Sect. 2. 
353
 See e.g. ISOCRATES, Evagoras, 42; AESCHINES, In Ctesiphontem, 22; DEMOSTHENES, Philippica I, 
36.4, In Midiam, 218; MENANDER, Sententiae, 17 (Meineke). 
354
 The translation “life without examination” is suggested by De Strycker and Slings. They also add that this is 
a life “in which there is place neither for examination nor for being examined”. See E. De STRYCKER and S. 
R. SLINGS, Plato’s Apology of Socrates, Leiden/New York, Brill, 1994, ad 38a5. For more discussion on the 
meaning of the expression “ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ”, see Chap. 3, Sect. 2 above. 
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of it in a first moment) or we can put it to test or proof, in order to force it to react and reveal 
itself. The object or person may pass or fail the test and this passing or failing may be more or 
less conclusive (depending on how reliable the test is) – but at any rate we have the 
possibility of trying to lay bare what something really is (its “true colors”, its true value) 
through our own acts. Sometimes the simple interaction with something or someone is 
enough to reveal new aspects. It gives us more time with something and time is indeed an 
important factor in our access to things. But in many cases there is need for more artificial 
means, which one will then use to compel things, views, persons to show themselves as they 
truly are. We only have to determine what exactly has this power, how it is to be employed 
and what the extent of its revealing power is. 
Plato expresses this idea of submitting something to a test with several terms and their 
respective associations. One of the most common and meaningful is αάζακμξ or ααζακίγεζκ. 
Βάζακμξ is the name of the touchstone, which was used to test gold. One had to rub or scrape 
the supposed gold and this would leave a streak whose color was then used to ascertain if the 
material was genuine or counterfeit gold. The noun also denotes (as does the verb) the 
process itself of testing the alleged gold and determining its value, whereby one could 
prevent the circulation of false currency and the accumulation of an illusory (or merely 
dreamt) wealth.
355
 These words may then apply to any test of genuineness or truthfulness, 
especially in the case of persons. The character, inner dispositions and thoughts of someone 
are not immediately accessible and are often not easy to ascertain. People sometimes turn out 
to be the opposite of what they seem and therefore we may need a sure test in this domain, in 
order to determine if others are sincere, reliable, worthy, or not. 
It is important to remark that αάζακμξ does not designate a simple and innocuous test. 
It referred originally to a test done through rubbing or scrapping and this implied submitting 
something to a certain amount of violence. The same holds for the other uses of the word. It 
always suggests a hard test, which submits something to strong pressure and in a way beats 
the truth out of it. With respect to persons, it often involves being submitted to great suffering 
or being put under duress – as can be seen in several examples. A person‟s character may 
indeed be tested not only by the more neutral passing of time, but more intensely and with 
                                                 
355
 The idea of a dreamt wealth (ὄκαν πθμοηε῔κ) was a common topos in Greek culture and it plays an important 
role in the cognitive domain, as we will later see. Cp. Chap. 14, Sect. 3.1. 
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greater precision by a misfortune, by the acquisition of wealth (in which case gold itself 
becomes the αάζακμξ) or by drunkenness.
356
 
 This notion of testing through hardship is most patent in the use of αάζακμξ and 
ααζακίγεζκ to designate the questioning of someone (particularly slaves) under torture. In 
Attic lawsuits, one litigant could challenge his opponent to submit one of his slaves to torture 
in order to confirm that he is saying the truth. Being almost omnipresent and often regarded 
as little more than furniture by their masters, slaves often had access to privileged and often 
incriminating information.
357
 But it was assumed that slaves would not disclose this 
information without coercion, for fear of being afterwards punished by their masters. Hence 
their testimony could only be trusted when given under extreme duress.
358
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 For more on the general meaning of αάζακμξ and ααζακίγεζκ, cf. R. BURY (ed.), The Symposium of Plato, 
Cambridge, Heffer, 1909, ad 184a; A. C. PEARSON (ed.), The Fragments of Sophocles, vol. III, Cambridge, 
University Press, 1917, ad 1033; J. SCHNEIDER, Βάζακμξ, ααζακίγς, ααζακζζµόξ, ααζακζζηήξ, in: TWNT, sub 
voce; A. GOW (ed.), Theocritus, vol. 2, Cambridge, University Press, 1950, ad 12.36-37; E. DODDS (ed.), 
Plato Ŕ Gorgias, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959, ad 486d; B. van GRONINGEN, Pindare au banquet, Leiden, 
Sijthoff, 1960, 37-39; R. TURASIEWICZ, De servis testibus in Atheniensium iudiciis saec. V et IV a. Chr. n. 
per tormenta cruciatis, Wrocław/etc., Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich/ Wyndawn. Polskiej Akademii 
Nauk, 1963, 17-19; B. van GRONINGEN, Theognis. Le premier livre édité avec un commentaire, Amsterdam, 
Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1966, 164-5; G. THOMSON (ed.), The Oresteia of Aeschylus, 
Amsterdam/Prague, Hakkert/Academia, 1966, ad Agamemnon 390-4; P. HUART, Le vocabulaire de l’analyse 
psychologique dans l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, 207f.; J. MOLINE, Plato’s Theory of 
Understanding. Madison (WI), University of Wisconsin Press, 1981, 130-134, 224; D. LEVINE, Symposium 
and the Polis in: T. FIGUEIRA/G. NAGY (eds.), Theognis of Megara Poetry and the Polis, Baltimore/London, 
1985, 176-96, especially 195-196; D. WHITEHEAD (ed.), Hypereides. The Forensic Speeches, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, 70; S. DOUGLAS OLSON (ed.), Aristophanes Ŕ Acharnians, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, ad 110, 646-7.  
357
 For this idea of slaves being regarded by their masters as little more than furniture, see in particular V. 
HUNTER, Policing Athens. Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320 B.C., Princeton (NJ), Princeton 
University Press, 1993, 70-93. 
358
 There has been much discussion about the torture of slaves in Athenian lawsuits and about the value of the 
challenge (πνόηθδζζξ εἰξ αάζακμκ). See e.g. M. GUGGENHEIM, Die Bedeutung der Folterung im attischen 
Processe, Zürich, Bürkli, 1882; J. HEADLAM, On the πνόηθδζζξ εἰξ αάζακμκ in Attic Law, Classical Review 7 
(1893), 1-5; R. BONNER, Evidence in Athenian Courts, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1905 (rev. 
ed., N.Y., Arno Press, 1979), 69ff.; J. LIPSIUS, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren. Mit Benutzung des 
“Attischen Processes” von M H. E. Meier u. G. F. Schömann dargestellt, Leipzig, Reisland, 3 vols., 1905-1915 
(republished in one volume: Hildesheim, Olms, 1966), 729, 888-95; R. BONNER & G. SMITH, The 
Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, vol. 2, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1911, 126-130, 
132, 224-29; E. LEISI, Der Zeuge im attischen Recht, Frauenfeld, Huber, 1908, 20-26; R. TURASIEWICZ, op. 
cit.; A. HARRISON, The Law of Athens. Vol. II: Procedure, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, 147-150; A. 
SOUBIE, Les preuves dans les plaidoyers des orateurs attiques, Revue internationale des droits de 
l’Antiquité 20 (1973), 171-253, especially 226-238; G. THÜR, Die πνόηθδζζξ zur αάζακμξ, Symposion (1974) 
153-173; G. THÜR, Beweisführung vor den Schwurgerichtshöfen Athens. Die Proklesis zur Basanos, Wien, 
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977; M. GAGARIN, The Torture of Slaves in Athenian Law, 
The Classical Philology 91 (1996), 1-18; IDEM, La torture des esclaves dans le droit athénien, in: P. CARLIER 
(ed.), Le IVe siècle av. J.-C. Approches historiographiques, Paris, de Boccard, 1996, 273-279; D. MIRHADY, 
Torture and Rhetoric in Athens, Journal of Hellenic Studies 116 (1996), 119-131; G. THÜR, Reply to D. C. 
Mirhady. Torture and Rhetoric in Athens, Journal of Hellenic Studies 116 (1996) 132-134; K. DOVER 
(ed.), Aristophanes Ŕ Frogs, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, ad 616f.; K. KAPPARIS (ed.),              
Apollodoros Ŕ “Against Neaira” [D. 59], Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999, 424ff.; D. MIRHADY, The Athenian 
Rationale for Torture, in: V. HUNTER & J. EDMONDSON (eds.), Law and Social Status in Classical Athens, 
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 All this helps us understand Plato‟s use of the terms αάζακμξ and ααζακίγεζκ. It 
denotes on the one hand a test that submits its object to a strong pressure and forces it to 
reveal itself as it really is. On the other hand, when applied to persons, the test pressures them 
not only to reveal their views, but also to recognize and admit the worth of these views (i.e., 
whether they are correct, justified, accurate, or not).
359
  
Another word sometimes used to express the idea of testing is δμηζιάγεζκ. Like 
ααζακίγεζκ, it refers to the metallurgical domain, in which it denotes the testing of gold and 
its genuineness. But δμηζιάγεζκ has a broader use and also applies to other domains. It is 
particularly used to designate several forms of scrutiny or vetting in the πόθζξ which tried to 
ascertain if certain individuals had the qualifications required to perform a certain role or not. 
One example is the scrutiny to which young men were submitted before being admitted as 
full citizens of the state. They had to confirm their coming of age (which was supposed to 
imply the possession of certain moral and intellectual skills associated with adulthood) and 
their descendency from legitimate citizens (and thus their connection to the πόθζξ). As V. 
Farenga points out, only after going through this process could they assume a superior status 
and all the rights associated with their place in the social body, leaving behind “the liminal 
experience when an individual wavered between noncitizen and citizen”.
360
Also very 
important in Athens was the scrutiny of officials (for instance, of orators, cavalrymen, new 
citizens, etc.) before entering office, which tested not only their competence and legal 
qualification, but also the probity of their lives, and thus helped protect the institutions.
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Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 53-74. For the use of this sense of αάζακμξ for other sorts of 
interrogation or examination, cp. for instance B. KNOX, Oedipus at Thebes, N. Haven/London, Yale University 
Press/Oxford University Press, 1957, 97f., 231f.; R. MARTEN, Der Logos der Dialektik. Eine Theorie zu 
Platons Sophistes. Berlin, de Gruyter, 1965, 37, 41; D. KURZ, Ἀκρίβεια. Das Ideal der Exaktheit bei den 
Griechen bis Aristoteles, Göppingen, Kümmerle, 1970, 48f.; P. de LIMA, L’inchiesta e la prova, Torino, 
Einaudi, 1996, 135f.; S. SCABUZZO, Violencia en el escenario. El básanos, de la tragedia a la comedia, Logo 4 
(2003), 201-206. 
359
 For Plato‟s use of αάζακμξ and ααζακίγεζκ in the context of philosophical examinations, see La. 188a, 188b, 
Euthd. 307b, Grg. 486d, 487a, 487e, Rep. 361c, 434e, 537d, Tht. 150c, 191c, 203a, Sph. 237b, 241d, Plt. 290c, 
Phlb. 19d, 21a, 23a, 31b, Ti. 68d. For other uses of these words, cp. Grg. 486d, Smp. 184a, Rep. 413e, 503a, 
503e, 531b, 537b, 540a, Plt. 303e, 308d, Lg. 648b, 649d, 650a, 650b, 735a, 736c, 751c, 768a, 831a, 922d, 946c, 
957b, 957d, 961a. 
360
 See V. FARENGA, Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece. Individuals Performing Justice and the Law, 
Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 2006, 350. 
361
 For more on this subject, see e.g. J. LIPSIUS, op. cit., 269-285; W. GRUNDMANN, δόηζµμξ, ἀδόηζµμξ, 
δμηζµή, δμηίµζμκ, δμηζµάγς, ἀπμδμηζµάγς, δμηζµαζία, in: TWNT, sub voce; A. DILLER, Scrutiny and Appeal 
in Athenian Citizenship, Classical Philology 30 (1935), 302-311; P. HUART, op. cit., 205f. ; A. HARRISON, 
op. cit., 200-207; D. MacDOWELL (ed.), Aristophanes Ŕ Wasps, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, ad 578; D. 
MacDOWELL, The Law in Classical Athens, London/Ithaca (NY), Thames and Hudson/Cornell University 
Press, 1978, 69f., 167-69; G. ADELEYE, The Purpose of Dokimasia, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 24 
(1983), 295-306; R. GARLAND, The Greek Way of Life. From Conception to Old Age, Ithaca (NY), Cornell 
University Press, 1990, 180-33; V. HUNTER, op. cit., 106-108; K. A. KAPPARIS (ed.), op. cit., 171, 320f.; R. 
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Plato himself mentions and describes scrutinies of this kind in the Laws, when determining 
the functioning of his ideal city.
362
 The philosophical use of δμηζιάγεζκ (based either in the 
metallurgical or the political sense) is rare in the corpus – but the association is nevertheless 
meaningful to understand the importance of examination to preserve the quality of our body 
of views and also of the civic body in general.
363
 
Much more frequent in the corpus is another expression taken from the political 
sphere, namely θόβμκ δζδόκαζ. This expression refers to the public control of magistrates or, 
more specifically, to the process of “setting them straight” or correcting them – the εὔεοκαζ. 
At the end of their office, magistrates had to render an account of what they had done, both in 
the stricter sense of declaring how they handled public funds (to prove they had not 
embezzled any money) and in the broader sense of justifying their actions during office. This 
was very important instrument to avoid corruption and social conflicts, since it allowed the 




Λόβμκ δζδόκαζ may then be used in a broader sense to denote the justification or 
explanation of something. This reflects the polysemy of the word θόβμξ. Without entering 
into a detailed consideration of its many meanings and their interconnection, there are some 
aspects that we should bear in mind in order to better understand the general meaning of 
θόβμκ δζδόκαζ. First, θόβμξ can mean a computation or an account, in which many elements 
must be concatenated or grasped together, in order to determine their quantity or general 
value, which is not immediately accessible when we first see them. Based on this idea of 
concatenation, θόβμξ can also mean formula, definition, argument, theory, thesis. In these 
cases, the word denotes a discursive chain (of words or thoughts) that goes through a 
multiplicity of elements and fits them together in a meaningful way, thus allowing us to better 
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Cri. 51d. 
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 For the use of the term to denote philosophical examination, see Rep. 546e, Tht. 181b, 197b, Ti. 20d.  
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 For more on this process, see for instance J. LIPSIUS, op. cit., 101-110, 286-298; R. BONNER & G. 
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understand them. Λόβμξ can still have the sense of ground, reason, pretext or justification, in 
which case it is the basis for something else (i.e., it accounts or is responsible for it).
365
 
These different senses of θόβμξ determine Plato‟s use of θόβμκ δζδόκαζ. Λόβμκ δζδόκαζ 
is the act of providing (or attempting to provide) a discursive account that explains or justifies 
something, in order to let us better understand it. The account given may be a definition, an 
argument, or set of arguments, but it always implies that the immediate appearance of things 
is often not enough to elucidate them. Just like in the case of the magistrates, something may 
be escaping one‟s notice, and so the object is regarded with suspicion. It cannot be taken at its 
face value and a deeper insight into it (i.e., into its essence and its grounds) is required, in 
order to understand what this thing is and why it is what it is.
366
 In fact, this suspicion and 
requirement of further information are not only directed at the object and the view someone 
has of it, but in many cases it also pertains to the person that has that view, who must justify 
his cognitive probity. The notion of θόβμκ δζδόκαζ carries with it the idea of personal 
responsibility or accountability – of not simply saying or acting, but having to stand by one‟s 
words or actions, having to submit to cognitive εὔεοκαζ (to the corrections or chastisements 
of what is wrong). This is something we normally do not do. We do not have to explain 
ourselves, our views, our life. But philosophical examination changes that and submits our 
views and ourselves to test.
367
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Seins, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1965
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), 94, 184, 223f., 236, 242, 257, 415, 451, 459, 466, 
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Other terms expressing the idea of a test are ἔθεβπμξ and the corresponding verb, 
ἐθέβπεζκ. These words can express the act of accusing people, exposing their faults, putting 
them to shame, discrediting and disgracing them. They are also associated with the idea of 
getting the better of someone in some kind of contest, either athletic, forensic or     
intellectual – and thereby exposing this person‟s weakness and inferiority. In a forensic or an 
intellectual context, the word acquires the sense of disproving or refuting someone and 
thereby vexing and humiliating him. All these cases involve a strong component of 
antagonism and even personal attack. One aims at exposing the personal flaws of another and 
these flaws may be related with his character, capabilities or intelligence. Ἔθεβπμξ and 
ἐθέβπεζκ, however, do not only denote the successful attempt of exposing another, but also 
the process that leads to it, the effort of getting the better of, exposing or refuting the       
other – independently of it being successful or not. Hence ἔθεβπμξ may refer to the act of 
submitting someone to a proof – i.e., the act of testing someone‟s value, strength, character, 
or knowledge. In some cases, the word may even mean cross-examination – i.e., the act of 
questioning someone with hard, invasive and relentless questions.
368
 Additionally, ἔθεβπμξ 
may have the meaning of proof, when the one submitted to the test withstands it. The term 
can therefore have a neutral or even positive sense – although the idea of antagonism, conflict 
and personal risk is always present.
369
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Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000, 100f.; N. DENYER (ed.), Plato Ŕ Protagoras, Cambridge/etc., 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, ad 336c2, 338d4-5. 
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 For more on examination as questioning, see Section 2.6 below. 
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 For more on this term, cf. F. BÜCHSEL, ἐθέβπς, ἔθεβλζξ, ἔθεβπμξ, ἐθεβµόξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; H. 
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We find all these senses in Plato. The term often designates the process of refuting 
someone‟s views. It is in this sense that it is used to designate a particular method or the 
negative side of philosophical method.
370
 But the word also denotes in many cases the neutral 
idea of submitting what one thinks, what one says or the way one lives to a test.
371
 One can 
pass or fail this test, thereby saving or losing one‟s face, and this is very relevant in the 
dialogues, since the interlocutors are often conceited and proud of their supposed knowledge 
and intellect. This conceit of knowledge is an important feature of human beings, as we will 
see.
372
 Ἔθεβπμξ echoes this and thereby expresses how personal philosophical examination 
can become. 
The noun πε῔να (especially in the construction πε῔νακ θαιαάκεζκ) and its cognates 
also belong to this group of terms. Their original sense is associated with the ideas of 
piercing, perforating or penetrating something. They can also denote the passing or going 
through something (especially some place or situation), which allows us to get acquainted 
with it – with its details or its hidden sides.
373
 From πε῔να we gain empirical knowledge 
(ἐιπεζνία), which was often regarded as the best (or surest) form of knowledge, in contrast 
with knowledge from hearsay or some theoretical and abstract knowledge. Moreover, the 
word implies some resistance of the object or situation and the need to make a special effort 
to go through. Accordingly, the word may also have the sense of “attempt” or “enterprise”, as 
well as of “test” or “trial”. It is in fact particularly used to denote an athletic or military trial, 
in which one has to prove one‟s strength and worth. The word also applies to dialectical 
trials, in which persons are submitted to difficult tests and must fight to prove their cognitive 
worth. Πε῔να is therefore an important means of showing and revealing what something or 
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who someone really is.
374
 Because of this, Plato often uses the word to express the idea of 
examination. The Platonic πε῔να may be referred to particular objects, to views of them or to 
the persons who hold these views.
375
 In each case, something must face some kind of attack 
and prove its own worth. 
The idea of a test to determine the quality of something can also be expressed by the 
verb ηνμύεζκ, which denotes the act of striking or smiting something, normally with the 
fingers (e.g. a door, a string in a musical instrument). In a stricter sense, it designates the 
tapping of a piece of pottery to assess through the sound if it is in good condition (὏βζήξ) or if 
it is cracked (ζαενόξ).
376
 Plato then employs it as a metaphor for the examination of an object 
or a view with the purpose of confirming their quality or forcing them to reveal any faults 
they may contain. They must be tapped in order to see through the resulting θόβμξ if they are 
as sound as they seem.
377
 
Besides all these terms, there are still some groups of images that are used to denote 
philosophical examination as a testing of something. The first group comprises several 
different fight metaphors. Examination is often compared to a wrestling match, in which two 
opponents try to overthrow each other. Returning to a interrupted examination can described 
as resuming a previous handle or grip (θααή) and an objection is designated as a handle 
against someone or a point of attack (ἀκηζθααή).
378
 An examination can also be regarded as a 
kind of boxing match, which may or may not have a specific opponent.
379
 Finally, it can be 
compared to an all-out war – even the greatest of them all: the βζβακημιαπία.
380
 These 
metaphors express particularly well the interplay of different characters and their views 
during a philosophical examination. The characters fight for some argument and assist it, 
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while at the same time they can also assist each other.
381
 Through this fight, they try to 
ascertain their strength, the strength of their argument and also how things are. In fact, we 
could say they are fighting against the indeterminateness of things or what things may 
withhold from them (and us). They fight for the truth, against its hiding away from us (i.e., 
against θήεδ). But there is also the possibility and the risk of someone not caring about the 
truth of the matter and being only concerned with winning the discussion and employing all 
possible means and tricks in order to do so. The examination may become simple eristic, 




Very close to the image of examination as a fight is its representation as a game. The 
most common example of this is the comparison between philosophical examination and the 
game of πεηηεία (a sort of draughts), which is a game of intelligence (as opposed to games of 
chance or of strength) and requires one to defeat the opponent with one‟s wits.
383
 The 
characters then describe their answers or agreements (i.e., any logical step) as moves in the 
game and sometimes need to revoke (ἀκαηίεεζεαζ) some move and follow a different line of 
argumentation.
384
 At other times, Plato speaks of other, less meaningful games.
385
 By 
comparing philosophical examination to a game, Plato once more highlights the idea of it 
being a competition or contest between views and individuals – but now this competition is 
not as serious as in the case of a fight. It is rather a παζδζά – child‟s play. In other words, it is 
a moment of leisure and relief of the serious business.
386
  
But this relief is not only a way of distracting oneself. Like any game, it can also be an 
occasion for practicing one‟s abilities and preparing for serious action. Something similar is 
indicated by the representation of philosophical examination as a form of physical exercise 
(βοικάγεζεαζ, ιεθεη᾵κ, ἀζηε῔κ). The idea of exercise also stresses the importance of effort 
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and practice for the development of one‟s ability to examine and determine things.
387
 In 
addition, it suggests that philosophical examination is a form of mental gymnastics that has 
some medicinal value, insofar as it can cure or prevent ills. 
Finally, there is some affinity between the idea of testing and the imagery of flavoring 
and sampling some food or delicacy.
388
 The sense of taste expresses a deeper mode of contact 
with something – a contact that goes beyond its looks and is different from simply devouring 
something in a voracious manner, without appreciating it. On the other hand, it also stresses 
the provisional or preparatory character of examination, insofar as it is different from a full 
assimilation and digestion of something. This comparison is probably also connected with the 
conception of learning as a form of nourishment (ηνμθή) or with the idea of being hungry for 




2.3. Philosophical examination as an intense gaze and close inspection 
 
A second important side of philosophical examination is expressed by the vocabulary 
of inspection in the Platonic corpus, which reveals examination as a particular mode of 
looking at things. Plato‟s texts are full of references to vision, be it sensible vision (by means 
of the physical body, which has – or at least seems to have – direct and full access to its 
object) or intellectual vision (either as a particular way of looking at sensible things or a 
vision of non-sensible beings).
390
 In fact, vision is often used as a metaphor for knowledge, 
insofar as it is understood as providing us a perfect access to something.
391
 But it can also be 
used to express some important traits of philosophical examination. This is possible because 
our vision (both in the literal and the figurative sense) is not simple. It admits of different 
modalities. We can have a perfect access, in which nothing escapes, or we can catch no more 
than a glimpse. This can be determined by several factors. First, we can have a good or a bad 
vision. We may have perfect vision or be nearsighted (although in the latter case we can still 
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use artificial means to correct the defect). Second, things may be more or less illuminated. 
Third, our own position may vary and we may be closer or farther away from something, 
which will then offer us a more detailed or more panoramic view of things. Fourth, we can 
adopt different standpoints. We can see things from different angles and this allows them to 
show different sides. Some angles may be more favorable than others – and some may be 
blind spots. We can also direct our attention to different things in the field of vision, changing 
what is in the spotlight and what is in the background. Fifth, we may look at things in very 
different states of mind. For instance, we may be relaxed or concerned, pleased or scared, and 
this also affects how we see things.
392
 Sixth, we can be focused in what we are seeing or so 
distracted that we look at something without really seeing it or without noticing it. In this 
case, our gaze is apathetic or drowsy and, despite having some access to something, it still 
lets this thing escape us. Finally, we can also have a better or worse understanding of what 
we are seeing. In this sense, we may also see something (have it before our eyes or our mind) 
without really seeing it (i.e., without discerning what it is).
393
 All these factors determine our 
access (or lack thereof) to things, views and persons. But we may also try to change the 
conditions in which we see something. We can redirect our gaze or take a closer look at 
things, we can increase our attention, intensify our gaze, try to notice something we did not or 
see things differently. This is precisely what philosophical examination does. It changes our 
relation to something and tries to see it in a different light. Plato is very aware of this and we 
find the notion of a changed and intensified gaze in various of terms he uses to express the 
idea of examination.  
The most important of these terms is ζημπε῔κ. It is frequently used by Plato to indicate 
an attentive and tense gaze. The word itself is from the same family as ζημπή and ζημπζά, 
which designate a lookout place or a watch-tower – i.e., some high place, from which one has 
an unhindered and panoramic gaze. In this context, one‟s gaze was normally intense and 
preoccupied with discerning particular things (especially suspicious movements and threats) 
that should not go unnoticed. The verb is also linked with the Greek word for target (ζημπόξ), 
and this link lets us better understand its sense. ΢ημπε῔κ involves a focused or concentrated 
gaze, directed at something in particular. Regardless of whether its target is an external 
physical object or something that can only be seen with the eye of the mind, one‟s gaze is 
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 On this matter, see e.g. B. SNELL, Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen 






 This was expressed in Greek culture by formulas such as “αθέπμκηεξ αθέπεζκ ιάηδκ” (cp. e.g. Aeschylus, 
Prometheus vinctus, 447) or “ὁν῵κ μ὎η ὁν᾵κ” (see Aeschylus, Agamemnon, 1623). For more on these formulas, 
see e.g. E. FRAENKEL (ed.), Aeschylus Ŕ Agamemnon, 3 vols., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1950, ad 1623. 
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focused and strives to come near its goal, hit it, not pass it by. It inspects, considers closely, 
examines and tries to attain a perfect knowledge of its object.
394
 Plato thus uses the word and 
its composites to designate an intense gaze that is trying to gain a better access to its object.
395
 
Another term that conveys the idea of an intensified gaze is ἀενε῔κ. The verb belongs 
to the same family as the adjective ἀενόμξ, which means “jumbled together”, “in heaps”, 
“compact”. Accordingly, ἀενε῔κ involves a concentrated or compact gaze that focus on a 
point and strives to grasp, encompass or comprehend it, without leaving anything aside.
396
 In 
the Platonic corpus it designates precisely this impulse to see and understand something.
397
 In 
this respect, one passage in particular stands out. In Cratylus, Plato uses the composite 
ἀκαενε῔κ to describe the essence of human being.
398
 The verb has the meaning of seeing anew 
or once more, reviewing, looking over or back on. It expresses the possibility of returning to 
something we already saw and searching for new aspects, new sides, new angles – thus 
rediscovering this thing and coming closer to it. By identifying our essence with such an act, 
Plato may be alluding to our ability to reflect on things and thereby gain access to something 
more than their sensible properties, but he may also have in mind the possibility of reviewing 
any perspective, whether its content is sensible or not. The latter alternative is precisely what 
characterizes philosophical examination. 
 One other form of intensified gaze is the one expressed by the verb ηδνε῔κ, which has 
the meaning of “watch over something”, “guard it”, “take care of it”. These actions require an 
attentive and concerned gaze, a gaze that watches its object closely, usually with the intent of 
protecting it or protecting oneself from it. One does not lose sight of the object and is ready to 
react to anything that may happen. The verb can also have the sense of observing or keeping 
a promise, an oath, the peace, and so on – something that does not capitulate even in face of 
                                                 
394
 For more on this term, see e.g. H. SCHMIDT, op. cit., vol. 1, 261-264; E. FUCHS, ζημπόξ, ζημπές, 
ηαηαζημπές, ηαηάζημπμξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; B. KNOX, op. cit., 120f.; P. HUART, op. cit., 14; R.   
ALPERS-GÖLZ, Der Begriff ζκοπός in der Stoa und seine Vorgeschichte. Mit einem Anhang: Materialien zum 
Zielbegriff in der griechischen und lateinischen Literatur von W. Haase, Hildesheim, Olms, 1976; R. PRIER, 
Thauma Idesthai. Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek, The Florida State University Press, Tallahassee, 
1989, 33-36. 
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 There are many instances of ζημπε῔κ and its cognates in Plato‟s writings. See e.g. Euthphr. 7a, 7b, 7c-d, 9c, 
9d, 9e, 15c, Ap. 21b, 21e, 27a, 40d, Cri. 46b, 46c, 46d, 47a, 48b, 48c, 48e, 49d, 50a, 51c, 53a, Phd. 63d, 64c, 
64d, 65b, 65e, 66d, 67e, 70c, 70d, 70e, 73b, 74a, 74b, 78b, 79c, 79d, 80a, 82e, 83b, 84c, 85c, 85d, 87b, 87c, 89a, 
95e, 96b, 96c, 96d, 97d, 99d, 99e, 100a, 100c, 101d, 103c, 104a, 107b, etc. 
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 For more on this term, cp. e.g. H. SCHMIDT, op. cit., vol. 1, 260f.; R. PRIER, op. cit., 27-29.  
397
 For the use of the term in Plato, see Cri. 49e, Ly. 215c, Hp. Ma. 287d, Grg. 495b, 497e, Phd. 104b, Rep. 
394e, 420d, 551c, 552b, 558c, 572b, 577c, 583b, 601b, Tht. 156c, 191e, Prm. 144d, Phlb. 24e, 29a. 
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 Much in the same way, philosophical examination requires an 
attentive and undistracted gaze that allows us to really see what happens with something.
400
 
 Some other verbs used by Plato in this context refer to particularly intense 
experiences, which cause us to look at things in a more attentive manner. One of these verbs 
is εαοιάγεζκ. It designates an intense gaze directed at something extraordinary, something 
that goes against expectations, that stands out and captures our attention. This gaze may be 
caused by astonishment, admiration, or even horror, and it can lead us to examine something 
in detail. But this intense experience is not only a trigger of examination. It is by itself a form 
of intensified gaze and in this sense a form of inspection or examination.
401
 For this reason, 
Plato can also use the verb to designate the philosophical examination of something, thereby 
stressing how this examination includes a component of wondering at something and 
dwelling on it, in order to understand what this something is. It is an intense consideration of 
something, marked by perplexity and the incapacity (at least at first) of fully accounting for 
what is being seen.
402
 
 Another relevant verb in this context is εε᾵ζεαζ, which usually denotes a gaze that is 
not personally invested in what it sees or considers. One has no personal interest in what is 
going on before one‟s eyes. But this does not mean that εε᾵ζεαζ is an impassive gaze. On the 
contrary: it is interested in seeing what it sees. It is surprised and pleased with what it sees 
and this binds it intensely to its object. It is precisely in this sense that the verb is used of 
watching or beholding a play or some spectacle (εέα).
403
 But it can also designate the 
contemplation of a problem, which is in a way something distant and abstract, but can be seen 
with a sense of marvel and satisfaction (and thus with a very increased attention).
404
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 For more on this term, see for instance H. RIESENFELD, ηδνές, ηήνδζζξ, παναηδνές, παναηήνδζζξ, 
δζαηδνές, ζοκηδνές, in: TWNT, sub voce. 
400
 The term is used to denote a philosophical examination in Tht. 169c. Usually it is used in its ordinary sense. 
See e.g. Rep. 412e, 413c, 413d, 442a, 484c, Lg. 836d, 952b. 
401
 Much has been written about the meaning of εαοιάγεζκ and its relation with philosophy. For a more detailed 
consideration of the meaning of the word, see for instance G. BERTRAM, εαῦµα, εαοµάγς, εαοµάζζμξ, 
εαοµαζηόξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; H. METTE, Schauen und Staunen, Glotta 39 (1960), 49-71; P. HUART, op. 
cit., 76f.; R. PRIER, op. cit., 84ff.; C. HUNZIGER, Le plaisir esthétique dans l‟épopée archaïque. Les mots de 
la famille de εαῦια, Bulletin de l‟Association Guillaume Budé 1 (1994), 4-30. 
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 The term is often used by Plato to denote astonishment or perplexity, but in some cases it refers to a certain 
way of looking at things and examining them. Cp. in particular: Chrm. 164a, Euthd. 286c, Prt. 326e, Grg. 456a, 
458e, Men. 96d, 97c-d, Phd. 97a, Smp. 205b, Rep. 489a, Tht. 155c, 162c, Lg. 628e. 
403
 For more on εε᾵ζεαζ, cp. for instance H. SCHMIDT, op. cit., vol. 1, 265f.; W. MICHAELIS, ὁνάς, εἶδμκ, 
αθέπς, ὀπηάκμµαζ, εεάμµαζ, εεςνές, ἀόναημξ, ὁναηόξ, ὅναζζξ, ὅναµα, ὀπηαζία, α὎ηόπηδξ, ἐπόπηδξ, ἐπμπηεύς, 
ὀθεαθµόξ, ηαεμνάς, πνμμνάς, πνμεἶδμκ, in TWNT, sub voce; H. METTE, op. cit.; R. PRIER, op. cit., 81-84. 
404
 For Plato‟s use of the term εε᾵ζεαζ and its cognates to describe the act of philosophical examination, see 
Euthphr. 5e, Chrm. 154e, Hp. Ma. 295b-c, Cra. 411a, 418a, 424d, 425b, Phd. 66e, Rep. 369a, 421b, 434d, 490e, 
504d, 511c, 545c, 576e, 579e, 611c, Tht. 154e, Sph. 237b, 245e, 254b, Plt. 260c, 267e, 281d, 292d, 305b, Phlb. 
53a, Ti. 48b, Lg. 676a, 683a, 702a, 720e, 816d, 862b, 965c. 
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Not very distant in sense is the verb εεςνε῔κ, which designates a solemn or 
contemplative gaze, usually interested in learning. The term is closely connected with the 
figure of the εεςνόξ – the ambassador that takes part in a religious festival or consults an 
oracle. The term is thus associated with religious festivities and the sacralized or ritualized 
visuality (to use A. Nightingale‟s expression) experienced therein.
405
 But it can also refer 
more generically to an experience of what is distant and alien. In this sense, it is also 
connected with the idea of travelling to explore and know other customs.
406
 In sum, εεςνε῔κ 
is a gaze that leaves its sphere of familiarity and gains distance, searches for extraordinary 
knowledge and returns to share it with its community.
407
 In this sense the verb can also be 
associated with the idea of examination, insofar as the latter implies this careful 
contemplation or beholding of something distant and extraordinary, with the intent of 
understanding it.
408
 But the term may also designate the perfect contemplation of an object, 
which is precisely the goal of philosophical examination, and it is actually in this sense that 
the word is more frequently used in the history of philosophy.
409
 
 Finally, there are still some other more generic verbs which are sometimes used to 
express the act of focusing on something. Two of these verbs are ὁν᾵κ and ἰδε῔κ, which can 
designate either the act of seeing with no further qualification or an attentive seeing, capable 
of noticing and discerning what things are.
410
 Plato frequently uses both verbs to express the 
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 See A. NIGHTINGALE, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy. Theoria in its Cultural Context, 
Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 2004, 4, 69, 82, 113, 139. Nightingale‟s notions of sacralized or 
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THORDARSON, ΟΡΩ – ΒΛΔΠΩ – ΘΔΩΡΩ. Some Semantic Remarks, Symbolae Osloenses 46 (1971),      
108-130; W. SCHADEWALDT, op. cit., 181f.; J. REDFIELD, Herodotus the Tourist, Classical Philology 80 
(1985), 97-118; J. KER, Solon‟s Theôria and the End of the City, Classical Antiquity 19 (2000), 304-329; I. 
RUTHERFORD, Theoria and Darśan. Pilgrimage and Vision in Greece and India, The Classical Quarterly 50 
(2000), 133-146; A. NIGHTINGALE, On Wandering and Wondering. Theôria in Greek Philosophy and 
Culture, Arion 9 (2001), 23-58; A. NIGHTINGALE, op. cit.; D. ROOCHNIK, What is Theoria? Nichomachean 
Ethics Book X.7-8, Classical Philology 104 (2009), 69-82. 
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 See Rep. 372e, 511c, Tht. 177e, Phlb. 38b., Lg. 663c, 695c, 720b, 815b, 951a ff.  
409
 We also find this usage in Plato. See Phd. 65e, 109e, Smp. 210d, Phdr 247c, 247d, Rep. 486a, 517d, Ti. 57d.  
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 For more on ὁν᾵κ and ἰδε῔κ, see e.g. H. SCHMIDT, op. cit., vol. 1, 244-260; W. MICHAELIS, op. cit.; P. 
HUART, op. cit., 175f.; F. THORDARSON, op. cit. 
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act of focusing on and examining something.
411
 For the idea of a directed, steadfast gaze, that 
turns to something and focuses on it, abstracting from all else, Plato uses the constructions 
πνόξ ηζ αθέπεζκ (looking at something) and κμῦκ πνμζέπεζκ ηζκζ (literally, turning one‟s mind 
or attention to something).
412
 
Finally, another way of expressing the idea of focusing on something is through the 
verb θαιαάκεζκ and, in particular, through ἀκαθαιαάκεζκ. The latter verb can designate the 
act of picking something up, taking it from where it was, isolating it and bringing it closer, in 
order to inspect it and see it with more detail.
413
 Such an act can bring about a new 




2.4. Philosophical examination as a journey 
  
 Also very common in the Platonic corpus is the comparison between philosophical 
examination and a journey. The association of knowledge with the idea of a journey was a 
common topos in Greek culture. To name just two examples, Ulysses is presented as having 
learnt much during his travels, whereas Parmenides‟s truth about being is revealed at the end 
of a journey to the gates of the paths of Night and Day.
415
 The very notion of εεςνία, as was 
just mentioned, shows the connection between the idea of travelling to see a festival (or 
simply the world at large) with the acquisition of knowledge. It is therefore no wonder that 
Plato also employs the idea of a journey when describing the process of examination, as can 
be seen in the vocabulary he uses to describe the act of examining something. However, this 
vocabulary is not very specific and so we will also bring into consideration the complex 
network of images that Plato uses to compare philosophical examination to a journey.
416
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 Usually these verbs are used by Plato in the imperative form as a command or request to examine something. 
See e.g. Euthphr. 11e, 12d, Cri. 48e, 49c, Phd. 92c, 105a, etc. 
412
 The notion of πνόξ (or εἰξ) ηζ αθέπεζκ (or ἀπμαθέπεζκ) appears many times in the dialogues, with several 
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187a, 189b, 191e, 210e, 217b, Phdr. 235a, Chrm. 160d, 166e, La. 197e, Euthd. 283a, Men. 96d, 97d, Hp. Ma. 
295c, Hp. Mi. 369d, Rep. 432b, Lg. 652a-b, 809e, 858d. 
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 Cp. E. De STRYCKER and S. R. SLINGS, op. cit., ad 19a8. 
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 For this use of ἀκαθαιαάκεζκ, see Ap. 19a, 22b, Cri. 46c, Men. 87e, Rep. 606e, Sph. 232b, 255e, Plt. 261c, 
Phlb. 33c, Lg. 644b. Other times, ἀκαθαιαάκεζκ, as well as ἐπακαθαιαάκεζκ, have the more general sense of 
taking something (some subject) up again. See e.g. Tht. 187c, Plt. 294d, Phlb. 34e, 60d, 66d Lg. 781b, 961c. 
415
 See HOMER, Odyssey, I.1-3, and PARMENIDES, DK B1. 
416
 What follows is just a brief consideration of the ways in which philosophical examination is compared to a 
journey in the Platonic corpus. For more on the image of a journey (applied either to philosophical examination 
or to other things, and particularly to one‟s life), cp. e.g. G. BERG, op. cit., 151-158; O. BECKER, Das Bild des 
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 We find a very complex geography of philosophical examination in the corpus. The 
characters often talk of roads, paths or ways (a ὁδόξ or a πμνεία) during examination and they 
employ many verbs that express movement from one place to the other, such as ἰέκαζ, 
πμνεύεζεαζ, ἔνπεζεαζ (along with their composites).
417
 In some cases, the movement is 
ascending or descending, which expresses an additional qualification of the starting point and 
the destination of the movement.
418
 Sometimes they speak of impulses or assaults (ὁνιαί or 
ὁνι᾵κ).
419
 We also find the distinction between being immobile (ιέκεζκ) or even seated (as in 
the Allegory of the Cave) and being in movement (either by one‟s own initiative or because 




In general, the journey of examination has a particular destination, which can be more 
or less qualified.
421
 But this does not prevent characters from straying off topic, going on an 
excursus only to come back on topic later.
422
 At any rate, philosophical examination has a 
course which one must traverse in order to see something, contemplate, come to know, and 
thereby transform oneself. In this sense, it is a form of theoretic travel or εεςνία in the sense 
considered above. This travel, however, is not simple and its difficulties are emphasized in 
different manners.  
One source of difficulties is the fact that there are multiple directions or paths one can 
follow. There are many forks in the road and the examiners must choose a direction. This 
choice is often expressed via adverbs such as πῆ, ηῆ, ηῆδε, ηαύηῃ, ᾗ, ὅπῃ. These adverbs often 
have an almost spatial sense and indicate different paths one can follow – and thus different 
                                                                                                                                                        
Weges und verwandte Vorstellungen im frühgriechischen Denken, Berlin, Weidmann, 1937; P. LOUIS, op. cit., 
45-55; R. DRIESCH, Platons Wegbilder. Untersuchungen zur Funktion der Wegbilder und -metaphern im 
Aufbau der Dialoge Platons, Diss. Köln, 1967; E. MESSIMERI, Wege-Bilder im altgriechischen Denken und 
ihre logisch-philosophische Relevanz, Diss. Tübingen, 1998. 
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 For the use of ὁδόξ and πμνεία to refer to a philosophical examination, see e.g. Ly. 213e, Phdr, 272c, Rep. 
435a, 532b, 532e, Tht. 147c, Sph. 218d, 237b, 242b, Plt. 265b, 266e, 268d, Phlb. 16a-b, 50e, 61a, Lg. 685a-b, 
799c-d, 810e, 859b. For occurrences of the verbs ἰέκαζ, πμνεύεζεαζ, ἔνπεζεαζ with a similar sense, see for 
instance Ly. 213e, Cra. 415a, Phdr. 239d, Rep. 420b, 510b, Tht. 187c, Phlb. 50e, Plt. 259d, 262b, 290d. 
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 These terms are particularly important in the context of the Allegory of the Cave. See in particular Rep. 515e 
ff. 
419
 See e.g. Phdr. 279a, Rep. 354b, 487c, 506e, 511b, Prm. 130b, 135d, Phlb. 57d. 
420
 For the contrast between being immobile and moving, see e.g. Euthphr. 11b-d, Rep. 514a ff.  
421
 In many cases Plato speaks simply of the end (ηέθμξ) of a particular examination. See e.g. Prt. 347c, Phd. 
77c, Rep. 392c, 497e, 533e, Phlb. 23b. 
422
 For the moment of coming back to a previous discussion after an excursus, cp. e.g. Cra. 414b, Plt. 263a, Tht. 





 The path chosen can indeed correspond to a certain procedure or 
method (which is expressed precisely by terms such as ὁδόξ).
424
  
However, the difference between possible roads is not just a difference of method. 
They do not necessarily lead us to the same place – and some may even seem to lead us 
nowhere. Moreover, the course of examination can be hindered by difficulties – in particular 
by a situation of ἀπμνία in which one cannot find a passage or an exit.
425
 This forces one to 
go back and return to the beginning (what is expressed in the frequent formula πάθζκ ἐλ 
ἀνπ῅ξ).
426
 Other times the examination simply goes in circles and one comes to the starting 
point (to the same difficulty one departed from) without realizing it.
427
 The entire effort was 
in vain and one must go in another direction. But the journey can be even more difficult or 
complex and this is then expressed by the image of wandering or roaming about (πθακ᾵ζεαζ). 
The characters move from one answer to another and all are refuted, so they do not know 
which way to turn and what to say.
428
 This difficulty is then condensed in the image of the 
philosophical examination as a maze.
429
 
But assuming the paths of examination eventually lead to their destination, they can 
still have different extensions, which also causes problems. The paths can be shorter or 
longer.
430
 The characters often take the shorter road or a shortcut, which entails a loss in 
detail and rigor. Other times, the road taken is the longest possible, as in Parmenides, when 
they embark into a δζὰ πάκηςκ δζέλμδμξ ηαὶ πθάκδ.
431
 This is indeed not only a very long and 
exhaustive path, but a wandering or roaming about, a going back and forth, completely lost, 
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 See e.g. Phdr. 246a, Rep. 435c-d, 504b, Plt. 265a-b. 
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 See 136e. 
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without having a clear path or a fixed destination – which in this case emphasizes that one 
must explore all possibilities. 
The idea of exploration is present in many uses of the prefix δζα- (and sometimes also 
of ἐη-), which express the idea of exhaustiveness, of going from one end to the other, not 
leaving anything aside. We find frequently verbs of movement like δζελζέκαζ, δζαπμνεύεζεαζ, 
δζένπεζεαζ or δζαπεναίκεζκ used as designations of the act of examining and the examination 
can be referred to as a δζαπμνεία or a δζέλμδμξ. It is, for instance, common to present 
philosophical examination as an act of θμβῶ δζεθεε῔κ: a going through every aspect of 
something by means of a θόβμξ viz. an articulate and rational discussion. This is in line with 
the description of dialectic in the Republic as a “going through every test (ἔθεβπμξ)”.
432
 
 Such a long journey requires much effort and, in fact, sometimes the path one has to 
make is described as being particularly hard.
433
 The difficulty may be expressed by the image 
of a path upwards (ἀκάααζζξ).
434
 Other times Plato compares philosophical examination to a 
journey made by water, which emphasizes the difficulty and the risks involved therein. For 
the Greeks, seafaring was the symbol of unpredictability and danger. It is also in this sense 
that Plato employs images of swimming and navigation. In Parmenides the characters must 
swim across a sea of θόβμζ.
435
 Other times one can sail, but here Plato distinguishes between 
a first and a second sailing – i.e., between an easier and faster way of sailing and a slower and 
harder one.
436
 But particularly meaningful is the reference to waves, tempests and shipwrecks 
during some examinations.
437
 One must then hold on to a raft (to use an image from Phaedo) 
and follow the wind of θόβμξ (as is said in the Republic).
438
 All this, along with the 
possibility considered above of straying off or following the wrong road, shows how one can 
never be sure that one will reach one‟s destination, even after much insistence. Philosophical 
examination can indeed be extenuating and even exasperating. 
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 See Rep. 534c. For other constructions with δζα-, see e.g. La. 187c, Prt. 320c, 329c, Phlb. 18a, 33a, 50e, 66e, 
Prm. 136e, Criti. 106a, Lg. 718b, 768d. 
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 See e.g. Ly. 213e. 
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 This is the case in the Allegory of the Cave (see Rep. 515e ff.) and also in Socrates‟ Palinode in the Phaedrus 
(see in particular 246d ff.). 
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 Cp. 137a. For another meaningful association of swimming with philosophical examination, see Rep. 453d. 
436
 The expression δεύηενμξ πθμῦξ is used in Phd. 99c-d for a different kind of examination – one that is not 
directly focused on things, but rather sees their reflection on θόβμζ. For the use of the expression “second 
sailing” in Plato, see also Plt. 300c and Phlb. 19c. 
437
 See e.g. La. 194c, Euthd. 293a, Rep. 472a, Phlb. 13d, 14a, 29a-b. 
438
 See 85c-d and 394d, respectively. 
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2.5. Philosophical examination as a search or pursuit 
 
Philosophical examination is also presented as a sort of search or pursuit. Searching 
for something or pursuing it is a meaningful possibility for us, since we do not possess or do 
not have access to everything we want at once. There are things that are unavailable, that 
escape us, are absent or hidden. Our possessions in general (and our cognitive possessions in 
particular) are limited and we can be unsatisfied with them. As a response, we can mobilize 
and exert ourselves, with the purpose of attaining more, and discovering, finding, capturing 
or grasping what eludes us – otherwise we may never reach what we desire.
439
 Movement is 
once more essential, just like in the portrayal of examination as a journey, but now what 
matters the most is not the fact that we go through the path or explore its complexity, but the 
directionality of the movement, what it tries to reach and how it tries to reach it. The search 
or pursuit of something requires the identification of a target and at the same time effort, time 
and resourcefulness. The same can be said of philosophical examination. It is directed at 
something that eludes our grasp in some way (i.e., something that is not immediately given in 
all certainty or clearness). We must have an idea of this and set it as a target. At the same 
time, we must search for it, seek it, pursue it – and this is what we do when we investigate the 
matter or inquire into it. 
Several terms make reference to this pursuit and the most important in this context are 
γδηε῔κ and γήηδζζξ. They denote the act of searching or seeking after something – i.e., the 
attempt to discover and reach it. They can designate any kind of search or inquiry, but are 
especially applied to judicial inquiries (where one wants to find out what happened and who 
is responsible for it), as well as to scientific or philosophic researches (where one inquires 
into some particular matter).
440
 In these cases, the terms express an insisting pursuit that tries 
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 We find this idea that things do not reveal themselves at once, without effort on our part, expressed already in 
many pre-Platonic texts. See, for instance, XENOPHANES, DK B18 (“μὔημζ ἀπ‟ ἀνπ῅ξ πάκηα εεμὶ εκδημ῔ζ‟ 
὏πέδεζλακ,/ ἀθθὰ πνόκςζ γδημῦκηεξ ἐθεονίζημοζζκ ἄιεζκμκ”) and SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, 110f. (“ηὸ 
δὲ γδημύιεκμκ/ ἁθςηόκ, ἐηθεύβεζ δὲ ηἀιεθμύιεκμκ”). 
440
 For more on the term, see e.g. H. GREEVEN, γδηές, γήηδζζξ, ἐηγδηές, ἐπζγδηές, in: TWNT, sub voce; P. 
HUART, op. cit., 14, 199f.; B. KNOX, op. cit., 117-120. 
441
 For the use of the term γδηε῔κ and cognates in the Platonic corpus, see e.g. Euthphr. 7a, Ap. 18b, 18c, 19b, 
21b, 22a, 23b, 24b, 29c, 37d; Alc. I 106d, 109e, 110a, 130b; Cra. 384c, 391b, 409e, 411b, 415b, 424a, 432c, 
433b, 436a, 439b; Phd. 65a, 65d, 66d, 95b, 95e, 99d, 107b; Phdr. 244c, 265a; Tht. 144b, 148b, 174b, 180a, 
187a, 188c, 191a, 196d, 200c-d, 201a, 202d, 210a; Sph. 218b-c, 218c, 221c, 223c, 224c, 229b, 232b, 235d, 
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 Frequently, the search or pursuit we find in the corpus is further qualified by a more 
explicit comparison with a particular kind of pursuit – especially one in which its object tries 
to escape. The best example is the frequent use of hunt or chase as an image of philosophical 
examination.
442
 The object being examined or the knowledge pursued is like a wild animal 
running away from the examiners, which try to capture it. The capture itself requires the 
effort of pursuing, but is not simply a matter of running after something. It also requires 
devices, tricks, craft and cunning. But this is not all. The image of hunt also expresses how 
the result of one‟s pursuit is uncertain. The prey (i.e., the object of examination) may escape 
or hide in a dark and inaccessible spot.
443
 Moreover, like hunting, philosophical examination 
is often a collective undertaking, in which various persons try to surround the game and 
prevent its escape.
444
 The parallels are varied and Plato often alludes to them.  
These allusions are also found in the vocabulary of examination. For instance, one of 
the verbs used to talk about examination is ἐνεοκ᾵κ, which denotes the way dogs sniff out 
something or the tracing of a scent or trail. It can also be used to refer the act of sweeping a 
region, in order to scare off any prey that may be hidden.
445
 Based on these senses, the term 
can then be used in the judicial domain with the sense of “inquiry” and can also be applied to 
any intellectual research whatsoever.
446
 
 The hunting metaphor is even clearer in εήνα and εδνεύεζκ. These words designate 
the eager pursuit with the intent of capture. They refer primarily to the pursuit of pedestrian 
animals, fishes, and birds, but they can also be figuratively used of persons – in particular in 
the context of sexual interest and romantic love. Plato, in turn, uses them to denote the chase 
of knowledge or of the reality that one strives to know.
447
 
 Also relevant is the verb ἰπκεύεζκ, which denotes the act of tracking or following the 
traces, footsteps or trail (ἴπκμξ) of someone or something. This image stresses not only one‟s 
                                                                                                                                                        
246d, 253c, 258b, 258c, 261a, 261d, 264b; Prm. 133a; Phlb. 16d, 18d, 27c, 30d, 34d, 45c, 46b, 53d-e, 57a, 58b, 
58d, 59a, 61b. 
442
 For a detailed consideration of the hunting metaphors in Plato, see C. CLASSEN, Untersuchungen zu 
Platons Jagdbildern, Berlin, Akademie, 1960. See also G. BERG, op. cit., 133-137; P. LOUIS, op. cit., 53-55.  
443
 See e.g. Rep. 432b-d, Sph. 231c, 236d, 239c, 254a, 260c-d. 
444
 Cp. for instance La. 194b, Rep. 432b, Sph. 231c. 
445
 Cp. Mx. 240b. 
446
 For more on the term, cp. J. BURNET (ed.), Plato’s Phaedo, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911, ad 63a2; G. 
DELLING, ἐνεοκάς, ἐλενεοκάς, in: TWNT, sub voce. For its use in Plato, see Ap. 23b, 41b; Chrm. 166b, 166d; 
Phd. 63a; Rep. 368c; Tht. 155e, 168e, 174a, 174b, 200e; Sph. 236d, 241b, 243d, 260e; Phlb. 58d; Lg. 654e, 
735c, 816c, 821a, 968c. 
447
 See e.g. Ly. 218c, Phd. 66a, 66c; Tht. 197c ff.; Sph. 235a, Plt. 264a, 285d, Phlb. 65a. We also find in Plato 
the expression “ὁκόιαηα εδνεύεζκ”, which denotes a distorted modality of examination, in which one employs 
verbal traps to cause the other to contradict himself. The whole Euthydemus is an illustration of this hunting of 
words. See in particular 295d. Cp. also Grg. 489b, Tht. 166c. 
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distance from something, but also the indirect contact with what is pursued. The tracks the 
persons or things pursued leave behind already reveal something about them, point towards 
them and show where they can be found.
448
 
 The verb δζώηεζκ also belongs to this group. It has the meaning of impelling or 
causing something or someone to run, especially because one draws nearer or is pursuing the 
person or thing that runs. In addition, the word denotes the act of pursuing. It is used in 
judicial language to designate the prosecutor, who attempts to convict (i.e., to capture, αἱνε῔κ) 
someone because of their alleged injustices – whereas the defendant, ὁ θεοβώκ, tries to 
escape or run away. Likewise, the examination is an attempt to capture something that tries to 
elude our effort to capture it and runs away from us quickly.
449
  
The idea of pursuit is also implied in the term ιέεμδμξ. Despite its similarity to the 
word “method”, the word is normally not used by Plato in that sense.
450
 It rather works as the 
nomen actionis of verb ιεηζέκαζ and, consequently, designates the act of going after 
something or someone, pursuing it, following its trail.
451
 
Finally, Plato also employs some terms and images that are more or less explicitly 
taken from the context of amorous pursuit (which was itself frequently conceived as a form 
of chase or hunt, as was mentioned above). The examination is sometimes described as 
θζθμζμθία or θζθμζμθε῔κ (i.e., as a strong or obsessive desire for wisdom), as a form of 
intense love (an ἔνςξ or ἐν᾵κ) for knowledge or lucidity, as a desire (ἐπζεοιία) or yearning of 
knowledge (πόεμξ ημῦ εἰδέκαζ) or as a striving for being (ὀνέβεζεαζ ημῦ ὄκημξ).
452
 In other 
words, philosophical examination is an intense pursuit of knowledge and reality. One is fully 
committed to it and desires it deeply. Certainly not all forms of examination involve such a 
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 For the use of ἰπκεύεζκ and cognates to refer to philosophical examinations, see Rep. 365d, 432d, Tht. 187e, 
Sph. 226b, Plt. 263b, 290d, 301e, Phlb. 44d, Prm. 128c, Lg. 654e. 
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 For the use of δζώηεζκ (or ιεηαδζώηεζκ) in this sense, cf. Euthd. 307c, Cra. 420b, Grg. 482e, 492c, Smp. 
210b, Phdr. 266b, Rep. 490a, 531c, Sph. 224e, 225e, Plt. 307c, Phlb. 23e, 32d, 44d, Ti. 46d-e, 59c, 64b, 72e, 
80a.  
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 For the idea of method and proceeding methodically, Plato rather uses expressions such as ηαε‟ ὁδόκ and 
ὁδῶ (as was mentioned in footnote 424), ἑλ῅ξ or even ηνόπμξ η῅ξ ιεεόδμο (as in Phd. 97b). 
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 For Plato‟s use of the word, see Phd. 79e, 97b, Phdr. 269d, 270c, 270d, Rep. 435d, 510b, 510c, 528d, 531d, 
533b, 533c, 596a, Tht. 183c, Sph. 218d, 219a, 227a, 235c, 243d, 265a, Plt. 260e, 266d, 286d, Lg. 638e, 965c. 
For the use of verb ιεηζέκαζ (as well as ιεηένπεζεαζ) to designate the act of examining something, cp. Men. 74d, 
Prt. 350d, Phd. 88d, Smp. 210a, Phdr. 263b, 270e, 276d, Rep. 502e, 528e, 530b, Tht. 187e, Sph. 218d, 235c, 
252b, Plt. 257b, 263b, Ti. 50c, Lg. 754e. For a careful discussion of this question and a list of further literature 
on the subject, see M. de CARVALHO, Μέεμδμξ e ὏πόεεζζξ – o problema do pressuposto na fundação 
platónica da ciência, in: D. FERRER (ed.), Método e Métodos do Pensamento Filosófico, Coimbra, Imprensa da 
Universidade, 2007, 9-69 (especially 10-17). 
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 Cp. e.g. Ap. 28e and 29c (where θζθμζμθε῔κ is accompanied by other terms that designate examination), Hp. 
Ma. 297e, Men. 84c, Phd. 65c, 66e, 68a. For an analysis of the term θζθμζμθία, see also Chap. 13, Sect. 3.3, and 
Chap. 14 below.  
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love, but Plato presents this as a fundamental feature of any genuine philosophical 





2.6. Philosophical examination as the act of asking questions or cross-examining 
someone 
 
We are often aware of our ignorance about some things. Some matters are completely 
open and indeterminate for us. Other times, we may have some definite view about 
something, but we may be unsure about it. In all these cases, we can not only seek to know 
how things are, but we can also formulate questions (which is a particular form of relating to 
what we do not know, making it more determinate to us and giving us a direction of 
investigation) and search for answers, in order to overcome our cognitive limitations. These 
questions may be experienced within us, in silence (and Plato indeed uses them to identify a 
structural moment of our being, as we will see below).
454
 But frequently they are directed at 
others as requests for information. We are often dependent on their testimony, either because 
they saw or experienced something first hand or simply because they know something we do 
not. By eliciting information from them we can thus expand our knowledge. But the 
questions may also be directed at those who do not know, in order to make them aware of 
their own ignorance or to help them further inquire about something. There can be different 
relations between questioner and respondent, as is illustrated in the Platonic corpus. The texts 
often depict philosophical examination as a shared undertaking based on questions and 
answers, and this makes it even more natural to conceive philosophical examination as a form 
of asking questions.  
Two terms that commonly designate the act of asking questions and requesting 
information are ἐνςη᾵κ and ποκεάκεζεαζ. ἖νςη᾵κ is the more generic term for asking about 
something, but it can also designate a more intense form of questioning, as we will see below. 
Ποκεάκεζεαζ, in turn, has the sense of asking for or gathering information. We find it often in 
Herodotus to designate the gathering of testimonies about realities with which the author has 
had no direct contact.
455
 In the Platonic corpus we also find the attempt to learn from others 
something one might not know. This is an expression of the limitations of one‟s point of view 
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 For more on this, cp. in particular Chap. 14, Sect. 4. 
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 See Chap. 5, Sect. 1.3. 
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 See e.g. Historiae 1.22, 1.92, 1.105, 1.111, 1.170, 1.196, 1.207, 1.214, and so on. 
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and also of how useful other points of view may be if one is ever to overcome one‟s 
limitations. To designate these requests for information, Plato also uses ποκεάκεζεαζ.
456
 
However, philosophical examination is about more than just asking questions to 
others. The questions we find in the corpus, as well as the questions with which philosophical 
examination is often compared, involve more than a simple request for information. We can 
understand this if we consider what happens when we ask someone a question and receive an 
answer. The information we receive is strongly influenced by who gave it to us – and this 
makes it highly questionable. Other persons may lie to us, withhold information or they may 
be themselves deceived or deluded. But we are not forced to simply accept whatever the other 
says. We can insist, put pressure on the other, ask further questions, require more details and 
check for inaccuracies or inconsistencies. The need of doing so becomes particularly evident 
when we are faced with different versions of events that contest each other. One can then 
relentlessly cross-examine the other and employ particular techniques in order to find out the 
truth. Such a cross-examination is especially employed in law courts, where two versions of 
things are opposed and cause a conflict that disturbs the public order. It is necessary to see 
who is in the right and thereby restore order.
457
  
Plato uses this judicial cross-examination as a model for philosophical examination, 
as becomes patent in several of the terms he employs to designate the latter. Some of these 
terms were already considered above. We saw how ἐλέηαζζξ, αάζακμξ and ἔθεβπμξ also have 
a judicial sense. Ἔλέηαζζξ is rather neutral and designates the cross-examination of the other 
party in a trial. Ἔθεβπμξ is an antagonistic questioning which has the refutation or 
discrediting of someone as its goal. Βάζακμξ is a questioning (frequently, but not exclusively, 
of slaves) which involves torture, in order to force the truth out of someone who would 
otherwise not disclose it.
458
 The idea behind all these forms of questioning is that one cannot 
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 Cp. Chrm. 158e, La. 187b, 189c, 191d, 191e, 196c, Hp. Ma. 287d, 293b, 295b, Hp. Mi. 363a, 363b, 369d, 
369e, 372c, Euthd. 280b, 295c, Grg. 447c, 455c, 462c, 462d, 463b, 463c, Prt. 318a, Cra. 384a, 399c, 413a, 
413b, Smp. 204e, Rep. 328e, 337b, 353a, 358d, 469a, 476e, 491c, 599d, Tht. 209e, Sph. 216d, 226b, 237c, 243d, 
248d, Plt. 272c, 286a, Phlb. 54a, 61b, 63a, Lg. 635b, 638c, 758c, 888d, 952a. 
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 There were, however, several other contexts in which such cross-examination was relevant. We saw in Sect. 
2.2 above that in politics there is also a need for magistrates to render an account (θόβμκ δζδόκαζ) of their 
expenses and their decisions in general, which are then submitted to a close scrutiny. Questioning also played an 
important role in the people‟s dealings with ηέπκαζ (and especially medicine). There were frequent controversies 
regarding who was better qualified to intervene in a certain domain, so that one had to demonstrate one‟s 
knowledge by answering questions and convincing the others of one‟s credentials. Finally, it was also necessary 
to question people in the context of historiography. An historian had to interrogate witnesses and ascertain what 
truly happened. Plato, however, seems to pay more attention to the judicial metaphor and to conceive the 
examination more along those lines – perhaps because of how present judicial questions were in Athenian life. 
458
 See Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above. 
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simply take persons at their word, one must ascertain the truth and this requires putting each 
person‟s version to the test and checking its consistency and sense. 
To these we can add two other terms that are also used by Plato to compare 
philosophical examination to a questioning. The first is ἀκαηνίκεζκ (or ἀκάηνζζζξ). It refers to 
the preliminary hearing in a lawsuit, in which the magistrate inquires both parties, in order to 
determine their versions of events and decide if the matter shall go to court.
459
 In the 
dialogues, the characters are sometimes required to introduce precisions and better explain 
their views, in order to prepare for a decision of the matter.
460
  
Another important term in this context which is often used by Plato is ἐνςη᾵κ 
(together with ἐνώηδζζξ). As was said, it can have a more neutral sense, though it can also 
designate an intense interrogation of someone (as the ones in law courts). Here one must 
assent or deny something, justify one‟s position, present proofs and convince the others.
461
 
Furthermore, ἐνςη᾵κ is also used by Plato (along with ἀπμηνίκεζεαζ) to describe a particular 
method of investigation illustrated in many of the dialogues – namely, the method of 
conversation (δζαθέβεζεαζ) or δζαθεηηζηή.
462
 In this method two persons occupy 
asymmetrical positions. One guides the inquiry and asks questions, requires explanations and 
proofs, in order to understand the other‟s views and ascertain their value. The other must 
answer by presenting his views, standing by them and justifying them. The positions may be 
inverted and the one asking the questions may then answer them – but the process is always 
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 There are many references in the corpus to conversing and to a ηέπκδ of conversing and some of these 
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Γζαθέβεζεαζ is thus a form of conversation in which something is rationally 




This method and all other terms that convey the idea of an intense interrogation 
emphasize an important aspect of philosophical examination. As we will see in the following 
chapters, philosophical examination (whether it includes two interlocutors, as is normally the 
case in the dialogues, or is rather conceived as an inner movement of the soul) usually has a 
personal character and is primarily concerned with someone‟s views. This personal character 
of examination can be seen as a logical flaw, but it is actually determined by the conditions in 
which the examination always take place. We have always adopted many views and they 
must be put into question if we are ever to determine the truth about anything.  
 
2.7. Philosophical examination as an effort to determine something or reach a 
decision 
 
One final group of terms stresses the idea of determining something or giving it 
precise contours. This is actually the goal of examination. While the latter is taking place, the 
matter is still open, but one already aims at a decision. Because of this, the examination can 
be designated as an act of giving determination, whereby one can emphasize either the 
process that leads to a decision or the achievement of a decision. 
 One term that denotes the process that leads to a decision is αμοθεύεζεαζ, which has 
the sense of debating or deliberating some matter (either privately or in public gatherings) in 
order to reach a decision or a verdict. The fact that many deliberations are intersubjective 
processes (and even inner deliberations are often conceived as a discussion between different 
inner entities) contributes a great deal to the use of this verb in Plato‟s writings, where most 
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of the examinations are also a shared undertaking.
465
 In fact, the deliberation may even 




 However, the idea of reaching a decision is best conveyed by the verb ηνίκεζκ, which 
means separating or choosing, but also judging, deciding and passing a verdict (thereby 
settling a dispute). Such judgments take place in courts and in all other sorts of contests 
(physical, artistic and so on). Likewise, philosophical examination (as was said above) often 
assumes the shape of a competition or contest between different possibilities of acting or of 
seeing and understanding something. Moreover, the fact that the examination is often 
compared to an interrogation or a trial also contributes to understanding it as an attempt to 
reach a decision or verdict about what something is.
467
 
 Also relevant in this context is ὁνίγεζκ, which denotes the act of demarcating or 
setting the boundaries of something. Ὅνμξ referred originally to the limits and the 
delimitation of a territory, but it can also be applied in a figurative sense to a view, a notion 
or a thing. The limits or contours define what something is and also allow this thing to be 
seen as what it is and as distinguished from other things. ὇νίγεζκ is then the act of 
demarcating or defining what something is. It allows for a clearer perspective on something 
and may lead up to a definition in the stricter sense of the word – which is what many 
examinations in the corpus are actually searching for.
468
 
 Not very distant from the idea of defining something is the idea of division (usually 
expressed by δζαζνε῔κ) or of cutting something in twain, as with a knife or an axe (ηέικεζκ). In 
their figurative sense, as operations of examination, these terms express how our way of 
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 For the use of the verb αμοθεύεζεαζ (and also of ζοιαμοθεύεζεαζ) in the context of philosophical 
examinations, see Cri. 46a, 49d, Chrm. 176c, La. 185a, 185b, 185d, 187d, 201c, Grg. 527d, Men. 91a, Smp. 
190c, Phdr. 237c, 238d, Rep. 345b, 400b, 428c-d, 458a, Sph. 218d, Plt.257c, Phlb. 20a, 62e. 
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 There are several references to “voting with someone” (i.e. being ζύιροθμξ) in the sense of sharing the same 
view. Cp. La. 184d, Grg. 500a, Cra. 398c, Phdr. 267b, Rep. 380c, Lg. 907b. However, the corpus also presents 
a strong criticism of the appeal to the majority vote in philosophical matters. See in particular Grg. 471e-472c, 
473e-474b. 
467
 For Plato‟s use of ηνίκεζκ (and ηνίζζξ) in association with the act of examining something, cp. La. 184e, Ion 
539d, Phd. 100a, Phdr. 237d, 277a, Rep. 344a, 360e, 361d, 420c, 433c, 486a, 545c, 555b, 576d, 577a, 577b, 
578b, 579c, 580b, 580c, 582a, 582d, 585c, Tht. 150b, 170d, 186b, Sph. 234e, 242c, Plt. 272b, 305b, Phlb. 20e, 
27c, 33a, 38c, 41b, 41d, 41e, 44d, 50e, 52e, 55c, 57e, 59d, 64d, 65b, 66c, 67a, Lg. 633a, 658a, 667d, 667e, 732a, 
814d. 
468
 For the use of ὁνίγεζκ (as well as of δζμνίγεζκ and ἀθμνίγεζκ) in this sense, see Chrm. 163d, 163e, 173a, 173e, 
La. 194c, Grg. 453a, 457c, 470b, 475a, 488d, 491c, 495a, 513d, 521a, Phd. 104c, 104e, 105a, Smp. 205e, Phdr. 
239d, 265d, 269b, 277b, Rep. 341b, 344e, 346b, 436b, 454b, 455c, 474b, 474c, 499e, 507b, 511c, 524d, 534b, 
558d, 598a, Tht. 146e, 158d, 187c, 192a, 208c, Sph. 217b, 222b, 222c, 227c, 239a, 240c, 242c, 246b, 257c, 
257e, 267a, Plt. 259d, 261a, 264e, 267d, 275a, 275e, 282e, 283b, 292a, Prm. 131e, 133a, 133b, 135c, Phlb. 19e, 
37a, 56d, 66c, Ti. 29b, 51b, 51d, 54b, 68e, Lg. 632b, 643a, 802e, 815c, 861b, 861d, 867b, 874d, 944a, 963c. 
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seeing things is often gross or imprecise, seeing things in bulk and without establishing 
relevant distinctions. We do not pay attention to the specificities or details of things and 
notions. Hence it is important to break them down and see their different moments. This will 




 Some other meaningful terms in this group are associated with mathematic and thus 
involve the idea of a precise decision or definition of something. Philosophical examination 
may thus be referred to as an act of θμβίγεζεαζ or a θμβζζιόξ – that is, as a calculation in 
which disperse elements are brought together and considered in their unity. Calculation lets 
us consider, connect and add up all relevant elements of a thing or of a question and thus 
reach a more discerning view about something. Plato‟s use of the notions of θμβζζιόξ and 
θμβίγεζεαζ actually emphasize how these operations give us access to more than our sensible 
perception lets us see.
470
 
 The idea of determining something with precision or exactitude is also stressed in 
verbs like ιεηνε῔κ (measuring), ἱζηάκαζ (weighting) and ἀνζειε῔κ (counting). Such operations 
allow one to know exactly what one is dealing with or what the properties of something are. 
They are also presented as a way of discovering and correcting perceptual illusions or the 
way things appear to us. Measuring, weighting and counting counteract the immediate access 




In contrast with these terms, philosophical examination may also be represented as a 
fallible and provisional decision of a matter, more or less based on conjectures or guesses. 
Plato sometimes refers to it as a ηεηιαίνεζεαζ – that is, as an act of making an inference 
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 In some passages, Plato even develops a method of divisions, as was mentioned in Sect. 1.5 above. Cp. Chap. 
9, Sect. 3.3. For references to philosophical examination as an act of dividing or cutting something in twain, see 
Hp. Ma. 301b, Prt. 340b, Grg. 495c, 500d, Cra. 396a, 424b, 425b, 425c, Phdr. 265b, 265e, 266a, 266b, 273e, 
277b, Rep. 412b, 454a, 476a-b, 523a, 534a, 618c, Tht. 181d, Sph. 217a, 219e, 220b, 221e, 223c, 223d, 225a, 
227d, 235b, 235c, 248a, 252b, 253d, 264c, 265a, 265e, 266a, 267b, 267d, Plt. 258e, 260b, 261a, 261b, 261c, 
262b, 262c, 262d, 262e, 263c, 263e, 264a, 264b, 264e, 265a, 265b, 265c, 265d, 266a, 266e, 267b, 276a, 276d, 
276e, 279b, 282c, 282d, 283d, 284e, 285a, 286d, 287b, 287c, 288d, 291e, 302c, 302d, Phlb. 20c, 23e, 48d, 49a, 
Ti. 27d, 35b, Lg. 658a, 672e, 895e. 
470
 For the use of θμβίγεζεαζ and its cognates (such as ἀκαθμβίγεζεαζ and ζοθθμβίγεζεαζ), see Ap. 21d, 37c, Cri. 
46b, La. 193a, Grg. 511e, 512a, 524b, Men. 98a, 100b, Cra. 399c, 412a, Phd. 62e, 65c, 66a, 79a, 83b, 83c, 84a, 
85a, 91b, 97d, Smp. 207b, Phdr. 246c, 249c, Rep. 330e, 339a, 431c, 439c-d, 439d, 440a-b, 441a, 496d, 516b, 
524b, 524d, 546b, 553d, 586d, 587e-588a, 603a, 604d, 606b, 611c, 618c, Tht. 165c, 165d, 175a, 175b, 186a, 
186c, 186d, Sph. 248a, 254a, Prm. 130a, Phlb. 21a, 21c, 41c, 52a-b, 52b, 57a, Ti. 52b, 55c, 69a, 72a, 75b-c, 87c, 
Lg. 644d, 645a, 670c, 693c, 728b, 739a, 798c, 805a, 813d, 854e. 
471
 See in particular Prt. 356a ff., Rep. 602c ff. See also Euthphr. 7b-c, Rep. 426d-e, 522b-533d, Phlb. 17d,   





 This term thus conveys the constitution of a questionable and provisional 
perspective on something, for which one does not have enough grounds, but which is also a 
form of examination or something that results from it.  
 
2.8. A preliminary sketch of Plato’s concept of philosophical examination 
 
 Plato makes an analogy between philosophical examination and all the ordinary acts 
just considered. There are affinities between the different groups of acts and they represent 
different sides of the act Plato has in mind. Some particular moments of philosophical 
examination may have a greater resemblance with one side or the other, but in a way they 
coexist and complement each other. Therefore, they can be integrated in a unitary description 
of philosophical examination. We could say that philosophical examination is the act 
whereby we put something (a thing, a view, a person) to test by focusing on it and going 
through its different moments, questioning ourselves (or another) and seeking to reach a 
definite decision about it in the end of the whole process. This is the formal structure of 
philosophical examination and it gives us important clues about what is submitted to 
examination. The fact that it is meaningful to submit it to this operation strongly suggests 
several things. For one, it is something that is insufficiently tested, that is not usually forced 
to demonstrate its value, that rather tends to be taken at face value; it is also something we 
normally do not focus on, about which we are distracted or which we see as if from a 
distance; our contact with it is imprecise and we do not go through its elements or parts; we 
do not embark in any journey of exploration and we do not feel the need to mobilize 
ourselves to search for it or anything about it; it does not raise any particular questions and it 
is not fully indeterminate or unknown. But the circumstance that it can be examined points to 
the fact that the regular access to it is not as sure and precise as it could be. There is still 
something that eludes our grasp (in other words, there is θήεδ) and philosophical 
examination fights against it – against things not showing or not revealing themselves and 
thus escaping us. It tries to bring out the truth about something. By examining, we fight for a 
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 The term ηεηιαίνεζεαζ appears more directly connected with philosophical examination in Chrm. 172c, La. 
192c, Ion 537d, Euthd. 289b, Rep. 433b, 501b, 578c, Lg. 790d. For more on this term, see e.g. B. KNOX, op. 
cit., 122-4; W. SCHADEWALDT, op. cit., 189-191; H. INGENKAMP, Erkenntniserwerb durch ζημπάγεζεαζ 
bei Aristoteles, Hermes 109 (1981), 172-178. 
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better access to reality, and even if such an act does not produce immediate results, with time 
and effort it can bring about discoveries and better views.
473
  
 However, this is still a very vague description. It does not tell us how exactly 
philosophical examination is performed. The comparison with ordinary acts of examination 
gives us some direction, but it also raises the question of exactly what is the difference 
between the original operation (the literal sense of the words above considered) and the 
philosophical operation. The latter is not just a simple test, a simple journey or a simple 
cross-questioning, but rather a sublimated form thereof. It transposes the original act to a new 
domain, which is analogous to the one we already know. But we cannot take this new test, 
this journey or this question in a literal sense – otherwise we would mistake the image for the 
thing itself (or, as Plato would say, we will have an oneiric relation to it).
474
 That such a 
direct identification of both things is to be avoided becomes particularly clear if we consider 
that Plato sometimes attacks the kinds of ordinary acts we have just considered, both in 
themselves (insofar as they do not guarantee truth and often depart from it) and with respect 
to philosophical examination. The latter aspect is particularly relevant. Love of competition 
and honor is criticized as something that disturbs the search for truth.
475
 Love of sights and 
spectacles is a mere semblance of philosophy.
476
 Dedicating oneself fully to judicial matters 
and judicial θόβμζ is a form of slavish education, which is opposed to life dedicated to 
philosophy and philosophical θόβμζ.
477
 So it is still unclear how philosophical examination is 
supposed to overcome the limitations of these ordinary activities. By invoking them, Plato 
points towards a new kind of examination, but does not fully present it. Just as in the first 
section of this chapter, the images are insufficient to guide us to an adequate understanding of 
philosophical examination – and therefore further discussion of it is still required.   
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 In this sense, our condition corresponds to what Xenophanes says in the already quoted fragment DK16: 
“μὔημζ ἀπ‟ ἀνπ῅ξ πάκηα εεμὶ εκδημ῔ζ‟ ὏πέδεζλακ,/ ἀθθὰ πνόκςζ γδημῦκηεξ ἐθεονίζημοζζκ ἄιεζκμκ.”  
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 For more on Plato‟s notion of dream, see in particular Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 below. 
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 See e.g. Grg. 457c ff., 511b, Phd. 91a, Phlb. 14b. 
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Γόλα and μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ as the objects of philosophical examination 
 
 
“εἰ δὲ ιδεὲκ ὏πμθαιαάκεζ ἀθθ᾽ ὁιμίςξ μἴεηαζ ηαὶ μ὎η μἴεηαζ, ηί ἂκ 
δζαθενόκηςξ ἔπμζ η῵κ βε θοη῵κ;” 
Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1008b10-12 
 
 
The philosophical examination (ἐλέηαζζξ) is a transitive operation. It presupposes that 
there is an object that undergoes examination and suffers its effects. This object is not 
incidental to the examination. Rather, it is essential to determine it. Therefore, in order to 
obtain a unified notion of Plato‟s ἐλέηαζζξ, we have to understand the nature of this object.  
 At first sight, the philosophical examination seems to have many different objects. In 
principle, anything can be submitted to examination. Such a diversity, however, does not 
preclude the existence of a unifying principle – something that all the possible objects have in 
common and qualifies them to be examined. In the previous chapter we saw that the 
examination is directed to three main kinds of objects: persons, views and things at large. But 
these are not simply three juxtaposed objects that can be examined in turn. They are 
intrinsically connected. But how are they connected? What exactly is at the core of this 
connection and, consequently, at the core of the Platonic examination? 
 An examination of things, of all particular beings in the world, could be understood as 
a direct contact with these beings, in which one inspects their properties. However, the 
Platonic examination seems to focus on human beings. Socrates is very clear in the Apology: 
it is a matter of examining oneself and the others.
478
 The kind of being that carries out the 
examination is in a way also the object that undergoes it. But in what respect are human 
beings to be examined? It is not their physical properties, their actions, their desires, their 
feelings or their biography that is primarily at issue. The examination is above all concerned 
with one‟s way of seeing or understanding things, with one‟s set of perspectives, with one‟s 
access to beings or with how they appear to us. In short, the examination is primarily an 
examination of our views. This does not mean that the examination is circumscribed to a 
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 See 28e5-6 (“ἐλεηάγμκηα ἐιαοηὸκ ηαὶ ημὺξ ἄθθμοξ”) and 38a5 (“ἐιαοηὸκ ηαὶ ἄθθμοξ ἐλεηάγμκημξ”). 
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particular aspect of a particular being, leaving everything else unexamined. The aspect at 
issue here (namely, our views) is an essential feature of this being (i.e., of who a person is, 
their character, their intelligence). Moreover, our views can mediate or encompass 
everything. Everything we come in contact with is conditioned by them and possibly even 
constituted by them. Perhaps there is nothing that is not in some way a view or a set of views. 
Thus, by being confined to something as plastic as our views, philosophical examination 
extends to everything these views refer to and is potentially universal. 
We must therefore determine how our views or perspectives are to be understood, 
how they are constituted according to Plato. In order to do this, we must focus on two notions 
used throughout the corpus to designate our views: namely, δόλα and μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ. They 
are the primary object of examination. This does not mean, however, that there are two 
different objects of examination. Γόλα and μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ are not two different things. They 
are rather two different and complementary descriptions of the same reality. They emphasize 
different aspects of it and this means that certain features can be more clearly seen in one 
term than in the other. Thus, in order to see how the primary object of examination is 
understood by Plato, we will look into the meaning of these notions and the passages in 
which they are discussed.  
However, it is important to bear in mind that the meaning of these notions in Plato‟s 
writings is complex. They both have a neutral (potentially positive) and a negative sense. In 
other words, they denote either our views in general (in a sense in which we still do not know 
whether they are true or false) or the fact that these views are mere opinions or conceit of 
knowledge and nothing more. Plato normally calls our attention to the negative component 
and points to a constitutive defect in virtue of which many (perhaps even all) of our views are 
somehow distorted and false. But from the standpoint of examination itself, our views have a 
neutral value, and it is these neutral views, whose truth value is not yet determined, that 
undergo examination. It is in this sense that our δόλαζ and our μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ are objects of 
examination. The negative value of these notions is an added property that is ascertained by 
the examination. Therefore, we must first analyze the neutral sense of δόλα and μἴεζεαζ 
εἰδέκαζ and only later will we look at the kinds of cognitive defects with which these two 
expressions are associated.
479
 We will begin with the notion of δόλα, whose analysis in the 
Platonic corpus is more explicit and developed, and then we will see what is added and 
emphasized by the notion of μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ.  
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1. Δόμα in the neutral sense as the object of philosophical examination 
 
 The philosophical examination is often associated with δόλαζ (or some cognate 
expression) in the dialogues. The examinees are often explicitly asked to produce their own 
δόλαζ.
480
 In addition, someone else‟s δόλαζ (sometimes even the ones shared by all) are also 
brought into discussion. In general, the word is employed by Plato in various contexts, with 
different shades of meaning. In some of these contexts, it does not seem to be used in a 
technical sense. Other times, we find not only a very specific usage, but also important 
indications or even detailed analyses about the meaning of the term.
481
 These analyses have 
many points in common, but they also have some important discrepancies. This mirrors the 
common usage of the word, which associates it with things whose interconnection is not 
immediately clear. Both the word δόλα and Plato‟s treatment of it thus raise the question of 
how to unite this diversity.
482
 But we will not consider this in depth here. We will simply 
consider a part of what is implied in this word. As was said before, there are the two main 
usages of the word. In the first, δόλα has a neutral and broader sense. It designates the result 
of an operation and is in itself indeterminate with respect to its truth or falsity. In the second 
usage, δόλα has a pejorative sense and designates a defective result (or, more precisely, a 
defective access to things), which is in some cases associated with a particular kind of defect 
that is supposed to affect all δόλαζ as such. Since it is δόλα in the neutral sense that is the 
object of examination (though the examination may also discover a global or even 
constitutive defect in this object), we will first consider some passages in which this sense of 
δόλα is discussed. In doing so, we will abstract from other forms of knowledge (other 
cognitive powers or capacities) and how they connect to each other. We will not discuss here 
the inner structure of our cognitive apparatus and the central role δόλα (understood as a 
cognitive power or capacity among others) plays therein. We will isolate δόλα as such and we 
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 For explicit requests of someone‟s δόλα, see Chrm. 159a, Grg. 501c, Men. 84d, 85b, 85c, Rep. 346a, 350e, 
456d, 470a, 576e. Other times, the request uses the verb δμηε῔κ and is thus also referred to one‟s δόλαζ. The 
examiner may ask for “ηό ζμζ δμημῦκ” or “ηά ζμζ δμημῦκηα”. See Chrm. 163e, Grg. 495a, 500b-c, Men. 83d, 
Rep. 349a, 487d, 509c, 523a, Tht. 157c-d, Lg. 641d-e. The inquiry may also assume the form of “δμηε῔ ζμζ;” See 
e.g. Euthphr. 12b, 12d, Ap. 24d, 25a, Cri. 49e, 50b, Phd. 62b, 64d, 64d-e, 64e, 67b, 76d, 79d, 80a, 87b, 92e, 
96e, 100e, 103d, 104a, 105b, etc. See also Tht. 161e, where “἟ ημῦ δζαθέβεζεαζ πναβιαηεία” is defined as “ηὸ 
ἐπζζημπε῔κ ηαὶ ἐπζπεζνε῔κ ἐθέβπεζκ ηὰξ ἀθθήθςκ θακηαζίαξ ηε ηαὶ δόλαξ”. 
481
 The more detailed discussions are found in Men. 97b ff., Rep. 476d ff., Tht. passim (in particular 189e f.), 
Sph. 263d ff., Phlb. 36ff. and Ti. 27d ff. 
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 One could be tempted to regard this as an accidental unity, caused by the attribution of different meanings to 
the same word in the Greek language. It would be something idiosyncratic and philosophically irrelevant. But it 
may also be the result of an insight into an intrinsic connection between different aspects of reality or of our 
experience of it – and in the following we will see that this is rather the case. 
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will try to define its structure in light of the analyses we find in Plato‟s works.
483
 We will 
likewise pay little attention to the contents of our δόλαζ and whether they are all somehow 
referred to sensible beings (as Plato often suggests) or whether they can also correspond to 
intelligible realities (as seems to be the case in some other passages). This will play an 
important role in the discussion of the pejorative sense of δόλα and for this reason will be 




1.1. The complex meaning of δόμα, δνθεῖλ and δνμάδεηλ in Greek as the basis for 
Plato’s concept of δόμα 
 
 Before tackling Plato‟s analysis of δόλα in the neutral sense, it is important to make a 
brief survey of the complex meaning this word has in colloquial Greek. This meaning serves 
as a basis for the Platonic usage of the term and surveying it will thus give us important 
indications about how Plato understands this term. It will likewise provide us the chance to 
see how problematic and unilateral the usual translations of the term are. The semantic fields 
of these English words do not coincide with the Greek word δόλα, and this means that much 
of what a Greek would immediately understand by this word always gets toned down or lost 
in translation. 
We will consider the semantic field of the term δόλα along with the corresponding 
verbs δμηε῔κ and δμλάγεζκ.
485
 Much could (and has been) said about these terms.
486
 We will, 
however, confine ourselves to the most essential aspects. 
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 Later, in Chap. 11, we will consider how our cognitive apparatus is structured according to Plato. This will 
require us to consider in detail other cognitive powers, which are “below” δμλάγεζκ (i.e., may give us access to 
something inferior, less complex) and “above” or “beyond” it. 
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 See Chap. 7, Sect. 2. 
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 Γόλα is the noun most directly related to both these verbs, whose meaning do not entirely coincide. Γμλάγεζκ 
only refers to an act of a subject, whereas δμηε῔κ can be used of a subject or of an object (and the same applies 
to δόλα, as we will see, which has both an active and a passive sense). 
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 See in particular H. SCHMIDT, Synonymik der griechischen Sprache, vol. 1, Leipzig, Teubner, 1876, 323ff., 
335ff.; O. IHM, Über den Begriff der platonischen Doxa und deren Verhältnis zum Wissen der Ideen, Leipzig, 
Edelmann, 1877; A. MURRAY, On a Use of δμη῵, Classical Philology 5 (1910), 488-493; G. KITTEL, δμηές, 
δόλα, δμλάγς, ζοκδμλάγς, ἔκδμλμξ, ἐκδμλάγς, πανάδμλμξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; J. SPRUTE, Der Begriff der 
Doxa in der platonischen Literatur, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962; P. HUART, Le vocabulaire de 
l’analyse psychologique dans l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, 250-255, 259-263, 489-491; E. 
TIELSCH, Die Platonischen Versionen der griechischen Doxalehre. Ein philosophisches Lexikon mit 
Kommentar, Meisenheim am Glan, Anton Hain, 1970; W. SCHADEWALDT, Die Anfänge der Philosophie bei 
den Griechen, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1978, 174-177; Y. LAFRANCE, La théorie platonicienne de la doxa, 
Montréal/Paris, Bellarmin/Les Belles Lettres, 1981; M. CARVALHO, O caso do cogito no Filebo de Platão, in: 
A. CAEIRO & M. CARVALHO, (ed.), Incursões no Filebo, Porto, Fundação Eng. António de Almeida, 2012, 
179-318 (in particular 214-216 and, for further bibliography, 271ff.). 
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 First of all, the etymology of these words has been the matter of much discussion.
487
 
Γόλα, δμηε῔κ and δμλάγεζκ have the root δεη-, which is also found in δέπμιαζ and δμηεύς, or 
in Latin words as doceo, decet, dignus. It seems to express the idea of adequateness or 
conformity to something. This can be construed in different ways, but it seems to include a 
reference to an objective pole and a component of reception or passivity. Because of this, 
δμηε῔κ and δόλα can denote the appearance or semblance of something, the impression it 
produces on us, how it strikes us. In this sense, it almost coincides with the verb θαίκεζεαζ.  
But δόλα, together with the verbs δμηε῔κ and δμλάγεζκ, can also be used to denote a 
decision or judgment, the formation of an opinion, the settling of a matter, the fixation of a 
version of things.
488
 The word δόλα and its cognates (in contrast with other verbs of similar 
meaning) may further qualify this decision or judgment by conveying the idea that this 
judgment does not depend on an inner feeling, but rather on the outer appearance of 
something (which brings the meaning of δόλα closer to αἴζεδζζξ).  
Γμηε῔κ is also used in official formulas to refer to political decisions and decrees. In 
these and similar contexts, the word has the sense of judging good or fit, approving, 
resolving, intending – which in turn is based on the fact that something seems good or fit. But 
despite the objective basis, there is also a component of activity, which renders us responsible 
or accountable for our δόλαζ. In other words, each δόλα is always partially passive and 
partially active. The emphasis may be laid either on the objective or the subjective side, but 
they are always connected. 
 Γόλα and δμηε῔κ can also acquire a derogative sense and designate the mere 
appearance or semblance of being something (Schein), which is opposed to and hides the true 
being of something.
489
 As a result, δόλα comes to mean illusion, fancy or even dream 
image.
490
 This usage of the word expresses how we tend to simply accept without 
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 See for instance E. BOISACQ, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grècque. Étudiée dans ses rapports 
avec les autres langues indo-européennes, Paris/Heidelberg, Klincksieck/Carl Winter, 1916, sub voce δμηεύς; 
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488
 Here and in the following the term “judgment” should not be primarily understood as a logic act of asserting 
or denying the connection between a subject and a predicate. It rather refers to one‟s act of determining 
something in a certain way, regardless of the logical structure of such an act. 
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 One of the most emblematic passages that expresses this idea is AESCHYLUS, Septem contra Thebas, 592: 
“μ὎ βὰν δμηε῔κ ἄνζζημξ, ἀθθ᾽ εἶκαζ εέθεζ”. Plato himself quotes this passage in Rep. 362a. 
490
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Agamemnon, 275, 421, Choephoroe 1051, 1053. 
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examination what something appears to be. We take things at their face value, interpret our 
views as purely passive and thereby dilute our own responsibility in our δόλαζ. 
Γόλα can also acquire the sense of conjecture or opinion, which implies an awareness 
of the frailty of one‟s decision or judgment. In this case, δόλα emphasizes the personal 
character of the decision and opposes it either to other views or δόλαζ (which may or may not 
be held by others) or to effective knowledge and true insight. The admission of frailty can 
then be used rhetorically, to attenuate a categorical assertion, or to express one‟s actual lack 
of commitment to a particular view.
491
 
Finally, in line with the political usage of the expression, δόλα, δμηε῔κ and δμλάγεζκ 
(or δμλάγεζεαζ) can also express public appearance or public opinion, as well as the 
reputation something or someone can have (whether positive, negative or neutral). These are 
collective experiences to which all individuals are somehow related and that affect how 
things appear and what one thinks about them. 
This complex network of meanings is the basis for Plato‟s analysis of the term δόλα. 
Plato does not so much modify it as he tries to elucidate it. He will isolate the center of this 
network and then determine how the other meanings are derived from it. This is what we 
must now consider. 
 
1.2. Δόμα as decision or judgment (θξίζηο) 
 
 Plato uses different strategies in the corpus to isolate and define δόλα. These strategies 
often imply the contrast with more basic forms of cognitive access to something – in 
particular with sensation (αἴζεδζζξ, which has a certain proximity with δόλα, as was 
indicated above), but also to a lesser degree with memory (ικήιδ, which is understood as a 
preservation or retention of one‟s αἰζεήζεζξ).
492
 Plato attempts to isolate components in our 
access to beings that are irreducible to our sensations and memories.  
 One such attempt can be found in the Philebus. Socrates gives the example of 
someone seeing something from a distance, not very clearly (ιὴ πάκο ζαθ῵ξ), and not being 
able to discern if it is a person or a statue.
493
 There are different possible identifications and 
                                                 
491
 We will see the same holds true for μἴεζεαζ. 
492
 These contrasts presuppose the scale of cognitive powers or faculties we will consider in Chapter 11.  
493
 See 38c-d: “[΢Ω.] πμθθάηζξ ἰδόκηζ ηζκὶ πόννςεεκ ιὴ πάκο ζαθ῵ξ ηὰ ηαεμνώιεκα ζοιααίκεζκ αμύθεζεαζ 
ηνίκεζκ θαίδξ ἂκ ηαῦε᾽ ἅπεν ὁνᾶ; [ΠΡΩ.] θαίδκ ἄκ. [΢Ω.] μ὎ημῦκ ηὸ ιεηὰ ημῦημ α὎ηὸξ α὏ηὸκ μὗημξ ἀκένμζη᾽ ἂκ 
ὧδε; [ΠΡΩ.] π῵ξ; [΢Ω.] ηί πμη᾽ ἄν᾽ ἔζηζ ηὸ πανὰ ηὴκ πέηνακ ημῦε᾽ ἑζηάκαζ θακηαγόιεκμκ ὏πό ηζκζ δέκδνῳ; 
ηαῦη᾽ εἰπε῔κ ἄκ ηζξ πνὸξ ἑαοηὸκ δμηε῔ ζμζ, ημζαῦη᾽ ἄηηα ηαηζδὼκ θακηαζεέκηα α὏ηῶ πμηε; [ΠΡΩ.] ηί ιήκ; [΢Ω.] 
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one is in a state of doubt or hesitation (of δζζηάγεζκ, to use an expression from the 
Theaetetus).
494
 In this moment, one is closer to having a pure αἴζεδζζξ. One has a muddled 
access from a distance and is unable to determine what appears. This is what characterizes 
our sensations as that which is immediately given to us. They are in themselves indeterminate 
or indistinct. If we only had sensations, we would be completely at a loss about what things 
are. It is necessary to have more – and this surplus in relation to mere sensation is precisely 
what we lack in the moment of hesitation or doubt. But in general we do not leave things at 
that. Socrates says that in this moment we strive and strain ourselves to fully determine 
(δζαδμλάγεζκ) things.
495
 We are directed to more than an absolutely hazy access. We want to 
remove doubts. We want to decide and determine what things are. Γόλα is precisely this 
decision, this ηνίκεζκ.
496
 The latter term is used in judicial language, as was noted in the 
previous chapter. In a court of law, the jury must decide which of the two conflicting versions 
of events is in the right, thereby bringing order to the conflict. The term is also used for 
contests in general, in which a winner must be chosen. This is precisely what happens when 
forming a δόλα. One must set apart the right alternative (in the example given, whether 
something is a person or a statue) and establish a version as the right one. One has to reach a 
judgment that lets one discern the truth (or as Plato says, one has to δζαδμλάγεζκ).
497
 In the 
Theaetetus, Socrates describes this as setting the boundaries of something or defining it 
(ὁνίγεζκ).
498
 This process of judging something is precisely what brings clarity to our access 
to something. It brings the object nearer, defines its contours, allows us to make out what it 
is. In other words, a δόλα does what a sensation or αἴζεδζζξ cannot do. The latter cannot 
identify its object. It does not even have doubts or hesitations about it. It is neutral in terms of 
deciding or judging. In order to decide or judge, it is necessary to have something    
additional – namely, a δόλα.  
Plato isolates this moment by considering what happens when we have doubts about 
the identity of something seen from afar and have to make a decision about it. This may 
suggest that all δόλαζ imply a kind of judicial process of hesitation between possibilities and 
                                                                                                                                                        
ἆν᾽ μὖκ ιεηὰ ηαῦηα ὁ ημζμῦημξ ὡξ ἀπμηνζκόιεκμξ ἂκ πνὸξ α὏ηὸκ εἴπμζ ημῦημ, ὡξ ἔζηζκ ἄκενςπμξ, ἐπζηοπ῵ξ  
εἰπώκ; [ΠΡΩ.] ηαὶ πάκο βε. [΢Ω.] ηαὶ πανεκεπεείξ β᾽ αὖ ηάπ᾽ ἂκ ὡξ ἔζηζ ηζκ῵κ πμζιέκςκ ἔνβμκ ηὸ ηαεμνώιεκμκ 
ἄβαθια πνμζείπμζ. [ΠΡΩ.] ιάθα βε.” 
494
 See 190a: “ὅηακ δὲ ὁνίζαζα, εἴηε αναδύηενμκ εἴηε ηαὶ ὀλύηενμκ ἐπᾴλαζα, ηὸ α὎ηὸ ἢδδ θῆ ηαὶ ιὴ δζζηάγῃ, 
δόλακ ηαύηδκ ηίεειεκ α὎η῅ξ.” 
495
 See 38b: “μ὎ημῦκ ἐη ικήιδξ ηε ηαὶ αἰζεήζεςξ δόλα ἟ι῔κ ηαὶ ηὸ δζαδμλάγεζκ ἐβπεζνε῔κ βίβκεε᾽ ἑηάζημηε;” 
496
 In 38c, Socrates speaks precisely of a αμύθεζεαζ ηνίκεζκ, which describes the process of constituting a δόλα. 
497
 The verb δζαδμλάγεζκ appears in passage quoted above. The prefix δζα- conveys here both the idea of a 
complete process and the idea of full discernment and clarity about something.  
498
 See the above quoted passage in 190a. 
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finally reaching a verdict. However, this is not what normally happens. Normally there is no 
hesitation between different alternative versions (we may even be aware only of one 
possibility) and there is also no deferral of judgment. But this does not mean our access is 
immediate or absolutely sensible. Neither does it mean that we are in suspense about what 
appears to us. Our access is still pervaded by decisions or judgments – only they are 
immediate or automatic. A version is adopted, taken as valid and as something that does not 
pose any problems and has no need of revision. Because of this, we do not even think about 
it. We only do think about it if there is any disturbance similar to the one described in the 
Philebus. But in these relatively rare moments of doubt and hesitation we can more clearly 
identify, by contrast, the decisions that affect everything we come in contact with. This is 
why Plato calls our attention to them. 
By emphasizing the idea of decision in his description of δόλα, Plato also points out to 
one‟s personal responsibility in our access to things. We are not purely passive (even if one 
has in many cases a strong tendency to follow appearances).
499
 Things are not absolutely 
given as what they are. It depends on us to decipher or determine them. Γόλα is precisely this 
attempt at decipherment. It establishes a version of events. In addition, this version (i.e., our 
δόλα) is not predetermined and fixed. There are (or there can be) alternative versions. One 
can define things differently and one can revise one‟s decision (i.e., one can ιεηαδμλάγεζκ). 
This may happen automatically or it may be the result of an explicit reflection about one‟s 
judgment.
500
 But it is in any case the result of our own inner activity.  
 
1.3. Δόμα as a process of thinking (δηάλνηα) and a conversation (δηάινγνο) 
 
 Plato also tries to define δόλα by comparing it to the process of thinking. This process 
is not simply a monologue, but rather a conversation in our mind or soul (ροπή).
501
 This 
implies a certain scission within the soul. Moreover, this is a very particular kind of 
                                                 
499
 “Following appearances”, however, cannot mean “following one‟s αἴζεδζζξ”, for αἴζεδζζξ as such is 
indeterminate. It can only mean “following the version of events that must promptly suggests itself”. 
500
 Even if most of our decisions are made without a previous process, this does not mean that such a process 
cannot take place. On the contrary, any of our decisions can be revised and revoked. We can consciously take 
the role of the decider. This is precisely what happens in the philosophical examination.  
501
 See Tht. 189e: “[΢Ω.] ηὸ δὲ δζακμε῔ζεαζ ἆν᾽ ὅπεν ἐβὼ ηαθε῔ξ; [ΘΔΑΙ.] ηί ηαθ῵κ; [΢Ω.] θόβμκ ὃκ α὎ηὴ πνὸξ 
α὏ηὴκ ἟ ροπὴ δζελένπεηαζ πενὶ ὧκ ἂκ ζημπῆ.” See also Sph. 264a-b: “μ὎ημῦκ ἐπείπεν θόβμξ ἀθδεὴξ ἤκ ηαὶ 
ρεοδήξ, ημύηςκ δ᾽ ἐθάκδ δζάκμζα ιὲκ α὎η῅ξ πνὸξ ἑαοηὴκ ροπ῅ξ δζάθμβμξ, δόλα δὲ δζακμίαξ ἀπμηεθεύηδζζξ 
(...).” For the term ροπή, see in particular Chap. 10 below. 
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conversation. The soul asks itself questions and gives itself answers.
502
 Thinking is thus a 
dialectic conversation and what we see Socrates doing with other characters in the dialogues 
is actually prefigured at the heart of who we are. Our soul needs answers and when it does 
not find them it assumes an interrogative structure and strives to overcome its doubts.
503
 
More specifically, it submits us to a kind of cross-examination. There is a tension to 
determining things. In the Theaetetus, Plato describes this activity as a consideration 
(ἐπζζημπε῔κ or ζημπε῔ζεαζ) or calculation (ἀκαθμβίγεζεαζ or ζοθθμβζζιόξ) regarding what is 
immediately given by the senses.
504
 As he says, the soul “is busy by itself about the things 
which are”.
505
 It tries to go beyond what appears and decide (ηνίκεζκ) what things are. In 
other words, the soul demands answers from itself. It has to affirm or deny some version of 
things (i.e., it must produce a θάζζξ or ἀπόθαζζξ).
506
 When it does, it brings the process of 
thinking to completion. A δόλα is precisely the completion of this process (a δζακμίαξ 
ἀπμηεθεύηδζζξ, as it is said in the Sophist).
507
 It produces non-immediate, non-sensible, 
intellectual contents.  
This process can either take place externally, via a loud θόβμξ (so that others can hear 
it and possibly participate in it), or it can take place within us.
508
 In both cases, the structure is 
the same and this means the structure of our statements reflects the structure of our thoughts. 
Both are dialogical, discursive or, as we could also say, rational (even if usually they are not 
fully rational). Still, the possibility of a silent dialogue is something we often do not notice 
(only when there is more resistance and the conversation is therefore more intense) and this is 
very significant, as we shall see in the next chapter.
509
 It might suggest that there is always a 
certain conversation within us, a certain examination of what appears and a finding of 
                                                 
502
 For an illustration of this, see once more Phlb. 38c-d. See also Tht. 189e-190a: “ημῦημ βάν ιμζ ἰκδάθθεηαζ 
δζακμμοιέκδ μ὎η ἄθθμ ηζ ἠ δζαθέβεζεαζ, α὎ηὴ ἑαοηὴκ ἐνςη῵ζα ηαὶ ἀπμηνζκμιέκδ, ηαὶ θάζημοζα ηαὶ μ὎ 
θάζημοζα.” 
503
 This description of δόλα is in fact very close to the one we first considered, based on the Philebus, since 
doubt or hesitation is itself what raises the question and the decision is the answer. This is made clear in the 
words used by Socrates in the Philebus. He describes a person having doubts about what he is seeing as 
someone who is asking questions to himself and giving answers. See Phlb. 38c-d for the use of the verbs 
ἀκενςη᾵κ and ἀπμηνίκεζεαζ. 
504
 For all these terms, see 185e-186d. 
505
 See 187a: “(...) α὎ηὴ [sc. ἟ ροπή] ηαε‟ α὏ηὴκ πναβιαηεύδηαζ πενὶ ηὰ ὄκηα.” I follow M. Levett‟s translation, 
revised by Myles Burnyeat (see PCW). 
506
 See once more Tht. 189e-190a. See also Sph. 263e-264a: “[ΞΔ.] ηαὶ ιὴκ ἐκ θόβμζξ βε αὖ ἴζιεκ                  
ἐκὸκ – [ΘΔΑΙ.] ηὸ πμ῔μκ; [ΞΔ.] θάζζκ ηε ηαὶ ἀπόθαζζκ. [ΘΔΑΙ.] ἴζιεκ. [ΞΔ.] ὅηακ μὖκ ημῦημ ἐκ ροπῆ ηαηὰ 
δζάκμζακ ἐββίβκδηαζ ιεηὰ ζζβ῅ξ, πθὴκ δόλδξ ἔπεζξ ὅηζ πνμζείπῃξ α὎ηό; [ΘΔΑΙ.] ηαὶ π῵ξ;” 
507
 See 264a-b: “μ὎ημῦκ ἐπείπεν θόβμξ ἀθδεὴξ ἤκ ηαὶ ρεοδήξ, ημύηςκ δ᾽ ἐθάκδ δζάκμζα ιὲκ α὎η῅ξ πνὸξ ἑαοηὴκ 
ροπ῅ξ δζάθμβμξ, δόλα δὲ δζακμίαξ ἀπμηεθεύηδζζξ (...).” 
508
 See Sph. 263e-264a and Phlb. 38d-e.  
509
 See Chap. 6, Sect. 1. 
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answers. But we do not spend every moment examining and our δόλαζ are not the result of a 
long explicit dialogue with ourselves. As we saw, most δόλαζ are automatic. We simply have 
answers (i.e., we affirm a certain version of things, without even considering alternatives). 
Things are decided and we do not have to ask questions about them. Only the lack of answers 
(or our doubting them) creates the pressure and the intense dialogue that correspond to the 
cross-examination described. 
 
1.4. Δόμα as the writing in the book of the soul 
 
In the Philebus, Socrates takes the similarity between δόλα and θόβμξ even further. He 
says that our soul resembles a book and that the association of memories and sensations 
writes as it were θόβμζ (statements) in our soul.
510
 He then mentions an internal scribe (ὁ παν‟ 
἟ι῔κ βναιιαηεύξ). This artisan is precisely the δμλάγεζκ and the statements being written are 
δόλαζ. They are based on our present or past sensations, but they produce something that goes 
beyond them. Γόλα exceeds what is given, adds to it and completes it. This addition is 
primarily a tying together of our sensations. But this is done by means of something that is 
compared to writing. The soul has a scribe – a secretary that is literate, able to read and write. 
He is able to transform sounds into writing (whereby he fixates them) and is able to 
understand the graphic symbols and their meaning. Analogously, our soul is able to translate 
or codify its immediate experience and produce a new and heterogeneous meaning that 
transcends it. The new meaning (the δόλαζ and θόβμζ) is not a mode of sensation or memory. 
It differs from a fixed image of a sensation we had, just like the written word is different from 
sound.
511
 This heterogeneity is further proven by the fact that the scribe needs a painter. 
According to Socrates, this new sphere can produce its own quasi-perceptive contents. There 
is a second artisan in our soul, a painter (γςβνάθμξ), who comes after the scribe, paints 
images of the things being said or written in the soul, and lets one see (or have a quasi-
sensible contact) with what is being written.
512
 Plato seems to be describing imagination and 
stressing that it is determined by our δμλάγεζκ. Our judgments determine what we see and 
                                                 
510
 See 39a: “἟ ικήιδ ηα῔ξ αἰζεήζεζζ ζοιπίπημοζα εἰξ ηα὎ηὸκ ηἀηε῔κα ἃ πενὶ ηαῦη᾽ ἐζηὶ ηὰ παεήιαηα θαίκμκηαί 
ιμζ ζπεδὸκ μἷμκ βνάθεζκ ἟ι῵κ ἐκ ηα῔ξ ροπα῔ξ ηόηε θόβμοξ· ηαὶ ὅηακ ιὲκ ἀθδε῅ βνάθῃ ημῦημ ηὸ πάεδια, δόλα ηε 
ἀθδεὴξ ηαὶ θόβμζ ἀπ᾽ α὎ημῦ ζοιααίκμοζζκ ἀθδεε῔ξ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ βζβκόιεκμζ (...).” 
511
 In other words, the soul is not simply a tablet in which sensations leave impressions (to use the metaphor 
employed in Theaetetus 191c ff. to describe our memory). It is also something in which the soul itself writes. 
512
 See 39b: “[΢Ω.] ἀπμδέπμο δὴ ηαὶ ἕηενμκ δδιζμονβὸκ ἟ι῵κ ἐκ ηα῔ξ ροπα῔ξ ἐκ ηῶ ηόηε πνόκῳ βζβκόιεκμκ. 
[ΠΡΩ.] ηίκα; [΢Ω.] γςβνάθμκ, ὃξ ιεηὰ ηὸκ βναιιαηζζηὴκ η῵κ θεβμιέκςκ εἰηόκαξ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ ημύηςκ βνάθεζ.” 
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how we see it. They not only transform our sensations, but can also produce sensible (or 
quasi-sensible) moments.  
The scribe is thus able to transfer our immediate experience to a domain analogous to 
writing. Such a ιεηάααζζξ εἰξ ἄθθμ βέκμξ allows one to fixate one‟s experience (give it some 
permanence at least in our mind).
513
 It also allows us to interpret it by establishing a version 
of events. Without this operation, the soul would be illiterate. It would not be able to read and 
understand the text of reality. In other words, our sensations and memories cannot discern 
what things are and what happens. In the Philebus, Socrates even argues that without δόλαζ 
we would not even be aware of our own sensations while having them.
514
 Therefore, even if 
our δόλαζ are frequently (if not always) referred to sensations, they still have a different 
origin and structure. This causes them to affect and transform all sensations. In a way, they 
teach our sensations to read, allow them to have an understanding of what happens. 
The scope of this activity is vast and Plato even suggests, by comparing the soul to a 
book, that it can be global. Not only are our sensations and memories collected and brought 
together by the scribe, thereby connecting our past and present, but the scribe‟s activity can 
also be referred to moments of which the soul had no sensation – and particularly to the 
future. He then uses the painter to complete these projections. All these moments are then 
linked up in a whole (the book as such, the narrative) and seen in light of it. In other words, 
no sensation, memory or δόλα is isolated or loose. They are all connected and constitute a 
world. This world appears as a θόβμξ or a text that is being written – something that cannot 
be reduced to sensory moments.
515
 It is a text written not in mathematical characters, as was 





                                                 
513
 Fixity is one of the most important features of writing, according to Plato. It is also presented as one of its 
limitations (cf. Phdr. 275d-e, Ep. VII 343a). A written text cannot explain or defend itself. But fixity is also a 
condition for having access to something determinate. Otherwise, we would not be able to discern something or 
have some clarity about it. Γόλα is precisely what allows us to do this.   
514
 See 21c: “(...) δόλακ δ᾽ αὖ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἀθδε῅ ιὴ δμλάγεζκ παίνεζκ παίνμκηα (...)”. Without judgment, we 
would have no relation to pleasure and we would not be aware of its existence. The same applies to any other 
sensation of ours. 
515
 This reminds of Heraclitus and his application of θόβμξ both to his philosophy (or the expression of it), to the 
representation a soul has of reality and to reality itself. There is a language of things which the soul must 
understand. The senses by themselves are insufficient to decipher what things are if one‟s soul does not know 
this language. See in particular DK B1, 2, 45, 72 107, 115. 
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1.5. The intentional character of δόμα and the semblance of immediacy 
 
 By comparing δόλα with judging, giving answers and writing, Plato emphasizes the 
active component of δόλα. It can be conceived as the act of a subject – as a δμλάγεζκ. This act 
as such is an absolute fact, as Socrates stresses in Philebus. It is something whose occurrence 
we cannot doubt, much less prove false or illusory. Every time there is a δόλα, there is a 
δμλάγεζκ.
516
 But δόλα is not simply an act within our soul, absolutely contained in itself. Any 
δμλάγεζκ is related to an object, it has a content – or, as it is formulated in the Philebus, it has 
a δμλαγόιεκμκ.
517
 Something is judged and the δόλα refers intrinsically to that. We could say, 
using the language of phenomenology, that δόλα has an intentional character. Judging is 
always judging something.
518
 It is a power or capacity (δύκαιζξ) and, as Socrates says in the 
Republic, each power or capacity is determined not by any physical property (as color or 
shape), but rather by that on which it depends (ἐθ‟ ᾧ ἔζηζ) and by what it accomplishes (ὃ 
ἀπενβάγεηαζ). There is something to which the δμλάγεζκ refers (a δμλαζηόκ) and something 
that results from the power, namely δόλα itself.
519
  
 This something to which the δόλα refers is often mediated by our sensations (in which 
case it corresponds to what is called θακηαζία in the Sophist, i.e., the power of letting 
something appear).
520
 But our δόλαγεζκ can also create its own sensible content by employing 
the painter within our soul, as was seen above. In general, something appears before us and 
δόλα tends to be absorbed in this appearance (be it real or imaginary). With this, we tend to 
lose sight of the act itself (unless we face some resistance and cannot immediately determine 
something). Our act of judging sets things before us. In fact, this is how things are seen by us. 
Our judgments constitute our immediate experience and pervade everything with which we 
come in contact. Moreover, our δόλαζ do not refer only to our sensible or quasi-sensible 
experiences. Sometimes Plato also uses the word with respect to judgments about intelligible 
                                                 
516
 See 37a: “μ὎ημῦκ ηὸ δμλάγμκ, ἄκηε ὀνε῵ξ ἄκηε ιὴ ὀνε῵ξ δμλάγῃ, ηό βε δμλάγεζκ ὄκηςξ μ὎δέπμηε 
ἀπόθθοζζκ.” For more on this passage, see Chap. 10, Sect. 1 below. 
517
 Cp. 37a: “[΢Ω.] (...) ἔζηζκ βάν πμύ ηζ δμλάγεζκ ἟ι῔κ; [ΠΡΩ.] καί. (...) [΢Ω.] ηαὶ ιὴκ ηαὶ ηὸ δμλαγόιεκόκ ἐζηί 
ηζ; [ΠΡΩ.] π῵ξ δ‟ μὔ;” 
518
 See Chrm. 168a3-5 and Tht. 189a6. 
519
 Cp. Rep. 477c ff. For an analysis of this passage, cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 below. To be sure, the discussion in 
the Republic refers to a narrower sense of δόλα – a sense in which it implies a constitutive limitation and is 
opposed to a superior form of access or a superior cognitive power (simply called βκ῵ζζξ in this passage). 
Nonetheless, this particular feature we are now considering is an essential feature of δόλα in broader sense, i.e., 
of all our judgments.   
520
 See 264a: “[ΞΔ.] ὅηακ μὖκ ημῦημ ἐκ ροπῆ ηαηὰ δζάκμζακ ἐββίβκδηαζ ιεηὰ ζζβ῅ξ, πθὴκ δόλδξ ἔπεζξ ὅηζ 
πνμζείπῃξ α὎ηό; [ΘΔΑΙ.] ηαὶ π῵ξ; [ΞΔ.] ηί δ᾽ ὅηακ ιὴ ηαε᾽ α὏ηὸ ἀθθὰ δζ᾽ αἰζεήζεςξ πανῆ ηζκζ, ηὸ ημζμῦημκ αὖ 
πάεμξ ἆν᾽ μἷόκ ηε ὀνε῵ξ εἰπε῔κ ἕηενόκ ηζ πθὴκ θακηαζίακ; [ΘΔΑΙ.] μ὎δέκ.” 
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realities (i.e., about notions of which we have a certain understanding and which are then 
reflected in all sensible contents).
521
 The range of our judgments is extremely broad and in a 
sense it corresponds to the world or the totality of our experience.
522
  
 What is judged (the δμλαγόιεκμκ) can thus be very complex. But this complexity still 
does not consider a fundamental ambiguity that is present in the usage of the term in the 
Philebus and that pervades all that was said just now. Γμλαγόιεκμκ can mean either the 
immanent content of a judgment or the object or reality outside the judgment (i.e., a reality 
that transcends the act of judging as such). Plato does not specify what he means. However, 
this ambiguity is neither incidental nor irrelevant. Both elements characterize any δόλα and 
its intentionality. A δόλα has an apparent object, which appears to it or within it. This 
apparent object is as absolutely given as the act of judging. But δόλα also has a constitutive 
relation to reality as such, regardless of whether it appears to us as such or not. These two 
moments may coincide or not and their coincidence or non-coincidence defines any δόλα. 
This is what we must consider now, for it is not only a decisive structure of our judging as 
such, but it also essential to determine the examination of our judgments or δόλαζ. 
 
1.6. The δόμα as a shot (βνιή) aimed at truth and the possibility of a false δόμα 
 
 It was already mentioned how the soul has a tension to decide or determine what 
things are.
523
 This is in line with another image that is used to elucidate the nature of δόλα, 
namely the image of shooting the bow (ἀπὸ ημῦ ηόλμο αμθή). This is put forward in Cratylus 
as one of two possible etymologies of δόλα. The other (presented as less likely) describes 
δόλα as soul‟s pursuit of the knowledge of how things are.
524
 In Theaetetus, the false δόλαζ 
are described as the work of a bad archer (ημλόηδξ θαῦθμξ).
525
 Finally, in Sophist, Plato 
compares the soul with beings that partake of motion, set a target for themselves and try to hit 
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 In the Theatetus (184d ff.), for instance, Plato associates this operation with common predicates such as 
μ὎ζία, ὁιμζόηδξ, ἀκμιμζόηδξ, ηὸ ηα὎ηὸκ, ηὸ ἕηενμκ, etc. In Philebus 44a, Socrates talks of a judgment about the 
notion of having pleasure (ηὸ παίνεζκ). For more on this, see Chap. 10, Sect. 3.3 below. 
522
 This global character of δόλα can then have different meanings in Plato, in accordance with the two main 
senses of δόλα. It can mean that everything is mediated by a judgment or that everything is mediated by a false 
judgment. For a consideration of the latter possibility, see Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 and Chap. 16, Sect. 5. 
523
 For instance, in Philebus we find expressions such as δζαδμλάγεζκ ἐβπεζνε῔κ (38b) or αμύθεζεαζ ηνίκεζκ (38c), 
which we considered above in Section 1.2. 
524
 See 420b: “ „δόλα‟ δὴ ἢημζ ηῆ δζώλεζ ἐπςκόιαζηαζ, ἡκ ἟ ροπὴ δζώημοζα ηὸ εἰδέκαζ ὅπῃ ἔπεζ ηὰ πνάβιαηα 
πμνεύεηαζ, ἠ ηῆ ἀπὸ ημῦ ηόλμο αμθῆ. ἔμζηε δὲ ημύηῳ ι᾵θθμκ.” 
525
 See 193e-194a: “ἤ ηαὶ ἐεεθήζεζξ ὁιμθμβε῔κ ἃ δζ᾽ ἑηέναξ δοκάιεςξ ηαὶ ἄιθς ὁν῵κηα ἢ ηζκα ἄθθδκ αἴζεδζζκ 
ἔπμκηα ἀιθμ῔κ ηὼ ζδιείς ιὴ ηαηὰ ηὴκ α὎ημῦ αἴζεδζζκ ἑηάηενμκ ἔπεζκ, ἀθθ᾽ μἷμκ ημλόηδκ θαῦθμκ ἱέκηα 
παναθθάλαζ ημῦ ζημπμῦ ηαὶ ἁιανηε῔κ, ὃ δὴ ηαὶ ρεῦδμξ ἄνα ὠκόιαζηαζ.” 
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it. He speaks of various impulses, thrusts or assaults (ὁνιαί) and says that they may hit this 
target, but they may also go astray (suffer a deviation, a πανάθμνα) and miss 
(ἀπμηοβπάκεζκ).
526
 In Philebus, we find once more the image of hitting or missing a target.
527
 
All these images show how we are directed at something, namely at reality as it is.
528
 This is 
the object of any δόλα. Indeed, the act of δμλάγεζκ is not simply an arbitrary or subjective 
decision. It tries to establish the right version of events. It is in itself related to an objective 
sphere, to reality and to the truth. It strives toward this target and hence all the particular 
judgments are in themselves determined by whether they reach their target or not. A δόλα is 
not simply a δόλα, but it is always qualified in a certain manner (always πμία ηζξ), namely 
either as true and correct (ὀνεή), or as false.
529
 This is so regardless of whether or not we can 
properly determine its truth or falsehood. In many cases we may wrongly think we hit the 
target, but when this happens, the act of judging still contains in itself the relation to a target 
(to the truth of the matter), and this is precisely what makes a false δόλα false. 
 Any δόλα is in itself exposed to these two possibilities and characterized by one of 
them. This raises some problems, which are tackled in several moments of Plato‟s works. The 
first is how can we explain the possibility of falsehood as such – in other words, how can a 
δόλα hit something else than the target that was set and judge of what is not, that it is or, of 
what is, that it is not.
530
 A second problem is how this can happen to us, which psychological 
motivations can lead us to judge something falsely. Also problematic is the nature of the 
target itself – i.e., what the truth is – and how we can reach it. Is a true or correct δόλα the 
highest form of access to the truth sc. the highest form of knowledge? Finally, although Plato 
does not discuss this possibility in detail, we could also wonder what the status of this setting 
of the target is (i.e., of our relation to truth). Is it an inherent and inextricable structure of the 
soul or can it also be the result of a δόλα (the δόλα that there is truth and that we should be 
directed to it) and as such be exposed to the possibility of being false? And how can the latter 
                                                 
526
 See 228c-d: “[ΞΔ.] ηί δ᾽; ὅζ᾽ ἂκ ηζκήζεςξ ιεηαζπόκηα ηαὶ ζημπόκ ηζκα εέιεκα πεζνώιεκα ημύημο ηοβπάκεζκ 
ηαε᾽ ἑηάζηδκ ὁνιὴκ πανάθμνα α὎ημῦ βίβκδηαζ ηαὶ ἀπμηοβπάκῃ, πόηενμκ α὎ηὰ θήζμιεκ ὏πὸ ζοιιεηνίαξ η῅ξ 
πνὸξ ἄθθδθα ἠ ημ὎κακηίμκ ὏πὸ ἀιεηνίαξ α὎ηὰ πάζπεζκ; [ΘΔΑΙ.] δ῅θμκ ὡξ ὏πὸ ἀιεηνίαξ. [ΞΔ.] ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ροπήκ 
βε ἴζιεκ ἄημοζακ π᾵ζακ π᾵κ ἀβκμμῦζακ. [ΘΔΑΙ.] ζθόδνα βε. [ΞΔ.] ηό βε ιὴκ ἀβκμε῔κ ἐζηζκ ἐπ᾽ ἀθήεεζακ 
ὁνιςιέκδξ [228δ] ροπ῅ξ, παναθόνμο ζοκέζεςξ βζβκμιέκδξ, μ὎δὲκ ἄθθμ πθὴκ παναθνμζύκδ.” For a detailed 
analysis of this passage, see Chap. 8, Sect. 1 below. 
527
 See 38d: “[΢Ω.] ἆν᾽ μὖκ ιεηὰ ηαῦηα ὁ ημζμῦημξ ὡξ ἀπμηνζκόιεκμξ ἂκ πνὸξ α὏ηὸκ εἴπμζ ημῦημ, ὡξ ἔζηζκ 
ἄκενςπμξ, ἐπζηοπ῵ξ εἰπώκ; [ΠΡΩ.] ηαὶ πάκο βε. [΢Ω.] ηαὶ πανεκεπεείξ β᾽ αὖ ηάπ᾽ ἂκ ὡξ ἔζηζ ηζκ῵κ πμζιέκςκ 
ἔνβμκ ηὸ ηαεμνώιεκμκ ἄβαθια πνμζείπμζ.” 
528
 As we will see, this constitutes the core of the soul‟s intrinsic love of knowledge or wisdom (θζθμζμθία). See 
in particular Chap. 13, Sect. 3.3 below. 
529
 For this discussion of δόλα being always qualified, see Phlb. 37b ff. The predicates “true” and “false” are 
there presented as something that can accrue (ἐπζβίβκεζεαζ, πνμζβίβζβκεζεαζ) to the pure fact of judging. 
530
 For Plato‟s discussions of this possibility, see in particular Tht. 187d ff. and Sph. 236e ff. 
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possibility be conceived, given the fact it puts the very structure of truth and falsity in 
question? We will consider some of these problems later.
531
 But whatever the answer to them 
is, it is nevertheless clear that for Plato each judgment of ours is in itself related to what 
things are and determined by whether it reaches these things and establishes the right version 
about them or not. The possibility of failing the constitutive target of any δόλα is in turn what 
gives meaning to the examination. We examine δόλαζ to see whether they hit the target (truth) 
or not. 
 
2. Οἴεζζαη εἰδέλαη in the neutral sense as the object of philosophical examination 
 
 Let us now take a look at the notion of μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ and what it entails. Οἴεζεαζ 
εἰδέκαζ is a different mode of characterizing the object of examination. It coincides partly 
with the notion of δόλα, but it also shows the object of examination in a different light. 
Literally, μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ means “thinking one knows” or “presuming to know”. However, 
for the sake of convenience, it is often rendered as a noun: namely, as “knowledge claim” or 
some close equivalent. We will also use this rendering, since it emphasizes the most 
important aspect of the notion: the perhaps unjustified conviction that one knows something 
in particular. This conviction is what we will now consider.   
 
2.1. Οἴεζζαη εἰδέλαη and equivalent expressions. The usually pejorative sense of 
νἴεζζαη εἰδέλαη and the isolation of a neutral sense 
 
 Though we will focus the expression “μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ”, several other expressions can 
be found throughout the corpus that have a very close meaning and basically refer to the 
same. The variation of formulas is itself meaningful and it is important to have some idea of 
this. 
First, both verbs can be replaced by other verbs or expressions. In the place of μἴεζεαζ 
(and in combination either with εἰδέκαζ or with one of the other expressions that may replace 
it) we find expressions such as δμηε῔κ (e.g. Ap. 22a, 29a, Sph. 229c), δμλάγεζκ (Sph. 244a) 
἟βε῔ζεαζ (e.g. Alc. I 106e, Sph. 230d), ἀλζμῦκ (Ap. 22d), πζζηεύεζκ (La. 186d, Rep. 450d), 
πείεεζκ (Phd. 97b). Also close in meaning is the idea of saying (θάκαζ, θάζηεζκ – see 
Euthphr. 13e, Chrm. 165b) or insisting (δζζζπονίγεζεαζ, Euthphr. 5c) that one knows. As for 
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 See in particular Chap. 8, Sect. 3.4, and Chap. 20, Section 3.4. 
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the idea of knowing, it can likewise be expressed by ἐπίζηαζεαζ (e.g. Euthphr. 4e, La. 184b, 
Alc. I 106d, 110c, 117b), βζβκώζηεζκ (e.g. Alc. I 116d, Euthd. 301e, Sph. 244a), ἐπαΐεζκ (Tht. 
145d), ιακεάκεζκ (e.g. Euthphr. 10a, La. 194d, Men. 73d, 75e, Phdr. 263a Phlb. 17a), 
ζοκζέκαζ (Tht. 147a, Sph. 243b), ζμθὸξ εἶκαζ (e.g. Ap. 21c, 29a, Chrm. 162b, Sph. 230a), κμῦκ 
ἔπεζκ (Cra. 406c), ἐκ ε὎πμνίᾳ εἶκαζ (Hp. Ma. 298c) or δεζκὸξ εἶκαζ πενὶ ηζκόξ (Sph. 230a). 
Each of these terms has its own meaning and associations, but they all point to the ideas we 
will consider in the following.  
 Our knowledge claims may also be denoted by the separate use of any of these 
expressions. The verb μἴεζεαζ and the like may imply the idea of knowing (or they may be 
experienced as knowledge), and the term μἴδζζξ, as well as δόλα and πίζηζξ, often have a 
sense that is very similar to μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ. In turn, the verb εἰδέκαζ and its equivalents may 
sometimes have a merely presumptive character, which is more clearly expressed in the 
construction “ὡξ εἰδώξ” (e.g. Ap. 29a, Hp. Ma. 298c, Men. 84a, Rep. 510c).  
 When together, both verbs can also receive additional qualifications. In particular, the 
verb of knowing can be qualified with an adverb such as ἱηακ῵ξ, εὖ, ζαθ῵ξ, ἀηνζα῵ξ, which 
emphasizes the high quality of the supposed knowledge.
532
 This emphasis can also be given 
by specifying the importance or the amplitude of what is known (as in εἰδέκαζ ηὰ ιέβζζηα or 
εἰδέκαζ πάκηα).
533
 In these cases, the ones who claim to know believe that they possess the 
ιεβίζηδ θνόκδζζξ or that they are the wisest of all human beings.
534
  
Despite all these different ways of referring to knowledge claims in the corpus, we 
will center the following analysis on the expression “μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ”, because it is frequently 
used by Plato and also because it is the most generic designation for our knowledge claims.
535
  
 As was said, we will isolate the knowledge claim as such, regardless of whether one 
actually has knowledge or not. Rigorously speaking, it is the knowledge claim as such (the 
μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ) that constitutes the object of philosophical examination. This examination 
strives to ascertain which of our knowledge claims are legitimate and which are hollow or 
false. However, when the expression is used in the dialogues, it usually refers to knowledge 
claims that were or will be proven illegitimate and thus correspond to what Plato designates 
as “μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ μ὎η εἰδώξ” or “μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ ἃ μ὎η μἶδεκ”.
536
 In fact, the corpus 
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 See e.g. Euthphr. 15e, Ap. 29a, La. 186d, Sph. 243b. 
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 Cp. for instance Ap. 22d and Lg. 732a. 
534
 See e.g. Ap. 22c, Euthd. 305c, Lg. 886b. 
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 For Plato‟s use of the notion of μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ, see Euthphr. 15e, Ap. 21d, 23c, 29b, Chrm. 166d, 167a, Alc. 
I 110a, 113e, Prt. 312c, Men. 82e, 84a, Phd. 96c, Tht. 187c, 210c, Sph. 267e, Lg. 732a, Ep. VII 345b. 
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 For an inventory and discussion of these and other similar expressions, see Chap. 7, Sect. 1 below. 
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strongly hints – and at times even explicitly asserts – that all knowledge claims are false. The 
notion of μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ itself points to this defect, since it expresses – as we will see – a 
formal defect in our beliefs which opens the door to many errors and misunderstandings.
537
  
But let us start by isolating the neutral sense of μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ and see what it tells us 
about the particular structure of our access to beings in general. In order do this, we will first 
consider each component of the expression separately and then bring these components 
together and determine what results from their combination.  
 
2.2. The meaning of “νἴεζζαη” 
 
 Let us first consider the verb μἴεζεαζ as such, independently of its usage in the 
expression μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ (though its meaning by itself comes close to the latter). On the one 
hand, the verb denotes a certain decision, the adoption of a version of things without 
indecision. From a subjective standpoint, one is convinced of something. We can understand 
this better if we consider the fanciful etymology of the substantive μἴδζζξ in Cratylus (420c), 
which comes immediately after the etymology of δόλα and is presented as a confirmation of 
it. Socrates says that μἴδζζξ conveys “the motion (μἶζζξ) of the soul to every thing, towards 
how each of the things that really are is”.
538
 There is an alterity or otherness to which it is 
directed, a distance that must be overcome, and a movement towards it. The μἴδζζξ thus 
determines things as being in a certain way (μὕηςξ) and not otherwise (ἄθθςξ), which is very 
different from having no decision whatsoever.  
 However, at the heart of the term μἴεζεαζ lies the idea of cognitive debility or      
frailty – which can be translated by such expressions as “suppose”, “presume”, “think”, 
“believe”, “deem”, “have the impression”, “be of the opinion”. One establishes something, 
one is not totally confused about something, but this establishing can be wrong. It is not 
necessarily so. A supposition does not have a definite guarantee of its validity. What one 
“decides” lacks confirmation. It is intrinsically characterized by a modal weakness (or by a 
ἐκδέπεζεαζ ἄθθςξ ἔπεζκ). Οἴεζεαζ is thus a particular access to something that is not 
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 See in particular Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4, and Chap. 16, Sect. 5. 
538
 “἟ βμῦκ „μἴδζζξ‟ ημύηῳ ζοιθςκε῔. „μἶζζκ‟ βὰν η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ἐπὶ π᾵κ πν᾵βια, μἷόκ ἐζηζκ ἕηαζημκ η῵κ ὄκηςκ, 
δδθμύζῃ πνμζέμζηεκ (...)”. I follow C. Reeve‟s translation (see PCW). 
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absolutely certain and absolutely clear. There is not a solid or legitimate ground for one‟s 
conviction. It is not indubitable and irrefutable – even if it is experienced as such.
539
  
Oἴδζζξ or μἴεζεαζ thus denote a questionable or precarious conviction. This 
questionable or precarious character is expressed by all verbs of opinion (such as δμηε῔κ, 
἟βε῔ζεαζ, κμιίγεζκ, ἀλζμῦκ, ὏πμθαιαάκεζκ, πζζηεύεζκ and πείεεζεαζ), but in a way it is 
intensified by the particular nuances of the verb μἴεζεαζ. It has been noticed that μἴεζεαζ 
designates the adoption of a view based on subjective factors, as feeling or inclination, what 
strongly suggests an unreflected and hasty character. In contrast, the verb δμηε῔κ, as we saw, 
refers to the adoption of a view more based in what appears to us (thus having a more 
objective basis) and the verbs κμιίγεζκ, ἟βε῔ζεαζ and ἀλζμῦκ indicate a view that is based 
rather on evaluation or reflection. As for the verbs πζζηεύεζκ and πείεεζεαζ, they stress the 
conviction (the adherence to a view) and are neutral with respect to its reasons. The same 
holds for ὏πμθαιαάκεζκ.
540
 These differences, however, are very subtle and Plato does use all 
these terms somewhat interchangeably, especially because the impulsive and ungrounded 
nature of the μἴεζεαζ in a way characterizes all these verbs. It is also an essential component 
of the expression μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ, as we shall see. 
One important aspect to keep in mind about μἴεζεαζ, though, is that the frailty or 
deficiency of one‟s access may be recognized by the one who has it or by someone else. In 
other words, the one that presumes something may have different relations to this 
presumption and this is reflected in the use of the word. When one uses it of oneself and 
one‟s view, it can be just meant to soften an affirmation or claim, without any genuine 
admission of frailty (just like δμηε῔ ιμζ). It can also correspond to the admission of a merely 
academic possibility that one might be wrong, without producing any actual insecurity or 
doubt.
541
 However, the use of the verb μἴεζεαζ can also be the expression of a light doubt or 
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 In this sense, the verb seems to be sometimes associated with the domain that is intrinsically open or 
undetermined (at least from our point of view): the future. According to H. Liddell and R. Scott, the verb can 
mean “forebode”, “presage”, “suspect”, “fear”, “guess”, “mean”, “intend”. See A Greek-English Lexicon with a 




), sub voce μἴμιαζ. This shows an important aspect 
of the verb. Though it does not always (nor mostly) relate to the future, it is constitutively related to a domain 
that is outside of our immediate and perfect grasp, to which we are not totally oblivious and blind (we can 
anticipate something), but to which we do not have an unimpeded access either. 
540
 For a detailed analysis of the different nuances of these terms, see e.g. H. SCHMIDT, Synonymik der 
griechischen Sprache, vol. I, Leipzig, Teubner, 1876, 333ff. and P. HUART, Le vocabulaire de l’analyse 
psychologique dans l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, 242ff. 
541
 In this sense, the verb has a certain resemblance to several particles constantly used in the dialogues with the 
purpose of mitigating the strength of an assertion (e.g. βε, ζπεδόκ, πμο, πςξ). The translation of these particles is 
often difficult, because they do not intend to restrict the content of the affirmation (as is suggested when one 
renders them as “at least”, “in a way”), but rather the conviction one has about it or the assertiveness with which 
one affirms it. 
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even a strong suspicion and fear that one might be wrong.
542
 The degree of conviction or 
doubt may vary according to the situation and one‟s reflection about it – but even in the cases 
in which the doubt is stronger, there is still an adherence or commitment (even if 
accompanied by the awareness of the possibility that what one has is no more than a opinion). 
The matter is settled. One is not unsure to the point of undertaking a full inquiry of 
examination. In sum, μἴεζεαζ is always more than a mere academic hypothesis – but at the 
same time less than an effective or full εἰδέκαζ (whether one is aware of it or not). 
This conviction or certainty of the verb μἴεζεαζ is then particularly emphasized by the 
use of μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ in the corpus. When someone has a knowledge clam, he takes his view 
as absolutely certain and clear – so much so that it is virtually indiscernible from the 
conviction that characterizes knowledge. This is what motivates the characters to answer 
Socrates‟ questions and what causes them to roam about or ramble (πθακ᾵ζεαζ) when they 




2.3. The meaning of “εἰδέλαη” 
 
Let us now consider the second component of μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ. The verb εἰδέκαζ means 
“to know”. Now, Plato‟s analysis of knowledge is very complex, and we will have to see it in 
more detail later, while considering the cognitive nature of our soul.
544
 However, there are 
some aspects that we can anticipate in order to obtain a better understanding of the notion of 
“knowledge claim”. We can start by considering the verb εἰδέκαζ itself. As the infinitive form 
of the perfect tense of the verb εἴδς, which means “to see”, εἰδέκαζ conveys the idea of 
acquisition – of having seen something, having become acquainted with it and perhaps even 
having gained mastery over it. Seeing tends indeed to be regarded as the perfect access to 
something and all forms of appropriate access to something (whether sensible or not) tend to 
be compared to the act of seeing.
545
 This is all the more so in a culture which praises and 
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 Precisely what is expressed in Sophist 268a3-4: one has “πμθθὴκ ὏πμρίακ ηαὶ θόαμκ ὡξ ἀβκμε῔ ηαῦηα ἃ πνὸξ 
ημὺξ ἄθθμοξ ὡξ εἰδὼξ ἐζπδιάηζζηαζ”. This hesitation or restriction of one‟s commitment to a view is expressed 
in many other ways in the dialogues. One can for instance use “ἴζςξ”, “ηάπ‟ ἄκ”, “ηζκδοκεύεζ” or some form of 
“so it seems” (as θαίκεηαζ or ἔμζηεκ). 
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 For more on this last point, see Chap. 7, Sect. 1.2 a) and Chap. 8, Sect.1.5 below. 
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 Cp. Chap. 11, Sect. 2.2 c). 
545
 This is not exclusive of Greek culture. For instance, we find an expression of the same in Augustine‟s 
Confessiones. In X.35.54, Augustine says: “ad oculos enim proprie videre pertinet, utimur autem hoc verbo 
etiam in ceteris sensibus, cum eos ad cognoscendum intendimus. neque enim dicimus, „audi quid rutilet,‟ aut, 
„olefac quam niteat,‟ aut, „gusta quam splendeat,‟ aut, „palpa quam fulgeat‟: videri enim dicuntur haec omnia. 
dicimus autem non solum, „vide quid luceat,‟ quod soli oculi sentire possunt, sed etiam, „vide quid sonet,‟ „vide 
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privileges α὎ημρία (i.e., to the witnessing of something, to having direct, first-hand 
knowledge), in contrast with having heard something from others or having made a 
conjecture based on signs (which provides us only an indirect knowledge, at best). In courts, 
history, science, and life in general, having been present and having had something in front of 




Several features of vision contribute to this protagonism. In the Phaedrus, vision is 
considered the keenest sense and Aristotle says that vision, “most of all the senses, makes us 
know and brings to light many differences between things”.
547
 Vision has indeed a great 
scope, covers many things and can be very refined. In ideal conditions it can sweep an entire 
object or scene, without leaving out things and without failing to notice what is in front of it. 
In sum, it can grasp something. Of course it requires some conditions, and chief amongst 
them is light, which plays an important role in the appearing of things to us and, 
consequently, in the conception of knowledge and being.
548
 
It is true that this privilege of seeing and praise of α὎ημρία is not without opposition. 
Seeing with our physical eyes is also subject to many limitations and we find in Greek culture 
an elaborate criticism of seeing.
549
 Our eyes are not entirely reliable and can deceive us in 
                                                                                                                                                        
quid oleat,‟ „vide quid sapiat,‟ „vide quam durum sit.‟” Cp. L. VERHEIJEN (ed.), Sancti Augustini 
Confessionum libri XIII, Turnhout, Brepols, 1981. It is true that one can also use images from other forms of 
αἴζεδζζξ to express the idea of knowledge. We often find, inclusively in Plato, the image of touching, having 
contact, to express knowledge (in particular the full grasp of something). Hearing or listening can be used to the 
same effect (insofar as they correspond to an access to sounds, words and meaning in general). Later the 
Romans will resort to the metaphor of taste and use sapere for knowing. But seeing, with its emphasis on both 
presence and distance (insofar as the subject is separated from the object, but somehow reaches it), is by far the 
most natural and most used image for knowledge. 
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many ways. Sometimes, the conditions for seeing are not the best, other times, something (or 
someone) is disguised as something else, and there also many optical illusions. All this will 
lead to the philosophical criticism of seeing, which we also find throughout Plato‟s works.
550
 
We considered before how seeing or sensation (αἴζεδζζξ) in general is not enough to discern 
what beings are (nor to make mistakes about it). Beings are not purely sensible and the access 
to them thus requires an inner activity or an activity of the soul. It is on this other level that 
there can be a true seeing, a true insight into beings. This then leads to the Platonic idea of the 
soul‟s eye and to the characterization of one‟s intellect (κμῦξ) as a spectator.
551
 It is here and 
not in the senses that we can find a perfect access to what things truly are. 
These are just some aspects of Plato‟s analysis of knowledge. However, we have to 
bear in mind that εἰδέκαζ is only one of the several expressions that Plato uses to express the 
idea of knowledge. We also find βζβκώζηεζκ, ἐπίζηαζεαζ, ἐπαΐεζκ, ζμθία, ηέπκδ, ζοκζέκαζ, 
ιακεάκεζκ, θνμκε῔κ, κμε῔κ, among others. In Plato‟s writings, most of these expressions are 
no less frequent and no less important than εἰδέκαζ, and they are also used for knowledge 
claims as such. Much could be (and has been) said about the different contexts from which 
these expressions are taken.
552
 Γζβκώζηεζκ and κμε῔κ are also originally connected with vision 
and denote the adequate discernment of something (of who someone is or what is the 
meaning of a situation). ΢οκζέκαζ and ιακεάκεζκ emphasize our understanding of     
something – i.e., our ability to perceive the meaning of what is before us, what we hear or 
what we think about. Terms such as ἐπίζηαζεαζ, ἐπαΐεζκ, ζμθία, ηέπκδ include a practical or 
productive component and the idea of mastering something. Φνμκε῔κ was originally referred 
to a organ of consciousness (θνήκ) that was responsible for our awareness or lucidity and our 
appropriate reaction (emotional and active) to things around us.  
                                                                                                                                                        
ενοθμῦζζκ, ὅηζ μὔη᾽ ἀημύμιεκ ἀηνζαὲξ μ὎δὲκ μὔηε ὁν῵ιεκ;” One good example of this can be found in 
EPICHARMUS, DK B12, which says: “κμῦξ ὁν῅ζ ηαὶ κμῦξ ἀημύεζ· ηἆθθα ηςθὰ ηαὶ ηοθθά.” 
550
 Heraclitus, for instance, says: “ηαημὶ ιάνηονεξ ἀκενώπμζζζκ ὀθεαθιμὶ ηαὶ ὦηα ααναάνμοξ ροπὰξ ἐπόκηςκ” 
(DK B107). Plato himself points out the insufficiencies of seeing several times. Cp. e.g. Phd. 65b-66a, 79a, 79c, 
83a-b, Rep. 523a ff., Phlb. 38d ff. The whole discussion of the thesis that knowledge is sense-perception (Tht. 
151e ff.) can also be read as a criticism of seeing. See Tht. 151 ff. 
551
 See Rep. 533d and Phdr. 247c7-8, respectively. Cp. also Phd. 83b, where Socrates explicitly says that the 
ροπή sees something. 
552
 We will briefly return to these terms later, in Chap. 11, Sect. 2.2 c). For an analysis and comparison of their 
respective meanings, see e.g. H. SCHMIDT, Synonymik der griechischen Sprache, vol. 1, Leipzig, Teubner, 
1876, 282ff.; IDEM, vol. 3, 621ff.; B. SNELL, Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der 
vorplatonischen Philosophie. ΢μθία, βκώιδ, ζύκεζζξ, ἱζημνία, ιάεδια, ἐπζζηήιδ, Berlin, Weidmann, 1924; P. 
HUART, Le vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968,   
219-230, 236-242. 278-313; B. SNELL, Wie die Griechen lernten, was geistige Tätigkeit ist, The Journal of 
Hellenistic Studies 93 (1973), 172-184; W. SCHADEWALDT, Die Anfänge der Philosophie bei den Griechen, 
Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1978, 162-169, 171, 173-4, 177-180.  
184 
 
Based on this, we can get a better picture of what constitutes knowledge. At the center 
of the idea of knowledge there is the idea of reaching or grasping something fully. It is 
something that happens within us, but somehow allows an access to what is or exists. This 
allows for degrees – even if only a perfect access can be considered knowledge proper. This 
perfect knowledge includes different aspects, of which we normally only have a hazy notion. 
First, it must exclude any distortions and include all aspects of the thing. In other words, it 
must be acute and complete. It must also understand what it has access to. Its object cannot 
be an unsolvable mystery, for that would still be a form of eluding one‟s grasp. Knowledge 
proper must also be certain and effectively exclude the possibility of things being otherwise. 
It also contains a claim to universality: whoever wants to know things, must see them the 
same way. Knowledge must therefore be adequate, complete, clear and definite. This allows 
one to master one‟s object and deal properly with it. 
But despite all this, we also seem to admit the possibility of a weaker form of 
knowledge. Plato himself often uses qualifications as εὖ, ζαθώξ, ἀηνζα῵ξ to designate a 
superior form of knowledge, which suggests that there are other lesser forms. These are 
defective forms that fail to achieve the ideal of knowledge in some respect. They must 
contain some share of perfect contact with something in order to be taken as knowledge. 
There must be some component of hitting the mark, of what Plato calls δόλα ὀνεή.
553
 But 
there is also something that eludes this cognitive access and makes it imperfect and 
precarious. In a sense, it is even problematic whether it can be regarded as knowledge at all. 
On the other hand, it is also not certain that we can ever achieve anything more than this. In 
fact, when it is revealed that one does not possess perfect knowledge, one may still think one 
has correct δόλαζ (as is illustrated by the characters in the dialogues). But this raises the 
question of how can the correctness of one‟s views be verified, since such forms always 
include a degree of confusion or of uncertainty (or both).  
Plato is very attentive to these intermediate forms of cognitive access, but their 
meaning always depends on what knowledge proper is. One must primarily inquire what is 
contained in a perfect and full access to something and how can anyone reach it. At first, it is 
not easy to say more than what has just been said, and this is still very vague. Moreover, it is 
unclear whether we can ever conceive (much less reach) such an optimal cognitive state. 
Notwithstanding, we possess some formal notion of perfect knowledge (both of a particular 
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being or of all beings altogether) and we are in fact often convinced of having such a perfect 
knowledge, as we shall see. It is precisely this that corresponds to the notion of μἴεζεαζ 
εἰδέκαζ. Therefore, despite all difficulties in conceiving perfect knowledge (and despite all 
particularities of Plato‟s conception of it), we always have some hazy relation to this notion. 
This is what makes it indispensable for us. 
 
2.4. The meaning of “νἴεζζαη εἰδέλαη” 
 
 Philosophical examination is not simply an examination of presumptions or of 
knowledge, but rather of presumed knowledge or knowledge claims. In the dialogues, this 
presumption of knowledge (one‟s μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ) is often exposed as vain or baseless, as we 
will see.
554
 When submitted to the pressure of examination, the characters cannot explain and 
justify their views. This shows they did not have knowledge proper (and probably no 
knowledge at all). But nonetheless they had a conviction of possessing knowledge, which 
allowed them to mistake their false or inadequate views for knowledge. This is why they 
answer resolutely and why they end up falling into contradiction. From their subjective 
standpoint, the empty knowledge claim is indiscernible from knowledge. It is a conviction or 
belief as strong as knowledge. But it is still a presumption, an μἴδζζξ. It is a kind of access or 
awareness that is fallible or exposed to defects. It determines something in a certain way and 
determines our access to it as appropriate (as a cognitive access in the fullest sense of the 
word). The self-diagnosis is here decisive. We believe we know. We determine our own 
access (and the content that it gives access to) as being perfect, as reaching its object. We do 
not regard our representation as indeterminate or a mere conjecture. It is a perfect access, it 
has completely revealed how something is and the matter is settled. However, this             
self-diagnosis is itself precarious. It is no more than an μἴεζεαζ – i.e., an imperfect access. In 
sum, the terms of the expression μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ are thus at odds with each other. Insofar as it 
is a form of μἴεζεαζ, the knowledge claim is exposed to the possibility of it being otherwise 
(of us not knowing and thus of the object we think we know not being as we represent it). But 
to the extent that what we presume is the fact that we know, we do not experience any doubt 
nor any fear of being wrong. The restrictive component is not experienced as such. We are 
not astonished by something. We can determine it and what results from this act of 
determining it is regarded as absolutely valid, as corresponding to what the thing is. This does 
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not exclude that in certain cases we may be aware of the frailty of our views – and have some 
weaker form of knowledge claim. But Plato calls our attention particularly to those forms of 
knowledge claim in which there is no shadow of a doubt. 
Regardless of whether it is true or false, a knowledge claim is a form of conviction or 
belief and this conviction or belief is at the center of all knowledge claims. We could 
conceive a certain view without regarding it as knowledge, we could be cognitively humble, 
but we end up being rash and becoming convinced that we are perfectly aware of things, and 
that they are exactly as we represent them.
555
 This is by itself a form of defect, even if the 
view is not false, and it opens to door to the possibility of us missing what things are.
556
 A 
knowledge claim is different from perfect knowledge (which completely coincides with its 
object), although it is experienced as being precisely such a knowledge. As a result, the value 
of its content (what it determines or represents, the “thus” it posits and whose positing is 
taken to be knowledge) is intrinsically problematic. It can somehow correspond to what 
something is, but it can also be a deviation and deceive us. This indeterminateness with 
respect to its truth value is thus what justifies and calls for philosophical examination. 
It is important to bear in mind that our knowledge claims and their possible defects 
can fundamentally be of two sorts.
557
 They correspond roughly to the difference between 
attributing a predicate and understanding it. On the one hand, one can attribute a certain 
predicate to something and be certain that this attribution is correct, that it cannot be 
otherwise. For instance, one can be convinced that death is a bad thing. This attribution, 
however, may be wrong or we may have insufficient reasons for making it. One may have a 
baseless or unjustified certainty. On the other hand, one can be sure one understands what a 
certain predicate is (for instance, what is justice or goodness). This corresponds to the notion 
of μἴεζεαζ ζοκζέκαζ (sc. claim to understanding) and Plato often stresses its importance. All 
attribution of predicates depends on a previous understanding of what these predicates mean. 
We must be convinced we understand the alphabet of reality in order to read it. However, our 
claim to understanding some notion does not preclude the possibility that we do not really 
understand it. One can misunderstand it, one‟s notion may even be self-contradictory, or one 
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may have but a hazy understanding of what a certain predicate is, which is still incompatible 
with the nature of knowledge, since the latter requires a perfect and clear access to 
something. 
If we consider these two forms of knowledge claim, we can better understand how 
much our life is marked by them. But a knowledge claim as such raises the question of 
whether we effectively know or not know (i.e., if things really are as we think and if we 
really have reasons to think so). From an external and informed standpoint, the value of a 
knowledge claims is indeterminate. This should make us wonder how we can become 
convinced of knowing something when we may very well not know it. The perplexity is all 
the greater if we consider (as we will do in what follows) that most, if not all, of our life and 
our being is based on knowledge claims.
558
 In fact, their omnipresence and their 
defectiveness is a decisive factor in determining the importance of philosophical examination, 
as we shall see. 
 
3. The unitary object of examination 
 
 As was said, δόλα and μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ are two designations for the object of 
examination in the corpus. They designate fundamentally the same and complement each 
other. The analysis of their meaning thus reveals different important aspects of the object of 
examination. We saw how δόλα is connected with cognitive decisions or judgments, which 
have their own content or intentionality and may be true or false. The expression “μἴεζεαζ 
εἰδέκαζ”, in turn, stresses the conviction one has in a certain way of seeing things, which is 
regarded as a cognitive access to something. At their core, both notions refer to a certain way 
of seeing or determining something, a certain view, a version of things. This view or version, 
however, is frail and questionable in both cases – and it is precisely because of this that our 
judgments and knowledge claims warrant examination. Each of them can be a merely 
subjective version of things, without any objective or real basis. They may distort things, 
including others and ourselves. Anything and everything may be different from how it is 
conceived in a δόλα or a knowledge claim. 
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 But this is not the only relevant aspect of the object of examination. It is also 
important to bear in mind that there is a fundamental ambivalence in the way it was described 
in this chapter. There are many possible views – many possible judgments or knowledge 
claims. In other words, there are many incompatible versions of the same events. The domain 
of views is a domain of relativity. However, some views are installed in us. We are deeply 
persuaded of them and hold them for certain. They constitute our beliefs. Our relation to them 
is one of trust (πίζηζξ).
559
 Other views, in turn, are regarded by us as false or, at most, as 
having an indeterminate truth value.
560
 
  If we consider the notions of δόλα and μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ, we notice that they are 
described in the first person. Γόλα is the judgment made by a soul and the way things appear 
to it. Knowledge claims are the versions of events to which a soul is deeply committed. 
However, one can also be aware of views that one does not presently subscribe. They may be 
possessed by others, one can have endorsed them in the past or simply recognize them as 
valid alternatives to one‟s own. These other views are thus simply hypothetical. They still 
refer to one‟s beliefs, in the sense that they may become one‟s beliefs and they are possible 
beliefs. But they are also different from these beliefs, insofar as one‟s relation to them is 
concerned. 
 Views are thus mainly of two kinds. Both of them may be submitted to examination 
and there is indeed a certain tendency to equate all views and regard them in abstract. 
However, some views actually mould our gaze and experience. They are always present. All 
the other views are an abstraction, the projection of a possible conviction. Considering them 
is imagining ourselves (or someone in general) adopting them and seeing things through 
them. 
 This heterogeneity of views is also reflected in the corpus. Despite the myriad of 
views that could be examined, there is a strong tendency to privilege those in which someone 
actually believes, with the highest degree of conviction, setting aside or neglecting all other 
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possible or hypothetical views. If we look at the dialogues, we often see Socrates asking other 
characters to produce their own views on a certain topic and stand by them. They are to 
answer what they believe and render account of it.
561
 The examination has an extremely 
personal character and in this sense we could also say that the person is being examined 
together with the matter at hand. The examination is not primarily an examination of 
impersonal views in an impartial domain. Many decisions are already made and we cannot 
simply suspend our assent in order to critically evaluate all possible views. The convictions 
we have prevent us from adequately appraising other views. The examination must therefore 
begin with these beliefs and only afterwards, as one‟s beliefs have been rendered problematic 
or even refuted, does the examination broaden its scope. It can then consider all views in 
general, evaluate different hypotheses, explore different indications, and possibly adopt better 
views (views that are objectively grounded, that effectively give us access to reality). This is 
not the starting-point, but rather a stage of the examination that already requires much 
examination in order to be attained.
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 But this privilege of someone‟s beliefs is not the only criterion when it comes to 
decide which views are to be examined. As it happens, not all personal beliefs are at the same 
level. There is also a marked privilege of those that are more important for one‟s life – i.e., 
those that determine the situation one is in, how one lives and what is to be done. These 
beliefs may be more or less directly connected with the practical sphere. Some of them may 
be theoretical, but still have a decisive impact on how one lives. In fact, the privilege of the 
beliefs relevant for life raises the question of what exactly is relevant for how we live. But 
whatever the answer to this question may be, philosophical examination is always primarily 
concerned with one‟s life and because of this it can also be conceived as an examination of 
one‟s life (an ἔθεβπμξ ημῦ αίμο).
563
 
 In sum, the examination does not take place in an ethereal domain of possible views 
nor does it consider all matters with the same attention. It focuses above all on the surest and 
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most relevant views. These are the ones we are most concerned with and if they happen to be 
overturned, we will be more unsettled and will feel a greater need to inquire and seek out 
answers. 
 With all this we can thus understand what characterizes the object of examination, 
how it works as the unifying factor of the whole examination and also how this unity is 
compatible with the privilege of some questions. The examination is an examination of views 
and these are primarily the views we are committed to – i.e., our beliefs or convictions – and 
especially those beliefs of ours that are most relevant for how we live. It is important to 
recall, however, that this is far from being a restriction of philosophical domain to a very 
confined domain of reality. The views that are examined are not simply something in our 
head nor just one more thing among many other things. Our views determine everything   
else – or at least the way we experience all things, the whole of reality. From our own 
standpoint, there is nothing that is completely isolated from them. Consequently, 
philosophical examination concerns the whole of reality.  
 This description, however, still does not let us see how everything is mediated by our 
views. Therefore, we will consider in the next chapter the indications given by Plato about 






The different kinds of belief. Their modes of presence and the structures that 
determine their content 
 
 
   “Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée: car chascun pense en 
estre si bien pouruû, que ceux mesme qui sont les plus difficiles a contenter en 
toute autre chose, n‟ont point coustume d‟en desirer plus qu‟ils en ont.” 





 The analysis of the notions “δόλα” and “μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ” in the previous chapter was 
still quite abstract. We considered the general structure of our views and the fact that many of 
them are adopted by us and constitute our beliefs, but we did not discriminate the different 
kinds of belief we may have, which is also an important question. We must therefore try to 
differentiate our beliefs, and this is not an easy thing to do. In fact, there is a strong chance 
that we do not immediately recognize the quantity and complexity of our beliefs. To correct 
this is the purpose of this chapter. We will not carry out a full inventory. Instead, we will 
present a basic typology of our beliefs, identifying their main kinds according to two criteria 
of classification. The first criterion is their mode of presence or our awareness of them. The 
second criterion concerns the main structures of our beliefs or their modes of interconnection, 
which determine the particular content of these beliefs and make them much more complex 
than what we tend to think. With this we will better understand the challenges that a full 
examination of our beliefs must face. 
  
1. The different modes of presence of our beliefs. Explicit and implicit beliefs 
 
We will first consider the mode of presence of our beliefs – i.e., how manifest they are 
for us, how aware we are of them or what kind of contact we have with them. In brief, our 
beliefs can be explicit or express, but they can also be tacit or implicit. This is a fundamental 
distinction and, although Plato does not formulate it in such terms, he reveals an acute 
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awareness of it – so much so that this distinction determines both the dramatic presentation 
and the conception of philosophical examination we find in his writings. This does not mean 
that this distinction is absolutely clear and without problems. The tacit dimension in 
particular is not easy to identify and raises many questions about its nature and its contents. 
The interrelation and interchanges between both dimensions are also problematic. Therefore, 
we must consider this distinction in some detail, see what it entails and how it affects the 
project of philosophical examination. 
 
1.1. Our tendency to only recognize explicit beliefs 
 
 The description of δόλα and μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ can easily suggest that Plato has in mind 
the views or beliefs we identify when we explicitly think about something. These beliefs are 
in the spotlight of our mind. They are the focus of our attention. We are aware of their 
presence and content, as well as of our commitment to them. These beliefs, however, tend to 
be loose or unconnected. There are many things about which we have no explicit beliefs 
present in the spotlight. Thus, it may seem that the scope of examination is very limited. 
However, our perspectives are not confined to our explicit reflection about something. This is 
something we can easily recognize. We admit that our beliefs do not simply disappear when 
they are not under focus. There is some memory of them (or at least of many of them). In 
other words, it is as if there was a depository or storehouse where we keep the beliefs that 
come out of the spotlight. This is something normally out of sight, but we can still bring the 
beliefs back to the spotlight. In this sense, they are still our beliefs.  
 However, this idea of a depository of beliefs beneath the surface of our mind or out of 
the spotlight raises several questions. First, it is not clear what role these tacit or implicit 
beliefs play when they are tacit or implicit. Are they completely inert or do they still affect us 
in some way? As we will see, Plato is very aware of how deeply they can determine us. We 
can still be committed to them and see things according to them. Moreover, this model 
presupposes that they were once clearly formulated and then they were stored in some place 
where they are more or less easily accessible. We remember them, we remember the process 
that led to them and we can promptly bring them back in the spotlight. Even if in some cases 
we may need some time, these tacit views can be reconstructed in the explicit domain. 
However, things are actually more complicated. In many cases we cannot reconstruct these 
subterranean beliefs. More than that, there is even the possibility that some (if not many) of 
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our tacit beliefs were not originated by rigorous examinations done in the spotlight of our 
mind. If we have beliefs we are not aware of, it is possible that they had different sources. 
But this is a question we will leave aside for now. What we must consider is how there are 
beliefs in us that affect us even when we are not aware of them – or more precisely, how does 
Plato conceive of these kind of beliefs and how this determines Plato‟s understanding of the 
philosophical examination. By calling attention to one‟s tacit beliefs, Plato shows how we 
normally think we know much more than what we immediately think we know. Our beliefs 
are much more voluminous than what we tend to think. If this is not borne in mind, one 
introduces a strong deviation in the project of examination and leaves out what is actually the 
greatest and firmest part of our beliefs. 
 But how exactly is the existence of this kind of beliefs demonstrated and conceived in 
the corpus? And how does this affect Plato‟s notion of philosophical examination? 
 
1.2. Plato’s indirect demonstrations of the existence of tacit beliefs 
 
In the dialogues Socrates often calls his interlocutors‟ attention to certain facts that 
indicate that they have more knowledge claims than they would immediately admit. These 
facts concern the characters‟ attitudes or behaviors, sc. their deeds (ἔνβα) in the broadest 
sense. Socrates points to the practical domain (i.e., to something more than one‟s logical 
arguments and theoretical reflections) and argues that much (if not all) of what happens in 
this domain is only possible because one has certain beliefs. These beliefs, however, are often 
not in the spotlight of one‟s mind. One was not thinking about them, although one‟s attitude 
is an expression of them. In this sense, our attitude (or behavior) reveals that we have tacit 
beliefs and that these beliefs influence us. They are not just stored on our mind, but they can 
also be causing or underpinning our behavior.
565
  
This demonstration of the existence of implicit knowledge claims, however, has an 
indirect character. It does not immediately reveal which implicit knowledge claims one has 
and what their exact content is. It only aims at showing that these behaviors cannot be 
explained without beliefs and the explicit beliefs one has are often not enough to account for 
them. Thus, one discovers a different mode of belief present in one‟s everyday life. Of 
course, this does mean that our implicit knowledge claims are restricted to those identified in 
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 In general, Socrates tries to show this in order to elicit assertions from his interlocutors, who are thus 
prompted to express the tacit knowledge claims that justify their behavior and submit them to examination. In 
this way, he makes the examination all the more personal for them. 
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these indirect demonstrations. The latter only prove that in many occasions we have implicit 
beliefs which determine our way of seeing, our behavior and how we live. However, these 
beliefs may be much more numerous and in many cases they may not find such a direct 
expression. 
Let us then take a brief look at the several attitudes that betray the occurrence in us of 
an implicit modality of belief. 
 
a) Resolute action 
 
One of the most common ways in which Socrates demonstrates that someone has 
beliefs he may not be immediately aware of is by interrupting this person on the course of 
doing something and pointing to the very action he is about to undertake.
566
 In the Alcibiades 
I, the characters agree that we only attempt to do something when we think we know what we 
are doing.
567
 Our actions are based on knowledge claims and are not possible without it. If 
there were no knowledge claims, we would not know what to do and we would either be 
quiet or entrust the matter to others.
568
 This is particularly clear when something important is 
at stake or when one‟s action involves a serious risk.
569
 But the presence of knowledge claims 
characterizes all our actions, as can be seen by the fact that we usually act without hesitation 
and when we hesitate or experience some fear, this seems to be confined to very particular 
aspects. Most things are known (or so we think) and this is why we act.
570
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 This is the case in Alcibiades I, Euthyphro, Crito, as we saw in Chap. 4, Sect. 1.1. In a way, it is also what 
happens in the Theaetetus, since Socrates questions Theaetetus about something essential for his usual 
occupation – namely, learning. In other texts, Socrates puts to test someone‟s claim to competence (as in Ion, 
Protagoras or Gorgias, for instance) – which is also a way of interrupting one‟s actions to see what one is doing 
and why. 
567
 See 117d11-13: “[΢Ω.] Σόηε πμο ἐπζπεζνμῦιεκ πνάηηεζκ, ὅηακ μἰώιεεα εἰδέκαζ ὅηζ πνάηημιεκ; [AΛ.] καί.” 
Cp. Laws 727a-b: “α὎ηίηα πα῔ξ ε὎εὺξ βεκόιεκμξ ἄκενςπμξ π᾵ξ ἟βε῔ηαζ πάκηα ἱηακὸξ εἶκαζ βζβκώζηεζκ (...) ηαὶ 
πνμεοιμύιεκμξ ἐπζηνέπεζ πνάηηεζκ ὅηζ ἂκ ἐεέθῃ”.  
568
 See e.g. Alc. I, 117c9-d3: “[΢Ω.] Σί δ‟ εἰ ἐκ κδῒ πθέμζξ, ἆνα δμλάγμζξ ἂκ πόηενμκ πνὴ ηὸκ μἴαηα εἴζς ἄβεζκ ἠ 
ἔλς, ηαὶ ἅηε μ὎η εἰδὼξ πθακῶμ ἄκ, ἠ ηῶ ηοαενκήηῃ ἐπζηνέραξ ἂκ ἟ζοπίακ ἄβμζξ; [AΛ.] ηῶ ηοαενκήηῃ.”  
569
 On the matter of there being a risk (i.e., of ηζκδοκεύεζκ or παναηζκδοκεύεζκ), cp. e.g. Euthphr. 15d7 and La. 
187b1-3. 
570
 The way one‟s actions depend on one‟s knowledge claims is emphasized in several dialogues. Euthyphro, for 
instance, would not accuse his father of impiety if he did not think he knew for sure what is piety and impiety. 
See Euthphr. 15d4-e2: “εἰ βὰν ιὴ ᾔδδζεα ζαθ῵ξ ηό ηε ὅζζμκ ηαὶ ηὸ ἀκόζζμκ, μ὎η ἔζηζκ ὅπςξ ἄκ πμηε 
ἐπεπείνδζαξ ὏πὲν ἀκδνὸξ εδηὸξ ἄκδνα πνεζαύηδκ παηένα δζςηάεεζκ θόκμο (...)· κῦκ δὲ εὖ μἶδα ὅηζ ζαθ῵ξ μἴεζ 
εἰδέκαζ ηό ηε ὅζζμκ ηαὶ ιή.” Laches and Nicias would not advise his friends on the good and bad occupations for 
a young man if they were not convinced of knowing it adequately (cp. La. 186c8-d3). Alcibiades would not 
want to talk in the Assembly if he did not assume he knows something better than the other members of the 
Assembly (see Alc. I 106c4-d1). Indeed, the fact that this is someone who played such a decisive role in the 
history of Athens shows how, according to Plato, the destiny of an entire people may be decided based on 
someone‟s knowledge claims. 
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Plato‟s dialogues develop this idea that our action and our life in general are guided 
by our knowledge claims.
571
 The set of knowledge claims that guide our actions is very 
complex and if we were cross-examined about it we would not be able to immediately 
produce everything that leads us to act in a certain way. Plato normally focus on central 
elements of this set of knowledge claims, especially the knowledge claims relative to what 
the good is or what excellence (ἀνεηή) is. But we require much more to act. We need to 
determine our present circumstances, the courses of action available, how they can be 
pursued, what their worth is, how they relate to goodness and excellence, and so on. Certain 
actions or courses of action may even require expert or superlative knowledge (ηέπκδ or 
ζμθία). But even the simplest acts presuppose many beliefs. They are what allows us to act 
with confidence and not stay frozen in ἀπμνία, without knowing what to do.   
This does not imply, however, that we must be reflecting on all that is necessary to 
determine our action. In fact, most relevant beliefs are automatically and silently active in us. 
Only in rare occasions are we forced to really think through what we are about to do (and 
even then we may simply assume many things). Normally we just act and do not need to 
think about what we think we know. The knowledge claims are simply expressed in our 






Not only are our active moments influenced by undeclared knowledge claims. Also 
our passive moments (our affects or emotions) are often grounded on knowledge claims of 
which we may not be expressly aware. We find a good illustration of this in the Apology, 
when Socrates discusses one of the strongest emotions we are exposed to: the fear of death. 
He argues that such a fear is not something instinctive, but rather based on knowledge claims 
about the nature and worth of life and death. This is why one can also desire to die (for 
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 For more on this, see Chap. 12 Sect. 5 below. Cp. also Chap. 13 Sect. 6.2, and Chap. 16 Sect. 2.1.  
572
 It is interesting to note that Aristotle likewise resorts to this kind of argument in his demonstration of what 
was later to be called the principle of contradiction. According to him, any definite perspective cannot at the 
same time posit and remove (assert or deny) a particular reality. In other words, our views are determined in a 
certain way and not another. This is then demonstrated (among other things) by the fact that we act in a certain 
manner. See Metaphysica 1008b14-23: “δζὰ ηί βὰν ααδίγεζ Μέβανάδε ἀθθ᾽ μ὎π ἟ζοπάγεζ, μἰόιεκμξ ααδίγεζκ 
δε῔κ; μ὎δ᾽ε὎εέςξ ἕςεεκ πμνεύεηαζ εἰξ θνέαν ἠ εἰξ θάναββα, ἐὰκ ηύπῃ, ἀθθὰ θαίκεηαζ ε὎θααμύιεκμξ, ὡξ μ὎π 
ὁιμίςξ μἰόιεκμξ ιὴ ἀβαεὸκ εἶκαζ ηὸ ἐιπεζε῔κ ηαὶ ἀβαεόκ; δ῅θμκ ἄνα ὅηζ ηὸ ιὲκ αέθηζμκ ὏πμθαιαάκεζ ηὸ δ᾽ μ὎ 
αέθηζμκ. εἰ δὲ ημῦημ, ηαὶ ηὸ ιὲκ ἄκενςπμκ ηὸ δ᾽ μ὎η ἄκενςπμκ ηαὶ ηὸ ιὲκ βθοηὺ ηὸ δ᾽ μ὎ βθοηὺ ἀκάβηδ 
὏πμθαιαάκεζκ. μ὎ βὰν ἐλ ἴζμο ἅπακηα γδηε῔ ηαὶ ὏πμθαιαάκεζ, ὅηακ μἰδεεὶξ αέθηζμκ εἶκαζ ηὸ πζε῔κ ὕδςν ηαὶ ἰδε῔κ 
ἄκενςπμκ εἶηα γδηῆ α὎ηά· ηαίημζ ἔδεζ βε, εἰ ηα὎ηὸκ ἤκ ὁιμίςξ ηαὶ ἄκενςπμξ ηαὶ μ὎η ἄκενςπμξ.”   
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instance, to save someone else, because one does not want to live, etc.) or be serene in face of 
death (as Socrates is in Crito and Phaedo).
573
 Everything hinges on our beliefs. If we regard 
death as evil and life as good, then we think it is better to live than to die and we fear death. 
Likewise, someone who believes that death is good and life is evil will gladly die. But if 
these matters are undetermined, one does not know how to react to the possibility of dying 
and will likely only suffer the disturbance caused by this very indeterminacy.
574
 
The relation between our views and our emotions is also made explicit in several other 
passages in the corpus. Most decisive in this respect are the analyses of false pleasures in 
Philebus.
575
 In them Socrates shows how our pleasures (and also our pains or sufferings) are 
based on three kinds of δόλαζ: the δόλαζ about the reality in which we take pleasure 
(especially the ones about what we expect will happen), the δόλαζ about the comparative 
intensity of our emotions (how they relate to other emotions we remember or expect to have) 
and also the δόλαζ about what pleasure is.
576
 All these judgments determine how we actually 
feel – but we do not need to think about them to feel what we feel. Usually none of these 





c) Using language 
 
Our knowledge claims are also revealed by our use of language. In Alcibiades I, 
Socrates is sure that, as a child, Alcibiades already thought he knew what justice was, since 
                                                 
573
 See e.g. Cri. 43b, Phd. 58e-59a, 115c-116a. 
574
 It is an indeterminacy of this sort that is expressed in the final words of the Apology. Socrates says in 42a: 
“ἀθθὰ βὰν ἢδδ ὥνα ἀπζέκαζ, ἐιμὶ ιὲκ ἀπμεακμοιέκῳ, ἟ι῔κ δὲ αζςζμιέκμζξ· ὁπόηενμζ δὲ ἟ι῵κ ἔνπμκηαζ ἐπὶ 
ἄιεζκμκ πν᾵βια, ἄδδθμκ πακηὶ πθὴκ ἠ ηῶ εεῶ.” However, Socrates‟ view is supposedly much more determined. 
He believes he is going to a better place – and hence his peaceful relation with death (his ῥᾳδίςξ ηαὶ πνᾴςξ 
θένεζκ, as it is said in Cri. 43b8). 
575
 See 36c ff. 
576
 To this we must still add the kind of δόλα which is mentioned in Phlb. 21c4-5, which allows us to be aware 
of the pleasure we are feeling as such. How this δόλα relates to the three mentioned, however, is not made clear 
in the dialogue. 
577
 Sometimes these feelings are even totally unexpected from the standpoint of our explicit views and seem to 
go against what we think we should be feeling. This does not mean they are not the result of our beliefs. What 
happens is that we have two kinds of beliefs which in this case are in conflict and have different degrees of 
strength, so that one of them overcomes the other. At least this is what we might conclude from what is said in 
the texts. Plato‟s conception of our emotions provides us with an interesting framework to interpret them and it 
also raises some interesting questions. For instance, are all our emotions dependent on our knowledge claims? 
And what kind of dependency are we talking about? Do they depend on knowledge claims to appear to us as 
emotions or to constitute themselves as emotions? Or are the emotions themselves a knowledge claim, namely a 
knowledge claim regarding what we feel? On the other hand, is it the case that only some knowledge claims 
produce emotions, or do they all have an emotional dimension (though we often do not notice it)? We find some 
indications in Plato‟s texts about these questions, but this is not the place to discuss them in depth. 
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he would sometimes accuse other children of “doing injustices” or “cheating” (the verb is 
ἀδζηε῔κ) – and this could only happen if he thought he understood what these words meant (or 
more precisely, what ἀδζηία and δζηή mean).
578
 This claim to understanding (μἴεζεαζ 
ζοκζέκαζ) is also something that the questioner (usually Socrates) evokes at the outset of some 
examinations, asking if his interlocutor understands something by this or that term, if it has 
some particular and definite meaning for him, or if he uses that term to designate some 
specific thing.
579
 This points to the fact that words or ὀκόιαηα in our mother tongue do not 
appear to us as simple noise, lacking all meaning (as is the case when we hear an unknown 
language).
580
 They mean something and refer to some particular reality. Better still, we think 
we understand what they mean. Otherwise, language and our capacity of conversing with 
each other would be annihilated.
581
 
 Language is thus based on many beliefs (or many claims of understanding) that define 
the meaning the terms have for us. This does not mean, however, that we are constantly 
thinking about their meaning nor does it imply that we can easily define these words. We do 
not require a transparent and articulate understanding of all that is implied in the meaning of a 
word in order to to use it. This is due to the fact that the cognitive claim that supports it is 
usually implicit. We understand tacitly what words mean and simply use them. This tacit 
understanding is precisely what is invoked at the beginning of some examinations, when 
someone refers to our use of a word. This does not mean that the matter being examined only 
concerns language. What is at issue is not a linguistic problem, but rather an ontological and 
epistemological one, which concerns the reality in question and the views we have of it. This 
is so because the understanding that enables us to use language is also what enables us to 
interpret what appears to us. Our claims to understanding the meaning of general predicates 
                                                 
578
 See 110a-b: “(...) [΢Ω.] ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ηό βε πνὸ ημῦ πα῔ξ ἤζεα. ἤ βάν; [ΑΛ.] καί. [΢Ω.] ηόηε ιὲκ ημίκοκ εὖ μἶδα 
ὅηζ ᾤμο εἰδέκαζ. [ΑΛ.] π῵ξ εὖ μἶζεα; [΢Ω.] πμθθάηζξ ζμῦ ἐκ δζδαζηάθςκ ἢημομκ παζδὸξ ὄκημξ ηαὶ ἄθθμεζ, ηαὶ 
ὁπόηε ἀζηναβαθίγμζξ ἠ ἄθθδκ ηζκὰ παζδζὰκ παίγμζξ, μ὎π ὡξ ἀπμνμῦκημξ πενὶ η῵κ δζηαίςκ ηαὶ ἀδίηςκ, ἀθθὰ ιάθα 
ιέβα ηαὶ εανναθέςξ θέβμκημξ πενὶ ὅημο ηύπμζξ η῵κ παίδςκ ὡξ πμκδνόξ ηε ηαὶ ἄδζημξ εἴδ ηαὶ ὡξ ἀδζημ῔· ἠ μ὎η 
ἀθδε῅ θέβς;” 
579
 We find formulations such as: “ηαθε῔ξ ηζ ἀθδε῅ θέβεζκ ηαὶ ρεοδ῅;” (Cra. 385b2), “ζςθνμζύκδκ ηζ ηαθε῔ξ ηαὶ 
δζηαζμζύκδκ ηαὶ ἀκδνείακ ηαὶ ε὎ιαείακ ηαὶ ικήιδκ ηαὶ ιεβαθμπνέπεζακ ηαὶ πάκηα ηὰ ημζαῦηα;” (Men.        
88a7-88b1), “ἐπζζηήιδκ πμο ηαθε῔ξ ηζ;” (Grg. 495c3-4), “ὂκ ηαθε῔ηέ ηζ;” (Sph. 244b12), “Ἆν‟ μὖκ θέβμιέκ ηζ 
δόλακ εἶκαζ;” (R. 477b3). 
580
 In the Theaetetus, Socrates actually uses the example of language to try to show that our access to things is 
more than simple αἴζεδζζξ. We hear known and unknown languages alike, but the former we can understand, 
whereas the latter we cannot. It is therefore manifest that our contact with a known language includes a 
component of discerning its meaning. Cp. 163b f. 
581
 The passage in Prm. 135b5ff. also alludes to this, if we bear in mind that this understanding of terms is 
associated with what Plato calls εἴδδ. For this association, see Sect. 2.2 below. 
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affect and shape everything we see and come in contact with. In this sense, they are also 
decisive in determining our actions and feelings, as was indicated above.   
 
d) Profession of knowledge (θάζθεηλ εἰδέλαη) 
 
Our actions, feelings and language demonstrate that our beliefs are much more 
pervasive and voluminous than what we usually think. Many of them are tacit and exert a 
tacit influence on our life without requiring that we think about them. But this does not mean 
that we cannot ever be aware of them. It is possible for us to relate to them in a hazy manner, 
without having them clearly articulated in our mind. This is illustrated in the dialogues, when 
the characters explicitly claim or affirm that they possess knowledge (θάζηεζκ or θάκαζ 
εἰδέκαζ) – especially when they profess having some extraordinary competence they want to 
display.
582
 In a first moment, they have not yet put forward any views and are not yet 
explicitly thinking about all they profess to know – but they already have some explicit 
relation to it. They are in the antipodes of Socrates‟ usual attitude of disclaiming any 
knowledge.
583
 These characters feel they have authority to speak about a subject, they speak 
bravely about it, and after doing so they are convinced of having spoken well.
584
 
This boasting, however, is not limited to the moments when a character thinks he has 
spoken well. Even when these characters do not seem to be able to answer a question and 
their knowledge is thereby rendered doubtful, they can still feel confident. They can keep 
affirming that they know and that all that is required is to keep inquiring. The difficulty 
seems to be circumstantial and it is not enough for one to be convinced of one‟s ignorance. 
Thus, one finds oneself in the curious and paradoxical situation of affirming to know without 
being able to articulate this knowledge.
585
 One has an explicit relation with an alleged 
                                                 
582
 For the notions of θάζηεζκ εἰδέκαζ and θάκαζ εἰδέκαζ, cp. Euthphr. 13e, Rep. 338a, 344e. The profession of 
competence is the basis of dialogues such as Laches, Ion, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Gorgias and 
Protagoras. 
583
 Cp. Rep. 337e4ff.: “Π῵ξ βὰν ἄκ, ἔθδκ ἐβώ, ὦ αέθηζζηε, ηὶξ ἀπμηνίκαζημ πν῵ημκ ιὲκ ιὴ εἰδὼξ ιδδὲ θάζηςκ 
εἰδέκαζ (...)· ἀθθὰ ζὲ δὴ ι᾵θθμκ εἰηὸξ θέβεζκ· ζὺ βὰν δὴ θῂξ εἰδέκαζ ηαὶ ἔπεζκ εἰπε῔κ”. See also Chrm. 165b5ff.: 
“Ἀθθ‟, ἤκ δ‟ ἐβώ, ὦ Κνζηία, ζὺ ιὲκ ὡξ θάζημκημξ ἐιμῦ εἰδέκαζ πενὶ ὧκ ἐνςη῵ πνμζθέθῃ πνόξ ιε, ηαὶ ἐὰκ δὴ 
αμύθςιαζ, ὁιμθμβήζμκηόξ ζμζ· ηὸ δ‟ μ὎π ὅοηςξ ἔπεζ, ἀθθὰ γδη῵ βὰν ιεηὰ ζμῦ ἀεὶ ηὸ πνμηζεέιεκμκ δζὰ ηὸ ιὴ 
α὎ηὸξ εἰδέκαζ. ζηεράιεκμξ μὖκ ἐεέθς εἰπε῔κ εἴηε ὁιμθμβ῵ εἴηε ιή.” 
584
 They are in a condition similar to the one of Meno‟s slave, about whom Socrates says (referring to what 
initially happened when the slave was questioned about geometry): “(...) ηόηε δὲ ῥᾳδίςξ ἂκ ηαὶ πνὸξ πμθθμὺξ 
ηαὶ πμθθάηζξ ᾤεη‟ ἂκ εὖ θέβεζκ πενὶ ημῦ δζπθαζίμο πςνίμο, ὡξ δε῔ δζπθαζίακ ηὴκ βναιιὴκ ἔπεζκ ιήηεζ.” See 
84b. 
585
 This does not imply that we do not have any knowledge claims when there is no θάζηεζκ εἰδέκαζ and we 
humbly acknowledge our ignorance and incapacity to talk about some matter. The disavowal of knowledge or 
profession of ignorance can be deceitful (either with intent to deceive the others or because we deceive 
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knowledge that cannot be articulated. This shows that we can have an explicit diagnosis of 
our perspective that goes beyond what we already formulated for ourselves or others. We are 
not totally distracted from our implicit knowledge claims – though we normally do not pay 
much attention to them. 
This explicit awareness of implicit knowledge claims can manifest itself in several 
ways, but often it seems to imply a general conviction of knowledge that does not specify all 
its elements. This is certainly the case in the profession of expert knowledge. Many views 
may be contained therein, but one is not aware of each one of them at all times. The same 
may happen with any particular belief of ours that is supported by other beliefs. We may be 
aware of it as a conclusion without having in mind all the other beliefs that contribute to it. 
As we will see, this kind of distraction plays a very important role in our life and Plato‟s 




e) Not inquiring 
 
Despite all these beliefs, we often undergo the experience of thinking we do not know 
something or thinking we might be wrong about it. In such cases, we are not necessarily 
condemned to ignorance. Our views may be corrected and expanded. This can happen either 
by finding something out by ourselves or by learning it from someone else.
587
 But neither of 
these two things happen of its own accord, without us doing something to cause them. This is 
what Socrates points to when he asks Alcibiades: “Could you ever have learned or found out 
anything without wanting to learn it or work it out (γδηε῔κ) for yourself?”
588
 Perhaps we can 
discover errors without taking any initiative, but listening to someone or trying to see new 
angles to a problem requires an effort from us. We must inquire into the matter, seek out 
answers. In turn, this effort (the attempt to discover or learn) is not possible if we are already 
                                                                                                                                                        
ourselves). We may still have implicit knowledge claims. This also makes Socrates‟ disavowal of knowledge 
highly problematic. However, this is not the place to tackle this question. 
586
 See in particular the analysis of the notion of ὏πόεεζζξ in Sect. 1.3a) below. 
587
 Plato sometimes mentions discovery and learning as two possibilities of acquiring knowledge, but they are 
also two ways of acquiring knowledge claims. See e.g. Alc. I 106d: “[΢Ω.] Ο὎ημῦκ ηαῦηα ιόκμκ μἶζεα, ἃ παν‟ 
ἄθθςκ ἔιαεεξ ἠ α὎ηὸξ ἐλδῦνεξ; [ΑΛ.] Πμ῔α βὰν ἄθθα;” See also La. 186a-187a, where this alternative is 
repeatedly referred to. This disjunction does not imply that discovering and learning cannot be combined. But 
they are nonetheless two different sources of views. 
588
 See 106d: “Ἔζηζκ μὖκ ὅπςξ ἄκ πμηε ἔιαεέξ ηζ ἠ ἐλδῦνεξ ιήηε ιακεάκεζκ ἐεέθςκ ιήη‟ α὎ηὸξ γδηε῔κ;” I follow 





 It is necessary that we stop thinking we know in order to feel the need 
to inquire something. Otherwise, there is no pressure to seek something out.
590
 
This lack of pressure to inquire (or, as we could also say, to examine) is what 
normally characterizes us. Even if we admit that we do not know and then make some 
inquiries, it is easy to recognize that we could be much more engaged in the search for 
knowledge than we actually are. For the most part, we renounce the search for more 
knowledge. This could mean that we are totally indifferent about knowing or not knowing the 
things we do not inquire about. However, as was said above, our action, feelings and even our 
speaking require many knowledge claims. We need elucidation about many things and yet, in 
many cases, we have no explicit beliefs about them. If all our beliefs were explicit, then it 
seems we would long for knowledge in all these matters and, consequently, spend much time 
inquiring them. But we do not. This means we do not regard ourselves as indigent in 
cognitive matters. We have some cognitive wealth that is hidden from sight. In other words, 
we already think we know enough (i.e., we have a claim of ἱηακ῵ξ εἰδέκαζ).
591
 It is enough 
for our practical needs. This is why we do not consume our lives inquiring everything we 
need to know or searching for someone to teach us.
592
 We have many tacit knowledge claims 
and they effectively render any inquiry otiose or moot in our own eyes.
593
 It does not even 
occur to us that we could examine these matters. 
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 See Alc. I 106d: [΢Ω.] “἞εέθδζαξ ἂκ γδη῅ζαζ ἠ ιαεε῔κ ἃ ἐπίζηαζεαζ ᾤμο;” [ΑΛ.] Ο὎ δ῅ηα.” Cp. likewise 
Meno 84c: “Οἴεζ μὖκ ἂκ α὎ηὸκ πνόηενμκ ἐπζπεζν῅ζαζ γδηε῔κ ἠ ιακεάκεζκ ημῦημ ὃ ᾤεημ εἰδέκαζ μ὎η εἰδώξ, πνὶκ 
εἰξ ἀπμνίακ ηαηέπεζεκ ἟βδζάιεκμξ ιὴ εἰδέκαζ, ηαὶ ἐπόεδζεκ ηὸ εἰδέκαζ;” 
590
 As Plato says in Smp. 204a, while discussing what philosophizing (sc. desiring to be ζμθόξ) consists in: 
“μὔημοκ ἐπζεοιε῔ ὁ ιὴ μἰόιεκμξ ἐκδεὴξ εἶκαζ μὗ ἂ ιὴ μἴδηαζ ἐπζδε῔ζεαζ.” Indeed, the act of seeking out (γδηε῔κ) 
mentioned in Alcibiades I is only possible if one recognizes a lack, if one thinks there is something missing. 
This is what put us on the track of what is lacking, what mobilizes and guides us – and consequently this is what 
opens the possibility of finding out what is missing. 
591
 Cp. La. 186d. 
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 If we did not already have many knowledge claims, we would be required to search everything we need to 
know as exhaustively as Socrates advises his friends to do in Phd. 78a, regarding the need to convince 
themselves that the ροπή is immortal. Socrates says: “Πμθθὴ ιὲκ ἟ ἗θθάξ, ἔθδ, ὦ Κέαδξ, ἐκ ᾗ ἔκεζζί πμο 
ἀβαεμὶ ἄκδνεξ, πμθθὰ δὲ ηαὶ ηὰ η῵κ ααναάνςκ βέκδ, μὓξ πάκηαξ πνὴ δζενεοκ᾵ζεαζ γδημῦκηαξ ημζμῦημκ ἐπῳδόκ, 
ιήηε πνδιάηςκ θεζδμιέκμοξ ιήηε πόκςκ, ὡξ μ὎η ἔζηζκ εἰξ ὅηζ ἂκ ε὎ηαζνόηενμκ ἀκαθίζημζηε πνήιαηα. γδηε῔κ δὲ 
πνὴ ηαὶ α὎ημὺξ ιεη‟ ἀθθήθςκ· ἴζςξ βὰν ἂκ μ὎δὲ ῥᾳδίςξ εὕνμζηε ι᾵θθμκ ὏ι῵κ δοκαιέκμοξ ημῦημ πμζε῔κ.” Such 
an expedition throughout Greece and all other lands, without caring about the cost and energy required, is 
something we considered ourselves exempt or excused from. We feel entitled to act or think because we already 
possess everything we need. We already think we know enough. 
593
 This also expresses the paradoxical condition of the Platonic ἐλέηαζζξ itself as a form of inquiring. The 
philosophical examination tests our knowledge claims and this means that such an examination has as its object 
what usually renders most examination useless in our own eyes. Our knowledge claims are indeed the basis of 
the unexamined life and without them this life would not be sustainable. For more on this, cp. Chap. 16 below.  
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g) A life without implicit knowledge claims 
 
 The facts of our life just considered reveal the importance of tacit beliefs. At any 
given moment, we have only a small raft of explicit beliefs to hold on to (to use the metaphor 
from Phaedo) and we require much more.
594
 Thus, if all we had were the views that are in the 
spotlight of our mind, everything would be very different for us. We would hesitate much 
more in our actions and be often paralyzed. We would be much more uncertain about how to 
feel. We would also have many more doubts about the language we speak and the terms we 
use. We would need much more reflection to act, to feel, and to speak. We would also be 
more unsure about our own knowledge and qualifications. Consequently, we would have to 
inquire or examine much more than we do. 
 This shows how explicit beliefs are insufficient for us to live as we do. We need to 
have other beliefs actively shaping our way of seeing things and affecting that of which we 
are most immediately aware. The precise way in which these tacit beliefs interfere in what 
happens in the spotlight of the mind may not be easy to explain, but we can notice the effects 
of these beliefs in our life nonetheless.  
 
1.3. The Platonic understanding of the tacitness and explicitness of our beliefs 
 
 What we just saw shows how the discussions in the Platonic corpus refer not only to 
explicit, but also to implicit beliefs. Our beliefs can be present in us in two different ways or 
we can relate to them in two different ways – or perhaps even more, if we consider that there 
can be many intermediate or mixed forms between these two extremes (namely, the 
absolutely tacit and the fully explicit). We will, however, focus our attention on the extremes. 
To a certain extent, they have a similar structure. They both correspond to the description 
made above of our δόλαζ and our knowledge claims. They both correspond to a certain way 
of seeing things or determining them. But despite their similarity, they also have a different 
constitution, which raises the question of whether this difference also affects their content 
(i.e., the representation of things as being “thus and not otherwise”) in some way. Moreover, 
this difference also makes us wonder how these two forms of belief are combined within us 
and how their combination constitutes our whole experience of things and ourselves.  
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In order to define both these kinds of belief and their interrelation, we will consider 
some important indications given in Plato‟s writings and see what we can infer from them. 
We will begin by defining with greater precision the nature of the tacit or implicit beliefs, 
which considerably differ from our most immediate conception of what a belief is, and then 
we will reconsider the explicit beliefs in light of this background of tacit beliefs. Finally, we 
will define the continuity and the interactions between both domains. 
 
a) The tacit or implicit beliefs in light of Plato’s notion of ὑπόζεζηο in the 
Republic  
 
 As was shown, we have δόλαζ or knowledge claims that are implicit, tacit, inarticulate 
or athematic. At any given moment, there are many beliefs active in us of which we are not 
clearly aware. Their presence, quantity and content are essentially unclear (ἀζαθήξ) to us. 
However, this does not detract anything from their effectiveness. On the contrary, the lack of 
awareness can even make them more firm, since it prevents us from seeing them in detail, 
putting them in question, and comparing them with alternative perspectives. For the most part 
they remain unopposed in the way they shape our experience and how we see things. They 
determine us in a silent, compact, and hazy manner. However, their effectiveness also gives 
us the possibility of gaining some form of awareness of them (as was just seen) and even the 
possibility of reflecting about their structure. The latter is what we must now consider.  
Despite all the arguments that can be found in the corpus to show that there are beliefs 
in us of which we may not be immediately aware, we find no express notion of tacit belief as 
such in the texts. In some passages Plato speaks of silent δόλαζ, but the description only 
implies that one does not speak them out loud.
595
 One can still be fully aware of them and of 
their content. However, despite the lack of an express concept of tacit belief, the dialogues 
are constantly aware of this kind of belief. This can be seen in the moments in which Socrates 
requests his interlocutors to express their actual views, to bring them to light and not hide 
them – especially after failing to do so at a first attempt.
596
 Although Socrates in many cases 
interprets the situation with some irony and acts as if the others were purportedly withholding 
these views from him, his demand for honesty raises the possibility that they are also 
somehow hiding these views from themselves and have to make an effort to focus them, in 
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 See e.g. Sph. 264a and Phlb. 38e. 
596
 See e.g. Euthphr. 11b and 15e. 
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order to submit them to examination. It is precisely in this context that appear most of the 
arguments considered above for the existence of tacit knowledge claims in us. 
There is, however, one notion in the Platonic corpus that does not refer exclusively to 
tacit beliefs, but still lets us better understand not only the nature of our tacit beliefs, but also 
the way they are normally presented during the examinations portrayed in the dialogues. This 
notion is the notion of ὏πόεεζζξ as it is used and defined in the analogy of the divided line in 
the Republic. Although this usage of the word is rarely found in other passages (indeed, Plato 
normally uses ὏πόεεζζξ and ὏πμηίεεζεαζ in a different sense), it actually designates 
something which is found throughout the corpus.   
Let us start with the general meaning of the word ὏πόεεζζξ. There are two main 
nuances in the term, both deriving from the prefix. A εέζζξ is the positing of a certain view, a 
certain version of things, a way of determining them as being thus and not otherwise. A 
὏πόεεζζξ is then a view that underpins or is a basis for another view. In this sense, it is 
particularly used in deductive contexts to designate premises from which something results 
(ζοιααίκεζ). It may also designate a general principle from which a whole system of 
knowledge is unfolded. More broadly, it may simply designate something that is presupposed 
in something else or relevant for determining it, even if this something else is not entirely 
derived from it. The latter possibility is particularly relevant if we consider the complexity of 
our views and how they are often intertwined, affecting each other (even if in many cases we 
do not notice this intertwinement and take things as being simple).
597
 In addition to this 
function of support for another positing or view, the notion of ὏πόεεζζξ can also be associated 
with a defective kind of positing – a positing that is uncertain, that is not yet sufficiently 
justified. Things may be otherwise.
598
 
This basic meaning can then be applied to two different things. On the one hand, it 
can designate explicit assumptions, especially in a deductive context. These ὏πμεέζεζξ are 
something of which one is fully aware and which one decides to posit. Often they are also 
acknowledged as uncertain and only provisionally posited. Consequently, the Greek term can 
correspond to the usage of “hypothesis” in English. It is something provisionally admitted 
and thus it implies no conviction or knowledge claim. It allows one to explore possibilities, 
see the consequences of a certain view, assess its strength and eventually decide the matter at 
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 We will see in detail this intertwinement of our views or beliefs in Sect. 2 below. 
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 The definition of ὏πόεεζζξ we find in the pseudo-Platonic Definitiones (415b10) expresses these two aspects 
by saying that a ὏πόεεζζξ is an ἀνπὴ ἀκαπόδεζηημξ.  
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hand. Plato also employs the term in this sense.
599
 But the term is not confined to this sense 
and Plato also uses it to designate what we may call implicit or tacit assumptions – i.e., 
὏πμεέζεζξ of which we are not aware (which we did not decide to posit, whose content is not 
something we have thought about), but nonetheless underpin something else. In contrast with 
the explicit assumptions, the tacit assumptions are not recognized as such and thus also not 
recognized as uncertain and provisional, despite all the errors or defects they may conceal. 
They are taken as absolutely evident and can therefore be described as tacit or implicit 
beliefs. 
This usage of the term designates something that we find throughout the corpus. 
When reflecting on a question and articulating a belief, the characters often presuppose many 
things. These presuppositions determine both how they understand a particular view and also 
how convinced they are of it. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the presuppositions in 
order to fully determine what is being discussed. Socrates tries to do precisely this. He wants 
to expose these tacit assumptions and asks about them, thereby eliciting admissions from his 
interlocutors. In other words, he is committed to seeing all that is being presupposed by 
someone when defending a view.
600
 One could perhaps argue that these assumptions are 
revealed during a discussion and may therefore be the result of an explicit reflection about 
some particular question, but their existence need not be (and normally is not) restricted to 
the moments of reflection. They are often beliefs that permanently shape the characters‟ (and 
in many cases also our) way of seeing or understanding things.  
Considering the way they are revealed in the corpus would therefore render more 
visible how this is a permanent and deep-lying structure of our way of seeing things. We will, 
however, follow another line of inquiry. We will consider the way the notion of ὏πόεεζζξ is 
defined in the simile of the divided line, in the Republic.
601
 The ὏πμεέζεζξ mentioned therein 
are not necessarily tacit (at least they admit a degree of awareness of their existence), but they 
share several key features with those tacit ὏πμεέζεζξ that affect both our explicit views and 
our behaviors. Let us then briefly consider some of main aspects of the simile (without 
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 In Meno, Phaedo and Parmenides we find different presentations of a method of examination based on such 
hypotheses. For a consideration of these presentations, see Chap. 9, Sect. 3.1.  
600
 In fact, a full list of all the presuppositions identified by Socrates in the course of the dialogues would be 
very long.  
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 See Rep. 509d ff. and 532a ff. The pages that follow are vastly influenced by the analyses in M. 
CARVALHO, Μέεμδμξ e ὏πόεεζζξ. Ο problema do pressuposto na fundação platónica da ciência, in: D. 
FERRER (ed.), Método e Métodos do Pensamento Filosófico, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade, 2007, 9-69, 
and F. SERRANITO, Lovers and Madmen. The Μακία-Φνμκε῔κ Opposition in Plato‟s Phaedrus, Diss. 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2015, 337-378. 
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entering into much detail about all that is implied in it), in order to determine the role played 
by the notion of ὏πόεεζζξ within this framework. 
First of all, the divided line represents a scale of modes of being, as well as of the 
affections (παεήιαηα) of the soul (i.e., the cognitive states, the modes of access to beings) 
that correspond to them. In other words, the line has both an objective (or ontological) and a 
subjective (or epistemological) sides, mirroring the correlation between being and knowledge 
in the end of book V (see 476e ff.). However, it is important to bear in mind that in book V 
this correlation implies a subordination of one side to the other – and in fact a subordination 
that is inverted in the course of the analysis. In a first moment, Socrates starts by discussing 
different kinds of objects or beings and then he tries to determine the forms of access that 
correspond to the different kinds of being. In a second moment (477b ff.), Socrates inverts the 
relation and focus on the forms of access before considering the kinds of being they reveal in 
themselves.
602
 This kind of inversion also happens in the simile of the line. Socrates starts by 
describing domains of reality, but then talks about how they depend on the form of access to 
them or on how the soul understands things.  
Let us see how this is so. The line is first cut in two segments, distinguishing visible 
and intelligible beings (which are later identified with the distinction between δόλα and 
κόδζζξ, as well as the difference between coming to being and being). Each segment is in turn 
divided in two subsegments. There are, therefore, four different modes of being. The first 
counting from the bottom corresponds to all kinds of images or εἰηόκεξ (shadows, reflections 
in water or other surfaces, etc.).
603
 They have no intrinsic identity. Their being is 
constitutively referred to something else which they resemble, but of which they fall short. 
The second subsegment encompasses the things themselves (be they natural or artificial 
beings) which these images resemble.
604
 When we see the description made by Socrates, this 
seems to be the place where we find ourselves or the reality we normally recognize: the world 
of concrete things around us, of which we are a part. But this is only the second subsegment. 
So how is the segment beyond it conceived? 
The passage to the third and forth subsegments happens when the soul is compelled to 
inquire (γδηε῔κ ἀκαβηάγεηαζ) or when it performs an investigation or pursuit (ιέεμδμξ).
605
 
This happens because the things themselves or our access to them is revealed as defective. 
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 We will discuss this passage in more detail in Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 below.  
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 See 509e-510a. 
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 See 510a. 
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 See 510b. For the meaning of ιέεμδμξ, cp. Chap. 4, Sect. 2.5. 
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But the defect at stake here is not just any defect – and this will determine the kinds of 
inquiry it gives rise to. Things in the second subsegment, which were taken to be things 
themselves, are revealed as problematic. One cannot understand and define them by 
themselves. They have properties, but these are not clearly seen when we are focusing these 
things as such. In this sense, these things that seem maximally real are also images somehow. 
They refer to something else that explains them, but they fall short of it. Therefore, one needs 
to inquire (or is forced to do so). The crisis of the second subsegment mobilizes the soul to 
search for what things really are or for the true beings. These will not correspond to a kind of 
reality that completely transcends the way we normally experience this second subsegment, 
taking it as all that there is. The new beings that will come into focus were already somehow 
present and shaped this second subsegment. The latter already referred to them or it 
pretended to be them. We thought we were before all that there is, and now we discover that 
what we thought we had before us is “somewhere” else, so we have to seek it. 
But there are still two subsegments to go, and this means that there are two forms of 
pursuit. The first kind of pursuit, which opens up the third subsegment, corresponds to those 
sciences that occupy themselves with non-sensible beings – especially arithmetic and 
geometry (although in a sense we could include here even the sciences or ηέπκαζ directed to 
sensible beings, insofar as they are forms of inquire that try to correct our way of seeing 
things).
606
 These sciences give us an understanding of certain properties of beings and allow 
us to see what immediately appears in a different light. However, they also have limitations 
and it is precisely these limitations that must be overcome in order to achieve the fourth 
subsegment. The limitations are of two kinds, according to Plato. One of them is the fact that 
they use visible images to represent intelligible beings (for instance, mathematics uses images 
a square or a diagonal in their inquiry, though these are not its true objects).
607
 This can cause 
some confusion in the inquiry, but it is not the decisive limitation.  
Decisive is rather the fact that these forms of knowledge are based on ὏πμεέζεζξ.
608
 
This does not mean that they consciously employ a tentative or hypothetical method. What 
Plato means is that they presuppose many notions that are relevant for their researches. The 
examples given concern mathematics. Although this science is supposed to be the most 
certain and most clear, it presupposes the meaning of many things: odd and even, the figures, 
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 Socrates mentions geometry and arithmetic as examples in 510c2-3 and then continues referring to them 
during the course of the discussion. In 533b-c, he contrasts these and other sciences (or alleged sciences, as we 
will see), which are directed at something intelligible, with the ηέπκαζ that are concerned with sensible beings. 
607
 See 510d5 ff. 
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 See 510c2 ff and 511a3 ff. 
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the three forms of angles and so on.
609
 This form of inquiry employs these notions without 
rendering account of them, because they are taken to be manifest to everybody.
610
 They are 
seen as well-known or self-evident, and the ones doing the inquiry regard themselves as 
knowing them (ὡξ εἰδόηεξ, 510c6). The relation with the basic notions of the field is marked 
by knowledge claims that disregard the possibility of there being any mistake or haziness in 
one‟s access to these contents. In other words, one is as convinced of one‟s access to these 
notions as one was of one‟s access to reality in the second subsegment. Hence, one leaves 
these notions untouched (ἀηίκδηα) or unexamined.
611
 There is no mobilization to inquire into 
them. But this does not mean they are fully known. On the contrary. Plato is very aware that 
our relation with these kind of notions is not one of full knowledge or full insight. We are not 
able of rendering account of them.
612
 Our awareness of them is still imagetic. We do not have 
access to the thing itself. In relation to them, we are still left behind in the second  
subsegment – i.e., in our usually defective access to them. 
This has consequences for the entire field of study, since the latter is based on these 
὏πμεέζεζξ. As Plato says, the entire science has an unknown beginning or principle and “the 
end and what comes in between are woven out of what isn‟t known”.
613
 Any defects in these 
notions will affect the entire domain in question, which is based on these assumptions and 
agrees with them. It is not as if in some respects science would achieve full knowledge and in 
others it would still be imagetic. The unexamined aspects contaminate everything and 
because of this Plato says that these sciences do not deserve the name of “science” 
(ἐπζζηήιδ), for they not only include, but are even based on nescience. As he says, these 
sciences dream about being – i.e., they mistake an image of the main ontological notions for 
the real thing.
614
 This is the major limitation of the form of inquire that constitutes the third 
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 See 510c2-c5. 
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 See 510c6-8: “(...) μ὎δέκα θόβμκ μὔηε α὏ημ῔ξ μὔηε ἄθθμζξ ἔηζ ἀλζμῦζζ πενὶ α὎η῵κ δζδόκαζ ὡξ πακηὶ θακεν῵κ 
(...)”. 
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 Plato uses in 532c2 the expression “ηαύηαξ [namely, the ὏πμεέζεζξ] ἀηζκήημοξ ἐ῵ζζ”. This is a reference to 
the expression ηζκε῔κ ηὰ ἀηίκδηα. In this context, the verb ηζκε῔κ means not simply “setting in motion”, but 
rather “stirring up”, “shaking”, “disturbing” or even “waking up”. It also has a connotation of danger, since its 
object is something that should probably be kept alone and asleep. It is in this sense that the verb is used in 
expressions such as “ιὴ ηζκε῔κ εὖ ηείιεκμκ” (cp. Phlb. 15b). The expression “ἀηίκδηα”, in turn, does not simply 
denote something motionless, but rather something that should not be moved – for instance, customs or the 
constitution. Κζκε῔κ ηὰ ἀηίκδηα has thus the sense of “poking the bear” or “knocking off a hornets‟ nest”. It is 
used for violent political changes (see e.g. Lg. 684d-e). By referring to this expression here, Socrates is also 
implying that one tries to avoid the troubles (and the changes) that would result from questioning one‟s basic 
beliefs. For more on ηζκε῔κ and ηζκε῔κ ηὰ ἀηίκδηα (and for further bibliographical references), see M. 
CARVALHO, op. cit., 58ff.   
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 Cp. 533c2-3. 
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 See 533c3-4: “(...) ηεθεοηὴ δὲ ηαὶ ηὰ ιεηαλὺ ἐλ μὗ ιὴ μἶδεκ ζοιπέπθεηηαζ (...)”. 
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 See 533b8-c1. For more on Plato‟s notion of dreaming (ὀκεζνώηηεζκ), see Chap. 4, Sect. 2.4 below. 
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subsegment of the line. In a sense it overcomes the second subsegment, but in a fundamental 
sense it still remains in it. In some fundamental respects it shares the same limitations and 
these spread over the entire domain. Thus a new kind of investigation is required, which will 
bring about a fourth and final subsegment. 
The fourth subsegment is formally defined as knowledge – as perfect clarity 
(ζαθήκεζα) or that which gives us perfect access to being. But what exactly is knowledge in 
the fullest sense? Plato associates it with the notion of ἀκοπόεεημκ (510b7, 511b6) and says 
that this new form of inquiry must uproot the assumptions (ἀκαζνε῔κ ηαξ ὏πμεέζεζξ, 533c8). 
This means it does not leave them undisturbed, but rather converts them in points of attack 
(ἐπζαάζεζξ) or assaults (ὁνιαί).
615
 They become true principles of investigation, in the sense 
that one inquires into them. The direction is the opposite from the one in the so-called 
sciences. One sees the content of one‟s assumptions, see if they in turn presuppose 
something, and leads the examination towards something that does not presuppose anything.  
This lack of presuppositions can be understood in two senses. First, one can suspend 
the knowledge claims corresponding to the ὏πμεέζεζξ. This will stop the distortion caused by 
them and one will no longer dream about being. In a sense, this would already allow one to 
overcome the limitations of the second and third subsegment. But Plato also understands the 
lack of presuppositions as referring to a first principle of knowledge (an ἀνπή) on which all 
reality is based. This first principle seems to be the form of the good, on which all other 
forms or εἴδδ are based. But let us leave that aside for now.
616
 
This brief consideration of the simile of the line lets us better understand the central 
aspects of Plato‟s notion of ὏πόεεζζξ. In the Republic, the notion refers primarily to notions 
presupposed in scientific inquiries. These notions can be explicit or implicit, they can come 
from the second subsegment (our usual understanding of things) or they can be innovations of 
the scientific inquiry. At any rate, they are taken as obvious and as not needing any inquiry. 
This obviousness is their most important feature. Despite not having a full insight into them, 
they are nonetheless taken for granted. Moreover, our relation to them also determines the 
way we see and understand other things. This can be understood in a deductive sense, as 
sometimes is suggested in the simile of the line, or in a broader sense. Things may be directly 
derived from these notions or simply affected by them, but in both cases one‟s way of seeing 
things would be very different without these assumptions. Finally, although Plato uses the 
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term “὏πόεεζζξ” to designate a structural moment of sciences and especially mathematics, the 
notion can be applied not only to all forms of inquiries, but also to what happens outside of 
any inquiry. When we are still in the second subsegment and do not inquire into things, we 
still presume to know many things. We are always full of assumptions, even if we only  
rarely think about them. This is what is illustrated in the dialogues – both when Socrates 
points out that someone‟s behavior would not be possible without tacit assumptions and also 
that someone‟s argument presupposes other views that are were not formulated. 
The notion of ὏πόεεζζξ plays thus a very important role in Plato‟s understanding of 
the tacit dimension. It shows how this dimension is populated with convictions similar to the 
ones we express in our moments of reflection.
617
 There is a structural resemblance between 
the two domains. One could perhaps be tempted to think of this as an abusive projection of 
the explicit domain into the immediate contact with life, which would have a very different 
structure. However, it actually shows that what happens at the heart of our being has 
fundamentally the same structure as what happens in our reflection. Both are understood by 
Plato as thinking. Both are logical or rational, although in different degrees.
618
 The difference 
is one of awareness and clarity, as we shall see, not of form. Both explicitly and implicitly, 
we are convinced of knowing things as they are. We have many more knowledge claims than 
we would immediately recognize and the fact that we do not recognize them does not 
minimize their effectiveness. We can be totally ignorant of this tacit dimension or even argue 
that it does not exist. It will nonetheless affect all our being (or, more precisely, all our ἔνβα 
and all our θόβμζ). 
The structural resemblance between the two forms of knowledge claim also means 
that we can render (or at least try to render) them explicit. Expressing them is, in fact, 
absolutely necessary for their examination. But this expression is not an automatic process. It 
requires us to focus and identify their content, which is primarily unclear to us and, in some 
cases more than others, may resist becoming explicit.
619
 Thus, we have to exert ourselves and 
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often make several attempts. But at least there is the possibility of rendering our tacit views 
explicit. The two domains are not totally heterogeneous. 
 
b) The express or explicit beliefs in light of Plato’s definition of ιόγνο in the 
Theaetetus 
 
 By introducing the idea of tacit beliefs, we get a better notion of just how extensive 
the set of beliefs that is to be examined is. In light of this expansion, we can now reconsider 
the limited domain of our explicit beliefs and what characterizes it. We described it initially 
as a kind of spotlight in which the contents are fully present to our mind. This is achieved by 
means of speech or θόβμξ.
620
 These beliefs are articulated, formulated, verbalized or put into 
words and, as a result of it, they are much clearer to us. We can better understand how it is so 
if we quickly consider the three definitions of θόβμξ given at the end of Theaetetus.
621
  
According to the first definition, θόβμξ has the sense of “making one‟s thought 
apparent vocally, by means of words and verbal expressions – when a man impresses an 
image of his judgment upon the stream of speech, like reflections upon water or in a 
mirror”.
622
 Theaetetus later reformulates it as “a vocal image of thought”.
623
 The emphasis is 
thus on the use of voice, with its linguistic structure, but also on how it allows us to reveal 
(ἐκδείλαζεαζ) how we see things – both to others (who have no direct access to our thoughts) 
and also to ourselves (if we happen to be unmindful of them).
624
 One‟s thoughts become 
more visible. 
The idea of clarity is further developed in the other two definitions. The second one 
describes θόβμξ as “the way to the whole through the elements”.
625
 One must consider 
everything that composes a certain being and go through it all. This changes one‟s relation to 
the whole and gives us a better understanding of it. Λόβμξ brings clarity to our access to 
                                                 
620
 The term θόβμξ is indeed extremely complex and it can mean many different things: word, statement, 
calculation, account, reason, thought, proportion, and so on. Here, however, we will have in mind primarily the 
sense of speech or of something said (either silently to ourselves, in our own mind, or vocally to someone else). 
For more on the term and for some bibliographical references, cp. Chap. 4, Sect. 2.2 above. 
621
 See 206c ff. In this passage, Socrates and Theaetetus are exploring the possibility of knowledge being a δόλα 
ὀνεή accompanied by θόβμξ. Initially, θόβμξ seems to mean something as an account or justification, but as the 
characters try to define it, they use a more general sense of the word. 
622
 See 206d: “ηὸ ιὲκ πν῵ημκ εἴδ ἂκ ηὸ ηὴκ α὏ημῦ δζάκμζακ ἐιθακ῅ πμζε῔κ δζὰ θςκ῅ξ ιεηὰ ῥδιάηςκ ηε ηαὶ 
ὀκμιάηςκ, ὥζπεν εἰξ ηάημπηνμκ ἠ ὕδςν ηὴκ δόλακ ἐηηοπμύιεκμκ εἰξ ηὴκ δζὰ ημῦ ζηόιαημξ ῥμήκ”. I follow M. 
J. Levett‟s translation, revised by Myles Burnyeat, in PCW. 
623
 See 208c. 
624
 See 206d7-9. 
625
 See 208c: “(...) δζὰ ζημζπείμο ὁδὸξ ἐπὶ ηὸ ὅθμκ (...)”. 
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something. The same holds for the third definition, which presents θόβμξ as the ability “to tell 
some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things.”
626
 Λόβμξ 
brings differentiation and distinctness – and thus a clearer view about what something is.
627
  
These senses of θόβμξ may be applied to things in general, but also to our views. 
Λόβμξ allows us to define our views and see what characterizes them. One becomes aware of 
them and is no longer distracted about their presence and content. This awareness or clarity is 
therefore what characterizes our explicit beliefs (as well as explicit views in general, whether 
we endorse them or not). Their content is stated and thus clearer to us. We see a reflection of 
it, identify its elements and can distinguish it from other contents.  
But this is not all. Our explicit beliefs are also connected with θόβμξ in the sense of 
rational discussion and account or justification of something.
628
 In other words, our explicit 
beliefs are often the result of a process akin to what we see in the dialogues. Questions are 
explicitly asked, answers are expressly given and they must then be rationally justified. In 
other words, these explicit beliefs usually arise in a process of examination – be it an ordinary 
examination or a philosophical examination. This dialectical process can indeed be more or 
less rational, more or less demanding, but it is always something we follow and up to a point 
control. It may end up producing theories (either philosophical or not) that we adopt. But 
these theories are also open to questions, doubts and corrections. Many of them are thus 
regarded as more or less probable conjectures. However, despite all the doubts the dialectic 
process may induce, it is nonetheless a precious instrument in reviewing and developing our 
set of beliefs, as well as in considering new views. 
This instrument is something to which we can relate in different ways. We can have 
different degrees of dedication to it and regard its results with in different manners. The two 
opposites extremes are what Plato designates ιζζμθμβία and θζθμθμβία.
629
 One can avoid all 
reflection or one can dedicate oneself to it with passion, follow all the dictates of logic (or as 
Plato says, follow θόβμξ like a wind, in whichever direction it leads).
630
 But one way or the 
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 See 208c: “(...) ηὸ ἔπεζκ ηζ ζδιε῔μκ εἰπε῔κ ᾧ η῵κ ἁπάκηςκ δζαθένεζ ηὸ ἐνςηδεέκ.” 
627
 The two latter senses of θόβμξ also correspond to the notion of “definition”. They are not simply the 
verbalization of something, but the grasping of it. However, even when it is not a definition, θόβμξ makes us 
more aware of the elements and the distinctive marks of something. 
628
 This was probably the sense Theaetetus (or at least the people he refers to) had in mind when he first 
introduced the notion in 201c-d. 
629
 Cp. e.g. La. 188c-e, Phd. 89d ff., Rep. 411c-e. For the notion of θζθμθμβία, see e.g. G. NUCHELMANS, 
Studien über θιλόλογος, θιλολογία und θιλολογεῖν, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1950. 
630
 See Rep. 394d8-9. 
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other, we all become aware of some of our beliefs at some points and these explicit beliefs 
can affect in different ways how we see things and how we act.  
The explicit beliefs may then become (or return to being) tacit, and at that point we 
may have different degrees of recollection of their existence and content. This recollection is 
then what determines the way we tend to understand the Platonic notions of δόλα and μἴεζεαζ 
εἰδέκαζ. There are some views of which we are better aware, which we can more easily 
articulate, and these are the ones we most immediately notice and identify. However, this is 
only a small part of our overall beliefs. Our explicit beliefs coexist with our tacit beliefs and 
we are not directly aware of most of the latter. We must bear this in mind, or else our 
conception and performance of philosophical examination will be wholly inadequate.  
 
c) The interrelation of both modalities of belief 
 
 Finally, let us consider a little bit better the coexistence or correlation between explicit 
and tacit beliefs. These two modes of presence of beliefs are very important and without any 
of them our life would be very different. It is very hard to imagine a life composed solely of 
implicit knowledge claims, in which we would never reflect or our reflection would never 
produce any results. On the other hand, a life in which all our beliefs were express and fully 
present in the spotlight of our mind is also very different from our own experience. We have 
the possibility of thinking about our own beliefs (as well as other possible beliefs), but we 
cannot contemplate everything at the same time. We must use a cursor or moving focus, 
which attends to something while losing sight of everything else. In some cases, it may be 
more difficult to identify and focus on a belief – but at least there is the possibility of doing 
so. 
 It must be remarked that these two modalities of belief do not exist side by side, 
totally indifferent to each other. They are actually entangled and affect one another. Our 
implicit knowledge claims often guide our reflection, determine what we accept or refuse, 
and they can also stimulate or inhibit the very act of reflecting on (or examining) something. 
In turn, our reflection and the beliefs that are present or developed in it may also affect our 
other beliefs and change them (at least in part). But this is not all. The boundaries between 
what is tacit and what is explicit is not always easy to draw. This is particularly clear if we 
recall that our explicit beliefs are often (if not always) based on tacit ὏πμεέζεζξ. The explicit 
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domain contains in itself something tacit – and the tacit domain is likewise something we 
experience from within some domain of awareness.  
 But this continuity between the two modalities of belief goes only to a point. We can 
still distinguish the two basic forms – and this raises the question of what kind of 
interchanges between them can there be. First, it is not clear to what extent our implicit 
knowledge claims can be translated into explicit ones. This is required for examining them, 
but it is not easy to do, because of our hazy awareness of what lies in our storehouse of 
beliefs. Moreover, the possibility of such a translation also raises the question about whether 
it only changes the mode of presence of the contents or whether it can also transform the 
contents in some way – and even the conviction we have about them. By introducing a 
different degree of clarity, the contents may be seen differently. On the other hand, it is also 
not clear how our explicit reflections and beliefs can pass into the storehouse and become 
tacitly effective in us. Some of them may be installed in us, but it is not easy to determine 
what enables this installation in some cases and not in others.  
 The question about the interchanges of the two modes of belief points to yet another 
interesting aspect of how we see things. We saw that we can reflect or be directly aware of 
some beliefs and have many others stored in our mind. This immediately suggests that all 
these beliefs have different contents. But it is possible to have different tacit and explicit 
views about the same thing. In other words, our theories may not coincide with how we 
immediately see things. We may be in inner dissonance and this dissonance can be direct (in 
the sense that both views concern the same object) or indirect (in so far as the consequences 
of some belief we have contradict another belief or its consequences). In fact, such 
contradictions need not be between what is in the tacit and what is in the explicit domain. 
They can also occur within one of the domains. Due to the lack of clarity of the tacit domain, 
we can adopt tacit views whose consequences are in conflict. Likewise, our explicit 
reflections can also be too superficial and fail to notice that different beliefs have 
consequences that disagree with each other. We may be full of contradictions without 
realizing it, without even realizing that this is possible. This is possible because our contact 
with our beliefs (even when they are explicit) is imperfect. They are in general 
compartmentalized. We do not bring them together and compare them side by side. Even in 
reflection we do this only up to a point. But it is the role of philosophical examination to try 
to annul that. It must consider all our beliefs and their implications, compare them, and 
identify any conflicts. This is what Socrates often does in the dialogues. He steers the 
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examination towards the revelation of these contradictions and forces the characters to choose 
between their beliefs. They must say which view they are more certain of – or acknowledge 
that they actually do not know.  
 
2. The contents of our beliefs. Their morphology and intricate syntax 
 
 In Chapter 5 we considered the general or formal notion of belief (i.e., of adopting a 
δόλα or holding a knowledge claim). In the first section of this chapter, we considered how 
our beliefs can be either implicit or explicit and how philosophical examination must take this 
into account. But there is another important principle of variation of beliefs that we must bear 
in mind. Our beliefs may also differ with respect to their content. Not only can there be 
different kinds of beliefs about the same thing, but there are also many things about which we 
may have beliefs. What is determined or posited by them varies greatly and Plato‟s dialogues 
provide us a rich (though far from exhaustive) description of this diversity and complexity.  
 It is important to bear in mind that the characters‟ beliefs are not always expressly 
identified as δόλαζ or knowledge claims. But even if we confine ourselves to the passages in 
which Plato uses the notion of δόλα or μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ (as well as any of their equivalents), 
we can easily see how diverse the objects our beliefs refer to are. The characters‟ beliefs 
concern what concrete beings are, what happens, where one is, the features someone has, 
practical matters, distinctions and resemblances between beings, instrumental or technical 
matters, professions, physics, biology, arithmetic, geometry, medicine, literature, formal 
ontology, life‟s greatest questions (ηὰ ιέβζζηα – which encompass political, religious, 
eschatological matters, what is happiness, how can one be the best possible) – and the list 
goes on.
631
 These contents can be more or less general, more or less abstract and more or less 
important. 
Our beliefs may thus have different forms or shapes. But this is not the most 
important question. In fact, such a morphological analysis (as we could call it) gives the 
impression that our beliefs are all simple and concern independent objects. Plato, however, 
strongly emphasizes how our beliefs are intertwined or entangled. They co-determine each 
other, exert influence over one another and thus what seems to be a simple belief often (if not 
always) turns out to be a bundle of beliefs. This was already expressed by the notion of 
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 For a more precise idea of the particular contents of beliefs discussed in the corpus, see for instance the list of 
passages in which μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ and equivalent expressions appear (presented in Chap. 5, Sect. 2.1). 
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὏πόεεζζξ, as we saw above. Our views often presuppose other views. But they can also be 
interconnected or synthesized in other, more specific ways – and Plato actually discusses 
several different kinds of intertwinement. To use once again a grammatical metaphor, there is 
a syntax of beliefs, with its own rules. There are general structures of beliefs that pervade all 
individual beliefs and their contents. No moment is simple or atomic. All our views are 
intrinsically complex. Therefore, any analysis of the contents of our beliefs must first of all 
consider these intertwinements of beliefs or their contents, since everything else depends on 
them. However, the different kinds of intertwinement are not easy to identify. Our attention is 
normally focused on the result of the intertwinements or on some separate component of the 
whole. All the rest tends to be tacitly present, so we do not clearly see the main structures of 
our beliefs.   
Plato, however, tries to identify and describe these structures. Although the dialogues 
do not provide us a treatise on the relations between our beliefs, Plato points to them in many 
moments and in different ways – sometimes by using them in the discussions, other times by 
explicitly discussing and defining them. Moreover, the relevant discussions are mainly of two 
kinds. In some cases, the characters are discussing how we see things or how knowledge is 
constituted. In other cases, they are considering the structure of reality as such. In fact, 
knowledge and being are usually regarded as intrinsically connected, so many analyses hold 
for both. But one may also raise the question of whether these structures are primarily 
subjective and, as such, themselves the result of some belief. This would mean that they 
could perhaps be subjective illusions that do not correspond to any reality outside our minds. 
It would also imply that they could perhaps be revised and changed. But, whether things are 
really so or not, and whether this is a necessary way of seeing things or not, our spontaneous 
way of seeing and conceiving things may still be marked by these intertwinements identified 
by Plato. They can be interpreted as a description of the structure of our beliefs – and it is as 
such that we will now consider them. 
 
2.1. The difference between what something is (ηί ἐζηηλ) and how something is 
qualified (πνῖόλ ηη) 
 
 Plato often distinguishes in the dialogues between two kinds of questions or two kinds 
of perspective over something. On the one hand, it is possible to determine the identity of 
something, what something is (ηί ἐζηζκ/ὅπεν ἐζηίκ). On the other hand, it is also possible to 
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determine how something is qualified or what sort of thing something is (πμ῔όκ ηζ). This 
difference is an expression of the basic structure or basic intertwinement of cognitive 
contents. Everything we see (as well as every belief of ours) is determined by this structure or 
matrix. Plato conceives it as an alternative to other ontological models which caused many 
difficulties and could not account for how we see things. The characters in the dialogues not 
only discuss this ontological model, but they often invoke it during other discussions, either 
to call our attention to the complexity of a certain being (how it cannot be reduced to a simple 
identity) or to denounce the way we can lose sight of this identity altogether and focus only a 
secondary aspect of something.
632
 But the model itself applies to all we see and          
conceive – i.e., to all individual beings and all general modes of being (the so-called 
universals). Let us then see what characterizes it. 
 First, it seems natural to think that each moment of reality must have its own identity, 
different from any other. This is what one inquires about when one asks “ηί ἐζηζκ;” One 
searches for the definition of something, for what distinguishes it from everything else. The 
answer then is that which something is (ὅπεν ἐζηζκ).
633
 This is its identity and it has a 
tautological character: something is what it is and nothing else. It is itself by itself (α὎ηὸ ηαε‟ 
α὏ηό).
634
 In other words, it is self-contained, simple, atomic, monadic and monoeidetic.  
However, the notion of identity raises several problems. First of all, if we associate it 
with the idea of simplicity (of something being only itself and nothing else), we must deal 
with the problem that it is not easy to conceive something entirely simple, and even if we 
admit that such a thing exists, it is not easy to say what relation we could have to it. We find a 
complex discussion of the question in Theaetetus. Socrates argues therein that it is impossible 
to describe and define a simple moment. We can only have a direct apprehension of it and 
name it. However, this raises many aporias.
635
 Moreover, it goes against the structure of 
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 See in particular Euthphr. 11a-b, La. 189e, 190b, Prt. 360e-361a, Grg. 448e, 462c-d, 463c, Men. 71a-b,   
86d-e, 100b, Rep. 354b-c, 437d ff., Sph. 262e f., Phlb. 37b ff., Ep. VII 342e f. Cp. also Ti. 49d-50b.  
633
 The expressions ηί ἐζηζκ and ὅπεν ἐζηζκ appear often in the Platonic corpus. See e.g. Euthphr. 13e, Smp. 
199e, Rep. 505e, 524c, Tht. 203a, 204e, 210a, Prm.163b, Phlb. 54a.  
634
 For this expression, see e.g. Phd. 64c, 66a, 78d, 83b, 100b, Tht. 205c, Sph. 238c, Phlb. 53d. 
635
 See Tht. 201d ff. The passage seems to refer to Antisthenes‟ arguments about the impossibility of 
predicating, defining or contradicting (ἀκηζθέβεζκ) something. If something is simple and we can only name it, 
then we cannot qualify it, present a description of it (a θόβμξ) nor can we say anything other than what it is. 
There can only be qualification and θόβμξ (both true and false) of composites. For more on Antisthenes‟ views, 
cp. e.g. C. GILLESPIE, The Logic of Antisthenes, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 26 (1913), 479-500; 
G. GRUBE, Antisthenes Was No Logician, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological 
Association 81 (1950), 16-27; H. RANKIN, Irony and Logic. The ἀκηζθέβεζκ Paradox and Antisthenes‟ Purpose, 
L’antiquité classique 43 (1974), 316-320. 
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δόλαζ and knowledge claims. As we saw, our beliefs require us to define things as being in a 
certain way and not otherwise. 
 Leaving that aside, it is also very difficult to find a simple moment of pure identity. 
Things around us are all composed of multiple moments of reality, as it were, and even if we 
try to reduce these moments to points or atoms, these points or atoms will still complex – in 
the sense that they will still have multiple properties (color, dimension, and so on), and each 
of them will still be next to other points or atoms. This means that there are always some 
relations that would not be found in a simple identity. Moreover, these moments are 
integrated in more complex realities (what we normally call things), and the latter determine 
the whole group of moments subordinated to them. Besides, these complex realities or things 
are likewise integrated in a complex system of relations with one another.
636
 
This is just a very brief and vague description of how everything we come in contact 
with is composed of multiple relations. We must assume these complex realities are 
composed of simple moments with their own identity (their own being thus and not 
otherwise). If it were not so, everything would be jumbled together. There would only be an 
indistinct mixture.
637
 However, any moment of reality we can identify is still part of a system 
of relations in which the different moments of reality communicate with each other, interact 
and determine each other, thus producing something more than simple identities. If it were 
not so, if we only had simple moments of reality deprived of any relation with each other, 
reality as we know it would collapse. The different moments need to be somehow 
synthesized, put together or intertwined. 
Thus, each moment of reality is not only composed of itself, but of something else too 
– something extrinsic, non-definitional, that comes in contact with a particular identity and 
further qualifies it.
638
 It thus becomes an identity qualified in a certain manner. It has the 
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 We could even wonder if all moments of reality are somehow integrated in a global system as the one we see 
described in Leibniz, Spinoza or the German Idealism, in which all moments are deduced from a first principle 
and are thus constitutively intertwined. Plato never expressly says this, though at some points he seems to point 
in this direction – especially when he talks of a ἀνπὴ ἀκοπόεεημξ in the Republic (see 510b and 511b).  
637
 This would correspond to the Anaxagoras‟ notion of “ὁιμῦ πάκηα πνήιαηα” (DK B1), which describes a 
reality very different from the one we experience. Aristotle emphasizes precisely this in Metaphysica Γ, when 
discussing the so-called principle of contradiction (1005b19 ff.). If what we say and think did not exclude not 
only its opposite, but also anything whatsoever that differs from it, then we would not be able to posit anything, 
because any positing would simultaneously imply not positing the same thing. We would say that something is 
simultaneously “thus and otherwise” – which goes against the structure of our mind and of reality as we 
experience it. Only by saying that something is “thus and not otherwise” can we mean something (ζδιαίκεζκ ἕκ) 
or think something (κμε῔κ ἕκ). This is the core of Aristotle‟s analysis, though it involves many other aspects 
which we will not consider here.  
638
 In order for this to be possible, the principle of contradiction as presented in the previous footnote must be 
restricted. In its absolute form, it would be impossible for something not to be itself. But now there is a moment 
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sphere of its own identity and also a sphere of additional qualification, on account of which it 
becomes an identity qualified in a certain manner, of some sort, such and such – and it is 
precisely about this additional qualification that the question “πμ῔όκ;” inquires. 
What was just said applies to all kinds of relations between moments of reality, but 
Plato usually singles out a particular kind of relation – namely, the relation of predication, in 
which a particular reality becomes a predicate or an attribute of another reality. The relation 
between the two moments of reality is thus asymmetric. The attribute is subordinated to that 
which has the attribute. The latter constitutes thus the central moment of the relation. It 
establishes the identity of something, whereas the predicate qualifies this identity in a 
particular way. But the predicate itself must have its own identity. In other words, both terms 
of the relation must have their own identity in order for one to be predicated of the other and 
thus qualify it (or render it such and such).  
According to Plato, this is how we see things and how the reality around us is 
structured, and therefore he often calls attention to the fact that identity must precede 
qualification (or, as we could also say, the question “ηί ἐζηζκ;” precedes the question “πμ῔όκ 
ἐζηζκ;”). If we do not know what something in itself is, we also cannot know how it is 
qualified.
639
 This does not mean that we cannot know the identity (i.e., the “ηί ἐζηζκ;”) of the 
moment of reality that qualifies it. In fact, we need to know it in order to see something as 
qualified. What we cannot know is the relation of qualification (i.e., that such a predicate 
qualifies such a reality). Without the reality that is qualified, we have only a free-floating 
predicate, which is not even a predicate, since we cannot relate it to anything.  
Now, it may seem that Plato is arguing that we need to have a perfect definition of 
something (i.e., we need to fully know its identity) in order for us to know (or even to believe 
in) any of its predicates. But if that is the case, then his thesis seems to be manifestly false. 
We do not need to have a perfect knowledge of an entity in order to know (or at least to 
believe) something about it. Our knowledge of entities is often defective, and yet we can 
know some of their predicates.
640
 But Plato does not deny this. What Plato does say is that 
                                                                                                                                                        
of reality (i.e., a particular entity) that is somehow within another, as something that accrues to its identity. 
Aristotle designates this structure as ηζ ηαηὰ ηζκόξ: something that is in relation to or with respect to something 
else (and consequently is not by itself, ηαε‟ α὏ηό). See e.g. Metaphysica 1041a23 and 1043b31.  
639
 See in particular Men. 71b: “[΢Ω] (...) ὃ δὲ ιὴ μἶδα ηί ἐζηζκ, π῵ξ ἂκ ὁπμ῔όκ βέ ηζ εἰδείδκ; ἠ δμηε῔ ζμζ μἷόκ ηε 
εἶκαζ, ὅζηζξ Μέκςκα ιὴ βζβκώζηεζ ηὸ πανάπακ ὅζηζξ ἐζηίκ, ημῦημκ εἰδέκαζ εἴηε ηαθὸξ εἴηε πθμύζζμξ εἴηε ηαὶ 
βεκκα῔όξ ἐζηζκ, εἴηε ηαὶ ηἀκακηία ημύηςκ; δμηε῔ ζμζ μἷόκ η᾽ εἶκαζ; [ΜΔ] μ὎η ἔιμζβε.” 
640
 The question resembles what is at issue in the so-called Socratic fallacy, which has been object of much 
discussion in the secondary literature. Socrates defends in Plato‟s dialogues that one most know a term before 
applying it to particular instances, but this has been interpreted as meaning that one must possess a full 
definition of a term in order to recognize its instances. But this likewise seems to be manifestly false – and 
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when we think about something we tend to subvert the priority of definitional knowledge (or 
at least definitional belief) by neglecting the identity of the thing we are thinking about and 
instead focusing on some particular qualification of it, which does not clarify what this thing 
is. This is what often happens in the dialogues. The discussion tends to gravitate towards 
whether an entity has a certain predicate or not, and the characters neglect what the entity in 
question is – as well as the identity of the predicate. 641 The terms of the relation are not 
considered in detail and so one‟s contact with the relation between them is itself hazy (since 
the relation of predication is based on the identity of both terms).  
Such a neglect of the identity of beings is only possible because we have at least a 
tacit knowledge claim about the identity of something – and this means a knowledge claim 
about both what the subject of predication is and what the predicate in itself is. Even if we do 
not possess a perfect definition of something, there is an apparent satisfaction of the         
identity-question and therefore we can concern ourselves with the predication or 
qualification.
642
 This apparent satisfaction is what Plato criticizes. We have many tacit views 
about the identity of things and this is what allow us to focus on particular predicates of 
anything without thinking about the rest. But any predication or qualification presupposes 
identities. This is how we see any being or how any moment of reality is structured. More 
precisely, the structure of identity and qualification determines all our views of individual 
beings – and this is what enables them to be qualified by any predicates.   
 
2.2. The alphabetic structure of reality. Our understanding of particular εἴδε 
 
The description just made fails to consider an essential feature of the predicates that 
normally qualify individual beings – namely the fact that these predicates are not absolutely 
unique, but each of them qualify many different beings and still remains the same across all 
                                                                                                                                                        
hence a fallacy. For more on the “Socratic fallacy”, see e.g. P. GEACH, Plato‟s Euthyphro. An Analysis and 
Commentary, Monist 50 (1966), 369-82 (especially 371-373); G. SANTAS, The Socratic Fallacy, in Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 10 (1972), 127-141; J. BEVERSLUIS, Does Socrates Commit the Socratic Fallacy?, 
American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987), 211-22; G. VLASTOS, Is the “Socratic fallacy” Socratic?, 
Ancient Philosophy 10 (1990), 1-16; W. PRIOR, Plato and the “Socratic Fallacy”, Phronesis 43 (1998), 97-113; 
D. WOLFSDORF, The Socratic Fallacy and the Epistemological Priority of Definitional Knowledge, Apeiron 
37 (2004), 35-67. 
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 This is the case for instance in Meno, when discussing ἀνεηή (see 71a-b, 86d-e, 100b), or in the Republic, 
when discussing justice (cp. Rep. 354b-c). 
642
 In other words, we must believe we know who Meno is (i.e., we must have some, however vague, belief 
about him) in order to know something about him – otherwise the thing we know would not be a predicate of 
Meno. Something similar happens in the case of the “Socratic fallacy”. We can recognize instances of a 




its instances. We could therefore say that these predicates are abstract or universal entities, 
although Plato does not use this language. In this sense, they correspond to the letters of the 
alphabet, with which the “text” of reality is written. Just as the discovery of the alphabet is 
based on the perception that the extraordinary vastness of a language can be traced back to 
very few elements and their different combinations, the discovery of general predicates traces 
back all complexity of reality to a limited number of predicates. These simple elements are 
the atoms of reality or the identities (the moments of ὅπεν ἐζηζκ) that compose the individual 
beings. They have their own essence, distinct from each other and they are what determines 
all individual beings. The characters on the dialogues are usually focused on these predicates 
and try to define them, based on the understanding (or the claim of understanding) that they 
have of them. Plato designates this object of our understanding in different ways, but the 
most common and meaningful designation is εἶδμξ (usually translated as idea or form, but it 
could also be translated as type, as we will see).
643
 Plato‟s analyses of this notion and what it 
refers to are very complex and have given rise to many discussions, especially about whether 
there is a particular theory of the εἴδδ and what its main features are. We will leave aside 
these discussions for now and rather consider the aspects of Plato‟s analyses that are more 
directly relevant for our purpose of defining the kinds of beliefs that we have. 
The most central aspect was already mentioned and can be better understood if we 
consider the other uses of the term εἶδμξ. The word can be used to designate the outward 
appearance of something and by extension its inner constitution. It can also be a kind of 
mental image of something – for instance, the image an artisan has in mind while producing 
something. In all these usages, it refers to a clear, distinct and well-determined pattern. But 
the term has also an important meaning in the scientific language, especially in the 
Hippocratic texts. It designates the different classes, types or sorts of natural constitution or 
of disease. In this sense, εἴδδ are the correlate of a typification or an inventory of the alphabet 
of reality, which is an essential component of any ηέπκδ. One‟s intervention in reality must be 
based on knowledge or insight and this requires the identification of repeated configurations 
or patterns, which will make it possible for one to know what to do in different 
circumstances. If it were not so, any new reality would be completely unpredictable and the 
ηέπκδ would have no knowledge of how it would behave. Therefore, in order for one to 
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 Other designations that Plato uses include: ἰδέα, ιμνθή, βέκμξ, μ὎ζία, θύζζξ, δύκαιζξ, πανάδεζβια, α὎ηὸ ηό x, 
and so on.  
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possess ηέπκδ, reality must be ordered in some way and one must be able to trace back that 
order to a few elements that account for it.
644
   
Plato‟s notion of εἶδμξ refers to something similar. It is a clear pattern or a type of 
being that can be present in many different individual beings. The contrast between the one 
pattern and the many instances is essential. As is said in the Republic, an εἶδμξ is something 
unitary and at the same time something distributed throughout many things, that appears 
everywhere in connection with bodies or actions.
645
 Different εἴδδ constitute the predicates of 
individual beings, what makes them such and such. The εἴδδ are that in virtue of which things 
are as they. In this sense, they are the causes of individual beings.
646
 Things partake in 
different εἴδδ and are a combination of them. This participation (ιέεελζξ) makes the 
individual beings images (εἴδςθα) or imitations (ιζιήιαηα) of the εἴδδ.
647
 Individual beings 
are constitutively referred to εἴδδ.  
This description, however, is vague and can be understood in different ways. The εἴδδ 
can be regarded as a structure of our subjective way of seeing things or as a structure of 
reality in itself. The latter raises many questions, some of which Plato himself discusses in 
the beginning of the Parmenides.
648
 What seems to be a fact is that our own mind is 
constitutively related to these general predicates. This relation is the core of our claims to 
understanding (μἴεζεαζ ζοκζέκαζ). Normally we think we understand these predicates (they 
have some meaning for us) and this is what determines the way we see everything. It is 
because we have already some understanding of what these predicates are that things can 
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 For more on the notion of εἶδμξ, see e.g. C. RITTER, Δἶδμξ, ἰδέα and verwandte Wörte in den Schriften 
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 See Rep. 476a: “ηαὶ πενὶ δὴ δζηαίμο ηαὶ ἀδίημο ηαὶ ἀβαεμῦ ηαὶ ηαημῦ ηαὶ πάκηςκ η῵κ εἰδ῵κ πένζ ὁ α὎ηὸξ 
θόβμξ, α὎ηὸ ιὲκ ἓκ ἕηαζημκ εἶκαζ, ηῆ δὲ η῵κ πνάλεςκ ηαὶ ζςιάηςκ ηαὶ ἀθθήθςκ ημζκςκίᾳ πακηαπμῦ 
θακηαγόιεκα πμθθὰ θαίκεζεαζ ἕηαζημκ.” 
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 See the whole discussion about αἴηζμκ in Phd. 95e-102, especially 100c: “θαίκεηαζ βάν ιμζ, εἴ ηί ἐζηζκ ἄθθμ 
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 For individual beings described as εἴδςθα or ιζιήιαηα, see e.g. Phdr. 250d5, Rep. 520c4, Ti. 48e6, 50c5. He 
also talks about them as things that bear the same name (ὁιώκοια) as the εἴδδ (cp. e.g. Phd. 78e2, Prm. 133d3, 
Ti. 52a5). 
648
 See 130b-135b. 
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appear to us as being such and such. Each thing we come in contact with is actually the 
intertwinement of an individual being and some εἴδδ. A pure individual entity, with totally 
original predicates, is something we cannot represent. Individuality for us is a particular 
combination of general predicates. In addition, these claims to understanding are also the 
basis of language, as was seen above.
649
 They allow us to speak about things and understand 
what others say. But none of this requires us to have an explicit notion or an explicit 
definition of these εἴδδ. In fact, most of our notions are tacit and we do not have an acute 
relation with them. But without them, things would not appear as they do. Without our 
(however deficient) understanding of the letters that compose each reality, we would not be 
able to read the words (i.e., we would not understand what each individual being is – and we 
would also not be able to talk about it). In this sense, the εἴδδ are not an invention of        
Plato – but rather a fundamental structure of our way of seeing things. 
The fact that we can have a deficient understanding of εἴδδ points to yet another 
important feature of Plato‟s understanding of them. The εἴδδ are not simply notions, but the 
“reality” these notions refer to. Indeed, our notions may vary from person to person or from a 
moment in our life to the other. But an εἶδμξ is something permanent that transcends each 
particular view about it. It is what a general predicate truly is (or a true being, as Plato calls 
it) and, to this extent, it has a certain kind of objectivity.
650
 But this objectivity raises many 
questions. The εἴδδ are not concrete beings within the world. Plato‟s presentations may, 
however, suggest that the εἴδδ are part of a different kind of reality – namely, a metaphysical 
world of forms. But it is not clear how such a world is to be understood. Moreover, these 
presentations are usually mythical and have a very problematic status, so their meaning is not 
entirely clear. What is clear, though, is that according to Plato we are always referred to these 
predicates. Even if our understanding of them is defective, we have already some relation to 
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2.3. The intertwinement of εἴδε and of our beliefs about them 
 
 We have already seen two different ways in which Plato denies the atomic character 
of beings and also of our beliefs. Different moments of reality are intertwined in individual 
beings and these beings are determined by general predicates. Still, it seems there is one last 
remnant of simplicity, which in itself is not affected by any intertwinement. If we look at the 
dialogues, Plato often presents the εἴδδ as monoeidetic. They are atomic or self-contained. 
Each of them has its own identity and as such exists only by itself or in respect of itself (α὎ηὸ 
ηαε‟ α὏ηό). The complex beings are so in virtue of the participation of εἴδδ, but the εἴδδ 
themselves would have no participation in each other. As the young Socrates says in 
Parmenides, it would be wondrous if there could be mixture of predicates in the εἴδδ and if 
they could have contradictory predicates.
652
 However, the Platonic corpus does explore the 
possibility that the εἴδδ may contain different moments or predicates, which differ from the 
εἴδδ they determine and from each other. In this sense, the εἴδδ themselves are not simple and 
Plato‟s denial of the atomic character of our views and of reality goes still further that what 
was previously seen. There is also an intertwinement or entanglement of moments at the level 
of the εἴδδ. They interfere in each other‟s identity. Each of them is not simply itself, but in a 
way it is also the other. This brings back the problem of how to connect the identity and the 
qualification of something, now at the level of the general predicates or εἴδδ. The moments 
that were supposed to be the simple identities on which everything is based are now revealed 
as complex – and this raises the problem of whether there is anything monoeidetic at all that 
can function as the basis of all reality. Plato, in fact, hints at the possibility that there is an 
irreducible synthesis or intertwinement even at the core of how we see things or at the core of 
reality – although it is not clear how such a core synthesis could be understood without 
presupposing atomic moments of reality, with their own identity. The alternative seems to be 
something like a systematic identity, but Plato does not develop this possibility in full. What 
he does is counteract the illusion of simplicity in our way of seeing things, thereby revealing 
how each of our beliefs is always part of a very complex system. 
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 See Prm. 129b-c: “εἰ ιὲκ βὰν α὎ηὰ ηὰ ὅιμζά ηζξ ἀπέθαζκεκ ἀκόιμζα βζβκόιεκα ἠ ηὰ ἀκόιμζα ὅιμζα, ηέναξ ἂκ 
μἶιαζ ἤκ· εἰ δὲ ηὰ ημύηςκ ιεηέπμκηα ἀιθμηένςκ ἀιθόηενα ἀπμθαίκεζ πεπμκεόηα, μ὎δὲκ ἔιμζβε, ὦ Εήκςκ, 
ἄημπμκ δμηε῔, μ὎δέ βε εἰ ἓκ ἅπακηα ἀπμθαίκεζ ηζξ ηῶ ιεηέπεζκ ημῦ ἑκὸξ ηαὶ ηα὎ηὰ ηαῦηα πμθθὰ ηῶ πθήεμοξ αὖ 
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πενὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ ἁπάκηςκ ὡζαύηςξ· εἰ ιὲκ α὎ηὰ ηὰ βέκδ ηε ηαὶ εἴδδ ἐκ α὏ημ῔ξ ἀπμθαίκμζ ηἀκακηία ηαῦηα πάεδ 
πάζπμκηα, ἄλζμκ εαοιάγεζκ· εἰ δ᾽ ἐιὲ ἕκ ηζξ ἀπμδείλεζ ὄκηα ηαὶ πμθθά, ηί εαοιαζηόκ (...).” 
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 We must now consider how this intertwinement of identities is present in the εἴδδ 
themselves, and thus also in our beliefs about them (or our claims of understanding them). 
The latter aspect is the most important for our analysis. But it is not something of which we 
can become easily aware, since we tend to be distracted about the alphabet of general 
predicates and, even we become aware of some of the letters of reality, we tend not to notice 
the reciprocal relations between these letters. Plato, however, tries to invert this. He discusses 
how different εἴδδ can be intertwined and presents in fact two models of such an 
intertwinement, which are discussed in more detail in Philebus and Sophist, respectively.  
 
a) The inner division or unfolding of a single εἶδνο in a multiplicity of εἴδε 
 
In Philebus 14c ff., Socrates mentions various levels of the problem of the one and 
many (which in fact works as a matrix for all forms of intertwinement, as we will see below) 
and then focus on a particular one, which is particularly relevant for determining the value of 
what is being discussed in this text – namely, pleasure and knowledge or intelligence. 
Socrates says he will not be considering how a particular being can have many predicates, or 
how one of the general predicates can be in many individual beings. He is rather concerned 
with how one of the general predicates can by itself be many, before being instantiated in the 
potentially infinite individual beings that share this predicate. The unity of a general predicate 
considered by itself and its infinite instances are thus the two extremes between which 
Socrates now tries to find some intermediate. He finds such an intermediate at least in some 
cases. There are εἴδδ that admit inner variation, can assume different shapes, despite being 
always the same. In other words, some classes of being contain subclasses. They are a genus 
that encompasses different species. Consequently, between unity and the unlimited instances, 
there is number, which corresponds to the different inner variations of a particular εἶδμξ.  
Socrates says that it is thus necessary to identify how many instances and which sorts 
can there be of a particular εἶδμξ (or as he says: ὁπόζα ἐζηὶ ηαὶ ὁπμ῔α, 17b7-8) – or, in other 
words, which subclasses can there be within a particular class of beings. The identification of 
these subclasses is, to a certain extent, something we often deal with, but Socrates focus on 
the fact that it is also necessary to have a ηέπκδ or an expert knowledge of a certain domain of 
reality. Socrates provides the example of the letters and sounds.
653
 In both cases, there is not 
only the εἶδμξ “letter” or “sound” and all its instances, but there are also different kinds of 
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letters and sounds, which can themselves be instantiated in many individual beings. We can 
even identify several intermediate levels, insofar as there are different groups of letters 
(vowels, semi-vowels, mutes) and also the particular letters within each group. Our 
knowledge is only complete when we know all these layers and all the diversity. Each 
subclass refers to the others and to the main class, which in turn includes in itself all this 
diversity. 
A similar kind of inner diversity of an εἶδμξ is the basis of the method of dichotomies 
which we find discussed and illustrated throughout the Sophist and the Statesman. Each εἶδμξ 
is divided or cut into two, in an effort to see all possible specifications, until one can localize 
an entity and thus define it.
654
 As a matter of fact, this kind of distinction is often found in the 
dialogues, even when there is no reference to a particular method. For instance, the notion of 
ἀνεηή can be divided into particular ἀνεηαί.
655
 Notions such as ἔνςξ and ιακία can also be 
divided into different modalities.
656
 There are many other examples. Divisions are used 
throughout the corpus and discussed in the passages above mentioned – even if that 
discussion also leaves some questions unanswered. Plato never indicates, for instance, what 
constitutes the distinctive mark between the different subclasses. He also never specifies how 
many chains of classes and subclasses are there and whether they are all part of a single chain 
or not. However, he does not seem to point in this direction. In Philebus he applies the 
method only to letters, sounds, pleasures and sciences. In Sophist and Statesman he aims to 
define two different activities or occupations (which are already very complex εἴδδ) and he 
never applies this method to the most general predicates, as we will see in the following. 
Hence, the validity of this kind of division seems to be circumscribed.  
Regardless of any of this, it still seems to be the case that we often do not think of 
general predicates in isolation, but rather associate them with other general predicates that are 
of higher, equal or lower rank within the ontological hierarchy. Plato alludes precisely to this. 
Although in the dialogues above mentioned (especially in Philebus) he is discussing a 
scientific method that is supposed to bring clarity to how we see things, he is also referring to 
a structure of general predicates that is reflected in our beliefs. We all have a notion of classes 
and subclasses of beings, we have beliefs about them (even if mostly tacit), and this is an 
important element of the syntax of our beliefs. 
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 See Smp. 180c ff., Phdr. 244a ff., 265a. 
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b) The entanglement of the highest genera in the Sophist  
 
 The fact that many general predicates belong to a system of classes and subclasses 
does not preclude that some general predicates are still autonomous. However, we find in the 
Sophist a different model of intertwinement of common predicates. This model is put forward 
in the discussion of the highest genera (the ιέβζζηα βέκδ).
657
 According to Plato, these genera 
are predicates that are present in everything else.
658
 They are like vowels, that are present in 
every word and bind the letters together.
659
 They are intertwined with the whole of reality. 
This means that they are the common predicates of the common predicates, and characterize 
individual beings in many different ways. The relation between these universal predicates and 
the chains of classes and subclasses, however, is not entirely clear. Plato does not specify 
whether these are the highest classes or something that lies beyond the entire system of 
classes and subclasses. It is also not clear whether these highest genera are the basis of all 
other predicates, which are then deduced from then, or an abstraction derived from the more 
immediate common predicates. However, they seem to be more than an abstraction. More 
precisely, they seem to be the matrix for all other predicates and for the whole of reality (even 
if we admit that the other moments of reality are not entirely derived or deduced from them).  
But regardless of their precise relation with the other predicates and the whole of 
reality, Plato considers the possibility that not even these most general moments of reality 
(and also of our beliefs) can be understood as simple and monoeidetic. They are intertwined 
or entangled with each other and none of them can be conceived in isolation. The discussion 
we find in the text is actually quite elaborate and we will only focus on some of the main 
aspects. What interests us is not so much the precise identification of the highest genera and 
their intertwinement, but rather the possibility of there being such an intertwinement in the 
way we see things. In order to consider this, there are several things we should examine. In 
the text, the Visitor and Theaetetus are discussing what an image is and how it seems to 
imply a strange intertwining (ζοιπθμηή) between being and non-being.
660
 To be sure, an 
image is something, it exists, but at the same time it includes a negative component that 
distinguishes it from the thing itself whose image it is. But this raises a complex problem, 
insofar as non-being seems to be unconceivable by itself. It cannot be pronounced, thought or 
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 They correspond to the possibility the Visitor admits in 254b9-c1: “(...) ηὰ δὲ ηαὶ δζὰ πάκηςκ μ὎δὲκ ηςθύεζκ 
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 See 253a, 253c. 
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 See 240c: “Κζκδοκεύεζ ημζαύηδκ ηζκὰ πεπθέπεαζ ζοιπθμηὴκ ηὸ ιὴ ὂκ ηῶ ὄκηζ, ηαὶ ιάθα ἄημπμκ.” 
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accounted for if no predicate accrues to it, especially if it does not exist at all in any way.
661
 It 
thus seems that the predicates “being” and “non-being” must be forced together, which 
implies that “being” in a way is not and “non-being” in a certain respect is.
662
 
This renders the notion of “non-being” more intelligible, but the problems do not stop 
here, for the predicate “being” is itself more problematic than it appears to be. Plato discusses 
several theories about being and ends up focusing on two in particular: the one that reduces it 
to concrete being (i.e., the sphere of becoming) and the theory that identifies it with eidetic 
contents that are absolutely permanent and at rest. He then integrates both theories and shows 
how being always implies movement and rest.
663
 Regardless of how the argument is 
developed, what is most relevant for us here is the fact that being is clarified by two other 
general predicates (namely, movement and rest) and, as the Visitor highlights, these other 
predicates are themselves different from being (otherwise they would both be being and not 
two different predicates).  
The Visitor and Theaetetus then discuss which degree of mixture should we admit 
between the different predicates: either a complete mixture of everything, no mixture 
whatsoever or some things mixing and others not. The Visitor then compares the relation 
between predicates with the relation between the letters of the alphabet and, as was said, 
expressly identifies the highest genera to vowels that pervade everything and compose all 
mixtures. They are in everything – and, in a way, they are also in each other. In order to 
demonstrate this, the Visitor introduces two further predicates: “same” (ηα὎ηόκ) and 
“another” (ηὸ ἕηενμκ, which is later identified with “non-being”).
664
 He then shows how these 
five predicates (being, movement, rest, same, another) are present in one another. In 
particular, each of them is the same as itself and something other than the others. “Same” and 
“other” are thus predicated even of “being”, though they cannot be identified with it. In sum, 
despite their heterogeneity, they are also intrinsically intertwined. The identity of any of them 
is pervaded by the identity of the others. This breaks up the complete isolation of being and 
non-being. In themselves, they are also something else. This brings about the absurdity 
(ηέναξ) that Socrates considered impossible in Parmenides. An εἶδμξ seems to contain within 
it a predicate that is different from itself – and in this sense it contradicts itself. It is itself and 
not itself. This is highly problematic, but we seem to be unable to conceive things in any 
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other way. Though the predicates cannot be fused together to the point of becoming 
indistinct, they cannot be thought in complete isolation either.  
Plato characterizes the interrelation between the ιέβζζηα βέκδ in this way, and in so 
far as they are spread through all other predicates and all reality, they reproduce this 
intertwinement in all things. But Plato‟s characterization also raises important questions. One 
of them is whether there are other highest genera that pervade all other predicates and all 
individual beings. In other texts, predicates such as “one”, “many”, and “good” seem to apply 
to all other predicates.
665
 Moreover, one must also wonder in what way these and other 
predicates (even those that are not highest genera) are intertwined not only with the ιέβζζηα 
βέκδ identified in the Sophist, but also with one another. Plato does not develop this, but his 
analyses suggest that the syntheses between εἴδδ are more intricate than we would 
immediately think. At any rate, this is not just a theorical problem. This intricateness is also 
reflected in our beliefs or, more precisely, in the way we understand (or claim to understand) 
the meaning of the general predicates. Whether we are aware of it or not, our understanding 
of any notion may imply many other notions and this is something we must be aware of when 
examining our beliefs. 
 
2.4. The extremely intricate system of beliefs and the eternal disease of discourse, 
according to the Philebus 
 
 We saw how, according to Philebus, there are at least some εἴδδ that are organized in 
classes and subclasses. However, this is not put forward as an isolated fact. On the contrary, it 
is presented as a particular modality of a general structure of reality (and also of our views or 
beliefs, though this is not expressly said in the text). This structure is said to cause many 
problems and perplexities, which Socrates and Protarchus briefly consider before coming to 
what we saw above.
666
 In fact, their discussion of this general structure of reality can be read 
as a summary of all the intertwinement of beliefs we just identified and it also allows us to 
determine how we normally relate to our beliefs and why we tend not to recognize their 
complexity. 
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offspring of the good, and illuminates and nurtures all sensible beings), and this means that it is the cause of 
truth and knowledge, as well as the source of being for all objects of knowledge. Consequently, even if the 
formulations are vague, the good seems to somehow pervade all other εἴδδ and all reality. 
666
 See 14c ff. 
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 The general structure identified by Socrates is expressed by the assertion that “the 
many are one and the one many” (and in fact “indefinitely many”, as is said afterwards).
667
 
This means that we never come into contact with a multiplicity that is not somehow 
integrated in an encompassing unity, and likewise we never find a unity or a simple moment 
of reality that is not in itself composed of multiple moments. Each predicate (one and many) 
turns out to be in itself its opposite. This structure pervades all things and it can be iterated 
many times over. The encompassing unity may itself be part of a multiplicity that is 
comprised by a higher unity. Likewise, any member of a multiplicity can be itself composed 
of a multiplicity whose elements are themselves multiple. There are, therefore, many levels 
and the matrix of intertwinement is present in all of them. 
 When Protarchus hears Socrates‟ description of the structure, he immediately thinks 
of the many predicates that he himself has – especially those that are relative and opposite to 
each other (tall and short, heavy and light). Socrates adds how one is also composed of 
different limbs and parts of a body. In both these cases, one being (i.e., one particular 
identity) is composed of many moments or predicates. But Socrates also says that the 
difficulties or puzzles caused by these intertwinements are commonplace, childish and 
trivial.
668
 In other words, they are easy to identify. There are other that are not so accessible, 
though – namely, those that concern the unities that are not sensible or individual beings (or 
as Plato says, that “do not come to be and do not perish”). He seems to be referring to the 
εἴδδ (the common predicates or common modes of being) and the examples provided confirm 
it: he talks of “man as one”, “ox as one”, “the beautiful as one”, and the “good as one”.
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Some of these are empirical (man and ox) and more clearly composed of multiple moments, 
others (such as the beautiful and the good) are sometimes identified in other dialogues as 
simple and fundamental εἴδδ. Socrates is thus referring to all kinds of general modes of 
being, which raise several questions – especially, whether they really exist (and in what way), 
whether they are always the same, and how they can be scattered in many instances of the 
same.
670
 Still, it seems to be a fact that each of them, despite their unity, is also many (and in 
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 See 14c: “(...) ἓκ βὰν δὴ ηὰ πμθθὰ εἶκαζ ηαὶ ηὸ ἓκ πμθθὰ (...)”. See also 14e: “(...) ηό ηε ἓκ ὡξ πμθθά ἐζηζ ηαὶ 
ἄπεζνα, ηαὶ ηὰ πμθθὰ ὡξ ἓκ ιόκμκ.” 
668
 See 14d: “ζὺ ιέκ, ὦ Πνώηανπε, εἴνδηαξ ηὰ δεδδιεοιέκα η῵κ εαοιαζη῵κ πενὶ ηὸ ἓκ ηαὶ πμθθά, 
ζοβηεπςνδιέκα δὲ ὡξ ἔπμξ εἰπε῔κ ὏πὸ πάκηςκ ἢδδ ιὴ δε῔κ η῵κ ημζμύηςκ ἅπηεζεαζ, παζδανζώδδ ηαὶ ῥᾴδζα ηαὶ 
ζθόδνα ημ῔ξ θόβμζξ ἐιπόδζα ὏πμθαιαακόκηςκ βίβκεζεαζ (...).” 
669
 See 15a: “(...) ὅηακ δέ ηζξ ἕκα ἄκενςπμκ ἐπζπεζνῆ ηίεεζεαζ ηαὶ αμῦκ ἕκα ηαὶ ηὸ ηαθὸκ ἓκ ηαὶ ηὸ ἀβαεὸκ ἕκ 
(...).” 
670
 See 15b: “πν῵ημκ ιὲκ εἴ ηζκαξ δε῔ ημζαύηαξ εἶκαζ ιμκάδαξ ὏πμθαιαάκεζκ ἀθδε῵ξ μὔζαξ· εἶηα π῵ξ αὖ ηαύηαξ, 
ιίακ ἑηάζηδκ μὖζακ ἀεὶ ηὴκ α὎ηὴκ ηαὶ ιήηε βέκεζζκ ιήηε ὄθεενμκ πνμζδεπμιέκδκ, ὅιςξ εἶκαζ αεααζόηαηα ιίακ 
ηαύηδκ; ιεηὰ δὲ ημῦη᾽ ἐκ ημ῔ξ βζβκμιέκμζξ αὖ ηαὶ ἀπείνμζξ εἴηε δζεζπαζιέκδκ ηαὶ πμθθὰ βεβμκο῔ακ εεηέμκ, εἴε᾽ 
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fact indefinitely many), insofar as it can be instantiated many times. But there is more. 
Socrates proceeds to show how εἴδδ by themselves can be multiple, before being instantiated, 
as we considered above. They can be divided in subordinated εἴδδ. The only thing Socrates 
does not consider is how εἴδδ can themselves be predicated of each other, as was shown in 
the Sophist, which also constitutes a form of inner multiplicity.   
 For all these reasons, everything we ever represent is complex and involved in many 
intertwinements. Any particular moment of reality brings with it all others – and the same 
applies to our beliefs. When we represent something, we are always representing much more 
than that. Everything is part of a very complex system with many layers. Consequently, if we 
want to expressly think about some particular moment, we have to follow its multiple 
connections (or at least be tacitly aware of them). But precisely here lies the problem. 
Socrates talks of an “immortal and ageless condition [πάεμξ]” of discourse (θόβμξ).
671
 When 
we try to articulate something or expressly think about something, we tend to focus only on a 
part and abstract from the rest. We see it as autonomous, though it is still part of the system 
of which we lose sight. In order to counteract this, we must shift the focus to what was left 
out. But then we may also absolutize this new focus. According to Socrates, this is precisely 
what the young like doing in order to cause difficulties. They roll and unroll every statement, 
and transform the one into many and the converse.
672
 They isolate a moment and then convert 
it into the opposite. Both moments are always interconnected, but one can de-emphasize one 
or the other – and if one confronts the two abstract statements of something (one emphasizing 
unity and the other multiplicity), then there seems to be a contradiction and a particular thing 
seems inconceivable.  
 Express beliefs tend to be abstract in this way. They generally do not include the 
whole system of which we are tacitly aware. This is why it is important to determine as 
exactly as possible the complexity of things, the number and identity of moments that 
compose them – in order to have as much as possible an expert knowledge of a particular 
moment or domain of reality.
673
 One cannot simply see a unity or an indefinite multiplicity. It 
                                                                                                                                                        
ὅθδκ α὎ηὴκ α὏η῅ξ πςνίξ, ὃ δὴ πάκηςκ ἀδοκαηώηαημκ θαίκμζη᾽ ἄκ, ηα὎ηὸκ ηαὶ ἓκ ἅια ἐκ ἑκί ηε ηαὶ πμθθμ῔ξ 
βίβκεζεαζ.” 
671
 See 15d: “ηαὶ ημῦημ μὔηε ιὴ παύζδηαί πμηε μὔηε ἢνλαημ κῦκ, ἀθθ᾽ ἔζηζ ηὸ ημζμῦημκ, ὡξ ἐιμὶ θαίκεηαζ, η῵κ 
θόβςκ α὎η῵κ ἀεάκαηόκ ηζ ηαὶ ἀβήνςκ πάεμξ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ (...)”. 
672
 See 15e: “(...) πάκηα ηζκε῔ θόβμκ ἅζιεκμξ, ημηὲ ιὲκ ἐπὶ εάηενα ηοηθ῵κ ηαὶ ζοιθύνςκ εἰξ ἕκ, ημηὲ δὲ πάθζκ 
ἀκεζθίηηςκ ηαὶ δζαιενίγςκ (...)” 
673
 This is precisely what Socrates goes on to illustrate, when talking about such ηέπκαζ as βναιιαηζηή and 
ιμοζζηή, in which one must identify all the classes and subclasses of letters and sounds. Cp. Sect. 2.3 a) above. 
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is necessary to determine the precise composition of something if we are to have some sort of 
appropriate access to it. 
 
2.5. The special place and role of our beliefs about how to act and how to live 
 
 The whole presentation up to this point, by focusing on individual beings and their 
predicates, may suggest that the intricate system of beliefs that shape our way of seeing 
things is only concerned with things insofar as they are objects of knowledge or 
contemplation. However, this does not exhaust the whole of our reality. We also have to act 
and live, and there is something like a domain of action and life. This domain is not 
something juxtaposed to the domain of knowledge. They are not two domains side by side. 
Rather, they are also intertwined and this intertwinement determines our system of beliefs in 
its entirety. All beliefs (as well as the things they refer to) are located in our life, as it were, 
and this is reflected in all of them. We will consider this in detail in Parts III and IV, but there 
are some aspects that we can anticipate, in order to complete the picture we drew in the 
previous pages. 
 To begin, the practical domain in the broadest sense (which includes not only our 
actions, but also our desires and all our life) is underpinned by many beliefs, as was already 
pointed out before. There are many δόλαζ or knowledge claims about what to do and these are 
also part of a complex system that requires us to determine many other things. For one, we 
must determine our circumstances and the things around us – which is done on the basis of 
the complex system of beliefs just considered. But we must also determine what life is all 
about. We must have an understanding (however tacit it might be) of life‟s structure and 
requirements. This also involves common predicates or εἴδδ of a practical or ethical kind, that 
not only determine the practical nature of particular acts or circumstances (for instance 
whether they are just or not, brave or not), but also constitute the identity or perfect pattern of 
what we pursue in particular instances. In other words, our understanding of these ethical 
predicates guides us in life. Amongst them, the form of the good is central, and it always 
requires a particular identification in the context of our life, as we will see.
674
 This core of 
practical or life-related beliefs (which constitutes the most important matters or ηὰ ιέβζζηα 
often mentioned in the dialogues) is then unfolded in a complex system of practical beliefs 
that determine our course in life and the practical relevance of the individual beings around 
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 These practical predicates are an additional layer of qualification of things. They are 
added to their identity and their non-practical predicates, and they determine our interest in 
each thing and how we deal with it.  
 Reality and the beliefs through which we see it are thus composed of cognitive and 
practical moments. Their coexistence, however, raises several questions about how they 
relate to each other and to what extent they influence the content of one another. We will 
discuss this in detail later, but for now we can already see some of the more patent relations 
of dependence. For one, some practical beliefs directly depend on how we represent our 
circumstances and things around us, as was said. But they also affect how we see things at 
large, especially by guiding our interest. This then affects how we look at things, what we 
pay attention to and how much attention we pay to it. Consequently, it influences the        
non-practical beliefs we have about these things. For instance, if something is regarded as 
irrelevant, we will look at it only superficially and we will not focus on it in order to properly 
ascertain its properties. If a thing is just a little relevant, we may pay some attention to its 
general aspect, but not to the details (which may well lead us to miss something important 
about it). 
 To be sure, this still presupposes a strict separation between practical and non-
practical beliefs, as if they were two autonomous domains. But it is also possible that they 
coincide in some way (for instance, in the sense that some inner property of things may be 
already understood as related to life). Furthermore, it is not clear whether one kind of belief 
can generate the other (instead of just affecting or influencing it). The precise relation 
between our life as a practical task and our way of seeing things is very difficult to define, but 
we must pay special attention to it if we are to understand the real content and the real extent 
of our beliefs.  
 Finally, it is important to keep in mind that, from the standpoint of philosophical 
examination, the beliefs that are related to our life and to how we are to live it are not just 
some beliefs among others, but they often play a central role – so much so that the 
examination is sometimes described as an examination of one‟s life or αίμξ.
676
 This reflects 
not only the way the life-related beliefs determine all others, but also how our primary 
interest is our own life and how to live it (though the fact that we are interested in this may 
itself be the result of a belief or set of beliefs). 
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 For the notion of ηὰ ιέβζζηα, see e.g. Ap. 22d, Alc. I 118a-b, Grg. 451d, Lg. 688c-d. 
676




3. The vastness of our beliefs and the project of a global examination 
 
 In the previous chapter, we considered how philosophical examination is an 
examination of views, and primarily of those views we endorse or which constitute beliefs of 
ours. The notion of belief is indeed central and even the views we do not subscribe at a given 
moment are seen by us as possible beliefs. However, saying that the examination is an 
examination of beliefs does not ensure that we identify exactly what is at issue. Therefore, we 
turned our attention to the complexity of our beliefs and considered how diverse and 
numerous they can be. In a first moment, we considered how most of our beliefs are tacit and 
thus not in the spotlight of our mind. This makes it all the more difficult to identify and 
determine them. In a second moment, we considered how most of our beliefs (if not all) are 
far from being simple or autonomous. They are not juxtaposed to other beliefs, but are 
combined and intertwined with them. Different beliefs determine each other and we can even 
talk of a global system of beliefs, in which each particular moment is somehow determined 
by many (if not even all) others.  
 The result of these considerations is that philosophical examination as Plato conceives 
it is much more difficult than we may immediately think, since its object is much more vast 
and complex than what might be suggested when we talk about views or beliefs. The analyses 
just made offer a glimpse into this vastness and complexity, but nothing more. Most of the 
work of identifying our beliefs is still to be done – and this is indeed a necessary stage of 
philosophical examination. The verification of our beliefs requires us to first identify them or 
and make an inventory of them. We need not only to verify all our beliefs, but also to identify 
them all. 
 To be sure, Plato also identifies some beliefs as playing a special part in our system of 
beliefs. On the one hand, some beliefs are presuppositions of many others and have a vast 
influence in the whole system. The beliefs about εἴδδ, for instance, determine all their 
particular instances, and the beliefs about the highest genera determine all εἴδδ and all 
individual beings. In this sense, one should perhaps start with these more general beliefs, 
since they affect everything else. On the other hand, the practical or life-related beliefs also 
play a very important role, insofar as they determine our relation with everything, even with 
our beliefs and the examination of them. These two kinds of belief (the main presuppositions 
and the life-related beliefs) have thus global influence in our system of beliefs and the 
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consequences of their examination may likewise be global. Therefore, it seems obvious that 
we should start with them. But this will not yet conclude the examination, not only because 
there are more beliefs beyond these (which may also have some importance), but also 
because our beliefs may contain many defects, which will require us to examine alternate 
views and perhaps even all possible views about the same matters.
677
 It is difficult to 
anticipate how extensive the whole process will be, but what we saw in this chapter allows us 
to understand how naive and inadequate our immediate representation of philosophical 
examination usually is.  
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We saw that philosophical examination is intrinsically referred to our views or beliefs, 
which can be very complex and difficult to identify. We do not know exactly how we see 
things and this complicates the examination. But now we have to consider a different 
question. As a result of our distraction, our views may contain many limitations or defects of 
which we are not aware. The task of philosophical examination is to counteract this 
distraction and detect any limitations or defects in our views, as well as in any views at all we 
can conceive. For this reason, the conception of the defects of our views (i.e., of our cognitive 
frailty or finitude) is very important. It is intrinsically connected with the project of 
philosophical examination and guides it.
679
 In order to properly examine, we must be aware 
of the kinds of defects we are looking for. 
We can determine Plato‟s conception of our cognitive defects by returning to the 
notions of μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ and δόλα, and completing the analysis of Chapter II. As was said, 
both notions can be used in a more neutral sense, to characterize the object being examined, 
without anticipating the outcome of the examination; but they can also be used, in a 
pejorative sense, to say that some view of ours is nothing more than a mere μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ or 
a mere δόλα. In this case, these notions are contrasted with actual knowledge and denote a 
deviation or distortion in our access to things, which is ascertained precisely by philosophical 
examination. We will now discuss this negative sense of both notions and what it entails. We 
will consider and systematize the different contexts in which these notions are used in the 
negative sense, starting with μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ, whose usage is more generic. Afterwards we 
will see the usage and analysis of the term δόλα in Plato, which points in a more definite 
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 See v. 842. 
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 The conception of our cognitive defects will likewise play an important role in the description of the 
unexamined life, which is precisely characterized by these defects, as will be shown in Chap. 16 Sect. 5. 
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direction and gives us a more precise idea of the kind of defects that usually characterize our 
views. 
 
1. The description of the cognitive defects associated with the notion of νἴεζζαη εἰδέλαη 
 
As we have seen, our being is pervaded by innumerable knowledge claims. They 
shape our relation to everything. However, these knowledge claims can be (and in many 
cases are) unfounded or false. They can be no more than a knowledge claim without actual 
knowledge – or, as Plato says, a μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ μ὎η εἰδώξ.
680
 In that case, we only think we 
know, but we actually do not. We have only a vain or empty semblance of knowledge (a 
ιάηαζμξ δμλμζμθία), which does not allow us to see things as they are.
681
 On the contrary, it 
distorts things. The fact that this is possible – that one may be convinced of something that is 
not the case – requires elucidation. Beings that are ignorant of everything and have no idea of 
anything whatsoever are unable to believe that they know something when they do not. 
Likewise, an omniscient being would be impervious to false knowledge claims. The 
possibility of false knowledge claims lies somewhere in between. It is an intermediate state 
between these two extremes. But what does it amount to? 
If one tries to imagine an intermediate state between the two possibilities just 
mentioned, one will probably think of a state in which one knows some things (either 
explicitly or implicitly) and does not know others, in such a way that the relation with any 
particular content is unambiguous – one either knows it or not. But this absolute separation of 
knowledge and ignorance cannot account for the mistake that is at the center of any false 
knowledge claim. In order to make such a mistake, we need to have a diagnosis of our 
cognitive state. This self-diagnosis is something we often make (either expressly or tacitly) 
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 Plato uses many formulations to express this. Aside from μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ μ὎η εἰδώξ (Ap. 21d), we can also 
find expressions such as: “δμηε῔κ ιὲκ εἶκαζ ζμθὸξ ἄθθμζξ ηε πμθθμ῔ξ ἀκενώπμζξ ηαὶ ιάθζζηα ἑαοηῶ, εἶκαζ δ᾽ μὔ” 
(Ap. 21c); “μἴμζημ ιὲκ εἶκαζ ζμθόξ, εἴδ δ᾽ μὔ” (ibidem); “μἰμιέκςκ ηαὶ ηἆθθα ζμθςηάηςκ εἶκαζ ἀκενώπςκ ἃ μ὎η 
ἤζακ” (22c); “μἰμιέκςκ ιὲκ εἰδέκαζ ηζ ἀκενώπςκ, εἰδόηςκ δὲ ὀθίβα ἠ μ὎δέκ” (23c); “μἰόιεκμξ ζμθὸξ εἶκαζ μ὎η 
ὤκ” (29a); “δμηε῔κ ζμθὸκ εἶκαζ ιὴ ὄκηα” (ibidem); “δμηε῔κ εἰδέκαζ ἐζηὶκ ἃ μ὎η μἶδεκ” (ibidem); “μἰόιεκμξ ιέκ ηζ 
εἰδέκαζ, εἰδὼξ δὲ ιή” (Chrm. 166d); “μἴεηαζ ιὲκ εἰδέκαζ, μἶδεκ δ᾽ μὔ” (167a); “἟βμύιεκμζ ιὴ εἰδέκαζ ἃ ιὴ 
ἴζαζζκ” (Ly. 218b); “μἴεζεαζ κμῦκ ἔπεζκ (...) μ὎η ἔπμκηαξ” (Cra. 406c); “μἰδζόιεεα εἰδέκαζ ὃ ιδδαιῆ ἴζιεκ” 
(Tht. 187c); “μ὎η μἰόιεκμξ εἰδέκαζ ἃ ιὴ μἶζεα” (Tht. 210c); “ηὸ ιὴ ηαηεζδόηα ηζ δμηε῔κ εἰδέκαζ” (Sph. 229c); 
“δμλάγςιεκ ιακεάκεζκ ιὲκ ηὰ θεβόιεκα παν᾽ ὏ι῵κ, ηὸ δὲ ημύημο βίβκδηαζ π᾵κ ημ὎κακηίμκ” (244a-b); “μἳ πενὶ 
ηὰ πμθζηζηὰ ηαη᾽ μ὎δὲκ βζβκώζημκηεξ ἟βμῦκηαζ ηαηὰ πάκηα ζαθέζηαηα παζ῵κ ἐπζζηδι῵κ ηαύηδκ εἰθδθέκαζ” 
(Plt. 302b); “μ὎η εἰδόηεξ ὡξ ἔπμξ εἰπε῔κ μ὎δέκ, μἰόιεεα ηὰ πάκηα εἰδέκαζ” (Lg. 732a-b); “ὡξ εἰδὼξ πακηεθ῵ξ 
πενὶ ἃ ιδδαι῵ξ μἶδεκ” (863c).  
681
 The expression appears in Sph. 231b6, in a passage that will be analyzed in Chap. 8. For the notions of 
δμλμζμθία or δμλμζμθόξ, see also Phdr. 275b, Phlb. 42a, 42d. 
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with respect to many things. We regard ourselves as knowing or as not knowing things.
682
 In 
the case of a knowledge claim, we regard ourselves as being in a good cognitive state (i.e., as 
a state of knowledge) with respect to something. However, this diagnosis (which is in most 
instances automatic) is not infallible and so it can make us think we know something when 
we do not. We are then related to something and take this relation to reveal the thing as it is, 
but it eludes our grasp nonetheless.   
There are, thus, three possible forms of ignorance. First, there is the one initially 
mentioned – namely, not having any idea whatsoever of something (i.e., not being aware of 
its existence at all). Secondly, one can have some notion that there is something and, at the 
same time, be aware that one does not know it. In this case, we have some relation to the 
object we are ignorant of, but we regard this relation as one of ignorance. We recognize the 
thing is hidden from us.
683
 Finally, there is the possibility of having a false knowledge claim. 
We then think we know and are totally wrong about it. This is a very particular form of 
ignorance, since it disguises itself as its opposite. As Plato says in the Laws (863c-d), it is a 
form of double ignorance (in contrast with the other forms of ignorance, which are simple). 
One is ignorant of something and one is ignorant of this ignorance too, instead experiencing it 
as knowledge.
684
 This in turn increases the distance from what things are. One is twice 
removed from them.  
 We find a more precise discussion of the matter in Sophist 226b-231b. We will 
analyze the whole passage in the following chapter, but we can briefly anticipate some 
central aspects here. Plato says that the soul sets for itself as a target the truth about beings, 
and he also says that the soul makes different assaults (ὁνιαί) to try to reach them. These 
assaults can hit the target (and thus produce knowledge) or they can swerve away from the 
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 These are in fact only two extreme possibilities. We can also regard ourselves as having a more or less 
doubtful view about something or we can be unsure about our cognitive state. These other possibilities, 
however, are not our usual cognitive state nor are they essential to explain what a false knowledge claim is and 
for that reason we will not consider them here. 
683
 This is the state we find ourselves with respect to many things that we recognize as being beyond our 
understanding – especially technical matters. Cp. e.g. Alc. I 117b-c, where Socrates says to Alcibiades that, with 
respect to these matters, “μ὎η μἴεζ α὎ηὸ ἐπίζηαζεαζ μ὎η ἐπζζηάιεκμξ”, “ἃ ιὴ ἐπίζηαζαζ, βζβκώζηεζξ δὲ ὅηζ μ὎η 
ἐπίζηαζαζ”, “μἶζεα δήπμο ὅηζ μ὎η μἶζεα”. This is also the state characters are often reduced to after being 
submitted to Socrates‟ cross-examination. It is, for instance, the state the slave in Meno finds himself in after 
being cross-examined, according to Socrates: “ὥζπεν μ὎η μἶδεκ, μ὎δ‟ μἴεηαζ εἰδέκαζ” (84b). He and other 
characters are no longer deluded about themselves, they are no longer ignorant of themselves, they become 
aware of their actual state. In this sense, they come to resemble Socrates, who in the Apology describes his 
general attitude as “μὗημξ ιὲκ μἴεηαί ηζ εἰδέκαζ μ὎η εἰδώξ, ἐβὼ δέ, ὥζπεν μὖκ μ὎η μἶδα, μ὎δὲ μἴμιαζ” (21d) or “ἃ 
ιὴ μἶδα μ὎δὲ μἴμιαζ εἰδέκαζ” (ibidem). 
684
 Or, in Plato‟s formulation, such ignorance happens “ὅηακ ἀιαεαίκῃ ηζξ ιὴ ιόκμκ ἀβκμίᾳ ζοκεπόιεκμξ ἀθθὰ 
ηαὶ δόλῃ ζμθίαξ, ὡξ εἰδὼξ πακηεθ῵ξ πενὶ ἃ ιδδαι῵ξ μἶδεκ”.  
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target and miss it.
685
 In the case of such a deflection (παναθμνά), one is ignorant of things or 
does not reach them. However, it is possible for one to miss and still believe that the target 
was hit.
686
 In such a case, one loses sight not only of what the thing is, but also of the fact that 
one lets it escape. One does not see one‟s state and this produces an obstruction of the thing 
itself far greater than if one had simply missed it. Plato carries the idea of deflection even 
further and associates false knowledge claims with παναθνμζύκδ. The word means madness, 
which is understood as a losing of one‟s mind (dementia). According to Plato, a false 
knowledge claim is a form of madness – i.e., of living in an illusory reality.
687
  
 Also particularly telling in this passage is the fact that Plato designates this form of 
ignorance as ἀιαεία. In Greek, this word is a strong insult. It means something like stupidity, 
folly, thickheadedness, slow-wittedness or boorishness. It refers to a form of ignorance that is 
due to one‟s incompetence or ineptitude. One should know the matter in question – either 
because it is easy or because it is very important and one should have made the effort to know 
it.
688
 Not knowing it is disgraceful, and Plato even increases this component of reproach by 
adding the adjective ἐπμκείδζζημξ. False knowledge claims are a blameworthy stupidity.
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This does not imply that one should know the objects to which the knowledge claims refer. 
What one should know is that one has merely a knowledge claim and no actual knowledge 
(or at the very least one should doubt whether one actually knows the thing in question). The 
very fact that we are convinced of knowing it is what constitutes this stupidity.
690
 Stupid 
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 See 228c: “ὅζ᾽ ἂκ ηζκήζεςξ ιεηαζπόκηα ηαὶ ζημπόκ ηζκα εέιεκα πεζνώιεκα ημύημο ηοβπάκεζκ ηαε᾽ ἑηάζηδκ 
ὁνιὴκ πανάθμνα α὎ημῦ βίβκδηαζ ηαὶ ἀπμηοβπάκῃ (...)”. See also 228c-d: “ηό βε ιὴκ ἀβκμε῔κ ἐζηζκ ἐπ᾽ ἀθήεεζακ 
ὁνιςιέκδξ [228δ] ροπ῅ξ, παναθόνμο ζοκέζεςξ βζβκμιέκδξ, μ὎δὲκ ἄθθμ πθὴκ παναθνμζύκδ.” This idea of the 
soul setting for itself a target is in keeping with the description of δόλα as a shooting directed at what things are. 
See Chap. 5 Sect. 1.5. 
686
 This is what corresponds to the notion of ηὸ ιὴ ηαηεζδόηα ηζ δμηε῔κ εἰδέκαζ, which appears in 229c. 
687
 For more on this, see Chap. 8 Sect. 1.2 below.  
688
 In some passages, stupidity is referred to the most important things in life – which are precisely those whose 
ignorance is more censurable. See e.g. Alc. I 118a-b and Prt. 358c4-5. The passage in Alc. I is also relevant for 
another reason. Socrates hesitates to tell Alcibiades that he is in a state of extreme ἀιαεία because of the very 
negative charge of the word. For more on the notion of ἀιαεία, see e.g. A. VERRALL (ed.), The Medea of 
Euripides, London, Macmillan, 1881, ad 223; R. ARCHER-HIND (ed.), The Timaeus of Plato, London, 
Macmillan & Co, 1888, ad 86b; F. CORNFORD, Plato’s Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato Translated with a 
Running Commentary, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937, re-ed. 1956, 346f.; E. DODDS (ed.),          
Plato Ŕ Gorgias, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959, ad 477b7; M. J. O‟BRIEN, The Socratic Paradoxes and the 
Greek Mind, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1967, 24, 26, 186-197; P. HUART, Le 
vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, 278f.; F. 
HIERONYMUS, Μελέηη. Uebung, Lernen und angrenzende Begriffe, vol. 2, Basel, Kung und Ochsé, 1970, 12; 
D. TARRANT, The Hippias Major. Attributed to Plato, New York, Arno Press, 1976, ad 290e; C. GOODEY, 
Mental Disabilities and Human Values in Plato‟s Late Dialogues, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 74 
(1992), 26-42.  
689
 See Ap. 29b and Alc. I 118a. 
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 Indeed, although it is not experienced as such, our false knowledge claims have a component of pretense or 
of giving oneself airs. They are a pretense or affectation of knowledge (a πνμζπμζε῔ζεαζ εἰδέκαζ, as Plato says 
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ignorance or ἀιαεία is thus a very specific cognitive state, which differs greatly both from 
simple ignorance (either conscious or unconscious) and from knowledge. When we have 
false knowledge claims, we do not suspect at all that we might not know. A false knowledge 
claim is experienced as knowledge, though it is in fact ignorance – and, in this sense, it is a 
form of qualified or aggravated ignorance.  
This is the most central aspect of the notion of false knowledge claim, but now we 
must determine in more detail the kind of defects that are associated with this notion and how 
it can characterize our way of seeing things. 
  
1.1. The formal or structural defect of νἴεζζαη εἰδέλαη 
 
To begin with, the very structure of a knowledge claim (of thinking one knows) is 
defective. This structural defect is not what Plato primarily stresses when he talks about 
knowledge claims, but it is always implied in his analyses, so it is important to isolate and 
define it.  
We saw that in and out of itself, a knowledge claim is neutral regarding its truth or 
falsehood. From the standpoint of philosophical examination, we can either be ignorant of the 
thing we think we know or we can actually know it. The only sure thing is that we have a 
claim. We proclaim our representation of something (sc. the way we determine it, the “thus” 
we posit) as a perfect access to what this thing is. However, this proclamation by itself is 
neutral with respect to its truth value. It may well be false. 
Plato, by emphasizing that it is a claim (something we think or believe), strongly 
dissociates it from actual knowledge, which would exclude the possibility of any defect. If we 
know something, this something cannot be different from what we know it to be. But a 
knowledge claim cannot guarantee that the way it sees things is appropriate. It cannot justify 
its claim in the way effective knowledge is supposed to be able to do. In fact, usually none of 
our knowledge claims is the result of the most stringent rational process. We are not aware of 
the reasons for things being as they are, we do not possess a full insight into them, and so we 
cannot really justify any of our claims. We cannot justify that it is thus and not otherwise. We 
are not even sure of what such a justification would amount to. Our knowledge claims have 
                                                                                                                                                        
for instance in Ap. 23d and Chrm. 173b). One passes oneself off for something one is not (namely, 
knowledgeable). One may do so consciously (as in Chrm. 155b), but it can also be (and often is) an unconscious 
act, which includes a component of self-deception that we will discuss later – see Chap. 17, Sect. 3.2 c).  
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an insufficient basis or a deficient foundation and this means they have a deficient contact 
with their object.  
It is true that a knowledge claim may be right – i.e., the thing may be as we represent 
it. In this sense, we may have knowledge. But this is not knowledge in the fullest sense of the 
word. It is not something of which we can be completely sure without adding something else 
to the claim. Moreover, in our normal state we cannot distinguish knowledge from mere 
knowledge claims. We cannot draw the boundary between what we actually know and what 
we only think we know. This means that even if we have some kind of knowledge (if we get 
something right), we relate to it in the mode of a knowledge claim. This knowledge claim 
may get it right and somehow know something, but not in the proper sense of the word. We 
do not have enough reasons to be sure about the way we see things. Objectively seen, what 
we have is no more than a conjecture – but we take it as knowledge. This is a hasty or rash 
judgment. We are satisfied with it and need not inquire any further. We accept some 
uncertain view as knowledge, which requires us not to see or to forget the possibility of it 
being otherwise. At the very least we must not take this possibility seriously. We do not 
experience it as a weakness – otherwise, if we were conscious of its frailty, we would 
probably lose our conviction. But we do not. We are fully convinced and need no sufficient 
proof. 
Our representation of things may thus be full of errors or distortions, even if we 
normally do not think about this possibility. The defective form of knowledge claims (i.e., the 
fact that they have false credentials) opens the door to this. The formal defect can translate 
into many material defects.
691
 Our views can be mere subjective views, valid only for 
ourselves, but having no contact with reality. All our way of seeing things may be wrong 
from top to bottom. This is a possibility that our knowledge claims, on account of their 
formal limitation or defect, cannot exclude. 
The problem, however, can be even more serious. The formal defect is a defect in how 
we determine our cognitive condition. We do not notice the lack of grounds for our belief. 
                                                 
691
 The distinction here mentioned between a formal and a material component of our knowledge claims (and 
thus the distinction between formal and material defects) is inspired by Kant‟s analysis of judgment or 
knowledge, especially by his discussion of prejudices (Vorurtheile). In his reflections on logic (I. KANT, Logik, 
in: IDEM, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 16, Berlin/Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1924), Kant uses several times the 
distinction between formal and material in this sense. See in particular reflections 1971, 2152, 2562, 2677. 
Reflection 2562 is of particular interest. Kant says: “Praeiudicium est vitium cognitionis formale.” This is 
precisely what is at issue in Plato. Knowledge claims are prejudices or prejudgements, since the latter are what 
happens “[w]enn aus einem unzureichenden Grunde ohne Untersuchung etwas vor wahr gehalten wird” (see 
Reflection 2515). For Kant‟s analysis of prejudices or “prejudgments”, see Reflections 2515ff.  
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But does this also of necessity imply a defect in our representation of the object? The modal 
defect raises the question of whether we can have an imperfect access to something that is 
somehow right – or whether this modal imperfection (the unjustified certainty of a thesis or 
notion) is by itself a form of deviation. What precisely does a knowledge claim lack in 
comparison with simple and perfect knowledge? What results from the lack of justification? 
And what changes when we confirm a belief and exclude the possibility of it being false? 
But perhaps we cannot just ask these questions in general, about all knowledge 
claims. Indeed, it must be borne in mind that knowledge claims can be mainly of two kinds, 
as we already mentioned. They can concern either the attribution of predicates or εἴδδ 
(whether we distribute them correctly or not) or the way we understand these predicates. In 
the first kind, we think we attribute a predicate correctly (that there is a δζακέιεζκ ὀνε῵ξ), 
whereas in the second kind we believe we comprehend clearly what some predicate is (what 
Plato calls μἴεζεαζ ζοκζέκαζ). This means that there are also two kinds of distortion or 
deviation. On the one hand, we may make an error (ἁιανηάκεζv) in attributing a predicate, 
but fully understand the predicate we are attributing; on the other hand, we may either have 
no more than a hazy understanding of some notion (i.e., it may be unclear or ἀζαθήξ to us) or 
we may misunderstand it altogether. Conversely, one may be right about the attribution of a 
predicate without having sufficient grounds for it (in which case the only problem is that we 
cannot exclude that it is otherwise). As to the claim to understanding, things are more 
complicated. Being right about the meaning of a predicate without having a full access to it 
(without being absolutely clear about it) seems to necessarily imply some form of deviation. 
We do not fully understand the eidetic content at issue.
692
 This is particularly important if we 
consider that this second kind of knowledge claims (the claims to understanding) are what 
Plato has primarily in mind, not only because they affect all attributions, but also because we 
have many strong beliefs in this domain and they often have very little justification. 
 At any rate, it seems to be certain that our beliefs often (if not always) contain a 
formal defect, which corresponds to the tendency to be certain about our views without 
having sufficient grounds for it. This tendency is what philosophical examination is supposed 
to invert. It must ask for the credentials of our knowledge claims, confirm the true ones and 
disavow the false ones (either because things are not as they represent them or because we 
cannot confirm them as actual knowledge), thus bringing us to a state in which we only think 
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 We will see this problem in more detail when we discuss the pejorative sense of δόλα, which is associated 
precisely with this kind of defect. See Sects. 2.3 and 2.4 below. 
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we know what we actually know.
693
 This overcomes the formal defect and closes the door to 
any material defect (to any false knowledge claims). Our knowledge claims can then become 
more than claims, they can become effective knowledge, and we also become aware of our 
ignorance with respect to that we do not fully know. This may entail the loss of many beliefs, 
but it is important to remark that the state of conscious ignorance also implies a reduction of 
our deviation from what things are and thus brings us closer to them.
694
 But let us leave this 
question aside for now. 
 
1.2. The material defect of our νἴεζζαη εἰδέλαη. The way of exposing false conceit 
of knowledge in the Platonic corpus 
 
According to Plato‟s writings, the problem with our knowledge claims is not only that 
we have no reason to exclude that they are false (which, by itself, would be enough to raise 
suspicion about them). If this were the case, it could very well happen that examination 
would confirm that we all our beliefs (whether they refer to the attribution of predicates or the 
understanding of them) get it right and are true. But this is not what we find in the dialogues. 
The defects presented and discussed in them are not simply formal or modal. Plato 
documents many errors and much confusion or incomprehension. The characters‟ beliefs 
collapse under close inspection and are revealed as nothing more than vain conceit of 
knowledge. One is ignorant of many things and one is also ignorant of the fact that one is 
ignorant. 
What we must now consider is how false or baseless knowledge claims are identified, 
displayed or documented in the dialogues, and what this display reveals about our knowledge 
claims and their possible defects.
695
 This will also give us a better idea of how the 
examination is performed. Particularly relevant in this context are the characters‟ reactions to 
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 Plato points explicitly to this in several passages. For instance, in Sph. 230c3-4 he describes the result of the 
examination as a state of “ηαῦηα ἟βμύιεκμκ ἅπεν μἶδεκ εἰδέκαζ ιόκα, πθείς δὲ ιή”. For this, however, one needs 
to absolutely disavow one‟s defective views and abandon all commitment to them, even at the tacit level, which 
may prove to be more difficult than we think (as we will see in Chap. 8, Sects. 3.3 and 3.4). 
694
 It is true that there is also the risk of abandoning correct beliefs only because we cannot prove them. This is a 
problem we will have to return later, when considering the usefulness and the risks of philosophical  
examination – see Chap. 20, Sect. 3.5 below. But in any case the fact that they are beliefs (i.e., knowledge 
claims) already implies some defect, and by putting them in question we can achieve a better and more solid 
view about the matters at issue.  
695
 The documentation of material defects in our knowledge claims (i.e., of the fact that we have at least some 
vain conceit of knowledge) is not something to which we as readers should be indifferent. These defects affect 
the characters‟ views, but they can likewise affect ours, either because our views are similar to theirs or because, 
despite all the differences, they are likewise defective. This is something we have to verify in ourselves. 
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their apparent displays of ἀιαεία. In general, there are two parties involved. On the one hand, 
we have the examiner (usually Socrates), who elicits statements, guides the examination and 
often reflects about its course and its outcome. On the other hand, there is the examinee, who 
gives answers and reacts to what is happening – often resisting the apparent result of the 
examination (i.e., the refutation of one‟s view and the way this appears to expose one‟s stupid 
ignorance or ἀιαεία). Thus, Socrates and the examinee may have different interpretations of 
the course of examination and its results. This suggests that what is revealed by examination 
is actually ambiguous. But is it really so? How should we interpret what happens in these 
examinations? What is the value of the supposed displays of stupid ignorance and of the 
examinee‟s reaction to these displays? 
 
a) Ways of exposing false knowledge claims in the corpus 
 
We find in the corpus different ways of exposing (or attempting to expose) that 
someone possesses false knowledge claims. The different processes employed are not equally 
successful in displaying someone‟s lack of knowledge (especially from the standpoint of the 
characters being refuted), but they all strongly suggest that there is something seriously 
wrong with the characters‟ views. We will discuss afterwards what these attempts appear to 
prove and what they actually prove. But for now we will consider the very attempts to expose 
someone‟s false conceit of knowledge. 
 One possible way of exhibiting or exposing someone‟s false conceit of knowledge is 
related to one‟s actions (one‟s πνάλεζξ or ἔνβα) or one‟s way of life. This is mentioned or 
alluded to in the texts several times. Some limitations or defects in the practical domain 
betray the fact that there are defects or distortions in our knowledge claims. This is possible 
because our actions and the way we lead our life are based in knowledge claims, as we 
considered before.
696
 This means that these knowledge claims are accompanied by a claim to 
practical efficiency and, consequently, any mistake or failure (ἁιάνηδια) in our action (i.e., 
any missing the target of action) must therefore be due to our lacking the knowledge or 
insight we thought we had.
697
 In other words, practical errors refute one‟s knowledge claims. 
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 See Chap. 6, Sect. 1.2a). 
697
 This is emphasized by Plato in many occasions. See e.g. Alc. I 117d ff. and Rep. 505d ff. In Laws 863c-d, it 
seems to be admitted that some practical errors can be owed to simple ignorance (probably because one was 
forced to act despite lacking any conviction), but these are nonetheless very small errors. All the major blunders 
are caused by the double ignorance or the vain conceit of knowledge. Furthermore, Plato emphasizes several 
times that if one had true insight into a certain reality or domain of reality (in particular if one had a ηέπκδ 
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 This description, however, is somewhat imprecise. According to the corpus, the ways 
of exposing one‟s false conceit of knowledge by referring to what happens in the practical 
domain are actually diverse and complex. Sometimes Socrates points to the possibility of one 
not being able to present the credentials of one‟s knowledge: the works one has done, one‟s 
teacher, and one‟s students.
698
 Other times we may come to realize that we have concerned 
ourselves with the wrong things (i.e., we may have a wrong view about what matters in life) 
and have thus neglected what matters the most – in particular, ourselves.
699
 The result of this 
neglect is that we lack excellence or virtue (ἀνεηή). Cowardice, injustice, lack of restraint and 
stupidity can therefore be interpreted as a result of false knowledge claims. In other words, 
our whole character may prove our cognitive competence or incompetence, according to 
Plato.
700 
But the proof of our incompetence may also concern what happens in a particular 
moment. We may notice an inner conflict in our action and we may be pulled by different 
drives. We may even seem to act against our better judgment and lack any control of our 
actions. According to Plato, this apparent ἀηνάηεζα implies that there are different beliefs in 
us (either in different moments or at the same time), forcing us in different directions. 
Consequently, at least one of these beliefs must be wrong.
701
 Finally, even if nothing goes 
manifestly wrong in what we do, we may still face difficulties if we are called to account for 
our action and everything that is relevant for determining it.
702
 At best, we possess a correct 
δόλα about it, without full knowledge – and this is problematic, because it is equivalent to a 
form of divine inspiration or madness, of which one has no control. One gets it right but one 
does not know how. In some cases, one cannot even be sure. Getting it right might have been 
a matter of chance and not of correct judgment.
703
 The inability to explain one‟s actions thus 
reveals that there is some defect in our knowledge claims, some degree of not grasping things 
as they are. 
                                                                                                                                                        
regarding something), one would not be able to fail in this respect (at least if one would act according to the 
precepts of this ηέπκδ). See e.g. Chrm. 171d ff. and Rep. 340d ff. 
698
 Cp. in particular La. 185b ff. 
699
 This is what Socrates says he usually shows others (cp. Ap. 29d ff.) and it is what Alcibiades comes to realize 
in Alc. I 118a ff. 
700
 This association between all forms of ηαηία and false knowledge claims is implied in the equation of ἀνεηή 
with knowledge (cp. e.g. La. 199c-e, Men. 86d ff., Prt. 329c ff.) and in the fact that we can only act defectively 
(ηαη῵ξ) if we have defective knowledge claims (as is said for instance in Alc. I 117a ff.). 
701
 Cp. e.g. Prt. 352b ff. We will not discuss here whether or not Plato changed his understanding of the 
phenomenon at issue. For a discussion of Plato‟s analysis of ἀηνάηεζα, cp. Chap. 12, Sect. 5.5 and Chap. 13, 
Sect. 5.3 below.  
702
 The whole Euthyphro, for instance, is an illustration of how difficult it may be to explain one‟s intended 
action. 
703
 For more on the notion of correct δόλα, see Sect. 2.3 below. 
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 All these practical problems demonstrate (or at least strongly suggest) that we do not 
know exactly what we are doing. But all these demonstrations are problematic, since our 
practical shortcomings can be more or less easy to identify (and usually we identify them 
only in retrospect). In addition, even if we identify them, we may not see exactly where we 
failed (i.e., which particular view was wrong). We can only know that something must be 
wrong with our views. Besides, we depend on the “theoretical” reflection (i.e., the explicit 
consideration or focusing of things) in order to identify and interpret the practical moments 
that expose one‟s false knowledge claims. This means that the theoretical domain and the 
way one‟s stupid ignorance is exposed therein are absolutely decisive. 
 So how are our defective knowledge claims exposed in the “theoretical” domain – i.e., 
the domain of rational discussion (θόβμξ)? If we look at the dialogues, we see that usually 
someone is required to present and explain his view about something. Before being 
questioned, one perhaps did not think about whether one knew something or not. Usually we 
all have the idea that we know enough, without being fully aware of all the elements we 
know. We are not concerned with searching for more. This is also the state the characters are 
often in. But when they are questioned about something, they are confident they can 
articulate their views and explain them. As we have seen, this intellectual bravado is a 
consequence of the claim to knowledge as such. One acts as knowledgeable, and this implies 
mastering the knowledge one has and being able to prove one has it. If we cannot prove it 
then something may be rotten in our set of knowledge claims.  
 But before discussing the meaning of this failure, let us see how it is illustrated in the 
corpus. The characters‟ ἀιαεία is often exposed and the process of doing so has a general 
pattern, which does not exclude some important differences, especially between the way of 
examining one‟s attribution of predications and the way of examining the understanding one 
has of these predicates. We will pay some attention to these differences, but since the 
examination in the texts often concerns the claims to understanding (insofar as the characters 
are usually called to define some important notion, either from the start, or because some 
other discussion leads them to this), we will pay special attention to the particular features of 
this second kind of examination.
704
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 This does not mean that attributions are not important. In fact, from the standpoint of life, the attribution of 
predicates is essential, since it allows to define things and what to do. Plato recognizes this, but he is well aware 
of how these attributions always hinge on our understanding of the notions we attribute to particular beings in 
order to define them. 
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 When examining a claim to understanding, the first problem usually is the examinee‟s 
inability to comprehend the question that is being posed to him. He does not comprehend that 
Socrates is asking for a definition of a particular notion and not an enumeration of the 
different things it applies to.
705
 The examinee may even be unaware that he has a notion (i.e., 
a certain understanding) of a particular predicate – despite the fact that he is constantly 
employing it. Other times, someone uses the term that is to be defined in the definition 
itself.
706
 So the examination (and in particular the examination of one‟s notions) requires 




After identifying and presenting one‟s understanding (or the attribution of a particular 
predicate to something), one may be convinced that one‟s view is adequate and clear enough. 
The examiner, however, does not easily accept it. He resists and asks further questions. He 
requires clarification about what was said, and inquires especially about the presuppositions 
(὏πμεέζεζξ) and the consequences (ηὰ ζοιααίκμκηα) of a particular view. He inquires 
likewise about the examinee‟s views in other matters closely related to these (either about 
different things or notions or about some particular thing being an instance of a concept or 
not – which will actually test the extension of the definition put forward). He can then 
examine these other views and their precise content. This is important since our first and 
usual contact with our views is distracted and unaware of their precise content – and given 
the interconnection of our views, it is not possible to have an appropriate access to any of 
them without seeing other views with which they are intertwined. 
Throughout the whole process, the examiner requires the assent of the examinee. They 
must establish agreements (ὁιμθμβίαζ) and the examinee must stand by them, since the 
subsequent examination will be based on these previous agreements. The affirmation of 
views and their unfolding ends up revealing inconsistencies or contradictions either within a 
particular knowledge claim (regarding its content and what is presupposed or entailed by this 
content) or between different knowledge claims one holds at the same time and their 
respective implications. In many cases, this implies the presentation of occurrences of a 
notion that do not fit the definition put forward, or also things that fit the definition, but are 
not accepted as instances of the notion – thus implying that one actually has a different 
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 Cp. e.g. Men. 71d ff., Tht. 146c ff. 
706
 See e.g. Hp. Ma. 287e. The last attempted definition of knowledge in Theaetetus also turns out to imply the 
same kind of mistake. Cp. 209d ff. 
707
 In comparison, the examination of the attribution of predicates seems simpler. One presupposes the 
understanding of one or several notions and simply has to affirm or deny the attribution. 
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understanding of the notion, which is either broader or narrower.
708
 In other cases, the 
conflict is between views in different matters that have incompatible consequences.
709
 At any 
rate, as the Visitor says in the Sophist (in a passage we will consider in detail in the following 
chapter), one subscribes views that “are simultaneously contrary to themselves about the 
same things in regard to the same things in the same respects”.
710
 This is what exhibits the 
falsity of one‟s views. The impossibility of contradiction seems to be a constitutive structure 
of our mind.
711
 Any view must define things as being in a particular way and not otherwise. 
Knowledge requires a clear and unambiguous content. When this is not the case, when the 
views put forward turn out to posit incompatible contents, one is not thinking anything 
precise by them. They lack inner harmony or ζοιθςκε῔κ – i.e., they are in dissonance 
(δζαθςκε῔κ) or disharmony and this turns one‟s statements into a meaningless talk. This is 
what is revealed by the discussion. By focusing on the views presented, the examination 
cancels out the confusion and compartmentalization of someone‟s mind. It puts someone‟s 
different views side-by-side and renders their interrelations intuitive.
712
 Thus the 
contradictions that were hidden in these views are brought to light, much to the surprise of 
the examinee – which only goes to prove how vague his contact with these views was.  
The scope of what is thus exhibited or brought to light is not clear, though. Does this 
mean there is a contradiction in our own views or in our formulation of them? The characters 
tend to reaffirm their conviction and insist that they know. Their tacit conviction and the 
profession of knowledge stands. They disregard the failure and try to state their views 
differently, presenting them from a different angle. They start again, as if from the beginning, 
but often this does not cause them to completely review the beliefs initially put forward. In 
general, they simply replay some move (as if in a game of strategy) – i.e. recant their answer 
to one of the previous questions.
713
 In other words, their correction generally involves the 
least amount of variation possible. They stand by as many of the views previously stated as 
possible. Some things may change considerably, but often many of the ὏πμεέζεζξ remain 
untouched. At any rate, the characters put forward different formulations and different 
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 For the first kind of counterexamples, see e.g. La. 190e-191e. As for the second, cp. e.g. Rep. 331c-d.  
709
 See e.g. Phd. 92c-e. 
710
 Sph. 230b7-8: “(...) α὎ηὰξ [sc. ηὰξ δόλαξ] α὏ηα῔ξ ἅια πενὶ η῵κ α὎η῵κ πνὸξ ηὰ α὎ηὰ ηαηὰ ηα὎ηὰ ἐκακηίαξ”. I 
follow Bernardete‟s translation (see S. BENARDETE, The Being of the Beautiful. Plato‟s Theaetetus, Sophist, 
and Statesman, Chicago/London, The University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
711
 Plato formulates it as a general principle in Rep. 602e: “μ὎ημῦκ ἔθαιεκ ηῶ α὎ηῶ ἅια πενὶ ηα὎ηὰ ἐκακηία 
δμλάγεζκ ἀδύκαημκ εἶκαζ; – ηαὶ ὀνε῵ξ β᾽ ἔθαιεκ.” See also 436b and 436e f. 
712
 Cp. Sph. 230b, where the Visitor (referring to one‟s δόλαζ) speaks precisely of a “ηζεέκαζ παν‟ ἀθθήθαξ”.  
713
 See e.g. Chrm. 164c-d, Grg. 461d and 462a.  
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explanations and they seem to be equally satisfied with all of them at the time they present 
them. This fact, by itself, is rather suspicious (especially because it implies a contradiction 
between the different answers that are put forward and accepted). But this is not the only 
problem. The examination of the new answers actually tends to produce the same result: 
contradiction and rejection of one‟s answers.  
The process of revising one‟s views and seeing them being refuted one more time can 
be repeated several times. One constantly changes one‟s accounts – or, as Plato says, one 
roams about from one version to the other.
714
 There is no stability or fixedness in one‟s 
accounts. The different attempts to answer contradict each other and one was equally 
convinced of their respective truth. This ends up producing a state of ἀπμνία (of being 
blocked, not being able to come across) and aphasia.
715
 One is no longer able to state what 
one thinks. One is at a loss, perplexed and astonished. The discussion tends to end in    
silence – or Socrates may then try to introduce a new line of inquiry. 
 
b) The value of the failures to justify one’s knowledge claims 
 
 The characters‟ failure to justify their knowledge claims is not univocal and the 
dialogues illustrate how there can be different interpretations of this failure. The course of the 
examination strongly suggests that they have no knowledge and Socrates often insinuates as 
much. But the examinees are often not convinced and tend to insist. They formulate new 
answers, as was just said, and when these are refuted they still downplay their inability to 
explain or justify themselves and their knowledge claims. They tend not to interpret this as a 
symptom of not knowing – at least at first. They assume that there is some sort of gap 
between what they are able to say and what they know. Their conviction tends to remain 
unscathed. They simply cannot voice what they think.
716
 They are indeed surprised they 
cannot explain themselves, but they easily think that Socrates played some sophistical trick 
                                                 
714
 Plato‟s in fact expresses this constant change of view with several different images. For instance, he talks of 
a wandering around or rambling (πθακή) – see in particular Alc. I 116e ff., and also Ly. 213e, Hp. Mi. 372d-e, 
376c, Hp. Ma. 304c, Sph. 230b. In other instances, Plato compares it to a going around round in circles (see 
Euthphr. 15b and Tht. 200a) or a labyrinth (Euthd. 291d). One is like Proteus, constantly changing the shape of 
one‟s views (cp. Euthphr. 15d, Ion 541e, Euthd. 288b-c). The examiner himself (namely, Socrates) is compared 
to Daedalus, who built statues that could move. Likewise, the examiner can make the different attempts at a 
definition run away. See Euthphr. 11b ff., 15b. In addition, the whole discussion can be compared to a tempest 
at sea (cp. e.g. La. 194c). 
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 Cp. e.g. Hp. Ma. 298c, Me. 79e ff., Sph. 244a.  
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 They blame the examiner and the way he examines – not themselves. When 
Socrates is not present, they do not find it difficult to talk about these matters.
718
 Sometimes 
they say that they will be able to correct their mistakes afterwards, either by their own 
reflection or with the aid of someone else.
719
 The present ἀπμνία pales in comparison with 
their past and future ε὎πμνία, and so they maintain their knowledge claims. As a result, the 
characters may simply dismiss the question or they may even respond vigorously.  
However, as was said, this is not the only possible reaction. Some characters seem to 
recognize, at least after being refuted several times, that the failure may be an expression of 
more than a superficial inability. They do not assign the blame to Socrates, but rather to 
themselves and their ignorance. They get angry at themselves and at the fact that they were 
previously convinced that they knew. They lose confidence, recognize that they really do not 
know and, as a result, their beliefs are dispelled.
 720
  
These different interpretations raise the question of how should we as readers interpret 
these failures to justify one‟s knowledge claims. What do the failures suggest about the 
characters‟ knowledge claims and what do they actually reveal? What is the significance of 
the characters‟ frequent resistance to them and how legitimate are they? 
If we look at the examinations performed, they are all based on the understanding that 
if one knows how to talk and one has true knowledge, one should be able to articulate, 
explain and justify this knowledge.
721
 Even if one is caught unprepared and needs to think 
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 The latter is indeed a frequent accusation throughout the Platonic corpus, formulated in different manners. 
Cp. e.g. Me. 79e ff., Grg. 482c ff., 489b-c, Rep. 338d. See also the Adeimantus‟ description of what Socrates‟ 
interlocutors often feel, in Rep. 480b-c: “ἀθθὰ βὰν ημζόκδε ηζ πάζπμοζζκ μἱ ἀημύμκηεξ ἑηάζημηε ἃ κῦκ θέβεζξ· 
἟βμῦκηαζ δζ᾽ ἀπεζνίακ ημῦ ἐνςη᾵κ ηαὶ ἀπμηνίκεζεαζ ὏πὸ ημῦ θόβμο παν᾽ ἕηαζημκ ηὸ ἐνώηδια ζιζηνὸκ 
παναβόιεκμζ, ἁενμζζεέκηςκ η῵κ ζιζην῵κ ἐπὶ ηεθεοη῅ξ η῵κ θόβςκ ιέβα ηὸ ζθάθια ηαὶ ἐκακηίμκ ημ῔ξ πνώημζξ 
ἀκαθαίκεζεαζ, ηαὶ ὥζπεν ὏πὸ η῵κ πεηηεύεζκ δεζκ῵κ μἱ ιὴ ηεθεοη῵κηεξ ἀπμηθείμκηαζ ηαὶ μ὎η ἔπμοζζκ ὅηζ 
θένςζζκ, μὕης ηαὶ ζθε῔ξ ηεθεοη῵κηεξ ἀπμηθείεζεαζ ηαὶ μ὎η ἔπεζκ ὅηζ θέβςζζκ ὏πὸ πεηηείαξ αὖ ηαύηδξ ηζκὸξ 
ἑηέναξ, μ὎η ἐκ ρήθμζξ ἀθθ᾽ ἐκ θόβμζξ· ἐπεὶ ηό βε ἀθδεὲξ μ὎δέκ ηζ ι᾵θθμκ ηαύηῃ ἔπεζκ.” 
718
 This is in fact the reason why Meno compares Socrates to a torpedo ray. Cp. in particular Men. 80a-b: “ηαὶ 
δμηε῔ξ ιμζ πακηεθ῵ξ, εἰ δε῔ ηζ ηαὶ ζη῵ραζ, ὁιμζόηαημξ εἶκαζ ηό ηε εἶδμξ ηαὶ ηἆθθα ηαύηῃ ηῆ πθαηείᾳ κάνηῃ ηῆ 
εαθαηηίᾳ· ηαὶ βὰν αὕηδ ηὸκ ἀεὶ πθδζζάγμκηα ηαὶ ἁπηόιεκμκ κανη᾵κ πμζε῔, ηαὶ ζὺ δμηε῔ξ ιμζ κῦκ ἐιὲ ημζμῦηόκ ηζ 
πεπμζδηέκαζ, κανη᾵κ· ἀθδε῵ξ βὰν ἔβςβε ηαὶ ηὴκ ροπὴκ ηαὶ ηὸ ζηόια κανη῵, ηαὶ μ὎η ἔπς ὅηζ ἀπμηνίκςιαί ζμζ. 
ηαίημζ ιονζάηζξ βε πενὶ ἀνεη῅ξ παιπόθθμοξ θόβμοξ εἴνδηα ηαὶ πνὸξ πμθθμύξ, ηαὶ πάκο εὖ, ὥξ βε ἐιαοηῶ 
ἐδόημοκ· κῦκ δὲ μ὎δ᾽ ὅηζ ἐζηὶκ ηὸ πανάπακ ἔπς εἰπε῔κ.” 
719
 Cp. Hp. Ma. 295a, 297e, and La. 200b-c. 
720
 The matter of who the characters blame for the refutation is decisive, as Plato himself stresses in Theaetetus 
and Sophist. One can assign blame to the examiner and so one will resist him or the blame may be assigned to 
oneself and one‟s ignorance, and this renders one docile to the examiner. On this matter, compare Ap. 23c, 39d, 
Tht. 149a, 150c-151a, 210c, and Sph. 230b. 
721
 The characters say that much in La. 190c: “[΢Ω] θαιὲκ ἄνα, ὦ Λάπδξ, εἰδέκαζ α὎ηὸ ὅηζ ἔζηζκ. [ΛΑ] θαιὲκ 
ιέκημζ. [΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ ὅ βε ἴζιεκ, ηἂκ εἴπμζιεκ δήπμο ηί ἐζηζκ. [ΛΑ] π῵ξ βὰν μὔ;” In Phd. 76d, they go even 
further, and say: “ἀκὴν ἐπζζηάιεκμξ πενὶ ὧκ ἐπίζηαηαζ ἔπμζ ἂκ δμῦκαζ θόβμκ ἠ μὔ; πμθθὴ ἀκάβηδ, ἔθδ, ὦ 
΢ώηναηεξ.” See also Chrm. 159a: “μ὎ημῦκ ημῦηό βε, ἔθδκ, ὃ μἴεζ, ἐπεζδήπεν ἑθθδκίγεζκ ἐπίζηαζαζ, ηἂκ εἴπμζξ 
δήπμο α὎ηὸ ὅηζ ζμζ θαίκεηαζ; ἴζςξ, ἔθδ.” 
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about it for a moment, one should be able to put it forward sooner or later. But if the views 
expressed end up being refuted, this strongly suggests that these views contain some serious 
defect. The account was provided and accepted by the examinee. Even if the examiner used 
some fallacy, the examinee accepted it and was unable to solve it. He accepted any small 
deviations that may have lead to contradictions. The problem is not simply that a particular 
person has no practice in dialectical discussions. Philosophical examination is not a type of 
game for which one may be more or less prepared, and which would be no serious indicator 
of anything else than one‟s ability for theoretical games. The examination is directly 
concerned with one‟s cognitive state and this is what is under scrutiny. Therefore, any failure 
in explaining them shows that these views are not absolutely clear for the examinee. There is 
at least some confusion, and he does not fully understand what he thinks he knows. He does 
not have knowledge in the fullest sense of the word. Even if there is something right in the 
views he has articulated, he has no clear notion and cannot dissociate it from what is 
wrong.
722
 And exactly how much knowledge (in a weaker sense of the word) can he still have 
in these circumstances? If it were just a small degree of haziness, some small imprecision, the 
examinee would not time and again accept contradictory statements about the matter at issue 
and replace them with other considerably different formulations. But the characters in the 
dialogues do precisely this.  
This does not necessarily mean that they have no contact whatsoever with what is 
being discussed. Especially in the case of their understanding of notions, the characters (just 
like everyone of us) seem to have at least some hints (some glimpses or inklings) about what 
something is. But they cannot avoid contradictions when they try to develop and explain 
them, and once all the explicit knowledge claims they put forward are refuted, they can notice 
that they have no more than a hazy contact with the reality at hand. This is what Plato shows 
in particular discussions about particular notions. He shows likewise that many important 
attributions of predicates are wrong or baseless. But this is not all. The dialogues also raise 
the suspicion that this kind of defect is actually much greater than what is revealed in the 
texts. It can affect many other notions and many other attributions. It may likewise be much 
more than an idiosyncratic feature of some characters. It can be the state we all find ourselves 
in. We may all think we know many things that we do not.  
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 Cp. Chrm. 165b: “(...) ἴζςξ ιὲκ βάν ηζ ζὺ ἔθεβεξ πενὶ α὎η῵κ ὀνεόηενμκ, ἴζςξ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ζαθὲξ δ᾽ μ὎δὲκ πάκο ἤκ 
ὧκ ἐθέβμιεκ (...).” 
251 
 
1.3. The different kinds of false knowledge claims and their possible range  
 
 After seeing how false knowledge claims are revealed in the corpus, it is important to 
see the full spectrum of possibilities that is opened by philosophical examination – not only 
the different kinds of false knowledge claim (to which we already alluded several times) but 
also their interrelation and the range they may have – i.e., how far the empire of ἀιαεία may 
reach. 
 Let us start by reviewing some of the indications given above about ἀιαεία or false 
conceit of knowledge and its different forms. We saw that ἀιαεία is opposed to simple 
ignorance. One must be convinced of knowing what one does not. It involves an error of 
cognitive self-diagnosis. In this sense, it is different from not being aware of something or 
simple incompleteness of knowledge. This does not involve an error (unless one wrongly 
believes one already knows everything there is to know in a certain domain).  
 We also saw that our knowledge claims as such are characterized by a formal or 
modal defect. We regard a certain view as absolutely certain or apodictic and yet have no 
sufficient grounds to exclude the possibility of things being otherwise. This incorrect 
formation of beliefs or knowledge claims does not necessarily imply an objective error (i.e., 
things may actually be as we think), but it opens the door to material defects. Without 
knowledge claims, there would be no cognitive errors. We would only accept what was fully 
given to us or, at the most, adopt some view because of practical necessity, but still being 
fully aware of its insufficient grounds. But this is not what we normally do – so our way of 
seeing things may come to have many defects. 
The defects are of two kinds. One of them corresponds to the error in attributing a 
predicate to something, which constitutes an error in the narrow sense. One attributes a 
predicate to something to which it does not belong (or one fails to attribute it to something to 
which it belongs). However, in this case, the predicates being employed are taken as         
non-problematic or self-evident. The problem is only the relation of attribution or             
non-attribution. 
A different form of false conceit of knowledge is the pseudo-understanding of a 
notion that is being predicated of other things. We may think we have a clear understanding 
of what some predicate is and yet have no more than a hazy or a fully inconsistent notion. 
Plato usually emphasizes this kind of defect and for good reasons. The comprehension of 
predicates or notions (i.e., of each letter of the alphabet with which reality is written) is 
252 
 
presupposed in all attributions and all entities. A deviation in this respect has therefore the 
most serious consequences for our access to things. Moreover, we tend not to think about this 
when we think about cognitive defects. We think about errors in the narrow sense, but this is 
also a kind of error, since it involves a judgment that excludes that things (or more precisely, 
the notions we think we understand) may be otherwise than we think. This judgment wrongly 
assumes the truth of its content and the fact that it understands it. 
However, the possible scope of defects in our knowledge claims are not restricted to 
particular attributions or particular predicates (along with all the attributions that depend on 
them). The intricate syntax of our understanding means that we can misunderstand not only 
each particular notion in itself (justice, beauty, and so on), but also the more general notions 
that qualify this notion (for instance, a particular class in which it is included or even the 
highest kinds presented in the Sophist, which qualify all notions). If we misunderstand these 
more generic notions, then all other notions which are determined by them will be distorted, 
as well as all particular entities that of which they are predicated. 
There are thus different ways in which a false knowledge claim may affect many 
others. Many knowledge claims (if not all) imply in themselves, as their assumptions or 
὏πμεέζεζξ, other knowledge claims. This means that, even if the defect does not concern the 
core of a knowledge claim, it may still affect it insofar as any of the knowledge claims 
implied therein may be false. It may also happen that several or even all knowledge claims 
that are relevant for a particular moment of reality (or for a particular notion) are wrong, 
which will produce a heightened form of deviation in our way of seeing this moment of 
reality. In sum, the complex syntactic relations of our beliefs make it possible for any 
knowledge claim to be defective in multiple regards. 
The false conceit of knowledge may thus have very different amplitudes, according to 
all these different factors. It may affect part of our knowledge claims and, in that case, the 
defect will be confined to some particular attributions and perhaps some particular notions. 
But even some false knowledge claims may have serious impact in our way of seeing things, 
if they happen to be some of the basic assumptions that determine all others. They may also 
fully derail our life, if they perchance concern decisive moments or the most important 
matters. In addition, one may have false views about all other matters – i.e., all other beings 
and all other notions, even the most irrelevant ones. The defects may be cumulated and thus it 
may happen that most of our knowledge claims, if not all, are false – either directly (because 
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all knowledge claims are false) or indirectly (because there is no knowledge claim that is not 
affected by some false knowledge claim). 
The range of deviation in one‟s way of seeing things may change from person to 
person. In the dialogues, it seems to be greater in the case of those that regard themselves as 
having an extraordinary knowledge (i.e., as being ζμθμί), in comparison to laypeople. This 
seems to be the case in the Apology, where Socrates says he has been focused on those that 
are publicly recognized as having some sort of superlative knowledge or ζμθία. These people 
are then revealed as being full of false conceit of knowledge. But the same may be true of 
everybody else. All of us have many views that determine the whole of reality in a certain 
way and identify what matters and what is irrelevant. But these views may be false and we 
may be full of false conceit of knowledge.  
The discussion of possible ranges of ἀιαεία thus raises the question about ourselves 
and our own cognitive condition. How many knowledge claims do we have and how many of 
them are false? How much deviation is there in our way of seeing or understanding things? 
This is not something we can immediately determine. Usually we are not aware of our 
cognitive condition nor of how bad it can be.
723
 This means that at first we can only outline 
the map of the possible diagnoses of our cognitive state. To find out our actual state, we need 
to undertake a deep examination of our knowledge claims – and not only of some of them, 
but of all (or at least the most relevant).  
    
2. The description of the cognitive defects associated with the notion of δόμα 
 
After considering the cognitive defects that are associated with the notion of μἴεζεαζ 
εἰδέκαζ in the Platonic corpus (and particularly in the so-called aporetic dialogues), we must 
now turn our attention to the description of the limitations of our views which is intrinsically 
tied with Plato‟s concept of δόλα and which can be mostly found in more doctrinal dialogues 
(such as Meno or the Republic). This will allow us to develop and complete the description 
made in Section 1 of this chapter, thereby achieving a better understanding of the cognitive 
limitations to which we are exposed. 
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 We are exposed to the possibility of being surprised by how bad our cognitive state is, just like Alcibiades 
when he is first examined by Socrates. See in particular Alc. I 127d, when he starts realizing how bad his 
cognitive state is and says: “ἀθθὰ ιὰ ημὺξ εεμύξ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, μ὎δ᾽ α὎ηὸξ μἶδ᾽ ὅηζ θέβς, ηζκδοκεύς δὲ ηαὶ πάθαζ 
θεθδεέκαζ ἐιαοηὸκ αἴζπζζηα ἔπςκ.” This happened to Alcibiades and other characters, but it is also an indication 
of what could happen to us if some Socrates were to appear and start cross-examining us. 
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It was mentioned in Chapter 5 that, just like μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ, the term δόλα has a 
neutral and a pejorative sense in Plato. On the one hand, it designates a judgment (or a view 
of things) that can be either right or wrong (i.e., that can either hit the target of truth or 
swerve away from it). On the other hand, δόλα can also designate a false view as such, a 
subjective way of seeing things with no real objective content – or as we could also say, a 
mere opinion. In this sense, it may refer to a view that happens to be false, but it can also 
denote a mode of seeing things that is constitutively defective and false – i.e., marked by 
distortion and illusion. Such a usage of δόλα mirrors the colloquial usage of the word. We 
saw that δόλα means not only judgment, but also appearance or semblance, and this second 
meaning points to the kind of defect that we will now consider. Both in the colloquial and in 
the Platonic sense, δόλα is characterized by its relative passivity. It corresponds to a certain 
immediate impression of things that is confined to the subjective sphere, and one‟s decision 
about what things are does not go beyond this sphere. Γόλα loses sight of what things really 
are beyond our impressions and it is not truly concerned with it. It is satisfied with what 
things seem to be and accepts this semblance as their truth. In sum, δόλα is a limited form of 
activity of the mind. 
 Plato considers in detail this limited activity and points out that it is the cause of the 
main kind of cognitive defect in our way of seeing things. According to him (or, more 
precisely, according to certain passages in the corpus) all our views are affected by a critical 
distortion which constitutes an aggravated or extreme form of ἀιαεία. It is the result of an 
extreme neglect and, as such, blameworthy in the highest degree. It does not only happen that 
some judgments are wrong. In a way, all of them are wrong. The defect in question tends to 
pervade everything and to constitute a distorted picture of the whole of reality. In other 
words, the whole world as we experience it may be nothing more than δόλα in the negative 
sense.
724
 This will most probably come as a surprise to us, since normally we are not aware of 
any constitutive defect in our way of seeing things. Plato, however, is adamant about its 
occurrence and also about the fact that our lack of awareness of it is an essential requirement 
for it to take place. Moreover, by stressing the constitutive defectiveness of our way of seeing 
things, Plato‟s analysis of δόλα also points to the possibility of a different and superior way 
of seeing things – one that will overcome the limitations that characterize δόλα. But this is 
also something of which we normally have no idea. We do not know how to achieve it nor 
                                                 
724
 This has the most severe consequences for one‟s life, since the latter will then be marked by a series of 
cognitive mistakes. We will, however, leave aside these practical consequences for now and focus only on the 
cognitive defect as such. For a discussion of the practical side of the question, cp. Chaps. 15, 16, and 18. 
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what it may amount to (i.e., how this new way of seeing things may be constituted and what 
it may reveal about reality).  
 All these questions take us to the core of the perspectives outlined in the Platonic 
corpus. But before considering them in more detail, it is important to consider some moments 
of the Pre-Platonic history of the notion of δόλα that may have influenced Plato‟s analysis 
and that help us better understand all that is involved therein. 
 
2.1. The pre-Platonic conception of δόμα as a intrinsically defective way of seeing 
things  
 
Plato is not the first thinker to use the notion of δόλα to express a constitutive defect 
in our way of seeing things or in our access to reality. The term is also used in this sense by 
some of the so-called Pre-Socratics – in particular Xenophanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus. 
Their usage of δόλα – as well as of δμηε῔κ – and the questions they associate with it provide 
the background to Plato‟s understanding of the notion. In fact, their own analyses reverberate 
in Plato‟s words. He often refers to them (especially Parmenides and Heraclitus) and we find 
thought patterns that are similar to theirs in Plato‟s own conceptions. It is therefore important 
to determine these authors‟ own conception of δόλα, in order to better understand what Plato 
says. 
However, this is not an easy task. We have a very limited (and perhaps somewhat 
distorted) access to these authors‟ views. We possess only some quotes of their works and 
some testimonials from later authors. Moreover, the very way in which these authors 
expressed themselves also contributes to rendering their thought particularly ambiguous and 
obscure. Xenophanes and Parmenides wrote poems and Heraclitus wrote what seem to be 
aphorisms, and both these forms of expressions are hardly the most straightforward way of 
conveying ideas. But this fact did not discourage interpreters from analyzing and discussing 
the thought of these authors. There have been many interesting attempts at reconstructing 
their doctrines by integrating the different fragments into a coherent whole. In what follows, 
we will not do such an attempt. We will not discuss in full these authors‟ philosophies and 
their interpretative problems. We will only try to outline the way they talk about δόλα and its 
cognates, in order to determine the general thought patterns associated with the notion. This 




Let us then start with Xenophanes. His thought is marked by theological concerns. He 
criticizes many aspects of the traditional representation of the divine. He often speaks of a 
single god (indeed, the concern with unity will mark all these authors, including Plato) and he 
describes it as being extremely superior to human beings in essence, knowledge, and 
power.
725
 The absolute heterogeneity between human beings or mortals and the one god is 
indeed one of the most important features of Xenophanes‟ thought and it determines his 
conception of δόλα, which is used to describe the way human beings represent reality or how 
they think about it. Xenophanes describes how the human way of seeing things is strongly 
limited – especially with respect to the most important being, god. He explains that human 
beings anthropomorphize the divine and in this context he uses precisely the verb δμηε῔κ. He 




These limitations then extend to all things, and so he claims in B34 that: “(...) the 
plain truth (ηὸ ζαθέξ) no man has seen nor will any know concerning the gods and what I 
have said concerning all things. For even if he should completely succeed in describing 
things as they come to pass, nonetheless he himself does not know: opinion (δόημξ) is 
wrought over [or: comes to] all.”
727
 In this fragment, Xenophanes starts by stressing that we 
have no clearness or certainty about things. We may get something right somehow, but still 
this is not knowledge in the proper sense, since it is not a perfect access to things. There is 
still a cognitive imperfection or distance in our access to things, and this is what is expressed 
by δόλα. A δόλα may have some validity, but it is intrinsically limited and human beings are 
intrinsically marked by this cognitive limitation. This is also expressed by fragment 35, 
which says “Let these things be believed (δεδμλάζες) as being like true things”.
728
 The 
content of δόλα may have some resemblance to truth, but falls short of it. 
At first sight, it is not entirely clear whether Xenophanes is describing a mere fact 
(i.e., the fact that human beings happen to have these limitations) or a constitutive limitation 
that cannot be overcome. Xenophanes does admit, in fragment B18, the possibility of 
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 See DK B23-25. 
726
 See DK B14: “ἀθθ‟ μἱ ανμημὶ δμηέμοζζ βεκκ᾵ζεαζ εεμύξ,/ ηὴκ ζθεηένδκ δ‟ ἐζε῅ηα ἔπεζκ θςκήκ ηε δέιαξ ηε.” 
On this matter, see also DK B11, 12, 15, 16. Here and in the following I will use D. Graham‟s rendering of the 
fragments. See D. GRAHAM (ed.), The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge 
University Press, 2010.  
727
 “Καὶ ηὸ ιὲκ μὖκ ζαθὲξ μὔηζξ ἀκὴν ἴδεζκ μ὎δέ ηζξ ἔζηαζ/ εἰδὼξ ἀιθὶ εε῵κ ηε ηαὶ ἅζζα θέβς πενὶ πάκηςκ·/ εἰ 
βὰν ηαὶ ηὰ ιάθζζηα ηύπμζ ηεηεθεζιέκμκ εἰπώκ,/ α὎ηὸξ ὅιςξ μ὎η μἶδε· δόημξ δ‟ επὶ π᾵ζζ ηέηοηηαζ.” 
728
 “Σαῦηα δεδμλάζες ιὲκ ἐμζηόηα ημ῔ξ ἐηύιμζζζ.” 
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cognitive progress – i.e., of expanding our views and achieving better ones.
729
 But it is not 
clear whether he thinks we can ever achieve perfect views. The status of Xenophanes‟ own 
doctrines is also unclear. He seems to present them as a form of ζμθίδ and he himself as a 
ζμθόξ.
730
 He thus seems to distinguish his extraordinary knowledge from the views human 
beings at large. But apparently the limitations he describes would also have to apply to him, 
and the above mentioned fragment 35 may well be referring to his own doctrines. In that 
case, these doctrines would admittedly be a kind of δόλα and only resemble truth, without 
granting a perfect access to it. Xenophanes‟ own understanding of these questions would be 
limited, and his ζμθίδ would include recognizing the limits of his own perspectives, as well 
as of any other human perspective.  
Let us now turn our attention to Parmenides. His thought has several features in 
common with Xenophanes (thus raising similar questions), although it also introduces 
significant changes. The mode of discourse itself is somewhat different, since it includes 
allegorical elements, especially at the beginning of the poem, when he describes his own 
inquiry as a journey in a chariot, guided by the daughters of the sun, to the gates of paths of 
Night and Day, where he meets a goddess that reveals to him all things (πάκηα).
731
 What is 
communicated to him is thus a perfect understanding of things and it does not have a human 
origin. It seems completely heterogeneous to our own access to things. In this sense, 
Parmenides (like Xenophanes) contrasts the usual way of seeing things with a superior 
understanding. This superior understanding, communicated by a goddess, has the status of a 
revelation. However, the goddess also takes pains to present it with rational elements and 
give a full insight into the truth.
732
 The teaching imparted by the goddess is comprised of two 
parts: what she calls “the unshaken heart of persuasive Truth” and “the opinions of the 
mortals, in which there is no true reliance”.
733
 This raises the vexed question of how these 
two parts relate to one another and of what is the status of the second part, dedicated to δόλαζ. 
The goddess says the traveler must learn the latter too as acceptable, which seems to assume 
that there is some validity in them, unreliable though they are. 
                                                 
729
 See DK B18: “μὔημζ ἀπ‟ ἀνπ῅ξ πάκηα εεμὶ εκδημ῔ζ‟ ὏πέδεζλακ,/ἀθθὰ πνόκςζ γδημῦκηεξ ἐθεονίζημοζζκ 
ἄιεζκμκ.” 
730
 See DK B2, vv. 11-12: “ῥώιδξ βὰν ἀιείκςκ/ ἀκδν῵κ ἞δ‟ ἵππςκ ἟ιεηένδ ζμθίδ.” 
731
 See DK B1. 
732
 In this regard, Parmenides seems to differ greatly from Xenophanes, who – judging from the fragments we 
possess – is not concerned with demonstrating his views. 
733
 See DK B1, vv. 28-30: “πνεὼ δέ ζε πάκηα ποεέζεαζ/ ἞ιὲκ Ἀθδεείδξ ε὎ηοηθέμξ ἀηνειὲξ ἤημν/ ἞δὲ ανμη῵κ 
δόλαξ, ηα῔ξ μ὎η ἔκζ πίζηζξ ἀθδεήξ.”  
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The case is very different in the first part. There the goddess emphasizes the contrast 
between falsity and truth, and allows no middle ground. Falsity is associated with non-being, 
which cannot actually be known or said.
734
 People (or mortals) in general assume that       
non-being is and for this reason the goddess describes them as being two-headed, says that 
they have a wandering mind and qualifies them as blind, dazed and undiscerning.
735
 Truth, in 
turn, is intrinsically connected with being. Parmenides‟ analysis of being is very complex and 
there have been many discussions about it – especially about the senses of being he is 
referring to.
736
 But regardless of how being is here understood, the goddess does present an 
ontological truth in a rational manner, arguing and deducing the predicates being must have. 
She shows that being must be ungenerated and imperishable, whole, homogeneous, 
motionless and complete, for anything other than this would imply non-being and thus be 
false.
737
 Our usual way of seeing things, since it assumes there is generation, death, parts, 
heterogeneity, motion and void, is according to Parmenides‟ goddess full of errors and 
illusion. 
But what about the second part of the poem? It is dedicated precisely to the kind of 
predicates that were rejected in the first part.
738
 Parmenides puts forward a full-blown 
cosmology, which tries to encompass and explain the whole sensible world. It is initially 
qualified as unreliable, as we saw, but it is also the result of much examination and testing 
(πεν᾵κ).
739
 It is a “deceptive order of words”, but also a likely arrangement.
740
 It is not 
something one can fully explain (and in this sense it is far from the reliability of the rational 
doctrine about being), but it seems to be presented as the best cosmology that could be 
developed. It is somewhat valid (i.e., more valid than other versions), though it is still no 
more than a δόλα. If in a way it seems to be refuted by the first part of the poem, in another 
way it seems to complement it. It is therefore difficult to determine what exactly Parmenides 
has in mind, but it seems that his notion of δόλα would apply not only to views that are 
                                                 
734
 See DK B8, vv. 8-9: “(...) μ὎ βὰν θαηὸκ μ὎δὲ κμδηόκ/ ἔζηζκ ὅπςξ μ὎η ἔζηζ.” For the rejection of non-being, 
see also DK Β7: “Ο὎ βὰν ιήπμηε ημῦημ δαιῆ εἶκαζ ιὴ ἐόκηα· /ἀθθὰ ζὺ η῅ζδ‟ ἀθ‟ ὁδμῦ δζγήζζμξ εἶνβε κόδια· 
735
 See DK B6, vv. 3-9: “πνώηδξ βάν ζ‟ ἀθ‟ ὁδμῦ ηαύηδξ δζγήζζμξ <εἴνβς>,/ α὎ηὰν ἔπεζη‟ ἀπὸ η῅ξ, ἡκ δὴ ανμημὶ 
εἰδόηεξ μ὎δὲκ/ πθάηημκηαζ, δίηνακμζ· ἀιδπακίδ βὰν ἐκ α὎η῵κ/ ζηήεεζζκ ἰεύκεζ πθαηηὸκ κόμκ· μἱ δὲ θμνμῦκηαζ/ 
ηςθμὶ ὁι῵ξ ηοθθμί ηε, ηεεδπόηεξ, ἄηνζηα θῦθα,/ μἷξ ηὸ πέθεζκ ηε ηαὶ μ὎η εἶκαζ ηα὎ηὸκ κεκόιζζηαζ/ ημ὎ ηα὎ηόκ, 
πάκηςκ δὲ παθίκηνμπόξ ἐζηζ ηέθεοεμξ.” 
736
 See e.g. C. KAHN, The Thesis of Parmenides, The Review of Metaphysics 22 (1969), 700-724; L. 
BREDLOW, Parmenides and the Grammar of Being, Classical Philology 106 (2011), 283-298.  
737
 See DK B8, vv. 1-49. 
738
 Cp. DK B19: “Thus you see according to opinion these things arose and now are,/ and hereafter when they 
have been nurtured, will they pass away./ And on them men imposed a distinguishing name for each.” 
739
 See DK B1, v. 32: “ἀθθ΄ ἔιπδξ ηαὶ ηαῦηα ιαεήζεαζ, ὡξ ηὰ δμημῦκηα/ πν῅κ δμηίιςξ εἶκαζ δζὰ πακηὸξ πάκηα 
πεν῵κηα.” 
740
 DK B8, vv. 52 (“ηόζιμκ ἐι῵κ ἐπέςκ ἀπαηδθόκ”) and 60 (“ηόκ ζμζ ἐβὼ δζάημζιμκ ἐμζηόηα πάκηα θαηίγς.”) 
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outright false and wholly unlikely, but also to views that may not be entirely invalid, but are 
still unreliable and lack the surety that characterizes the rational arguments about being. In 
this sense, δόλα seems to correspond to an intermediate form of access similar to the one that 
was suggested in Xenophanes‟ fragments. 
What we find in Heraclitus‟ fragments is not very different either. He seems to use the 
notion of δόλα to denote an intrinsically defective form of access to beings. We are told that 
he compared human δόλαζ to children‟s toys.
741
 This is a very meaningful comparison, 
because it constitutes an instance of the Heraclitean thought pattern identified and analyzed 
by H. Fränkel.
742
 In several fragments, Heraclitus identifies and compares three elements or 
terms. The latter possess a certain quality (for instance, beauty or wisdom) in different 
degrees. Human beings are the middle term. The inferior term are animals or children (who 
possess very little or even nothing of the quality at issue), whereas god is the superior term 
(insofar as god is supposed to possess this quality in its highest degree). Heraclitus then 
establishes a comparison of two comparisons. He says that the relation between human 
beings and the superior term is just like the relation between the inferior term and human 
beings. This allows us to represent something that surpasses us in the same way that we 
surpass something that we acknowledge as inferior in some respect, and at the same time it 
makes us realize how precarious or questionable our own position is (in spite of what we 
might usually think).  
Thus, when Heraclitus compares our δόλαζ to children‟s toys he is declaring how 
childish and insignificant they are. What is usually regarded as knowledge is very far from it. 
We can understand this better if we consider fragment B17, which says: “many do not 
understand such things as they encounter, nor do they learn by their experience, but they 
think they do (ἑςοημ῔ζζ δὲ δμηέμοζζ)”.
743
 In other words, many have false knowledge claims 
about everything they encounter. Their views are no more than opinions and appearances. 
But Heraclitus‟ words also admit the possibility of a different kind of access. In fact, he 
distinguishes between the many (μἱ πμθθμί) and some distinguished human beings, who are 
superior in terms of wisdom and have access to some transcendent truth. This does not mean 
that all distinguished human beings possess perfect knowledge. Heraclitus admits that 
                                                 
741
 See DK B70: “παίδςκ ἀεύνιαηα κεκόιζηεκ εἶκαζ ηὰ ἀκενώπζκα δμλάζιαηα” 
742
 See in particular DK B79, 82 and 83. Cp. H. FRÄNKEL, A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus, American Journal 
of Philology 59 (1938), 309-337; IDEM, Eine heraklitische Denkform, in: IDEM, Wege und Formen 





252-283; H. FRÄNKEL, Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums. Eine Geschichte der griechischen 






 “μ὎ βὰν θνμκέμοζζ ημζαῦηα πμθθμί, ὁηόζμζ ἐβηονεῦζζκ, μ὎δὲ ιαεόκηεξ βζκώζημοζζκ, ἑςοημ῔ζζ δὲ δμηέμοζζ.” 
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distinguished persons are full of illusions or possess distorted forms of knowledge, such as 
erudition (πμθοιαείδ).
744
 These are still δόλαζ or false knowledge claims, and for Heraclitus 
all δόλαζ or knowledge claims are a form of sacred disease (i.e. a disease not caused by 
anything physical).
745
 This disease seems to consist mainly in the fact that we are often 
deceived by the senses.
746
 We usually follow them, but cannot correctly interpret what we 
see. As Heraclitus says, if our soul is barbarian, it cannot use the senses and cannot 
understand the θόβμξ of reality.
747
 Reality is indeed conceived by Heraclitus as a sort of 
discourse or text, and our reason (our own θόβμξ) is what makes us able to understand it and 
achieve θνόκδζζξ – or it is what makes us be awake, lucid and fully present, as Heraclitus 
says. 
However, most human beings are as if asleep, deaf and absent.
748
 They have only a 
private version of things and no access to what is common to everything (ηὸ λοκόκ) – namely, 
the universal θόβμξ.
749
 Their access to things is limited and distorted. More specifically, they 
see things in motion, coming to being and perishing, changing into their opposites, in 
conflict, and they absolutize each moment or consider it separately, thus failing to see how 
things belong together – i.e., how there is a hidden harmony or a law underlying all 
contraries. There is a common element that encompasses the whole, constitutes a unity out of 
it and brings order to the permanent flux or conflict – and wisdom consists precisely in 
knowing this.
750
 But normally we are very far from being wise. Although everybody has 
some contact with this truth or this θόβμξ, most people do not understand it and have 
                                                 
744
 See DK B28: “δμηέμκηα βὰν ὁ δμηζιώηαημξ βζκώζηεζ, θοθάζζεζ (...).” For the contrast between πμθοιαείδ 
and κόμξ, see DK B40: “πμθοιαείδ κόμκ μ὎ δζδάζηεζ· Ἡζίμδμκ βὰν ἂκ ἐδίδαλε ηαὶ Ποεαβόνδκ αὖηίξ ηε 
Ξεκμθάκεα ηαὶ ἗ηαηα῔μκ.” Cp. also DK B129 and 81. 
745
 See DK B46: “ηήκ ηε μἴδζζκ ἱενὰκ κόζμκ ἔθεβε ηαὶ ηὴκ ὅναζζκ ρεύδεζεαζ.” 
746
 Cp. DK B56: “ἐλδηάηδκηαζ, θδζίκ, μἱ ἄκενςπμζ πνὸξ ηὴκ βκ῵ζζκ η῵κ θακεν῵κ παναπθδζίςξ ὇ιήνςζ, ὃξ 
ἐβέκεημ η῵κ ἗θθήκςκ ζμθώηενμξ πάκηςκ. ἐηε῔κόκ ηε βὰν πα῔δεξ θεε῔ναξ ηαηαηηείκμκηεξ ἐλδπάηδζακ εἰπόκηεξ· 
ὅζα εἴδμιεκ ηαὶ ἐθάαμιεκ, ηαῦηα ἀπμθείπμιεκ, ὅζα δὲ μὔηε εἴδμιεκ μὔη‟ ἐθάαμιεκ, ηαῦηα θένμιεκ.” 
747
 See DK B107: “ηαημὶ ιάνηονεξ ἀκενώπμζζζκ ὀθεαθιμὶ ηαὶ ὦηα ααναάνμοξ ροπὰξ ἐπόκηςκ.” 
748
 See DK B1: “ημῦ δὲ θόβμο ημῦδ ἐόκημξ ἀεὶ ἀλύκεημζ βίκμκηαζ ἄκενςπμζ ηαὶ πνόζεεκ ἠ ἀημῦζαζ ηαὶ 
ἀημύζακηεξ ηὸ πν῵ημκ· βζκμιέκςκ βὰν πάκηςκ ηαηὰ ηὸκ θόβμκ ηόκδε ἀπείνμζζζκ ἐμίηαζζ, πεζνώιεκμζ ηαὶ ἐπέςκ 
ηαὶ ἔνβςκ ημζμύηςκ, ὁημίςκ ἐβὼ δζδβεῦιαζ δζαζνέςκ ἕηαζημκ ηαηὰ θύζζκ ηαὶ θνάγςκ ὅηςξ ἔπεζ. ημὺξ δὲ ἄθθμοξ 
ἀκενώπμοξ θακεάκεζ ὁηόζα ἐβενεέκηεξ πμζμῦζζκ, ὅηςζπεν ὁηόζα εὕδμκηεξ ἐπζθακεάκμκηαζ.” See also DK B34: 
“ἀλύκεημζ ἀημύζακηεξ ηςθμ῔ζζκ ἐμίηαζζ· θάηζξ α὎ημ῔ζζκ ιανηονε῔ πανεόκηαξ ἀπε῔καζ.” 
749
 See DK B2: “δζὸ δε῔ ἕπεζεαζ η῵ζ λοκ῵ζ, ημοηέζηζ η῵ζ ημζκ῵ζ· λοκὸξ βὰν ὁ ημζκόξ. ημῦ θόβμο δ‟ ἐόκημξ λοκμῦ 
γώμοζζκ μἱ πμθθμὶ ὡξ ἰδίακ ἔπμκηεξ θνόκδζζκ.” 
750
 See in particular DK B41: “εἶκαζ βὰν ἓκ ηὸ ζμθόκ, ἐπίζηαζεαζ βκώιδκ, ὁηέδ ἐηοαένκδζε πάκηα δζὰ πάκηςκ.” 
For more on the notion of unity or hidden harmony, cp. e.g. DK B10, B30, B50, B51, B53, B54, B72, B80, 
B102, B123. On the topic of conflict between the different moments of reality and its importance, see e.g. DK 
B8, B23, B32, B48, B67, B88.  
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therefore only a partial vision or understanding of things.
751
 This is precisely what 
characterizes human δόλαζ and what makes humans resemble children (or apes) in terms of 
knowledge, by contrast with god and his perfect knowledge.
752
 There are, however, some 
exceptions. Heraclitus also contrasts human δόλαζ with the views of the few wise persons, 
who are aware that there is an underlying unity of things (even if they cannot fully grasp it). 
In sum, δόλα designates once more the usual way of seeing things, which is referred 
to appearances, multiplicity and movement, and fails to see the unity that underlies this 
changing multiplicity. This carries with it a failure to understand the multiple beings 
themselves. It is true that one may try to overcome this perspective (i.e., to overcome δόλα), 
but the perspective one achieves afterwards is very different from the one we normally have. 
Normally, we have no more than δόλαζ, which may give us some access to what really exists, 
but are always marked by a constitutive defect, insofar as one is ignorant of the general 
structure of reality. 
The conception of δόλα we find in Xenophanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus has thus 
important common traces. They all stress the limitations of our regular access to things and 
how it is very different from a perfect way of seeing things. This is the most important feature 
of the pre-Platonic understanding of δόλα. All these authors see δόλα as something 
constitutively defective, and it is in this sense that they probably influenced Plato. As will be 
shown, Plato also sees δόλα as being intrinsically defective and his discussion of its defects 
has some points of contact with what we just considered. Although we will not explore the 
relations between Plato and these authors nor discuss how conscious Plato was of their 
doctrines, we can at any rate understand his own conception better if we bear in mind what 
was thought before him. 
 
2.2. Plato’s criticism of δόμα as a social version of truth 
 
 Plato‟s analysis of the defective nature of δόλα contains several distinct aspects and 
we will consider them separately. We will start with the most peripheral aspects and them 
move towards the center. 
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 Heraclitus emphasizes the universal contact with this truth. According to DK B113, he said: “λοκόκ ἐζηζ π᾵ζζ 
ηὸ θνμκέεζκ.” In DK B116, it is said: “ἀκενώπμζζζ π᾵ζζ ιέηεζηζ βζκώζηεζκ ἑςοημὺξ ηαὶ θνμκε῔κ”. See also DK 
B72: “ὧζ ιάθζζηα δζδκεη῵ξ ὁιζθμῦζζ θόβςζ η῵ζ ηὰ ὅθα δζμζημῦκηζ, ημύηςζ δζαθένμκηαζ, ηαὶ μἵξ ηαε‟ ἟ιένακ 
ἐβηονμῦζζ, ηαῦηα α὎ημ῔ξ λέκα θαίκεηαζ.” 
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 One important aspect of δόλα that Plato criticizes is its usually social character and 
how it tends to correspond to a social representation of truth or reality. We find many 
references to this question throughout the Platonic corpus. It is directly associated with the 
meaning of δόλα in Greek. As was said above, the word δόλα can designate a public view or 
public opinion about something. It can refer to the good or bad repute of someone and also to 
what a community decides or deems good. In fact, the verb δμηε῔κ played a central role in the 
language of decrees and the public decisions about important matters. In sum, our δόλαζ often 
have a social component. This component was not entirely absent from the philosophical 
analyses we considered in the previous section. Xenophanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus 
speak of δόλα as something that is shared by almost everybody or at least the majority of 
people, and it is opposed to a superior way of seeing things that is the prerogative of the 
divine and perhaps some wise human beings. We find a similar idea in Plato. The views 
shared by the majority of human beings are defective and the defect is not incidental, but 
rather the result of the very process of forming and sharing of these views. Let us see this in 
more detail. 
 First, it is manifest that each one of us has many δόλαζ, and we are aware not only of 
our own δόλαζ (or at least of some of them), but also of the fact that others have their own 
δόλαζ, which may agree or disagree with our own. Usually we are not indifferent to these 
agreements or disagreements. We feel a certain pressure to be in agreement with others, 
either by conforming ourselves to their views or by trying to conform them to ours. This 
seems to be the basis of the traditional education process, as Plato himself suggests several 
times. People instill δόλαζ in children through several complex mechanisms.
753
 First it is the 
family and those closest to a particular child (including the slaves).
754
 They define awards 
and punishments and pass on certain basic δόλαζ and values. Then teachers and literature will 
instill more refined δόλαζ.
755
 But one continues to be pressured throughout life, even as an 
adult. One is pressured by one‟s social class, by the many or the majority (μἱ πμθθμί), by the 
πόθζξ in general (or any other political body) and even by everybody (in cases where there    
is – or at least one thinks there is – a universal consensus).
756
 In some cases force may be 
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 For the idea of instilling δόλαζ, cp. e.g. Rep. 429d-430b, where Socrates compares the process to education to 
the process of dying wool. 
754
 This is what we find in the description of the degeneration of the ideal πόθζξ in Republic VIII and IX. 
Socrates describes the development of young boys as being deeply influenced by one‟s family, servants and 
companies. See e.g. 549c ff. 
755
 For a complex description of the whole process of education, cp. Prt. 325c ff. 
756
 In the Republic there is even a discussion of how μἱ πμθθμί are the greatest sophists, since they influence and 
educate children through the many processes that control people‟s views and their way of living. See 492a ff. 
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involved, in others it may be simply a matter of persuasion. But the fact is that public opinion 
and the πόθζξ carry weight and have power over us.
757
 It is only the degree of pressure 
exerted over us that varies. One may try to keep to himself and avoid problems with others 
(with requires just a basic level of conformity) or one can be a “friend of the people” 
(δδιεναζηήξ) and be more deeply regulated by others.
758
 These different degrees of pressure 
may in turn be due to various reasons, but we will not consider the latter here. The important 
thing now is that we are not indifferent to differences of opinion. Our δόλαζ and the δόλαζ of 
others interact. 
 The corpus talks about different forms of interaction between people‟s δόλαζ, but it 
also shows us how during the very course of the examinations one is often concerned with 
what others think. There are several references to others – either to authorities (such as poets 
or philosophers), or to the majority of people (μἱ πμθθμί) or even to a universal consensus (for 
instance, in the sense that anybody can see that things are so, even a child).
759
 Others are 
invoked as witnesses to testify on one‟s behalf.
760
 Even the young Socrates is no exception. 
He pays attention to what others think and thereby limits his philosophical impulse.
761
 
 All these instances reflect the same tendency to identify and subscribe a shared 
version of things or a shared truth – which defines what every sane person will see and think 
(as well as what forms of ζμθία are acknowledged).
762
 This corresponds to the notion of 
κόιμζ – i.e., the practices and values of a certain community, which are the result of a 
collective agreement and yet are not experienced as such, but rather as the best practices and 
values or what everybody should do and think. They have a universal claim and are taken as 
being θύζεζ.
763
 This is possible because the process of conforming to a public version of 
things is often a latent process. One is not aware of it or one has forgotten it. As a matter of 
fact, we often cannot explain where our views come from or why we adopted them. They are 
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 Cp. e.g. Alc. I 135e: “[ΑΛ] ἀθθὰ μὕηςξ ἔπεζ, ηαὶ ἄνλμιαί βε ἐκηεῦεεκ η῅ξ δζηαζμζύκδξ ἐπζιέθεζεαζ. [΢Ω] 
αμοθμίιδκ ἄκ ζε ηαὶ δζαηεθέζαζ· ὀννςδ῵ δέ, μὔ ηζ ηῆ ζῆ θύζεζ ἀπζζη῵κ, ἀθθὰ ηὴκ η῅ξ πόθεςξ ὁν῵κ ῥώιδκ, ιὴ 
ἐιμῦ ηε ηαὶ ζμῦ ηναηήζῃ.”  
758
 Cp. Grg. 481d-482a and Alc. I 132a. 
759
 See e.g. Alc. I 110d ff., Hp. Ma. 248a, Grg. 470c, 484b, Rep. 331d. 
760
 For the image of others being used as witnesses, cp. Grg. 471e ff. 
761
 See Prm. 130e: “κέμξ βὰν εἶ ἔηζ, θάκαζ ηὸκ Πανιεκίδδκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ηαὶ μὔπς ζμο ἀκηείθδπηαζ θζθμζμθία 
ὡξ ἔηζ ἀκηζθήρεηαζ ηαη᾽ ἐιὴκ δόλακ, ὅηε μ὎δὲκ α὎η῵κ ἀηζιάζεζξ· κῦκ δὲ ἔηζ πνὸξ ἀκενώπςκ ἀπμαθέπεζξ δόλαξ 
δζὰ ηὴκ ἟θζηίακ.” 
762
 We will return to this notion of social truth in Chap. 11, Section 2.3. 
763
 In other words, the opposition between θύζζξ and κόιμξ usually emphasizes how different communities have 
different customs and how these customs are not grounded on nature, but are rather the result of a social 
agreement. However, this does not express how the κόιμζ themselves are experienced by the community for 
which they are valid. In this community, a κόιμξ is simply the natural or right way of living and doing       




simply the way we see things. However, at their root lies our passivity. We receive views 
from others and give them weight. We guide ourselves by what other people think. 
 Plato often refers to these processes of conforming one‟s views to the views of    
others – especially if they are shared by many. But Plato also deconstructs and criticizes 
them, as well as their assumptions. There are indeed several problems with these processes 
and the views that result from them, and this is what we must now briefly consider. 
 To begin, the very act of transmitting one‟s views is problematic. As we saw in the 
Introduction, Plato criticizes not only the written word as a vehicle for knowledge, but also 
orality.
764
 His criticisms are particularly relevant when it comes to philosophical views, but 
they apply to any view whatsoever. Our contact with a particular view is always determined 
not only by our knowledge and our intellectual talent in general, but also by our interests or 
psychic disposition (which we will consider below). This means that there can be important 
distortions in the process of transmitting one‟s views, which render the whole process of 
conforming oneself to others problematic.  
 But the problems are not confined to whether or not there is a real conformity. Plato 
also criticizes the sources of the views being transmitted. For instance, he often stresses the 
lack of authority of μἱ πμθθμί. The term μἱ πμθθμί has in itself a pejorative sense and is 
marked by aristocratic overtones. It is not merely a matter of statistics, but it refers to the 
rabble or populace – i.e., the uneducated or laypeople. In this sense, the many are opposed to 
the best (ἄνζζημζ) or, in scientific contexts, to the expert (ηεπκίηδξ), who has cognitive 
competence.
765
 The expression μἱ πμθθμί has therefore a connotation of inferiority and 
ignorance – and so they are not a good source for one‟s beliefs.
766
 
Another problem with these views shared by many (or allegedly by all) is the fact that 
they often have an opaque origin. We cannot say who has originally determined that things 
are so – and perhaps we will not even be able to say who has taught it to us. Popular views 
are the views of everybody, but also of no one in particular. They are like Socrates‟ fame as it 
                                                 
764
 See e.g. Smp. 175d: “ηαὶ ηὸκ ΢ςηνάηδ ηαείγεζεαζ ηαὶ εἰπε῔κ ὅηζ εὖ ἂκ ἔπμζ, θάκαζ, ὦ Ἀβάεςκ, εἰ ημζμῦημκ εἴδ 
἟ ζμθία ὥζη᾽ ἐη ημῦ πθδνεζηένμο εἰξ ηὸ ηεκώηενμκ ῥε῔κ ἟ι῵κ, ἐὰκ ἁπηώιεεα ἀθθήθςκ, ὥζπεν ηὸ ἐκ ηα῔ξ 
ηύθζλζκ ὕδςν ηὸ δζὰ ημῦ ἐνίμο ῥέμκ ἐη η῅ξ πθδνεζηέναξ εἰξ ηὴκ ηεκςηένακ.” It is also important to bear in mind 
that the criticism of language‟s imprecision in Ep. VII 342a ff. also applies to orality. 
765
 Cp. in particular Cri. 47a ff. 
766
 For more on the notion of μἱ πμθθμί, see e.g. H.-D. VOIGTLÄNDER, Der Philosoph und die Vielen. Die 
Bedeutung des Gegensatzes der unphilosophischen Menge zu den Philosophen (und das Problem des 
Argumentum e consensum omnium) im Philosophischen Denken der Griechen bis auf Aristoteles, Wiesbaden, 




is described in the Apology.
767
 They are no more than a rumor, which one received perhaps 
even as a child, but one does not know exactly when and why. This makes it all the more 
difficult to examine or criticize these views. One does not know how they came about and 
one does not consider alternatives. One simply accepts the popular views.  
However, people do not always agree. Often people disagree with each other – and 
this renders their views particularly problematic. One may invoke them in some question for 
which many other people have a different view.
768
 According to Socrates, this is a feature that 
distinguishes them from the experts, who always agree with respect to the matters of their 
expertise.
769
 So it seems we can only trust others in questions in which everybody seems to 
agree. When that is the case, one may appeal to the universal consensus. However, this 
appeal is itself questionable, because generally when one appeals to the views of everybody, 
one did not actually consult everybody. There was no process of voting. One simply assumed 
that everybody would agree, since one took one‟s views to be evident to everybody. Its 
universality is thus nothing more than a prediction, a projection or a construct – though an 
important one, since in turn it gives more weight to one‟s view. In Gorgias, Polus invokes 
such a kind of consensus as a way of refuting Socrates. Socrates, however, rejects the validity 
of such an appeal. He says that they cannot refer to the multitude, but they must rather 
examine the question by themselves and see if they actually agree with each other.
770
 Later, 
in the conversation with Callicles, Socrates will even say that the most important thing is to 
agree with oneself and not to be in inner contradiction.
771
 
This contrast between the appeal to others and examining by oneself actually points to 
what is perhaps the main problem of δόλα as a social version of truth. When considering the 
way we seem to be pressured by others into seeing things in a certain way, Plato discusses the 
motivation behind the process that leads one to adopt other people‟s views. He stresses that 
there is no real pressure coming from the outside. One is not forced to accept the public 
views. When one does accept them, the motivation to do so is rather internal. One may for 
instance desire to be admired or to have power, or one may want to escape punishments or 
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 See Ap. 18b ff. 
768
 This is what Alcibiades does with respect to justice (see Alc. I 110e ff.). He says he learned what justice is 
from the many, but Socrates then argues that the many have strong divergences about its meaning and about 
how it applies to particular circumstances.  
769
 See Alc. I 111b: “[΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ ημὺξ εἰδόηαξ ὁιμθμβε῔κ ηε ἀθθήθμζξ ηαὶ ιὴ δζαθένεζεαζ; [ΑΛ] καί.” 
770
 See Grg. 470c ff., especially 471e-472c, 473e-474b and 475e-476a. For a detailed analysis of this passage, 
cp. M. de CARVALHO, “Les témoins malgré eux”. Socrates‟ Unwitting Witnesses in Plato‟s Gorgias, in: M. de 
CARVALHO & T. FIDALGO (eds.), Plato’s Gorgias. Labyrinth and Threads, Coimbra, Instituto de Estudos 
Filosóficos, 2016, 67-124.   
771
 See Grg. 482b-c. 
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pain. Whatever the reason, the source of the others‟ power over us lies within us.
772
 In fact, 
our passivity or receptivity is a way of exonerating ourselves from deciding difficult or 
controversial matters. We take the others as an authority in those matters and thus we make 
our life easier. The others help with cognitive decisions and with avoiding doubts. We do not 
have to examine things. We can simply adopt the views of others (especially if they agree 
with our inner inclinations). 
Plato, however, strongly opposes this “cognitive exoneration”. It is an intrinsically 
defective way of adopting views and, to make matters worse, the views shared by many or by 
all also tend to be characterized by particular defects. Indeed, there is a certain kind of views 
that is more easily accepted, since they themselves involve more passivity. These views are 
closely related to the sensible word and to individual beings therein. This is the domain of the 
πόθζξ and it corresponds to the bottom of the cave. In this domain, one is guided primarily by 
one‟s body and the pursuit of satisfaction (or pleasure) and honor.
773
 Therefore, one transmits 
and adopts the views that are associated with these interests. This constitutes the ordinary 
way of seeing things, which is actually inferior to what it could be, if one were really 
concerned with truth. The views of the many (or the views of the πόθζξ) are a mere δόλα and 
they are opposed to the views of the few – i.e., the best or the true elite. This opposition is 
very important in Plato, as was said, but it is not implied therein that we can easily identify 
who the best are and what their views are. It may in fact be very unclear. Those that were 
traditionally regarded as the best may also fail to overcome the limitations of δόλα. But by 
referring to the figure of the those that are truly best, Plato at any rate stresses the intrinsic 
limitation of δόλα as a shared view of reality. 
 
2.3. The Platonic critique of ὀξζὴ δόμα 
 
 More decisive in the discussion of δόλα‟s constitutive defect is Plato‟s treatment of 
the concept of correct or true judgment (δόλα ὀνεή or δόλα ἀθδεήξ). This notion refers to a 
judgment that hits the mark (i.e., hits reality, things as they are), that has some contact with 
what things are, or that is in a state of ἀθδεεύεζκ – and yet it is something other than 
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 For a more detailed discussion of this, see Chap. 17, Sect. 4.2 below. 
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 In Phaedo, for instance, Socrates argues that the many are only concerned with sensual pleasures and 





 Such a thing seems to go against all logic. We are tempted to think that our 
views are either true or false – and so we either know something or are in error. It is indeed 
possible for us to be convinced that a certain view is true and provides us with knowledge 
when that is not the case. A knowledge claim can be false, but it does not seem possible to 
have a view that is true and still does not allow us to know something. How can a correct 
δόλα be something other than knowledge? A correct δόλα seems to be without cognitive 
fault. Plato, however, clearly identifies it with a defective way of seeing things, just because 
it is a δόλα. It is not a perfect access to something or a perfect contact with it. It includes 
some significant deviation or defect. The problem then is how can a δόλα be defective, if it is 
correct or true. How can truth not be knowledge – or, as we could also say, how can truth not 
be truth? What exactly is the defect of an ὀνεὴ δόλα and how does it fall outside the 
dichotomy of falsehood and truth?  
 There are several references to the notion of ὀνεὴ δόλα in the corpus.
775
 The most 
developed treatment of it is found in Meno, though it is also lacking in some respects and 
must be supplemented with other considerations. But let us first briefly consider what is said 
in Meno. Socrates and Meno are discussing how human beings come to achieve excellence or 
virtue (ἀνεηή) – more particularly, whether they become excellent by teaching, by practice, or 
by nature.
776
 At a certain point in the dialogue, it appears that ἀνεηή is knowledge and as such 
it would admit (and even require) teachers. But are there such teachers? And are all excellent 
men able to transmit their excellence? Both things are questionable. It is difficult to identify 
such teachers and it seems that men that were recognized as excellent (insofar as they seemed 
to guide the πόθζξ‟ affairs with success) were not able to impart excellence to their 
children.
777
 This seems to prove that ἀνεηή is not knowledge. But Socrates admits that there 
might be another way of achieving practical success (and thus of being excellent, according 
to the common conception of ἀνεηή which Socrates is not questioning at this point). One can 
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 As it is said in Tht. 202c1-2: “(...) ἀθδεεύεζκ ιὲκ α὎ημῦ ηὴκ ροπὴκ πενὶ α὎ηό, βζβκώζηεζκ δ‟ μὔ”. Cp. Smp. 
202a: “ηὸ ὀνεὰ δμλάγεζκ ηαὶ ἄκεο ημῦ ἔπεζκ θόβμκ δμῦκαζ μ὎η μἶζε᾽, ἔθδ, ὅηζ μὔηε ἐπίζηαζεαί ἐζηζκ – ἄθμβμκ 
βὰν πν᾵βια π῵ξ ἂκ εἴδ ἐπζζηήιδ; – μὔηε ἀιαεία – ηὸ βὰν ημῦ ὄκημξ ηοβπάκμκ π῵ξ ἂκ εἴδ ἀιαεία; – ἔζηζ δὲ 
δήπμο ημζμῦημκ ἟ ὀνεὴ δόλα, ιεηαλὺ θνμκήζεςξ ηαὶ ἀιαείαξ.” 
775
 The notion (or any equivalent) is mentioned e.g. in Smp. 202a, Rep. 430b, 431c, 602a, Tht. 187b ff., Plt. 
390c, Phlb. 11b, 37d-38a, 64a, Ep. VII 336e. 
776
 See 70a: “ἔπεζξ ιμζ εἰπε῔κ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ἆνα δζδαηηὸκ ἟ ἀνεηή; ἠ μ὎ δζδαηηὸκ ἀθθ᾽ ἀζηδηόκ; ἠ μὔηε ἀζηδηὸκ 
μὔηε ιαεδηόκ, ἀθθὰ θύζεζ παναβίβκεηαζ ημ῔ξ ἀκενώπμζξ ἠ ἄθθῳ ηζκὶ ηνόπῳ;” 
777
 For all these questions, see 86e-96d. 
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 The focus on the practical domain is very important here, since it provides a criterion 
for judging the correctness of one‟s views. We have a correct δόλα when our action is 
effective or successful. But this does not apply to random acts or lucky guesses. One must 
guide one‟s action consciously and this requires some form of awareness or representation of 
what one is doing and why.
779
 In the example provided by Socrates of a successful act, one 
reaches Larissa not by accident, but because one tried to reach it and steered oneself towards 
it, guided by some idea of what one should do. However, one had never gone there before 
and did not know the path.
780
 In other words, one did not have first-hand knowledge of the 
path. One probably learned it from others or made some conjecture based on what one knew. 
The text is indeed unclear about how one attains a correct δόλα. It seems to be somewhat 
random. This is also what is suggest in Theaetetus, where Plato gives another example of 
what corresponds to a correct δόλα. He speaks of judges in court and says that, although they 
have no knowledge of what actually happened (since they were not eye witnesses), they can 
still accept the true version of events and judge the matter correctly.
781
  
However, the idea of a correctness deprived of knowledge is very problematic. In 
Meno, Socrates stresses its problematic character by comparing actions based on correct 
δόλαζ to what soothsayers, diviners and poets supposedly do (and Socrates indeed compares 
the statesmen that lead the state successfully to all these figures). Their actions are not the 
result of knowledge. They are not fully aware of things as they are. Rather, they are inspired 
or possessed (ἐκεμοζζ῵κηεξ). Some higher power acts in them and guarantees the correctness 
of their views and of what results from them – but they are not fully lucid. They are out of 
their minds, in trance (ἔπζπκμζ, ηαηεπόιεκμζ).
782
 This means that they receive a divine 
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 See e.g. 97b-c: “δόλα ἄνα ἀθδεὴξ πνὸξ ὀνεόηδηα πνάλεςξ μ὎δὲκ πείνςκ ἟βειὼκ θνμκήζεςξ· ηαὶ ημῦηό 
ἐζηζκ ὃ κοκδὴ πανεθείπμιεκ ἐκ ηῆ πενὶ η῅ξ ἀνεη῅ξ ζηέρεζ ὁπμ῔όκ ηζ εἴδ, θέβμκηεξ ὅηζ θνόκδζζξ ιόκμκ ἟βε῔ηαζ 
ημῦ ὀνε῵ξ πνάηηεζκ· ηὸ δὲ ἄνα ηαὶ δόλα ἤκ ἀθδεήξ.” 
779
 Cp. 99a: “(...)ηὰ βὰν ἀπὸ ηύπδξ ηζκὸξ ὀνε῵ξ βζβκόιεκα μ὎η ἀκενςπίκῃ ἟βειμκίᾳ βίβκεηαζ – ὧκ δὲ ἄκενςπμξ 
἟βειώκ ἐζηζκ ἐπὶ ηὸ ὀνεόκ, δύμ ηαῦηα, δόλα ἀθδεὴξ ηαὶ ἐπζζηήιδ.” 
780
 See 97a-b: “[΢Ω] (...) εἰ εἰδὼξ ηὴκ ὁδὸκ ηὴκ εἰξ Λάνζζακ ἠ ὅπμζ αμύθεζ ἄθθμζε ααδίγμζ ηαὶ ἄθθμζξ ἟βμ῔ημ, 
ἄθθμ ηζ ὀνε῵ξ ἂκ ηαὶ εὖ ἟βμ῔ημ; [ΜΔΝ] πάκο βε. [΢Ω] ηί δ᾽ εἴ ηζξ ὀνε῵ξ ιὲκ δμλάγςκ ἣηζξ ἐζηὶκ ἟ ὁδόξ, 
ἐθδθοεὼξ δὲ ιὴ ιδδ᾽ ἐπζζηάιεκμξ, μ὎ ηαὶ μὗημξ ἂκ ὀνε῵ξ ἟βμ῔ημ; [ΜΔΝ] πάκο βε.” 
781
 See Tht. 201b-c: “[΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ ὅηακ δζηαίςξ πεζζε῵ζζκ δζηαζηαὶ πενὶ ὧκ ἰδόκηζ ιόκμκ ἔζηζκ εἰδέκαζ, ἄθθςξ 
δὲ ιή, ηαῦηα ηόηε ἐλ ἀημ῅ξ ηνίκμκηεξ, ἀθδε῅ δόλακ θααόκηεξ, ἄκεο ἐπζζηήιδξ ἔηνζκακ, ὀνεὰ πεζζεέκηεξ, εἴπεν 
εὖ ἐδίηαζακ; [ΘΔΑΙ] πακηάπαζζ ιὲκ μὖκ.” 
782
 For all this, see 99b-d: [΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ εἰ ιὴ ἐπζζηήιῃ, ε὎δμλίᾳ δὴ ηὸ θμζπὸκ βίβκεηαζ· ᾗ μἱ πμθζηζημὶ ἄκδνεξ 
πνώιεκμζ ηὰξ πόθεζξ ὀνεμῦζζκ, μ὎δὲκ δζαθενόκηςξ ἔπμκηεξ πνὸξ ηὸ θνμκε῔κ ἠ μἱ πνδζιῳδμί ηε ηαὶ μἱ 
εεμιάκηεζξ· ηαὶ βὰν μὗημζ ἐκεμοζζ῵κηεξ θέβμοζζκ ιὲκ ἀθδε῅ ηαὶ πμθθά, ἴζαζζ δὲ μ὎δὲκ ὧκ θέβμοζζκ. [ΜΔΝ] 





 They are suffering from a form of beneficial ιακία similar to the 
ones mentioned in Phaedrus.
784
 It allows them to do something (and this is taken to imply 
that it gives them some glimpse of how things are), but they cannot fully see or understand 
things as they are. They have a diminished awareness of things (and in this sense they are just 
like flitting shadows in Hades).
785
 They are in a way blind, and having a correct δόλα is 
actually described as blindness in the Republic.
786
 But this is a strange form of blindness.  
They are not absolutely blind (otherwise their actions would be the result of pure chance), but 
they are not completely lucid either. In sum, the forms of efficient action based on a correct 
opinion presuppose some contact with things and thus some truth.
787
 There is some 
correctness, some ὀνεμῦκ, but it bears significant limitations. Full truth is more than getting it 
right. A correct δόλα is not knowledge. It is a deficient grasp of what things are or an inferior 
way of seeing them.
788
  
But then Meno wonders: if a correct δόλα has the same practical success, if it does not 
fail, why is it inferior to and less precious than knowledge?
789
 In fact, one can take Meno‟s 
question even further and wonder why is it different from knowledge at all? We all assume 
knowledge must be correct and correspond to how things are, but if this is all knowledge is, 
then the idea of a correct form of access to things that is not knowledge is absurd. 
Consequently, knowledge must imply additional requisites that are not being fulfilled in the 
case of a correct δόλα. But what are the additional requisites of knowledge that an ὀνεὴ δόλα 
lacks and that renders it somehow blind to what things are?  
                                                                                                                                                        
ἔπμκηεξ πμθθὰ ηαὶ ιεβάθα ηαημνεμῦζζκ ὧκ πνάηημοζζ ηαὶ θέβμοζζ; [ΜΔΝ] πάκο βε. [΢Ω] ὀνε῵ξ ἄν᾽ ἂκ 
ηαθμ῔ιεκ εείμοξ ηε μὓξ κοκδὴ ἐθέβμιεκ πνδζιῳδμὺξ ηαὶ ιάκηεζξ ηαὶ ημὺξ πμζδηζημὺξ ἅπακηαξ· ηαὶ ημὺξ 
πμθζηζημὺξ μ὎π ἣηζζηα ημύηςκ θα῔ιεκ ἂκ εείμοξ ηε εἶκαζ ηαὶ ἐκεμοζζάγεζκ, ἐπίπκμοξ ὄκηαξ ηαὶ ηαηεπμιέκμοξ ἐη 
ημῦ εεμῦ, ὅηακ ηαημνε῵ζζ θέβμκηεξ πμθθὰ ηαὶ ιεβάθα πνάβιαηα, ιδδὲκ εἰδόηεξ ὧκ θέβμοζζκ.” 
783
 See 99e: “(...) ἀνεηὴ ἂκ εἴδ μὔηε θύζεζ μὔηε δζδαηηόκ, ἀθθὰ εείᾳ ιμίνᾳ παναβζβκμιέκδ ἄκεο κμῦ μἷξ ἂκ 
παναβίβκδηαζ (...).” See also 100b. 
784
 Cp. Phdr. 244a ff. 
785
 In 100a, Socrates contrasts those that have only a correct δόλα about ἀνεηή with someone that would possess 
ἀνεηή along with κμῦξ, and says about the latter that “(...) ζπεδὸκ ἄκ ηζ μὗημξ θέβμζημ ημζμῦημξ ἐκ ημ῔ξ γ῵ζζκ 
μἷμκ ἔθδ Ὅιδνμξ ἐκ ημ῔ξ ηεεκε῵ζζκ ηὸκ Σεζνεζίακ εἶκαζ, θέβςκ πενὶ α὎ημῦ, ὅηζ μἶμξ πέπκοηαζ η῵κ ἐκ Ἅζδμο, ημὶ 
δὲ ζηζαὶ ἀίζζμοζζ. ηα὎ηὸκ ἂκ ηαὶ ἐκεάδε ὁ ημζμῦημξ ὥζπεν πανὰ ζηζὰξ ἀθδεὲξ ἂκ πν᾵βια εἴδ πνὸξ ἀνεηήκ.” 
786
 See 506c: “μ὎η ᾔζεδζαζ ηὰξ ἄκεο ἐπζζηήιδξ δόλαξ, ὡξ π᾵ζαζ αἰζπναί; ὧκ αἱ αέθηζζηαζ ηοθθαί – ἠ δμημῦζί ηί 
ζμζ ηοθθ῵κ δζαθένεζκ ὁδὸκ ὀνε῵ξ πμνεομιέκςκ μἱ ἄκεο κμῦ ἀθδεέξ ηζ δμλάγμκηεξ;     μ὎δέκ, ἔθδ.” 
787
 This is precisely what is said in the passage from Symposium quoted above in footnote 774. 
788
 This is emphasized by the very term “δόλα”, which is associated with the idea of appearance and semblance 
(i.e., a form of awareness that hides the true being of something). A correct δόλα is in a way a correct 
semblance. 
789
 See 97c-d: “[΢Ω] (...) ὁ ἀεὶ ἔπςκ ὀνεὴκ δόλακ μ὎η ἀεὶ ἂκ ηοβπάκμζ, ἕςζπεν ὀνεὰ δμλάγμζ; [ΜΔΝ] ἀκάβηδ 
ιμζ θαίκεηαζ· ὥζηε εαοιάγς, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ημύημο μὕηςξ ἔπμκημξ, ὅηζ δή πμηε πμθὺ ηζιζςηένα ἟ ἐπζζηήιδ η῅ξ 
ὀνε῅ξ δόλδξ, ηαὶ δζ᾽ ὅηζ ηὸ ιὲκ ἕηενμκ, ηὸ δὲ ἕηενόκ ἐζηζκ α὎η῵κ.” 
270 
 
Socrates says that correct δόλαζ differ from knowledge insofar as they are not tied 
down. They are a way of seeing things that somehow reaches being, but is at the same time 
characterized by a lack of security or stability. Correct δόλαζ as such are infallible (and as 
long as we have a correct opinion, we will always guide our action correctly), but they are 
like Daedalus‟ statues, who were able to move by themselves and escape if they were not 
fastened with chains.
790
 This characterization suggests that although we have a correct view 
in one moment, we may lose it in the next – i.e., we may become convinced of something 
else or we may regard things from a different angle and no longer be able to determine them 
correctly. We may lose these δόλαζ. Nothing guarantees us that our perspective will remain 
correct. But this is only part of the problem. If the only criterion for the correctness of our 
views is external and concerns the outcome of our action, we have no way of discerning the 
quality of our views beforehand. We have no control over the value of our views. There is no 
guarantee that they are correct, we cannot know for sure that things are the way we think they 
are, unless we are successful.
791
 Thus, the problem is not simply that our beliefs may run 
away, but it affects the very way we see things. When our δόλαζ are correct, we still do not 
have a perfect access to things (and hence we cannot confirm our δόλαζ). We fail to really see 
things as they are. But what would “seeing things as they are” amount to? What do correct 
δόλαζ lack? What could fasten them and give them assurance? And how much would they 
change if they were to be fastened? 
In Meno, Socrates associates the fastening of δόλαζ with a reasoning about the cause 
of something – i.e., about what is responsible for it, what makes it what it is.
792
 Something 
similar is implied in Theaetetus and Symposium. The limitations of a correct δόλα are 
overcome if one is able to render account or justify one‟s view, which implies explaining 
what something is and why something is as it is.
793
 Instead of seeing things as simple facts, 
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 See 97d-98a: “[΢Ω] (...) ημ῔ξ Γαζδάθμο ἀβάθιαζζκ μ὎ πνμζέζπδηαξ ηὸκ κμῦκ· ἴζςξ δὲ μ὎δ᾽ ἔζηζκ παν᾽ ὏ι῔κ. 
[MEN] πνὸξ ηί δὲ δὴ ημῦημ θέβεζξ; [΢Ω] ὅηζ ηαὶ ηαῦηα, ἐὰκ ιὲκ ιὴ δεδειέκα ᾖ, ἀπμδζδνάζηεζ ηαὶ δναπεηεύεζ, 
ἐὰκ δὲ δεδειέκα, παναιέκεζ. [MEN] ηί μὖκ δή; [΢Ω] η῵κ ἐηείκμο πμζδιάηςκ θεθοιέκμκ ιὲκ ἐηη῅ζεαζ μ὎ πμθθ῅ξ 
ηζκμξ ἄλζόκ ἐζηζ ηζι῅ξ, ὥζπεν δναπέηδκ ἄκενςπμκ – μ὎ βὰν παναιέκεζ – δεδειέκμκ δὲ πμθθμῦ ἄλζμκ· πάκο βὰν 
ηαθὰ ηὰ ἔνβα ἐζηίκ. πνὸξ ηί μὖκ δὴ θέβς ηαῦηα; πνὸξ ηὰξ δόλαξ ηὰξ ἀθδεε῔ξ. ηαὶ βὰν αἱ δόλαζ αἱ ἀθδεε῔ξ, ὅζμκ 
ιὲκ ἂκ πνόκμκ παναιέκςζζκ, ηαθὸκ ηὸ πν῅ια ηαὶ πάκη᾽ ἀβαεὰ ἐνβάγμκηαζ· πμθὺκ δὲ πνόκμκ μ὎η ἐεέθμοζζ 
παναιέκεζκ, ἀθθὰ δναπεηεύμοζζκ ἐη η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ημῦ ἀκενώπμο, ὥζηε μ὎ πμθθμῦ ἄλζαί εἰζζκ (...).” 
791
 This is a problematic criterion, because in many cases there may be no sure test, or it may turn out that 
reaching Larissa was after all not the best thing for us. But Socrates does not follow this line of inquiry. 
792
 See 98a: “(...) μ὎ πμθθμῦ ἄλζαί εἰζζκ, ἕςξ ἄκ ηζξ α὎ηὰξ δήζῃ αἰηίαξ θμβζζιῶ. ημῦημ δ᾽ ἐζηίκ, ὦ Μέκςκ ἑηα῔νε, 
ἀκάικδζζξ, ὡξ ἐκ ημ῔ξ πνόζεεκ ἟ι῔κ ὡιμθόβδηαζ. ἐπεζδὰκ δὲ δεε῵ζζκ, πν῵ημκ ιὲκ ἐπζζη῅ιαζ βίβκμκηαζ, ἔπεζηα 
ιόκζιμζ· ηαὶ δζὰ ηαῦηα δὴ ηζιζώηενμκ ἐπζζηήιδ ὀνε῅ξ δόλδξ ἐζηίκ, ηαὶ δζαθένεζ δεζιῶ ἐπζζηήιδ ὀνε῅ξ δόλδξ.” 
793
 See Tht. 201c-d: “(...) ηὴκ ιὲκ ιεηὰ θόβμο ἀθδε῅ δόλακ ἐπζζηήιδκ εἶκαζ, ηὴκ δὲ ἄθμβμκ ἐηηὸξ ἐπζζηήιδξ· ηαὶ 
ὧκ ιὲκ ιή ἐζηζ θόβμξ, μ὎η ἐπζζηδηὰ εἶκαζ, μ὏ηςζὶ ηαὶ ὀκμιάγςκ, ἃ δ᾽ ἔπεζ, ἐπζζηδηά.” See also the passage from 
Symposium quoted in footnote 774. 
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we will know what makes them what they are. This is what provides assurance and genuine 
knowledge. When we are aware of what explains things, we can fully see them, and this will 
also allow us to act successfully and be excellent or virtuous, not because our views are 
correct, but because we are fully aware of what we are doing.  
But what exactly does this reasoning about the cause consist in? In Meno, Plato does 
not say exactly what kind of causes he has in mind. In Phaedo Socrates defends that the 
forms or εἴδδ are what really accounts for things being as they are.
794
 In other words, the 
general modes of being, which are the predicates of things, are what ultimately explains what 
things are. Even if they are not the only factors, they are the main ones.
795
 This is closely 
connected with something we already mentioned. All attributions of predicates presuppose an 
understanding of these predicates. As a result, we may attribute a certain predicate correctly, 
but if we do not have a full insight into it, our access to a thing with this predicate will still be 
defective. This is precisely the defect of a correct δόλα. Though one can have many correct 
judgments about what particular beings are (in the sense that one attributes the right predicate 
and not wrong ones), one may still be far from having a perfectly clear understanding of what 
one is dealing with. One may not be able to render account of one‟s judgment because one 
cannot fully explain what is being judged. 
This is very important to understand the kind of defect a correct δόλα involves. When 
we think about cognitive defects, we may think only of errors in the attribution of a predicate. 
But we can also have a defective understanding of predicates. An appropriate access to things 
presupposes correctness and intelligibility, but we may not realize that it may be correct (i.e., 
it may attribute the right predicates to things) without us understanding properly what these 
predicates are. In that case, we have an intermediate form of access to things (i.e., a form that 
can be characterized as ιεηαλύ, to use the terminology we will consider in the following 
subsection). There is a certain correctness in this way of seeing something, but it is also in a 
way incorrect, insofar as it involves a deviation. It does not attribute the wrong predicate, but 
it has an inadequate understanding of the correctly attributed predicate. In other words, the 
claim to understanding that accompanies a δόλα is false. Plato‟s criticism of correct δόλαζ is 
thus associated with how our views tend to be directed to particular beings and disregard our 
                                                 
794
 See Phd. 95e-103a, especially 100c ff. 
795
 We can actually apply here a distinction Socrates makes in Phaedo, shortly before talking about the εἴδδ as 
the real causes or agents responsible for what things are. In 97c-99c, Socrates had distinguished between the real 
responsible for something and that without which the responsible would not be the responsible for something. 
See especially 99b: “(...) ἄθθμ ιέκ ηί ἐζηζ ηὸ αἴηζμκ ηῶ ὄκηζ, ἄθθμ δὲ ἐηε῔κμ ἄκεο μὗ ηὸ αἴηζμκ μ὎η ἄκ πμη᾽ εἴδ 
αἴηζμκ (...).”  
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understanding of their common predicates. It points in this direction, even if it does not 
render it fully explicit.
796
  
In sum, Plato‟s analysis of a correct δόλα reveals how knowledge and non-knowledge 
(as well as truth and untruth) do not exclude one another. There can be intermediate forms, 
which are not genuine knowledge, but still contain some truth. This is possible because 
knowledge has several requirements (such as correctness, practical efficiency, assurance, full 
insight) and a particular view (or a particular set of views) of ours may fulfill some of them 
without fulfilling the others. The word δόλα thus expresses the fact that we decide things are 
in a certain way and regard them as being so without having a real assurance of this version 
of things and a full insight into its content. It may be correct, but it is nonetheless an 
intrinsically defective form of access to things. 
 
2.4. Δόμα as a power or capacity that lies between ignorance and knowledge. The 
characterization of this “in between” (κεηαμύ) in Republic V  
 
 At the end of Republic V we find an analysis of δόλα‟s constitutive defectiveness that 
takes what we just saw much further. Once more, δόλα is defined as being something more 
than absolute ignorance and something less than perfect knowledge. In this sense, it 
corresponds to what we saw when considering the notions of knowledge claim and correct 
δόλα. The question then is how this intermediate position is now conceived and what it says 
about our usual way of seeing things.  
 The passage that interests us comes in a very particular context, which we must 
briefly consider. The whole discussion about δόλα is prompted by Socrates‟ claim that 
philosophers should be kings or kings should be philosophers.
797
 This leads Socrates to define 
what philosophers are. He explains that philosophers are people who desire all forms of 
knowledge or learning. They have an unrestrained philosophical urge, directed at all 
beings.
798
 However, such a characterization immediately suggests that philosophy is simply 
                                                 
796
 As we will see, the same idea is also at the center of Plato‟s third form of criticism of the notion of δόλα, 
which is directly connected with our understanding of εἴδδ. 
797
 See 473c-e. 
798
 Cp. 475b-c: “μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ ηὸκ θζθόζμθμκ ζμθίαξ θήζμιεκ ἐπζεοιδηὴκ εἶκαζ, μ὎ η῅ξ ιέκ, η῅ξ δ᾽ μὔ, ἀθθὰ 
πάζδξ;     ἀθδε῅.     ηὸκ ἄνα πενὶ ηὰ ιαεήιαηα δοζπεναίκμκηα, ἄθθςξ ηε ηαὶ κέμκ ὄκηα ηαὶ ιήπς θόβμκ ἔπμκηα 
ηί ηε πνδζηὸκ ηαὶ ιή, μ὎ θήζμιεκ θζθμιαε῅ μ὎δὲ θζθόζμθμκ εἶκαζ, ὥζπεν ηὸκ πενὶ ηὰ ζζηία δοζπεν῅ μὔηε 
πεζκ῅κ θαιεκ μὔη᾽ ἐπζεοιε῔κ ζζηίςκ, μ὎δὲ θζθόζζημκ ἀθθὰ ηαηόζζημκ εἶκαζ.     ηαὶ ὀνε῵ξ βε θήζμιεκ.     ηὸκ δὲ 
δὴ ε὎πεν῵ξ ἐεέθμκηα πακηὸξ ιαεήιαημξ βεύεζεαζ ηαὶ ἁζιέκςξ ἐπὶ ηὸ ιακεάκεζκ ἰόκηα ηαὶ ἀπθήζηςξ ἔπμκηα, 
ημῦημκ δ᾽ ἐκ δίηῃ θήζμιεκ θζθόζμθμκ (...).” We will return to this definition of the philosopher and see it in 
more detail in Chap. 13, Sect. 3. 
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concerned with expanding our cognitive horizons. A philosopher wants to see more things, 
hear more things, and so on – i.e., he wants to experience more things similar to the ones we 
already experience. Glaucon then points out that if it is so, then Socrates seems to be 
identifying the philosopher with strange fellows, such as lovers of sights (or lovers of 
spectacles – θζθμεεάιμκεξ), lovers of hearing, lovers of arts (θζθόηεπκμζ) and practical men 
(πναηηζημί).
799
 The philosopher apparently desires a full contemplation (an absolute εέα) of 
reality. He wants to fully watch the spectacle of reality. Socrates, however, vehemently 
denies such an interpretation and says he means something entirely different. These lovers of 
spectacles (θζθμεεάιμκεξ) are just similar to philosophers (i.e., an image thereof), but they 
are no genuine philosophers. According to Socrates, genuine philosophers are the “lovers of 
the sight [or spectacle] of truth”.
800
 They want to have access to the truth, which means that 
all the other people just mentioned are concerned with something other than truth. But how is 
truth here conceived and why is it directed at something other than what one would 
immediately think? 
 Socrates defines truth by reference to the forms or εἴδδ. He asks Glaucon whether 
there is something like beauty, ugliness, justice, injustice, goodness, badness – and 
everything akin to them. These are general modes of beings or general predicates that appear 
everywhere, in many guises.
801
 They constitute the alphabet of things and our understanding 
of it allows us to read the text of reality. In other words, we must have some contact with 
them in order to see things as determined in some way. However, Socrates says that there can 
be two different modes of relation to the εἴδδ, which are also two modes of relation to 
everything in which they appear. He uses as an example the form of beauty (which is in 
keeping with the previous references to spectacles) and says that one is either able to see it, 
delight in it, approach it, follow it – or not.
802
 If one is aware of beauty itself, one will hold 
                                                 
799
 The two last designations are introduced by Socrates in 476a, but they correspond to what Glaucon says. See 
475c-e: “πμθθμὶ ἄνα ηαὶ ἄημπμζ ἔζμκηαί ζμζ ημζμῦημζ. μἵ ηε βὰν θζθμεεάιμκεξ πάκηεξ ἔιμζβε δμημῦζζ ηῶ 
ηαηαιακεάκεζκ παίνμκηεξ ημζμῦημζ εἶκαζ, μἵ ηε θζθήημμζ ἀημπώηαημί ηζκέξ εἰζζκ ὥξ β᾽ ἐκ θζθμζόθμζξ ηζεέκαζ, μἳ 
πνὸξ ιὲκ θόβμοξ ηαὶ ημζαύηδκ δζαηνζαὴκ ἑηόκηεξ μ὎η ἂκ ἐεέθμζεκ ἐθεε῔κ, ὥζπεν δὲ ἀπμιειζζεςηόηεξ ηὰ ὦηα 
ἐπαημῦζαζ πάκηςκ πμν῵κ πενζεέμοζζ ημ῔ξ Γζμκοζίμζξ μὔηε η῵κ ηαηὰ πόθεζξ μὔηε η῵κ ηαηὰ ηώιαξ 
ἀπμθεζπόιεκμζ. ημύημοξ μὖκ πάκηαξ ηαὶ ἄθθμοξ ημζμύηςκ ηζκ῵κ ιαεδηζημὺξ ηαὶ ημὺξ η῵κ ηεπκοδνίςκ 
θζθμζόθμοξ θήζμιεκ;” 
800
 See 475e: “μ὎δαι῵ξ, εἶπμκ, ἀθθ᾽ ὁιμίμοξ ιὲκ θζθμζόθμζξ.     ημὺξ δὲ ἀθδεζκμύξ, ἔθδ, ηίκαξ θέβεζξ;     ημὺξ 
η῅ξ ἀθδεείαξ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, θζθμεεάιμκαξ.” 
801
 See 475e-476a: “ἐπεζδή ἐζηζκ ἐκακηίμκ ηαθὸκ αἰζπνῶ, δύμ α὎ηὼ εἶκαζ.     π῵ξ δ᾽ μὔ;     μ὎ημῦκ ἐπεζδὴ δύμ, 
ηαὶ ἓκ ἑηάηενμκ;     ηαὶ ημῦημ.     ηαὶ πενὶ δὴ δζηαίμο ηαὶ ἀδίημο ηαὶ ἀβαεμῦ ηαὶ ηαημῦ ηαὶ πάκηςκ η῵κ εἰδ῵κ 
πένζ ὁ α὎ηὸξ θόβμξ, α὎ηὸ ιὲκ ἓκ ἕηαζημκ εἶκαζ, ηῆ δὲ η῵κ πνάλεςκ ηαὶ ζςιάηςκ ηαὶ ἀθθήθςκ ημζκςκίᾳ 
πακηαπμῦ θακηαγόιεκα πμθθὰ θαίκεζεαζ ἕηαζημκ.     ὀνε῵ξ, ἔθδ, θέβεζξ.” 
802
 See 476b-c: “μἱ ιέκ πμο, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, θζθήημμζ ηαὶ θζθμεεάιμκεξ ηάξ ηε ηαθὰξ θςκὰξ ἀζπάγμκηαζ ηαὶ πνόαξ 
ηαὶ ζπήιαηα ηαὶ πάκηα ηὰ ἐη η῵κ ημζμύηςκ δδιζμονβμύιεκα, α὎ημῦ δὲ ημῦ ηαθμῦ ἀδύκαημξ α὎η῵κ ἟ δζάκμζα ηὴκ 
274 
 
that it exists. But if one is not aware of it, one will either be completely distracted from it or 
one will even defend that it does not exist.
803
 Consequently, one will either regard individual 
beings as self-contained and as lacking any reference to general predicates, or one will look at 
them as particular instances of general predicates or εἴδδ. Given that the latter alternative is  
what these beings actually are, the fact that one is unaware and unable to focus the εἴδδ as 
such implies that there is a defect in one‟s contact with individual beings. 
 This is how Socrates begins to explain what truth is and how we frequently fail to 
achieve it. It may suggest that the problem with non-philosophical lovers of spectacles is that 
they do not pay attention to how we see things (i.e., to how we always have some 
understanding of the εἴδδ and everything is referred to them). However, since one must still 
be tacitly aware of εἴδδ in order to see things as determined in a certain way, it not clear what 
the limitation of their way of seeing things is and how they differ from philosophers. But at 
this point it is important to distinguish two things that are conflated in Plato‟s analysis. One 
thing is the fact that there are εἴδδ (i.e., the fact that reality is not as nominalists claimed, but 
rather composed of general contents or predicates that are present in different things) and that 
we may be aware of them or not – i.e., their existence and effect in how we see things may be 
hidden from us or not. However, this is something different from the fact that there can be 
defects in our way of understanding εἴδδ and, since one does not focus on the εἴδδ themselves 
(in fact, one is not expressly aware of them at all), one is not able to identify and correct these 
defects. In this second case, the problem is the fact that one ultimately does not understand 
the content of the εἴδδ – and Plato tries to show that this is actually what happens with us. We 
do not really know the alphabet of reality – and so, by not focusing on the alphabet and not 
correcting our understanding of it, any expansion of our knowledge at the “empirical” level 
(i.e., at the level of particular beings) is only illusory – or, as Plato says, it is a form of 
becoming rich only in dreams.
804
  
 This kind of defect is precisely what is expressed in the Platonic notion of dreaming. 
Plato talks of dreaming as something that may occur both when one is asleep and when one is 
awake, and says that it consists “in believing a likeness of something to be not a likeness, but 
                                                                                                                                                        
θύζζκ ἰδε῔κ ηε ηαὶ ἀζπάζαζεαζ.     ἔπεζ βὰν μὖκ δή, ἔθδ, μὕηςξ.     μἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ᾽ α὎ηὸ ηὸ ηαθὸκ δοκαημὶ ἰέκαζ ηε 
ηαὶ ὁν᾵κ ηαε᾽ α὏ηὸ ἆνα μ὎ ζπάκζμζ ἂκ εἶεκ;     ηαὶ ιάθα.” 
803
 Cp. 479a: (...) ὁ πνδζηὸξ ὃξ α὎ηὸ ιὲκ ηαθὸκ ηαὶ ἰδέακ ηζκὰ α὎ημῦ ηάθθμοξ ιδδειίακ ἟βε῔ηαζ ἀεὶ ιὲκ ηαηὰ 
ηα὎ηὰ ὡζαύηςξ ἔπμοζακ, πμθθὰ δὲ ηὰ ηαθὰ κμιίγεζ, ἐηε῔κμξ ὁ θζθμεεάιςκ ηαὶ μ὎δαιῆ ἀκεπόιεκμξ ἄκ ηζξ ἓκ ηὸ 
ηαθὸκ θῆ εἶκαζ ηαὶ δίηαζμκ ηαὶ ηἆθθα μὕης.” 
804
 Cp. Ly. 218c and Tht. 208b. 
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rather the thing itself to which it is like”.
805
 This is different from our concept of dreaming, 
which defines it as a state in which one is surrounded by mere images that are not real, 
regardless of how one relates to these images (i.e., of whether one is aware of their imagetic 
status or not). In our sense, one only stops dreaming when one has access to reality. For 
Plato, however, dreaming implies that one mistakes an image for the real thing. The mistake 
or confusion is an essential part of this experience. As such, dreaming is a state of extreme 
hiddenness. The thing itself is hidden, but so is the image as such. We do not recognize the 
image and think we are seeing the thing itself, and so we are ignorant of both, as well as of 
our own cognitive state. Moreover, if this is the case, we do not need to see reality (i.e., the 
things themselves) in order to stop dreaming in the Platonic sense of the word. We only need 
to realize we are seeing images. This is enough for us to be “awake” according to             
Plato – even if we still have to search for the things themselves. 
 In the case of εἴδδ, dreaming means not only that we take particular beings as 
autonomous (though not fully, since εἴδδ are still presupposed in our access to them), but also 
that we fail to see what the εἴδδ are (i.e., we cannot understand them) and still think we 
understand them. It is in this sense that we dream about being.
806
 Our understanding is 
deviated. We have just an image of the εἶδμξ, which is then primarily determined by 
particular beings, or at least is strongly affected by them – i.e., by something incidental to the 
εἶδμξ as such. This is the core of dreaming for Plato. It may correspond to some pockets of 
reality, but when we dream about one particular εἶδμξ, this is reflected in everything that 
partakes of it. In addition, if we dream about many or all εἴδδ, this will correspond to a state 
of aggravated or absolute dream.
807
  
 What is then the opposite of dreaming in this sense? In order to be awake, we must 
focus on the εἶδμξ as such. We must be aware of it – and this is possible in two ways. We 
may either grasp its content and be fully aware of it, or, given the fact that we often do not 
really understand the εἴδδ (i.e., we somehow relate to them, but still fall short of a full 
insight), we may be fully aware of our cognitive limitations and of how the εἴδδ present a 
problem for us. If this happens, we will no longer concentrate on particular beings and our 
views will not be characterized by the defect that results from this concentration. We become 
                                                 
805
 See 476c: “ηὸ ὀκεζνώηηεζκ ἆνα μ὎ ηόδε ἐζηίκ, ἐάκηε ἐκ ὕπκῳ ηζξ ἐάκη᾽ ἐβνδβμνὼξ ηὸ ὅιμζόκ ηῳ ιὴ ὅιμζμκ 
ἀθθ᾽ α὎ηὸ ἟β῅ηαζ εἶκαζ ᾧ ἔμζηεκ;” Here and in the following I use Bloom‟s translation (see A. BLOOM, The 
Republic of Plato, New York/etc., Basic Books, 1968). 
806
 Cp. 476c-d. For the notion of dreaming about being (ὀκεζνώηηεζκ πενὶ ηὸ ὄκ), see Rep. 533b. 
807
 It may even correspond to what is said by the Visitor in Plt. 277d: “ηζκδοκεύεζ βὰν ἟ι῵κ ἕηαζημξ μἷμκ ὄκαν 
εἰδὼξ ἅπακηα πάκη᾽ αὖ πάθζκ ὥζπεν ὕπαν ἀβκμε῔κ.” 
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aware of the εἶδμξ as a problem, we reach a deeper insight into it, even if it still falls short of 
a perfect understanding of it – and so we are, in a way, already awake.  
 But, according to Plato, this is not the state people (and especially the lovers of 
sensible spectacles) usually find themselves in. In general, people‟s relation to the general 
modes of being is different. They have some knowledge of them, but they are also ignorant of 
them to a certain extent. The εἴδδ are somehow revealed and somehow hidden – and not in 
the sense that we fully know some aspects and are fully ignorant of others, but both things are 
completely intertwined, as we shall see. Our access to them is something through and through 
intermediate (ιεηαλύ) and this affects our contact with everything else (i.e., with all particular 
beings which partake of them). Our access to all beings is marked by this defect – and it is in 
this sense that Plato characterizes it as a δόλα. Plato‟s analysis of δόλα is thus a revision of 
the opposition of knowledge and non-knowledge. He shows that there is something 
intermediate that is neither genuine knowledge nor a complete absence of knowledge. This 
was already implied in the notion of ὀνεὴ δόλα, as we saw, but in the Republic Plato 
develops the idea further. He identifies δόλα as something that lies between knowledge 
(βκ῵ζζξ) and non-knowledge or ignorance (ἀβκςζία), and its own content or what it refers to 
is identified as something that lies between pure being and absolute non-being.  
Let us see how Plato presents this idea in the text and what is implied therein. The 
whole discussion is marked by the correlation between subjective or mental states and the 
objects they refer to.
808
 Plato considers them together, but still puts the emphasis on one of 
the sides. In fact, he first approaches the correlation from the objective side and then changes 
his perspective and starts focusing on the subjective side. This change is very meaningful and 
we must consider it in detail.  
In a first moment (477a2-b11), Socrates considers different kinds of realities and their 
characterization, and then he tries to determine what they require in cognitive terms. He 
speaks of absolute being (ηὸ πακηεθ῵ξ ὄκ) and says that it is entirely knowable. The access to 
it requires knowledge, and the latter must indeed be referred to being in order to be 
knowledge.
809
 Socrates also speaks of absolute non-being (ηὸ ιδδαιῆ ὄκ), which is entirely 
unknowable, and it enables nothing in terms of knowledge but complete ignorance.
810
 Being 
and non-being are thus entirely different and enable entirely different things. If there were 
                                                 
808
 As was said above, a similar correlation is presupposed in the simile of the line. See Chap. 6, Sect. 1.3a). The 
resemblance between the two passages is not surprising, since the simile of the line is in fact an elaboration of 
what we are now considering. 
809
 See 477a: “(...) ηὸ ιὲκ πακηεθ῵ξ ὂκ πακηεθ῵ξ βκςζηόκ (...). μ὎ημῦκ ἐπὶ ιὲκ ηῶ ὄκηζ βκ῵ζζξ ἤκ (...).” 
810
 See ibidem: “(...) ιὴ ὂκ δὲ ιδδαιῆ πάκηῃ ἄβκςζημκ (...)” and “(...) ἀβκςζία δ᾽ ἐλ ἀκάβηδξ ἐπὶ ιὴ ὄκηζ (...)”. 
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only these two modes of reality, then there would always be either knowledge or ignorance, 
and no intermediate. But Socrates also admits the possibility of something that lies between 
being and non-being – and this intermediate reality is then what makes a mixture of 
knowledge and non-knowledge possible.
811
 In fact, it requires such a mixture, and δόλα is 
precisely this mixed form of cognition. It resembles knowledge in a way, but it also includes 
ignorance. In itself, δόλα is at the same time knowledge and ignorance (and therefore it is not 
absolute ignorance nor absolute knowledge). But how is this possible? 
 In order to explain what δόλα is, Plato changes his perspective and adopts the 
subjective side as a point of reference (477c1 ff.). This change coincides with the introduction 
of the notion of power or capacity (δύκαιζξ). Plato considers various cognitive powers and 
the different subjective mental states they are associated with. He also sees what they are 
related to – i.e., what they show or what they let appear, but this is no longer the primary 
focus. It is in this sense that we can say that Plato now changes everything. Whereas in the 
first moment the objects were primarily considered by themselves (i.e., as absolute 
ontological contents), now they are seen from the standpoint of our mental representation or 
of how we have access to them.   
 What is then a power? According to Socrates, powers make us capable of something, 
but they are not sensible realities. They cannot be seen. They have no color or shape.
812
 They 
are only determined (and distinguished from one another) by two things. One of these things 
is that on which they depend or to which they are subordinated – their ἐθ‟ ᾧ or their object. 
This is not simply a thing in itself, but it is the correlate of the δύκαιζξ – what it lets appear. 
In addition, a δύκαιζξ is also determined by what it accomplishes or brings about (ὃ 
ἀπενβάγεηαζ) – i.e., the subjective state that the δύκαιζξ originates when it lets something 
appear.
813
 Socrates says that different powers have different objects and produce different 
mental states. He also suggests that the two factors of each δύκαιζξ are always correlate and 
inseparable. A particular power has always the same kind of object and always produces the 
                                                 
811
 See 477a-b: “εἰ δὲ δή ηζ μὕηςξ ἔπεζ ὡξ εἶκαί ηε ηαὶ ιὴ εἶκαζ, μ὎ ιεηαλὺ ἂκ ηέμζημ ημῦ εἰθζηνζκ῵ξ ὄκημξ ηαὶ 
ημῦ αὖ ιδδαιῆ ὄκημξ;     ιεηαλύ.     (...) ἐπὶ δὲ ηῶ ιεηαλὺ ημύηῳ ιεηαλύ ηζ ηαὶ γδηδηέμκ ἀβκμίαξ ηε ηαὶ 
ἐπζζηήιδξ, εἴ ηζ ηοβπάκεζ ὂκ ημζμῦημκ;     πάκο ιὲκ μὖκ.”  
812
 See 477c: “δοκάιεςξ βὰν ἐβὼ μὔηε ηζκὰ πνόακ ὁν῵ μὔηε ζπ῅ια μὔηε ηζ η῵κ ημζμύηςκ μἷμκ ηαὶ ἄθθςκ 
πμθθ῵κ, πνὸξ ἃ ἀπμαθέπςκ ἔκζα δζμνίγμιαζ παν᾽ ἐιαοηῶ ηὰ ιὲκ ἄθθα εἶκαζ, ηὰ δὲ ἄθθα (...).” 
813
 See 477c-d: “(...) δοκάιεςξ δ᾽ εἰξ ἐηε῔κμ ιόκμκ αθέπς ἐθ᾽ ᾧ ηε ἔζηζ ηαὶ ὃ ἀπενβάγεηαζ, ηαὶ ηαύηῃ ἑηάζηδκ 





 This is the fundamental structure of δοκάιεζξ – and it is in this 
framework that Socrates discusses the notion of δόλα. 
 Γόλα is clearly different from ignorance and Socrates does not even feel the need to 
dissociate them, but he and Glauco carefully distinguish knowledge from δόλα. They stress 
that knowledge never makes mistakes and is thus an absolutely efficient cognitive power. 
Γόλα, in turn, makes mistakes and is essentially fallible.
815
 This difference is very meaningful 
and it proves that they are not the same thing and do not coincide. Consequently, they must 
also be referred to different things. One opines some things and one knows different things. 
Now, knowledge lets appear what absolutely is (which is not a qualified or mystical form of 
being, but rather something that contains nothing of its opposite).
816
 Γόλα must therefore let 
something else appear, especially since it also differs from ignorance, which is relative to 
nothing and has an empty correlate.
817
 So what is there between nothing or non-being and 
simple being? Socrates calls it ηὸ δμλαζηόκ and goes on to define it as something that 
wanders about between non-being and being.
818
  
But before discussing this question, Socrates also distinguishes the different powers 
(namely, ἀβκμε῔κ, δμλάγεζκ and βζβκώζηεζκ) in terms of what they bring about – namely, 
ἄβκμζα, δόλα and βκ῵ζζξ. In order to distinguish the last two from one another, Plato 
introduces the criterion of clearness (ζαθήκεζα) and non-clearness, obscurity, or confusion 
(ἀζάθεζα). He says that δόλα cannot be clearer than knowledge or more obscure than 
ignorance.
819
 Knowledge is indeed the extreme form of clearness. It gives a complete access 
                                                 
814
 Cp. 477d: “(...) ηαὶ ηὴκ ιὲκ ἐπὶ ηῶ α὎ηῶ ηεηαβιέκδκ ηαὶ ηὸ α὎ηὸ ἀπενβαγμιέκδκ ηὴκ α὎ηὴκ ηαθ῵, ηὴκ δὲ ἐπὶ 
ἑηένῳ ηαὶ ἕηενμκ ἀπενβαγμιέκδκ ἄθθδκ.” 
815
 See 477e-478a: “ἀθθὰ ιὲκ δὴ ὀθίβμκ βε πνόηενμκ ὡιμθόβεζξ ιὴ ηὸ α὎ηὸ εἶκαζ ἐπζζηήιδκ ηε ηαὶ δόλακ.     π῵ξ 
βὰν ἄκ, ἔθδ, ηό βε ἀκαιάνηδημκ ηῶ ιὴ ἀκαιανηήηῳ ηα὎ηόκ ηζξ κμῦκ ἔπςκ ηζεείδ;     ηαθ῵ξ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ηαὶ δ῅θμκ 
ὅηζ ἕηενμκ ἐπζζηήιδξ δόλα ὁιμθμβε῔ηαζ ἟ι῔κ.” 
816
 Cp. 478a-b: “εἴπεν ἐπ᾽ ἄθθῳ ἄθθδ δύκαιζξ πέθοηεκ, δοκάιεζξ δὲ ἀιθόηεναί ἐζημκ, δόλα ηε ηαὶ ἐπζζηήιδ, 
ἄθθδ δὲ ἑηαηένα, ὥξ θαιεκ, ἐη ημύηςκ δὴ μ὎η ἐβπςνε῔ βκςζηὸκ ηαὶ δμλαζηὸκ ηα὎ηὸκ εἶκαζ.     μ὎ημῦκ εἰ ηὸ ὂκ 
βκςζηόκ, ἄθθμ ηζ ἂκ δμλαζηὸκ ἠ ηὸ ὂκ εἴδ;     ἄθθμ.” 
817
 Cp. 478b: “ἆν᾽ μὖκ ηὸ ιὴ ὂκ δμλάγεζ; ἠ ἀδύκαημκ ηαὶ δμλάζαζ ηό βε ιὴ ὄκ; ἐκκόεζ δέ. μ὎π ὁ δμλάγςκ ἐπὶ ηὶ 
θένεζ ηὴκ δόλακ; ἠ μἷόκ ηε αὖ δμλάγεζκ ιέκ, δμλάγεζκ δὲ ιδδέκ;     ἀδύκαημκ.” 
818
 See 478e: “ἐηε῔κμ δὴ θείπμζη᾽ ἂκ ἟ι῔κ ε὏νε῔κ, ὡξ ἔμζηε, ηὸ ἀιθμηένςκ ιεηέπμκ, ημῦ εἶκαί ηε ηαὶ ιὴ εἶκαζ, ηαὶ 
μ὎δέηενμκ εἰθζηνζκὲξ ὀνε῵ξ ἂκ πνμζαβμνεοόιεκμκ, ἵκα, ἐὰκ θακῆ, δμλαζηὸκ α὎ηὸ εἶκαζ ἐκ δίηῃ 
πνμζαβμνεύςιεκ, ημ῔ξ ιὲκ ἄηνμζξ ηὰ ἄηνα, ημ῔ξ δὲ ιεηαλὺ ηὰ ιεηαλὺ ἀπμδζδόκηεξ.” For the idea of wandering 
about between being and non-being, see 479d: “δ὏νήηαιεκ ἄνα, ὡξ ἔμζηεκ, ὅηζ ηὰ η῵κ πμθθ῵κ πμθθὰ κόιζια 
ηαθμῦ ηε πένζ ηαὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ ιεηαλύ πμο ηοθζκδε῔ηαζ ημῦ ηε ιὴ ὄκημξ ηαὶ ημῦ ὄκημξ                             
εἰθζηνζκ῵ξ.     δ὏νήηαιεκ.     πνμςιμθμβήζαιεκ δέ βε, εἴ ηζ ημζμῦημκ θακείδ, δμλαζηὸκ α὎ηὸ ἀθθ᾽ μ὎ βκςζηὸκ 
δε῔κ θέβεζεαζ, ηῆ ιεηαλὺ δοκάιεζ ηὸ ιεηαλὺ πθακδηὸκ ἁθζζηόιεκμκ.” 
819
 See 478c: “ἄν᾽ μὖκ ἐηηὸξ ημύηςκ ἐζηίκ, ὏πενααίκμοζα ἠ βκ῵ζζκ ζαθδκείᾳ ἠ ἄβκμζακ ἀζαθείᾳ;     μ὎δέηενα.” 
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to something. It lets it appear as it is.
820
 Ignorance, in turn, is not a way of letting non-being 
appear. It does not show anything. It is a very peculiar form of power – a negative power. In 
ignorance, things are nothing to us or nothing exists for us. So what about δόλα? It cannot go 
beyond these extremes, because there is nothing more revealing than knowledge nor anything 
more concealing than ignorance. Hence, it must lie between them – not as something entirely 
different from them, but as something that is intrinsically conceived by reference to them. It 
participates in both extremes (which are absolutely opposed to one another), but it cannot be 
reduced to any of them. In order to conceive it, we must go beyond the dual logic of 
knowledge and ignorance. Γόλα is darker than knowledge or brighter than ignorance.
821
 This 
means that it has a certain clearness and a certain obscurity. It reveals and hides something at 
the same time – i.e., it must hide what it reveals and reveal what it hides. In this sense, it 
corresponds to what is expressed in the Platonic notion of dreaming. As we saw at the 
beginning of this subsection, dreaming is the state in which the thing itself is hidden behind 
the image and the image as such is also hidden behind the supposed thing (i.e., the image is 
seen as the thing and its imagetic character is concealed). As we will see, it is precisely in this 
sense that δόλα is something that lies in-between (ιεηαλύ).
822
 
This is how Plato determines what the act or power of δμλάγεζκ accomplishes or 
brings about. But the description of its intentional object or its ἐθ‟ ᾧ – namely, ηὸ     
δμλαζηόκ – is still too vague at this point, so Plato returns to it in order to define the kind of 
reality that lies between being and non-being. This definition is very important for the 
question we are discussing, since it completes the analysis of the constitutive defect that 
characterizes δόλα and it also shows how this defect translates into our ordinary experience of 
things. So how does Plato explain the intermediate reality or object that is ηὸ δμλαζηόκ? In a 
first moment, he resumes the distinction initially introduced between individual beings and 
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 In this sense, it seems to correspond to what exists independently of ourselves, even if the idea of 
“independent existence” is still something that we ourselves represent. More precisely, we represent it as that 
which we have access to when we have knowledge. Plato, however, does not engage in these discussions. 
821
 Cp. 478c-d: “ἀθθ᾽ ἆνα, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, βκώζεςξ ιέκ ζμζ θαίκεηαζ δόλα ζημηςδέζηενμκ, ἀβκμίαξ δὲ      
θακόηενμκ;     ηαὶ πμθύ βε, ἔθδ.     ἐκηὸξ δ᾽ ἀιθμ῔κ ηε῔ηαζ;     καί.     ιεηαλὺ ἄνα ἂκ εἴδ ημύημζκ δόλα.” 
822
 The notion of “in-betweenness” (ιεηαλύ) plays indeed a central role in Plato‟s thought and especially in his 
description of human condition, both in its cognitive and in its practical side. We will return to it later, but some 
of its traits can already be seen here. In-betweenness describes a state or a being that is characterized entirely by 
this intertwining of two extremities. It cannot be conceived without an intrinsic reference to both extremities. 
These extremities may be something we never experienced in their pure state (and this seems to be the case 
here, since our entire way of seeing things is defined by Plato as δόλα). However, we are always experiencing 
them in their mixture and have thus a certain relation to them. Moreover, the extremities have different values. 
One is bad or inferior, the other superior. As a result, the being that lies in-between is also marked by the tension 
to move away from one and towards the other. We will not consider the latter aspect here, but for more on it see 
the more extensive analysis of the notion of ιεηαλύ in Chap. 12, Sect. 3.3. 
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εἴδδ, as well as the distinction between two different ways of relating to εἴδδ – either by 
focusing on the eidetic contents or predicates present in individual beings or by reducing 
one‟s focus to individual beings (which are only an instance of these eidetic contents).
823
 As 
we considered, the problem these distinctions allude to is not only the possibility of us not 
realizing that individual beings as we experience them are dependent on general or common 
predicates, but also that by having no explicit awareness of them we do not realize the 
limitations of our way of understanding these predicates, and thus we cannot correct them.  
But Plato now adds a new layer of complexity to the description by comparing both 
kinds of reality with respect to ontological stability or firmness and shows that individual 
beings are marked by a particular kind of ambiguity, whereas the εἴδδ are absolutely and 
fixedly what they are. The problem lies therefore in the way beings are determined or how 
they are what they are. Individual beings simultaneously are and are not what they are. They 
may be beautiful, but they are also non-beautiful or ugly.
824
 This can mean that they can 
change or are in flux (which is then contrasted with the constancy of the εἴδδ), but also that 
they are not absolutely beautiful, because they also have other predicates that are different 
from “being beautiful”. In other words, they can be seen in several respects. This idea of 
different respects is then further developed by the reference to relative determinations. The 
same thing that is double is at the same time half, whereas what is big is also little.
825
 
Individual things can be seen from different angles and they result from the synthesis of all 
these respects or all these sides. But normally we are not clearly aware of all this    
complexity – nor do we have a perfect understanding of the synthesis itself and how 
something can be different things. This is what Plato has in mind when he speaks of the 
children‟s riddle about the eunuch.
826
 Something is and is not what it is. Individual beings 
have a particular kind of instability, and Plato uses the verb ἐπαιθμηενίγεζκ (479b11 and 
                                                 
823
 Cp. the passage from 479a quoted above (footnote 803). 
824
 See 479a-b: “(...) „ημύηςκ βὰν δή, ὦ ἄνζζηε, θήζμιεκ, η῵κ πμθθ῵κ ηαθ῵κ ι῵κ ηζ ἔζηζκ ὃ μ὎η αἰζπνὸκ 
θακήζεηαζ; ηαὶ η῵κ δζηαίςκ, ὃ μ὎η ἄδζημκ; ηαὶ η῵κ ὁζίςκ, ὃ μ὎η ἀκόζζμκ;‟     μὔη, ἀθθ᾽ ἀκάβηδ, ἔθδ, ηαὶ ηαθά 
πςξ α὎ηὰ ηαὶ αἰζπνὰ θακ῅καζ, ηαὶ ὅζα ἄθθα ἐνςηᾶξ.” 
825
 See 479b: “ηί δὲ ηὰ πμθθὰ δζπθάζζα; ἥηηόκ ηζ ἟ιίζεα ἠ δζπθάζζα θαίκεηαζ;     μ὎δέκ.     ηαὶ ιεβάθα δὴ ηαὶ 
ζιζηνὰ ηαὶ ημῦθα ηαὶ αανέα ιή ηζ ι᾵θθμκ ἃ ἂκ θήζςιεκ, ηαῦηα πνμζνδεήζεηαζ ἠ ηἀκακηία;     μὔη, ἀθθ᾽ ἀεί, 
ἔθδ, ἕηαζημκ ἀιθμηένςκ ἕλεηαζ.     πόηενμκ μὖκ ἔζηζ ι᾵θθμκ ἠ μ὎η ἔζηζκ ἕηαζημκ η῵κ πμθθ῵κ ημῦημ ὃ ἄκ ηζξ 
θῆ α὎ηὸ εἶκαζ;” 
826
 See 479b-c: “ημ῔ξ ἐκ ηα῔ξ ἑζηζάζεζζκ, ἔθδ, ἐπαιθμηενίγμοζζκ ἔμζηεκ, ηαὶ ηῶ η῵κ παίδςκ αἰκίβιαηζ ηῶ πενὶ 
ημῦ ε὎κμύπμο, η῅ξ αμθ῅ξ πένζ η῅ξ κοηηενίδμξ, ᾧ ηαὶ ἐθ᾽ μὗ α὎ηὸκ α὎ηὴκ αἰκίηημκηαζ ααθε῔κ (...).” According to 
the Scholia in Platonem, the enigma Plato is referring to runs as follows: “αἶκμξ ηίξ ἐζηζκ ὡξ ἀκήν ηε ημ὎η ἀκὴν/ 
ὄνκζεα ημ὎η ὄνκζε‟ ἰδώκ ηε ημ὎η ἰδώκ/ ἐπὶ λύθμο ηε ημ὎ λύθμο ηαεδιέκδκ/ θίεῳ ηε ημ὎ θίεῳ αάθμζ ηε ημ὎ 
αάθμζ”. See W. GREENE (ed.), Scholia Platonica, Haverford (PA), American Philological Association, 1938. 
According to Jowett and Campbell, the solution of the enigma is as follows: “a eunuch aimed at a bat which he 
saw imperfectly sitting upon a reed with a pumice-stone and missed him”. See L. CAMBELL & B. 
JOWETT(eds.), Plato’s Republic, vol. 3, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1894, ad 479b. 
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479c3) to describe it. The verb means to be double or ambiguous – and so play a double 
game or be of two minds. The object of δόλα is thus marked by this duality of incompatible 
predicates. We cannot conceive it clearly, we cannot discern its content and how its different 
parts relate to each other. They are jumbled together, as it were, and do not produce a clear 
identity. They negate each other and render this object something that is and is not what it is. 
All individual beings are determined in this way, according to Plato, and he also says “we 
cannot think of them fixedly as either being or not being”. Each individual being “rolls 
around somewhere between being and non-being”.
827
 
The εἴδδ, in turn, are the opposite of this. They are absolutely what they are or, as 
Plato says, they “are always the same in all respects”.
828
 They do not change and do not have 
different sides. Therefore, it is possible to fixedly think them (παβίςξ κμ῅ζαζ). They 
determine themselves and are not determined by something else. In other words, they are 
simple elements and do not involve a problem of synthesis.
829
 This makes it possible for us to 
see them clearly and have knowledge of them. Knowledge is indeed marked by clearness and 
so it must fully determine the identity of what it deals with. This being so, and since the 
source of all determinateness are the εἴδδ, one must focus on the latter in order to actually 
have knowledge. 
Γόλα, in turn, is marked by confusion or obscurity. It cannot breakdown the beings it 
deals with and identify their “parts” or “sides” (i.e., their predicates), as well as how they 
relate to each other. It is a hazy access to beings and to their predicates. It must indeed have 
some contact or some understanding of these predicates, but it does not see them clearly or it 
misunderstands them. In sum, δόλα consists in a defective understanding of the εἴδδ and also 
of the individual beings as a synthesis of εἴδδ. It has no true access to anything, but it is also 
far from being an absence of access or complete ignorance. It sees things that refer to εἴδδ, 
but is not fully aware of this reference and cannot properly follow it. As such, δόλα is 
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 See 479c: “(...) ηαὶ βὰν ηαῦηα ἐπαιθμηενίγεζκ, ηαὶ μὔη᾽ εἶκαζ μὔηε ιὴ εἶκαζ μ὎δὲκ α὎η῵κ δοκαηὸκ παβίςξ 
κμ῅ζαζ, μὔηε ἀιθόηενα μὔηε μ὎δέηενμκ.” 
828
 See 479e: “(...) ημὺξ α὎ηὰ ἕηαζηα εεςιέκμοξ ηαὶ ἀεὶ ηαηὰ ηα὎ηὰ ὡζαύηςξ ὄκηα (...).” 
829
 This characterization of the εἴδδ works as a contrast to the characterization of individual beings. It 
emphasizes the need for having simple elements that are the basis of all composition. However, such 
characterization of the εἴδδ may itself be more problematic than Plato suggests in this passage. If we consider 
the discussion of the ιέβζζηα βέκδ in the Sophist (see 251a-259e, and for an analysis of the passage cp. Chap. 6, 
Sect. 2.3b above), we see that εἴδδ are also conceived as involving a synthesis. Such a synthesis is problematic, 
not only because one must also try to understand how an εἶδμξ can be and not be something, but also because it 
raises the possibility that there are no simple elements at the basis of all composition. The whole of reality may 
be intrinsically synthetic. If it is so, the distinction between individual beings and the εἴδδ will not be as marked 
as the Republic suggests – which in turn raises the question of how we can achieve knowledge of them. But this 
is too complex a question for us to discuss here.  
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somehow in contact with everything, but it falls short of fully grasping anything. It is retained 
in an image of things, which it takes to be what really exists, and in this sense it corresponds 
to a state of dreaming. This last point is essential. Γόλα implies a false claim to understanding 
or a false claim of knowledge. We must think we are seeing things as they are, but this is only 
possible if we pay no attention to the εἴδδ – otherwise we would realize all that is missing in 
our access to things. So we (i.e., our δόλαζ) stay bound to sensible beings and their subjective 
appearing. It becomes more passive and closer to an αἴζεδζζξ, even if it always implies   
more – namely, a decision of what something is and attribution of predicates, as well as their 
understanding. But a doxastic way of seeing things is not clearly aware of these predicates, 
and even if it becomes aware of them, it only considers the question of their attribution and 
not the question of their content, which is always presupposed in each attribution. We have 
some glimpse or some vague remembrance of what each predicate is, but we do not focus on 
this glimpse or remembrance of ours, so we do not realize how defective it is. We are rather 
absorbed by what appears and therefore δόλα is primarily referred to appearances – even 
though it is also in its essence a particular mode of relation to the εἴδδ. 
In sum, δόλα falls short of true being, and so it does not reach what it thinks it 
reaches. This does not mean that its problem is failing to reach another domain of reality or a 
metaphysical plain of existence. It is the understanding of the predicates of the very things we 
deal with that is distorted or missing – and this affects our experience of all individual beings. 
Therefore, Plato says that people in this state “opine all these things but know nothing of 
what they opine”.
830
 Γόλα is a universal way of seeing things and the whole of reality as we 
normally experience it. 
But is it possible to overcome the state of mind that corresponds to δόλα? Can we 
reach knowledge? What would it amount to? What kind of δύκαιζξ does it imply and what 
transformations does it bring? The description in the Republic provides some indications, 
though it is far from a full description of this state. Γόλα is indeed overcome if one loses the 
belief that things are as we normally see them – i.e., if we realize the problems with their 
predicates. But this is still something very different from having a full knowledge of these 
predicates or a clear insight into them, and there may actually be several stages of 
development of our views between our ordinary way of seeing things and genuine 
knowledge. In book V, Plato does not consider this intermediate space between δόλα and full 
knowledge, but it will play an important role in book VI and VII. In the simile of the line, 
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 See 479e: “(...) δμλάγεζκ θήζμιεκ ἅπακηα, βζβκώζηεζκ δὲ ὧκ δμλάγμοζζκ μ὎δέκ.” 
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Plato will identify two states above δόλα and in the allegory of the cave there will be many 
intermediate stages between our regular way of seeing and perfect knowledge. At any rate, 
we start overcoming δόλα when we start questioning things as we normally see them. 
Philosophical examination is the way to overcome δόλα and, as such, it can bring about a 
profound and even global change of our way of seeing things. 
The changes philosophical examination can make and how it makes them is what we 






The destructive side of philosophical examination. The project of casting away 
all δόλα (ἐηαμθή η῅ξ δόλδξ) in the Sophist 
 
 
“Opinari autem, duas ob res turpissimum est: quod et discere non 
potest, qui sibi iam se scire persuasit, si modo illud disci potest; et per se 
ipsa temeritas non bene affecti animi signum est.” 
Augustine of Hippo, De utilitate credendi, XI.25831 
 
 
After considering the nature, complexity and defectiveness of the object of 
examination, we are now prepared to tackle the question of the unity of philosophical 
examination in Plato‟s writings. As was mentioned, different passages seem to point to 
different directions and at first sight it is not clear how we can integrate them all in a single 
project. Plato does not explicitly discuss how all forms of examination belong together. This 
is particularly valid for the negative (or destructive) and the positive (or constructive) kinds 
of examination. In some passages and texts, the examination refutes the views one holds, 
while in others it seems to bring about and develop new views. The fact that both kinds of 
examination are referred to views already produces a certain unification, but we will also 
consider how they complement each other and how they are both required by the same 
project. Although the texts do not discuss it explicitly (which led some interpreters to 
attribute the different forms of examination to different periods in Plato‟s philosophical 
career), we can see their potential unity if we consider what is implied in each kind (or, as we 
will show, on each side or stage) of examination. 
We can pick up the trail that leads to the unity of philosophical examination by 
considering a very important passage in the Sophist. Between 226b and 231b, Plato outlines 
the project of an ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ – i.e., of casting away all δόλα in the pejorative sense of 
the word (or all false knowledge claims, as we could also say). He presents this casting away 
as a purge or cleansing (ηαεανιόξ) and a refutation, exposing or shaming (ἔθεβπμξ in the 
negative sense). Although this passage has a purpose that differs from our own (insofar as the 
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 See A. AUGUSTINUS, Opera Omnia, vol. 8, Paris, Migne, 1863. 
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characters are trying to define what a sophist is), the project therein described largely 
coincides with the kind of examination performed by Socrates in the so-called aporetic 
dialogues (a kind of examination that many interpreters also call “elenchus”).
832
 In these 
dialogues, the characters undergo refutative examination (ἔθεβπμξ), come to realize their 
ignorance, and end up disowning false judgments or knowledge claims. Socrates‟ ultimate 
goal is to restrict their knowledge claims to what they actually know, as he himself does. This 
kind of examination is thus primarily negative or destructive. It is an examination of this kind 
that is described in the Sophist. Plato is trying to define what a sophist is, but in doing so he 
outlines a formal project that can be interpreted as a reflection about the nature, motivation 
and purpose of this negative or destructive examination.  
We will thus consider this passage as a description of a formal project of negative 
examination, and we will try to understand the role of this kind of examination within the 
global project of philosophical examination. At first, it is not clear whether the elenctic 
examination is merely a preparation for the examination or rather a central part of 
philosophical examination itself. However, we will see that the cathartic or elenctic 
examination (the ἐηαμθή) is not a different project alongside philosophical examination 
proper. It is rather a reformulation of the project of philosophical examination that takes into 
consideration the circumstances in which this examination occurs and the particular state of 
those that undergo it. We saw how we have always adopted many judgments or knowledge 
claims and how these are often (if not always) unjustified, wrong or distorted. Philosophical 
examination unmasks these defects and cleanses our mind of them. This constitutes a 
preliminary, inevitable and potentially permanent side of philosophical examination. It plays 
a central role in the entire project, though its importance hinges on how much cognitive 
defect there is in our way of seeing or understanding things. Plato does not discuss the 
question in this passage. He does not specify how much defect we have and in what degree 
we need this kind of examination. It may vary from person to person. However, even if all 
our views were good (and their only defect was lack of confirmation), the project of pursuing 
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 There are indeed many analyses and discussions of the elenctic method we find in Plato‟s aporetic dialogues. 
Cp. for instance B. WALDENFELS, Das sokratische Fragen. Aporie, Elenchos, Anamnesis, Meisenheim, 
Anton Hain, 1961; G. VLASTOS, The Socratic Elenchus, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983),      
27-58; P. WOODRUFF, The Skeptical Side of Plato‟s Method, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 40 (1986), 
22-37; H. MAY, Socratic Ignorance and the Therapeutic Aim of the Elenchos, Apeiron 30 (1997), 37-50; H. 
BENSON, A Note on Eristic and the Socratic Elenchus, Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (1989),       
591-599; G. SCOTT (ed.), Does Socrates have a Method. Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato‟s Dialogues and 
Beyond, University Park (PA), Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002; C. KING, Wisdom, Moderation, and 
Elenchus in Plato‟s Apology, Metaphilosophy 39 (2008), 345-362; G. MATTHEWS, Whatever Became of the 
Socratic Elenchus? Philosophical Analysis in Plato, Philosophy Compass 4 (2009), 439-450. 
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and expelling all cognitive defects could still be useful, since it would confirm the validity 
and clarity of our judgments or knowledge claims. Regardless of our cognitive state, elenctic 
examination changes our relation to the object of examination and, consequently, to ourselves 
(insofar as we are beings committed to their own views and whose lives are based on them). 
This is one effect of this modality of examination, but it can also have other effects – and this 
is what we now have to consider.  
The passage in the Sophist helps us understand how the examination of our views is 
much more than an inventory of what we actually know and what we only think we know. It 
is not simply an innocuous diagnosis of our epistemic condition. It is also a treatment of this 
condition – and a potentially violent one, insofar as it is a removal of something to which we 
are committed and even attached. In addition, refutative examination can also open us up to a 
new kind of examination. By reducing our convictions and making us more neutral, it frees 
us to explore different solutions to the problems. In fact, it forces us to examine them and try 
to adopt new beliefs. This positive or constructive side of philosophical examination is 
something we will consider in the following chapter. We must see how this positive kind of 
examination, which tries to establish answers to the problems without previous judgments 
and conceptions, is not the starting point of philosophy (as we might be tempted to think), but 
rather something that must be preceded by a refutative kind of examination. We will thus 




But before anything else, we have to focus on the negative side and see what we can 
learn about philosophical examination when we conceive the ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ described in 
the Sophist as one of its moments. What kind of intervention in the object of examination 
does it entail, how is it performed, what problems are associated with it and what can its 
results be?  
 
1. The terms in which the project of an ἐθβνιὴ ηῆο δόμεο is described in the Sophist 
 
 The passage we find in 226b-231b is very complex. It includes many different 
aspects, but since our main interest is to understand the negative side of philosophical 
examination, we will focus on those aspects that are more directly relevant for this goal. 
                                                 
833
 I will talk throughout these two chapters of two sides, designating them as negative or destructive and 
positive or constructive. This is not Plato‟s language, but I will try to show that it appropriately describes what 
we find in the texts, and also that it helps us understand Plato‟s conception of philosophical examination.  
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Other related questions will be merely mentioned or very briefly discussed. Some moments 
of the analysis will be directly related to what we saw in our previous analyses, which will 
thus help us better understand what is at issue here. Other moments will anticipate important 
questions we will tackle later, but we will not enter into much detail here, since these 
questions require many other considerations. Moreover, they are not essential for our present 
goal. 
 
1.1. Defining the ηέρλε of the sophist. The ηέρλε of casting away the θαθία of the 
“soul” 
 
The first important thing to have in mind is the context in which the project of the 
ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ is presented. This project is presented as one of several attempts of 
grasping and defining what a sophist is. The sophist reveals himself to be very elusive and it 
is not clear how the different attempts at a definition are to be understood or how they relate 
to each other. Are they alternate views or compatible and complementary? And do they all 
refer to the same thing? The first four definitions (or five, since one is subdivided – see  
221c-226a) are rather superficial and the last one (232b ff.) is more elaborate and decisive. 
As for the one we will be considering, it ends up mixing up the sophist with the     
philosopher – which raises the question of the boundaries between the two. This is 
particularly important for our problem. By presenting a sort of sublimated sophist (the 
“sophistry of noble descent”, as it is said in 231b), this definition can also be read as a 
description of philosophical examination, and this is how we will read it.
834
 
All the definitions result from applying the method of dichotomies. They start from a 
major division within a class of beings and progress through further divisions until no more 
distinctions can be made. The full path of specification constitutes a definition.
835
 Given that 
the theme of the investigation is a vocation or a practitioner (the sophist), the first distinction 
is thus the one between being ηεπκίηδξ or ἄηεπκμξ.
836
 The sophist clearly has a ηέπκδ (a 
specialized and expert knowledge) – i.e., an insight on what constitutes a class of beings or an 
operation – and this ηέπκδ qualifies him to intervene in a certain reality and insert, change or 
                                                 
834
 Here and in the following I adopt Benardete‟s translation, with a few changes. See S. BENARDETE, The 
Being of the Beautiful. Plato‟s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, Chicago/London, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1984. 
835
 The method was briefly considered above (Chap. 4, Sect. 1.5) and we will discuss it in more detail below 
(see Chap. 6, Sect. 3.3).  
836
 See 219a. 
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remove something, in order to achieve a certain end.
837
 Σέπκδ is indeed associated with an 
insufficiency of nature (either in itself, according to an immanent criterion, or for us, in 
reference to our desires or needs). There is something beings cannot achieve by themselves or 
which they can miss if they are left to their natural course. So a qualified intervention is 
required, and such an intervention involves above all correctness or appropriateness 
(ὀνεόηδξ) – both with respect to the insight in a certain domain of beings and to the results 
one will produce.  
 All this is from the very beginning presupposed in the presentation of the refutative or 
cathartic examination viz. the ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ. But what is the particular ηέπκδ of the 
sophist? In order to approach this particular ηέπκδ, the Visitor invokes some trivial household 
chores. They do not constitute a special job in the πόθζξ, but rather something women or 
slaves would do. This emphasizes the secondary or auxiliary character of this kind of work. 
The Visitor mentions filtering, sifting, winnowing, separating, carding, spinning, combing.
838
 
All these tasks have in common the act of dividing (δζαζνε῔κ), separating (δζαηνίκεζκ) or 
setting apart (ἀπμπςνίγεζκ). This presupposes that reality is complex and that we find 
associated beings that can (and perhaps should) be dissociated. This may require more or less 




 This separative expertise may separate either the like from the like or the better from 
the worse.
840
 In the first case, the things separated are homogeneous, they have the same 
value and they are both preserved. In the second case, they are heterogeneous, they have a 
different value and only some of them (the better) are preserved or left behind, whereas the 
worse are cast away.
841
 It is this latter kind of separation that is called ηαεανιόξ or    
ηάεανζζξ – a purge, purification, cleansing in the broadest sense.
842
 This is only possible 
because there are differences of value between beings. We are sensitive to many qualitative 
                                                 
837
 To use Aristotle‟s expression, the sophist has an access to things that lies beyond our usual access to things, 
(πανὰ ηὰξ ημζκὰξ αἰζεήζεζξ). Cp. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 981b13-17.  
838
 In Greek: δζδεε῔κ, δζαηη᾵κ, ανάηηεζκ, δζαηνίκεζκ, λαίκεζκ, ηαηάβεζκ, ηενηίγεζκ. See 226b. 
839
 For this notion, see 226c. 
840
 See 226d: “ηαὶ ιὴκ ἔκ βε ηα῔ξ εἰνδιέκαζξ δζαηνίζεζζ ηὸ ιὲκ πε῔νμκ ἀπὸ αεθηίμκμξ ἀπμπςνίγεζκ ἤκ, ηὸ δ᾽ 
ὅιμζμκ ἀθ᾽ ὁιμίμο.” 
841
 See ibidem: “(...) η῅ξ δὲ ηαηαθεζπμύζδξ ιὲκ ηὸ αέθηζμκ δζαηνίζεςξ, ηὸ δὲ πε῔νμκ ἀπμααθθμύζδξ (...).” 
842
 The term ηαεανιόξ and its cognates are used in different domains (in particular the magical, religious and 
medical domains) and Plato presents here a philosophical version of it in the form of a cathartic examination. 
For more on this notion, see Section 1.4 below. 
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differences, even though the criterion of differentiation may not be clear at first (and there 
may in fact be several different criteria).
843
  
 A cathartic ηέπκδ thus requires several kinds of insight in order to produce an 
adequate separation: one has to discern the beings that are connected and their difference, one 
also has to discern their different value, and one must know how they can be separated (i.e., 
one must be able to perform the separation). The two first components (knowing the beings at 
issue and their different value) are essential, since they will determine if there is any need for 
a separation. But the correctness or appropriateness of the operation (of the purification) 
requires a correct insight into these three things. 
 After defining what characterizes a cathartic ηέπκδ, the Visitor goes on to identify two 
domains in which it can be applied. The first domain is the body. Here he distinguishes 
between animate or ensouled bodies and inanimate or soulless ones. The first kind of bodies 
can be purified or cleansed on the inside, by gymnastics and medicine, or on the outside, by 
bathing. As for the ηέπκαζ that cleanse inanimate bodies, the Visitor provides the example of 
fulling.
844
 All these technical interventions in the concrete domain of the body separate the 
good from the bad in a visible way. They can affect us more or less, but are still somewhat 
external to our being.  
 A different kind of ηάεανζζξ is the one applied to the ροπή – our “soul” or “inner 
being”. It is something much more difficult to identify and define. It lies beyond the body, is 
intangible, but no less real. We will consider Plato‟s use of this notion in detail in Part III, but 
for now it is important to bear in mind that the Visitor is referring to everything in us that 
cannot be immediately reduced to the body (regardless of whether it must have some form of 
physical basis or not). Later in the passage, he will also speak of δζάκμζα (thought, intellect, 
mind), thus pointing to the central place of thinking in our inner being. It is at any rate clear 
that he does not have in mind something otherworldly, but rather a constitutive component of 
our being. 
This component is also complex. It has its own components, which can have different 
values. Some of them may be good and others bad. In other words, the soul may contain 
defective elements (forms of πμκδνία or ηαηία, i.e., evil or badness in a functional, not 
necessarily moral sense) and excellent or perfect elements (marked by ἀνεηή). In addition, the 
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 Some criteria may be intrinsic to the beings being separated, others may be external and refer either to 
something else or even to ourselves (as when beings are evaluated according to their usefulness, pleasantness or 
beauty).  
844
 See 226e-227a. 
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different elements are not just something within us, but they define the quality of our being 
and thus the quality of our life (i.e., if it is a happy or a miserable life).
845
 It is therefore 
important to identify some sort of cathartic ηέπκδ that could cleanse the soul – i.e., isolate and 
preserve the good parts, casting away all that is worthless (θθαῦνμκ). This will make it 
healthier and holier – i.e. more perfect. Otherwise, if left to its natural course, the soul will be 
found lacking and unable to reach its best state.
846
  
The Visitor must thus determine what kind of ηέπκδ will be able to correct the nature 
of the soul. As seen above, this ηέπκδ has several requirements. It must have an insight into 
the nature of the soul, what its best condition is, what elements are connected in it, what is 
their respective quality or value, how they affect the goodness or badness of the soul – and 
then it must know how to separate the good from the bad and cleanse the soul of the latter. 
The following discussion will try to do precisely this.  
 
1.2. The description of the soul’s defects (θαθίαη) and the focus on its deformity 
(αἶζρνο) 
 
 The first question then is which ηαηία or ηαηίαζ can there be in the soul. In this 
context, it is necessary to keep in mind that the word ηαηία does not primarily mean “evil” in 
a moral sense. It rather has a functional sense. It designates a defect that prevents something 
from being or performing in accordance with some kind of standard, which may be internal 
or external. In the case of the soul, the standard is internal to the soul itself, engraved in its 
own constitution, as we shall see. When the soul meets the standard, it reaches its excellent or 
optimal condition. When it does not, it is defective. But the standard is not the only thing that 
is internal. As we shall see, the source of the defect is likewise internal. The soul‟s defects are 
not caused by things, people or events around oneself, as we may think. They result from an 
internal corruption of the soul – i.e., from a form of disturbance, debility or powerlessness of 
the soul itself. In short, they come from the soul itself. 
Now, according to the Visitor, there is not just one kind of ηαηία in the soul, nor are 
there infinitely many, all different from each other. All defects of the soul can be reduced to 
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 We will not discuss here whether or not these forms of defectiveness and excellence within the soul are the 
sole factor in determining our ε὎δαζιμκία, but they do not seem to be entirely irrelevant either, as will become 
clear in the following discussion. For a more detailed discussion of this matter, see Chap. 18 below.  
846
 The description of a cathartic ηέπκδ actually raises the possibility that the soul is constitutively infected with 
bad elements and naturally requires such a ηέπκδ. This is not what we usually think. We do not tend to regard it 
as defective and requiring a specialized knowledge in order for it to achieve a good condition. We think this 
may happen in certain circumstances, but not by default. Plato, however, will point in a different direction. 
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two modalities, and the analysis of these two forms of ηαηία is very important. It presents a 
schema we find in many other moments of Plato‟s writings and which is decisive for our 
main question. We will return to it later.
847
 For now we will only consider the main aspects of 
this distinction and some of the questions it raises. The main objective is to isolate the kind of 
ηαηία that the refutative or cathartic examination has to deal with. 
 The Visitor does not describe these two forms of inner defect directly. He rather 
compares them to two things that happen to the bodies, namely illness (κόζμξ) and deformity 
(αἶζπμξ).
848
 These two concepts are then at the center of the whole analysis. The Visitor focus 
on them and identifies their essential features. He argues that illness is a form of ζηάζζξ (of 
sedition or dissent) and deformity is a form of ἀιεηνία (disproportion or inadequacy). We 




 Let us then start with the notion of ζηάζζξ. This word is a political term: it designates 
the sedition, rebellion of a class or group and the resulting civil war. Civil war itself is often 
compared to an illness, which is only natural, given the fact that Greek medicine often 
described illness as a form of conflict between different elements in the body.
850
 Plato is 
alluding precisely to this. The term ζηάζζξ is here defined as the “variance (δζαθμνά) of the 
naturally akin that comes from some kind of corruption”.
851
 This kinship is the result of the 
fact that our organism is composed of different parts that belong together. However, these 
parts can have different relations to each other. When there is a sedition, each part pulls in a 
different direction and they no longer work together. There is no harmony and no concord. 
The organism becomes dysfunctional. It is subjected to a sort of civil war, in which those that 
live together and have close ties try to destroy each other. 
 Something of the kind happens in an ill body and also in an ill soul. In the latter, Plato 
says that there are “opinions at variance with desires, anger with pleasures, speech with pains, 
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 This will actually provide the basis for the appraisal of the unexamined life in Chap. 18 below. 
848
 The meaning of the term αἶζπμξ in this passage seems to be primarily aesthetic, but the word also has a 
strong moral connotation, implying that something is unsightly, unbecoming or even turpid. 
849
 For these comparisons, see 227d-228a. 
850
 For more on the word ζηάζζξ and the relation with medicine, see e.g. G. GROSSMANN, Politische 
Schlagwörter aus der Zeit des Peloponnesischen Krieges, Zürich, Leemann, 1950, 43ff., especially 53ff.; R. 
BROCK, Sickness in the Body Politic. Medical Imagery in the Greek Polis. in: V. HOPE & E. MARSHALL 
(eds.) Death and Disease in the Ancient City, London, Routledge, 2000, 24-34; C. KOSAK, Polis nosousa. 
Greek Ideas About the City and Disease in the Fifth Century BC, in: V. HOPE & E. MARSHALL (eds.), op. 
cit., 35-54; J. PRICE, Thucydides and Internal War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
851
 See 218a: “[ΞΔ] Πόηενμκ ἄθθμ ηζ ζηάζζκ ἟βμύιεκμξ ἠ ηὴκ ημῦ θύζεζ ζοββεκμῦξ ἔη ηζκμξ δζαθεμν᾵ξ 
δζαθμνάκ; [ΘΔΑΙ] O὎δέκ.” 
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and all these with each other”.
852
 These are conflicts we experience in ourselves. Different 
parts of us pull us in different directions and this inner laceration renders the soul bad. This 
badness is then translated in our behavior and way of being, producing cowardice, lack of 
restraint and injustice (“δεζθίακ ιὲκ ηαὶ ἀημθαζίακ ηαὶ ἀδζηίακ”, 228e). These have an 
endogenous nature, just as sickness and sedition in general.
853
 On the other hand, harmony of 
the different internal elements brings about excellence, health and concord. 
But the decisive kind of ηαηία is the second one, which is compared to deformity. 
Deformity in turn is defined as a form of ἀιεηνία – which implies that beauty or shapeliness 
is a form of ζοιιεηνία.
854
 ΢οιιεηνία and ἀιεηνία require a relation between two elements. 
This may be a mathematical relation of proportion or lack thereof – or a broader relation of 
correspondence, of being functionally adequate or inadequate (fit or unfit) to something. At 
any rate, it implies an agreement or disagreement.
855
 In bodies, this produces beauty and 
ugliness (understood as proportion or disproportion). In the soul, it will likewise produce 
fitness and unfitness (or adequacy and inadequacy). This means that in the case of the soul‟s 
deformity, the soul will fail to correspond to something.  
But what does the soul fail to correspond to? One could perhaps be tempted to think 
of some sort of moral norm, but the Visitor has something else in mind. He talks of things 
that partake of motion and that, despite setting for themselves a target and trying to hit it, end 
up straying off and missing the target at every try or every assault (ηαε‟ ἑηάζηδκ ὁνιήκ).
856
 
In these cases, there is a disproportion or lack of correspondence between the movement of a 
particular thing and the target that was set (or the aiming at it). If, on the other hand, the 
projectile happens to hit the target, then both things agree with each other and the movement 
is appropriate. 
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 See 228b: “[ΞΔ] Σί δέ; ἐκ ροπῆ δόλαξ ἐπζεοιίαζξ ηαὶ εοιὸκ ἟δμκα῔ξ ηαὶ θόβμκ θύπαζξ ηαὶ πάκηα ἀθθήθμζξ 
ηαῦηα η῵κ θθαύνςξ ἐπόκηςκ μ὎η ᾐζεήιεεα δζαθενόιεκα; [ΘΔΑΙ] Καὶ ζθόδνα βε.” 
853
 Plato points to an internal origin of any sedition or illness of the soul insofar as they result from an internal 
imbalance. However, in this passage he does not explain how the internal imbalance can come about in the first 
place – whether it is incited or even forced by some external element or rather caused by any of the internal 
parts (or even all of them). For a discussion of Plato‟s possible answer (or at least the one we can infer from his 
writings), see Chap. 17 below. 
854
 This brings to mind the association of the opposite of αἶζπμξ – namely, ηάθθμξ – with ζοιιεηνία in Philebus. 
See 64e. A comparison of the two passages would be interesting, but we will have to leave it for another time. 
855
 The notions of agreement and disagreement can indeed be applied to describe both forms of ηαηία of the soul 
and their opposites, which points to a fundamental relation between both phenomena. We will, however, leave 
this aside for now, for Plato does not explicitly discuss the question of their relation in the Sophist. For more on 
this topic, see in particular Chap. 18 below. 
856
 See 228c: “[ΞΔ] Σί δ᾽; ὅζ᾽ ἂκ ηζκήζεςξ ιεηαζπόκηα ηαὶ ζημπόκ ηζκα εέιεκα πεζνώιεκα ημύημο ηοβπάκεζκ 
ηαε᾽ ἑηάζηδκ ὁνιὴκ πανάθμνα α὎ημῦ βίβκδηαζ ηαὶ ἀπμηοβπάκῃ, πόηενμκ α὎ηὰ θήζμιεκ ὏πὸ ζοιιεηνίαξ η῅ξ 
πνὸξ ἄθθδθα ἠ ημ὎κακηίμκ ὏πὸ ἀιεηνίαξ α὎ηὰ πάζπεζκ; [ΘΔΑΙ] Γ῅θμκ ὡξ ὏πὸ ἀιεηνίαξ.” 
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According to the Visitor, the soul is supposedly characterized by a motion of this 
kind. It sets for itself the target of truth, which it tries to hit – that is, it tries to know beings as 
they are (more specifically, what predicates can be attributed to them and what the meaning 
of these predicates are). The soul is not enclosed in its own domain, but it is rather directed to 
other entities, has some idea of them (and of itself), wonders about what they are and tries to 
determine them. These attempts at determining are the tries or assaults (ὁνιαί) Plato is 
talking about. The soul mobilizes itself towards the truth (ἐπ᾽ ἀθήεεζακ ὁνιςιέκδξ ροπ῅ξ).
857
 
This idea is closely related to something we considered before in the analysis of the         
δόλα – namely, the fact that Plato sometimes describes δόλα as some sort of projectile, such 
as a dart or an arrow.
858
 In the Sophist, the use of the terms target (ζημπόξ), hitting 
(ηοβπάκεζκ) and missing (ἀπμηοβπάκεζκ) also bring to mind the throwing of a projectile. The 
soul is a sort of archer or spearman that tries to have access to things as they are – and 
precisely this constitutes our many δόλαζ or knowledge claims.
859
  
At any given moment, we have already many shots. This in turn raises the problem of 
their quality and how they reflect on the soul. Our beliefs can hit the target or swerve off and 
this affects the soul and its quality. Knowledge is then the act of one‟s perspective coinciding 
with beings as they are, whereas ignorance is defined as a deflection or a going astray. The 
latter is, moreover, identified with παναθνμζύκδ, which constitutes a word-play.           
Πανα-θνμζύκδ denotes a deviation or derangement of one‟s mind and the Visitor says that it 
happens when the soul swerves away from understanding (ζύκεζζξ).
860
 Derangement or 
madness is primarily a deflection (a moving or being lead away, a παναθμνά) of our soul 
insofar as it tries to know beings as they are.
861
 This can mean the soul does not hit anything 
(i.e., that things remain indeterminate for it) or it can mean that it hits the wrong target 
(thereby acquiring a false view of things).
862
 At any rate, the soul is ἀκόδημξ (mindless or 
thoughtless). It has no comprehension or understanding. It is therefore deformed and 
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 See 228c. 
858
 Cp. Chap. 5, Sect. 1.6. 
859
 In fact, the metaphor is somewhat imprecise, because the soul is both the shooter and the object shot (i.e. the 
particular δόλαζ and knowledge claims). The soul is in tension and flies towards things, trying to grasp them and 
coincide with them. In a way, it becomes what it hits (whether that was its target or not) – though it cannot be 
reduced to it. We will see this better in Chap. 11 below. 
860
 See 228c-d: “ηό βε ιὴκ ἀβκμε῔κ ἐζηζκ ἐπ᾽ ἀθήεεζακ ὁνιςιέκδξ ροπ῅ξ, παναθόνμο ζοκέζεςξ βζβκμιέκδξ, 
μ὎δὲκ ἄθθμ πθὴκ παναθνμζύκδ.”  
861
 This is in consonance with what we find in Xenophon‟s Memorabilia, where Socrates is said to have equated 
ιακία with ἀιαεία and with believing one knows what one does not know. See 1.2.50 and 3.9.6-7. 
862
 This difference will be very important and we will return to it in the following section. 
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disproportionate (αἰζπνά and ἄιεηνμξ).
863
 It does not know things and this means there is no 
correspondence between the target set by the soul, to which it is directed, and the actual 
movement of trying to hit it and establish what things are. 
The possibility of this lack of correspondence requires our inner being to have a target 
“in sight”. In other words, the soul must relate to it in some way, must have a notion of this 
target in general, or it must aim at hitting it. Indeed, the soul has some constitutive relation to 
truth insofar as it aims at finding it. This is what enables each particular target and each 
particular shot (i.e., each particular try or assault), each corresponding to a particular being or 
a particular truth. In fact, these particular targets are included in the general target. The 
permanent shot towards the truth is divided midflight, as it were, into multiple shots. This 
multiplicity of shots (of impulses or assaults) suggests that the soul can be deformed in some 
respects and well-proportioned in others. It may hit its target sometimes and miss other times. 
But when the Visitor mentioned that there are beings that move towards a target, he also 
explicitly talks of missing it at every assault (ηαε‟ ἑηάζηδκ ὁνιήκ), which raises the 
possibility of the same happening with us. Our soul can be a completely deformed soul and 
resemble a bad archer that cannot hit his mark not even once.
864
 All its shots regarding the 
distribution of predicates and the understanding of them would be deviated or off target. 
However, regardless of how frequently the soul misses its target, the entire structure 
of aiming at a target must be present when the soul misses it. A deviation is only possible if 
there is a target from which something deviates.
865
 The relation to the target must remain. 
The soul cannot lose sight of it. Anything else would be very difficult (if not impossible) to 
represent or conceive. It would imply that the soul was no longer directed to beings as they 
are. This does not mean that we would regard them as indeterminate or even indeterminable. 
We would completely lose the notion of these beings and of there being something. There 
would be no cognitive decision (no δόλα) whatsoever and no expectation of it. There would 
simply be either indetermination or nothing (no manifestation) at all. 
This is not the case. We have a relation to truth (to determining things as they are) – at 
least in the form of a tension towards it. The movement towards the truth is not incidental to 
our being or to the soul, but rather its essence (or at least a very important part of it). The soul 
is always trying to hit the target or targets (i.e., trying to see things as they are or to have 
                                                 
863
 See 228d. 
864
 For the image of a bad archer, see Tht. 194a. 
865
 This does not necessarily entail that one recognizes the miss as a miss. The text up until now does not say 
anything about it, but we will see there is the possibility of mistaking a miss for a hit. 
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access to them). This means that its cognitive success or failure is also essential to 
characterize the soul. In itself, the soul is either deformed or shapely (i.e., well-proportioned). 
Not knowing is not a simple fact that accompanies the soul. It is a corruption of the soul, a 




The soul is constitutively directed to truth (whatever that means and whatever the 
consequences that has – or should have – for our lives). As the Stranger says and Theaetetus 
promptly accepts, “every soul is unwillingly ignorant of everything”.
867
 In other words, each 
one of us is marked by a negative non-indifference (or an aversion) to ignorance and a 
positive non-indifference (or attachment) to knowledge. Moreover, this non-indifference 
seems to concern everything (i.e., all beings or the entire truth). We do not want to be 
mistaken or deceived in any respect. We have an intrinsic desire for knowledge (i.e., we have 
θζθμζμθία). We are directed toward the target of truth, we want to determine things as they 
are. Even those that deny it need to presuppose this relation to the target in order to deny it. 
This is an essential thesis of Plato – one that may very well strike us as surprising. It does 
raise many questions. It is not clear whether each soul has a compulsive need to know 
absolutely everything or just what it comes in contact with. It is also unclear whether this is a 
tacit or an express need and what kind of knowledge it requires about everything (whether a 
complete knowledge or only generic). These and other questions are essential to determine 
the soul‟s attachment to truth (to the target it sets for itself), which in turn defines both what 
the soul is (how essential this setting the target is for it) and how important the alternative 
between deformity and its opposite is (i.e., how serious a defect deformity is). We must 
however leave the discussion of the soul‟s need for truth for a later stage of this 
investigation.
868
 At this point, what matters is the fact that ignorance can be conceived as a 
form of defect of the soul. At least in some cases, we require or try to know something, we 
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 The Visitor says that ignorance is not normally regarded as a ηαηία (a defect or an “evil”) of the soul. See 
228d. It is easier to identify seditions in the soul as an evil, since they are expressed in cowardice, lack of 
restraint, insolence, or injustice, which constitute clear forms of defect or vice (πμκδνία). As for ignorance, 
people tend not to recognize it as a defect of the soul in itself. Not knowing something is not considered a 
weakness of the soul, but rather something incidental to it. The Visitor, however, tries to show that ignorance by 
itself is always an inner corruption of the soul. Ignorance goes against the soul‟s nature and is therefore 
intrinsically undesirable and even reprehensible. 
867
 See 228c: “ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ροπήκ βε ἴζιεκ ἄημοζακ π᾵ζακ π᾵κ ἀβκμμῦζακ.”  
868
 It is indeed crucial for the argument about the value of philosophical examination and it will be discussed in 
detail in Chap. 13 Sect. 3.3, Chap. 18 Sects. 3.2, 4.2, and Chap. 19, Sect. 2.2. 
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are not indifferent to truth. This means we may reach it, but we may also fall short of the 




1.3. The forms of ignorance (ἄγλνηα) and the preminence of the false knowledge 
claims (κὴ θαηεηδόηα ηη δνθεῖλ εἰδέλαη).  
  
 Plato is trying to determine the cathartic ηέπκδ insofar as it applies to human beings 
and in order to do this he distinguished two forms of defectiveness or ηαηία in the body and 
in the soul. He then identifies all forms of cleansing us of these defects.
870
 First, he identifies 
a ηέπκδ that corrects bodily deformity, to wit gymnastics (βοικαζηζηή), and one that corrects 
bodily illness, namely medicine (ἰαηνζηή). He also identifies a ηέπκδ of chastisement 
(ημθαζηζηή) that is concerned with the inner seditions of the soul and the defects that result 
from it (insolence, injustice, cowardice).
871
 As for ignorance or the deformity of the soul, the 
ηέπκδ that corrects it is the instructive (δζδαζηαθζηή) ηέπκδ. However, these cathartic ηέπκαζ 
are not all equally relevant for the definition of the sophist and Plato will indeed focus solely 
on one: the instructive ηέπκδ, which is supposed to remove the deformity of the soul – its 
ignorance or παναθνμζύκδ. But ignorance is not uniform. There are different forms of 
ignorance and therefore we have to determine whether the cathartic ηέπκδ Plato has in mind 
(and which will turn out to be the cathartic or elenctic examination) casts away all forms of 
ignorance or one in particular.  
As we will see, cathartic examination purifies only a particular form of ignorance – so 
in order to understand it, we need a more detailed understanding of ignorance, its different 
modalities and their respective weight and importance. The Visitor does precisely this. He 
outlines a sort of anatomy of ignorance, though it is still somewhat imprecise, as we will see. 
He calls the attention to the prominence of one form of ignorance and contrasts it with many 
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 Our inner being is thus exposed to these two kinds of defect (of “evil”): the one that is like an illness and the 
one that resembles deformity. We will consider them in more detail later (see Chapter 18). We will see how they 
are something of which we can be more or less aware (to the point that we may even speak of a latent and a 
patent illness or deformity of the soul), and we will also discuss the relation between these two forms of ηαηία 
of the soul – whether they are completely independent from one another or not. There is some connection 
between them, but we find no discuss of this in the Sophist. The Visitor and Theaetetus focus solely on the 
second form of psychic ηαηία, for this is the only one that seems to be relevant for the definition of the sophist. 
The cathartic or refutative examination performed by the latter only acts (at least directly) on this form of ηαηία. 
870
 See 228e-229a. 
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 We will later have to consider if chastisement is the only (or even the best) means to bring about peace and 
harmony between the different elements of the soul. It is possible that philosophical examination, and in 
particular elenctic examination, also play an important role with respect to this. But for now we will follow the 




others, which he gathers and brings under one heading, without specifying what characterizes 
this one heading and what all these other forms of ignorance have in common. This raises 
several questions, but let us first consider the form of ignorance to which the Visitor gives all 
the prominence. He says that this is a big and difficult (or hard to handle) kind of ignorance 
and acts as a counterweight to all other kinds.
872
 This decisive kind of ignorance is here 
designated as ηὸ ιὴ ηαηεζδόηα ηζ δμηε῔κ εἰδέκαζ. It is a variation of the forms used throughout 
the corpus to designate what we considered in the previous chapter: the false or baseless 
knowledge claims (μἴεζεαζ εἰδέκαζ, εἰδέκαζ δ‟ μ὎).
873
 In this passage, the Visitor uses the verb 
ηαηεζδέκαζ to express the idea of knowing something well or fully. This is not the state one is 
in, but still one thinks one knows. In 231b6 the Visitor uses the expression ιάηαζμξ 
δμλμζμθία to denote the same thing: a vain semblance or conceit of wisdom. One is 
convinced of having a superlative knowledge, a perfect access to something, but this is a 
wrong conviction. One has merely a δόλα in the negative sense – i.e., a subjective judgment 
that has no objective grounds and thus distorts what something is.  
In this passage, the Visitor does not say much about this form of ignorance. He simply 
says that it is responsible for πάκηα ὅζα δζακμίᾳ ζθαθθόιεεα (228c5-6). The dative here is 
not clear. It may have an instrumental, an explanatory or a locative sense. In other words, the 
translation can be: all that we fail “through thought”, “due to thought” or “in thought”. Be 
that as it may, the baseless knowledge claims are nonetheless associated with mental errors 
and these are not necessarily simple theoretical lapses. They also cause many practical 
mistakes. In other texts, Plato often emphasizes that every failure in action is due to false 
knowledge claims and the imprudence that results from them.
874
 This is particularly true of 
everything that depends on our planning and our conception (and perhaps everything or 
almost everything does). Independently of whether there are other sources of failure, false 
knowledge claims seem to be particularly associated with it – and this derives from their own 
constitution. Baseless knowledge claims are a special kind of deformity. As is said in the 
Laws, in a passage mentioned above, they constitute a compound or double ignorance.
875
 One 
does not know something, one strays off the target, and in addition one also misses the kind 
of relation one has to the target (i.e., whether one hits or misses the mark). One swerves off 
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 Cp. 229c: “ἀβκμίαξ βμῦκ ιέβα ηί ιμζ δμη῵ ηαὶ παθεπὸκ ἀθςνζζιέκμκ ὁν᾵κ εἶδμξ, π᾵ζζ ημ῔ξ ἄθθμζξ α὎η῅ξ 
ἀκηίζηαειμκ ιένεζζκ.” 
873
 See Chap. 7, Sect. 1. 
874
 See for instance Alc. I 117e-118a. 
875
 See Laws 863c-d, especially 863c4-6: “(...) ηὸ δὲ δζπθμῦκ, ὅηακ ἀιαεαίκῃ ηζξ ιὴ ιόκμκ ἀβκμίᾳ ζοκεπόιεκμξ 
ἀθθὰ ηαὶ δόλῃ ζμθίαξ, ὡξ εἰδὼξ πακηεθ῵ξ πενὶ ἃ ιδδαι῵ξ μἶδεκ (...)”. Cp. Chap. 7, Sect.1 above. 
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with respect to the shot itself and misdiagnoses one‟s cognitive shot. One misfires in respect 
both to the object of the knowledge claim (since one has no true cognitive access to it) and to 
the quality of one‟s access to it (i.e., the quality of one‟s knowledge claim). One does not 
know something and one does not know that one does not know it. This constitutes a 
deviation within the deviation or an intensified deviation. It is the maximal distance one can 
be from truth. The soul does not simply fail to hit its target and it does not simply hit 
something else. It hits something other than what it believes it has hit. Things appear as 
something else. There is a kind of alienation from reality and from the soul‟s condition. The 
soul has a kind of private or deviated version of things (a kind of dream) and does not realize 
it. In sum, one‟s relation with the target is wholly subverted. One is still related to it (indeed it 
does not disappear or stop being the target), but because one thinks one has hit it, one fails to 
see the reality one is directed to and also fails to understand what one has and how it is no 
more than a missed shot. One does not see the missed shot as a missed shot nor the target as 
something one missed. One is therefore dreaming in Plato‟s sense, insofar as one mistakes an 
image (something that wants to be like something else) for the thing itself.
876
  
This enhanced form of ignorance is very different from simply not knowing 
something and having no claim to having knowledge of it. One knows even less and this is 
why the Visitor says that only this compound ignorance is called ἀιαεία. As was said, 
ἀιαεία is a very strong word. It means “stupidity” or “folly”, and contains a strong 
component of censure or reprehension.
877
 It is implied that the thing one is ignorant of is 
something that is within one‟s grasp, something everyone should know, not something 
transcendent or difficult – and yet we fail to reach it. This thing that should be within our 
grasp is not necessarily the object of the knowledge claim, but the fact that we do not know it 
and have an empty knowledge claim about it. It is the soul‟s own incompetence or ineptitude 
that makes the false knowledge claim possible. In other words, the error of thinking one 
knows is not a chance event, but rather something that could and should be avoided. It is the 
result of a particular lack of discernment and, as such, it constitutes the most extreme form of 
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 For Plato‟s notion of dreaming, see in particular Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 above. 
877
 As was said, Plato even stresses the component of censure and reprehension by qualifying this form of 
ignorance as a blameworthy stupidity (ἐπμκείδζζημξ ἀιαεία). See Ap. 29b and Alc. I 118a. For more on this 
notion, see Chap. 7, Sect. 1 above. 
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insanity or παναθνμζύκδ. One is out of one‟s mind and one has no notion of it. The defect 
comes from within and is intrinsically one‟s own fault.
878
 
This is the form of ignorance singled out by the Visitor. In contrast, the other forms of 
ignorance must entirely lack any empty conceit of knowledge. When affected by them, one 
does not suppose one knows when one does not know. All these other forms of ignorance are 
therefore simple (to use once again the distinction taken from the Laws). The soul does not 
reach the being to which it is directed. As we said, the target must remain in sight, the 
movement towards it must take place (otherwise one would be like a rock, of which we 
cannot not say in the proper sense of the word that it is ignorant of something), but in this 
case there is no presumption of hitting it. A failed shot is not mistaken for a perfect one.    
But what exactly are the different forms of ignorance that the Visitor opposes to the 
false knowledge claims? The text is vague in this respect and the only explicit indication we 
find is given by Theaetetus. When talking about the ηέπκδ that would correct these other 
forms of ignorance, he mentions the δδιζμονβζηαί δζδαζηαθίαζ (i.e., the different forms of 
instruction in particular handicrafts), and he opposes them to the ηέπκδ that is supposed to 
correct false knowledge claims, which he says is called παζδεία (and seems therefore to 
coincide with the formation of free citizens).
879
 But why does Theaetetus emphasize the 
handicrafts? There are many things we may be ignorant of and the handicrafts are just one 
more thing. It is perhaps important that they are a vulgar form of knowledge. They do not 
have a special social status and one is not disturbed by the fact of not possessing this kind of 
knowledge. Moreover, it is relatively easy to ascertain whether someone possesses this 
knowledge or not, and one is normally not mistaken about it. The other form of ignorance 
would then concern things that are not very important and which people normally do not 
claim to know.
880
 We do not make mistakes about knowing these things or not. We are aware 
of our lack of technical knowledge – in contrast with what happens with the other things that 
are related to παζδεία. They are things that all human beings need to know in order to acquire 
a respectable status both within the community and in one‟s own eyes – and we usually think 
we know them, even if we do not. 
 Theaetetus thus seems to identify the other forms of ignorance with different kinds of 
know-how. But we could make a different and more complete identification of these other 
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 We will return to the question of the soul‟s own fault in ἀιαεία when discussing the responsibility of the soul 
in the formation and preservation of the unexamined life and of all the knowledge claims that underpin it. See 
Chap. 17 below. 
879
 See 229d. 
880
 In this respect, cp. Alc. I 117b-d.   
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forms of ignorance that are opposed to the empty knowledge claims. The simple ignorance 
can indeed refer to three different things, to which we alluded above. First, it can concern 
something of which we have no idea whatsoever (of which we have no perception, no 
memory, no thought), something to which we are totally oblivious. This constitutes a form of 
unconscious ignorance. We have no clear notion of this particular target and of our impulse 
towards it. It is simply contained in the global target of truth. This is what allows us to talk of 
missing this particular being. Secondly, one may have some idea that a being exists, but lack 
any knowledge claim about its particular features or even about its exact identity (though in 
some cases, if not all, we may already have some tacit assumptions about this being and its 
features). In such a case, we would be aware of our ignorance, we would have an explicit 
notion of the target and our motion towards it, and we would be aware of not reaching it. It is 
something of this sort that happens in the case of the handicrafts we are not trained in. 
Finally, the simple ignorance may also pertain to matters about which we once had 
knowledge claims that were in the meanwhile refuted, thus making us realize our ignorance. 
The structure of this form of ignorance is similar to the second form. Both are conscious and 
both correspond to a form of interrogative presentation of something. One has some access to 
a being, but this access is very indeterminate. It may correspond to a state of uncertainty in 
which one doubts whether something is like one thinks. It may also correspond to a state of 
hesitation between two or more alternatives, or even to a state of complete perplexity and 
confusion about something. All these possibilities are very different from having a 
knowledge claim and are thus simple forms of ignorance. 
The Visitor, however, does not specify any of this. He is mainly concerned with 
identifying and highlighting the vain conceit of knowledge. The other forms of ignorance are 
not very problematic. We all acknowledge their existence and it seems that we may even be 
seriously affected by them without suffering any serious consequences. The case is very 
different with baseless knowledge claims. We tend to be distracted from this form of 
ignorance and the place it occupies in our life. The Visitor, however, not only identifies it, but 
he also puts it at the center of his analysis. He says that, despite our distraction from it, it is a 
counterweight to all other forms of ignorance. We may have as much double ignorance as we 
have ignorance – or even more. But quantity is not the main problem here. Even if there are 
millions of things that we are simply ignorant of, our knowledge claims can still pervade all 
those things and make us presuppose something about them or attribute predicates to them 
(either some general features, or the fact that they are irrelevant for our life, or anything else). 
301 
 
The complex syntax of our knowledge claims makes it possible that knowledge claims about 
one thing may infect our ignorance regarding something else. Knowledge claims (and mainly 
the tacit ones) have the power to give some context to what we do not know and thus they 
can pervert simple ignorance.
881
 This reduces the weight of of the latter and makes double 
ignorance all the more severe. Double ignorance is therefore the one that contributes the most 
to whether our soul is marked by deformity or shapeliness. 
  
1.4. The ways of correcting our ἄγλνηα and the need for an ἐθβνιὴ ηῆο δόμεο 
 
Let us now consider the kinds of ηέπκαζ used to correct these forms of ignorance. We 
already mentioned that the Visitor attributes a ηέπκδ to each form of ηαηία and the deformity 
of the soul is corrected by δζδαζηαθζηή (the instructive ηέπκδ). This form of expertise 
corrects the deviated assault of the soul towards its target and brings a new direction to the 
soul‟s cognitive access to things. But we have seen that there are two kinds of deviation or 
ignorance. One is simple and the other (namely, the vain conceit of knowledge) is double. 
Accordingly, there must also be two forms of instructive ηέπκδ.  
As was said, it is Theaetetus who identifies these two forms and his identification 
(although conventional and not as precise as the one the Visitor would probably make) 
reveals some interesting aspects regarding the correction of ignorance. The simple form 
ignorance is to be corrected by the instruction in handicrafts.
882
 This kind of instruction 
imparts a very specific knowledge, which we normally do not think we have. Since we have 
no knowledge claims in this respect, the transmission of this knowledge seems to be pretty 
straightforward. One needs only to have contact with a master, who already possesses this 
knowledge and then transfers it to the apprentice, who can easily receive it. Though some can 
have greater skill than others, the basics of a particular handicraft is something almost 
everyone can learn with proper training and for this reason it is also not the object of great 
admiration.
883
 These are the domains emphasized by Theaetetus, but the same holds for all 
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 Unconscious ignorance, in which we have no explicit idea about something, may be the result of a 
knowledge claim, since we may think that there is nothing to know in a certain domain (which means that this 
ignorance is not just simple ignorance, but already contains a portion of double ignorance). As for ignorance 
regarding what something is or the kind of ignorance that results from refutation, both can coexist with different 
knowledge claims regarding the object at issue – i.e., we may not know exactly what something is, but we may 
already have some beliefs about it. 
882
 Cp. 229d. 
883
 The knowledge of handicrafts, though certain (in the Apology these are indeed the only kind of ζμθμί 
acknowledged by Socrates – see 22c-d) and relatively simple, is vulgar and confined to a relatively unimportant 
domain. It is necessary for someone in the πόθζξ to know how to do it, but we do not all need to know it. 
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those things in relation to which we do not have any special knowledge claim. The lack of 
supposed knowledge allows us to receive a direct instruction.  
The case of the instruction that is supposed to correct our false knowledge claims is 
very different. According to Theaetetus, this instruction is called παζδεία. As was said above, 
the primary sense of this word is education. It is what allows one to overcome the childish 
condition and become a fully-fledged member of the tribal community, sharing in the duties 
and privileges that come with such a condition. In other words, this is the process of 
acquiring the superior condition – i.e., the process of becoming a man (ἀκήν) in the pre-
eminent sense the word had in Ancient Greek culture. In a culture with no notion of intrinsic 
human dignity, dignity had to be conquered and such a conquest required competence, skill, 
and knowledge. One had to share the community values and one also had to be able to act 
and partake in common deliberations. All this was acquired through παζδεία, which 
encompassed the different processes and activities that were required to abandon the childish 
condition and acquire the manly condition.
884
 
This was often regarded as a somewhat automatic process. Children would learn what 
they needed from their elders and the transmission of the necessary knowledge would be 
relatively simple. But when the Sophists proposed a new kind of education, things changed. 
This implied there were important limitations in the traditional education, which prevented 
men from acquiring the superior condition. The community in which they grew up and of 
which they are a part was unable to provide the education needed. It was necessary to resort 
to a specialist, the sophist, who possessed a superior form of wisdom and was able to transmit 
it. Only this new wisdom and the education provided by it could overcome the limitations of 
the traditional education. The young needed the services of the sophist, but so did the   
grown-up, for in a way they were still children. They lacked proper education and were 
therefore unable to lead their lives in a correct manner. This is the outrageous accusation that 




Theaetetus confusedly alludes to this framework. Παζδεία is supposed to correct our 
empty knowledge claims and the increased kind of deformity that results from them. It must 
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 Indeed, the process of education has both a negative and a positive side. One must put away childish things 
(i.e., one must stop speaking as a child, understanding as a child, thinking as a child), grow up and acquire new 
ways of acting, speaking and thinking. For more on the notion of παζδεία, cp. Chap. 1, Sect. 2.2. 
885
 The Sophists have indeed an important relation with the notion of παζδεία, and we must keep in mind that the 
reference to this notion comes in a text in which the characters are trying to define precisely what a sophist is. 
For more on the notion of παζδεία, see Chap. 1, Sect. 2.2 above.  
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counteract the cognitive tries or assaults (ὁνιαί) of the soul towards things and replace them 
with new tries or assaults. But here the Visitor feels the need to introduce a new distinction. 
Education – or as the Visitor also says, instruction in θόβμζ (words, speeches or  
conversation) – is twofold. He speaks of two paths (ὁδμί) and says that one is rougher and the 
other smoother.
886
 The first path (i.e., the first mode of παζδεία) is the traditional way of 
educating children through admonishments, which may be more or less forceful (i.e., harsher 
or softer). The parents may angrily or severely reprimand their children when they do 
something wrong or they may otherwise exhort them.
887
 This constitutes the         
κμοεεηδηζηή – the ηέπκδ of admonishments, of talking sense into someone.
888
 With this 
ηέπκδ, the parents produce a direct correction of the deviation of the soul and bring it to its 
proper course (i.e., to its target: the truth). It is a form of positive education, in which one 
directly transfers or inculcates the correct understanding of something.
889
 In other words, one 
uses speech (θόβμξ) to directly communicate a new access to things.
890
 This kind of 
instruction (just like the instruction in handcrafts) follows the model of nourishment (of 
ηνέθεζκ). One ingests knowledge, which is like food for the soul.
891
 One acquires more access 
or a better access and this knowledge is integrated into one‟s set of views. Thus one‟s inner 
being or soul becomes less deformed and shapelier. 
The Visitor, however, is very skeptical about the effectiveness of this positive 
education as a form of correcting one‟s false knowledge claims. It seems to work well in 
cases of simple ignorance (like the instruction in handicrafts) or when one is not so 
committed to a view (when one‟s δόλαζ are not stiff). But the case is much more complicated 
when people are convinced of possessing a superior form of knowledge (when they think 
they are ζμθμί or δεζκμί about something). In that case, because they think they already 
possess a superlative knowledge, the admonitory ηέπκδ would have to spend a lot of effort 
and it would accomplish little. Their condition resists any change. Indeed, this condition is 
not the result of an explicit decision and is not something one can simply choose to correct. 
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 See 229e. 
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 See 229e-230a. This vague description seems to correspond to the description of the first phase of the 
educational process made by Protagoras in the eponymous dialogue. See 325c ff. 
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 The word κμοεεηδηζηή itself seems to suggest that this is a matter of inserting (ηζεέκαζ) κμῦξ in someone. 
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 At least this is the understanding one has when one admonishes someone. It presupposes one already has a 
correct understanding of things and is thus in a position to transfer it to someone else. 
890
 As is said in Smp. 175d, knowledge would then be “ὥζπεν ηὸ ἐκ ηα῔ξ ηύθζλζκ ὕδςν ηὸ δζὰ ημῦ ἐνίμο ῥέμκ ἐη 
η῅ξ πθδνεζηέναξ εἰξ ηὴκ ηεκςηένακ.” In this model, what is transmitted goes from one side to the other without 
suffering any change during the process.  
891
 We find the metaphor of ingesting knowledge for instance in Protagoras (see 313c ff.) and Phaedrus (246e 
ff.). It is promptly suggested by the verb ηνέθεζκ, which means to nourish both in the sense of feeding and 
rearing (or educating) someone. 
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As the Visitor says, “all stupidity (ἀιαεία) is unwilling” (or “not of one‟s own accord”, 
ἀημύζζμκ). The stupidity sees itself as something completely different and this makes 
correcting it all the more difficult. “No one who believed he was wise would ever be willing 
to learn anything of those things in which he believed he was dreadfully clever”.
892
 These 
words express just how powerless a positive education is to correct all our vain conceit of 
knowledge. The soul‟s views of reality (its assaults on the target of truth) are firmly set and 
they are simply seen as corresponding to what things are. There is no uncertainty or 
instability – and thus no search (no γδηε῔κ). One is in a sedentary cognitive position (just like 
the prisoners in the cave). The admonitory ηέπκδ, which tries to directly impart new views, 
would only be able to produce very small corrections or additions, most probably limited or 
even distorted by what one already believes to know. All learning is blocked because of one‟s 
supposed knowledge. There is no neutral recipient, no pure passivity. The contact with all 
new views (or all new δόλαζ) is determined by the ones that are already installed in the soul 
of the person being educated. 
In order to better explain this idea, the Visitor employs a physiological image.
893
 He 
describes the soul as an organism and, although he does not say it explicitly, it is implied that 
this organism is swollen with all its false knowledge claims and is thus marked by a kind of 
cognitive ὄβημξ (a term which means bulk, but also has the connotation of pride, arrogance, 
conceit, exaltation). The soul is inflated with all its δόλαζ. It is overweight, stuffed up with 
unwholesome, unprofitable elements, and does not even realize it. In other words, the soul is 
ill. In fact, given the abundance of false knowledge claims, the soul is a very sick      
organism – possibly even entirely sick, if it turns out that the soul actually fails all its shots 
and there is deviation in each impulse.
894
 This is all the more serious since it prevents any 
direct intervention. The Visitor talks about administering teachings (πνμζθένεζκ ιαεήιαηα) 
as if they were remedies. These remedies are supposed to correct the deformity of the soul. 
But the false knowledge claims block these remedies as they block any incoming views. The 
δόλαζ are impediments to the absorption of anything new. They prevent the organism from 
benefitting (ἀπμθαύεζκ) from any sustenance it may receive. The soul cannot digest, 
assimilate – and so it is impossible to correct any cognitive shortcoming simply by nourishing 
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 For all these ideas, see 230a: “ηὸ δέ βε, εἴλαζί ηζκεξ αὖ θόβμκ ἑαοημ῔ξ δόκηεξ ἟βήζαζεαζ π᾵ζακ ἀημύζζμκ 
ἀιαείακ εἶκαζ, ηαὶ ιαεε῔κ μ὎δέκ πμη᾽ ἂκ ἐεέθεζκ ηὸκ μἰόιεκμκ εἶκαζ ζμθὸκ ημύηςκ ὧκ μἴμζημ πένζ δεζκὸξ εἶκαζ, 
ιεηὰ δὲ πμθθμῦ πόκμο ηὸ κμοεεηδηζηὸκ εἶδμξ η῅ξ παζδείαξ ζιζηνὸκ ἀκύηεζκ.” 
893
 See 230c-d. 
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 The use of this image actually points to a certain structural similarity between the soul‟s deformity and the 
understanding of disease we considered in Section 1.2 above. 
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one‟s soul with new views. All positive education is neutralized. This can mean that every 
remedy (every new view) is simply rejected, but it can also cause that these new views are 
absorbed by the disease and used as means to attend or nurture it. Instead of curing the 
organism and freeing it from harmful elements, they would only prolong the problem, insofar 
as they would be transformed by the soul‟s main presuppositions (὏πμεέζεζξ) and thus 
integrated in the system of δόλαζ that is already present in the organism.
895
 
This is the paradoxical situation that results from the vain conceit of knowledge. 
Although we do not want to be ignorant, we also do not want to learn. Learning is only 
possible if we clear up the way and somehow remove the conceit of knowledge. It is 
necessary that we stop thinking we are wise or clever when we are not. This is what the other 
form of education (the one that is rougher and different from the traditional form of 
education) is supposed to do. It has a negative character and it is precisely this negativity that 
is conveyed by the expression ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ (230b1). As is the case throughout this 
passage, δόλα has a negative sense here and coincides with the expression “ηὸ ιὴ ηαηεζδόηα 
ηζ δμηε῔κ εἰδέκαζ”. ἖ηαμθή in turn designates any form of casting away, expelling,  
discarding – like jettisoning or throwing one‟s cargo overboard, or vomiting, evacuating, 
having an abortion, etc. But in this context, given the image of an organism swollen up and 
intoxicated by its false knowledge claims, the ἐηαμθή seems to be what results from the 
action of a purgative or a laxative. It evacuates the intellectual bowels, and thus removes or 
takes out of commission the δόλαζ that block learning.
896
 This is described by the Visitor as 
an ἀπαθθαβή (230c2) – i.e., as an act of getting rid of something or a release from something, 
with the further implication that this something oppressed us and was an evil. He also calls it 
ηαεανιόξ – and this brings us back to the beginning of the analysis. The ἐηαμθή is the act of 
casting away the defect or ηαηία that is the false conceit of knowledge. This is what has to be 
separated from our cognitive organism. We have to purge or cleanse our soul of this 
unwholesome element or this spiritual pollution. The term ηαεανιόξ has indeed a medical 
and religious sense, as was said above, and the ηαεανιόξ Plato has in mind here is what can 
bring our soul to a good condition and allow it to be happy.
897
 The ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ is thus 
supposed to cure or save our soul. It constitutes a form of sublimated ηαεανιόξ, which 
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 This would constitute a kind of κμζμηνμθία, to use an expression from the Republic (407b1). 
896
 See 230d: “(...) ηὰξ ημ῔ξ ιαεήιαζζκ ἐιπμδίμοξ δόλαξ ἐλέθώκ (...).” 
897
 The notion of happiness (ε὎δαζιμκία) appears at 230e. The Greek meaning of the word is in some essential 
respects different from our contemporary conception of happiness. For a discussion of this question, see Chap. 
12, Sect. 3.2 below. 
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redeems us from our cognitive faults and gives us sound-mindedness (ζςθνμζύκδ).
898
 
According to the Visitor, this is the most pleasant and most stable release.
899
  
The Visitor thus outlines the project of a complete psychic purge or cleansing, which 
would produce a state of believing only the things we actually know and nothing more.
900
 All 
our soul‟s shots or assaults towards the truth would be reduced to those that are effectively 
knowledge and we would recognize our ignorance in all other matters. We would achieve a 
mindful ignorance and thereby remove the double ignorance or double deformity of the soul. 
This second kind of education is thus the opposite of a transmission of knowledge. It involves 
a reduction, a loss of weight. It corresponds to a diet and a getting rid of the diseased parts. In 
other words, it is a form of negative παζδεία. We must unlearn what we wrongly think we 
know. We lose the supposed education and instruction we had (what gave us our wrong 
views), we are returned to a childish condition or rather discover we have been a child all this 
time. We cancel the views of which we were wrongly convinced and, as a result, things 
become more indeterminate for us. The presentation of them becomes interrogative. The 
soul‟s old tries or assaults are cancelled and the soul is remobilized. It must try to hit things 
(i.e., the truth) again. It must redefine things and produce new δόλαζ.  
This is the cathartic ηέπκδ the Visitor had in mind all along. The other corrective 
ηέπκαζ (medicine, gymnastics, chastisement, instruction in handicrafts and admonishment) 
could expel ηαηία by modifying or inserting something. The ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ, in turn, is 
solely concerned with removal. It removes the soul‟s deformity by removing its false 
                                                 
898
 The state we achieve is appropriately described by Theaetetus (at 230d) as the best and most “moderate” (or 
“sensible”, ζώθνςκ) condition (ἕλζξ). It produces sound-mindedness insofar as it avoids cognitive excesses or 
cognitive ὕανζξ, which can have bad consequences and itself produces a state of inner disorder (the illness of the 
soul the Visitor talked about). In this sense, the state that results from the ἐηαμθή is much better than the one 
corresponding to the double deformity. The Visitor emphasizes this idea by saying that even the Great King, 
who is supposed to have the most sumptuous and most desirable life, is simply uneducated (a child) and 
deformed if he has not gone through such a purge, i.e. through the process of refutation (see 230d-230e). He is 
unpurified with respect to the things that matter the most (ηὰ ιέβζζηα). What seems to be the most admirable 
condition is thus to be despised or pitied if it is full of vain conceit of knowledge. The Great King is not in a 
better condition than someone like Socrates, who has much fewer possessions, but also much fewer knowledge 
claims. A happy or fortunate condition indeed requires one‟s soul to be shapely and not infected with deformity.  
899
 See 230c: “ηαὶ ημύηῳ δὴ ηῶ ηνόπῳ η῵κ πενὶ α὏ημὺξ ιεβάθςκ ηαὶ ζηθδν῵κ δμλ῵κ ἀπαθθάηημκηαζ παζ῵κ ηε 
ἀπαθθαβ῵κ ἀημύεζκ ηε ἟δίζηδκ ηαὶ ηῶ πάζπμκηζ αεααζόηαηα βζβκμιέκδκ.” In Phaedo we also find the project of 
a ηάεανζζξ of the soul (see in particular 65e-69d and 80d-83e), but in that case the thing one must get rid of is 
the body. This admits of different interpretations, but as we will see in Part III and IV, the body in Phaedo 
corresponds primarily to a way of life which values the pleasures of the body and a certain way of seeing things 
that is primarily focused on our sensations and particular things. It is precisely this way of life and the somatic 
views that are associated with it that must be purged. Insofar as these views are also intrinsically defective, there 
is a clear connection between the two conceptions of cleansing – although in the Sophist the description is more 
neutral and does not specify what the content of the δόλαζ that are to be expelled is and what way of life is 
outlined by them. For more on the Phaedo, see in particular Chap. 13 Sect. 2.2. 
900
 See 230d: “(...) ηαεανὸκ ἀπμθήκῃ ηαὶ ηαῦηα ἟βμύιεκμκ ἅπεν μἶδεκ εἰδέκαζ ιόκα, πθείς δὲ ιή.” 
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knowledge claims. This removal is in itself a gain, because it reduces the ignorance and 
brings us closer to knowledge.
901
 It intensifies our relation to truth. Achieving a state of 
simple ignorance is already a progress, insofar as it produces what Kant calls a negative 
expansion (negative Erweiterung).
902
 This is what then allows us to receive knowledge or 
search for it. 
 The purge of baseless knowledge claims has therefore a therapeutic character. It 
removes something and gives us the possibility of health – i.e., it gives the cognitive 
organism the possibility to grow. One can now receive cognitive sustenance, i.e., new views: 
One can create new beliefs, which will be correct or at least better than the previous ones. 
This positive moment is indeed very important, as we shall see. Plato‟s conception of a 
negative examination does not intend to do away with philosophical problems, but it lets 
them appear in their true form, perhaps for the first time. The ἐηαμθή turns the soul‟s eye 
from its usual direction and gives it the possibility to see something new. Therefore, 
philosophical examination is not concluded with the ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ. The expulsion of the 
empty conceit of knowledge has an auxiliary character and presupposes a second technical 
intervention. One must also expand one‟s knowledge, nurture it somehow. The passage of the 
Sophist we are considering does not specify how. We only find references to conventional 
forms of expansion: the instruction in handicrafts and parental admonishment. There is no 
reflection about a particular method and a particular kind of examination that allows one to 
find answers. We must search for it in other passages of the Platonic corpus and this is what 
we will do in the following chapter. But it is important to bear in mind that, given all the false 
knowledge claims we have, any positive examination must be preceded by the cathartic 
examination described in the Sophist. The ultimate goal is to achieve knowledge and have a 
shapely soul. The ἐηαμθή itself aims at this. But we cannot simply pursue or acquire it, since 
there is (or at least there might be) much deflection in our soul. We must first examine our 
own cognitive state and the knowledge claims we have, and only then are we in condition to 
properly acquire new knowledge. 




                                                 
901
 On this idea of losing knowledge claims as a gain, cp. in particular Men. 84a-c. 
902
 Cp. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in: IDEM, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, Berlin, Georg Reimer, 
1904, 212 (A256/B312). 
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1.5. The method of the ἐθβνιὴ ηῆο δόμεο 
 
 The question now is how the cathartic examination is to be carried out . The Visitor 
briefly describes the method or process of the ἐηαμθή. By considering his description, we can 
better understand the nature of this project of negative education – as well as its difficulty and 
insufficiency (i.e., how it needs to be supplemented by a positive form of examination). The 
description largely coincides with the method we find in many dialogues (the so-called 
Socratic elenchus). We considered some aspects of this method above, when we saw how 
one‟s vain conceit of knowledge is exhibited or revealed in the dialogues.
903
 However, some 
interpreters seem to contest this identification and rather discuss which sophist and which 
method the Visitor has in mind. They focus particularly on the ἀκηζθμβζηή, the δζζζμὶ θόβμζ, 
and how it can be used to expose the frailty of any position.
904
 But there is a certain 
ambiguity in the whole passage. The Sophists used such methods or techniques often as mere 
eristics – i.e. as a set of tricks meant to persuade or refute anyone and take advantage of them. 
As a result, these methods had a bad reputation and the word “sophist” itself acquired a 
negative sense.
905
 The Visitor himself is aware of this. After describing the cathartic 
examination, he fears he has described something more admirable than sophistry.
906
 The 
description seems rather to correspond to the philosopher and what we see Socrates doing in 
the corpus. This means that we can distinguish what the Sophists actually did and a formal 
project, which would outline something like an ideal sophist – and this is what the Visitor 
does, calling it the noble sophistry (἟ βέκεζ βεκκαία ζμθζζηζηή, 231b7-8).  
 Let us then see the description of the method of ἐηαμθή in the Sophist. As was said, 
some aspects were already mentioned and discussed in the previous chapter, when we 
considered the nature of false or baseless knowledge claims and also how they are unmasked 
in the dialogues. Now, however, the question is how to remove these false knowledge claims. 
This is not something that can be done from the outside, simply by pointing out to someone 
that they have false knowledge claims. The person that has false knowledge claims must 
understand that they have them and this understanding is supposed to provoke a strong 
reaction of rejection. 
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 Cf. Chap. 7, Sect. 1.2 a). 
904
 For a discussion of this question, see in particular G. KERFERD, Plato‟s Noble Art of Sophistry, The 
Classical Quarterly 4 (1954), 84-90; J. TREVASKIS, The Sophistry of Noble Lineage (Plato, Sophistes   
230a5-232b9), Phronesis 1 (1955), 36-49; J. SOLANA, Socrates and „Noble‟ Sophistry (Sophist 226b –231c), 
in: B. BOSSI & T. ROBINSON (eds.), Plato’s Sophist Revisited, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2013. 
905
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 1, Sects. 2.1 and 2.2 above. 
906
 See 230a. 
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One important clue about how this is done comes from the fact that Plato calls this 
form of examination ἔθεβπμξ.
907
 We saw in Chapter 4 that this term conveys the act of 
submitting someone to a test or a challenge, and it also denotes the act of refuting, exposing 
or shaming someone.
908
 The ηέπκδ the Visitor is describing does precisely this. It refutes 
people, shows that they do not have the knowledge they thought they had, but are rather 
uneducated and childish. It attacks the examinees‟ self-love and sense of honor, and shames 
them (εἰξ αἰζπύκδκ ηαηαζηήζαξ).
909
 They were convinced they possessed a superior form of 
wisdom and are now confronted with the fact that they know nothing and are stupid for 
thinking they do. In other words, they are forced to confront the double deformity of their 
soul and cannot but feel ashamed of their own condition. As the Visitor says, “those who are 
being examined, on seeing this, are harsh on themselves and grow tame before everyone 
else”.
910
 The elenctic examination changes everything and converts the double ignorance in 
simple ignorance, thus leading us to search for (and pay attention to) other possibilities of 
conceiving things.  
But how exactly is this to be done? According to the Visitor, it is necessary to 
question or cross-examine someone thoroughly (δζενςη᾵κ, 230b4). The ἐηαμθή takes place in 
θόβμξ and deals with θόβμζ. The one being questioned, having strong knowledge claims, will 
produce assertions which he believes are meaningful, either by putting forward his own views 
or by giving assent to what the questioner says. The examinee thus thinks he “says 
something” – or more precisely, something meaningful or true (ηζ θέβεζκ, 230b4). However, 
one‟s assertions often say nothing (insofar as one does not have actual knowledge) and it is 
this that the questioner must show (ἐκδεζηκύκαζ, 230b7) and the respondent must see (ὁν᾵κ, 
230b8). This lack of meaning or truth of one‟s assertions will be revealed by the             
cross-examination itself. By being demanded answers and clarifications, the respondent will 
end up wandering or roaming about (πθακ᾵ζεαζ) with respect to his judgments (δόλαζ).
911
 
The image of wandering is also connected with the idea of rambling, saying things without 
connection, and it expresses here the state of the one who has no real knowledge. In the case 
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 See 230d and 231b. 
908
 See Chap. 4, Sect. 2.2. 
909
 See 230d. 
910
 See 230b-c. The irritation with oneself is presented as an essential condition for learning. It makes one mild 
and receptive to an intervention from the outside (i.e., to learning from someone else). Otherwise, our stiff δόλαζ 
render us equally stiff and impervious to any external contribution. So by changing the relation to oneself and to 
how we see ourselves, we can change our relation to others – or, more precisely, our relation to the views they 
may try to impart us. 
911
 See 230b. 
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of this cross-examination, the one who wanders in his judgments pronounces statements that 
“are simultaneously contrary to themselves and about the same things, in relation to the same, 
in the same respect.”
912
 The conflict here may be between views one was already fully aware 
of before examining them but had not yet brought together; some of these views may have 
been tacit until this point and are now revealed as being in conflict with other express views 
or other previously tacit views. At any rate, the questioner puts the respondent‟s judgments 
side by side (ηζεέαζζ παν‟ ἀθθήθαξ, 230b6-7) and calls his attention to the          
contradictions – thus revealing the respondent‟s ignorance.  
The Visitor does not specify how exactly this contradiction is found, but if we 
consider the dialogues, we see that it can found in two ways. First, the examiner must elicit 
statements concerning different topics that are not entirely unconnected. He inquires directly 
about something and then requests admissions about other matters. These answers may 
coincide with the popular views or the views of some intellectual, but the person being 
examined must agree with them, they must be his own views. The questioner must then 
demand elucidations. He must analyze the presuppositions of what is being said and what 
results from it. This will produce chains of argument which, in case someone possesses false 
knowledge claims, are bound to lead to contradictory statements about the same topic.
913
 One 
will find oneself attributing different and incompatible predicates to the same thing or 
defining some notion in an inconsistent manner.  
But this is not all. As it is often seen in the dialogues, it is not enough to reveal 
inconsistencies in one‟s knowledge claims. One tends to hold on to one‟s beliefs. But there is 
a different kind of contradiction that is shown in the dialogues and that results from this first 
one. After failing to give a meaningful answer to a question, the characters tend to try again 
and give a different answer – which will in turn lead to a new contradiction. This process can 
be repeated several times and in the end the examinee has presented several different answers 
about the same topic. He is completely lost and wanders from one statement to the next about 
the same thing. He is not able to say something concrete and stable. This other kind of 
wandering or roaming about (πθακ᾵ζεαζ) is indeed essential. One is adrift, unable to explain, 
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 See 230b: “(...) α὎ηὰξ α὏ηα῔ξ ἅια πενὶ η῵κ α὎η῵κ πνὸξ ηὰ α὎ηὰ ηαηὰ ηα὎ηὰ ἐκακηίαξ.” 
913
 It is not exactly clear if this happens every time that one has false knowledge claims, and so one could doubt 
the validity of the method. But it seems that in many cases, especially concerning our understanding of notions, 
we end up being incoherent due to our lack of clarity about them. And even if that is not always the case (i.e., if 
in some cases there is no actual disagreement), the method of revealing one‟s bad cognitive shape through such 
disagreement can still be the only (or at least the most effective) method of removing one‟s knowledge      
claims – so it is important to develop it and consider its potential.  
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The Visitor‟s words are thus a fair description of what we find Socrates doing in the 
elenctic dialogues. The great strength of this whole process is that it turns our own δόλαζ 
against each other.
915
 This is what makes (or at least what can make) the process effective in 
removing our vain conceit of knowledge. We have an instinctive understanding of the 
principle of contradiction and we need harmony and concordance between our views. The 
ἔθεβπμξ cancels the compartmentalization of our views and shows how their contents, 
presuppositions and implications relate to one another. The resulting increase in clarity shows 
the incoherence of our views and how we are unable to put forward answers that can resist 
the elenctic examination.
916
 This is what shames us and what reveals our conceit of 
knowledge or our incompetence in cognitive matters. It is not an irrelevant or dispassionate 
matter. It is the quality of one‟s access – and therefore of one‟s inner being or soul – that is 
being put into question. Our shame regarding this is what can free us from great and stiff 
δόλαζ that are deeply embedded in our way of seeing and understanding things. One cannot 
accept them and gets angry at oneself for not being able to say something coherent about the 
matter. 
It is indeed possible to doubt the effectiveness of this process. In the dialogues we see 
many characters resisting the demonstration of their ignorance, as we considered above.
917
 
They may blame a particular formulation of their beliefs or say that they will find the right 
formulation if they continue searching. But even if they do not capitulate straightaway, their 
conviction is already starting to waver. If the process continues long enough, they will 
probably admit their uncertainty or their confusion about something, because of the πθάκδ 
just described. 
One could also wonder whether the person refuted will abandon all the conflicting 
views or will try to save some by denying others. The first reaction to the patent contradiction 
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 We see this very clearly in Alcibiades I. Socrates‟ questions are initially met with haughtiness, but as the 
dialogue proceeds, Alcibiades gradually makes more and more concessions and ends up fully conscious of his 
state and its meaning. Cp. in particular 128d. 
915
 To use Socrates‟ formulation in the Gorgias, one bears witness against oneself and this is what produces the 
most effective refutation (in contrast with the “arithmetic refutation”, which shows that many people disagree 
with something). See in particular 472b-c. We can also use a formulation by the Visitor later in the text: one is a 
sort of ventriloquist and can do another voice that refutes oneself, thus having the enemy inside oneself. See 
252c. 
916
 This incoherence actually constitutes a form of sedition or illness within our δόλαζ. They are in conflict with 
each other – and in this respect the soul‟s deformity again comes to resemble the description of the soul‟s 
illness. Cp. Section 1.2 above and Chapter 18, Section 2.2.  
917
 Cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 1.2 b). 
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of one‟s views is trying to rescue all that can be rescued. This raises the question of which of 
the two or more opposing views is right. But the fact that we initially have the two or more 
δόλαζ and that they say different things about something should already be sufficient to prove 
that we are not as knowledgeable as we supposed, for we cannot distinguish truth from 
falsehood. The process should at least bring some instability and doubt – much more than any 
admonishment or any positive communication. We only need to continue long enough for 
someone to realize the meaning of their inability to provide a solid answer. Whether or not 
the other person will endure the examination during this time is a different question, though.  
Finally, it is not clear how much knowledge one must have to perform the elenctic 
examination. Must the one who undergoes the examination have a knowledge of what is 
happening or how it is being done? Is it more or less effective if he is not quite aware of what 
is happening? How important is it to know exactly what this elenctic examination is? At first, 
it might seem irrelevant whether one knows what is happening (and why it is happening) or 
not. But given the possibility of misunderstanding the meaning of this ἔθεβπμξ and running 
away from what it tries to show, it is probably more effective if one is aware of what one is 
going through. It is perhaps because of this that Socrates often reflects about the meaning of 
the situation when he performs this kind of examination – although his reflections are often 
partial and somewhat dissimulated. This may be due to the fact that it is not easy to explain 
what exactly is taking place and how important it is. The process must be gradual and one 
must actually undergo ἔθεβπμξ and the ἐηαμθή to be able to fully appreciate its importance.  
The cross-examiner, on the other hand, must have knowledge. He must possess a 
specialized knowledge (a ηέπκδ) that allows him to appropriately intervene in a particular 
domain of reality (in this case, in the soul of the examinee). He must not only be able to 
discern false knowledge claims, but he must be able to ask the right questions and lead the 
examination in the right way, to show to the respondent the inconsistencies their views 
contain. But exactly how much ηέπκδ is required? How does one acquire it? And can one 
examine oneself in this way? Is that any different from submitting others to this elenctic 
examination? Are we perchance more lenient with ourselves than others would be? Or less 
capable of identifying hidden implications? Perhaps it is necessary to first suffer this kind of 
examination and cast away some of our beliefs in order to be able to see its importance and 
be able to examine ourselves. And perhaps this period of passive examination can be replaced 
by the reading of the dialogues. At any rate, elenctic exanination does not seem to be 
something we can perform without any preparation – but when we have it, then in principle 
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nothing prevents us from applying it to ourselves, as Socrates would probably do in order to 
remain fully aware of his ignorance.  
 
2. The different possible magnitudes of the ἐθβνιὴ ηῆο δόμεο and their consequences 
 
 The cathartic or elenctic examination aims at expelling all our baseless knowledge 
claims. We are to reduce our views to the ones that are effectively knowledge. However, the 
terms of the project do not specify how much of a reduction is to take place. The passage we 
considered is indeterminate and somewhat ambiguous. When the Visitor talks about a puffed 
up organism, it seemed to be a matter of reducing the excessive fat. There would be 
something left, which would then be the basis for the assimilation of new views. But the 
Visitor also raises the possibility that the movement of the soul towards things fails every 
assault or deviates from the target ηαε‟ ἑηάζηδκ ὁνιήκ (228c). In this case, we would have to 
cleanse our soul of all its cognitive assaults on things and there would not be any knowledge 
claim left. But it is not clear what exactly the Visitor has in mind and everything hinges on 
how many false knowledge claims we have. In the previous chapter we outlined a map of 
different possible diagnoses of our knowledge claims – i.e., of different possible degrees of 
presence of stupidity or vain conceit of knowledge in us.
918
 We have seen the different kinds 
of defect our knowledge claims are exposed to (namely, modal defect, error in the attribution 
of predicates, and pseudo-understanding of predicates) and we have also seen how the 
particular syntax or intertwining of our knowledge claims also means that each of our views 
may contain several different defects. These defects may affect different things, different 
notions, and even our entire representation of reality. 
The magnitude of the ἐηαμθή correlates directly with this. If all our knowledge claims 
are tenable (i.e., if we do not make any false distribution of predicates and have no false 
understanding of these same predicates), then the ἐηαμθή will only remove the modal defect 
(i.e., the unjustified certainty that we had) and add absolute certainty to our beliefs (thus 
rendering them knowledge in the full sense of the word). This is the result we naturally tend 
to expect, since we are usually convinced that most of our cognitive body is healthy. There 
may be some gaps in our views, some inaccuracies, some mistakes, some views may have to 
be discarded, but no great change would come from the process of expelling all our cognitive 
defects. At the most, we would have some doubts and feel confused about some particular 
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 See Chap. 7, Sect. 1.3. 
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things. This could perhaps mobilize us to search for answers, but it would be a very limited 
mobilization, and the gain that could come from it would also be limited. 
This is a possibility we must admit. At first we do not know exactly what our 
cognitive state is. But if we look at Plato‟s writings, we see that they point in a very different 
direction. As we have seen, the dialogues suggest that we have many more baseless 
knowledge claims than we could ever suppose (not only because we have many knowledge 
claims of which we normally have no idea, but also because the proportion of those that are 
false is much higher than we would expect). This raises the question of how it is possible that 
we do not notice such a great distortion in our access to things. We seem to have access to 
beings as they are – and yet, according to Plato, this is far from being an appropriate access to 
them. If this is the case and a high number of our knowledge claims is false, then the 
cleansing required will be much more extensive than we tend to think, and it would actually 
bring about a state of great doubt and confusion about what things are. 
 When we admit this possibility, we tend to presume that there would still be some 
healthy tissue in our body of knowledge claims, something that would withstand the elenctic 
examination. But, in several moments, Plato puts forward – and even seems to defend – the 
possibility that all our knowledge claims are erroneous and that we actually know nothing. A 
good example of this can be found in the Statesman, when the Visitor says that “it‟s probable 
that each of us knows everything as if in a dream and then again is ignorant of everything as 
it is in waking”.
919
 We have indeed seen how there can be a constitutive defect in our way of 
seeing things. We may have no more than δόλαζ in a negative sense: mere opinions, 
subjective standpoints, with no objective correspondence. What reality is for us may be no 
more than a world of δόλα, illusion, dream, in which all things and all notions are distorted 
and nothing is as it seems. This would mean that our body of knowledge claims is wholly 
sick. We would be in a state of absolute disproportion, deformity, ignorance or 
παναθνμζύκδ. Our way of seeing things could not be furthest from the truth.  
 This is possible in two ways. First, we tend to think of an examination of atomic 
moments and in that case an absolute deviation would imply that we have absolutely no 
knowledge and every predicate we attribute to things, as well as all our understanding of 
these same predicates, is wrong. Secondly, there is the possibility of only some of our views 
being wrong, but in virtue of the intricate syntax of our knowledge claims, they may 
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 See 277d: “ηζκδοκεύεζ βὰν ἟ι῵κ ἕηαζημξ μἷμκ ὄκαν εἰδὼξ ἅπακηα πάκη᾽ αὖ πάθζκ ὥζπεν ὕπαν ἀβκμε῔κ.” I 
follow the translation in S. BENARDETE, op. cit. 
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contaminate all other views. In that case, there would be no component that would not be 
affected by some distortion. In both cases, we would have to be cleansed of our entire way of 
seeing and understanding things. It is precisely a cleansing or ηάεανζζξ of this dimension that 
is suggested in the Phaedo, for instance. Socrates is not just talking about getting rid of one‟s 
body, but also of the way of life that is build around it, pursuing the bodily pleasures, and the 
entire way of understanding things within this way of life. We will return to this in more 
detail below, but for now we have to keep in mind that the outcome of the ἐηαμθή may be 




 A cleansing of these proportions would be extremely violent – in fact, much more so 
than what we immediately think when we try to conceive this possibility. Due to the fact that 
many of our knowledge claims are tacit, we are not clearly aware of how many doubts and 
how much confusion we would have. When we try to represent the terminus ad quem of a 
global cleansing, we tend to be very naive. We can, for instance, imagine we would not be 
able to say if we are awake or dreaming, if anything is real, but still assume the categorial 
system we use is clear and meaningful. In a global purge, however, all notions would become 
problematic, even the notions of dreaming and being awake. The result of a global cleansing 
would thus be a state of utter doubt and confusion – something we cannot conceive clearly, 
but which would certainly be very difficult to endure.
921
  
As we shall see, a cleansing of such a dimension raises serious difficulties. It is a sort 
of total amputation and we do not know what would be left. It can result in the complete 
collapse of our life. The δόλαζ that were blocking the ingestion of new views could also be 
what was sustaining us in life. On the other hand, it is also necessary to admit the possibility 
that the project of expelling all our cognitive defects is likewise based on knowledge claims 
which could be cast away by the execution of the project, thus cancelling the process itself or 
rendering it meaningless. 
When we admit such a degree of deviation in our mind, the whole project of an 
ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ becomes problematic. However, even if we were to cast away our whole 
body of views, it seems we would still have a relation to the target – i.e., to truth. The idea of 
truth and our aiming at it is a fundamentum inconcussum for Plato and can never be cast 
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 The result would then be what Socrates said of himself (regardless of it being true or not), according to 
Diogenes Laertius: that he knew nothing, expect this very thing – namely, the fact that he knew nothing. See 
DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Vitae Philosophorum, II, 32: “ἔθεβε δὲ (...) εἰδέκαζ ιὲκ ιδδὲκ πθὴκ α὎ηὸ ημῦημ 
[εἰδέκαζ]”.  
921
 In fact, we can experience a great agony even if not all our views are defective. We only need to find out that 
some of the most important views (especially the most important for how we live) are inadequate and we will 
immediately lose our footing and become greatly concerned. 
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away. It is what makes the cognitive defects possible and after cleansing us of them we 
would still have a relation to truth. But we could also ask if this notion of truth is not itself 
something that may be based on knowledge claims that can be refuted and expelled from our 
soul. It is indeed extremely hard to imagine what a complete elimination of the idea of target 
would correspond to. It is perhaps the greatest possible change that could result from the 
elenctic examination. We would realize not only that we do not know the truth (i.e., what its 
content is) or what the notion of truth means, but that the notion of truth is itself inconsistent 
and makes no sense.
922
  
 However, the entire discussion is no more than guesswork at this point. Before 
performing the elenctic examination, we do not know exactly how defective our views are. 
We cannot predict how long the examination will take, what its exact results will be and 
whether this project is at all feasible. This can only be determined if we actually submit 
ourselves to examination. Even if other people were to go through the entire process and 
communicate the results, it would not be clear if they were in the same state as we are and 
required the same amount of ἐηαμθή. What someone else did, as well as Plato‟s 
pronouncements on the matter, are no more than an indication that we must verify ourselves. 
Plato might be right and we know nothing – and it is this possibility of it applying to us that 
makes his analyses relevant for us.  
All these considerations help us understand that the process of a full ἐηαμθή is very 
arduous and slow. One could perhaps try to accelerate it by questioning the main assumptions 
of our way of seeing and understanding things, in the hope all others would collapse.
923
 But 
one must be cautious with such a procedure for several reasons. First, there is the risk of 
misidentifying the main presuppositions of everything. One may also fail to see all the 
implications. Finally, it is not clear that there are some basic views on which all others 
depend. Some or even many of our beliefs may have their own autonomous content, which 
would still remain active if one were already full of doubts or confusion in relation to the 
mainstays of our view of reality. Thus, in order to know what we must be cleansed of and 
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 For a discussion of the latter possibility, see Chap. 20, Sect. 3.4. 
923
 This is, for instance, how Descartes performs his suspension of assent in Meditationes, I, 2: “Ad hoc autem 
non erit necesse, ut omnes esse falsas ostendam, quod nunquam fortassis assequi possem; sed quia jam ratio 
persuadet, non minus accurate ab iis quae non plane certa sunt atque indubitata, quàm ab aperte falsis 
assensionem esse cohibendam, satis erit ad omnes rejiciendas, si aliquam rationem dubitandi in unâquâque 
reperero. Nec ideo etiam singulae erunt percurrendae, quod operis esset infiniti; sed quia, suffossis fundamentis, 
quidquid iis superaedificatum est sponte collabitur, aggrediar statim ipsa principia, quibus illud omne quod olim 
credidi nitebatur.” See R. DESCARTES, Meditationes de prima philosophia, in: IDEM, Œuvres, edited by C. 
Adam & P. Tannery, vol. 7, Paris, Vrin, 1973, 18.  
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how, we require a complete map of our knowledge claims and their relations with one 
another. 
 
3. The difficulties of a full ἐθβνιὴ ηῆο δόμεο 
 
 After considering the different magnitudes that the casting away of our δόλαζ in the 
negative sense may have and how it depends on how extensive our vain conceit of knowledge 
is, it is important to consider the difficulties that this undertaking may involve, especially to 
avoid an excessively naive understanding of what is implied in it. The ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ, if 
carried out to the end, is far from being an easy and straightforward act. It has to face 
multiple difficulties that are illustrated in the Platonic corpus and that derive from the inner 
constitution of our inner being or “soul”. These difficulties are not necessarily 
insurmountable, but require much skill, practice and commitment in order to be overcome. It 
is important to pay close attention to this. By doing so, we will also get a better idea of the 
feasibility and the possible outcomes of this “psychic cleansing”.
924
 
 The resistance to the complete ἐηαμθή of our δόλαζ is of two orders. On the one hand, 
there are factors that make it difficult to verify whether or not there is deviation in one‟s 
knowledge claims – and how much deviation there is. On the other hand, the very removal of 
the false knowledge claims can be obstructed in different ways. We will consider both orders 
of difficulty in turn, but it is important to keep in mind that the following analysis has a 
provisional or hypothetical character. It tries to anticipate what may make the elenctic 
examination more complicated, but after undertaking the examination one may find ways to 
overcome them (though one may also find other difficulties that were not anticipated). In 
sum, we can only know exactly how difficult it is after starting to examine – and even then 
the degree of difficulty may differ from person to person and from epoch to epoch, in virtue 
of many different factors.   
 
3.1. The difficulty in focusing on and identifying our beliefs  
 
 We considered how the ἐηαμθή is a form of instruction in θόβμζ, and that it requires 
the examinee to articulate the precise content of their beliefs, as well as the presuppositions 
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 This will give important indications that we will develop later, when we come to discuss not only the 
possible outcomes of abandoning the unexamined life and fully embracing the philosophical examination, but 
also the risks that this abandonment may involve. For this discussion, see Chap. 20. 
318 
 
and consequences of these beliefs. Only thus can they be compared and rendered 
problematic. However, we saw in Chapter 6 that a very large part of our beliefs are tacit and 
hidden from us (or better still, hidden from our explicit thought). The beliefs that immediately 
come to mind when we start examining are only the tip of the iceberg. There are many others 
whose existence tend to go unnoticed – and even when we notice any of them, we may still 
fail to see their content, as well as the other knowledge claims with which it may be 
intertwined. The last aspect is particularly relevant. The complex syntax of our body of views 
makes any access to what we actually think we know very difficult. Our contact with our 
beliefs is usually hazy or confused, and in many cases we cannot render them immediately 
clear. For instance, we may know a belief is referred to a particular identity, but this identity 
can be further qualified by other beliefs. It may imply different modes of being (εἴδδ) and 
these in turn may have other modes of being implied in them. Moreover, all this may be 
determined by how we understand and live our life. In sum, a particular knowledge claim 
may contain a cluster of knowledge claims and this cluster is not easy to perceive and break 
down. 
 This makes it more difficult to cleanse our soul of all baseless knowledge claims. In 
order to perform such a cleansing, we need a complete inventory of our beliefs, which is 
something we do not have. We notice some of them, but we can easily fail to see that we only 
grasped a small part of our knowledge claims. The inconspicuous nature of most of them and 
of their syntax, along with our usual lack of awareness of this tacit dimension, makes us think 
we have already identified all. Moreover, if we are expressly warned about this and are faced 
with a description of our tacit knowledge claims and their complex structure, we may still 
have strong doubts about their existence and their intertwining, given how opaque this 
domain is. 
But if this is the case, the elenctic examination will then be applied only to a small 
portion of our views and, as a result, the identification of contradictions and the casting away 
of contradictory views will be severely limited. The examination and the ensuing cleansing 
will be quick, but they will not comply with the program of full sanitization of our body of 
beliefs. Most of our baseless knowledge claims may still remain in commission due to their 
tacit character. We will not notice it, but assuming there are false beliefs in us that are tacit, 
our soul will remain deformed and our access to new views (as well as the possibility of 
assimilating them) will remain blocked. In fact, this deformity and the obstruction of new 
views will be all the more severe if we do not notice them.  
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However, if we become aware of all these problems and try to correct our limited 
access to our tacit knowledge claims, we may still face many difficulties. The attempts to 
focus on this domain of conviction will probably miss a good part of it at first. It may take 
many attempts. This makes it very difficult to determine when the task of fully cleansing us 
of our baseless knowledge claims will be complete. We may be convinced that everything 
was checked despite the fact that there are still many tacit beliefs that escaped the elenctic 
examination. We need therefore something similar to the maieutics that is described in the 
Theaetetus.
925
 Among several other things, the psychic maieutics Socrates claims to have 
gives birth and puts forward the views that one has – i.e., it brings them to θόβμξ. In other 
words, Socrates extracts someone‟s views about a certain matter in order to examine them. 
This is possible because we always have some idea of what we think we know. It may be a 
hazy idea that we cannot formulate clearly by ourselves, but it is at least enough to recognize 
and agree with certain formulations (as the characters often do in the dialogues, when they 
are examined by Socrates).  
 
3.2. The difficulty in ascertaining which knowledge claims are baseless 
 
 After identifying our knowledge claims, it is necessary to ascertain their quality and 
see whether they are actually knowledge or not. More specifically, it is necessary to 
determine whether the attributions of predicates to things are right or wrong, and also 
whether the understanding we have of these predicates is sound or not. The first problem, 
however, is that when we ask questions about some particular view, we tend to find that 
everything is fine. We adhere to what we already believe. Therefore, the Visitor insisted (as 
the dialogues in the corpus also do) on the identification of inconsistencies or contradictions 
that one is not immediately able to solve. The fact that we cannot find an inconsistency does 
not mean that our views are correct, but the fact that we find it proves that there is something 
wrong with our body of views. However, is it enough to reveal that there is some 
inconsistency or contradiction in our views? We already mentioned that this does not produce 
an immediate disavowal of one‟s views, but let us consider the question in more detail.   
 We saw that one of the things that may happen in this context is that one may very 
well dismiss the contradiction as irrelevant. The unavailable character of most of our 
knowledge claims makes it particularly difficult to determine which of our knowledge claims 
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are sound and which are not. Since we often do not have a clear notion of them, when one is 
unable to articulate a coherent view, one can blame the way one tried to articulate them, 
instead of blaming one‟s own cognitive state. Due to the opacity of our convictions, it is not 
easy to see whether we are actually being refuted or whether we still have the solution within 
us, as we initially thought we had. This makes the cleansing more difficult and it is therefore 
necessary to insist. Usually one only starts to accept the fact one does not know after a few 
failed attempts (i.e., when one roams about from one failed attempt to the other). But even 
then one may blame the examiner or the examination itself. 
 If we look more closely at what happens during the course of the examination, 
however, and disregard the fact that one may not take it very seriously, we find some other 
problems. For instance, we may find some inconsistency or contradiction in our views, but 
may also immediately deny one of the sides of the contradiction in order to solve the 
problem. This raises the question of which of them is wrong (whereby one assumes they are 
not both wrong), and since we usually have different degrees of conviction, its tends to be 
easy to choose. But this choice (and the greatest adherence to a particular view) does not 
necessarily imply that that this view is correct. It may simply be more central to our body of 
beliefs. How can we distinguish? It seems that we have to know the truth to be able to say 
which one is wrong or whether or not they are both wrong. Moreover, regardless of which 
one (if any) is true, the very fact that there was a contradiction already reveals that there is 
something wrong with our views. It demonstrates (or at least raises a strong suspicion) that 
we do not know exactly what we are talking about.  
 A different problem is whether untruth is something absolute or whether it can admit 
different degrees. Some unsound knowledge claims may contain true elements intertwined 
with the false ones. The syntax of our beliefs makes this possible. There is thus the risk of 
rejecting everything in block and cleansing us of too much. One could argue that some views 
should not be wholly rejected. However, even if we cast away our conviction in them, we do 
not condemn them to oblivion and may still think about them and try to identify any moment 
of truth they may contain. 
 There may still be many other difficulties which we have not considered here, but this 
brief consideration is already sufficient to illustrate how difficult it may be to determine 
which beliefs are to be cast away and which ones should remain. 




3.3. The difficulty in letting go of our baseless knowledge claims 
 
 Assuming we can correctly identify our knowledge claims and we can properly 
establish their ungrounded character, we must admit that they may not be as easy to expel as 
the Visitor seems to presuppose in the Sophist. We already considered that it is necessary to 
insist and cause one to roam about from one view to the other, but even this may be 
insufficient. The elenctic examination is supposed to show contradictions and these 
contradictions are ultimately what will make us dispel or disavow our knowledge claims. 
Through them, we realize we actually do not know something. However, we may still hold on 
to our beliefs after discovering that there are contradictions in them. In other words, our 
knowledge claims may be stubborn and resilient. It all depends on the reasons they are 
installed in us in the first place. Furthermore, even if we are somehow able to remove them, 
what guarantees that they do not get reinstalled after a while, either because we forget the 
results of the examination or because we started giving it less importance? It is not as if they 
disappeared at the first sign of incoherence, never to be seen again. 
 But what makes this resistance and this return possible? Based on Plato‟s writings, 
there are two possible answers to this question. One results from many things we have 
already considered, the other requires us to anticipate some aspects we will only analyze in 
Part III and Part IV. The interrelation of the two possible explanations is a problem and we 
will only be able to discuss it later. 
 Let us then see the first answer. We have seen that there is a sort of solidarity between 
our different knowledge claims. They are often interrelated and their interrelation is 
determined by the complex syntax of knowledge claims we considered in Chapter 6. This 
means that they influence each other in many ways and the strength of a belief may actually 
come, for the most part, from other beliefs to which it is connected. Therefore, when we try 
to expel a particular δόλα, the others that are still installed in us may disturb the refutation. If 
its presuppositions or consequences (and even all views with which it is interrelated) remain 
valid for us, then they can cause the resistance or possible reinstallation of said δόλα. 
 This can easily happen because often we do not adequately focus on our knowledge 
claims and do not see all that is implied in them (i.e., we do not examine all their implications 
and whether they themselves are incoherent or not). We leave many relevant aspects out of 
consideration and this can render the entire process ineffective. A combined examination of 
all these moments seems then to be required. We must remove the compartmentalization of 
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our views and try to see the whole picture. In the final analysis, the examination is always a 
matter of global verification (despite the fact that it must be done by installments). If we only 
consider some relations or instances of intertwining (i.e., some presuppositions or 
consequences), we may fail to truly expel a knowledge claim. It will perhaps remain with us 
in the tacit dimension, despite our explicit admission that it is not correct. Or we may indeed 
expel a knowledge claim, but leave within us beliefs that will bring it back. This 
reappearance or atavism of our knowledge claims may happen when we are not looking (i.e., 
when we are not explicitly thinking about it) and reinstall the knowledge claim in the tacit 
domain. It may also result from a dismissal of the previous examination and its results. We 
may think there was some fault with the process, that it was not sufficiently considered, or 
that it was our incompetence that allowed it to be revealed as contradictory and refuted. 
 This is one possible account for the resistance of our knowledge claims. But this 
resistance may also be caused by our psychological motivations or inner drives, which are not 
exclusively (and in most cases not predominantly) philosophical (i.e., concerned with 
knowledge). As we will see, we have other drives, other interests, which contaminate and 
weaken our interest in rational arguments. The balance of our inner drives is indeed decisive 
in many respects and also with respect to elenctic examination. Our relation to this 
examination, the way we perform it, the role it has in our life are all guided by our 
motivations. They may limit the efficiency of the examination or distort it. For instance, we 
may fear the disorientation that could come from a more thorough examination. We may also 
more easily depreciate the results of an examination. If we are not deeply committed to it, we 
can attribute the refutation to factors other than our lack of knowledge. Therefore, our 
relation to the examination and what determines it is very relevant. It may be necessary for us 
to experience a great amount of indetermination or problematicity for us to take any 
examination seriously – and this is also what we see illustrated in the dialogues. 
 On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that our relation to our knowledge 
claims is one of commitment and perhaps even affection. In the Theaetetus, Socrates alludes 
to the affection one may have for one‟s intellectual children – i.e., the explicit knowledge 
claims one puts forward in an examination.
926
 This also applies to our implicit beliefs. In 
addition, our self-love is also involved in our relation with our knowledge claims. Our inner 
being (our soul) is qualified by the quality of these beliefs and if they are put in question, so 
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 Cp. 151c: “ηαὶ ἐὰκ ἄνα ζημπμύιεκόξ ηζ ὧκ ἂκ θέβῃξ ἟βήζςιαζ εἴδςθμκ ηαὶ ιὴ ἀθδεέξ, εἶηα ὏πελαζν῵ιαζ ηαὶ 
ἀπμαάθθς, ιὴ ἀβνίαζκε ὥζπεν αἱ πνςημηόημζ πενὶ ηὰ παζδία. πμθθμὶ βὰν ἢδδ, ὦ εαοιάζζε, πνόξ ιε μὕης 
δζεηέεδζακ, ὥζηε ἀηεπκ῵ξ δάηκεζκ ἕημζιμζ εἶκαζ, ἐπεζδάκ ηζκα θ῅νμκ α὎η῵κ ἀθαζν῵ιαζ (...).” 
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is the shapeliness of our soul.
927
 Besides, our life is defined by the knowledge claims that we 
have, and we may fear losing them and becoming someone else. There is a sort of “death” in 
changing one‟s views or losing them – as it is emphasized in the Euthydemus, when 
becoming wise is equated with being destroyed, since one will then become someone else.
928
  
However, this attachment to our δόλαζ is also what can make the ἔθεβπμξ effective. By 
failing to justify our views, we lose face or are shamed – both in the eyes of the others and in 
our own eyes. The elenctic examination has a strong impact in us. It attacks one‟s self-image 
and self-love, which could be very important in our resistance to the refutation. It also affects 
our feelings, our inner drives, and the way we regard what matters in life. It can change our 
priorities and make the philosophical examination more important, as well as its results. 
This is not all. Besides determining our relation to philosophical examination and to 
particular beliefs, our inner drives may also be the mechanism that renders a knowledge 
claim evident. As we shall see, the inner system of our drives is not totally independent from 
our knowledge claims, but in a way it may even be responsible for creating and sustaining 
them. It is actually a problem how these interests or drives are constituted and how they relate 
to our knowledge claims. It may be the case that they are themselves based on or affected by 
knowledge claims, but they also determine the latter in turn – and if that is true, then they 
may also be able to bring them back once they are refuted (at least if the drives continue to be 
as strong as they were before the refutation).
929
  
It seems thus that our inner motivations or drives can influence the course of 
examination and limit or pervert its course. This raises the question of whether it is in our 
power to overcome this kind of inner resistance and how we can do it. But we are not in a 




3.4. The difficulty in performing a complete ἐθβνιή of our vain conceit of 
knowledge 
 
 There is still one last possible resistance to the purge of all δόλαζ. We have talked 
mainly about expelling some or even many beliefs, but what if all (or almost all) our 
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 Cp. Laws 731c-732b, where Plato mentions the relation between an excessive self-love (which tends to make 
one blind to oneself) and one‟s ἀιαεία or false knowledge claims. 
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 See 283c-e. 
929
 We find an allusion to this possibility at the end of Alcibiades I. Socrates fears that the progresses made by 
the elenctic examination in the course of the dialogue will be annulled by the power of the πόθζξ over 
Alcibiades, which is in fact the result of Alcibiades‟ concern with how he is seen by others. Cp. 135d-e. 
930
 For a discussion of this, see Chapter 17 below. 
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cognitive commitments are defective? A complete or almost complete deviation in our way 
of seeing things (either because each belief by itself is defective or because it is intertwined 
with defective moments which distort it) raises serious questions. Let us begin by admitting 
the possibility that there might be a complete deviation. What does it entail and how is it 
possible? Does this affect absolutely all our views (even the view that there must be a target, 
i.e. true beings)? Furthermore, what would a complete cleansing of all our δόλαζ amount to? 
We tend to think of this in an abstract manner and without paying attention to the possible 
consequences, but it seems that such a cleansing, being a complete disavowal of knowledge, 
would result in a state of absolute instability and unrest. We would have complete 
uncertainty, complete indetermination (no attribution of predicates), and complete confusion 
(no notion of a predicate with clear meaning). This would also be a state of complete 
astonishment – and probably of absolute horror. We would lose any basis to act, think or feel. 
 However, such a crisis of meaning can take place even if not all our beliefs are 
unjustified and false. We may have many correct beliefs, but if the most essential ones are put 
into question or refuted, we will become disoriented. In other words, if our basic assumptions 
(which determine most or all our other beliefs) become questionable, then we will become 
perplexed with everything. For instance, most of our attributions of predicates to beings may 
be right, but if we do not understand these predicates and they become mysterious, we will be 
unable to understand anything else. Likewise, if our basic practical beliefs are overturned, we 
will be rudderless.  
 But this is still very vague and insufficient to represent a state in which all or our most 
important δόλαζ are suspended or expelled. We do not know what it would amount to and 
how it is to be in such a “place”. If, as we have seen, our δόλαζ are not something separate, 
discontinuous, but rather a world, then an ἐηαμθή of the most important or of all would be the 
same as losing the world we inhabit. But how can we go outside this domain and exist there? 
A life (or a moment in life) without our basic δόλαζ seems unbearable, if not impossible. A 
purely interrogative presentation of the most important things, in complete indetermination 
about what they are, is extremely aggressive.  
But let us assume we could cleanse us of all our beliefs or even of the most central 
ones. Would this be the end of our conscious being? Or would there still be something to 
sustain it, other than these beliefs? Could we have some dim intuitions? Or some provisional 
views? In a sense, we would still have the same contents as before, but now they would not 
be something we believe in, but rather something entirely questionable. We could also 
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conceive new alternatives to our previous beliefs – so in a sense we could have even more 
contents. Moreover, our relation with everything would be more intense. But at the same time 
we would not be able to determine anything and we would feel much more lost and exiled. 
The indetermination could perhaps even apply to the very notion of cognitive target or truth. 
The latter could become incomprehensible, which would perhaps produce an even greater 
state of despair. 
 All this is something we cannot adequately represent from the outside, but it seems 
clear that it would not be easy to bear. This raises a new problem. Faced with such a collapse 
of our beliefs, we could try to renounce all examination and all its results. We could try to 
reinstall our old beliefs or create new ones as quickly as possible, without properly examining 
them (and thus falling back into the unexamined life).
931
 We have indeed a strong impulse to 
decide or determine what things are. We want clarity and certainty, and it is very difficult to 
endure a purely negative result of examination. We strive to find new solutions and often 
promptly accept the ones that require the fewest changes – or we simply adopt one of the 
alternatives at hand, without considering that they may share a presupposition that is not 
being questioned and may itself be wrong. But can we do any of these things – i.e., can we 
come back to our views or promptly accept new ones – if there is indeed a complete 
refutation of our beliefs? Or is such a complete refutation a point of no return? It is difficult 
to tell. 
It is also difficult to conceive how such a radical cleansing could be performed. 
Where do we stand when we perform the expulsion either of all δόλαζ or of all the basic 
ones? Which Archimedean point or fulcrum do we use to lift our world of beliefs? The 
expulsion of δόλα is carried out in the middle of our life, in the middle of δόλαζ. It seems thus 
that a radical cleansing would be a kind of self-amputation, in which the hand that is 
operating must amputate the whole body, including itself. This may be impossible, if only for 
the fact that the project of ἐηαμθή is itself based on cognitive claims, which determine how 
and why the ἐηαμθή is performed. It may thus be necessary that at least some knowledge 
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 We would be a sort of Anti-Penelope, insofar as we would rebuild all the chains we had undone. For the 
image of an Anti-Penelope, cp. Phd. 84a. We would also resemble the prisoner in the Allegory of the Cave, who 
is tempted to come back to his seat after being released. See 515d-e: “μ὎ημῦκ ηἂκ εἰ πνὸξ α὎ηὸ ηὸ θ῵ξ 
ἀκαβηάγμζ α὎ηὸκ αθέπεζκ, ἀθβε῔κ ηε ἂκ ηὰ ὄιιαηα ηαὶ θεύβεζκ ἀπμζηνεθόιεκμκ πνὸξ ἐηε῔κα ἃ δύκαηαζ ηαεμν᾵κ, 
ηαὶ κμιίγεζκ ηαῦηα ηῶ ὄκηζ ζαθέζηενα η῵κ δεζηκοιέκςκ;” For more on this, cp. Chap. 17, Sect. 5.3. 
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claims are left untouched to avoid a state of complete paralysis and complete ἀπμνία – or 
even of complete madness.
932
 
In other words, our body of beliefs may be just like Neurath‟s ship, whose 
reconstruction must be carried out on sea, while sailing, which means that all repairs must be 
partial and gradual. One must rebuild the rotten planks while using the others as support.
933
 In 
the case of an elenctic examination, this would entail that we can only cast away some of our 
beliefs at a time, because we need the others to sustain the process. The full execution of the 
project would have to be gradual. But such a gradual procedure, however, is not without 
problems. In fact, what is the validity of an operation that is still based on defective views? 
Can one fully correct the defects of our views by performing only small corrections at a time? 
This whole problem requires a difficult choice from us. On the one hand, the ἐηαμθή 
is performed for the sake of our life, to prevent the possibility of it being based on false 
knowledge claims, but at the same time it must be done from within life itself, with which it 
is on a collision course. This renders the Platonic project of a full ἐηαμθή problematic and 
perhaps this is why we do not find any attempt of a full ἐηαμθή in the dialogues. There are 
only partial ἐηαμθαί, confined to a certain question or domain, and this may indeed be the 
only way to proceed.  
Finally, we must still ask what happens if we try (even if gradually) to remove all 
basic δόλαζ and there is nothing or very little left. Would this be a permanent state or could 
there be a way out of it, and which one? This touches upon a problem that is independent of 
how defective our beliefs are – namely, whether the identification and casting away of this 
defect is all that there is to the Platonic examination, or whether there is some kind of 
examination beyond the cathartic examination – and if so, what this may be, when it may 
start and how it may be performed. This is the question we will now tackle. As for all others 
just mentioned, they are difficult (if not impossible) to answer a priori. Only the examination 
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 In this context, we could ask if it makes any difference whether the examination is being carried out by the 
examinee or by someone else. The difficulty in achieving and maintaining a completely purified state is perhaps 
greater if the examiner and the examinee are the same person, because one will more easily become soft and 
lose heart, thus vitiating the process. But one can also stop hearing the external examiner and stop submitting 
oneself to examination – and for this reason it is not decisive whether one is examining oneself or rather being 
examined by another. 
933
 Neurath says: “We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start 
afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of 
the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams and driftwood, the ship can be shaped entirely 
anew, but only by gradual reconstruction.” See M. NEURATH, Anti-Spengler, in: IDEM & R. COHEN (eds.), 
Empiricism and Sociology, Dordrecht/Boston, D. Reidel, 1973, 199. 
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 In fact, most of these questions do not just concern the elenctic examination, but the whole philosophical 
project. We will have to return to them when we discuss the imperative of philosophical examination, to 





The problem of the positive or constructive side of philosophical examination 
 
 
“(...) ηὸ δὲ γδημύιεκμκ 






The prominence given in Plato‟s writings to the negative (i.e., elenctic or cathartic) 
side of philosophical examination raises the question of whether we can also find in his 
writings a positive or constructive side and how it is conceived. The question is all the more 
relevant if we consider that philosophy is often understood as an activity of building theories, 
creating concepts, and providing answers. Even assuming it always contains a negative 
moment, the emphasis is often laid on the expansion of our knowledge. However, given all 
that we considered before, it is easy to understand that philosophy cannot be simply reduced 
to its positive side. Philosophical examination is an examination of views (i.e., of ways of 
seeing or understanding things) and we can have different relations to these views. They can 
be regarded as mere possibilities, they can also be regarded as something that is more or less 
probable, or we can have adopted them as our own views. We are indeed deeply committed 
to many views and think that they provide us with knowledge of what things are. But this 
does not mean that we fully examined these views. Many are left unexamined or under-
examined. As a result, they may be largely incorrect or hazy without us noticing. We may 
have a distorted access to things. But if this is the case, then any new examination we may 
undertake in order to expand our knowledge may be vitiated. Our contact with any new view 
being examined will be shaped by our defective beliefs and the results of its examination will 
be equally defective. This is why Plato the negative kind of examination is so important. We 
can only be sure of acquiring sound views and actually expanding our knowledge when we 
confirm and correct the views we started with. In order to enrich our way of seeing things, we 
need to disavow our false knowledge claims. This disavowal cannot be rhetorical; we must be 
fully conscious of our ignorance. Elenctic examination is thus necessary. We must test all our 
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 See vv. 110f. 
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attributions of predicates and also our entire understanding of these same predicates. In case 
many of them (and all the decisive ones) pass the test, we can then be fully assured of their 
validity. If, however, they are full of decisive lacunae, errors and confusion (an outcome 
which, according to Plato, is far more likely), then philosophical examination will have to 
overturn these cognitive claims and reduce our way of seeing things to those beliefs (if any) 
that are effectively true. 
We find good illustrations of this process in any of the so-called aporetic or Socratic 
dialogues. They lay a great emphasis on the negative side of philosophical examination and 
may even suggest to the reader that the examination being performed is only concerned with 
stripping us of our false views. But matters are much more complex. Although there is a 
certain tendency to absolutize the elenctic side of philosophical examination and to lose sight 
of its positive side, the project of philosophical examination also includes the attempt to 
overcome the limitations of our views and to reach actual knowledge (regardless of whether 
we are able to do so or not). The latter is indeed a central part of philosophical      
examination. We must therefore consider how Plato conceives this positive side, or else our 
description of philosophical examination will be one-sided and insufficient. The elenctic side 
is only a preliminary and insufficient stage that needs a complement in order to reach positive 
results (or answers) and overcome the indetermination and disorientation that may ensue 
from cleansing us of our vain conceit of knowledge. Plato does warn us against the dangers 
of relativism, cynicism and misology.
936
 The elenctic examination is supposed to mobilize 
and bring us to a new form of examination. It brings about an inquisitive skepticism or a 
zetetic form of examination. We are to seek out the truth of the matter being examined and 
explore new possibilities, now freed from the confinement of one‟s beliefs. We try to 
redetermine things and reach new, better and more solid beliefs – or even effective 
knowledge and full insight.  
Philosophical examination thus includes both sides, which are actually two moments 
of the same project – the project of attaining the truth or possessing knowledge. This requires 
us to confirm that the views we start with are solid, in order to avoid any deviations in the 
starting point of examination. We must also acquire any knowledge we may lack, either by 
correcting the views we already had or by finding completely new views. Both tasks belong 
together. Although the destructive and the constructive forms of examination are different 
moments, the project is always the same. To be sure, our usual cognitive state may require a 
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 See e.g. Phd. 89c ff., Rep. 538d ff.  
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special focus on the negative side. However, philosophical examination cannot be reduced to 
it.  
Plato‟s writings reflect precisely this complexity. If we consider the dialogues, we see 
that, besides the aporetic texts, there are also dialogues in which the leading characters put 
forward and develop positive doctrines that seem to resist any refutation. Even if we cannot 
be sure whether Plato himself endorsed any of these doctrines (as we saw in the 
Introduction), they nevertheless reveal an effort to go beyond a simple refutation. What we 
must now consider is how these positive doctrines are supposed to be achieved, according to 
Plato. How is the positive examination conceived? What is the method or methods that 
characterize it? How different is this examination from the elenctic examination? How are we 
to search and explore new possibilities? How can we reach new views? More importantly, 
how can we find out the truth and achieve knowledge? 
The answers to these questions help us define Plato‟s conception of philosophical 
examination. However, we must bear in mind that these questions concern only the method 
we find illustrated and discussed in Plato‟s works and not its possible or actual outcome. We 
will not consider here whether it is at all possible to reach full knowledge (or even any 
positive knowledge whatsoever).
937
 Even if we cannot truly know anything, we may still try 
to do so – and it is this attempt and the way it is conceived by Plato that we are now going to 
consider. We will likewise leave aside the question of whether Plato is trying to convey any 
positive teaching. The status of the views put forward in his dialogues is a different problem. 
Finally, we will also leave out the question of how Socrates achieved the deep commitments 
or certainties he seems to have at some points, despite his frequent disavowal of knowledge. 
We will rather focus our attention on the presentation of a positive method in the texts. We 
want to see what the dialogues say about the kind of examination that would allow new and 
better views to be reached, since this is an essential part of Plato‟s concept of philosophical 
examination and, as such, it is likewise an important part of what is missing in the 
unexamined life. 
We will briefly consider the different indications Plato provides about the positive 
side of philosophical examination and try to define it. A full discussion of all the relevant 
passages and their interrelation is too extensive a task to be undertaken here. Instead, we will 
just consider some of the most important aspects of a positive form of examination, in order 
to have a general idea of what it might entail. This will then allow us to reconsider the 
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relation between the negative or elenctic side of examination and the positive or constructive 
side. We will see what these two sides have in common, what their differences are, and how 
they interact. In doing so we will finally be able to outline a unitary and full concept of 
philosophical examination.  
 
1. The positive side of elenctic examination   
  
Before considering the strictly positive side of philosophical examination, it is 
important to see to what extent its negative side, which is presented as a refutation or a 
cleansing, can itself contain something positive. Is elenctic examination simply destructive or 
does it also allow us to reach some knowledge? 
There is an obvious sense in which the elenctic examination could yield positive 
results: it could confirm the validity of our beliefs. Our knowledge claims or δόλαζ may be 
right and their deficiency may be solely modal. Before examining them we could not be 
absolutely sure they were right (all certainty would be merely subjective), but after the 
examination there would be no more room for doubt. We would know for sure that our way 
of seeing things contains no serious defect, since the examination would prove the validity of 
our views.  
However, it is not clear whether elenctic examination can ever confirm the truth of 
our beliefs (both of our attributions of predicates and our understanding of them). According 
to the description in the Sophist, the method of elenctic examination establishes the 
consistency or inconsistency of our knowledge claims, but the fact that at a certain point we 
have not yet found any inconsistency does not allow us to exclude the possibility that we are 
in error or confused about something.
938
 We must examine things thoroughly, but how can 
we know whether we carried out the process to the end? 
Moreover, in one important passage of Cratylus, Plato raises the possibility of there 
being a completely consistent system based on a false principle, which forces everything else 
to agree with it.
939
 Our views may be distorted in a coherent way and, if this is the case, it 
will be hard (or even impossible) to find inner inconsistencies and refute our views. The 
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 Cp. Chap. 8, Sect. 1.5 above. 
939
 See Cra. 436c-d: “εἰ βὰν ηὸ πν῵ημκ ζθαθεὶξ ὁ ηζεέιεκμξ ηἆθθα ἢδδ πνὸξ ημῦη᾽ ἐαζάγεημ ηαὶ α὏ηῶ ζοιθςκε῔κ 
἞κάβηαγεκ, μ὎δὲκ ἄημπμκ, ὥζπεν η῵κ δζαβναιιάηςκ ἐκίμηε ημῦ πνώημο ζιζηνμῦ ηαὶ ἀδήθμο ρεύδμοξ 
βεκμιέκμο, ηὰ θμζπὰ πάιπμθθα ἢδδ ὄκηα ἑπόιεκα ὁιμθμβε῔κ ἀθθήθμζξ. δε῔ δὴ πενὶ η῅ξ ἀνπ῅ξ πακηὸξ πνάβιαημξ 
πακηὶ ἀκδνὶ ηὸκ πμθὺκ θόβμκ εἶκαζ ηαὶ ηὴκ πμθθὴκ ζηέρζκ εἴηε ὀνε῵ξ εἴηε ιὴ ὏πόηεζηαζ· ἐηείκδξ δὲ 
ἐλεηαζεείζδξ ἱηακ῵ξ, ηὰ θμζπὰ θαίκεζεαζ ἐηείκῃ ἑπόιεκα.” 
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question then is whether this is possible. Can there be an entirely coherent distortion of 
views? Or are there always some views (either true or false) that resist such a coherent 
distortion and are able to cause disagreements? For the most part, Plato seems to defend that 
there are always some inconsistencies in us that can be found and will then reveal our false 
beliefs. The distortions in our way of seeing things tend to cause contradictions. Moreover, he 
also defends that we always have some relation to truth – if only as the target to which we 
aspire, as is said in the Sophist (228c). Whether we also must have a minimum of correct 
beliefs or not is not clear. But at least it seems possible to see the incongruence between our 
system of beliefs and the truth we aim at. 
There are other problems concerning elenctic examination and its ability to confirm 
our beliefs. For instance, assuming that we have some false beliefs that are in disagreement 
with our true beliefs, we cannot simply refute those that are false and confirm the ones that 
are true. When two beliefs are inconsistent we cannot tell (at least using just the kind of 
examination we described above) whether any of them is true – and, in case one of them is 
true, we cannot tell which one. We may be tempted to accept whichever belief seems to be 
more plausible to us and reject the other, but in doing so we may end up accepting a false 
belief and rejecting the one that is true – or we may simply accept one of two false beliefs 
and reject the other. In principle, nothing prevents this from happening. Elenctic examination 
only shows there is a cognitive defect, but it does not seem able to establish any truth. It does 
not say which (if any) of two conflicting judgments is correct and, by itself, it does not bring 
forth any new beliefs. The only possible outcomes of this procedure seem to be either       
non-refutation (which does not necessarily mean the views are true) or puzzlement (ἀπμνία) 
and astonishment (εαοιάγεζκ), which may lead one to disown one‟s knowledge claims, but 
will not confirm any of them. 
But does this mean that all the positive contributions from the elenctic examination 
are reduced to the provisional confirmation of our views? Are there no other positive 
contributions? It seems that it either provides a provisional confirmation or reveals a great 
margin of cognitive defect. If this is so, it cannot make us absolutely sure of anything. But 
does this mean that it produces no gain? Or can there be another kind of gain? In fact, 
elenctic examination can produce a substantial gain. By testing our knowledge claims, it 
gives us an increased clearness about our knowledge claims, their presuppositions and their 
implications – and this clearness may give important clues for subsequent examinations. But 
this is not all. Elenctic examination also increases our self-knowledge or, more precisely, our 
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knowledge of our own cognitive condition. In particular, we become aware of what we do not 
know and thereby reduce our ignorance (i.e., we reduce our double ignorance to a simple 
ignorance).
940
 In other words, this increase in self-knowledge involves an expansion of our 
cognitive access to beings – more precisely, a negative expansion (negative Erweiterung), to 
use once more Kant‟s expression.
941
 By setting the boundaries of our actual knowledge, 
elenctic examination makes us more aware of what we do not know, which is itself a form of 
coming closer to the truth. We stop mistaking our defective view of something with what this 
thing actually is (or we stop dreaming about this thing) and develop an increased recollection 
or ἀκάικδζζξ of it. The real thing is evoked or brought to mind. However, such a recollection 
is at first still vague and problematic. It does not constitute a full insight into the being in 
question. It does not produce a new belief. It is a blocked recollection, which provides no 
more than a direction for further examination. We need other means in order to determine 
what something really is. But it is already a gain to know that there is something that escapes 
us, even if we still do not know it. Moreover, knowing that something eludes our grasp is an 
important condition for ever finding out the truth about it. The ἀκάικδζζξ produced by 
elenctic examination opens up the possibility of searching (γδηε῔κ) for something – and, 
according to Plato, it is also what allows us to recognize the answer when we come upon it.
942
  
It is now clear that, despite its negative character, elenctic examination can also bring 
about positive results. We must, however, bear in mind that these results are not produced at 
a single stroke. They increase as long as the cathartic process continues. One gives an answer, 
sees it refuted and tries again. It is not clear when this process is complete or even sufficiently 
performed. But by performing it we attain an ever sharper awareness of the questions we deal 
with and of the need to inquire further into them. Ideally, we would be cleansed of all false 
knowledge claims at some point (though it is difficult to determine when). At that point, the 
cleansing will reconfigure the examining process as such and bring about a positive version 
of it that is already protected from any false beliefs we might have had. This positive version 
or positive side of philosophical examination is what we must now consider. 
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 For the notions of simple and double ignorance, cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 1 and Chap. 8, Sect. 1.3. 
941
 See I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in: IDEM, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, Berlin, Georg Reimer, 
1904, 212 (A256/B312). 
942
 This is precisely the point of the paradox of inquiry in the Meno. See 80d ff. For more on the notion of 
ἀκάικδζζξ, see Chap. 11, Sects. 3.2 and 3.4 below. 
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2. The zetetic examination as a modification of the elenctic examination 
 
The elenctic examination motivates a new kind of examination, which is primarily 
concerned with acquiring the knowledge one lacks. Plato describes this examination as a 
form of pursuit and hunt. The term most often used to designate it is γδηε῔κ and hence we 
could call it zetetic examination.
943
 It is a form of examination that lacks something, desires 
to reach it, mobilizes itself towards it and tries to attain it.  
Zetetic examination can occur without being preceded by an elenctic examination, but 
we will only be fully aware of our ignorance (and thus fully mobilized to search for the truth 
about something) after cleansing us of all our false knowledge claims. Zetetic examination 
will be more genuine and intense in those conditions. Moreover, it will also be protected from 
any distortions caused the one‟s defective beliefs. 
The transition to this new kind of examination brings about some meaningful changes. 
The examination is no longer centered on one‟s knowledge claims. It is not primarily a matter 
of verifying one‟s cognitive status. It does not have the same personal character as elenctic 
examination. Zetetic examination is less subjective or more impersonal. To be sure, one is 
still required to accept or reject views, but the examination is now primarily directed at the 
being under scrutiny and to the different views one can conceive of it. These views can also 
be called δόλαζ, in the sense that they determine a certain way of seeing or understanding – 
and may be adopted as beliefs. But at first they are not installed in us. One tries to ascertain 
their validity without being committed to them. So one tries to focus on the being to which 
these δόλαζ refer (and to which we are already related by being aware of views about it) and 
see what it really is.
944
 
In addition, zetetic examination entails a different relation with the explicit or rational 
discussion of something (θόβμξ). One will not refer one‟s θόβμζ to tacit beliefs that one may 
not be able to clearly formulate. One will only consider what appears in the spotlight of the 
mind and one will require sufficient grounds or a sufficient justification (a θόβμξ) to accept 
something. In other words, one will only follow what is established in rational discussion. 
This is how one comes closer to the object being examined and how one may come upon new 
and better views.  
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 For more on this term and on the ideas of pursuit and hunt, cp. Chap. 4, Sect. 2.5. 
944
 This does not imply that one will not pay attention to the subjective conditions of knowledge and to how 
knowledge is produced and structured, but such an inquiry will also have an objective character and (as far as 
possible) it will not be conditioned by one‟s subjective and unexamined beliefs. 
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The whole process is directed at the answers we want to find. For this, two things are 
necessary. First, we need to expand our set of views, find new possibilities of conceiving 
things, and then we have to choose between them and decide the matter rationally. But let us 
start with the first moment. Elenctic examination calls our attention to the fact that we do not 
know and that things can be otherwise. So we start considering alternate ways of seeing 
things. We could be already aware of some alternatives and now we take them seriously. We 
also start searching for new possibilities. As Plato stresses, we can learn them from others or 
discover them by ourselves.
945
 At any rate, we increase the set of views at our disposal and 
are now free to correctly appraise them and decide between them.   
But how exactly do we decide? How do we establish the truth about something, after 
being faced with different possibilities of determining it? If we are still ignorant of the object, 
will we not be totally lost in the multiplicity of alternate views of which we are now aware? 
What may be the criterion for accepting one of them and rejecting the others? 
In the previous section, we saw how elenctic examination allows us to better 
understand the terms of a problem (especially when we are examining a particular notion) 
and somehow better recollect the being in question. This may then guide our zetetic 
examination. But the indications we collected must be developed. We must see what they 
point to. But how can we do this? How do we pursue the truth about something and how can 
we find it out?  
If we look at the Platonic corpus, we see that often characters present positive results 
without mentioning how they came to them. These results may be presented as definitive or 
as something likely or plausible (as in the Timaeus).
946
 In some cases, they are assigned to a 
sudden divine inspiration (ἐκεμοζζαζιόξ), which means that they are the result of a fortuitous 
element that is not under our control.
947
 It may therefore seem that achieving results is 
something that happens randomly and is out of our hands. However, even in the case of 
inspiration, one must still think about it and interpret what is said. It includes a rational 
process which depends on us. As for the simple presentation of results, it never implies that 
one did nothing to achieve them. They may be the result of an elaborate process, but this 
process is not presented in the texts. 
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 Plato speaks of these two possibilities as two ways of reaching truth, but they also apply to how we can 
obtain new views. Cp. La. 186c-e, Alc. I 106d ff., Phd. 78a. 
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 See Ti. 29c-d, 30b, 48d, 59c-d. 
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 See e.g. Cra. 396d-e, 399a, 428c-d, and Phdr. 241e ff.  
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What we must now discuss is what this process may be and which principles may 
guide it. In other words, we have to discuss which method or set of methods may be 
employed in order to achieve positive results.  
 
3. The method(s) for the constructive side of examination 
 
Plato‟s dialogues present some reflections about what method could be used to 
discover the truth about something. We mentioned some of these positive methods above, 
when we listed the different configurations philosophical examination assumed in the 
dialogues.
948
 Now we will consider (even if briefly) the terms in which these positive 
methods are presented. Their presentation is often determined by the context in which they 
are introduced, but we will try to isolate them and ascertain their possible role in the positive 
or constructive examination. This is not an easy task, since their multiplicity raises several 
questions. One wonders whether they are all equally important and effective, or whether 
some of them are better than others. It is also not clear how they relate to each other. Are they 
mutually exclusive or complementary? And does Plato present a definite version of what the 
positive method of examination should be, or does he rather leave it undetermined? 
Moreover, does the Platonic corpus present the most decisive kinds of positive method or is it 
possible to find others that are better than these? We find no direct answer to these questions 
in the corpus. Therefore, all we can do is identify the different positive methods and then 
reflect about their interaction, in order to better understand what a positive and constructive 
examination may consist in. 
 
3.1. The hypothetical method(s) 
 
One positive form of investigation can be found in the Meno, the Phaedo, the 
Republic and the Parmenides. In all these texts, the characters describe and employ a method 
that uses ὏πμεέζεζξ in order to move the examination forward despite one‟s lack of 
knowledge. As was said above, the term ὏πόεεζζξ can denote any view that is uncertain or 
insufficiently justified and that in turn underpins (or somehow affects) some other view that 
is being focused. It is an assumption and a presupposition, of which we may be more or less 
aware. We saw that in the Republic the term designates all the views presupposed or taken for 
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granted in a particular inquiry. One assumes they are clear and one does not examine them. 
They may be express or tacit, though they are often tacit.
949
 However, the term ὏πόεεζζξ can 
also be (and often is) used in the same sense as the English word “hypothesis”. It then 
denotes an explicit view that is regarded as precarious and provisional. One is aware of its 
fallibility and its lack of grounds. It is not something one believes in. It is rather something 
one provisionally accepts to see the implications it may have. It is precisely in this sense that 
the term is used in the texts we will now consider (with the exception of the Republic). 
The hypothetical method presented in these texts generally works in the following 
manner. The characters have a problem that they cannot easily solve, but they can conceive 
of several possible answers that have their own consequences. They then adopt one of these 
answers provisionally, as a ὏πόεεζζξ, and see what results from it.
950
 This is a conditional and 
tentative analysis. Their relation with the ὏πμεέζζξ is centrifugal. They assume something and 
are mainly concerned with what results from it. As a result, they will supposedly be able 
ascertain both the content and the strength of the assumption. They will also better 
understand the problem. The hypothetical method can thus contribute to solve a problem, 
though it does not guarantee a solution. 
These are the general features of the method presented in the four texts mentioned 
above. However, despite these common features, the several presentations also contain 
significant differences, which raises the question about the unity of this particular method. Is 
there only one hypothetical method or are there several? Do the different presentations refer 
to the different applications of the same method or to different methods altogether? In order 
to answer these questions, we will first briefly consider the most important aspects of each 
presentation, and then we will try to determine how they may relate to each other. 
 
a) The hypothetical method in the Meno  
 
 The hypothetical method is presented in the Meno as a solution to bypass the 
characters‟ lack of knowledge and proceed with the examination. The lack of knowledge is 
here twofold. It concerns both what something is and how it is qualified. In other words, 
Socrates and Meno do not know the identity of something (in this instance, ἀνεηή) and so 
they do not know if a certain predicate (namely, being teachable) corresponds to it or not. 
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Socrates underscores that the latter depends on the former. We must first know what 
something is and only then can we see how it is qualified.
951
 But since Meno insists on asking 
if ἀνεηή is teachable or not, Socrates suggests a different method, similar to the one employed 
in geometry, that circumvents one‟s ignorance about the core of the problem. He suggests 
they consider the matter on the basis of assumptions or suppositions (ἐλ ὏πμεέζεςξ α὎ηὸ 
ζημπε῔ζεαζ).
952
 They will make assumptions about ἀνεηή and then compare them with other 
connected questions, in order to see what are the consequences of these assumptions. 
Let us see more in detail how this is done in the text. The basic assumption Socrates 
makes concerns the question of whether or not ἀνεηή is knowledge. Based on how one 
answers this question, one will be able to find the solution to the main question – namely, 
whether or not ἀνεηή is teachable.
953
 After showing that the questions are interconnected, 
Socrates considers more closely whether ἀνεηδ is knowledge, in order to find a definite 
answer to the main the question. This seems to be the main advantage of employing this 
method. By showing that two questions are intrinsically connected in a way that the answer to 
one determines the answer to the other, one can find the answer to both just by finding the 
answer to one of them. For instance, if one confirms that ἀνεηή is knowledge, then one will 
also have confirmed that it is teachable. On the other hand, if one confutes the hypothesis that 
it is knowledge, then one will also confute the thesis that it is teachable. This seems to be the 
sense in which the method is used in geometry.
954
 One associates a complex question with 
other questions that are perhaps easier to answer – or even with questions about which one 
can have an intuitive knowledge. Thus, when one confirms a hypothesis, one will have the 
answer for all associated questions. The problem is how one can reach certainty at any    
point – but if one does, then everything else will be determined.  
It is important to stress that the method that is described in Meno can establish a 
relation between more than two questions. An important question may be connected to a 
second one, which may then be connected to a third one, and so on. This is also what happens 
in the case of ἀνεηή. Ἀνεηή will be teachable if it is knowledge, and it will be knowledge if 
                                                 
951
 Cp. 86d-e: “ἀθθ᾽ εἰ ιὲκ ἐβὼ ἤνπμκ, ὦ Μέκςκ, ιὴ ιόκμκ ἐιαοημῦ ἀθθὰ ηαὶ ζμῦ, μ὎η ἂκ ἐζηεράιεεα 
πνόηενμκ εἴηε δζδαηηὸκ εἴηε μ὎ δζδαηηὸκ ἟ ἀνεηή, πνὶκ ὅηζ ἐζηὶκ πν῵ημκ ἐγδηήζαιεκ α὎ηό· ἐπεζδὴ δὲ ζὺ ζαοημῦ 
ιὲκ μ὎δ᾽ ἐπζπεζνε῔ξ ἄνπεζκ, ἵκα δὴ ἐθεύεενμξ ᾖξ, ἐιμῦ δὲ ἐπζπεζνε῔ξ ηε ἄνπεζκ ηαὶ ἄνπεζξ, ζοβπςνήζμιαί ζμζ – ηί 
βὰν πνὴ πμζε῔κ; – ἔμζηεκ μὖκ ζηεπηέμκ εἶκαζ πμ῔όκ ηί ἐζηζκ ὃ ιήπς ἴζιεκ ὅηζ ἐζηίκ.” For more on the distinction 
between what something is (ηί ἐζηζκ;) and how it is qualified (πμ῔όκ ηί;), see Chap. 6, Sect. 2.1. 
952
 See 86e: “εἰ ιή ηζ μὖκ ἀθθὰ ζιζηνόκ βέ ιμζ η῅ξ ἀνπ῅ξ πάθαζμκ, ηαὶ ζοβπώνδζμκ ἐλ ὏πμεέζεςξ α὎ηὸ 
ζημπε῔ζεαζ, εἴηε δζδαηηόκ ἐζηζκ εἴηε ὁπςζμῦκ.” 
953
 See 87c: “εἰ δέ β᾽ ἐζηὶκ ἐπζζηήιδ ηζξ ἟ ἀνεηή, δ῅θμκ ὅηζ δζδαηηὸκ ἂκ εἴδ.” 
954
 Cp. the description in 86e-87b. 
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all good things involve knowledge. But if good things do not all involve knowledge, then 
ἀνεηή (which is itself a good thing) might not be knowledge.
955
 Socrates then confirms that 
all good things depend on knowledge – and so ἀνεηή must be knowledge.
956
 
This is not all. The hypothetical method also allows one to refute a particular 
assumption if one of its consequences is rejected – and in the cases when one has only two 
possibilities, it allows one to confirm the alternative. Socrates does precisely this to 
strengthen the view that ἀνεηή is knowledge. He considers what the consequences would be 
of ἀνεηή not being knowledge and just occurring by nature. According to him, it would 
require communities to identify and protect the good natures. But no such thing happens, so 
the facts refute these consequences and also the assumption that ἀνεηή occurs by nature.
957
 
However, Socrates is also suspicious of these conclusions and examines the matter 
from yet another angle. He argues that if ἀνεηή is knowledge, then there must be teachers and 
students of it – but it is not easy to find such teachers and students, which would mean that 
ἀνεηή is not in fact knowledge, and thus not teachable.
958
 
 These are the different lines of argumentation that Socrates and Meno follow using 
the hypothetical method and they allow us to identify not only the most important traits of the 
method as it is conceived in Meno, but also its limitations. As was shown, the method is 
based on the intrinsic interconnection of different questions. Because of this interconnection, 
one can assume something about the main question and then shift the focus from it to one of 
the associated questions. If one reaches some conclusion regarding the associated question, 
one can then infer the answer to the main question (and thus confirm or rebut a particular 
assumption). However, the answer to the main question hinges on its connection to other 
questions and the answers one finds for them. If one fails to identify the correct connection 
between questions and their correct consequences, then all conclusions will be wrong. 
Moreover, if any answer to an associated question is wrong, then the confirmation or rebuttal 
of the initial assumption will also be wrong. Finally, the way the method is presented also 
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 See 87d: “μ὎ημῦκ εἰ ιέκ ηί ἐζηζκ ἀβαεὸκ ηαὶ ἄθθμ πςνζγόιεκμκ ἐπζζηήιδξ, ηάπ᾽ ἂκ εἴδ ἟ ἀνεηὴ μ὎η ἐπζζηήιδ 
ηζξ· εἰ δὲ ιδδέκ ἐζηζκ ἀβαεὸκ ὃ μ὎η ἐπζζηήιδ πενζέπεζ, ἐπζζηήιδκ ἄκ ηζκ᾽ α὎ηὸ ὏πμπηεύμκηεξ εἶκαζ ὀνε῵ξ 
὏πμπηεύμζιεκ.” 
956
 See 87e-89a, and especially 88c-d: “εἰ ἄνα ἀνεηὴ η῵κ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ ηί ἐζηζκ ηαὶ ἀκαβηα῔μκ α὎ηῶ ὠθεθίιῳ 
εἶκαζ, θνόκδζζκ α὎ηὸ δε῔ εἶκαζ, ἐπεζδήπεν πάκηα ηὰ ηαηὰ ηὴκ ροπὴκ α὎ηὰ ιὲκ ηαε᾽ α὏ηὰ μὔηε ὠθέθζια μὔηε 
αθααενά ἐζηζκ, πνμζβεκμιέκδξ δὲ θνμκήζεςξ ἠ ἀθνμζύκδξ αθααενά ηε ηαὶ ὠθέθζια βίβκεηαζ. ηαηὰ δὴ ημῦημκ 
ηὸκ θόβμκ ὠθέθζιόκ βε μὖζακ ηὴκ ἀνεηὴκ θνόκδζζκ δε῔ ηζκ᾽ εἶκαζ.” 
957
 See 89b: “ηαὶ βὰν ἄκ πμο ηαὶ ηόδ᾽ ἤκ· εἰ θύζεζ μἱ ἀβαεμὶ ἐβίβκμκημ, ἤζάκ πμο ἂκ ἟ι῔κ μἳ ἐβίβκςζημκ η῵κ 
κέςκ ημὺξ ἀβαεμὺξ ηὰξ θύζεζξ, μὓξ ἟ιε῔ξ ἂκ παναθααόκηεξ ἐηείκςκ ἀπμθδκάκηςκ ἐθοθάηημιεκ ἂκ ἐκ 
ἀηνμπόθεζ, ηαηαζδιδκάιεκμζ πμθὺ ι᾵θθμκ ἠ ηὸ πνοζίμκ, ἵκα ιδδεὶξ α὎ημὺξ δζέθεεζνεκ, ἀθθ᾽ ἐπεζδὴ ἀθίημζκημ 
εἰξ ηὴκ ἟θζηίακ, πνήζζιμζ βίβκμζκημ ηα῔ξ πόθεζζ.” 
958
 See 89d ff. 
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allows for another source of error. If one fails to identify all possible assumptions with 
respect to a particular question, then the refutation of one or some of them may falsely lead us 
to conclude that the remaining hypothesis is true (since the others we identified were refuted) 
when that is not the case.  
 Nevertheless, despite all these possible sources of error, the hypothetical method lets 
us overcome the paralysis that resulted from trying to solve a particular problem. One makes 
the problem easier by identifying particular answers and not requiring a full justification of 
them. In the example given in Meno, one does not have to determine what exactly ἀνεηή is, 
but only some aspects of it. One sees questions that are connected with the initial question, 
explores possibilities, sees their implications, and attempts to find a solution for one of the 
questions and all those connected with it. If one finds such a solution, one will still be far 
from possessing a perfect knowledge of the question under discussion. In the case of ἀνεηή, 
for instance, one will still not know exactly what it is and how it can be taught. All one will 




b) The hypothetical method in the Phaedo 
 
 The presentation of the hypothetical method in Phaedo is in several respects more 
explicit and more complex. Plato connects it with one of his most emblematic and 
problematic doctrines, the doctrine of the εἴδδ – whose existence is precisely what will be 
assumed here. Socrates is trying to answer one of the most important and most difficult 
questions – namely, what happens to us when we die – and he will try to find an answer by 
employing this method. 
 The passage starts with Socrates describing his attempts at understanding the causes 
of things. He first tried a direct method of investigation, which he identifies with the natural 
sciences of the time. However, he ended up understanding nothing, so he turned to a different 
method, which he declares to be a second sailing.
960
 This second method examines things by 
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 For more on this passage from Meno, see e.g. R. ROBINSON, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, Ithaca/New York, 
Cornell University Press, 1941, 118-127; H. ZYSKIND & R. STERNFELD, Plato‟s Meno 89C. „Virtue Is 
Knowledge‟ a Hypothesis?, Phronesis 21 (1976), 130-134; J. MEYERS, Plato‟s Geometric Hypothesis. Meno 
86e-87b, Apeiron 21 (1988), 173-180; H. BENSON, The Method of Hypothesis in the Meno, Proceedings of the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 18 (2003), 95-126; D. WOLFSDORF, The Method ἐλ 
὏πμεέζεςξ at Meno 86e1-87d8, Phronesis 53 (2008), 35-64; L. FRANKLIN, Investigation from Hypothesis in 
Plato‟s Meno. An Unorthodox Reading, Apeiron 43 (2010), 87-115; N. IWATA, Plato on Geometrical 
Hypothesis in the Meno, Apeiron 48 (2015), 1–19. 
960
 See 99c-d: “ἐπεζδὴ δὲ ηαύηδξ ἐζηενήεδκ ηαὶ μὔη᾽ α὎ηὸξ ε὏νε῔κ μὔηε παν᾽ ἄθθμο ιαεε῔κ μἷόξ ηε ἐβεκόιδκ, ηὸκ 
δεύηενμκ πθμῦκ ἐπὶ ηὴκ η῅ξ αἰηίαξ γήηδζζκ ᾗ πεπναβιάηεοιαζ αμύθεζ ζμζ, ἔθδ, ἐπίδεζλζκ πμζήζςιαζ, ὦ Κέαδξ;” 
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means of θόβμζ (i.e., in rational discussions, using arguments which defend certain views).
961
 
In a particular question, one may be aware of different possible arguments or views and 
hesitate between them. One is not sure about which one is correct and so one must either be 
paralyzed or choose between them. Socrates says that he chooses the θόβμξ that he judges 
most robust (ἐννςιεκέζηαημκ) and makes an assumption of it (὏πόεεζζξ). Then he 
provisionally accepts as true whatever agrees or harmonizes with it (i.e., whatever does not 
contradict it).
962
 Later he also says that he considers the consequences of this (ηὰ ὁνιδεέκηα), 
to see if they agree with each other or not.
963
  
The method thus requires one to see everything that is implied in a certain view or 
argument, which includes not only everything that can be directly deduced from it, but also 
the way it may affect or determine other things. By considering the implications of a 
particular θόβμξ, one achieves a clearer understanding of its content and, at the same time, 
one also becomes more aware of the questions connected with it. This will make it easier to 
find inconsistencies or contradictions and refute the initial ὏πόεεζζξ. If this does not happen, 
then one will grow more confident that one‟s assumption is true. 
This is the first stage of the process. One clings to the best ὏πόεεζζξ and focuses on 
what results from it, without giving an account of the ὏πόεεζζξ itself. In a second stage, 
however, one will have to justify or ground one‟s ὏πόεεζζξ. In order to do so, the same 
method will be employed. One will once again choose the best available view and make an 
assumption of it – thus using it as the basis for the first assumption. If one finds no 
inconsistencies after making this second assumption, then one can search for a third 
assumption, which is supposed to justify the second one, and the process continues until one 
reaches “something sufficient” (ηζ ἱηακόκ).
964
 Socrates, however, does not specify what 
would render a certain view or θόβμξ sufficient. He may very well be thinking of a view that 
would be absolutely certain. One would not be able to put it into question and it would serve 
                                                                                                                                                        
The notion of “second sailing” refers to the use of oars instead of the wind, which implies greater exertion and 
also a longer time to attain one‟s destination or goal. Likewise, the method Socrates will describe is longer and 
much more arduous, since it will not directly determine how things are (which, according to Socrates, would 
ruin one‟s vision, as when one looks directly at the sun), but rather use a more indirect route (which Socrates 
compares with looking at the sun through its reflection in water). Cp. 99d-e. 
961
 See 99e: “ἔδμλε δή ιμζ πν῅καζ εἰξ ημὺξ θόβμοξ ηαηαθοβόκηα ἐκ ἐηείκμζξ ζημπε῔κ η῵κ ὄκηςκ ηὴκ ἀθήεεζακ.” 
962
 See 100a: “ἀθθ᾽ μὖκ δὴ ηαύηῃ βε ὥνιδζα, ηαὶ ὏πμεέιεκμξ ἑηάζημηε θόβμκ ὃκ ἂκ ηνίκς ἐννςιεκέζηαημκ 
εἶκαζ, ἃ ιὲκ ἄκ ιμζ δμηῆ ημύηῳ ζοιθςκε῔κ ηίεδιζ ὡξ ἀθδε῅ ὄκηα, ηαὶ πενὶ αἰηίαξ ηαὶ πενὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ ἁπάκηςκ 
ὄκηςκ, ἃ δ᾽ ἂκ ιή, ὡξ μ὎η ἀθδε῅.” 
963
 See 101d: “εἰ δέ ηζξ α὎η῅ξ η῅ξ ὏πμεέζεςξ ἔπμζημ, παίνεζκ ἐῴδξ ἂκ ηαὶ μ὎η ἀπμηνίκαζμ ἕςξ ἂκ ηὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐηείκδξ 
ὁνιδεέκηα ζηέραζμ εἴ ζμζ ἀθθήθμζξ ζοιθςκε῔ ἠ δζαθςκε῔ (...)” 
964
 See 101d-e: “(...) ἐπεζδὴ δὲ ἐηείκδξ α὎η῅ξ [sc. η῅ξ ὏πμεέζεςξ] δέμζ ζε δζδόκαζ θόβμκ, ὡζαύηςξ ἂκ δζδμίδξ, 
ἄθθδκ αὖ ὏πόεεζζκ ὏πμεέιεκμξ ἣηζξ η῵κ ἄκςεεκ αεθηίζηδ θαίκμζημ, ἕςξ ἐπί ηζ ἱηακὸκ ἔθεμζξ (...).” 
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as the basis for the entire system of assumptions. But how does one determine the certainty of  
this basic assumption? Is it simply a matter of the whole system being consistent or does it 
require something else? 
This is not the only question raised by Socrates‟ description of the method. We also 
need to ask about the status of any results that are still not fully grounded by a “sufficient 
assumption”. Most of the inquiry takes place before reaching a solid ground for the whole 
system. While one is inquiring and making one‟s assumptions, it is not at all clear that one 
will reach such a ground. One may find inconsistencies at any turn and therefore any results 
of such an examination are only provisional. The initial ὏πμεέζζξ (and in fact all of them until 
a sufficient basis is reached) is merely plausible or likely and, as such, fallible. So the results 
are likewise precarious. They are like a raft we hang on to in high sea, to use an image that 
appears earlier in the dialogue.
965
 This image evokes Odysseus lost at sea – i.e., in an 
absolutely unstable and unsafe element. It is, however, different from interrupting one‟s 
journey, drowning, or having to swim one‟s way through. It is a basis and allows one to 
proceed, even if in a precarious way.
966
 Before reaching something sufficient, the entire 
examination is indeed always liable to collapse. One may find contradictions in the first stage 
of the process, while seeing the consequences of an ὏πόεεζζξ, or perhaps later, when seeking 
the bases for the first hypothesis.  
But if this is the case, why should we start with the consequences of an assumption, 
given the fact that these consequences, as well as the assumption itself, depend on what will 
ground this assumption? The text does not answer the question, but one possible reason is 
that we need to be clear about what an assumption is in order to search for its grounds. If we 
are not able to determine everything directly, we can start exploring what is contained in a 
more plausible view and then search for what could support it. 
                                                 
965
 See 85c-d, where Simmias – referring to the question of soul‟s survival after death – anticipates some aspects 
of the hypothetical method by saying: “δε῔κ βὰν πενὶ α὎ηὰ ἕκ βέ ηζ ημύηςκ δζαπνάλαζεαζ, ἠ ιαεε῔κ ὅπῃ ἔπεζ ἠ 
ε὏νε῔κ ἢ, εἰ ηαῦηα ἀδύκαημκ, ηὸκ βμῦκ αέθηζζημκ η῵κ ἀκενςπίκςκ θόβςκ θααόκηα ηαὶ δοζελεθεβηηόηαημκ, ἐπὶ 
ημύημο ὀπμύιεκμκ ὥζπεν ἐπὶ ζπεδίαξ ηζκδοκεύμκηα δζαπθεῦζαζ ηὸκ αίμκ, εἰ ιή ηζξ δύκαζημ ἀζθαθέζηενμκ ηαὶ 
ἀηζκδοκόηενμκ ἐπὶ αεααζμηένμο ὀπήιαημξ, ἠ θόβμο εείμο ηζκόξ, δζαπμνεοε῅καζ.” 
966
 The passage about the raft also points to an important aspect: the examination concerns, among others, 
matters that are extremely important for us and regarding which a decision is needed. The hypothetical method 
also allows us to establish something about these matters, even if only provisionally, and in doing so it may give 
us some guidance in life – although one may wonder how effective such a guidance can be if one is fully aware 
of its provisional (i.e., questionable) character.  
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But be that as it may, one thing is clear: the hypothetical method as it conceived in 
Phaedo involves two distinct directions of inquiry.
967
 Socrates is adamant about the 
separation of the different stages and not mixing everything together.
968
 Considering the 
consequences of an assumption is different from grounding it and one cannot do both things 
at the same time. 
 Finally, there is one other question for which we find no clear indication in the 
passage. The question concerns the choice of the ὏πμεέζεζξ. Socrates says one should choose 
the most robust, but how does one determine the degree of robustness of a ὏πμεέζζξ? Does it 
require a careful examination of all possible views and the comparison of their merits (and if 
so, how is this examination to be performed)? Or is it something more intuitive? And if that is 
the case, what determines this intuition and how reliable is it? These questions are not 
answered in the text. Nevertheless, the idea that we should be guided by the views that seem 
most robust (and thus most probable) to us while employing the hypothetical method is one 




c) The hypothetical method in the Parmenides  
 
 A different version of the hypothetical method is discussed and illustrated in 
Parmenides. This version differs from the others in intent and scope. It is introduced by 
Parmenides as a form of mental gymnastics that will allow the young Socrates to define each 
of the things grasped by the mind (ἃ ιάθζζηά ηζξ ἂκ θόβῳ θάαμζ) – i.e., the εἴδδ.
970
 These 
were invoked by Socrates as the solution to the problems caused by multiplicity, which Zeno 
had discussed in his book.
971
 When cross-examined about them, Socrates faltered and was 
                                                 
967
 In this respect, this version of the method comes very close to what we will find in the Republic. Cp. Sects. 
3.1d) and 3.2 below. 
968
 See 101e: “(...) ἅια δὲ μ὎η ἂκ θύνμζμ ὥζπεν μἱ ἀκηζθμβζημὶ πενί ηε η῅ξ ἀνπ῅ξ δζαθεβόιεκμξ ηαὶ η῵κ ἐλ 
ἐηείκδξ ὡνιδιέκςκ, εἴπεν αμύθμζό ηζ η῵κ ὄκηςκ ε὏νε῔κ;” 
969
 For other discussions of the hypothetical method as it is conceived in Phaedo, see e.g. R. ROBINSON, 
Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, Ithaca/New York, Cornell University Press, 1941, 128-150; R. BLUCK, ὏πμεέζεζξ in 
the Phaedo and Platonic Dialectic, Phronesis 2 (1957), 21-31; P. PLASS, Socrates‟ Method of Hypothesis in the 
Phaedo, Phronesis 5 (1960), 103-115; T. ROSENMEYER, Plato‟s Hypothesis and the Upward Path, The 
American Journal of Philology 81 (1960), 393-407; L. ROSE, The deuteros plous in Plato‟s Phaedo, The 
Monist 50 (1966), 464-473; J. BEDU-ADDO, The Role of the Hypothetical Method in the Phaedo, Phronesis 
24 (1979), 111-132; T. EBERT, Sokrates Über Seinen Umgang mit Hypotheseis (Phaidon 100A). Ein Problem 
und ein Vorschlag zur Lösung, Hermes 129 (2001), 467-473; M. BYRD, Dialectic and Plato‟s Method of 
Hypothesis, Apeiron 40 (2007), 141-158.  
970
 Cp. 135c-d: “πνῲ βάν, εἰπε῔κ, πνὶκ βοικαζε῅καζ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ὁνίγεζεαζ ἐπζπεζνε῔ξ ηαθόκ ηέ ηζ ηαὶ δίηαζμκ 
ηαὶ ἀβαεὸκ ηαὶ ἓκ ἕηαζημκ η῵κ εἰδ῵κ.” See also 135e: “μ὎η εἴαξ ἐκ ημ῔ξ ὁνςιέκμζξ μ὎δὲ πενὶ ηαῦηα ηὴκ πθάκδκ 
ἐπζζημπε῔κ, ἀθθὰ πενὶ ἐηε῔κα ἃ ιάθζζηά ηζξ ἂκ θόβῳ θάαμζ ηαὶ εἴδδ ἂκ ἟βήζαζημ εἶκαζ.”  
971
 See 128e ff. 
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unable to give a full account of them (i.e., of what exactly an εἶδμξ is and how it relates to the 
beings that partake in it). Parmenides then suggests a program of exercises that will allow 
him to “discern the truth with authority”.
972
 The first formulation of the program only 
expresses the idea of exploring the ὏πόεεζζξ that something is the case or exists (e.g., the 
εἴδδ) and also the ὏πόεεζζξ that the same thing is not – seeing in both cases what are the 
consequences of each assumption (ηὰ ζοιααίκμκηα ἐη η῅ξ ὏πμεέζεςξ).
973
 One should see 
both sides of the question and see all that results from it. This may not seem very difficult, 
but when asked to clarify the task, Parmenides reveals just how difficult it is. He gives as 
example Zeno‟s assumption that there is multiplicity (πμθθά) and says that one should see the 
consequences of this assumption both for what is assumed (sc. multiplicity) in relation to 
itself, and for its opposite (namely, unity) in relation to itself and in relation to       
multiplicity – and likewise with the opposite assumption, that multiplicity is not.
974
 
Moreover, this is to be done with respect to these and to all other notions. Parmenides 
mentions similarity, dissimilarity, movement, rest, coming to being, corruption, being and 
non-being.
975
 In relation to any of these notions, one must assume both that it is (i.e., that it 
exists, is something definite and applies to reality) and that it is not and see what are the 
consequences for the notion itself and for all other notions. One is to see all relations between 
all notions. Moreover, this does not only concern their being (their existing and being 
something definite), but also any particular predicate they may have (any πάεμξ). One must 
also see the consequences of each attribute for the notion that is qualified by it and for all 
others.
976
 In sum, one must consider all possibilities of each particular εἶδμξ being and of it 
not being, and then one must see all the ways the εἴδδ relate to each other. This way one will 
be fully aware of the alphabet of reality – instead of having some vague notion of it, which is 
unable to determine the identity and the combination of the different letters.  
                                                 
972 See 136c: “(...) εἰ ιέθθεζξ ηεθέςξ βοικαζάιεκμξ ηονίςξ δζόρεζεαζ ηὸ ἀθδεέξ.” I follow A. Hermann‟s 
translation. See A. HERMANN (ed.), Plato’s Parmenides, Las Vegas/etc., Parmenides Publishing, 2010. 
973 See 135e-136a: “πνὴ δὲ ηαὶ ηόδε ἔηζ πνὸξ ημύηῳ πμζε῔κ, ιὴ ιόκμκ εἰ ἔζηζκ ἕηαζημκ ὏πμηζεέιεκμκ ζημπε῔κ ηὰ 
ζοιααίκμκηα ἐη η῅ξ ὏πμεέζεςξ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ εἰ ιὴ ἔζηζ ηὸ α὎ηὸ ημῦημ ὏πμηίεεζεαζ, εἰ αμύθεζ ι᾵θθμκ 
βοικαζε῅καζ.” 
974
 See 136a-b: “μἷμκ, ἔθδ, εἰ αμύθεζ, πενὶ ηαύηδξ η῅ξ ὏πμεέζεςξ ἡκ Εήκςκ ὏πέεεημ, εἰ πμθθά ἐζηζ, ηί πνὴ 
ζοιααίκεζκ ηαὶ α὎ημ῔ξ ημ῔ξ πμθθμ῔ξ πνὸξ α὏ηὰ ηαὶ πνὸξ ηὸ ἓκ ηαὶ ηῶ ἑκὶ πνόξ ηε α὏ηὸ ηαὶ πνὸξ ηὰ πμθθά· ηαὶ αὖ 
εἰ ιή ἐζηζ πμθθά, πάθζκ ζημπε῔κ ηί ζοιαήζεηαζ ηαὶ ηῶ ἑκὶ ηαὶ ημ῔ξ πμθθμ῔ξ ηαὶ πνὸξ α὏ηὰ ηαὶ πνὸξ ἄθθδθα (...).” 
975
 See 136b: “(...) ηαὶ αὖεζξ αὖ ἐὰκ ὏πμεῆ εἰ ἔζηζκ ὁιμζόηδξ ἠ εἰ ιὴ ἔζηζκ, ηί ἐθ᾽ ἑηαηέναξ η῅ξ ὏πμεέζεςξ 
ζοιαήζεηαζ ηαὶ α὎ημ῔ξ ημ῔ξ ὏πμηεεε῔ζζκ ηαὶ ημ῔ξ ἄθθμζξ ηαὶ πνὸξ α὏ηὰ ηαὶ πνὸξ ἄθθδθα. ηαὶ πενὶ ἀκμιμίμο ὁ 
α὎ηὸξ θόβμξ ηαὶ πενὶ ηζκήζεςξ ηαὶ πενὶ ζηάζεςξ ηαὶ πενὶ βεκέζεςξ ηαὶ θεμν᾵ξ ηαὶ πενὶ α὎ημῦ ημῦ εἶκαζ ηαὶ ημῦ 
ιὴ εἶκαζ (...).” 
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 See 136b-c: “(...) ηαὶ ἑκὶ θόβῳ, πενὶ ὅημο ἂκ ἀεὶ ὏πμεῆ ὡξ ὄκημξ ηαὶ ὡξ μ὎η ὄκημξ ηαὶ ὁηζμῦκ ἄθθμ πάεμξ 
πάζπμκημξ, δε῔ ζημπε῔κ ηὰ ζοιααίκμκηα πνὸξ α὏ηὸ ηαὶ πνὸξ ἓκ ἕηαζημκ η῵κ ἄθθςκ, ὅηζ ἂκ πνμέθῃ, ηαὶ πνὸξ 
πθείς ηαὶ πνὸξ ζύιπακηα ὡζαύηςξ· ηαὶ ηἆθθα αὖ πνὸξ α὏ηά ηε ηαὶ πνὸξ ἄθθμ ὅηζ ἂκ πνμαζνῆ ἀεί, ἐάκηε ὡξ ὂκ 
὏πμεῆ ὃ ὏πεηίεεζμ, ἄκηε ὡξ ιὴ ὄκ (...).” 
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  This version of the hypothetical method is thus very different from the previous ones. 
It aims at removing all one-sidedness from one‟s reflections and also all simplification. One 
would see what is contained in each notion and all possible relations between all notions. The 
task is one of extreme extension and difficulty and Parmenides describes it as a run through 
and a roaming about that leave nothing out (or more precisely, a δζὰ πάκηςκ δζέλμδμξ ηαὶ 
πθάκδ).
977
 He also compares it to swimming across “a hard and vast ocean of θόβμζ”.
978
 The 
image of swimming emphasizes the difficulty and danger of the task. On the one hand, there 
is no boat one can use to make the passage easier, and so one must make the greatest effort in 
order to move. On the other hand, the sea was seen as unpredictable and extremely 
dangerous, so one is always exposed to the possibility of drowning or failing. Moreover, the 
association of the ideas of swimming and roaming about also brings to mind Odysseus and 
his almost endless labors.  
 Parmenides discusses the formal project and describes its difficulty – and then he goes 
on to provide a small illustration of it, which occupies the rest of the dialogue. He discusses 
eight hypotheses and the discussion gives us a glimpse of what the project would correspond 
to. It helps to get things started. But Socrates (and we the readers) are left with the task of 
continuing the exercises in order to find out the truth. We must wonder what should come 
after the discussions we find in the text. 
 We must also wonder what (if anything) should follow the training once it is 
complete. The exercises are supposed to prepare one for something (namely, to discern the 
truth), but it is not clear what should come after them. It is also not clear how one can decide 
which ὏πμεέζεζξ are right. Do we become fully aware of their strengths and weaknesses after 
going through them all in such an exhaustive manner? That might well be the case. Many of 
the ὏πμεέζεζξ would probably be rejected for entailing contradictions. But what would then 
be left at the end? Only one possible version? Different coherent versions? Parmenides does 
not say and there might be a good reason for that. Perhaps we cannot predict what will 
happen without going through the whole process. 
 Finally, it is important to note that there is a very serious limitation in the way the 
project is formulated in the text. More precisely, the project is marked by a tacit assumption 
that is never discussed and may render any results questionable. Parmenides seems to assume 
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 See 136e. The description of this exercise as a roaming or wandering about is very expressive, because the 
latter correspond to a form of aimless movement, in which one goes to and fro – and it is precisely a examining 
movement of this kind that is being described.  
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 See 137a: “(...) ηἀβώ ιμζ δμη῵ ιεικδιέκμξ ιάθα θμαε῔ζεαζ π῵ξ πνὴ ηδθζηόκδε ὄκηα δζακεῦζαζ ημζμῦηόκ ηε 
ηαὶ ημζμῦημκ πέθαβμξ θόβςκ (...).” 
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that we already know or can easily have access to the framework of εἴδδ that is to be 
submitted to the exercise. It would only be a matter of making assumptions about their 
existence or non-existence, and then seeing their interrelations. However, the framework of 
εἴδδ that determines the way we see things may be very difficult to identify and we may have 
a naive identification of it that leaves out many important εἴδδ. Parmenides does not consider 
how we could identify them with full certainty. In fact, the entire discussion between Zeno 
and the opponents of Eleatism is a good example of this problem. It assumes that either there 
is multiplicity or there is unity, and tertium non datur. However, it may be possible to 
conceive other possibilities that in some way conciliate both possibilities. The same can be 
said about any other identification of εἴδδ, and therefore any exercise based on an immediate 
identification of εἴδδ will be just a first stage in one‟s pursuit of truth. In fact, it may even be 
used as a negative form of examination, in order to show the inconsistencies and untenability 
of our usual identification of εἴδδ. Parmenides may be describing a negative method – or at 
least something that can also be used as a negative method, in order to cleanse us of our 
views. At any rate, he is describing something that may not lead us immediately to truth and 
may indeed require further consideration of possibilities and perhaps even a different method. 
 
d) The hypothetical method in the Republic  
  
 One final instance of a method of examination that involves ὏πμεέζεζξ can be found 
in a passage of the Republic that we already considered above.
979
 In the simile of the          
line – and more precisely in its third subsegment – Plato describes something that has some 
similarity to the hypothetical method, though it also differs in several important respects from 
the other presentations we just considered. In the Republic, the ὏πμεέζεζξ are not necessarily 
explicit and the ones employing them do not necessarily regard them as questionable. In fact, 
the opposite seems to be the case. Their contents are taken for granted and they are seen as 
being evident for everybody – so much so that one does not think one needs to give an 
account of them.
980
 But this does not mean that one fully understands them. As Socrates says, 
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 See Chap. 6, Sect. 1.3 a). 
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 See 510c: “μἶιαζ βάν ζε εἰδέκαζ ὅηζ μἱ πενὶ ηὰξ βεςιεηνίαξ ηε ηαὶ θμβζζιμὺξ ηαὶ ηὰ ημζαῦηα 
πναβιαηεοόιεκμζ, ὏πμεέιεκμζ ηό ηε πενζηηὸκ ηαὶ ηὸ ἄνηζμκ ηαὶ ηὰ ζπήιαηα ηαὶ βςκζ῵κ ηνζηηὰ εἴδδ ηαὶ ἄθθα 
ημύηςκ ἀδεθθὰ ηαε᾽ ἑηάζηδκ ιέεμδμκ, ηαῦηα ιὲκ ὡξ εἰδόηεξ, πμζδζάιεκμζ ὏πμεέζεζξ α὎ηά, μ὎δέκα θόβμκ μὔηε 
α὏ημ῔ξ μὔηε ἄθθμζξ ἔηζ ἀλζμῦζζ πενὶ α὎η῵κ δζδόκαζ, ὡξ πακηὶ θακεν῵κ (...).” See also 511a: “὏πμεέζεζζ δ᾽ 
ἀκαβηαγμιέκδκ ροπὴκ πν῅ζεαζ πενὶ ηὴκ γήηδζζκ α὎ημῦ, μ὎η ἐπ᾽ ἀνπὴκ ἰμῦζακ, ὡξ μ὎ δοκαιέκδκ η῵κ 
὏πμεέζεςκ ἀκςηένς ἐηααίκεζκ, εἰηόζζ δὲ πνςιέκδκ α὎ημ῔ξ ημ῔ξ ὏πὸ η῵κ ηάης ἀπεζηαζεε῔ζζκ ηαὶ ἐηείκμζξ πνὸξ 
ἐηε῔κα ὡξ ἐκανβέζζ δεδμλαζιέκμζξ ηε ηαὶ ηεηζιδιέκμζξ.” 
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one is actually unable to give an account of them and does not really know them.
981
 They are 
insufficiently understood and insufficiently grounded. As a result, any inquiry that is based 
on them, as well as its results, is wholly problematic. Plato wants to stress precisely this. The 
third subsegment of the line is still a constitutively defective way of seeing things. Although 
Socrates identifies it with particular sciences, such as geometry, which are thus a form of 
hypothetical examination, he is not simply trying to present a positive method of finding out 
the truth. This inquiry may provide some true results and it involves a progress in our 
understanding of things, but it is also constitutively defective and must be overcome by a 
different form of inquiry. 
Let us consider all this in a little more detail. We saw earlier how the third 
subsegment of the line implies a departure from our normal way of seeing things. What we 
take to be real (namely, the sensible objects of which we find many sensible images) is 
revealed to be problematic, as was already shown at the end of book V.
982
 This forces us to 
inquire and brings about different pursuits (ιέεμδμζ) of what things are.
983
 According to 
Socrates, the different lines of inquiry opened correspond to different particular sciences 
(though in a way it may apply to any form of inquiry that shares the main features, and the 
main defects, of the sciences). However, despite changing our regular way of seeing things, 
these forms of inquiry are still defective, since they are based on views or notions which are 
not accounted for – i.e., in ὏πμεέζεζξ. For instance, mathematical knowledge (which is often 
taken to be the most certain science) uses notions as odd and even, the figures, the forms of 
angles, without defining them.
984
 It simply assumes they are evident, without being able to 
fully explain them. This introduces a form of defect that limits this kind of inquiry and its 
ability to give us an understanding of what things really are. Scientific inquiries move away 
from their ὏πμεέζεζξ. They only consider implications and consequences of these ὏πμεέζεζξ 
(which may be something deduced from the ὏πμεέζεζξ, or simply the way they affect 
questions that are associated with them). They move towards the end, and not the beginning 
(i.e. what grounds the entire system).
985
 More precisely, they do not inquire into the εἴδδ, the 
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 Rep. 533c: “(...) ἕςξ ἂκ ὏πμεέζεζζ πνώιεκαζ ηαύηαξ ἀηζκήημοξ ἐ῵ζζ, ιὴ δοκάιεκαζ θόβμκ δζδόκαζ α὎η῵κ.” 
982
 For an analysis of this passage, see Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 above. 
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 Plato expresses the idea of being forced to inquire in 510b: “ἥζ ηὸ ιὲκ α὎ημῦ ημ῔ξ ηόηε ιζιδεε῔ζζκ ὡξ εἰηόζζκ 
πνςιέκδ ροπὴ γδηε῔κ ἀκαβηάγεηαζ ἐλ ὏πμεέζεςκ (...)”. For the notion of ιέεμδμξ, see Chap. 4, Sect. 2.5. 
984
 See 510c, quoted in footnote 980 above. 
985
 See 510b: “ἥζ ηὸ ιὲκ α὎ημῦ ημ῔ξ ηόηε ιζιδεε῔ζζκ ὡξ εἰηόζζκ πνςιέκδ ροπὴ γδηε῔κ ἀκαβηάγεηαζ ἐλ 
὏πμεέζεςκ, μ὎η ἐπ᾽ ἀνπὴκ πμνεομιέκδ ἀθθ᾽ ἐπὶ ηεθεοηήκ (...).” 
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main constituents of reality, which are essential to their entire investigation.
986
 It is in this 
sense that sciences are said by Plato to dream about being.
987
 They do not consider the εἴδδ 
that shape their way of seeing things, they do not see the limitations of their understanding of 
these εἴδδ, but they believe they are already seeing things themselves or reality as it is.  
Plato is thus emphasizing the way these hypothetical examinations have an 
intermediate status. They overcome the limitations of δόλα (i.e., of the immediate 
perspective, focused on individual beings), but they fall short of providing actual knowledge 
(or even of becoming fully aware of all that they lack and thus fully awake). This is why 
these hypothetical examinations are called thought (δζάκμζα), which is more than an 
immediate access, but not intellectual apprehension (κμῦξ).
988
 They do not have full contact 
with reality. They take an insufficient view as a perfect access to what things are. More 
specifically, they do not see how problematic their ὏πμεέζεζξ are and how this affects their 
entire progress. They are ways of pursuing knowledge that are based on                             
non-knowledge – and this makes them wholly problematic.
989
 The limitations are not 
restricted to the basic principles of these inquiries, but the whole way of seeing things that is 
brought about by them is defective and, at best, only approximate. 
 This means that such inquiries are dependent upon a different kind of inquiry, which 
will uproot their basic assumptions and give them a firm footing. We will consider this other 
direction of inquiry or examination afterwards (in Section 3.2). Now we are just considering 
Plato‟s presentations of a hypothetical method and how the particular sciences constitute a 
form of hypothetical method (even if they are not aware of their ὏πμεέζεζξ as ὏πμεέζεζξ). 
Moreover, by associating hypothetical examination with the particular sciences, Plato seems 
to admit that these forms of examination can actually produce true results, although by 
themselves they always fall short of knowledge. One wonders then what would change with 
the other form of inquiry (which must move towards the ὏πμεέζεζξ and go beyond them). 
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 In this sense, they are like the inquiry in the Meno, which also does not try to determine the notion of ἀνεηή 
as such. Likewise, what is being hypothesized in the Phaedo (and, to a certain extent, also in the Parmenides) 
are the εἴδδ. They are assumed to exist and to account for what things are, even if one does not have a complete 
insight into them. 
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 See 533b-c: “αἱ δὲ θμζπαί, ἃξ ημῦ ὄκημξ ηζ ἔθαιεκ ἐπζθαιαάκεζεαζ, βεςιεηνίαξ ηε ηαὶ ηὰξ ηαύηῃ ἑπμιέκαξ, 
ὁν῵ιεκ ὡξ ὀκεζνώηημοζζ ιὲκ πενὶ ηὸ ὄκ, ὕπαν δὲ ἀδύκαημκ α὎ηα῔ξ ἰδε῔κ, ἕςξ ἂκ ὏πμεέζεζζ πνώιεκαζ ηαύηαξ 
ἀηζκήημοξ ἐ῵ζζ, ιὴ δοκάιεκαζ θόβμκ δζδόκαζ α὎η῵κ.” 
988
 See 511d: “δζάκμζακ δὲ ηαθε῔κ ιμζ δμηε῔ξ ηὴκ η῵κ βεςιεηνζη῵κ ηε ηαὶ ηὴκ η῵κ ημζμύηςκ ἕλζκ ἀθθ᾽ μ὎ κμῦκ, 
ὡξ ιεηαλύ ηζ δόλδξ ηε ηαὶ κμῦ ηὴκ δζάκμζακ μὖζακ.” 
989
 As Plato says in 533c, “ᾧ βὰν ἀνπὴ ιὲκ ὃ ιὴ μἶδε, ηεθεοηὴ δὲ ηαὶ ηὰ ιεηαλὺ ἐλ μὗ ιὴ μἶδεκ ζοιπέπθεηηαζ, ηίξ 
ιδπακὴ ηὴκ ημζαύηδκ ὁιμθμβίακ πμηὲ ἐπζζηήιδκ βεκέζεαζ;” 
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Would it also correct the results of hypothetical examinations, or simply see these results in a 
different light, integrating them into a more complex view of things? 
 Finally, there is still one relevant point that must be considered. The sciences that may 
be identified with this third subsegment are not simply something opposed to the examination 
of the εἴδδ, but they are presented by Plato as devices for purifying our gaze from sensible 
reality and for giving access to the intelligible beings.
990
 Indeed, our ordinary way of seeing 
things focuses on concrete beings, but has a hazy contact with the predicates that constitute 
them, and so does not see the problems that affect them. The particular sciences overcome 
this limitation and point us towards non-sensible structures that are present in them. By doing 
so, they also make it easier for us to identify and examine the εἴδδ or our notions of them.
991
   
 
e) The relation between the different presentations of the hypothetical method 
 
 The versions of the hypothetical method we just considered share some common 
features, which are mostly related to the notion of ὏πόεεζζξ. We have considered these 
features above. In short, there is some question about which we do not have knowledge and 
so we assume something about it and see the consequences of this assumption. The process 
may lead to contradictions (either internal to the assumption itself or between the assumption 
and other views we hold for certain) and thus refute the initial assumption.  
 However, there are also significant differences between the four versions of the 
method. One of these differences concerns the amplitude of the method. In Meno (and to 
some extent also in Phaedo) the method is used to examine a particular question, while in the 
Parmenides it is a matter of considering all possible ὏πμεέζεζξ and see how they relate to 
each other. The status of the ὏πμεέζεζξ themselves also varies. In Phaedo one hypothesizes 
some view that seems more plausible, whereas in the Meno and the Parmenides it is rather a 
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matter of seeing all the different alternatives. Another relevant distinction lies in the number 
of stages the method involves. Plato identifies different stages in Phaedo and the Republic: 
the first one makes an assumption and then the second stage requires one to justify this 
assumption. The introduction of this second stage renders the value of any progress made in 
the first stage problematic. In the Republic, given the association of the hypothetical inquiry 
with particular sciences, the first stage of the inquiry seems to have a certain validity, despite 
its constitutive limitation. In Phaedo the matter is not so clear. It will probably depend on the 
value of the ὏πμεέζεζξ that will ground the first one. As for the other texts, we find no 
reference to this question. In Meno there is no mention of grounding one‟s ὏πμεέζεζξ with 
further ὏πμεέζεζξ or with something else (something ἀκοπόεεημκ, as is said in the Republic). 
The confirmation of an assumption appears to come from a related question or even an 
empirical fact. In Parmenides, in turn, there is no clear indication of how one could ever 
confirm any ὏πόεεζζξ. 
 However, despite all these differences, the similarities are still striking and we could 
say that the four versions of the method correspond to four different possibilities of using 
὏πμεέζεζξ to examine something. They are four different kinds of hypothetical thinking, 
which are in part determined by their context and by what one expects to achieve. They may 
also have different relations to the elenctic examination and the casting away of false beliefs. 
In Parmenides, the hypothetical examination is supposed to help Socrates overcome the 
limitations he showed in the preliminary discussion, in which some beliefs were still holding 
him back. In Phaedo and Meno (and up to a point also in Parmenides) it seems to be rather a 
solution to escape the impasse created by the examination of a particular matter. This is 
actually the main virtue of the hypothetic examination. It avoids the paralysis created by the 
cathartic examination. Instead of remaining undecided, we start examining possibilities and 
seeing what they entail, which allows us to achieve a greater clarity about these possibilities, 
eliminate those that contain or bring about contradictions, and thus prepare a better decision. 
However, none of the texts specifies how exactly we can find the ὏πμεέζεζξ that we 
will use and whether we can actually identify all possible ὏πμεέζεζξ. We might leave out 
important possibilities, thereby rendering the entire examination inconclusive or invalid. 
Moreover, given the fact that the method may involve a very long process, it is not exactly 
clear where we should start and how we should proceed after starting. In Phaedo, Socrates 
talks about starting with the most robust ὏πόεεζζξ, but that is not always a straightforward 
criterion. In some cases, they may all seem equally plausible. Consequently, the method may 
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contain (at least at times) a chaotic element, which makes the examination all the more 
difficult. Finally, it is also not clear if such a method could ever actually determine how 
things are. The lack of contradiction (or the fact that we are not able to find any) does not 
mean that a ὏πόεεζζξ is true. The method seems to require something to complement it – and 
we must now consider what this complement may be according to Plato. 
 
3.2. The second form of inquiry in the Republic, directed at the first, non-
hypothetical principle  
 
 In the Republic, Plato gives some important indications about how to overcome the 
limitations of a hypothetical method. These indications have some resemblance to the second 
stage of hypothetical examination in Phaedo, which required one to find new ὏πμεέζεζξ to 
ground the first one, until reaching something sufficient. The description in the Republic goes 
in the same direction, but it contains some differences and is much more developed. Let us 
then consider what is said in the text and what are its implications for the positive side of 
philosophical examination.   
We saw how ὏πμεέζεζξ are views characterized by a defective understanding or a 
defective justification of their content. They determine other things, but are not sufficiently 
determined. This is what must be overcome – and it is by overcoming such a defect that we 
come to the fourth subsegment of the line. When one understands that the hypothetical 
examinations are based on assumptions that are not properly understood or properly justified 
(i.e., they are based on mere knowledge claims), one is required to examine these 
assumptions and try to clarify and ground them, in order to achieve actual knowledge.
992
 
Instead of moving away from them towards their consequences, they become the center of 
one‟s inquiries. They are now points of approach or attack (ἐπζαάζεζξ ηαὶ ὁνιαί).
993
 The goal 
is to uproot (ἀκαζνε῔κ) these ὏πμεέζεζξ – not by annulling them completely, but rather by 
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 Just like in the transition from the second to the third subsegment, this transition requires one to understand 
the intrinsic limitations of what is taken to be a superior form of understanding things – i.e., one must realize 
that what was taken to be an appropriate access to things is in fact a form of dreaming (of mistaking mere 
images with things themselves). 
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 The term ἐπζαάζζξ can mean something as stepping stone, but it can also express the movement towards 
something, and it seems to be in that sense that it is used here. Both ἐπζαάζζξ and ὁνιή express the idea of 
advancing towards something, attacking it, instead of having a static or distracted relation to it, as is 
characteristic of an hypothetical inquiry with respect to its ὏πμεέζεζξ. 
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annulling their hypothetical or precarious character.
994
 One will no longer fail to understand 
or justify them. One will clarify and ground them, thereby reaching a firm footing. 
 This new kind of examination, which opens the fourth subsegment, concerns the εἴδδ 
and only the εἴδδ – or, as we could also say, it concerns our understanding of the general 
predicates that constitute the alphabet of reality.
995
 One tries to fully understand what these 
εἴδδ are and how they affect all things. However, the εἴδδ are not necessarily independent 
from each other. They may still presuppose other εἴδδ – for instance in the sense we find in 
the Sophist, where it is said that some predicates pervade all others and even each other. In 
the Republic, Plato points to the idea of there being a first principle (ἀνπή) on which all εἴδδ 
and all reality depend, and which in turn does not depend on anything else. The examination 
that corresponds to the fourth subsegment of the line is ultimately concerned with this first 
principle – which Plato qualifies as ἀκοπόεεημξ.
996
 The adjective ἀκοπόεεημξ expresses 
several things here. First, the adjective ἀκοπόεεημξ indicates that this principle is 
unconditioned or absolute. It does not presuppose anything else and is not based on anything 
else. Moreover, by presenting it as the ultimate goal of inquiry, Plato points out that the 
access to this principle would not involve any ungrounded or unclear assumptions. In other 
words, the contact with the first principle would not be provisional in any way, it would not 
presuppose anything, it would not lack any intelligibility, it would be fully self-evident. This 
is the goal. But in fact there is still another way of reaching something ἀκοπόεεημκ – namely, 
by suppressing all ὏πμεέζεζξ (i.e., all our knowledge claims) and fully pursuing knowledge. 
As we saw, one can wake up from a dream in the Platonic sense either by coming into contact 
with reality (or the thing themselves to which one‟s images refer) or by realizing that one has 
mistaken a dream image for reality.
997
 If one realizes the mistake, then one is already turned 
to the thing itself, even if one does not have a full and clear access to it. So if one is able to 
suspend all ὏πμεέζεζξ that ground not only scientific inquiries, but also the sensible world, 
then one will already reach something ἀκοπόεεημκ – though one still has to search for what 
things really are. 
 Both senses of ἀκοπόεεημκ are relevant here, though Plato does not make a mere 
negative description of it. As was said, he talks of a first principle from which all εἴδδ and all 
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 Cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4. 
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particular beings are somehow derived. This would be the ultimate foundation of all 
knowledge. Indeed, Plato seems to be describing what is implied in the idea of knowledge. 
Given the system of reciprocal influence of our views and of the things that correspond to 
them, one would need to reach something that underpins everything and does not depend on 
anything else. This is what would allow us to avoid the false, though coherent, system of 
views which is invoked in Cratylus.
998
 
 However, this is only a formal description and Plato does not go into much detail 
about the ultimate foundation of knowledge and the kind of foundation it implies. In the 
context of the Republic, the first principle seems to be ἟ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ ἰδέα, which is designated 
as the greatest study (ιέβζζημκ ιάεδια).
999
 But Plato does not specify what exactly should we 
understood by “the good”. The analyses in the Republic are indirect (as Socrates himself 
declares) and no more than allusions.
1000
 It is not clear if it is to be understood in a more 
abstract sense (as a structure of formal ontology) or in a more practical sense (in which case it 
would coincide with the individual good and the cosmic good).
1001
 Moreover, this passage in 
the Republic seems to be at odds with other texts. Even if there are other passages in the 
corpus where the good seems to be the key to understanding reality (such as in Phaedo and 
Timaeus), there are also other passages that seem to point in a different direction.
1002
 The 
most striking instance is the Sophist, where the ultimate foundation of reality seem to be the 
ιέβζζηα βέκδ, which are not even susceptible of being reduced to one principle. One thus 
wonders how to harmonize the different texts. 
As for the kind of foundation involved in this model, Plato‟s description is also vague. 
Before introducing the simile of the line, Socrates had said that the good is the source of 
knowledge and being for all other things (just as the sun is the source of knowledge and being 
for sensible reality), but it is not clear what this means.
1003
 He says that the good illuminates 
everything as the sun does in the sensible domain, so it seems that if we have access to the 
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 See 436d.  
999
 See 505a: “(...) ὅηζ βε ἟ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ ἰδέα ιέβζζημκ ιάεδια, πμθθάηζξ ἀηήημαξ (...).” 
1000
 Socrates first declares he does not know what the good is (see 506b-c) and then he presents an image to 
clarify the thing itself – more precisely, he discusses what he calls “the child of the good” – namely, the         
sun – and says it is analogous to the good. See 506d-e and especially 508b-c: “ἆν᾽ μὖκ μ὎ ηαὶ ὁ ἣθζμξ ὄρζξ ιὲκ 
μ὎η ἔζηζκ, αἴηζμξ δ᾽ ὢκ α὎η῅ξ ὁν᾵ηαζ ὏π᾽ α὎η῅ξ ηαύηδξ;     μὕηςξ, ἤ δ᾽ ὅξ.     ημῦημκ ημίκοκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, θάκαζ ιε 
θέβεζκ ηὸκ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ ἔηβμκμκ, ὃκ ηἀβαεὸκ ἐβέκκδζεκ ἀκάθμβμκ ἑαοηῶ, ὅηζπεν α὎ηὸ ἐκ ηῶ κμδηῶ ηόπῳ πνόξ ηε 
κμῦκ ηαὶ ηὰ κμμύιεκα, ημῦημ ημῦημκ ἐκ ηῶ ὁναηῶ πνόξ ηε ὄρζκ ηαὶ ηὰ ὁνώιεκα.” 
1001
 For a discussion of what is said in the Republic about the good, see in particular Chap. 12, Sect. 6.3 below. 
1002
 Cp. Phd. 97b ff., Ti. 28a ff. 
1003
 See 509b-c: “ηὸκ ἣθζμκ ημ῔ξ ὁνςιέκμζξ μ὎ ιόκμκ μἶιαζ ηὴκ ημῦ ὁν᾵ζεαζ δύκαιζκ πανέπεζκ θήζεζξ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ 
ηὴκ βέκεζζκ ηαὶ αὔλδκ ηαὶ ηνμθήκ, μ὎ βέκεζζκ α὎ηὸκ ὄκηα.     π῵ξ βάν;     ηαὶ ημ῔ξ βζβκςζημιέκμζξ ημίκοκ ιὴ 
ιόκμκ ηὸ βζβκώζηεζεαζ θάκαζ ὏πὸ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ πανε῔καζ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ ηὸ εἶκαί ηε ηαὶ ηὴκ μ὎ζίακ ὏π᾽ ἐηείκμο α὎ημ῔ξ 
πνμζε῔καζ, μ὎η μ὎ζίαξ ὄκημξ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ, ἀθθ᾽ ἔηζ ἐπέηεζκα η῅ξ μ὎ζίαξ πνεζαείᾳ ηαὶ δοκάιεζ ὏πενέπμκημξ.” 
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good, we will understand all other things. They may in a way be contained in the good itself 
or be part of its identity, which would thus be a systematic identity. But Plato‟s analysis is 
very far from showing that it is so or explaining how can this be.  
 A different problem is how exactly are we to identify the first principle. Plato only 
indicates a direction of investigation and does not say how we are to proceed. He talks of 
separating the form of the good from everything else and going through every test 
(ἔθεβπμξ).
1004
 But how is it to be separated and tested? The only clues we find point to a 
deductive system, which we can understand better if we examine the ὏πμεέζεζξ of 
hypothetical examinations and focus exclusively on εἴδδ. But this is still far from being a 
clear indication of method. It is also not clear whether philosophical examination is supposed 
to be concluded with the inquiry of the first principle or if there is still some kind of inquiry 
that is supposed to follow it. In the Republic, one will be required to legislate and regulate all 
life in the πόθζξ in light of this knowledge, so this may still require some sort of examination. 
Finally, the connection with the inquiries that constitute the third subsegment is also 
problematic. Must all views one had acquired previously (especially in the particular 
sciences) be reformulated on this new basis or is it rather a matter or reviewing them, to see if 
they contained any defects that escaped notice? Plato does not say. It does seem that 
philosophical examination is not entirely concluded once one determines the source of all 




3.3. The method of division  
 
 There is one more kind of method in the corpus that seems to be able to produce 
positive results. Its relation and possible combination with the methods previously considered 
is not clear, but it appears to complement them. This method employs divisions – in 
particular dichotomies – in order to determine things. It seems to concern exclusively εἴδδ. It 
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 See 534b-c: “μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ πενὶ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ ὡζαύηςξ· ὃξ ἂκ ιὴ ἔπῃ δζμνίζαζεαζ ηῶ θόβῳ ἀπὸ η῵κ ἄθθςκ 
πάκηςκ ἀθεθὼκ ηὴκ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ ἰδέακ, ηαὶ ὥζπεν ἐκ ιάπῃ δζὰ πάκηςκ ἐθέβπςκ δζελζώκ, ιὴ ηαηὰ δόλακ ἀθθὰ 
ηαη᾽ μ὎ζίακ πνμεοιμύιεκμξ ἐθέβπεζκ, ἐκ π᾵ζζ ημύημζξ ἀπη῵ηζ ηῶ θόβῳ δζαπμνεύδηαζ, μὔηε α὎ηὸ ηὸ ἀβαεὸκ 
θήζεζξ εἰδέκαζ ηὸκ μὕηςξ ἔπμκηα μὔηε ἄθθμ ἀβαεὸκ μ὎δέκ (...).” 
1005
 For other discussions of these questions, cp. the texts mentioned in footnote 991 and, in addition, see also 
e.g. R. ROBINSON, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, Ithaca/New York, Cornell University Press, 1941, 162-191; D. 
BALTZLY, “To an unhypothetical first principle” in Plato‟s Republic, History of Philosophy Quarterly 13 
(1996), 149–65; D. BAILEY, Plato and Aristotle on the Unhypothetical, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
30 (2006), 101-126. 
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establishes contrasts between them and derives some of them from more general εἴδδ, thus 
allowing one to better understand their content and determinations.
1006
  
 The method is briefly described in Phaedrus (265d ff.) and exhaustively employed in 
the Sophist and the Statesman. In Philebus (14c ff.), Socrates outlines a method (which we 
discussed above) that closely resembles it.
1007
 Once more, it is difficult to determine how the 
different presentations relate to each other and whether they correspond to the same method 
or to different ones which are nevertheless very similar. 
 In Phaedrus, Socrates talks of a method of collection and division. He says that one 
must see the resemblances between things, but also their differences. This is necessary for 
speaking and thinking well.
1008
 One starts with the resemblances. The same predicates are 
scattered through many different things and one must bring them together and isolate the 
εἶδμξ they correspond to.
1009
 However, similarity is a slippery thing, as is said in the Sophist, 
and so one must be on the lookout for significant differences.
1010
 In other words, one must 
separate things from one another. After collecting them and grouping them under one 
heading, one must see if some distinctions can be made and then one must divide them by 
their natural joints.
1011
 This allows one to see how complex certain realities can be. 
 The idea is further developed in the Sophist and the Statesman, where two specific 
entities (namely, the sophist and the statesman) are to be defined by dividing a general εἶδμξ 
or βέκμξ into two different ones and repeating the process until one reaches something 
uncuttable or atomic, in which one can find no more distinctions.
1012
 While doing so, one 
cannot be too hasty and skip any division, even if they have no name. The division must be as 
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 The method follows the Greek tradition of identifying polarities in order to determine things, as well as 
Prodicus‟ δζαίνεζζξ ὀκμιάηςκ, which was used to clarify the meaning of words. Some of the distinctions we 
find in the corpus even imitate the traditional model of distinguishing the good and bad form of something, as 
when Hesiod distinguishes a good ἔνζξ and a bad ἔνζξ (see Opera et dies, 11-26). But we will not consider here 
the particular distinctions made in the corpus and how they relate with other distinctions in Greek culture. We 
will only consider Plato‟s presentation of a method of division and how it may help to find out the truth about 
things. 
1007
 For a discussion of this passage, cp. Chap. 6, Sects. 2.3a) and 2.4. 
1008
 See Phdr. 266b: “ημύηςκ δὴ ἔβςβε α὎ηόξ ηε ἐναζηήξ, ὦ Φα῔δνε, η῵κ δζαζνέζεςκ ηαὶ ζοκαβςβ῵κ, ἵκα μἷόξ ηε 
ὦ θέβεζκ ηε ηαὶ θνμκε῔κ (...).”  
1009
 See 265d: “εἰξ ιίακ ηε ἰδέακ ζοκμν῵κηα ἄβεζκ ηὰ πμθθαπῆ δζεζπανιέκα, ἵκα ἕηαζημκ ὁνζγόιεκμξ δ῅θμκ πμζῆ 
πενὶ μὗ ἂκ ἀεὶ δζδάζηεζκ ἐεέθῃ.” 
1010
 See 231a: “ηὸκ δὲ ἀζθαθ῅ δε῔ πάκηςκ ιάθζζηα πενὶ ηὰξ ὁιμζόηδηαξ ἀεὶ πμζε῔ζεαζ ηὴκ θοθαηήκ· 
ὀθζζεδνόηαημκ βὰν ηὸ βέκμξ.” 
1011
 Phdr. 265e: “ηὸ πάθζκ ηαη᾽ εἴδδ δύκαζεαζ δζαηέικεζκ ηαη᾽ ἄνενα ᾗ πέθοηεκ, ηαὶ ιὴ ἐπζπεζνε῔κ ηαηαβκύκαζ 
ιένμξ ιδδέκ, ηαημῦ ιαβείνμο ηνόπῳ πνώιεκμκ (...).” 
1012








 In Philebus, as we saw, Socrates speaks of a method that allows one to develop a 
ηέπκδ: namely, by identifying all inner divisions of a particular unity (i.e., all classes of being 
within a general class or domain of reality) that have, in turn, infinite instances in sensible 
reality.
1014
 The whole system resulting from division (the number and specification of all 
intermediate classes) is what actually supplies a perfect knowledge of a certain domain of 
reality – as in the case of letters and sound, which Socrates uses as an example.
1015
 
 But what exactly is the status of this method of divisions? And what can we reach 
through it? Is it universally valid? Or is its validity restricted to a certain domain? As was 
said, the method appears to be exclusively concerned with εἴδδ and their relations. Does this 
mean it cannot, at least directly, be applied to particular beings? Perhaps that is the case, but 
it is always indirectly relevant, insofar as particular beings depend on the εἴδδ in order to be 
determined. It is also uncertain whether the method can be applied to all εἴδδ. If we look at 
the Sophist, we notice that the identification and discussion of the ιέβζζηα βέκδ is not 
connected with the method of division in any way. They are not obtained through this method 
nor are they used as material for other divisions. This raises another question – namely, 
whether or not the method can be used to determine the very starting-point of the division. In 
the Sophist, the whole tree of divisions starts with the division between possessing a ηέπκδ or 
not and goes on to define the sophist through several subdivisions. But what is the status of 
the initial division and why does it start there? Is it arbitrary? Is it supposed to be a self-
evident beginning? And what is it a division of? How is the overarching εἶδμξ to be defined? 
By its own division or through some other means? In fact, here (as well as in the Philebus) 
the highest elements to be divided seem to be unexamined assumptions. Their meaning is 
taken for granted and the characters simply proceed by dividing them. In Phaedrus, Socrates 
speaks of a collection that precedes the division, but he does not explain how this is to be 
performed. 
 The method seems therefore to have a limited validity. But this is not its only 
problem. It is also unclear how the differences within each βέκμξ or εἶδμξ are to be identified. 
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 Cp. Plt. 262a-b: “ιὴ ζιζηνὸκ ιόνζμκ ἓκ πνὸξ ιεβάθα ηαὶ πμθθὰ ἀθαζν῵ιεκ, ιδδὲ εἴδμοξ πςνίξ· ἀθθὰ ηὸ 
ιένμξ ἅια εἶδμξ ἐπέης. ηάθθζζημκ ιὲκ βὰν ἀπὸ η῵κ ἄθθςκ ε὎εὺξ δζαπςνίγεζκ ηὸ γδημύιεκμκ, ἂκ ὀνε῵ξ ἔπῃ, 
ηαεάπεν ὀθίβμκ ζὺ πνόηενμκ μἰδεεὶξ ἔπεζκ ηὴκ δζαίνεζζκ ἐπέζπεοζαξ ηὸκ θόβμκ, ἰδὼκ ἐπ᾽ ἀκενώπμοξ 
πμνεοόιεκμκ· ἀθθὰ βάν, ὦ θίθε, θεπημονβε῔κ μ὎η ἀζθαθέξ, δζὰ ιέζςκ δὲ ἀζθαθέζηενμκ ἰέκαζ ηέικμκηαξ, ηαὶ 
ι᾵θθμκ ἰδέαζξ ἄκ ηζξ πνμζηοβπάκμζ.” 
1014
 See 16d-17a and 18a-b. 
1015
 See 17a-17e and 18b-d. 
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They seem to be intuitive, and sometimes this causes problems and ends up leading to several 
different routes of definition (and thus several different definitions), as is the case of the 
sophist.
1016
 It is not clear whether or not there is a way to be sure that one is identifying the 
aspects that should be distinguished. The method seems to be characterized by a certain 
degree of uncertainty – and this raises another problem. It is indeed questionable whether the 
result of the whole process is a full insight into a particular being or simply a greater clarity 
about it. By identifying a system of genera and species, and by and locating something 
therein, one is able to see this reality more clearly. One prevents confusions – or more 
specifically, one avoids thinking that dissimilar things are similar and the converse.
1017
 But it 
is uncertain whether one can reach a true definition or θόβμξ of something (i.e., a view that 




3.4. The combination of the positive methods as a problem 
 
 The different methodological reflections just discussed complement Plato‟s project of 
an ἐηαμθὴ η῅ξ δόλδξ. They present a more positive and constructive examination. Instead of 
focusing on whether or not we actually know what we think we know, they explore views we 
are not convinced of and try to determine how things actually are. While employing them, we 
may discover new views, adopt new beliefs and perhaps even find out the truth about things. 
However, the different presentations of a positive method point in different directions and 
this divergence raises the question of how they relate to each other. Are they alternate ways 
of conducing a more positive examination? Or are they complementary and in some way 
sequential? Plato gives no clear indication about this. In fact, the different methods are 
discussed in different contexts and their relation never becomes an explicit problem. There is 
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 Cp. Sph. 231b-232b, where the Visitor and Theaetetus recapitulate the results of the first attempts at defining 
the sophist and prepare for the last attempt. 
1017
 Cp. Phdr. 262a: “δε῔ ἄνα ηὸκ ιέθθμκηα ἀπαηήζεζκ ιὲκ ἄθθμκ, α὎ηὸκ δὲ ιὴ ἀπαηήζεζεαζ, ηὴκ ὁιμζόηδηα η῵κ 
ὄκηςκ ηαὶ ἀκμιμζόηδηα ἀηνζα῵ξ δζεζδέκαζ.” 
1018
 For more on this method, cp. e.g. A. LLOYD, Plato‟s Description of Division, The Classical Quarterly 2 
(1952), 105-112; H. KOLLER, Die dihäretische Methode, Glotta 39 (1961), 6-24; J. PHILIP, Platonic Diairesis, 
Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 97 (1966), 335-358; J. TREVASKIS, 
Division and Its Relation to Dialectic and Ontology in Plato, Phronesis 12 (1967), 118-129; S. COHEN, Plato‟s 
Method of Division, in: J. MORAVCSIK (ed.), Patterns in Plato’s Thought, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1973, 181–91; 
J. MORAVCSIK, Plato‟s Method of Division, in: IDEM (ed.), Patterns in Plato’s Thought, Dordrecht, Reidel, 
1973, 158-180; D. De CHIARA-QUENZER, The Purpose of the Philosophical Method in Plato‟s Statesman, 
Apeiron 31 (1998), 91–126; M. GILL, Division and Definition in Plato‟s Sophist and Statesman, in: D. 
CHARLES (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 172–99; L. 
FRANKLIN, Dichotomy and Platonic Diairesis, History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (2011), 1–20. 
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no unitary description of a positive method in the corpus and no presentation of a royal road 
to truth either. 
 One may even wonder whether these methods and their presentations are definitive or 
only provisional. Perhaps we can find other methods, either alluded in the texts or completely 
neglected. These other methods may be based in a similar understanding of ourselves 
(namely, that we have views, that they affect the examination, and so on) or they could stem 
from a very different conception of who we are and what are the circumstances in which the 
examination takes place. The history of philosophy offered us many other methods – and it is 
not clear that the ones considered by Plato are the best or most effective. So what is the 
meaning of this disconnection and incompleteness? What is the status of the methods 
conceived by Plato?  
It is not easy to answer these questions, which goes to show just how complicated it is 
to establish a positive method of philosophical examination. Perhaps this method is not 
something we can decide beforehand. Perhaps we have to experiment with different methods, 
set out exploring in different directions, and examine the results of our exploration. At least 
this is what is suggested in the corpus. The definition of the positive or constructive side of 
examination is itself a problem and a task. Plato gives us some instruments to make some 
progress, but our relation with these instruments must be critical and we must be open to 
changes of direction, based on the progresses we make. The road to reaching perfect 
knowledge (assuming there is one) is complex and shifting. We may take different paths and 
there is no method to determine which ones we are to take and in what order. We must go 
forward and explore. We are in a labyrinth of possibilities and we have no map. In fact, we 
do not even have a guarantee that we can get out of the labyrinth and find truth. All 
possibilities are still open.
1019
  
We have thus no easy way of determining the role each positive method conceived by 
Plato is to play in discovering the truth – and this renders all these methods problematic. But 
one thing is certain, though: the way Plato describes them lets us see some of the most 
important components that characterize the idea of knowledge. Knowledge involves 
agreement or coherence (ὁιμθμβία, ζοιθςκία) among our views; it requires our views to be 
grounded and to have a solid foundation; it implies an exhaustive analysis of each reality; and 
most importantly, it is primarily concerned with εἴδδ and requires us to have a clear 
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 In this respect, the positive side of philosophical examination is no easier than the negative side, which 
demanded us to be exhaustively cleansed of our views, without fully explaining how this was to be done and 
whether it was at all possible (and at what cost). Cp. Chap. 8, Sect. 3. 
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understanding of them. In general, these methods aim at achieving these goals and in the 
process they clarify all the views we examine. They define their content and implications, 
what grounds them and how they relate to each other. 
Seen from this angle, the positive side of philosophical examination bears a close 
resemblance to its negative side, which was also concerned with clarifying our views, in 
order to let us see their inconsistencies. But how exactly do the two sides relate to each other? 
 
4. The interrelation between the destructive and the constructive sides of philosophical 
examination 
 
 It is not difficult to see that there is a certain continuity between the two kinds of 
examination. They both require us to articulate and rationally discuss views (or, in other 
words, they both employ θόβμξ) and through this they check the agreement or disagreement 
of views, as well as their grounds. They both try to see and assess a system of views. But the 
negative and the positive examinations have different purposes. The former reviews the 
views (or beliefs) we endorse, while the latter tries to determine what are the correct views 
about something. Their relation to the object of examination (namely, the different views) is 
thus different in both cases. As a result, the scope of each form of examination is also 
different. Elenctic examination is more focused on one‟s individual beliefs, while zetetic 
examination refers to all possible views.  
Despite this important difference, the two kinds of examination are not completely 
impervious to each other. On the one hand, elenctic examination may very well include 
constructive elements. While trying to identify and articulate our own views or beliefs 
(which, as we saw, are mostly tacit), we may change them in some way and add new views. 
We may also contemplate other possible views of which we are not convinced, and 
consequently we may start focusing our attention on the thing itself and not just on what we 
believe about it. On the other hand, zetetic examination also refutes false views and therefore 
it may help us to cast away false beliefs. Perhaps we could even say that the two kinds of 
philosophical examination are never completely separated from one another, but they rather 
coexist in different degrees and usually one of them prevails over the other. This is why it is 
better to talk of two sides of philosophical examination. 
 Elenctic examination and zetetic examination are to a certain extent entangled, and we 
may even wonder whether they are to be conceived as two stages that come one after the 
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other. Plato presents the ἐηαμθή as a propaedeutic stage, but it is not clear if we must be 
absolutely done with the cathartic examination in order to start the positive and constructive 
examination. It seems that ideally that should be the case, but the elenctic process is very 
difficult to conclude. Moreover, it may be very difficult to deal with our lack of knowledge in 
some matters (especially the most important ones) – and so we may need the constructive 
examination long before being done with the cathartic process. On the other hand, it is also 
not certain that elenctic examination is something we may ever be done with and leave 
behind, especially because we may acquire new and potentially false convictions after 
starting the constructive examination. We have to keep examining our beliefs. In sum, 
philosophical examination seems to require a constant to and fro movement and its division 
in two stages is somewhat artificial. While examining, we may always have beliefs that 
require ἔθεβπμξ and we may always need to acquire new views.  
The two kinds of philosophical examination constitute a unity and in a way this unity 
comes close to what Plato calls δζαθεηηζηή. The term dialectic is somewhat plastic and Plato 
uses it to designate different methods.
1020
 However, at its core it describes a ηέπκδ that knows 
how to use conversations (and more precisely cross-examinations) in order to rationally 
discuss what is said, put it to test and ascertain its truth. In other words, it uses θόβμξ as a 
verbalization that at the same time has to render account of what is being said, justify it, in 
order to fully grasp the truth about something. The conversations brought about by this ηέπκδ 
are therefore very demanding and productive. They let us see the relations between things, let 
us realize our ignorance, and let us find out new possibilities – and even new truths. 
Philosophical examination is precisely this movement of rational discussion, and the 
configuration it assumes at each stage is only determined by our cognitive state and the 
progress we already made.  
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CONCLUSION OF PART II 
 
 
 As was said, the main goal of this Part II is to define the kind of examination that 
unexamined life lacks and without which it is not worth living, according to the Apology. 
There are indeed many ordinary forms of examination, but Plato has a particular form of 
examination in mind, which we labeled philosophical examination. The Platonic corpus 
provides many illustrations and discussions of this special kind of examination. However, 
these illustrations and discussions are scattered through many different passages and they 
might often appear to be inconsistent and incompatible (as was shown in Chapter 4). But we 
took the different elements from their immediate context and attempted to conciliate them in 
a single methodological reflection. Although this made us lose sight of many particularities of 
the different passages, it also gave us a more complex notion of what is required in order to 
lead an examined life and what its challenges are. 
 We started by looking at the most important traits of Plato‟s portrayal of philosophical 
examination in the corpus, which consists of many different images whose common structure 
is not immediate clear (Chapter 4). We then tried to determine the object of philosophical 
examination and saw that it is always applied to the views we adopted (our beliefs) or which 
can be adopted by us (Chapter 5). Afterwards, we considered the complexity and intricacy of 
our beliefs (Chapter 6), as well as their possible defects (Chapter 7). Finally, we considered 
what philosophical examination does to our views or beliefs – namely, how it tries to expel 
all our defective beliefs (Chapter 8) and find new and better ones (Chapter 9). These two 
moments or directions of examination are not two different projects, but rather two 
constitutive parts of the project of attaining knowledge, which requires us to avoid any 
distortions in our way of seeing things and also to acquire all knowledge we lack.  
We have thus determined a unitary concept of philosophical examination. This is not 
explicitly presented as such by Plato, but it results from putting together all the indications he 
gives throughout his writings. The result is not definitive and it seems to require some further 
indications, especially with respect to the positive method of philosophical examination. But 
what we saw already gives us a pretty good idea of what an unexamined life is lacking. 
However, there are several questions that are still open. For instance, it is not clear what 
shape our life will take once philosophical examination is correctly and fully carried out. In 
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other words, it is not clear how philosophical examination will affect our life and what its 
outcome will be.
1021
 Moreover, the formal description of the project does not yet let us realize 
the full importance of embracing philosophical examination. We still have to consider how 
our life is structured and what the consequences of leading an unexamined life are.
1022
 We 
also failed to consider the elaborate protreptic techniques Socrates uses throughout the corpus 
in order to convince both his interlocutors and the reader to examine – since they too require 
a consideration of our life structure.
1023
 Despite the importance of these questions for a full 
definition of philosophical examination, we will only be able to discuss them at a later stage. 
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 We will briefly discuss this question at the end, in Chapter 20, after determining the structure of our life and 
the main features of an unexamined life, which will be deeply modified by this kind of examination. 
1022
 These questions will require a long discussion. See Chaps. 10-18. 
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The inner constitution of human life according to Plato 
 
 
“L‟œil de l‟esprit ne peut trouver nulle part plus d‟éblouissements ni plus 
de ténèbres que dans l‟homme; il ne peut se fixer sur aucune chose qui soit 
plus redoutable, plus compliquée, plus mystérieuse et plus infinie. Il y a un 
spectacle plus grand que la mer, c‟est le ciel; il y a un spectacle plus grand que 
le ciel, c‟est l‟intérieur de l‟âme. [...] La conscience, c‟est le chaos des 
chimères, des convoitises et des tentatives, la fournaise des rêves, l‟antre des 
idées dont on a honte; c‟est le pandémonium des sophismes, c‟est le champ de 
bataille des passions. À de certaines heures, pénétrez à travers la face livide 
d‟un être humain qui réfléchit, et regardez derrière, regardez dans cette âme, 
regardez dans cette obscurité. Il y a là, sous le silence extérieur, des combats 
de géants comme dans Homère, des mêlées de dragons et d‟hydres et des 
nuées de fantômes comme dans Milton, des spirales visionnaires comme chez 
Dante. Chose sombre que cet infini que tout homme porte en soi et auquel il 
mesure avec désespoir les volontés de son cerveau et les actions de sa vie!” 





Before analyzing the structure of a life defined by the lack of philosophical 
examination (ἐλέηαζζξ), we must consider what characterizes a way of life (a αίμξ) as such. 
The term αίμξ expresses a particular contraction of life‟s possibilities. It often refers to one‟s 
singular destiny in life, but it can also denote a life pattern that can be shared by many 
different people, and it is precisely the latter that is at issue when we talk of an unexamined 
life.
1025
 In order to determine what is a αίμξ, we have therefore to consider the basic structures 
of life and see how they allow for different αίμζ.  
But when we talk of life‟s structures we must bear in mind how problematic the term 
life is. Putting aside Greek terminology for a moment, life is something we can understand in 
a biological or in a biographical sense. Moreover, there are many lives and so it seems life is 
a regional and very circumscribed phenomenon. Each life is one among many. But at the 
same time, life as we experience it is something that somehow encompasses the whole of 
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 See V. HUGO, Œuvres complètes. Roman, vol. 5, Paris, Hetzel-Quantin/Houssiaux, 1881, 394-395. 
1025
 Cp. Chap. 3, Sect. 2. 
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reality. We are aware of other things and other people, and they are all part of our life. This 
life, in turn, is always lived in the first person. It is someone‟s life, and for this someone it is 
not something incidental. It constitutes their being. Consequently, asking about our life is 
asking about our own being. What kind of being are we? What is our own constitution? What 
differentiates us from all other beings?  
We must then examine ourselves – and not just in the sense of examining our own 
views at large. We must examine our own being, or our views about ourselves (i.e., about the 
being that can devote itself to examination or neglect it ). We must carry out an examination 
in which we will be simultaneously the examiners and the object of examination. This may 
seem simple, since we are absolutely familiarized with the being in question. However, 
despite the familiarity with ourselves, we often surprise or puzzle ourselves, which raises the 
suspicion that we may be partially (or even completely) deluded about ourselves. Turning our 
gaze to ourselves may indeed be everything but simple. It may be an extremely hard task, 
with many steps and subject to many limitations, errors and illusions. Moreover, we are 
usually unprepared for it, since such a self-examination is something we normally do not 
carry out – at least in such a developed form as we see in the Platonic corpus. 
So how can we determine our own being? We are complex beings, composed of many 
different elements. Does this mean that we must make an inventory of all that composes us? 
No. We must rather see what pervades all these particular moments and brings them all 
together. We must find the unity or principle underlying everything in us, and then we will be 
able to consider the different elements that compose us and how they relate to each other. In 
other words, we must determine our identity or our self – viz. that which pervades all 
moments and makes them part of the same being. Moreover, the identity we are seeking is a 
very specific kind of identity. It is not simply a matter of personal identity – i.e., of what 
determines a particular person. It is also not a particular tribal identity (that determines people 
of a certain group or kind). We are asking about the identity of all people – of the species, as 
it were. This raises many epistemological problems. It is indeed not clear how we can know 
that we all have a similar identity. But regardless of that, we all have a notion of others and 
we constantly refer to this notion. We understand that despite the fact that our individual life 
somehow encompasses everything, there are other lives that have a structure similar to ours. 
We have something in common with others and the question then is how this common 
identity is to be conceived. In Greek terms, what exactly is the human nature (the ἀκενςπίκδ 
θύζζξ) – i.e., that which transcends individuals, circumstances and epochs?  
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The Greek notions of θύζζξ and ἄκενςπμξ (which are very important in Plato, but 
whose meaning was in part already defined by previous thinkers) can help us better 
understand the problem we will be discussing in this Part III.  
Let us first see what is involved in the notion of θύζζξ.
1026
 The word seems to refer 
originally to living beings and is associated with the ideas of birth, growth and manner of 
growth. It also designates the result of this growth and even the physical appearance of 
something or its characteristics.
1027
 With respect to persons, these characteristics may 
correspond to one‟s temperament, endowment, aptitude or character. Φύζζξ is, at any rate, 
conceived as something innate, which is present from the start or develops automatically.
1028
 
Moreover, the characteristics in question also point to one‟s origin or provenance, especially 
insofar as the features of a living being tend to reflect the beings that generated it. From all 
these usages, we can easily see that the word can have both a dynamic sense (according to 
which θύζζξ is something that unfolds and actualizes itself) and a static sense (in which case 
it is understood as the composition, inner constitution or essence of something – i.e., that 
which makes something what it is ). In fact, θύζζξ is most properly the essence that 
determines the range of possibilities available to a particular entity. It opens up some 
possibilities and closes off others. It sets the boundaries of what a particular being is and, as 
such, it is a kind of pre-established identity. In addition, it determines what the most 
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 What follows is just a very brief synopsis of the word‟s meaning. For more on θύζζξ, see e.g. R. BURY, 
Γύκαιζξ and θύζζξ in Plato, The Classical Review 8 (1894), 297-300; A. BENN, The Idea of Nature in Plato, 
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 9 (1896), 24-49; A. LOVEJOY, The Meaning of θύζζξ in the Greek 
Physiologers, The Philosophical Review 18 (1909), 369-383; P. SHOREY, Φύζζξ, Μεθέηδ, ἖πζζηήιδ, 
Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 40 (1909), 185-201; J. BEARDSLEE, 
The Use of θύζις in Fifth-Century Greek Literature, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1918; W. 
VEAZIE, The Word θύζζξ, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 33 (1921), 3-22; H. ΚÖSTER, θύζζξ, 
θοζζηόξ, θοζζη῵ξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; O. THIMME, Φύζις, ηρόπος, ἦθος. Semasiologische Untersuchung über 
die Auffassung des menschlischen Wesens (Charakters) in der älteren griechischen Literatur, Diss. Tübingen, 
1935; F. HEINIMANN, Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken 
des 5. Jahrhunderts, Basel, Reinhardt, 1945; M. POHLENZ, Nomos und Physis, Hermes 81 (1953), 418-438; D. 
HOLWERDA, Φύζις. Vi atque usu praesertim in Graecitate Aristotele Anteriore, Groningen, Wolters, 1955; P. 
JOOS, Τύτη, θύζις, ηέτνη. Studien zur Thematik frühgriechischer Lebensbetrachtung, Winterthur, Keller, 1955; 
M. MICHLER, Die Praktische Bedeutung des Normativen Physis-Begriffes in der Hippokratischen Schrift De 
Fracturis Ŕ De Articulis, Hermes 90 (1962), 385-401; D. MANNSPERGER, Physis bei Platon, Berlin, de 
Gruyter, 1969; F. MARZOA, Δἶκαζ, θύζζξ, θόβμξ, ἀθδεείδ, Emerita 42 (1974), 159-175; H. PATZER, Physis. 
Grundlegung zu einer Geschichte des Wortes, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 1993; G. NADDAF, The Greek Concept 
of Nature, Albany (NY), State University of New York Press, 2006. 
1027
 This seems to be the sense of the oldest occurrence of the word, in the Odyssey, where it is used of a plant. 
See X.302-303: ὣξ ἄνα θςκήζαξ πόνε θάνιαημκ Ἀνβεσθόκηδξ/ ἐη βαίδξ ἐνύζαξ, ηαί ιμζ θύζζκ α὎ημῦ ἔδεζλε.” 
1028
 In some cases the notion may be broad or indeterminate enough to include some features that are the result 
of one‟s upbringing, though this upbringing was still seen as almost hereditary, insofar as it was intrinsically 
associated with the fact of belonging to a certain family and with growing up in a certain environment. For more 
on this, see e.g. K. DOVER, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, Berkeley/L. A., 
University of California Press, 1974, 83ff. 
366 
 
meaningful possibilities for this being are or what its most proper possibility is (i.e., that 
which it will naturally tend to).
1029
   
Φύζζξ is thus opposed to the notion of pure chance (ηύπδ). The existence of a certain 
θύζζξ implies that a particular being is constituted in a certain manner and the course of its 
being follows a certain rule or set of rules. Its occurrence is ordered and constant, not 
random. However, this order and constancy do not exclude a certain degree of variation. 
First, a being may not be pre-determined in some respects and therefore may be free to be 
determined in different ways. Consequently, beings with a similar structure may differ – and 
the differences may even go to the point of allowing one to talk of different natures. This is 
for instance what happens with human beings. Although there is something like a human 
nature, different persons may also have different natures (in the above mentioned sense of 
having different temperaments, characters, and so on). Moreover, some beings may be unable 
to achieve their proper condition by themselves (i.e., they may be unable to fulfill their 
potential because of external factors or due to their own weakness) and this allows for further 
variation. But if some being is weak (or perhaps not good enough), it may also be object of 
care (εεναπεία) and even technical intervention, in order to improve it. We may intervene in 
what something is and try to change it, and we can do this even when there is no constitutive 
debility. Our intervention may then lead to a strong variation and to the transgression of a 
being‟s natural boundaries.
1030
 This possibility is particularly relevant in the case of human 
beings, as we will see. The Sophists in particular were very aware of our possibilities of 
variation – and so was Plato. Many things in our life are not determined by nature, but rather 
by custom (κόιμξ), although the latter tends to be regarded or experienced as nature.
1031
 We 
can determine our life to a point and we may even resort to ηέπκαζ in order to do it.  
We may therefore change, and change deeply. But what does this mean for the notion 
of θύζζξ? It may seem that in such a case there is no stable θύζζξ. However, the being in 
question and its variation may still be limited by some constitutive principles – i.e., by a 
                                                 
1029
 The concept of θύζζξ may thus assume a normative or prescriptive sense and designate the normal, healthy 
or perfect condition of something. This is a sense we often find in medicine. Here the body and its parts may 
move from or towards (πανά or ηαηά) their natural constitution. In this sense, a dislodged bone is something that 
is against “nature” and its reposition is a movement towards “nature”. For more on this and for bibliographical 
references, cp. M. MICHLER, op. cit. 
1030
 In this sense, θύζζξ is opposed to the idea of an expert knowledge (ηέπκδ) that intervenes in the natural 
course of things, and changes, adds or removes something in them. Φύζζξ is precisely associated with the 
immediate course of things, which may or may not contain limitations that require a technical intervention. As 
such, the word θύζζξ is also opposed to the ideas of practice, training or learning (ιεθέηδ, ἄζηδζζξ, πόκμξ, 
δζδαπή, and so on), insofar as the later always involve an artificial manipulation of things or of ourselves. 
1031
 Cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.2. 
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particular θύζζξ. In fact, the possibility of variations raises the question about whether or not 
there is a possible range of variation allowed by our inner constitution. We may doubt that 
there is such a thing as a “nature” (in particular a human nature), in the sense of a formal 
structure that can be found in different beings and determines their possibilities – and in 
particular the possibilities it should actualize in order to be a fulfilled being (to achieve its 
perfect condition). However, we must bear in mind that this nature may be understood in a 
very specific and closed sense (especially in what regards the perfect condition of something) 
or in a more open and less restrictive sense. Furthermore, the nature of a particular being or 
kind of beings is not necessarily something that can be easily identified. Often, if not always, 
the opposite is the case. As Heraclitus says, “nature is wont to hide herself”.
1032
 It is 
constitutively problematic and determining it requires much effort and examination. 
This is all the more valid for the kind of being that we are. There are many individual 
and cultural differences between human beings, so it is not clear what is our common nature 
– i.e., what makes us what we are or what determines our range of possibilities. At first it is 
not even clear that there is such a thing as a human nature, or that it is not something vague 
and unspecific. So what exactly is a human being and how can we determine it? We may find 
some meaningful indications for this problem if we briefly consider the Greek understanding 
of the term ἄκενςπμξ and how it relates to the discovery of the unity of all humankind. The 
definition of human being played an important role in pre-Platonic thinking and it strongly 
resonates in Plato. So let us then see the most important traits of the notion of ἄκενςπμξ. 
As a term for the species, ἄκενςπμξ is opposed to the regular identification of an 
individual as a member of a social group or a tribe. In the Ancient world, the fundamental 
distinctions were the ones between tribes, between an “us” and a “them”, and not so much 
those between human beings and other beings. One was primarily a member of a tribe, and 
the latter determined how one should think and how one should live. One had to conform to a 
shared way of thinking and living. Only by doing so could one be acknowledged and deemed 
worthy. There was no idea of all human beings having an intrinsic dignity. Dignity was 
restricted to the tribe.
1033
 However, even the tribe was not regarded as homogeneous and the 
main category of identification was in fact restricted to a particular kind of member of the 
tribe: the ἀκήν, i.e., the free male, the full citizen, who shares the common understanding of 
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 See DK B123: “θύζζξ ηνύπηεζεαζ θζθε῔.” 
1033
 One could perhaps recognize dignity in some strangers (λέκμζ), although this is only guaranteed by the 
individuals who receive them in the πόθζξ (i.e., by their θίθμξ). As for other categories, such as one‟s race or 
Greek identity, they were rather vague and, at any rate, weaker than the identity of the πόθζξ.   
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what matters in life and is thus qualified to partake in common deliberations and common 
undertakings.
1034
 Moreover, one can still establish a difference of social standing between the 
so-called better and the vulgar men (the ἄνζζημζ and the θαῦθμζ), and only the former are men 
in the most proper sense. The notion of man in this pre-eminent sense is thus very far from 
the notion of a universal condition. Most people (including women, children or slaves) are 
excluded from the most important category. There are the highest representatives of the tribe 
and all others are inferior. In this sense, the default Greek understanding of human beings 
was male, aristocratic, and elitist. It was not concerned with the unity of all humankind and 
much less with the idea of all human beings having an intrinsic dignity. It was, therefore, 
very different from our modern understanding. 
However, this does not mean that the Greeks did not have a specific notion of human 
nature. We find in Greek literature, ever since Homer, some passages that recognize a shared 
identity that binds everybody together and constitutes a kind of community of all human 
beings. This common identity corresponds to a condition that is essentially marked by 
vulnerability and suffering. We find a striking illustration of this in the dialogue between 
Achilles and Priam in book XXIV of the Iliad.
1035
 Their condition as enemies is overcome by 
their shared suffering. Human beings are indeed mortals (εκδημί, ανμημί) and essentially 
defined by their mortality. They fall like leaves.
1036
 They are weak, feeble, frail and transient. 
Their life is shadowy and insubstantial. They are ἐθήιενμζ, which means both that they live 
but a day (i.e., are short-lived, can die at any second) and also that they are exposed to what 
the day brings, to all changes of fortune, which they cannot make “unhappen” (in fact, not 
even the gods are able to change what happened).
1037
 Their life is uncertain and they roam 
about aimlessly. Their condition is one of helplessness (ἀιδπακία). They must fight for their 
survival; they most take many pains (πόκμζ) in supplying for their needs; and they are always 
subject to the possibility of loss. Human life is full of pains and evils. As is said in the Iliad, 
“the gods [have] spun the thread for wretched mortals, that they should live in pain; and 
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 The ἀκήν is recognized by the others as being lucid or having θνόκδζζξ – i.e., as sharing the socially 
accepted version of truth. For more on this, cp. Chap. 7 Sect. 2.2 and Chap. 11 Sect. 2.3.  
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 See vv. 485ff. 
1036
 This was indeed a common topos. Cp. e.g. HOMER, Iliad VI.146-149 and ARISTOPHANES, Aves, 685-
687. Although the term used in both passages is ἀκήν, the identification in question is the one associated with 
the term ἄκενςπμξ. 
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 See e.g. PINDAR, Pythia 8.95f.: “ἐπάιενμζ· ηί δέ ηζξ; ηί δ‟ μὔ ηζξ; ζηζ᾵ξ ὄκαν/ ἄκενςπμξ.” For the meaning 
of ἐθήιενμξ, see e.g. H. FRÄNKEL, Man‟s “Ephemeros” Nature According to Pindar and Others, Transactions 
and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 77 (1946), 131-145, and M. DICKIE, On the 
Meaning of ἐθήιενμξ, Illinois Classical Studies 1 (1975) 7–14. As for the idea of not even a god being able to 
change the past, see the verses of Agathon quoted by Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics VI, 1139b10-11): “ιόκμο 





 In the Odyssey, it is said that “nothing feebler does earth 
nurture than man, of all things that on earth are breathing and moving”.
1039
 Our condition is 




 In sum, human beings are characterized by their limitations. Their power and reach is 
limited and they can achieve almost nothing of what they want. Their knowledge is also very 
limited. Human beings see to no avail, they cannot discern many things.
1041
 They do not 
know the past, they do not know the present, and they cannot anticipate the future.
1042
 Their 
supposed knowledge is no more than conjecture or opinion.
1043
 As a result, they commit 
many mistakes and are condemned to much roaming. To be sure, one can counteract these 
cognitive and practical limitations up to a point. We saw above that the self-presentation of 
the ηέπκαζ in the 5th century BCE emphasizes precisely how human beings can in a sense 
invent themselves, create a new and better life, by findings new insights into things and 
constituting new ηέπκαζ. This was so both in primitive times and at the time of the Sophists. 
Innovations bring better material conditions and allow human beings to live peacefully in 
πόθεζξ. It distinguishes human beings from beasts and savages. However, progress is still 
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 See XXIV.525f.: “ὡξ βὰν ἐπεηθώζακημ εεμὶ δεζθμ῔ζζ ανμημ῔ζζ/ γώεζκ ἀπκοιέκμζξ· α὎ημὶ δέ η᾽ ἀηδδέεξ εἰζί.” 
I use A. Murray‟s translation – see HOMER, The Iliad, 2 vols., Cambridge (MA)/London, Harvard University 
Press/William Heinemann, 1924. 
1039
 Cp. HOMER, Odyssey, XVIII.130-137: “(...) μ὎δὲκ ἀηζδκόηενμκ βα῔α ηνέθεζ ἀκενώπμζμ,/ πάκηςκ ὅζζα ηε 
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again A. Murray‟s translation – see HOMER, The Odyssey, 2 vols., Cambridge (MA)/London, Harvard 
University Press/William Heinemann, 1919. 
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 Cp. e.g. SOPHOCLES, Oedipus at Colonus, vv. 1225ff.: ιὴ θῦκαζ ηὸκ ἅπακηα κζ/ηᾶ θόβμκ· ηὸ δ᾽, ἐπεὶ 
θακῆ,/ α῅καζ ηε῔εεκ ὅεεκ πεν ἣ/ηεζ, πμθὺ δεύηενμκ, ὡξ ηάπζζηα.”  
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 Cp. e.g. AESCHYLUS, Prometheus vinctus, vv. 447-450: “μἳ πν῵ηα ιὲκ αθέπμκηεξ ἔαθεπμκ ιάηδκ,/ 
ηθύμκηεξ μ὎η ἢημομκ, ἀθθ᾽ ὀκεζνάηςκ/ ἀθίβηζμζ ιμνθα῔ζζ ηὸκ ιαηνὸκ αίμκ/ ἔθονμκ εἰηῆ πάκηα (...).” Although 
Prometheus is referring to the primitive human beings, the description also applies in a way to human beings in 
general (especially when one has no particular knowledge of ηέπκαζ).  
1042
 Knowing the past, the present and the future was indeed a proverbial form of expressing a knowledge of 
things far superior to the one human beings normally have (such as the knowledge of a soothsayer or of the 
Muses). Cp. e.g. HOMER, Iliad, I.70, and HESIOD, Theogonia, v. 38.  
1043
 See ALCMAEON, DK B1: “(...) πενὶ η῵κ ἀθακέςκ, πενὶ η῵κ εκδη῵κ ζαθήκεζακ ιὲκ εεμὶ ἔπμκηζ, ὡξ δὲ 
ἀκενώπμζξ ηεηιαίνεζεαζ (...).” See also XENOPHANES, DK B34: “ηαὶ ηὸ ιὲκ μὖκ ζαθὲξ μὔηζξ ἀκὴν βέκεη‟ 
μ὎δέ ηζξ ἔζηαζ/ εἰδὼξ ἀιθὶ εε῵κ ηε ηαὶ ἅζζα θέβς πενὶ πάκηςκ·/ εἰ βὰν ηαὶ ηὰ ιάθζζηα ηύπμζ ηεηεθεζιέκμκ 
εἰπώκ,/ α὎ηὸξ ὅιςξ μ὎η μἶδε· δόημξ δ‟ επὶ π᾵ζζ ηέηοηηαζ.” For a brief analysis of the latter passage, cp. Chap. 7 
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limited by things that cannot be overcome – in particular sickness and death. One is still very 
far from living a life of ease, as the one the gods have.
1044
 
 All this outlines a scale of beings and determines the particular place of human beings 
in the cosmos. Humans are contrasted with animals, which are very limited by their lack of 
ηέπκαζ. A human being is thus a risen animal.
1045
 This superiority is often expressed by the 
idea that human beings alone of the animals possess a certain important characteristic – such 
as justice or intelligence.
1046
 On the other hand, human beings are also contrasted with the 
gods, who are taken as the ideal mode of being or the standard of perfection. The gods are 
immortal (ἀεάκαημζ) and live at ease (ῥε῔α γώμκηεξ).
1047
 Human beings are separated from 
them by an abyss. This is so in Archaic times and even later, when both conditions come 
closer and the rigid boundaries between humans and gods are somewhat undone. Pindar, for 
instance, emphasizes their common origin and how humans can resemble gods.
1048
 Human 
beings will even be regarded as fallen gods, who desire to become divine again. One may 




Human beings are thus something in between animals and gods, and their relation to 
their own condition is one of dissatisfaction. They long for much more. They desire to be like 
the gods, which only makes matters worse. Not only can such high ambitions be the cause of 
much frustration, but if one becomes confident of being able to achieve all one wants, one 
may awake divine ill-will (θεόκμξ), or simply commit errors that cause great damage. In 
other words, one may overreach and thereby become the cause of one‟s undoing. Hence we 
find in Greek culture many warnings against high expectations and overconfidence. One is 
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 For a consideration of these praises of the ηέπκαζ and for bibliographical references, see Chap. 1 Sect. 2.2 
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 At this stage of Greek culture there is no exaltation of animals as we find in many animist cultures, in which 
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brutes. For more on this, see e.g. R. RENEHAN, The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man, Harvard Studies in 
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πμθθὸκ ἀνίζηδ/ βίκεηαζ (...).” Cp. also ALCMAEON DK B2: “ἄκενςπμκ βάν θδζζ η῵κ ἄθθςκ δζαθένεζκ ὅηζ 
ιόκμκ λοκίδζζ, ηὰ δ‟ ἄθθα αἰζεάκεηαζ ιέκ, μ὎ λοκίδζζ δέ.” For more on this, see e.g. R. RENEHAN, op. cit., and 
S. NEWMYER, The Animal and the Human in Ancient and Modern Thought. The “Man Alone of the Animals” 
Concept, Abingdon/New York, 2017.   
1047
 See e.g. Iliad III.298, 3.308, 6.138, Odyssey IV.805, V.122.  
1048
 See Nemea 6.1-2: “ἓκ ἀκδν῵κ, ἓκ εε῵κ βέκμξ· ἐη ιζ᾵ξ δὲ πκέμιεκ/ ιαηνὸξ ἀιθόηενμζ (...).” 
1049
 The continuation of Pindar‟s ode confirms precisely this. See vv. 2-7: “(...) δζείνβεζ δὲ π᾵ζα ηεηνζιέκα/ 
δύκαιζξ, ὡξ ηὸ ιὲκ μ὎δέκ, ὁ δὲ/ πάθηεμξ ἀζθαθὲξ αἰὲκ ἕδμξ/ ιέκεζ μ὎νακόξ. ἀθθά ηζ πνμζθένμιεκ ἔιπακ ἠ 
ιέβακ/ κόμκ ἢημζ θύζζκ ἀεακάημζξ,/ ηαίπεν ἐθαιενίακ μ὎η εἰδόηεξ μ὎δὲ ιεηὰ κύηηαξ/ ἄιιε πόηιμξ/ ἅκηζκ᾽ 
ἔβναρε δναιε῔κ πμηὶ ζηάειακ.” 
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In sum, the Archaic Greek understanding of human being was very pessimistic. 
Human condition was not characterized by dignity. In fact, ἄκενςπμξ is a disparaging or 
offensive term.
1051
 It indicates the lowliness or weakness of our condition. Despite all the 
differences that may exist between different human beings, one is always nothing more than a 
human being – and one should be very aware of it. This is, in its most fundamental traits, the 
Archaic understanding of what characterizes a human being as such, and we will find strong 
echoes of it in Plato‟s anthropology.  
However, this is not the whole story. In the 5th century, with the development of 
ηέπκαζ and new forms of knowledge, a new vision of the human being emerged. History, 
medicine and other disciplines began to consider human being in a more neutral way. The 
idea of humanity will no longer by essentially defined by its frailty, which to a certain extent 
can be overcome. Human beings are rather defined by having a particular inner constitution. 
Human physiology and psychological motivations became more important in defining the 
unity of humankind. It is also something of the sort that we will find in Plato. He analyzes 
human beings from a neutral standpoint, even if the Archaic understanding of our own frailty 
and our longing for more also resonate in his analyses.
1052
  
So what is then common to all human beings according to Plato? What is human 
nature? What constitutes it? And how does this determine the contraction of possibilities that 
corresponds to the notion of αίμξ? How does it outline different ways of life? 
                                                 
1050
 This is precisely what characterizes the wisdom of Delphos and tragic wisdom, as we saw above. Cp. Chap. 
2, Sects. 1.1 and 1.3. We should accept our condition and think mortal thoughts. On the idea of thinking mortal 
thoughts (εκδηὰ θνμκε῔κ), cp. e.g. SOPHOCLES, fr. 590, EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 773-804 and Bacchae 386-401. 
1051
 This resonates in its use as a vocative, which is actually pretty common in the Platonic corpus (see e.g. Ap. 
28b, Prt. 330d, Smp. 206c).  
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The problematic conception of human being as ροπή 
 
 
“ροπ῅ξ πείναηα ἰὼκ μ὎η ἂκ ἐλεύνμζμ, π᾵ζακ ἐπζπμνεοόιεκμξ ὁδόκ·  
μὕης ααεὺκ θόβμκ ἔπεζ”.  
Heraclitus, DK B45 
 
 
What is a human being (ἄκενςπμξ)? We find precisely this question in Alcibiades I, 
along with some suggested answers. Socrates inquires whether the human being is the body, 
the ροπή or the two of them together (ζοκαιθόηενμκ), i.e., the whole thing (ηὸ ὅθμκ).
1053
 This 
formulation of the question shows that we have some kind of relation both to the ζ῵ια and to 
the ροπή, and that they constitute some kind of whole. It is not a question of having or not 
having a body, nor is it a matter of having or not a non-bodily element. It is an established 
fact that we have them. But this fact is not sufficient to account for our being, because it does 
not show how these elements are constituted, interconnected and what exactly is the center 
that holds everything together. Socrates goes on to identify the human being with the 
ροπή.
1054
 This does not mean that there is no body or that we have no relation to it, for 
precisely what proves that we are a ροπή is the fact that the latter uses and controls the 
body.
1055
 In other words, the ροπή is intrinsically referred to the body. But let us leave aside 
Socrates‟ arguments for now. The important thing here is how, according to this conception, 
the body does not lie at the center of our being, but is rather on the periphery of ourselves. 
This may be surprising. The body is something we seem to know very well. We can touch it, 
feel it, and it is normally not mistaken for something else or seen as particularly mysterious. 
Thus, we tend to identify ourselves with it. But here there is a different protagonist: that 
which Plato calls ροπή. We are something that surpasses or transcends the body. Each human 
                                                 
1053
 Cp. 129e-130a: “[΢Ω] ηί πμη᾽ μὖκ ὁ ἄκενςπμξ; (...) [΢Ω] ηαὶ ιὴκ ηόδε β᾽ μἶιαζ μ὎δέκα ἂκ ἄθθςξ μἰδε῅καζ. 
[ΑΛ] ηὸ πμ῔μκ; [΢Ω] ιὴ μ὎ ηνζ῵κ ἕκ βέ ηζ εἶκαζ ηὸκ ἄκενςπμκ. [ΑΛ] ηίκςκ; [΢Ω] ροπὴκ ἠ ζ῵ια ἠ 
ζοκαιθόηενμκ, ηὸ ὅθμκ ημῦημ. [ΑΛ] ηί ιήκ;” 
1054
 See 130c: “ἐπεζδὴ δ᾽ μὔηε ζ῵ια μὔηε ηὸ ζοκαιθόηενόκ ἐζηζκ ἄκενςπμξ, θείπεηαζ μἶιαζ ἠ ιδδὲκ αὔη᾽ εἶκαζ, 
ἠ εἴπεν ηί ἐζηζ, ιδδὲκ ἄθθμ ηὸκ ἄκενςπμκ ζοιααίκεζκ ἠ ροπήκ.” 
1055
 Cp. 129b-130c. 
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However, such a way of determining our own being or our θύζζξ is very far from 
settling the question, because ροπή is not something that can be easily identified and 
defined.
1057
 It is not immediately accessible. Rather, it is essentially invisible.
1058
 Then how 
can such a thing be discerned and understood? What is Plato referring to? At first, it is not 
easy to say, and the question is even more complicated for us nowadays, because of the 
subsequent history of philosophy. We tend to regard the opposition between body and ροπή 
as a metaphysical dualism, whereby we imagine ourselves looking at the body and the ροπή 
from the outside, as two different things, clearly distinguishable from one another. Such a 
dualism is full of problems and if this is what Plato has in mind, then we will be tempted to 
promptly dismiss it as naive and outdated. However, things may not be that simple. Plato may 
very well have something else in mind, and we will try to show how that is precisely the case. 
Plato understands ροπή primarily as an inner component of our own being, which means that 
it is something we experience from within, in the first-person perspective. Moreover, it is not 
easy to dissociate our ροπή from the body, as we will see. Thus, Plato‟s analyses cannot be 
reduced to a clear-cut dualism.    
In order to understand this, we may perhaps begin by considering the problem of how 
to translate ροπή. It is indeed difficult to find a proper rendering of the word in English 
because its semantic field does not entirely coincide with any of the words normally used to 
translate it. In fact, the usual renderings tend to obstruct our access to what Plato has in mind, 
but a consideration of their limitations may help put us in the right track.  
The most common translation of ροπή is “soul”, which is a word with strong religious 
and metaphysical connotations. When we talk about soul we tend to think of a simple, unitary 
substance that cannot be destroyed. It is divine and at least potentially in contact with god. It 
is also connected with our ultimate destiny or with what happens after dying. It can thus 
come close to the meaning of spirit or ghost. It is true that the word soul can also be linked 
with the idea of ethical value and moral judgment, and in this sense our soul is our moral self. 
Likewise, the word can be associated with feeling and with our emotional self. But what is 
                                                 
1056
 Cp. Lg. 959a-b: “(...) ροπὴκ ζώιαημξ εἶκαζ ηὸ π᾵κ δζαθένμοζακ, ἐκ α὎ηῶ ηε ηῶ αίῳ ηὸ πανεπόιεκμκ ἟ι῵κ 
ἕηαζημκ ημῦη᾽ εἶκαζ ιδδὲκ ἀθθ᾽ ἠ ηὴκ ροπήκ, ηὸ δὲ ζ῵ια ἰκδαθθόιεκμκ ἟ι῵κ ἑηάζημζξ ἕπεζεαζ (...).” 
1057
 We considered the notion very briefly above (cp. Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3), but now we have to consider it in more 
detail. 
1058
 Cp. e.g. Phd. 79b: “ηί δὲ ἟ ροπή; ὁναηὸκ ἠ ἀζδέξ;     μ὎π ὏π᾽ ἀκενώπςκ βε, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ἔθδ.     ἀθθὰ ιὴκ 
἟ιε῔ξ βε ηὰ ὁναηὰ ηαὶ ηὰ ιὴ ηῆ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ θύζεζ ἐθέβμιεκ· ἠ ἄθθῃ ηζκὶ μἴεζ;     ηῆ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ.     ηί μὖκ 
πενὶ ροπ῅ξ θέβμιεκ; ὁναηὸκ ἠ ἀόναημκ εἶκαζ;     μ὎π ὁναηόκ. ἀζδὲξ ἄνα;     καί.” 
374 
 
more promptly suggested by the word (especially in a philosophical context) is its religious 
and metaphysical sense – and ροπή in this sense is something whose existence is uncertain, to 
say the least.  
Now, although Plato at times considers the ροπή from these angles, the religious and 
metaphysical questions do not determine the primary layer of meaning of the word, but are 
rather something secondary and derivative, as we will see. Other aspects of ροπή are more 
decisive, and these aspects can perhaps be better rendered by other words. For instance, ροπή 
also designates that with which we think and know, and, in this sense, it is close in meaning 
to the notions of δζάκμζα or κμῦξ. Bearing this in mind, we could translate it as “mind”. But 
such a rendering tends to over-intellectualize the term ροπή, which is not only the seat of our 
conscious thoughts, but also the bearer of our perceptions, feelings and desires. Moreover, 
even if we take “mind” in a broader sense, to denote all our inner life, it still suggests the 
contemporary problematic of the mind-body relation, which usually adopts a materialistic 
approach and is therefore very far from the Platonic perspective and concerns. 
At any rate, the ροπή is essentially characterized by having some notion or even some 
sensation of things. Something appears to it, and to this extent we could perhaps render it as 
consciousness or wakefulness. However, this is once again a very unilateral way of 
translating the term, as it conceals a central component of ροπή. For us, words such as soul, 
mind or consciousness do not designate something intrinsically necessary to be alive or 
animated. Ψοπή, in turn, is first and foremost what enlivens or animates us. Ψοπή is life 
itself.
1059
 This may be taken in a primarily biological sense, but our life is not only something 
biological. It also has a biographical or existential character. We are interested in our life, we 
determine it in a certain way, and it has a certain content. Ψοπή may then refer to this. It may 
also denote our own character or personality. It is what justifies our behavior, and as such we 
could even translate it as “person” (at least if we put aside the philosophical and theological 
sense of the word and focus solely in its colloquial sense). 
However, in other cases the term has a more impersonal or abstract sense, and 
designates the entity that relates itself to itself – i.e., the self. There is indeed a constitutive 
splitting up of our being that provides us with self-awareness and reflexivity, and ροπή can 
designate this reflexive structure. In this sense, it can be used as a noun to replace the 
                                                 
1059
 Sometimes the term has this meaning, as can be seen in expressions such as δνόιμξ πενὶ ροπ῅ξ or 
θζθμροπία. The ροπή is also what is responsible for life. Plato emphasizes this several times. Cp. Cra. 399d and 
Phd. 105d. In this sense, it seems to be something concrete, non-metaphysical, organic or biological. It is what 
makes something a living being (a γῶμκ), and the latter is then qualified as being ἔιροπμξ (i.e., something that 
has a ροπή).  
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personal pronoun (ἐβώ) and the reflexive pronoun (α὎ηόξ).
1060
 It is the “thing” that we are. It 
differs from other things by being reflexive, though this does not mean that it is something to 
which we have a full access in introspection. It is not simply a correlate of an explicit       
self-reflection, but it is also present in our regular awareness of things or in the way we act 
and feel, so it not easy to fully isolate it and consider it by itself. 
In sum, ροπή is the bearer of mental functions (such as thinking, perceiving, desiring, 
feeling), the bearer of our character, the principle of life, and our own self. Ψοπή condensates 
all these functions and is not reduced to any of them. Furthermore, these are all facets of our 
being that we can easily recognize, so we can already see that ροπή is not simply a 
metaphysical entity whose existence we may doubt. It is a structural component of our being 
that accounts for the way we are and how we relate to ourselves and to other things. This is 
what Plato tries to determine. However, one may still not be convinced by all this. Hence, in 
order to better follow Plato‟s analyses of our being and also to understand why he called this 
essential part of our being “ροπή”, we will start by briefly considering the pre-Platonic 
history of the word. 
 
1. The pre-Platonic uses of the term ςπρή  
 
 The history of the term ροπή requires us to consider texts from fields as diverse as 
literature, religion, science and philosophy. Each of these areas has its own perspective or set 
of perspectives on life, and we will find echoes of all of them in Plato‟s analyses of ροπή. 
Hence, we must consider what is characteristic of each one, even if in a very brief and 
schematic manner. Our aim is indeed to identify some important aspects of the word ροπή, 
which will later help us better understand Plato‟s view of the human being.
1061
 
                                                 
1060
 For a consideration of the reflexive character of ροπή, cp. in particular E. HAVELOCK, The Socratic Self 
as it is Parodied in Aristophanes‟ Clouds, in: A. PARRY (ed.), Studies in Fifth-Century Thought and Literature, 
Cambridge, University Press, 1972. 
1061
 Much more detailed analyses of each stage of the Pre-Platonic history of ροπή can be found in the secondary 
literature on the theme, which is very vast and complex. See C. KEARY, The Homeric Words for “Soul”, Mind 
6 (1881), 471-483; E. ROHDE, Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen, 2 vols., Freiburg, 
Mohr, 1890-4; M. AQUINAS, The Pre-Socratic Use of υστή as a Term for the Principle of Motion, Diss. 
Washington D.C., 1915; J. BURNET, The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul, Proceedings of the British Academy 7 
(1915-16), 235-259; E. BICKEL, Homerischer Seelenglaube. Geschichtliche Grundzüge menschlicher 
Seelenvorstellungen, Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1926; J. BÖHME, Die 
Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos, Leipzig/Berlin, Teubner, 1929; M. HALBWACHS, La représentation 
de l‟ame chez les Grecs. Le double corporel et le double spirituel. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 37 
(1930), 493-534; A. DIHLE, Ψοπή in Greek World, in: TWNT, sub voce ροπή, ροπζηόξ, ἀκάρολζξ, ἀκαρύπς, 
δίροπμξ, ὀθζβόροπμξ; R. ONIANS, The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the 
World, Time, and Fate, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 1951; D. FURLEY, The Early History of 
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1.1. Ψπρή as a shade and the contrast with other psychic agents (Homeric poems) 
 
 The word ροπή plays an important role in the Iliad and the Odyssey. These works are 
not theoretical or conceptual, but they nonetheless express a certain understanding of ροπή 
and other related terms. This understanding is partly based on primitive beliefs, but it may 
also include poetical innovations, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between them. 
In fact, there are some important differences not only between the Iliad and Odyssey, but also 
between different passages within the same work (which may well mean that they correspond 
to different stages of composition). However, there is a fundamental coherence (at least with 
respect to ροπή and the psychological vocabulary at large) and this is what we will try to 
identify now. 
 The most important aspect of Homer‟s usage of the word ροπή is its restricted 
meaning. The ροπή is just one component of our being among many others and much of what 
is later encompassed by the word is here attributed to other inner entities. Thus, in order to 
comprehend the later developments, we must also consider the complex psychological 
vocabulary we find in the Homeric texts. But let us start with ροπή. It designates something 
that is lost or leaves the body at the moment of death, and that is at risk in moments of 
peril.
1062
 It does not seem to perform any particular role in life. In general, it is not noticed as 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Concept of Soul, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London 3 (1956), 1-18; E. 
HARRISON, Notes on Homeric Psychology, Phoenix 14 (1960), 63-80; A. ADKINS, From the Many to the 
One. A Study of Personality and Views of Human Nature in the Context of Ancient Greek Society, Values and 
Beliefs, London, Constable, 1970; H. INGENKAMP, Inneres Selbst und Lebensträger. Zur Einheit des      
ροπή-Begriffs, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 118 (1975), 48-61; S. DARCUS, A Person‟s Relation to 
ροπή in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek Lyric Poets, Glotta 57 (1979), 30-39; D. CLAUS, Toward the Soul. An 
Inquiry into the Meaning of ροπή before Plato, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1981; J. 
BREMMER, The Early Greek Concept of the Soul, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press, 1983; T. JAHN, 
Zum Wortfeld “Seele-Geist” in der Sprache Homers, München, Beck, 1987; M. FRAMPTON, Psyche in 
Ancient Greek Thought, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 31 (1988), 265-284; I. KALOGERAKOS, Seele 
und Unsterblichkeit. Untersuchungen zur Vorsokratik bis Empedokles, Stuttgart/Leipzig, Teubner, 1996; G. 
KATONA, The Evolution of the Concept of Psyche from Homer to Aristotle, Journal of Theoretical and 
Philosophical Psychology 22 (2002), 28-44; W. BURKERT, “Seele”, Mysterien und Mystik. Griechische 
Sonderwege und aktuelle Problematik, in W. JENS & B. SEIDENSTICKER (eds.), Ferne und Nähe der Antike, 
Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2003; H. LORENZ, Ancient Theories of Soul, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/ancient-soul/, October 2003, rev. April 2009 
(last consulted August 2017); D. FREDE & B. REIS (ed.), Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, Berlin/New 
York, De Gruyter, 2007; M. DAVIS, The Soul of the Greeks. An Inquiry, Chicago/London, The University of 
Chicago Press, 2011. 
1062
 The ροπή is described as leaving the body in passages such as Iliad V.196, 5.696, 14.518f., Odyssey 
XIV.134, etc. In Odyssey XXII.467 it is exhaled. Other times, it is said to be destroyed (see e.g. Iliad XIII.763). 
It is mentioned in contexts of danger in Iliad XXI.569, 22.161, and so on. It is thus intrinsically associated with 
the difference between life and death – which is also what is expressed by its possible etymologies. The word is 
either connected with breathing (which is essential for life) or with coldness or cooling (which characterizes the 
corpse). Cp. Cra. 399d-e. For more on the etymology, see e.g. E. BENVÉNISTE, Grec Ψοπή, Bulletin de la 
Société de Linguistique 33 (1932), 165-168; J. JOUANNA, Le souffle, la vie et le froid. Remarques sur la 
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such. After leaving the body, it is described as smoke, a shade or a dream image.
1063
 It 
resembles the person who died, it is a sort of double or a counterperson, but it has a 
considerably lesser degree of reality.
1064
 The real person is the body.
1065
 The ροπή by itself 
has no vitality and is usually witless or deprived of understanding.
1066
 It flutters and shrieks 
like a bat.
1067
 It is an unsubstantial and fading image of the dead. It may appear in dreams (as 
Patroclus to Achilles) and it is visible in Hades (as when Ulysses visits it), but it cannot be 
embraced.
1068
 The Underworld is indeed the place where it normally resides, but Homer‟s 
description of it is rather gloomy. It is a realm of shadows and much wailing.
1069
 Some ροπαί 
seem to keep doing what they did in life, but only Tiresias, an exceptional figure, retains his 
wits.
1070
 It is true that some other exceptional figures seem to avoid going to Hades and are 
rather taken to the Elysian Fields (which seems to correspond to the Isles of the Blessed), 
where they retain their body and thus the vitality and lucidity associated with it. In other 
words, they escape death. But this only applies to some heroes.
1071
 For most people, death is 
inevitable and the only way to partially defeat it is through immortal fame (ηθέμξ ἀεάκαημξ), 
though the latter is no more than an echo of one‟s life. 
 Ψοπή is thus something unsubstantial and almost irrelevant. We may need it in order 
to be alive, but nothing more. The particular functions of our psychological life are attributed 
to other psychic agents, which do not seem to have any clear relation to it. Hence, many have 
distinguished two different kinds of soul: the free soul (corresponding to ροπή) and the body 
soul. The latter may still be divided into life soul (which sustains one‟s life) and ego soul 
(which performs the functions associated with conscious life). The ego soul, in particular, 
                                                                                                                                                        
famille de ρύπς d‟Homère à Hippocrate, Revue des Études Grecques 100 (1987), 203-224; P.-A. MUMM & S. 
RICHTER, Die Etymologie von griechisch ροπή, International Journal of Diachronic Linguistics and 
Linguistic Reconstruction 5 (2008), 33-108. 
1063
 For its description as smoke, see e.g. Iliad, XXIII.100f. For its comparison to a shade (ζηζή), cp. e.g. 
Odyssey X.495 and XI.207. In the latter passage it is also compared to a dream. 
1064
 In this sense, it is also described as a εἴδςθμκ – i.e., an image, a simulacrum or a ghost. See e.g. 23.104. 
Apollodorus says in this respect that Homer “[὏]πμηίεεηαζ βὰν ηὰξ ροπὰξ ημ῔ξ εἰδώθμζξ ημ῔ξ ἐκ ημ῔ξ ηαηόπηνμζξ 
θαζκμιέκμζξ ὁιμίαξ, ηαὶ ημ῔ξ δζὰ η῵κ ὏δάηςκ ζοκζζηαιέκμζξ, ἃ ηαεάπαλ ἟ι῔κ ἐλείηαζηαζ ηαὶ ηὰξ ηζκήζεζξ 
ιζιε῔ηαζ, ζηενεικζώδε δ‟ ὏πόζηαζζκ μ὎δειίακ ἔπεζ εἰξ ἀκηίθδρζκ ηαὶ ἁθὴκ, ὅεεκ α὎ηὰξ ανμη῵κ εἴδςθα ηαιόκηςκ 
θέβεζ.” See fr. 10 in: K. MÜLLER, Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, vol. 1, Paris, Didot, 1853. 
1065
 Cp. the contrast in Iliad I.1-5 between the ροπαί Achilles sent to Hades and the persons themselves (α὎ημί) 
that were left as spoils for dogs and birds. 
1066
 See e.g. Iliad XVI.856f., 23.104. 
1067
 Cp. Odyssey X.495 and XXIV.1-9. 
1068
 See Iliad XXIII.97-100, Odyssey XI.207f. 
1069
 See e.g. Achilles‟ lamentation at Odyssey XI.482-491. 
1070
 See Odyssey X.490-495. 
1071
 See Odyssey IV.561-569. Cp. HESIOD, Opera et dies, 167-173. 
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corresponds to the self that is active in the embodied life.
1072
 This self is referred to different 
agents, which have different features, but are to a certain extent interchangeable with respect 
to the functions they perform. Some of these agents correspond to soul organs and have both 
a physiological and a mental side – though the distinction between these two sides was not 
very rigorous. Similarly imprecise was the differentiation between cognitive, practical and 
emotional functions. The three kinds of function were seen as constitutively intertwined and 
therefore not strictly distinguished. But still the Homeric texts distinguish multiple inner 
agents. This does not mean (as some have defended) that the human being is conceived as a 
mere aggregate of entities that do not constitute a real unity.
1073
 They are always part of the 
same individual. However, there is a sensitivity to inner differences that goes far beyond the 
dualism of body and soul. Instead of identifying just two components of our being, Homer 
identifies many, thereby showing that there can be other ways of looking at what we are. 
 Some of the agents identified by Homer (or the Homeric texts) will also play an 
important role in Plato, though in the texts of the latter these agents will be understood in a 
more restricted sense. In Homer, they have many uses and it is difficult to systematize them. 
Θύιμξ, for instance, is one of the most important terms in this context. Sometimes it is 
described as leaving the body, just like ροπή. It seems to be material, though it does not seem 
to have a specific location in the body. It is also unclear whether it is blood-like or breath-
like. At any rate, it appears to be intrinsically associated with one‟s emotions and also with 
deliberation. It manifests itself especially when one goes through intense experiences. It has 
energy, it must be nourished, and it can have knowledge or even forebode something. It is 
often personified and one can relate oneself to one‟s own εοιόξ. 
Another important psychological term is θνήκ. It designates both a bodily organ 
(though it is not clear which one) and a function.
1074
 As a function, θνήκ seems to correspond 
to one‟s wits. It is associated with emotions, plans, behavior, moral character and language. 
In a more specific sense, it can designate one‟s capacity to think clearly or to deliberate, and 
also one‟s capacity to think in a prolonged sense. Νόμξ, in turn, is not conceived as 
something material and denotes only a function – particularly the function of thinking. 
                                                 
1072
 For more on this nomenclature, see E. ARBMAN, Untersuchungen zur primitiven Seelenvorstellungen mit 
besonderer Rücksicht auf Indien, Monde Oriental 20 (1926) 85-222, and 21 (1927) 1-185. Cp. also J. 
BREMMER, op. cit., 9ff. 
1073
 Cp. B. SNELL, Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den 






 The θνήκ has indeed been associated with the chest, the pericardium, the lungs, and the diaphragm. For 
more on this, see e.g. S. SULLIVAN, Psychological Activity in Homer. A Study of Phren, Ottawa, Carleton 
University Press, 1988, 21ff. 
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However, it does not designate an ethereal thinking. It is mainly the perception or 
understanding of the meaning of a situation. It can also designate a plan of action. It is 
usually instantaneous, but it can also refer to a permanent perspective (such as one‟s attitude, 
way of thinking or customs).
1075
 In contrast, the other psychic agents identified in the 
Homeric texts do not seem to have an intellectual content. Ἦημν, η῅ν and ηναδίδ designate 
the heart, and especially the two latter can also designate one‟s strength or courage. We could 
perhaps also include in this list the term ιέκμξ, which denotes one‟s force or even warrior 
rage, but it does not seem to designate a psychic agent as such.
1076
 
As can be seen, these different agents are intrinsically associated with one‟s 
experience of the world and one‟s intervention in it. They usually become manifest in more 
intense moments, probably because that is when our inner life becomes more patent to us. 
They seem to be to a great extent reactive and that, along with their multiplicity, has lead 
some interpreters to wonder if Homer had any conception of individual will or of a capacity 
to make decisions.
1077
 The problem is all the more complicated if we consider the influence 
the gods may have in human life, though this influence does not seem to entirely remove 
one‟s merit and the responsibility for one‟s action.
1078
 Both things appear to be somehow 
compatible – precisely because what characterizes the Homeric view of mental or psychic life 
is the constitutive intertwinement of different elements that were seen as distinct at a later 
time. In Homer, the human being is seen as a system of forces that encompasses the different 
inner agents and also the external influences. One component may predominate in a particular 





                                                 
1075
 For more on the Homeric sense of κμῦξ, see in particular K. von FRITZ, Νόμξ and κμε῔κ in the Homeric 
Poems, Classical Philology 38 (1943), 79-93, and IDEM, Νμῦξ, Νμε῔κ, and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras). Part I: From the Beginnings to Parmenides, Classical Philology 40 (1945), 
223-242. 
1076
 For more on these terms and their use in Homer, see the already cited works of J. Böhme, R. Onians, D. 
Furley, E. Harrison, D. Claus, J. Bremmer, and T. Jahn.  
1077
 Cp. e.g. B. SNELL, Das Bewußtsein von eigenen Entscheidungen im frühen Griechentum, Philologus 85 
(1930), 141-158. For a different view, see e.g. A. SCHMITT, Selbstständigkeit und Abhängigkeit menschlischen 
Haldelns bei Homer. Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Psychologie Homers, Mainz/Stuttgart, Akademie der 
Wissenschaften und der Literatur/Franz Steiner, 1990. 
1078
 For more on this, see e.g. A. ADKINS, Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1960 (repr. 1975), 1-60. 
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1.2. New conceptions of life and death (Pythagoras, Empedocles and the 
Mysteries) 
 
 In Homer, our real self was the embodied self and death was conceived as a 
diminished form of being. But later the conceptions of life and death changed considerably, 
in connection with a new kind of religiosity or a new spirituality. We find an expression of 
these changes in Pre-Socratic thinkers like Pythagoras and Empedocles, as well as in the 
Eleusinian, Dionysian and Orphic Mysteries. We do not know much about these thinkers and 
these religions. The sources are sparse, and our access is often indirect and mediated by later 
authors (including Plato). Although in many cases the term ροπή is not employed to 
designate the part of our being that survives death, the developments introduced nevertheless 
had an effect on the concept of ροπή, and therefore it is important to consider them. 
 Pythagoras is very important in this context, because of his belief that the soul 
transmigrates and reincarnates.
1079
 Xenophanes tells in one of his fragments that Pythagoras 
recognized the ροπή of a dear friend in the yelp of a dog being beaten.
1080
 He was also said to 
remember his past lives.
1081
 One‟s being is therefore not restricted to the present embodied 
existence. Empedocles too speaks of having lived many different lives and remembering 
them.
1082
 He describes himself as a wandering spirit and a fallen deity (δαίιςκ) which was 
cast out or exiled as a punishment for an old crime.
1083
 A similar conception seems to be at 
the center of the Mysteries.
1084
 The soul or our inner being committed a sin and is now 
incarcerated in the body, which is a sort of prison that restricts the soul‟s activity or vitality. 
The body is also compared to a tomb in which the soul is buried.
1085
 Life is thus an inferior 
form of being and, in this sense, a kind of death.
1086
 It is subordinated to something else, to a 
different and superior state one should be looking forward to.  
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 Herodotus is probably referring to him and his followers in Historiae, II, 123 (which is also fr. DK 1). 
1080
 See DK B7: “ηαὶ πμηέ ιζκ ζηοθεθζγμιέκμο ζηύθαημξ πανζόκηα/θαζὶκ ἐπμζηη῔ναζ ηαὶ ηόδε θάζεαζ ἔπμξ·/ 
„παῦζαζ ιδδὲ ῥάπζγ‟, ἐπεὶ ἤ θίθμο ἀκένμξ ἐζηίκ/ροπή, ηὴκ ἔβκςκ θεεβλαιέκδξ ἀίςκ.‟ ” 
1081
 Cp. DK 8. 
1082
 See DK B117 and B129. 
1083
 See DK B115. 
1084
 Cp. PINDAR, fr. 133: “μἶζζ δὲ Φενζεθόκα πμζκὰκ παθαζμῦ πέκεεμξ/ δέλεηαζ, ἐξ ηὸκ ὕπενεεκ ἅθζμκ ηείκςκ 
ἐκάηῳ ἔηεζ/ ἀκδζδμ῔ ροπὰξ πάθζκ, ἐη η᾵κ ααζζθ῅εξ ἀβαομί/ ηαὶ ζεέκεζ ηναζπκμὶ ζμθίᾳ ηε ιέβζζημζ/ ἄκδνεξ 
αὔλμκη‟· ἐξ δὲ ηὸκ θμζπὸκ πνόκμκ ἣνμεξ ἁ/βκμζ πνὸξ ἀκενώπςκ ηαθ<έμκ>ηαζ.” 
1085
 We find in Plato several echoes of the idea that the body is a prison or a tomb. Cp. Cra. 400c, Grg. 493a, 
Phd. 62b, 82e, 92a. 
1086
 We find an expression of a similar idea in EURIPIDES, fr. 638 (quoted in Grg. 492e): “ηίξ δ‟ μἶδεκ εἰ ηὸ γ῅κ 
ιέκ ἐζηζ ηαηεακε῔κ, ηὸ ηαηεακε῔κ δὲ γ῅κ ηάης κμιίγεηαζ;”  
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 This other state and the elevation of our being that it entails is up to a point something 
one can experience (or something we can catch a glimpse of) during life. In certain states, the 
soul seems to detach itself from the body and exist only by itself. This is the case of sleep and 
dreams.
1087
 Something similar seems to happen when one is in a state of trance or ecstasy. 
There are multiple examples of this, from shamans to the Dionysian initiates. The latter, for 
instance, have an experience of intoxication and delirium in which they seem to come into 
contact with their delivering god. This and other similar experiences thus allowed to bridge 
the abyss that separated human beings from the divine. At the same time, they were 
interpreted as revealing the presence in us of an occult self, which is normally not active in 
life, and which will be fully released at death. 
 However, one is not guaranteed to reach a free and superior condition after dying. 
One‟s “salvation” depends on whether one purifies oneself during life. The purification is 
here conceived in ritualistic and ascetic terms. It requires mortification and stripping off of 
one‟s personality. This is an essential part of the initiation in the mysteries. Additionally, 
initiation will include an experience or an affect (a παεε῔κ, as Aristotle says).
1088
 It brings 
about an altered state of mind, which will change one‟s attitude towards life and death. One is 
then supposed to remember this experience, even after death.
1089
 Those who do so will have a 
lot different from those who did not go through initiation or did not remember.
1090
 A better 
destiny after death is reserved only to a few, but one can become one of these few if one 
follows the precepts of one‟s sect or religion.  
After dying, the initiated will be in a state of happiness or bliss, although it is not clear 
what such a state amounts to. It is also not clear just how personal or individual this         
post-mortem state is. In the process of purification one gets rid of much of one‟s individuality 
                                                 
1087
 Cp. PINDAR, fr. 131b: “ζ῵ια ιὲκ πάκηςκ ἕπεηαζ εακάηῳ πενζζεεκε῔,/ γςὸκ δ‟ ἔηζ θείπεηαζ αἰ῵κμξ 
εἴδς/θμκ· ηὸ βάν ἐζηζ ιόκμκ/ ἐη εε῵κ· εὕδεζ δὲ πναζζόκηςκ ιεθέςκ, ἀηὰν ε὏/δόκηεζζζκ ἐκ πμθθμ῔ξ ὀκείνμζξ/ 
δείηκοζζ ηενπκ῵κ ἐθένπμζζακ παθεπ῵κ ηε ηνίζζκ.” 
1088
 See fr. 15 from Aristotle‟s Πενὶ θζθμζμθίαξ, in: V. ROSE (ed.), Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum 
fragmenta, Leipzig, Teubner, 1886 (re-ed. Stuttgart, Teubner, 1967): “ηαεάπεν Ἀνζζημηέθδξ ἀλζμ῔ ημὺξ 
ηεθμοιέκμοξ μ὎ ιαεε῔κ ηζ δε῔κ ἀθθὰ παεε῔κ ηαὶ δζαηεε῅καζ, δδθμκόηζ βεκμιέκμοξ ἐπζηδδείμοξ.” For more on this, 
see e.g. Y. USTINOVA, To Live in Joy and Die With Hope. Experiential Aspects of Ancient Greek Mystery 
Rites, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 56 (2013), 105-123. 
1089
 On the topic of keeping memory after death, cp. ORPHEUS, fr. DK B17: “ε὏νήζζεζξ δ‟ Ἀίδαμ δόιςκ ἐπ‟ 
ἀνζζηενὰ ηνήκδκ,/ παν‟ δ‟ α὎η῅ζ θεοηὴκ ἑζηδηο῔ακ ηοπάνζζζμκ·/ ηαύηδξ η῅ξ ηνήκδξ ιδδὲ ζπεδὸκ ἐιπεθάζεζαξ./ 
ε὏νήζεζξ δ‟ ἑηένακ, η῅ξ Μκδιμζύκδξ ἀπὸ θίικδξ/ ροπνὸκ ὕδςν πνμνέμκ· θύθαηεξ δ‟ ἐπίπνμζεεκ ἔαζζκ/ εἰπε῔κ· 
„Γ῅ξ πα῔ξ εἰιζ ηαὶ Ο὎νακμῦ ἀζηενόεκημξ,/ α὎ηὰν ἐιμὶ βέκμξ μ὎νάκζμκ· ηόδε δ‟ ἴζηε ηαὶ α὎ημί·/ δίρδζ δ‟ εἰι(ὶ) 
αὔδ ηαὶ ἀπόθθοιαζ· ἀθθὰ δόη‟ αἶρα/ ροπνὸκ ὕδςν πνμνέμκ η῅ξ Μκδιμζύκδξ ἀπὸ θίικδξ‟./ ηα὎<ημί ζμ>ζ 
δώζμοζζ πζε῔κ εείδξ ἀπ<ὸ ηνήκ> δξ,/ ηαὶ ηόη‟ ἔπεζη‟ ἄ<θθμζζζ ιεε‟> ἟νώεζζζ ἀκάλεζξ.” 
1090
 Cp. Homeric Hymn to Demeter, vv. 480-2: “ὄθαζμξ, ὃξ ηάδ᾽ ὄπςπεκ ἐπζπεμκίςκ ἀκενώπςκ·/ ὃξ δ᾽ ἀηεθὴξ 
ἱεν῵κ ὅξ η᾽ ἄιιμνμξ, μὔ πμε᾽ ὁιμίςκ/ αἶζακ ἔπεζ θείιεκόξ πεν ὏πὸ γόθῳ ε὎νώεκηζ.” The edition used here is T. 







and humanity. So what is left? And exactly what role does this relatively impersonal part of 
ourselves play in our life? The extant texts do not say much about this, but we can see that the 
way they conceive of our being is very different from what we may more immediately think 
about ourselves. We are not our body, but rather something more, something imprisoned 
within us, on whose release we must work, thereby abandoning much of our normal state and 
our normal life.    
  
1.3. Ψπρή, matter and θόζκνο (Pre-Socratics and Medical Writers) 
 
 A very different perspective on the ροπή (and whose development is to a large extent 
contemporary to the views we just considered) can be found in the fragments of the so-called 
Pre-Socratics. They developed physical and cosmological speculations, and their inquiries are 
usually concerned with the first principle (ἀνπή) of everything. They strived to reach an     
all-encompassing view of the whole of reality, and ροπή is then considered as one more thing 
within this whole. It is primarily conceived in physical terms, as a life force or as what 
animates and sustains the body. It is what makes the body ἔιροπμξ (ensouled – i.e., animated, 
alive). Some thinkers even associated all kinds of movement in nature with some sort of ροπή 
and regarded many things (perhaps even the entire ηόζιμξ) as a psychic entity.
1091
 In other 
cases, the ultimate principles of reality were conceived in psychological terms. Anaxagoras, 
for instance, speaks of a cosmic κμῦξ, which orders and governs everything.
1092
 Empedocles, 
in turn, considers love and strife the main principles of everything.
1093
 The boundaries 
between physical and psychical features become thus somewhat blurry. 
 Leaving this aside and considering only the human ροπή, we see that the latter is here 
conceived as a kind of matter (following the general materialistic tendency of this kind of 
inquiry) and hence as something homogeneous to the ηόζιμξ at large. Some thinkers argue 
that it is made of air, fire, blood, or atoms.
1094
 One could then say that this material ροπή is in 
a way immortal, insofar as its elements are eternal, but its existence as a ροπή depends on a 
                                                 
1091
 Thales, for instance, apparently considered that the magnet has a ροπή, since it can move something else. 
See DK A22. 
1092
 Cp. DK B12, B13. 
1093
 Cp. DK B16-36. 
1094
 For the conception of ροπή as being made of air, cp. fr. DK B2 of Anaximenes and fr. DK B4-5 of Diogenes 
of Apollonia. See also fr. DK B29 of Anaximander. Heraclitus and others seem to have associated ροπή with 
fire. Cp. e.g. HIPPASUS, DK 9. For the idea that ροπή is related to water, see HIPPON, DK A3, and for its 
association with blood, cp. CRITIAS, DK A23. Democritus, in turn, appears to have believed that it was 
composed of atoms. See DK A1, sect. 44. The sources for these conceptions are somewhat questionable, but it 
seems clear that there was a strong tendency to conceive the ροπή in material terms. 
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certain arrangement of bodily factors. According to some sources, one‟s soul or one‟s mind 
seems to be described precisely as a particular blending of material elements. Philolaus is 
supposed to have conceived it as an attunement (ἁνιμκία) of opposite elements.
1095
 
Parmenides emphasizes how the mixture of the bodily members determines one‟s mind.
1096
 
The dependence of one‟s mental states on the body is also an important feature of the medical 
understanding of human beings. Mental disorders (which affect one‟s sensations, emotions 
and intelligence) are the result of internal bodily disorders.
1097
 In general, the balance or 
imbalance of elements determine one‟s ροπή, which is no longer an occult self. The Homeric 
ghost is now intrinsically linked with the body, and through the body it is also related to 
everything else in the ηόζιμξ. It can be directly affected by things and it can become aware 
of them or perceive them in virtue of having a constitution similar to theirs.
1098
  
 This will influence Plato‟s analyses. Although he does not conceive the ροπή in 
material terms, he will also consider the connection between ροπή and things in general. But 
before returning to the Platonic corpus, there is still one last stage in the history of the term 
ροπή that we must consider. 
 
1.4. Ψπρή as the seat of all mental life (lyric, tragedy, comedy, historiography, 
etc.)  
 
 We find a different and meaningful understanding of ροπή in lyric, tragedy, comedy, 
as well as in the historians and orators. Ψοπή now incorporates all the Homeric inner agents 
and their functions. It becomes the seat or bearer of all elements of our personality and of our 
conscious life in general. Our feelings, our actions and our knowledge are all attributed to 
ροπή, and the latter constitutes our individuality. Our ροπή is what we are; it is the core of 
our being. The term can even be used along with a genitive of person as a periphrasis for the 
person itself.
1099
 It is also something one can address or by which one can be            
                                                 
1095
 Cp. DK A23. 
1096
 See DK B16. 
1097
 See, for instance, the arguments presented in HIPPOCRATES, De morbo sacro. For more on this, see e.g. 
B. GUNDERT, Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine, in: P. POTTER & J. WRIGHT (ed.), Psyche and 
Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 2000, 13-35. 
1098
 Indeed, the conception of the ροπή and its ability to know things is sometimes expressly based on the like-
to-like principle. For more on this principle, see e.g. C. MÜLLER, Gleiches zum Gleichen. Ein Prinzip 
frühgriechischen Denkens, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1965.  
1099
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Hecuba, 87-89. 
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addressed – especially in moments of extraordinary tension.
1100
 Unlike what we saw in 
Homer, the term no longer has a connotation of danger, but it still seems to designate an 
obscure part of us, whose presence is particularly felt in moments of grief, distress, 
lamentation, or rejoicing and delight.
1101
 In general, the ροπή is strongly connected with the 
practical domain. It is marked by desires – especially those that aim at material gratification 
(such as food, drink and sexual pleasure).
1102
 It is something that makes plans and 
deliberates.
1103
 It is also that by which we one acts. It can mean heart, spirit, courage, and in 
general it designates what exerts itself in action.
1104
 It can even correspond to one‟s 
personality, and in this sense it can be qualified in different ways.
1105
 In particular, it can be 
virtuous or excellent.
1106
 Finally, the term ροπή can come to have a less practical and more 
intellectual sense. Ψοπαί not only deliberate, but they have knowledge and intelligence, and 
they desire to know.
1107
 
 In this context, ροπή is something over which one has some control, that can be 
guided, kept away from things and trained. One can manipulate the ροπή or care for it. 
Medicine will thus consider how different therapeutic regimens affect one‟s ροπή, Damon 
will try to shape one‟s moral character through music, and Gorgias will determine how to 
influence one‟s ροπή through θόβμξ.
1108
 But the ροπή (and, more precisely, its habits and its 
character) can also have effects on the body. In fact, it may even be regarded as what 
determines one‟s destiny. Democritus, for instance, said that the ροπή is the dwelling of the 
δαίιςκ – i.e., of the principle that determines the course of one‟s life and its value.
1109
 The 
notion of ροπή had thus acquired a new meaning, which is indeed decisive for the 
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 Cp. e.g. PINDAR, Pythia 6.60f. 
1101
 Cp. e.g. SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, 63-64, and PINDARUS, Pythia 4.121-123. 
1102
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Persae, 840-842; EURIPIDES, Cyclops, 340f., and fr. 323. 
1103
 See e.g. ANTIPHON, Tetralogia 3, 1.7, in: L. GERNET (ed.), Antiphon Ŕ Discours, Paris, Les Belles 
Lettres, 1923 (repr. 1965). 
1104
 Cp. e.g. EURIPIDES, Medea, 108-110. 
1105
 For instance, the ροπή can be said to be chaste (πανεέκμξ – see EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 1006) or stubborn 
(ζηθδνά – see SOPHOCLES, Ajax, 1361). 
1106
 See e.g. HERODOTUS, Historiae, 7.153. 
1107
 See e.g. ARISTOPHANES, Pax, 1068, EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 173, and Orestes, 1180.  
1108
 For more on this, see e.g. D. CLAUS, Toward the Soul. An Inquiry into the Meaning of ροπή before Plato, 
New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1981, 147ff. 
1109





 The different lines of development of the concept of ροπή raise the question about 
their unity. How can the Homeric ghost become an occult self which has to be released? How 
can this self be the source of movement and a part of the ηόζιμξ? And how can all this be the 
seat of our emotions, desires, acts perceptions, thoughts – in short, of our whole personality? 
In other words, how can the eschatological soul (or the shade) incorporate all these functions? 
What exactly is this entity that we are supposed to be? How is it constituted and how do all 
its functions relate to one another? Moreover, how does everything in our life depend on it?  
Plato deals with all these problems. He tries to determine the unity of our ροπή and 
the interrelation of its different functions. He also considers how one‟s ροπή relates to other 
things. But before considering in more detail his analyses of ροπή, a few general remarks 
about his use of the notion are in order. 
 
2. The main aspects and problems of Plato’s use and analysis of the term ςπρή 
 
Plato‟s conception of ροπή is based on the perspectives we just considered, although 
several other important aspects are introduced in the corpus.
1110
 We must, however, bear in 
mind that the analyses of the notion of ροπή are scattered throughout the texts, and they have 
very different features. The characters consider the notion of ροπή from different angles, and 
some of their assertions may even contradict each other. Moreover, the analyses are often 
provisional, abbreviated, or even metaphorical, which raises the question about what a proper 
description of ροπή would correspond to.
1111
 In a sense, this whole Part III is an attempt to 
develop a description of the ροπή in Platonic terms. We will try to combine and unify the 
different aspects of Plato‟s analyses and see in what direction they point. But first let us better 
                                                 
1110
 Many of these innovations may be due to the historical Socrates. It is indeed difficult to make a precise 
distinction between both – and we will not attempt to do it. In line with our general approach, we will rather 
consider the treatment of the concept of ροπή in the Platonic corpus. In doing so, we will regard the different 
texts not as different phases of Plato‟s thought, but as analyses of the same reality from different angles. 
1111
 In Phaedo, for instance, Socrates stresses that one must continue to examine the questions about the soul‟s 
nature and immortality (see e.g. 77e f., 90e ff., and 107a-b). In Timaeus, the description of the ροπή is part of a 
cosmological narrative that is no more than likely (see 29b-d). At times, Plato emphasizes that the discussion of 
the ροπή will be short and incomplete. See Rep. 435c-d and 504a-c. Cp. also Phdr. 246a, where the shorter 
version is also said to be an image or comparison: “πενὶ δὲ η῅ξ ἰδέαξ α὎η῅ξ ὧδε θεηηέμκ. μἷμκ ιέκ ἐζηζ, πάκηῃ 
πάκηςξ εείαξ εἶκαζ ηαὶ ιαην᾵ξ δζδβήζεςξ, ᾧ δὲ ἔμζηεκ, ἀκενςπίκδξ ηε ηαὶ ἐθάηημκμξ· ηαύηῃ μὖκ θέβςιεκ.” 
Several important aspects of the ροπή are indeed described in imagetic or mythological terms. The myths of 
Gorgias, Phaedrus, and Republic X are particularly relevant, but their imagetic character render all analyses 
very problematic.  
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consider some general aspects and problems associated with the word ροπή in the Platonic 
corpus.  
First of all, the very choice of the term ροπή to describe the essence of what we are is 
very meaningful. As we saw, the term has strong eschatological connotations, and this makes 
it particularly suitable for an analysis of our own being. Ψοπή reminds us of our mortality and 
raises the question of what happens to us after we die. This question naturally follows from 
our identity and our interest in ourselves. We are at risk of ceasing to be, and we need to 
somehow tame death and give it meaning. In other words, we need to understand death, in 
order to determine how much time we have and what the meaning of our existence is. To this 
extent, our interest in the question of death does not concern something remote, but rather 
something that determines our entire life. 
Moreover, by expressly raising the question of our death, we can adopt a different 
viewpoint on ourselves. Normally we tend to be distracted about ourselves and our life as a 
whole. However, by facing death, life itself becomes clearer and more present.
1112
 In this 
sense, reflecting about death is not very different from what happens when we experience the 
death of someone close to us. Faced with their absence, we can better notice all that was 
present and is now lost. As for our own death, although we cannot witness it as we may 
witness the death of someone else, we may try to imagine it. It is true that we cannot really 
imagine ourselves as being entirely absent, but in trying to do so we may increase our 
awareness of ourselves and of our own being. We may start to think about what it is to be 
alive, what we achieved in life, and what to expect after our life ends. In this sense, the 
eschatological experience is an intrinsically philosophical experience and it stimulates us to 
examine ourselves.
1113
   
One could perhaps argue that the eschatological reflections tend, however, to focus on 
the question of the hereafter, which is indeed a metaphysical question, in the sense that it 
refers to something that surpasses all that is immediately available to us. In order to 
determine whether and in what way one continues to exist after death, one must resort to 
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 For more on this, see in particular K. KERÉNYI, Die religiöse Idee des Nichtseins, in: IDEM, Die Religion 
der Griechen und Römer, München/etc., Droemer-Knaur, 1963, 269-287. 
1113
 The last day of Socrates‟ life in the Phaedo is a good illustration of this. The particular circumstances he 
found himself in led him and his companions to discuss the nature of ροπή and whether it dies along with the 
body or not. Also relevant in this context is the passage in the Republic where Cephalus confides to Socrates 
that the proximity to death makes him think not only about what will come after, but also about how he lived 
and whether he was unjust to someone. See 330d-e. In fact, not only does death stimulate a kind of 
philosophical examination of one‟s life, but philosophy itself is described in the Phaedo as a kind of death or as 





 But such arguments are not entirely unconnected with our own 
being. We must indeed pay attention to the kind of being that we are in order to determine 
what happens when we die. The metaphysical arguments about the immortality of the soul 
must be based on a certain description of what we are and, as such, they can also contribute to 
a better understanding of the kind of being that we are (even if in themselves they are highly 
questionable).
1115
 This is valid also for the myths that consider the pre-natal state of the ροπή 
and what happens after death. Some of the myths, for instance, have an etiological character 
and try to explain how we came to the state we find ourselves in. But along with the 
explanation for our present state, these myths also contain a description of the state that is 
supposed to be explained, and we can isolate such a description.
1116
 Likewise, when the 
myths about the hereafter try to isolate the psychic component, they still refer to a certain 
understanding of what characterizes our own being during life. 
Thus, the metaphysical and mythological components of Plato‟s analyses of the ροπή 
are always underpinned by a descriptive or phenomenological component. Ψοπή is primarily 
an undeniable fact or something we experience in our life, and then we may use myths or 
arguments to try to define it better and see its precise traits. The eschatological reflections are 
therefore important to better understand us and they must be brought together with all other 
passages in which Plato tries to describe or define the ροπή. The description or definition of 
the ροπή is actually the central moment of all these analyses. However, this description or 
definition is never fully clear. There is always a deficient grasp of what ροπή is, and this is 
not incidental. The nature of ροπή is intrinsically problematic – so much so that it is not even 
clear at first whether ροπή is what we are or something that we have. Sometimes it may seem 
an obscure part of us – a kind of second being that is within us and to which we are for the 
most part unrelated. But, as we will see, Plato is rather pointing to a structural component of 
our ordinary consciousness. The ροπή is indeed the correlate of a different perspective on our 
normal self – or, as we could also say, the correlate of a way of seeing ourselves that goes 
beyond the most immediate surface of our being and considers all its depth. It is in this sense 
                                                 
1114
 The question of immortality is indeed intricate. For instance, assuming that the soul continues to exist after 
death, one must still determine whether it survives in its entirety or just in part (and if the latter is the case, we 
must also determine whether it is connected with our personality or not). Likewise, it is necessary to establish 
whether the soul‟s immortality is static or rather kinetic (i.e., whether it involves the passing of time or not). 
These and other questions are not easy to answer, and hence the need for complex arguments. 
1115
 For instance, the argument for the soul‟s immortality in Phdr. 245c-e is based on the description of the soul 
as self-moving, whereas the argument in Rep. 608d ff. presupposes an understanding of the soul‟s badness and 
of what it does to the soul. 
1116
 This is precisely the strategy we will follow below in our analysis of Aristophanes‟ myth in Smp. 189d ff. 
and Socrates‟ myth in Phdr. 246a ff. Cp. Chap. 12, Sect. 4. 
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our innermost or truest being. We may very well overlook it or misinterpret it, but it is not 
something different from what we normally think we are. It constitutes and sustains our 
whole experience of ourselves and things. It is a structural moment of our being, and in fact 
the center of what we are. 
The term ροπή thus refers to something. Yet, Plato‟s description of it is primarily 
negative. The ροπή is first of all incorporeal (ἀζώιαημξ).
1117
 The principles of the body do 
not apply to it, and so it cannot be conceived in bodily terms. Moreover, the ροπή is 
described as invisible, as was said above. It is inaccessible to sight, and also to all other 
senses.
1118
 In this sense, our own θύζζξ is wont to hide herself. The ροπή is something 
elusive or occult. It is the mystery that we are, and this mystery is not just a small detail of 
our life, but it is at the centre of our life and affects (or locates) everything we come in 
contact with. Our body, things in general and other ροπαί are all mediated by our ροπή.
1119
 
But how can we have access to the ροπή in order to determine it in some way? By 
describing the ροπή as a mysterious inner being, it may seem that we can only have access to 
it through introspection. We must close our eyes to everything else and just look within. 
However, things are not so simple. The soul is not an abstract being, completely closed in 
itself. It communicates or relates itself with other things, and in fact it is essentially 
characterized by its own corporality and spatiality. The body locates the soul and brings it 
into a particular relation with other people, a political community and even the ηόζιμξ at 
large. The connection with the body is indeed an essential aspect of the soul. However, this is 
also a problem. As was mentioned, we tend to conceive the body and the soul or ροπή in light 
of a metaphysical dualism, according to which they are the completely opposite from one 
another. In Cartesian terms, body is sheer extension or materiality and soul is pure thought. 
Such a strict separation then raises the question about the relation or commerce between the 
two domains. One may be tempted to reduce everything to matter and explain the spirit in 
material terms – or instead one may try to reduce everything to consciousness.  
This way of putting the question, however, is not only unsatisfactory, but also 
incompatible with most of what we find in Plato (even if at some moments he may suggest 
something similar, especially when he describes the soul in mythological terms). To begin, 
                                                 
1117
 Cp. Phdr. 85e, where the ροπή is compared to the lyre‟s attunement, insofar as both are “ἀόναημκ ηαὶ 
ἀζώιαημκ ηαὶ πάβηαθόκ ηζ ηαὶ εε῔όκ”. 
1118
 See Phd. 79b. Cp. also Grg. 523b-e and Rep. 611b-612a, where access to the soul is said to be obstructed by 
the body and bodily things. 
1119
 This view is not something completely alien to us. In religion, poetry, psychology we are used to think about 
something mysterious within ourselves, with which we are in contact and of which we may be more or less 
aware (be it a moral soul, the heart or the unconscious), and this mysterious entity is also often called “soul”. 
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such a dualism presupposes that body and soul are two domains we can easily compare and 
distinguish. We look at them as if from the outside and see their particular features. However, 
Plato is very aware that body and ροπή are not two things or two objects that we may easily 
contemplate. They are both experienced in the first person, as a constitutive part of us, and 
thus as a constitutive part of our own gaze. In addition, they are intrinsically mixed with one 
another and we can only experience them in the mixture itself. We are not only composed of 
them, but we are precisely this composition. In other words, being composed of them is 
previous to our contact with any of them. The relation between the two elements is 
constant.
1120
 Any attempt to isolate one of them may try to abstract from the other, but it 
cannot really remove it from consideration. This means that when we try to consider what the 
ροπή is, our gaze is still obstructed by the body – both in the objective pole (insofar as we 
cannot see them separately) and in the subjective pole (insofar as our way of seeing is also 
affected by the body and this renders our access to things intrinsically defective). This 
obstruction is actually related to an important question. Among other things, Plato regards the 
body as a way of seeing things and this bodily perspective outlines a certain understanding of 
ροπή which differs from other possible ways of seeing it. There can indeed be many different 
ways of understanding ροπή (and also the body), and the question then is how can they be 
correctly conceived.    
Plato tries to determine many things about the ροπή. He discusses whether the ροπή is 
simple or complex. He tries to distinguish different kinds of ροπαί and see what they have in 
common. He talks not only of human ροπαί, but also of animal ροπαί and divine ροπαί, and 
tries to establish a relation between them. The relation of the human ροπή with the divine is 
in fact essential, especially insofar as the εἴδδ themselves are described as divine and the 
ροπή is the place of contact with them, as we will see. In Phaedo, Plato suggests that its two 
main features are δύκαιζξ and θνόκδζζξ.
1121
 This means that the soul is somehow in 
movement and it is also somehow lucidly aware of things. In other words, it has a practical 
and a cognitive side. 
Power in particular is a very important feature. The soul is explicitly defined as that 
which moves itself.
1122
 It can change itself and become something else. This raises the 
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 However, this does not mean that the relation with them is static. We may relate to them in different ways or 
they may have different relations to one another, in the sense that one of them may predominate over the other, 
as is shown in Phaedo. For more on this, cp. Chap. 13, Sect. 2.2 below. 
1121
 Cp. Phd. 70b. Socrates wonders whether these are features the ροπή preserves after dying, which 
presupposes that they are essential features of it during life. 
1122
 Cp. Phdr. 245c-246a and Lg. 895c-896b. 
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question of its own freedom. Its movement is in part spontaneous, but the soul also seems to 
be moved by something or someone else – such as θόβμξ, the examiner or its beloved.
1123
 In 
short, the soul is characterized both by its ἔνβα and its πάεδ.
1124
 So what causes us to move? 
What accounts for our behavior? And to what extent are we passive or active? 
In order to answer these questions about the soul‟s movement, we must also consider 
the soul‟s θνόκδζζξ. Its acts are indeed not separable from its way of seeing things. The ροπή 
moves with purpose and this purpose is determined by its own perspective on things. The 
ροπή determines its own targets, and it may reach them or not. Its success or failure is thus an 
expression of the cognitive quality of the soul. In fact, its own inner state in general 
determines the value of the ροπή and of its life. As we considered in Part I, the soul can have 
different modalities and they may correspond to a state of excellence (ἀνεηή) or of badness 
(ηαηία). This all depends on oneself and one‟s relation to one‟s own ροπή. One may attend to 
it, care for it (and thus train it or exercise it), but one can leave it as it is or neglect it. The 
latter possibility will cause it to be bad, because by itself the human soul is deficient or 
lacking. We need to intervene in it, and this intervention will be all the more effective if we 
have some insight into how the soul is constituted. In other words, in order to care for 
ourselves (i.e., for our ροπή), we need to know what this self is, we need to know ourselves, 
and how defective we are. But what exactly are we? As was said, at first our ροπή is a 
mystery or an implicatissimum aenigma, and we need to decipher this mystery that we carry 
within us and that expresses itself in everything that we are. We have already considered 
some problems connected with the ροπή, but now we have to see in more detail how Plato 
defines it and how he answers to the questions just mentioned and any other questions that 
may be raised by his conception of ourselves as a ροπή. 
  
3. The Platonic identification of the ςπρή through the contrast with the ζῶκα 
 
 All the problems associated with the notion of ροπή stem from how difficult it is to 
identify and to define what the ροπή is. Our access to our ροπή is obstructed, and so we may 
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 Cp. e.g. Phdr. 261a, for the definition of ῥδημνζηή as a ροπαβςβία ηζξ δζὰ θόβςκ. This is just one way of 
moving others. Socrates also moves or provokes others by asking them questions and pointing out 
contradictions, and he even tries to convert them to philosophy and thus change their whole life. Moreover, the 
palinode in Phaedrus describes in detail the effects on one‟s ροπή of seeing the beloved and how this vision 
moves one‟s ροπή. See in particular 250d ff. In all these moments, the ροπή seems to be passive (although this 
also raises some questions which we will have to discuss later – see Chap. 17 below). 
1124
 Cp. Phdr. 245c: “δε῔ μὖκ πν῵ημκ ροπ῅ξ θύζεςξ πένζ εείαξ ηε ηαὶ ἀκενςπίκδξ ἰδόκηα πάεδ ηε ηαὶ ἔνβα 
ηἀθδεὲξ κμ῅ζαζ (...).” 
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completely misunderstand what it is or we may even fail to notice that there is such a thing as 
a ροπή. To this extent, what Plato calls ροπή seems to be very different from the body, as 
was said. The body is always present, mediating our relation to many other things. It occupies 
a central position in our life and in a way everything turns around it. As a result, we may be 
easily tempted to reduce our being to it. Plato, however, will try to show how inconceivable 
such a reduction is. We are composed of body and ροπή, and both of them are decisive 
components of our experience. The fact that they are distinct from each other, however, does 
not mean that they are separated by clear boundaries or that we can easily distinguish them. 
Our experience of them is rather an experience of their synthesis.
1125
 They are radically 
intertwined or mixed, and this mixture is what we primarily deal with. 
 Plato is very aware of this and of how the body is not just an obstacle to the 
identification of our ροπή, but also something from which the latter must be dissociated. In 
other words, the conception of the body and the contrast with it are essential to identify and 
define the ροπή. One must first define the body as such, imagine it by itself, and then see how 
it is insufficient to account for the complexity of our being. The consideration of the body 
shows indeed that our experience of ourselves and of things in general requires more than a 
body, and the additional component in question is precisely what corresponds to the ροπή. 
This is the strategy followed in several passages of the Platonic corpus. The characters 
establish a more or less explicit contrast between the body and the ροπή, and this lets us see 
several important sides or components of the latter. It still does not present the ροπή in all its 
complexity, but it allows us to gain a better access to it. We will thus try to identify and 
organize the most important aspects of this contrast, and then we will be able to consider how 
these aspects can belong to the same entity – the ροπή. But before anything else, we must 
start by considering Plato‟s conception of body. 
 
3.1. The complexity of Plato’s conception of the body  
 
 The body may seem be more immediate, conspicuous and evident than the ροπή, but 
this does not mean that the former is absolutely free from problems or ambiguity. On the 
contrary: the body can be seen from different angles and it can even be conceived in different 
ways. This is precisely what happens in the Platonic corpus. The characters speak of body in 
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 In Phaedo, for instance, Plato uses expressions such as ημζκςκε῔κ (or ημζκςκία), ὁιζθε῔κ and ζοκμοζία. See 
e.g. Phd. 65a, 66a, 67a, 80e, 81c. 
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different ways and they identify different traits of it. But what exactly lies at the heart of this 
entity? Why does it seem so diverse? And does this diversity affect the concept of ροπή, 
given how closely connected the two concepts are?  
 We can better understand how complex the notion of body is if we briefly consider 
the pre-Platonic language used to designate the body. In Homer, the body is often conceived 
as an aggregate of limbs (as ιέθεα or βο῔α) which are responsible for our acts. One can also 
focus one‟s attention on the bodily structure or frame (which is what is implied in δέιαξ). 
Moreover, the body can be designated as πνώξ, which means skin, complexion, color. It can 
also be seen as a corpse (κεηνόξ) and this is possibly also what is implied in the word Plato 
uses to designate it: namely, ζ῵ια. Whether or not this word is linked with the verb ζήπμιαζ 
(and thus with the idea of being rotten or putrid), ζ῵ια seems to designate the body as 
something compact, which is precisely the perspective we have of a dead body. We can 
therefore see how the body can be conceived in different ways, and we find something 
similar in the Platonic corpus.
1126
 Plato puts forward different perspectives on the body and 
these perspectives are actually interconnected. In a way, they focus on different layers of the 
same entity. But it is important to determine their differences, especially because they are 
intimately connected with different layers of the term ροπή. 
 The first and most simple way of conceiving the body is as a lump of matter, 
composed of different elements. This may apply to any solid, and the human body may also 
be considered from this angle. Plato speaks of an earthen body (ζ῵ια βήσκμκ) in 
Phaedrus.
1127
 In other texts, he associates it with hair, flesh, bones, blood, limbs and 
sinews.
1128
 The body in this sense is all that is left when one dies – though it does not last for 
long, because it is corruptible and, when one dies, it quickly decomposes.
1129
 But while it 
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 For more on the Pre-Platonic understanding of body, see e.g. E. SCHWEITZER, ζ῵µα, ζςµαηζηόξ, 
ζύζζςµμξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; B. SNELL, Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des 




), 21ff.; H. KOLLER, ΢῵ια bei 
Homer, Glotta 37 (1958), 276-281; R. RENEHAN, The Meaning of ζ῵ια in Homer. A Study in Methodology, 
California Studies in Classical Antiquity 12 (1979), 269-282. 
1127
 See Phdr. 246c. 
1128
 These are the components mentioned in Symposium, when the body and the soul are being contrasted. See 
207d-e: “(...) μὗημξ ιέκημζ μ὎δέπμηε ηὰ α὎ηὰ ἔπςκ ἐκ α὏ηῶ ὅιςξ ὁ α὎ηὸξ ηαθε῔ηαζ, ἀθθὰ κέμξ ἀεὶ βζβκόιεκμξ, ηὰ 
δὲ ἀπμθθύξ, ηαὶ ηαηὰ ηὰξ ηνίπαξ ηαὶ ζάνηα ηαὶ ὀζη᾵ ηαὶ αἷια ηαὶ ζύιπακ ηὸ ζ῵ια.” 
1129
 Cp. Phd. 80c-d: “ἐκκμε῔ξ μὖκ, ἔθδ, ἐπεζδὰκ ἀπμεάκῃ ὁ ἄκενςπμξ, ηὸ ιὲκ ὁναηὸκ α὎ημῦ, ηὸ ζ῵ια, ηαὶ ἐκ 
ὁναηῶ ηείιεκμκ, ὃ δὴ κεηνὸκ ηαθμῦιεκ, ᾧ πνμζήηεζ δζαθύεζεαζ ηαὶ δζαπίπηεζκ ηαὶ δζαπκε῔ζεαζ, μ὎η ε὎εὺξ 
ημύηςκ μ὎δὲκ πέπμκεεκ, ἀθθ᾽ ἐπζεζη῵ξ ζοπκὸκ ἐπζιέκεζ πνόκμκ, ἐὰκ ιέκ ηζξ ηαὶ πανζέκηςξ ἔπςκ ηὸ ζ῵ια 
ηεθεοηήζῃ ηαὶ ἐκ ημζαύηῃ ὥνᾳ, ηαὶ πάκο ιάθα· ζοιπεζὸκ βὰν ηὸ ζ῵ια ηαὶ ηανζπεοεέκ, ὥζπεν μἱ ἐκ Αἰβύπηῳ 
ηανζπεοεέκηεξ, ὀθίβμο ὅθμκ ιέκεζ ἀιήπακμκ ὅζμκ πνόκμκ, ἔκζα δὲ ιένδ ημῦ ζώιαημξ, ηαὶ ἂκ ζαπῆ, ὀζη᾵ ηε ηαὶ 
κεῦνα ηαὶ ηὰ ημζαῦηα πάκηα, ὅιςξ ὡξ ἔπμξ εἰπε῔κ ἀεάκαηά ἐζηζκ (...).” 
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exists, it is visible and tangible, and when we conceive it in this way, it is just one more 
material or physical body, completely free from ροπή.
1130
  
 However, the body can also be understood as a living organism, in which the different 
elements (such as earth, water, air, fire – or the hot, the cold, the dry and the wet) are properly 
blended.
1131
 In other words, this body is a mixture (ην᾵ζζξ) and an attunement (ἁνιμκία).
1132
 
It is in a state of flux and it can move away from and back to its proper condition or θύζζξ.
1133
 
More importantly, body in this sense already implies a certain degree of animation and thus a 
certain degree of ροπή. It is alive, it moves itself, and it can die – i.e., it can be reduced to a 
decomposing corpse, in which the elements are still all present, but no longer producing any 
life or any movement.  
 This is the basis for an even more complex notion of body, which actually coincides 
with the domain of sensations (αἰζεήζεζξ). The body in this sense is not simply a self-moving 
thing, but rather something that has access to things or to which other things appear. The 
appearing of things (or simply of sensations) is normally seen as derivative from sensory 
organs (conceived as external objects), which can be affected by other external things and 
reveal something like a sensible world – even if in a way our sensory organs are also 
something that appears to the body, and are thus internal to the domain in question.
1134
 At any 
rate, the body is essentially characterized by having sensations, and the close connection 
between the body and sensations can be further developed in a concept of body as a particular 
way of seeing things – namely, one that is essentially determined by sensations and 
consequently only recognizes the existence of sensible beings. In this sense, the body‟s way 
of seeing things can be opposed to thinking as the capacity to identify the general modes of 
being (εἴδδ), which is an essential feature of the soul.
1135
 
  Finally, the body can also be regarded as a sphere of desire that tries to avoid pain and 
attain pleasure. This desire can even become one‟s main desire in life and thus produce a 
particular way of live, characterized by the love of the body. Socrates describes this αίμξ 
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 As said in the Phdr. 245e, it is a ζ῵ια ἄροπμκ. 
1131
 Cp. Phlb. 29a: “ηὰ πενὶ ηὴκ η῵κ ζςιάηςκ θύζζκ ἁπάκηςκ η῵κ γῴςκ, πῦν ηαὶ ὕδςν ηαὶ πκεῦια ηαεμν῵ιέκ 
πμο ηαὶ β῅κ ηαεάπεν μἱ πεζιαγόιεκμζ, θαζίκ, ἐκόκηα ἐκ ηῆ ζοζηάζεζ.” 
1132
 Both these concepts are used for a materialistic explanation of the ροπή in Phaedo (cp. Phd. 85e ff.), which 
Socrates goes on to refute, but they can nevertheless be applied to the body as such.  
1133
 Cp. Phlb. 31d: “[΢Ω] θέβς ημίκοκ η῅ξ ἁνιμκίαξ ιὲκ θομιέκδξ ἟ι῔κ ἐκ ημ῔ξ γῴμζξ ἅια θύζζκ η῅ξ θύζεςξ ηαὶ 
βέκεζζκ ἀθβδδόκςκ ἐκ ηῶ ηόηε βίβκεζεαζ πνόκῳ. [ΠΡΩ] πάκο θέβεζξ εἰηόξ. [΢Ω] πάθζκ δὲ ἁνιμηημιέκδξ ηε ηαὶ 
εἰξ ηὴκ α὏η῅ξ θύζζκ ἀπζμύζδξ ἟δμκὴκ βίβκεζεαζ θεηηέμκ, εἰ δε῔ δζ᾽ ὀθίβςκ πενὶ ιεβίζηςκ ὅηζ ηάπζζηα ῥδε῅καζ.” 
1134
 For more on this, see Chap. 12, Sect. 1 below. 
1135
 This contrast is particularly relevant in Phaedo. See in particular 65d-66a and 78d-79d. 
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θζθμζώιαημξ in the Phaedo.
1136
 It is only concerned with one‟s sensations, it produces the 
particular way of seeing things we considered above (which only recognizes a sensible 
reality) and it is completely closed to other possibilities of seeing and being.
1137
 In this sense, 
the body also constitutes a kind of prison. It restricts our ability to move and confines us to a 
certain domain of reality.
1138
  
 These are the multiple senses of body in the Platonic corpus. In its most basic form, it 
corresponds to the earthen body, which is actually an abstraction or something we reconstruct 
theoretically, because we do not have any direct experience of it (at least as being our body). 
In order for us to experience the body (as sensation or desire, for instance), it must already be 
intertwined with ροπή, and this is what we must now consider. We must see how these 
different layers (apart from the first) are associated with ροπή and how ροπή makes them 
possible.
1139
 We will also discuss how we can have access to more than what is described 
above and how this surplus is also associated with ροπή. Normally we tend to attribute many 
(if not all) of these things to the body and thus we regard ourselves as being primarily a body. 
But, as we said, Plato discusses the intrinsic limitations of the body as such and tries to show 
how we need more than a body to be what we are. In doing so, he calls the attention to the 
central role the ροπή plays in our being and also to how we must revise our most immediate 
conception of ourselves as a material being among others.  
 
3.2. The practical limitations of the body 
 
 Several limitations of the body in the strictest sense of the word concern the practical 
domain. Plato points out that we can identify and discern the ροπή in the way we act or 
behave. To begin with, ροπή is the source of movement in general. A non-animated body can 
only be moved by something else, whereas the soul itself is defined as self-movement.
1140
 
This means that the soul is not simply something in movement, but movement itself. In other 
words, it is intrinsically kinetic, and as such it is open to change and also the agent of this 
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 The qualification “θζθμζώιαημξ” appears in 68b-c. For the way of life in question, see e.g. 66b-67a. 
1137
 Cp. e.g. Phd. 83c-d. 
1138
 We will not consider here whether the soul‟s imprisonment is to be attributed to the material component of 
the body or whether it is somehow the fault of the ροπή itself. For a discussion of this, see Chap. 17, Sects. 3 
and 4. 
1139
 In a way, even the first layer is associated with the ροπή insofar as it is contrasted with it. The ροπή is what 
is absent from the earthen body and what distinguishes it from the body as we experience it. 
1140
 Cp. Phdr. 254c ff. and Lg. 895c-896b. See also Cra. 400a. 
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very change. This description also implies that the ροπή has power (δύκαιζξ).
1141
 In fact, this 
power to move itself is life in the broadest sense, and therefore ροπή is constitutively life or 
what brings life to the body.
1142
 We may be tempted to think the body moves itself or is the 
source of motion, but the real source lies beyond it.
1143
 It is the ροπή that moves the body 
and, through the body, it can also move other things. It can even move other ροπαί, insofar as 
it can guide them, provoke them or lead them to change their ways.
1144
 
 But the ροπή does not just cause movement in the body. It also controls the body, 
governs it, is in charge of it.
1145
 In Alcibiades I, Socrates points out that the ροπή uses the 
body, both to act and to talk.
1146
 In fact, the ροπή is superior and relates to the body as a 
master to a slave.
1147
 In the Republic, Socrates even says that the function (ἔνβμκ) of the soul 
is to manage, rule, and deliberate – in sum, to live, and to live better or worse, according to 
how it manages itself and the body.
1148
 As a result, the body is not only a slave of the ροπή, 
but it can also be conceived as a sign (a ζ῅ια) of it, insofar as its movements are an 
expression of the ροπή‟s wishes.
1149
 
Particularly relevant in this context is the argument in Phaedo against the view that 
soul is no more than the mixture and harmony of bodily elements, as the attunement of a 
lyre.
1150
 If it were so, the ροπή would not be able to oppose the body. But Socrates argues 
that the soul is constitutively free and it can either resist (ἐκακηζμῦζεαζ) or yield (ζοβπςνε῔κ) 
to the tensions and desires of the body. This means that although the body may somehow 
move the soul, insofar as it can lead it to pursue bodily desires, this movement is nonetheless 
based in a surrender of control or an abdication on the part of the soul, and it is, as such, an 
act of the ροπή.
1151
 In sum, the body and the ροπή do not necessarily agree, they can be in 
conflict, but the soul is not automatically dragged by the body, and therefore it must be 
something different from it. The ροπή is a principle different from the body and it is in fact 
                                                 
1141
 Cp. Phd. 70b and Lg. 892a.  
1142
 In the Cratylus it is said that the ροπή is the cause of a body being alive (399d-e) and that it makes it live 
and move around (γ῅κ ηαὶ πενζζέκαζ, 400a). In the Phaedo, the ροπή is said to bring with it life (105c-d). 
1143
 Cp. Phdr. 246c: “(...) ζ῵ια βήσκμκ θααμῦζα [sc. ἟ ροπὴ], α὎ηὸ α὏ηὸ δμημῦκ ηζκε῔κ δζὰ ηὴκ ἐηείκδξ δύκαιζκ 
(...).” 
1144
 Cp. footnote 1123 above. 
1145
 Cp. e.g. Phd. 79e-80a, 94b ff., Lg. 896c. 
1146
 Socrates speaks of using or employing (πν῅ζεαζ) the body in conversing with another, and also in making 
shoes or playing the cithara. See 129b ff. On the question of who or what converses with another, cp. Phd. 115c.  
1147
 He uses verbs such as δεζπόγεζκ and δμοθεύεζκ to describe the roles played by the ροπή and the body. See 
Phd. 79e and Tim. 34b-35a. 
1148
 See 353d-354a. 
1149
 See Cra. 400b-c. 
1150
 See 85e-86d and, especially, 92e ff. 
1151
 We will consider this better below, in Chap. 17, Sects. 3 and 4. 
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what determines whether the body is attended to or neglected. All the goods and evils come 
from the ροπή, as is stressed for instance in Charmides, and even headaches are said to result 
from it.
1152
 In Gorgias, Socrates ends up implying that it is the soul‟s desire that causes one‟s 
body to be oversized and sick.
1153
 Alternatively, the ροπή may also maintain and exercise the 
body, thereby strengthening it.  
But this is not all. The ροπή does not only control the movement of the body, but it 
also determines what the body wants. Plato several times shows that our desires do not have 
their origin outside of us. They are not the result of something absolutely fascinating 
appearing before us and awakening a completely new desire in us. Instead, our desires are 
primarily the result of immanent conditions that actually let something appear as desirable. 
The basic condition is lack (ἔκδεζα or ηέκςζζξ), which may occur at the level of the body.
1154
 
But as it is shown in the Philebus, lack by itself is insufficient to mobilize us and make us 
pursue something. It is necessary to anticipate the filling up or satisfaction of this lack (its 
πθήνςζζξ), and in order to do so, we need to have some memory of filling a similar lack and 
also of that with which we filled it. This memory, according to Plato, is what guides the body 
to something and makes it desire this thing. But memory is not something bodily. It is 
intrinsically psychic. Therefore, Socrates says that there is no bodily desire in the strict sense. 
In order for our body to desire, we need to have a ροπή and it is the ροπή itself that makes 
bodily desires possible.
1155
 Moreover, the ροπή has its own desires, which do not refer to any 
specific bodily condition. The best example of this is probably the desire of knowledge.
1156
 
Thus all kinds of desire are rooted in this non-bodily component of our being. 
It is likewise in virtue of the ροπή that we relate ourselves to the good (be it only an 
apparent good or the real good). The ροπή is the part of us that is concerned with the so-
called final cause or the end that is to be achieved. In Phaedo, Socrates argues that it is not 
because of his body and its parts that he is sitting in prison, but because he has a δόλα about 
what is best and this is what guides him.
1157
 He then distinguishes between what is the real 
cause and what is required by the real cause to be a cause.
1158
 The body and its parts are only 
                                                 
1152
 See 156e ff., and especially 156e: “πάκηα βὰν ἔθδ ἐη η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ὡνι῅ζεαζ ηαὶ ηὰ ηαηὰ ηαὶ ηὰ ἀβαεὰ ηῶ 
ζώιαηζ ηαὶ πακηὶ ηῶ ἀκενώπῳ (...).”    
1153
 Cp. 517a ff.  
1154
 We will discuss the question of the inner conditions of desire in Chap. 12 below. 
1155
 See Phlb. 34e-35d. 
1156
 For more on the desire of knowledge (θζθμζμθία), see Chap. 13, Sect. 3.3. 
1157
 See 98b ff. 
1158




something we need in order to act, whereas our mind or intellect (the κμῦξ) is what really 
guides us. We need a δόλα and κμῦξ to have some conception of what we should pursue and 
both of them are essential components of the ροπή, as we shall see. 
It is thus clear that for Plato our actions depend on the ροπή. But there is more. The 
ροπή also determines the moral value of our actions. Our doing things well or badly and 
becoming good or bad depends on the ροπή, as is said in Protagoras.
1159
 This idea is also 
expressed in Sophist, when the Visitor points out that there would be no excellences (ἀνεηαί) 
and their opposites if there was only the body and what is visible.
1160
 In other passages, the 
excellence and poor condition of the soul is characterized as a kind of harmony or 
disharmony different from the one of the bodily elements.
1161
 The soul must be kept in good 
shape. In other words, we need to take special care of it, exercise it, and improve it – which 




3.3. The cognitive limitations of the body    
 
Several of the practical limitations of the body (and especially the last one) already 
pointed to its cognitive limitations, but now we have to consider them in more detail. The 
ροπή is at times characterized by Plato as that part of us that desires and receives knowledge. 
It “ingests” knowledge (even if Plato also critizes the model of receiving knowledge from the 
outside, as we saw above) and learns.
1163
 Moreover, it is the part of us that may be affected or 
even bewitched by θόβμξ, and it then leads our actions according to it.
1164
 But the cognitive 
role of the ροπή is actually much more complex. Its relation with knowledge is very 
important, and this is why in Phaedo Socrates associates it not only with δύκαιζξ, but also 
with θνόκδζζξ – i.e., with intelligence, lucidity or some knowledge of what things are.
1165
 
The two things are intrinsically connected. In Sophist, ροπή‟s knowledge (θνόκδζζξ or κμῦκ 
                                                 
1159
 See 313a: “(...) ὃ δὲ πενὶ πθείμκμξ ημῦ ζώιαημξ ἟βῆ, ηὴκ ροπήκ, ηαὶ ἐκ ᾧ πάκη᾽ ἐζηὶκ ηὰ ζὰ ἠ εὖ ἠ ηαη῵ξ 
πνάηηεζκ, πνδζημῦ ἠ πμκδνμῦ α὎ημῦ βεκμιέκμο (...).” 
1160
 See 246e ff. 
1161
 See e.g. Phd. 93b-c. 
1162
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3. 
1163
 Cp. e.g. Prt. 313c ff. For criticism of the idea of ingesting knowledge, see in particular Smp. 175d-e, and cp. 
Intro., Sect. 4.1. 
1164
 Hence Socrates defines rhetoric itself as a ροπαβςβία ηζξ δζὰ θόβςκ (Phdr. 261a-b). 
1165
 See 70b: “(...) ἀθθὰ ημῦημ δὴ ἴζςξ μ὎η ὀθίβδξ παναιοείαξ δε῔ηαζ ηαὶ πίζηεςξ, ὡξ ἔζηζ ηε ροπὴ ἀπμεακόκημξ 
ημῦ ἀκενώπμο ηαί ηζκα δύκαιζκ ἔπεζ ηαὶ θνόκδζζκ.” As was said in footnote 1121, although Socrates is talking 
about what might characterize the ροπή after death, the characteristics he is referring to also apply to the period 
before death and are in fact the ροπή‟s essential features.  
398 
 
ἔπεζκ) is marked by movement and life.
1166
 In Laws, the inventory of movements attributed to 
the ροπή include both practical and cognitive movements – such as wishing, reflecting, 




Let us then consider more closely the specifically cognitive role the ροπή plays in our 
experience of things. The most basic form of ροπή‟s intervention is at the level of sensation 
(αἴζεδζζξ), which one may be tempted to regard as a strictly bodily moment. However, 
αἴζεδζζξ itself requires ροπή. In Philebus, Socrates argues that the sensation requires a 
shaking or disturbance (ζεζζιόξ) in the body, but the latter is not enough for us to feel 
anything. The bodily shaking or disturbance must reach the ροπή in order to be noticed.
1168
 In 
the same dialogue, Socrates also distinguishes between small changes in the body that do not 
produce any feeling of pleasure or plain, and great changes, of which we become emotionally 
aware.
1169
 What happens purely in the body is thus not enough to produce a sensation or 
feeling. Αἴζεδζζξ does not consist in the passivity of the body, but it requires an ability to be 
affected at a different level (a δύκαιζξ εἰξ ηὸ παεε῔κ, as said in the Sophist).
1170
 By itself, the 
body has no sensitivity. In Phaedo, Socrates points out that he will not suffer at all while his 
dead body is being burned.
1171
 But the same applies to a living body. Without the ροπή one 
will not know that one is going through something. The role of a non-bodily principle in our 
emotions seems therefore clear, and it becomes even clearer if we consider that there are 
many feelings of pleasure and pain that are not directly connected with bodily states. In 
Philebus, Socrates considers the pleasures and pains that imply both the body and the soul, as 
                                                 
1166
 See Sph. 248c ff. 
1167
 See 896e-897a: “ἄβεζ ιὲκ δὴ ροπὴ πάκηα ηὰ ηαη᾽ μ὎νακὸκ ηαὶ β῅κ ηαὶ εάθαηηακ ηα῔ξ α὏η῅ξ ηζκήζεζζκ, αἷξ 
ὀκόιαηά ἐζηζκ αμύθεζεαζ, ζημπε῔ζεαζ, ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ, αμοθεύεζεαζ, δμλάγεζκ ὀνε῵ξ ἐρεοζιέκςξ, παίνμοζακ 
θοπμοιέκδκ, εαννμῦζακ θμαμοιέκδκ, ιζζμῦζακ ζηένβμοζακ, ηαὶ πάζαζξ ὅζαζ ημύηςκ ζοββεκε῔ξ ἠ πνςημονβμὶ 
ηζκήζεζξ (...).”  
1168
 See Phlb. 33d-e: “[΢Ω] εὲξ η῵κ πενὶ ηὸ ζ῵ια ἟ι῵κ ἑηάζημηε παεδιάηςκ ηὰ ιὲκ ἐκ ηῶ ζώιαηζ 
ηαηαζαεκκύιεκα πνὶκ ἐπὶ ηὴκ ροπὴκ δζελεθεε῔κ ἀπαε῅ ἐηείκδκ ἐάζακηα, ηὰ δὲ δζ᾽ ἀιθμ῔κ ἰόκηα ηαί ηζκα ὥζπεν 
ζεζζιὸκ ἐκηζεέκηα ἴδζόκ ηε ηαὶ ημζκὸκ ἑηαηένῳ. [ΠΡΩ] ηείζες. [΢Ω] ηὰ ιὲκ δὴ ιὴ δζ᾽ ἀιθμ῔κ ἰόκηα ἐὰκ ηὴκ 
ροπὴκ ἟ι῵κ θ῵ιεκ θακεάκεζκ, ηὰ δὲ δζ᾽ ἀιθμ῔κ ιὴ θακεάκεζκ, ἆν᾽ ὀνεόηαηα ἐνμῦιεκ; [ΠΡΩ] π῵ξ βὰν μὔ;” 
1169
 See Phlb. 43a-c: “[΢Ω] ηαῦηα ιὲκ ημίκοκ μὕηςξ ἔζης, θ῵ιεκ πνὸξ ημύημοξ· ζὺ δ᾽ ἀπόηνζκαζ πόηενμκ ἀεὶ 
πάκηα, ὁπόζα πάζπεζ ηζ η῵κ ἐιρύπςκ, ηαῦη᾽ αἰζεάκεηαζ ηὸ πάζπμκ, ηαὶ μὔη᾽ α὎λακόιεκμζ θακεάκμιεκ ἟ι᾵ξ 
α὎ημὺξ μὔηε ηζ η῵κ ημζμύηςκ μ὎δὲκ πάζπμκηεξ, ἠ π᾵κ ημ὎κακηίμκ. [ΠΡΩ] ἅπακ δήπμο ημ὎κακηίμκ· ὀθίβμο βὰν ηά 
βε ημζαῦηα θέθδεε πάκε᾽ ἟ι᾵ξ. [΢Ω] μ὎ ημίκοκ ηαθ῵ξ ἟ι῔κ εἴνδηαζ ηὸ κοκδὴ ῥδεέκ, ὡξ αἱ ιεηααμθαὶ ηάης ηε ηαὶ 
ἄκς βζβκόιεκαζ θύπαξ ηε ηαὶ ἟δμκὰξ ἀπενβάγμκηαζ. [ΠΡΩ] ηί ιήκ; [΢Ω] ὧδ᾽ ἔζηαζ ηάθθζμκ ηαὶ ἀκεπζθδπηόηενμκ 
ηὸ θεβόιεκμκ. [ΠΡΩ] π῵ξ; [΢Ω] ὡξ αἱ ιὲκ ιεβάθαζ ιεηααμθαὶ θύπαξ ηε ηαὶ ἟δμκὰξ πμζμῦζζκ ἟ι῔κ, αἱ δ᾽ αὖ 
ιέηνζαί ηε ηαὶ ζιζηναὶ ηὸ πανάπακ μ὎δέηενα ημύηςκ.” 
1170
 Cp. 247d-e. 
1171
 See 115e. 
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well as those that come solely from the soul.
1172
 His entire analysis thus demonstrates that the 
ροπή is the source of all αἴζεδζζξ.  
A more precise explanation of this can be found in Theaetetus, where Socrates argues 
that the sensory organs (αἰζεδηήνζα) are not that with which (ᾧ) we sense or perceive 
something, but rather that through which (δζ‟μὗ) we sense or perceive it.
1173
 They are the 
instruments or the means employed by the sensing or perceiving agent in us. The perception 
as such is not performed by them, but rather by something that lies beyond them. More 
precisely, it is the ροπή that senses or perceives. Furthermore, Socrates points out in the same 
passage that our sensations are not isolated from each other. They are not atoms of 
consciousness or, as Socrates says, they are not sitting inside us as if they were within a 
wooden horse – i.e., as if they were in a container. They are not a mere aggregate. They are 
all part of the same domain or they all converge on the same thing.
1174
 This means that all 
sensations and all sensory fields refer or belong to one global domain. All sensations belong 
to the same entity, which pervades them and reaches them all. There is a constitutive unity 
that precedes all parts and holds everything together – and the ροπή is precisely this unity.  
 Socrates then goes on to show that the ροπή is not simply a unification of sensible 
contents, but it also performs its own operations. It compares and makes calculations or 
reflects about the sensitive contents, which allows the soul to determine what they are. This 
operation is called δμλάγεζκ and Socrates describes it as being at the core of the ροπή.
1175
 We 
have considered this before.
1176
 The soul is in dialogue with itself, asking questions and 
giving answers about what things are. It tries to determine things and the truth. It is directed 
to this target, though it is also subject to the deviation that corresponds to ignorance (be it a 
simple ignorance, or the double ignorance of having false knowledge claims).  
 The body by itself would not be able to do any of this. In Gorgias, Socrates describes 
a bodily way of seeing things (which would be closely related to one‟s sensations) as 
relatively indeterminate and unable to discern important features of things, which can only be 
                                                 
1172
 See 47c ff. 
1173
 See 184c: “[΢Ω] (...) ζηόπεζ βάν· ἀπόηνζζζξ πμηένα ὀνεμηένα, ᾧ ὁν῵ιεκ ημῦημ εἶκαζ ὀθεαθιμύξ, ἠ δζ᾽ μὗ 
ὁν῵ιεκ, ηαὶ ᾧ ἀημύμιεκ ὦηα, ἠ δζ᾽ μὗ ἀημύμιεκ; [ΘΔΑΙ] δζ᾽ ὧκ ἕηαζηα αἰζεακόιεεα, ἔιμζβε δμηε῔, ὦ 
΢ώηναηεξ, ι᾵θθμκ ἠ μἷξ.” 
1174
 See 184d: “δεζκὸκ βάν πμο, ὦ πα῔, εἰ πμθθαί ηζκεξ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ ὥζπεν ἐκ δμονείμζξ ἵππμζξ αἰζεήζεζξ ἐβηάεδκηαζ, 
εἰξ ιίακ ηζκὰ ἰδέακ, εἴηε ροπὴκ εἴηε ὅηζ δε῔ ηαθε῔κ, πάκηα ηαῦηα ζοκηείκεζ, ᾗ δζὰ ημύηςκ μἷμκ ὀνβάκςκ 
αἰζεακόιεεα ὅζα αἰζεδηά.” 
1175
 See Tht. 185a ff., especially 187a: “[΢Ω] ἀθθ᾽ μὔ ηζ ιὲκ δὴ ημύημο βε ἕκεηα ἞νπόιεεα δζαθεβόιεκμζ, ἵκα 
εὕνςιεκ ηί πμη᾽ μ὎η ἔζη᾽ ἐπζζηήιδ, ἀθθὰ ηί ἔζηζκ. ὅιςξ δὲ ημζμῦηόκ βε πνμαεαήηαιεκ, ὥζηε ιὴ γδηε῔κ α὎ηὴκ 
ἐκ αἰζεήζεζ ηὸ πανάπακ ἀθθ᾽ ἐκ ἐηείκῳ ηῶ ὀκόιαηζ, ὅηζ πμη᾽ ἔπεζ ἟ ροπή, ὅηακ α὎ηὴ ηαε᾽ α὏ηὴκ πναβιαηεύδηαζ 
πενὶ ηὰ ὄκηα. [ΘΔΑΙ] ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ημῦηό βε ηαθε῔ηαζ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ὡξ ἐβᾦιαζ, δμλάγεζκ.”  
1176
 See Chap. 5, Sect. 1.3. 
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discerned by ηέπκδ. He says that in this respect the perspective of the body corresponds to 
Anaxagoras‟ “ὁιμῦ πάκηα πνήιαηα ἤκ”.
1177
 He is actually talking about the body in a sense 
that already involves some ροπή and even some δμλάγεζκ – but what he says is a particularly 
apt description of a body completely deprived of δμλάγεζκ. Such a body would have no 
discernment whatsoever, because it is by judging about things that we become aware of what 
they are. But this is not all. It is also by judging that we become aware of having the 
sensations that we have.
1178
 Without judgment we would not know what we are feeling. In 
fact, we would not even know that we are feeling at all. 
 But the soul‟s activity does more than determine the sensations we have at each 
moment. It can also determine experiences of which we have no sensation at the present 
moment, because our body is not being affected in any way. For instance, the ροπή is able to 
retain or remember past experiences, and it can also anticipate future experiences, through 
calculation (θμβζζιόξ) and expectations (ἐθπίδεξ).
1179
 In the case of the future, there is still no 
sensation of what will happen, but the ροπή is able to imagine it by employing that part of it 
that is like a painter.
1180
 Thus, the ροπή illuminates our sensations and it also extends its own 
awareness towards the past and the future. This is then what distinguishes us from a 
mollusk.
1181
 Human life is much more complex than what we imagine the life of such sea 
creatures to be, and this complexity of ours must be attributed to the workings of the ροπή. 
 Finally, there is still one more decisive aspect in Plato‟s identification of the ροπή. 
Plato highlights in several passages (including the one from Theaetetus we just considered) 
that we are not only directed towards sensible and individual contents, but are also aware of 
what we might call intellectual predicates. These intellectual or general predicates cannot be 
given as such by any sensible experience. The sensory organs give specific kinds of content 
(visible, audible, and so on), but we can also reflect about our sensations and determine them 
                                                 
1177
 Cp. Grg. 465c-d: “ηαὶ βὰν ἄκ, εἰ ιὴ ἟ ροπὴ ηῶ ζώιαηζ ἐπεζηάηεζ, ἀθθ᾽ α὎ηὸ α὏ηῶ, ηαὶ ιὴ ὏πὸ ηαύηδξ 
ηαηεεεςνε῔ημ ηαὶ δζεηνίκεημ ἣ ηε ὀρμπμζζηὴ ηαὶ ἟ ἰαηνζηή, ἀθθ᾽ α὎ηὸ ηὸ ζ῵ια ἔηνζκε ζηαειώιεκμκ ηα῔ξ πάνζζζ 
ηα῔ξ πνὸξ α὏ηό, ηὸ ημῦ Ἀκαλαβόνμο ἂκ πμθὺ ἤκ, ὦ θίθε Π῵θε – ζὺ βὰν ημύηςκ ἔιπεζνμξ – ὁιμῦ ἂκ πάκηα 
πνήιαηα ἐθύνεημ ἐκ ηῶ α὎ηῶ, ἀηνίηςκ ὄκηςκ η῵κ ηε ἰαηνζη῵κ ηαὶ ὏βζεζκ῵κ ηαὶ ὀρμπμζζη῵κ.” 
1178
 This is expressly said in the Phlb. 21c: “(...) δόλακ δ᾽ αὖ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἀθδε῅ ιὴ δμλάγεζκ παίνεζκ 
παίνμκηα (...).”    
1179
 For soul‟s memory, see Chap. 11 Sect. 3.2, and for its anticipations, cp. e.g. Phlb. 39a ff. 
1180
 On this point, see Chap. 5 Sect. 1.5 above. 
1181
 See Phlb. 21b-c: “[΢Ω] κμῦκ δέ βε ηαὶ ικήιδκ ηαὶ ἐπζζηήιδκ ηαὶ δόλακ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμξ ἀθδε῅, πν῵ημκ ιὲκ 
ημῦημ α὎ηό, εἰ παίνεζξ ἠ ιὴ παίνεζξ, ἀκάβηδ δήπμο ζε ἀβκμε῔κ, ηεκόκ βε ὄκηα πάζδξ θνμκήζεςξ; [ΠΡΩ] ἀκάβηδ. 
[΢Ω] ηαὶ ιὴκ ὡζαύηςξ ικήιδκ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἀκάβηδ δήπμο ιδδ᾽ ὅηζ πμηὲ ἔπαζνεξ ιεικ῅ζεαζ, η῅ξ η᾽ ἐκ ηῶ 
παναπν῅ια ἟δμκ῅ξ πνμζπζπημύζδξ ιδδ᾽ ἟κηζκμῦκ ικήιδκ ὏πμιέκεζκ· δόλακ δ᾽ αὖ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἀθδε῅ ιὴ 
δμλάγεζκ παίνεζκ παίνμκηα, θμβζζιμῦ δὲ ζηενόιεκμκ ιδδ᾽ εἰξ ηὸκ ἔπεζηα πνόκμκ ὡξ παζνήζεζξ δοκαηὸκ εἶκαζ 




with general or universal predicates such as being, identity, similitude, and so on. In 
Theaetetus, Socrates calls these predicates ημζκά, because they are common not only to 
different objects, but also to the different sensory fields.
1182
 Usually, they are called εἴδδ and 
defined as something invisible, that we can reach only through our understanding, intellect or 
mind (δζάκμζα or κμῦξ).
1183
 We have some insight into them or, as Plato also says, a 
recollection of them, which cannot be derived from our sensible experience. Thus, we can 
only reach them through our own ροπή.
1184
 We must have a non-sensitive eye or an eye of 
the soul (ηὸ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ὄιια).
1185
 Indeed, the body cannot account for these kind of contents. 
It even hinders our access to them.
1186
 We can only see or hear individual things, and the 
contents or predicates in question transcend any particular instance. The soul must therefore 
reflect by itself about the sensible beings and determine their intellectual predicates. It must 
have some access to them that is entirely unrelated to the body. This is decisive, because it 
deeply affects the way we see everything. In Phaedrus, this remembrance of general 
predicates is even presented as the essential feature of the human being, without which no 
one could be human.
1187
 A purely sensitive experience of reality would be completely 
different from our own. We are not even able to imagine it. We must always see things 




 We have considered the way Plato proves the existence and importance of what he 
calls ροπή. Our life would be very different without all these components and the body 
cannot account for them. The problem then is how the different manifestations of ροπή are 
intertwined and what is at the core of this entity. In order to determine the ροπή, we need a 
more precise identification of its features. We have hitherto seen that the soul is something 
irreducible to the body, and although it is invisible, it is that in virtue of which we are able to 
experience not only the body, but reality in general. Up to a point, the soul is fully 
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 See Tht. 185b ff. 
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 See e.g. Phd. 65d ff. 
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 This is precisely what is said in Tht. 184d ff. 
1185
 Cp. Rep. 533d. 
1186
 Cp. once more Phd. 65dff. 
1187
 See Phdr. 249b-c: “(...) ἔκεα ηαὶ εἰξ εδνίμο αίμκ ἀκενςπίκδ ροπὴ ἀθζηκε῔ηαζ, ηαὶ ἐη εδνίμο ὅξ πμηε 
ἄκενςπμξ ἤκ πάθζκ εἰξ ἄκενςπμκ. μ὎ βὰν ἣ βε ιήπμηε ἰδμῦζα ηὴκ ἀθήεεζακ εἰξ ηόδε ἣλεζ ηὸ ζπ῅ια. δε῔ βὰν 
ἄκενςπμκ ζοκζέκαζ ηαη᾽ εἶδμξ θεβόιεκμκ, ἐη πμθθ῵κ ἰὸκ αἰζεήζεςκ εἰξ ἓκ θμβζζιῶ ζοκαζνμύιεκμκ· ημῦημ δ᾽ 
ἐζηὶκ ἀκάικδζζξ ἐηείκςκ ἅ πμη᾽ εἶδεκ ἟ι῵κ ἟ ροπὴ ζοιπμνεοεε῔ζα εεῶ ηαὶ ὏πενζδμῦζα ἃ κῦκ εἶκαί θαιεκ, ηαὶ 
ἀκαηύραζα εἰξ ηὸ ὂκ ὄκηςξ.” 
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independent from the body and in order to understand the former we need to conceive it in 
terms very different from the ones we use to conceive the body, even if there may still be 
some affinity and proximity between our ροπή and our body. Indeed, we will see how there is 
something body-like in the soul or how the two moments are often closely linked.
1188
  
 The nature of our ροπή is thus a complicated problem, and this is not without 
consequences for the body. In a sense, the body and the ροπή depend on each other and so 
the concept of body must also be reconsidered in light of the concept of ροπή. Actually, the 
whole structure of our being must be reconsidered. The body and the soul are mixed and 
unified, and we are the result of this mixture or union. So we cannot conceive ourselves apart 
from them, and they cannot be conceived in a pure state. They are constitutively mixed and, 
as such, they can only be experienced in the mixture. Analyzing them is therefore a matter of 
better understanding the union between them. This is something we must do from the inside, 
since we ourselves are this union. This does not mean that both elements are equally 
important. In fact, the ροπή is the more complex and more decisive component, and this 
means that the definition of the whole will be deeply marked by how the ροπή is conceived. 
So we must focus our attention on the latter and its main structures, in order to see how our 
whole experience (including the experience of the body) is possible. This inverts our usual 
perspective. The entire reality and our entire life will be seen as being primarily psychic. But 
how can this be? What is the structure of our soul? 
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The cognitive dimension of the ροπή 
 
 
“(...) ἐκ αοε῵ζ βὰν ἟ ἀθήεεζα.” 
Democritus, DK B117 
 
 
 We saw in the previous chapter that according to Plato the ροπή is the central 
component of our being and also that it is essentially characterized by power or movement 
and awareness or knowledge. These two features are at the center of the ροπή‟s two 
dimensions. Indeed, according to Plato, the ροπή has a practical and a cognitive dimension, 
although he also sees them as being intimately connected with one another. However, before 
we can determine their connection and the structure of our ροπή as a whole, we must 
consider each of these two dimensions separately – at least to the extent to which it is 
possible to separate them from one another. We shall start by isolating the cognitive 
dimension of the ροπή – i.e., the way it relates to knowledge and how it is defined by this 
relation.
1189
 We saw that the soul‟s movement is not completely blind and now we will try to 
determine what this non-blindness consists in. The soul is not absolutely closed to other 
things and to itself. It is rather open to beings in general. It has some kind of access to beings 
or is somehow aware of them (even if this access or awareness might be in part – or perhaps 
even entirely – fictitious, as we saw in Chapter 7). We must then try to determine the nature 
or structure of this access to things in general and see how it is at the heart of what we are. 
More precisely, we will try to determine how Plato conceives of our cognition in general.
1190
 
In order to do so, we will first consider the simplest forms of access to something, and then 
we will consider knowledge as such. In doing so, we shall pay special attention to the fact 
that knowledge cannot be conceived apart from the reality that is known, and the correlation 
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 The word “knowledge” is here used in a broad sense. It refers to any form of “seeing” or having access to 
something. It includes therefore knowledge in the proper sense (as a perfect access to reality) and its defective 
forms. The latter are also part of the cognitive dimension of the soul insofar as they constitute different modes of 
awareness and are somehow related (or to be more precise, are intrinsically referred) to knowledge in the proper 
or fullest sense. 
1190
 This will allow us to complement our analyses of knowledge claims and δόλαζ (both in their neutral and in 
their negative sense), insofar as we will now integrate these particular modes of cognition in the cognitive 
structure of our being. 
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of both things constitutes the inner structure of truth. Finally, we must also consider the 
subjective or cognitive powers (δοκάιεζξ) that constitute or affect our relation to truth.  
The analysis of all these aspects will allow us to see the complexity of the ροπή‟s 
cognitive dimension. But, as was said, this is just one side of the ροπή, and in order to focus 
on it we will have to abstract from the practical dimension of the ροπή (namely, from its 
desires, the way it acts and how it lives). This does not mean that the soul can be conceived 
as having a purely cognitive dimension, deprived of any practical tension. As we will 
consider later, even the soul‟s relation with knowledge is intrinsically determined by desire 
(and in particular by its love of knowledge or θζθμζμθία).
1191
 But for now we will leave aside 
the question of our interest in truth. We will not discuss how much we need to know the truth 
and whether this need is based on practical ends or on a purely theoretical or speculative 
interest, which is concerned with truth for its own sake. We will rather see that our ροπή is 
always somehow related to knowledge or truth and we will try to determine the nature and 
structure of this relation. The analysis will therefore be very abstract, but it will nevertheless 
provide an important contribution to our main problem. Both our life in general and 
philosophical examination in particular are intrinsically marked by knowledge and truth, so it 
is important to understand the meaning of these notions. In order to do so we will try to 
dismantle the unified whole that corresponds to the cognitive dimension of our being and see 
how it is constituted. But where can we start? How does Plato approach the problem? 
 
1. The appearing (θαίλεζζαη or non-ιήζε) of something as the basic layer of our ςπρή 
 
 One way in which Plato tries to determine the structure of truth is by contrasting it 
with conscious states that are still not characterized by truth. These are not the states we 
normally find ourselves in, but they let us better see what must be added to them in order to 
bring about our normal way of relating to things. In other words, they constitute the basic 
layer of the ροπή – and this is what we will now try to determine. We will see how Plato 
conceives of the minimal or simplest form of access to (or contact with) something, and then 
we will see what must be added to it. 
 What is then the ultimate basis of the ροπή? We could say that the ροπή, at its core, is 
a kind of being that is not locked up in itself and closed to everything else. It is open to other 
things and to itself, and this openness is essential to it. It is awake or conscious. Something 
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presents itself to it or appears to the ροπή. There is an appearance or an appearing (a 
θαίκεζεαζ, θακηάγεζεαζ, or Erscheinen) – not in the sense of an illusion that hides something 
(Schein), but rather in the sense that something (in the broadest sense of the word) shows, 
presents or manifests itself. The soul takes something in. It notices or witnesses something. 
This vague “something” is not necessarily an external object, nor does it need to be regarded 
as such. It may be something internal or even indeterminate with respect to its status – and 
the sphere we are trying to isolate is precisely indeterminate, as we shall see.   
 The “appearing” is an absolute fact. However illusory or wrong our way of seeing 
things might be, the appearance of something (the existence of an appearance) is absolutely 
undeniable. Its certainty resembles the certainty characteristic of Descartes‟ cogito. But let us 
leave this aside for the moment. What is important is that the appearing as such is an essential 
component of our being. It is the stuff we are made of. Without it, there would be no 
awareness at all. We would be like a stone – completely senseless and mindless. Likewise, 
appearing as such is an essential component of everything else we come into contact with. 
Despite all the differences between things in general, they must all somehow appear and they 
appear in the same domain – the domain of subjective appearance. This means that things in 
general are not isolated or scattered. They are all in relation with each other, insofar as they 
all appear in the same domain. 
However, our experience or our life is not reducible to the simple fact of something 
appearing. If we isolate this structural component of our being and identify its specificity, we 
will see that it cannot account for our ordinary experience of things. The appearance is 
always part of a more complex structure. This means that any analysis of the basic layer of 
the ροπή must be artificial, insofar as it dismantles something that is normally part of a 
compound. Indeed, it is not clear that this sphere may ever exist (or even be clearly 
conceived) in isolation. But we can try to imagine it as a means of contrast in order to better 
determine the inner structure of our being. This is what Plato does at some points. He tries to 
identify the primary or fundamental layer of our being, and he refers to it in different ways. 
Sometimes he tries to outline the threshold of consciousness – i.e., he tries to draw the 
boundaries between complete absence of awareness (i.e., the complete ignorance 
characteristic of a stone) and the minimal form of awareness.
1192
 Other times, he rather 
focuses on the distinction between the forms of awareness that are no more than pure 
                                                 
1192
 The moment which is now at issue is also opposed to the vanishing of something (ἀθακίγεζεαζ) or to its 
being hidden (ηνύπηεζεαζ). The appearing is the uncovering or laying bare of something, making it apparent. 
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appearing and what transgresses it (thus reaching in some way the reality beyond the 
appearing). These two kinds of boundary are then what circumscribes the domain of 
appearance. 
 Let us start with the threshold of consciousness. In Philebus, Plato identifies the basic 
level of the soul as a level of non-θακεάκεζκ or non-θήεδ. We considered this in the previous 
chapter. In order for us to have some sensation, there must be a stirring or a shaking in the 
body, but it must also reach the ροπή, in order for it not to escape our notice. This reaching 
the soul is thus opposed to the absolute nothingness of θήεδ (concealment, unmindfulness, or 
oblivion) or ἀκαζζεδζία (senselessness).
1193
 This still does not constitute ἀθήεεζα in the strict 
sense, but it is different from an absolute hiddenness.  
 In Theaetetus, Plato discusses in depth the nature of αἰζεάκεζεαζ and αἴζεδζζξ, and he 
comes to identify it with θαίκεζεαζ and θακηαζία.
1194
 In a first moment, however, he isolates 
the moment of something appearing, coming into view, becoming visible or being shown. 
Something is brought to light. But what is the status of this appearing? How is it to be 
understood? In Theaetetus, Socrates starts by following our natural tendency to think that 
there is some being that appears and that is beyond the fact of appearing as such – i.e., that 
exists independently of its appearing or not. We also think that there is someone to which 
something appears. The eye sees and something is seen. There is a subject and an object in 
the broadest sense: i.e., two poles that constitute the appearing but are independent of it. The 
appearing is something in between these two things, delimited by them.
1195
  
However, the discussion in Theaetetus goes on to show that this is still a naive 
conception. For instance, being will be identified with what appears or seems to someone, 
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 See 33d-34a: “[΢Ω] εὲξ η῵κ πενὶ ηὸ ζ῵ια ἟ι῵κ ἑηάζημηε παεδιάηςκ ηὰ ιὲκ ἐκ ηῶ ζώιαηζ ηαηαζαεκκύιεκα 
πνὶκ ἐπὶ ηὴκ ροπὴκ δζελεθεε῔κ ἀπαε῅ ἐηείκδκ ἐάζακηα, ηὰ δὲ δζ᾽ ἀιθμ῔κ ἰόκηα ηαί ηζκα ὥζπεν ζεζζιὸκ ἐκηζεέκηα 
ἴδζόκ ηε ηαὶ ημζκὸκ ἑηαηένῳ. [ΠΡΩ] ηείζες. [΢Ω] ηὰ ιὲκ δὴ ιὴ δζ᾽ ἀιθμ῔κ ἰόκηα ἐὰκ ηὴκ ροπὴκ ἟ι῵κ θ῵ιεκ 
θακεάκεζκ, ηὰ δὲ δζ᾽ ἀιθμ῔κ ιὴ θακεάκεζκ, ἆν᾽ ὀνεόηαηα ἐνμῦιεκ; [ΠΡΩ] π῵ξ βὰν μὔ; [΢Ω] ηὸ ημίκοκ θεθδεέκαζ 
ιδδαι῵ξ ὏πμθάαῃξ ὡξ θέβς θήεδξ ἐκηαῦεά πμο βέκεζζκ· ἔζηζ βὰν θήεδ ικήιδξ ἔλμδμξ, ἟ δ᾽ ἐκ ηῶ θεβμιέκῳ 
κῦκ μὔπς βέβμκε. ημῦ δὴ ιήηε ὄκημξ ιήηε βεβμκόημξ πς βίβκεζεαζ θάκαζ ηζκὰ ἀπμαμθὴκ ἄημπμκ. ἤ βάν; [ΠΡΩ] 
ηί ιήκ; [΢Ω] ηὰ ημίκοκ ὀκόιαηα ιεηάααθε ιόκμκ. [ΠΡΩ] π῵ξ; [΢Ω] ἀκηὶ ιὲκ ημῦ θεθδεέκαζ ηὴκ ροπήκ, ὅηακ 
ἀπαεὴξ αὕηδ βίβκδηαζ η῵κ ζεζζι῵κ η῵κ ημῦ ζώιαημξ, ἡκ κῦκ θήεδκ ηαθε῔ξ ἀκαζζεδζίακ ἐπμκόιαζμκ. [ΠΡΩ] 
ἔιαεμκ. [΢Ω] ηὸ δ᾽ ἐκ ἑκὶ πάεεζ ηὴκ ροπὴκ ηαὶ ηὸ ζ῵ια ημζκῆ βζβκόιεκμκ ημζκῆ ηαὶ ηζκε῔ζεαζ, ηαύηδκ δ᾽ αὖ ηὴκ 
ηίκδζζκ ὀκμιάγςκ αἴζεδζζκ μ὎η ἀπὸ ηνόπμο θεέββμζ᾽ ἄκ.” 
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 See in particular 152b-c: “[΢Ω] πόηενμκ μὖκ ηόηε α὎ηὸ ἐθ᾽ ἑαοημῦ ηὸ πκεῦια ροπνὸκ ἠ μ὎ ροπνὸκ θήζμιεκ; 
ἠ πεζζόιεεα ηῶ Πνςηαβόνᾳ ὅηζ ηῶ ιὲκ ῥζβ῵κηζ ροπνόκ, ηῶ δὲ ιὴ μὔ; [ΘΔΑΙ] ἔμζηεκ. [΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ θαίκεηαζ 
μὕης ἑηαηένῳ; [ΘΔΑΙ] καί. [΢Ω] ηὸ δέ βε „θαίκεηαζ‟ αἰζεάκεζεαί ἐζηζκ; [ΘΔΑΙ] ἔζηζκ βάν. [΢Ω] θακηαζία ἄνα 
ηαὶ αἴζεδζζξ ηα὎ηὸκ ἔκ ηε εενιμ῔ξ ηαὶ π᾵ζζ ημ῔ξ ημζμύημζξ.” In the course of the discussion, the appearing also 
comes to be associated with δμηε῔κ and ηὸ δμημῦκ (what seems to us), especially in the passages in which it is 
argued that “ηὸ δμημῦκ ἑηάζηῳ ημῦημ ηαὶ εἶκαζ ηῶ δμημῦκηζ”. Cp. e.g. 162c-d, 167c, 168b. As we saw, these 
terms may denote semblance in neutral and negative sense, but they also anticipate the component that is added 
to the sphere of pure appearance, and therefore we will leave them aside for now.  
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 See 156a-e.  
407 
 
and this means that if there is something like a subject and an object, they cannot be 
conceived autonomously from the appearing as such. They are rather structural components 
of the appearing. The ηζ (what appears) and the ηζκζ (that to which something appears) are part 
of the appearance, and therefore the actual appearing cannot be located in something beyond           
it – nor can it locate itself, as if there was not something else.
1196
 In sum, the appearance can 
be seen from without or from within, and the play of perspectives is important. One always 
tries to draw the boundaries of appearing from within it, but at the same time one tries to 
grasp what lies beyond it, and one also tries to situate the appearing therein. The ordinary 
perspective is indeed always situated beyond the sphere of appearing and cannot easily 
isolate this immediate sphere. However, we can also attain more refined perspectives, that try 
to counteract this transgression of the boundaries of appearing. Plato presents these more 
refined perspectives in Theaetetus and also in Philebus – and this leads to the identification of 
important features of the appearing as such, as well as of what lies beyond it.  
As was said, Plato also contrasts the appearing with something that is added to it and 
modifies it. There are, however, different approaches to this identification and they stress 
different aspects of the problem. Sometimes Plato tries to identify the different components 
of what appears (as well as the different psychic powers responsible for what appears to us). 
These components are intrinsically heterogeneous and they vary in their complexity. Some 
are simpler, other are more complex, and in fact the more complex components depend on 
the simpler components. We will consider them in more detail in Section 3. One of the 
components – namely, δόλα in a neutral sense – is responsible for determining what appears 
and establishing the truth about something. So when Plato tries to determine the components 
that are simpler than δόλα (namely αἴζεδζζξ and ικήιδ), he is discussing something that is 
closer to a simple appearing or an appearing still deprived of the relation to truth.  
 These discussions (especially when they concern αἴζεδζζξ) are often a sort of thought 
experiment, in which Plato imagines the components of judgment being removed. He may 
also discuss attempts to reduce ourselves to this sphere (such as Protagoras seems to do, 
according to the Theaetetus). However, we always have much more, and it is very difficult to 
conceive what exactly would correspond to a pure sensation. We can only determine certain 
general features. As we will see later, a pure sensation would be indeterminate and absolutely 
hazy.
1197
 It would not be able to determine what appears to it. It would not even experience 
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 See Sect. 3.1 below. 
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this indetermination as the frustration of an expectation (as we normally do). It would have 
simple contents and they would be in a state of permanent flux.
1198
 But one would not even 
be aware of such a flux, since the consciousness associated with it would be momentary. In 
other words, we are only aware of what is sensed at the present moment. This awareness 
corresponds to the sphere of senses and inner feelings (ἕλεζξ) – i.e., the felt or lived body.
1199
 
However, it is not something we can locate in physical reality. Any representation of reality 
already implies something more. At the level of pure αἴζεδζζξ, we have only a subjective, 
internal or individual plain, to which only the ροπή in question has access. But we would not 
even be able to represent this sphere as internal or individual, since that also implies that we 
determine it in that way. In fact, we would probably not even be aware of it (at least in the 
sense in which we are normally aware of things), since according to Plato we can only be 
aware of αἰζεήζεζξ and relate to them if we have a judgment about them.
1200
 
 We therefore need memory and judgment (δόλα). The former expands the temporal 
horizon of our consciousness, whereas the latter allows us to overcome the simple appearing 
of something and relate to truth (which is a relation that deeply transforms the sphere of 
sensations). But it is important to bear in mind that in a way our memories and even our 
judgments are also something that appears – and in this respect they are something absolutely 
certain. The sense of appearing is indeed more complex and goes beyond mere sensations. As 
was said, everything must somehow appear, including our judgments.  
In order to understand this better, we can look at what is said in Philebus. When 
considering the possibility of our pleasures being false, which implies that they are mediated 
by δόλαζ, Socrates discusses the properties of our judging (δμλάγεζκ) and our having pleasure 
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 Plato indeed associates this sphere with the Heraclitean view that everything is in flux (cp. 152d ff.). 
Although this view normally tries to define how things are, the features attributed to reality can be identified in 
the appearing as such. The latter is in a permanent state of becoming, always changing. It is transient and as 
such completely indeterminate. There is no permanent or fix content – i.e., no determinate being. Therefore, it 
cannot be said to be “thus” or “otherwise”. That would require some kind of stagnation. Everything that can be 
said of it is that it is “not even this”. See in particular 183a-b: “δε῔ δὲ μ὎δὲ ημῦημ ηὸ „μὕης‟ θέβεζκ – μ὎δὲ βὰν ἂκ 
ἔηζ ηζκμ῔ημ ηὸ „μὕης‟ – μ὎δ᾽ αὖ „ιὴ μὕης‟ – μ὎δὲ βὰν ημῦημ ηίκδζζξ – ἀθθά ηζκ᾽ ἄθθδκ θςκὴκ εεηέμκ ημ῔ξ ηὸκ 
θόβμκ ημῦημκ θέβμοζζκ, ὡξ κῦκ βε πνὸξ ηὴκ α὏η῵κ ὏πόεεζζκ μ὎η ἔπμοζζ ῥήιαηα, εἰ ιὴ ἄνα ηὸ „μ὎δ᾽ μὕηςξ‟ 
ιάθζζηα δ᾽ μὕηςξ ἂκ α὎ημ῔ξ ἁνιόηημζ, ἄπεζνμκ θεβόιεκμκ.”  
1199
 Plato refers to this in Theaetetus 167a-b, where he identifies the appearing with the sphere of our private 
state or condition (ἕλζξ), and argues that medicine (and in fact all forms of special knowledge or ζμθία) is only 
concerned with improving our ἕλζξ. The word ἕλζξ points here to the use of the verb ἔπεζκ with adverbs to 
designate how one is faring or feeling. Indeed, even if we cannot determine things as they are, we have different 
conditions and we can regulate ourselves by them. Although it is not clear which access we could have to this 
sphere of pure feeling, we can at least refer to it. 
1200
 This is what is expressed in the already mentioned passage in Phlb. 21b-c, where Socrates argues that our 




(ἣδεζεαζ). In particular, he stresses that both judgment and pleasure have a component that 
does not admit of falsity. Even if what we judge and that with which we have pleasure is 
false, the act of judging and of having pleasure are absolute (ὄκηςξ). As Socrates says, we 
really judge and really have pleasure. That cannot be doubted away or lost.
1201
 In a way, the 
same applies to what is judged (understood as the immanent content of judgment), as well as 
to the object in which one takes pleasure (assuming pleasure is always related to some sort of 
object, as Socrates tries to show). All these things appear to us and hence they are 
unquestionable and cannot be dismissed. Things may not be as we judge them, but the fact 
that we judge what we judge is absolutely certain.
1202
 In sum, the absolute certainty that 
characterizes the appearing as such is not restricted to our sensations. It extends to all forms 
of psychic activity and their intrinsic correlates. All of them are an absolute fact, and belong 
to a sphere of absolute givenness. Their appearing cannot be doubted away or put in question, 
and it is in this sense that the sphere of appearing resembles the sphere of the cogito 
identified by Descartes. However much we doubt the truth of our thoughts, it is nonetheless 
certain that we are thinking them.
1203
 In other words, regardless of how things are (and 
whether the appearing is a sort of dream and does not correspond to anything in reality, or 
rather the appearing of something real, that cannot be reduced to its appearance), it is 
nevertheless a fact that there is an appearance of something.  
However, if we isolate this fact as such, we are faced with a serious problem. Its 
certainty comes from it not being referred to something beyond it. But this also means that 
the appearance as such is indeterminate with respect to its own status. The mere fact of 
something appearing does not let us infer in any way if what appears is in any way real or 
not. Even saying that there is nothing beyond our consciousness and what appears to it 
already implies an additional component. The fact that something appears does not determine 
                                                 
1201
 See Phlb. 37a-b: “[΢Ω] ἔζηζκ βάν πμύ ηζ δμλάγεζκ ἟ι῔κ; [ΠΡΩ] καί. [΢Ω] ηαὶ ἣδεζεαζ; [ΠΡΩ] καί. [΢Ω] ηαὶ 
ιὴκ ηαὶ ηὸ δμλαγόιεκόκ ἐζηί ηζ; [ΠΡΩ] π῵ξ δ᾽ μὔ; [΢Ω] ηαὶ ηό βε ᾧ ηὸ ἟δόιεκμκ ἣδεηαζ; [ΠΡΩ] ηαὶ πάκο βε. 
[΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ ηὸ δμλάγμκ, ἄκηε ὀνε῵ξ ἄκηε ιὴ ὀνε῵ξ δμλάγῃ, ηό βε δμλάγεζκ ὄκηςξ μ὎δέπμηε ἀπόθθοζζκ. [ΠΡΩ] 
π῵ξ βὰν ἄκ; [΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ ηὸ ἟δόιεκμκ, ἄκηε ὀνε῵ξ ἄκηε ιὴ ὀνε῵ξ ἣδδηαζ, ηό βε ὄκηςξ ἣδεζεαζ δ῅θμκ ὡξ 
μ὎δέπμη᾽ ἀπμθε῔.” 
1202
 This does not mean that we are always expressly aware of our judgments. They may indeed be tacit, as we 
saw in Chap. 6. However, if we pay attention to them, we will not be able to doubt of their existence once we 
notice that they appear to our mind.  
1203
 Descartes notoriously goes on to use this absolute fact as a secure or unshakable foundation of the edifice of 
knowledge, and tries to ground everything else on it. In a way, Husserl identifies also a similar sphere (the 
sphere of the phenomena, which is the result of a suspension of assent or ἐπμπή). Both these philosophical 
projects are thus based on the sphere of appearing Plato is alluding to. However, Plato does not try to derive a 
full identification of reality from here. As was said, this is used only as a means of contrast to something else. 
For more on the passage we are considering and on this “Cartesian” aspect of Plato‟s reflections, cp. M. de 
CARVALHO, O caso do cogito no Filebo de Platão, in: A. CAEIRO & M. de CARVALHO (eds.), Incursões 
no Filebo. Estudos sobre Platão, Porto, Fundação Eng. António de Almeida, 2012, 179-318. 
410 
 
anything about it. But this is very different from our normal experience of things, which 
always involves more. The appearing as such is turned outwards or extroverted, as it were. It 
determines what appears in one way or the other – or, what is the same, it establishes some 
truth about it. This is decisive and changes everything. We cannot even represent or conceive 
what an appearing without this other component would correspond to. To be sure there are 
some experiences that somehow resemble the pure and indeterminate appearing. In moments 
of doubt, ἀπμνία or wonder, we do not know what is before us. It simply appears to us. 
However, these experiences are usually circumscribed and located in a larger context that is 
itself determined in some way. Moreover, our contact with an indeterminate appearance is 
already affected by the expectation of more. We cannot determine it yet, but we are already 
directed at something more. Consequently, the appearing as such fades out or is left in an 
unemphatic position. Our attention is already directed beyond it, to the reality that may be 
appearing in it and which we are trying to determine. 
In fact, even the conception of this sphere as a sphere of certainty is problematic, 
because in order for us to be certain of it, we would have to judge about it and determine it as 
a sphere of appearance as such. This already seems to involve the additional sphere we just 
mentioned. In sum, all attempts to isolate the appearance of something as the basic fact of our 
being already point to the component that transcends and transforms the simple appearance of 
something. In other words, although Plato refers to this immediate sphere, he moves 
immediately past it, and ends up stressing the importance of what is added to it. This addition 
is what we must now try to define. 
 
2. The relation to truth (ἀιήζεηα) as a fundamental trait of the ςπρή 
 
Some references were made to the additional component that transforms the sphere of 
appearance. The appearance of something is always exceeding itself and referring to 
something more than the mere fact of its appearance. So we have to determine the nature or 
structure of what is added to the pure appearance (or the pure θαίκεζεαζ) as such. At its core, 
the added component consists in the fact that the appearance is related to truth (ἀθήεεζα). 
This is what transforms the mere appearing of something into knowledge (or at least 
supposed knowledge) of some reality. It also opens up the possibility of untruth. The 
appearance of something is an absolute fact, but the relation to truth admits different 
modalities. When one tries to determine what appears, one may attain truth or untruth. This is 
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an essential aspect of Plato‟s thought. He is very aware of how complex our relation to truth 
is and of how it raises many questions, and this is what we must now discuss.  
In doing so, we will also be able to better determine philosophical examination and its 
importance, since any examination is also referred to truth and tries to ascertain it. 
Philosophical examination is all about truth and our need for philosophical examination 
depends on our need for truth, as we will see. But for now we will not try to determine 
whether we need truth, or to what extent we need it, or why. We will consider truth in an 
abstract manner and we will try to understand what it consists in. This does not mean (at least 
not at first) that we will try to say what is true according to Plato (i.e., how he conceives of 
reality). Our primary goal is rather to see what the notion of truth means according to Plato, 
regardless of what contents may correspond to the formal description.  
 But before exploring Plato‟s understanding of the notion of truth, it is important to 
briefly consider the pre-Platonic conceptions of truth, since they will give us a better access 
to the kind of questions involved in this notion and also let us better understand the angle 
from which Plato considers the notion. 
 
2.1. Some important aspects of the pre-Platonic conceptions of truth 
 
The pre-Platonic conceptions of truth (and of its opposite, untruth) are varied and can 
be found in different kinds of sources, such as epic and tragic poetry, history, sophistry, 
philosophy, and so on. We will restrict our description to some of the most important aspects 
we can find in these different contexts, which will involve an extraordinary simplification. 
Still, we will be able to see to what extent Plato‟s considerations were instigated or already 
prepared by previous thinkers, and also how he goes further than them in some respects. We 
will approach the various contexts from two different angles. First we will briefly consider 
the words used to designate truth and untruth, then we will see some important thought 
patterns associated with these notions in Greek culture.  
 
a) The language of truth and untruth 
 
 Let us start with the way the Greeks talked about truth and its opposite. If we consider 
Homer, we see that the vocabulary used is much more diversified than at Plato‟s time. 
Besides ἀθήεεζα (which only becomes the main designation for “truth” at a later time), 
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Homer uses several other words to denote truth, and this multiplicity is not meaningless, 
since they actually express different aspects of how truth is experienced.
1204
  
 One important trait shared by several of these words (including ἀθήεεζα), is the fact 
that they designate truth as the negation of something. This suggests that truth is not 
guaranteed or immediately accessible, but rather something that we must fight for. It must be 
attained or conquered. One of these negative terms, which is often used in Homer, is ἀηνεηήξ. 
It literally means not-crooked or not-deformed. It is generally used with verba dicendi and 
denotes mainly the reliability, preciseness and clearness of some report.
1205
 Also frequent is 
κδιενηήξ, which is related to ἁιανηάκεζκ and characterizes something as “faultless”, “not 
missing the mark”, “unerring”. Just like ἀηνεηήξ, the term is often referred to assertions.
1206
 
In both cases, the assertions may be of different kinds. They may simply impart information, 
or they may be promises or prophecies. In later authors, we will find other negative terms 
such as ἀρεοδήξ (without deceit) and ἄδμθμξ (without guile). All these terms are similar to 
ἀθήεεζα and they allow us to better understand its meaning. But before considering the term 
ἀθήεεζα, it is important to stress that Homer also uses terms with an intrinsically positive 
sense to refer to truth. The most important are the ἐηεόξ, ἔηοιμξ and ἐηήηοιμξ.
1207
 They 
qualify something as real, actual, authentic or genuine, and are therefore very close to the 
verb εἶκαζ. In other words, these terms have a more objective sense, whereas the other terms 
previously considered tend to designate subjective states or attitudes (especially insofar as 
                                                 
1204
 The analysis that follows will be, as was said, very brief, but for a more exhaustive consideration of these 
words, see e.g. R. BULTMANN, ἀθήεεζα, ἀθδεήξ, ἀθδεζκόξ, ἀθδεεύς, in: TWNT, sub voce; H. FRISK, 
“Wahrheit” und “Lüge” in den indogermanischen Sprachen. Einige morphologische Betrachtungen, Göteborgs 
Hogskolas Arsskrift 41 (1935), 1-35; E. MIELERT, Ausdrücke für Wahrheit und Lüge in der attischen 
Tragödie, Diss. München, 1958; W. LUTHER, “Wahrheit” und “Lüge” im ältesten Griechentum, 
Borna/Leipzig, Noske, 1935; E. HEITSCH, Die nicht-philosophische Ἀθήεεζα, Hermes 90 (1962), 24-33; P. 




), 233-242; T. KRISCHER, Ἔηοιμξ und 
ἀθδεήξ, Philologus 109 (1965), 163-174; W. LUTHER, Wahrheit, Licht und Erkenntnis in der griechischen 
Philosophie bis Demokrit, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 10 (1966), 1-240; H. HOMMEL, Wahrheit und 
Gerechtigkeit. Zur Geschichte und Deutung eines Begriffspaars, Antike und Abendland 15 (1969), 159-186, 
especially 174ff.; B. SNELL, Ἀθήεεζα, Würzburger Jahrbuch für Altertumswissenschaft 1 (1975), 9-17; J.-P. 
LEVET, Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaïque. Tome I: Présentation génerale – Le vrai et le faux 
dans les épopées homériques, Paris, Les Belles Letres, 1976; T. COLE, Archaic Truth, Quaderni Urbinati di 
Cultura Classica 13 (1983), 7-28; H. BOEDER, Der frügriechische Wortgebrauch von Logos und Aletheia, in: 
IDEM, Das Bauzeug der Geschichte. Aufsätze und Vorträge zur griechischen und mittelalterlichen Philosophie, 
Würzburg, Königshausen und Neumann, 1994, 1-30; E. HEITSCH, Der Ort der Wahrheit. Aus der 
Frühgeschichte des Wahrheitsbegriffs, in: IDEM, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, München/Leipzig, Saur, 2001, 
89-116; J. WOLENSKI, Aletheia in Greek Thought until Aristotle, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 
(2004), 339-360. 
1205
 Cp. e.g. Iliad, II.10, 10.384, and Odyssey I.179. 
1206
 Cp. e.g. Iliad, III.204, 6.376, and Odyssey, XVII.549. 
1207
 Cp. e.g. Iliad I.558, 13.375, 23.440, Odyssey, IV.140, XXIII.107. 
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they qualify things said and ways of behaving). This duality is, as we shall see (and as Plato 
himself stresses) very important.  
In Greek literature, we also find some other adjectives associated with the idea of 
truth, such as ζαθήξ (which means not only clear and manifest, but also sure, certain, 
evident), ἀηνζαήξ (exact or accurate), ὀνεόξ (right, correct) or even ε὎εύξ (straight, direct) 
and δίηαζμξ (right, fitting, exact). But the most important term, given the protagonism it later 
assumes, is ἀθήεεζα. With respect to it, we must bear in mind several aspects. First, there has 
been a long discussion about its precise etymology. The term also has a negative sense and 
seems to be related to θήεδ and θακεάκς. This relation implies that the term means 
something like the act or the result of not letting something escape (i.e., of not letting it out of 
sight or mind). The problem, however, is whether ἀθδεήξ originally means something like 
“unforgotten” – or rather something like unconcealed or unhidden. In the case it means 
“unforgotten”, ἀθήεεζα is then constitutively related to memory (to something that is retained, 
kept in mind), whereas if it means “unconcealed” it would refer to a more general experience 
of uncovering or unveiling something (thus rendering it manifest as what it is).
1208
 The first 
meaning thus rather focuses on the subjective side, whereas the second emphasizes the 
objective side of truth. We may wonder which one is primary, but they seem to be 
intrinsically correlated, and this is relevant for the use of the term ἀθήεεζα. The word is 
indeed ambiguous and it can refer both to knowledge (or the assertions that express it) and to 
reality. This is particularly important to understand Plato‟s use of the word, as we will see. 
But what about its Archaic use? 
If we consider Homer, we see that it is usually employed along with verbs of 
assertion, to qualify speech and reports. People are asked to tell the truth or asseverate that 
they are telling the truth.
1209
 It implies that one has had contact with something (or has 
acquired knowledge about it), has preserved this knowledge, and is willing to communicate 
it. It is opposed to lying or holding back. Often it is associated with the idea of completeness, 
                                                 
1208
 Heidegger notoriously defended that ἀθήεεζα meant originally “unconcealedness” (Unverborgenheit). See 




), 212ff.; Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, in: Wegmarken, 
Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1976, 177-202; Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, ibidem, 203-238. Cp. also N. 




), 239. Authors in 
Late Antiquity, however, rather stressed the connection with forgetfulness (θήεδ). Hesychius, for instance, 
defines ἀθδεέα as “ἀρεοδ῅ ηαὶ ηὰ <ιὴ> ἐπζθακεακόιεκα” and ἀθδεήξ as “δζηαία ἠ δίηαζμξ. ἠ ικήιςκ, ηαηὰ 
ζηένδζζκ η῅ξ θήεδξ.” See K. LATTE (ed.), Hesychii Alexandrini lexicon, 2 vols., Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 
1953-1966, sub voces. We find also the following explain of ἀθήεεζα in fragment 215g of Plutarchus: “ὅηζ ηαὶ ἟ 
ἀθήεεζα ηὸ ὄκμια δδθμ῔ θήεδξ ἐηαμθὴκ εἶκαζ ηὴκ ἐπζζηήιδκ, ὅ ἐζηζκ ἀκάικδζζξ.” See F. SANDBACH (ed.), 
Plutarchi moralia, vol. 7, Leipzig, Teubner, 1967. 
1209
 See e.g. Iliad, VII.297, 24.247. 
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of telling the whole truth, without withholding or leaving anything aside.
1210
 We will return to 
this in the next subsection. But for now it seems clear that truth implies the idea of reliability 
and trustworthiness. Ἀθήεεζα is something that determines one‟s character.
1211
 Truthful 
persons say true things and are therefore just or upright. They do not deceive other for their 
own profit. 
This contrast can be better understood if we consider the main designations of untruth. 
Many of them were already used by Homer, other were used only later. One of the most 
important and generic terms is ρεῦδμξ. It normally refers to statements, and it can denote 
either a lie or a false statement in general.
1212
 Indeed, the falsehood in question may result 
from an intent to deceive or from an error, and in this sense the term differs thus from 
ἁιανηάκεζκ or ἁιανηία, which denote a mistake, normally due to one‟s incapacity or an inner 
unbalance. The sense of deceit or illusion is rather expressed by ἀπαηή and its cognates.
1213
 
The idea of hiding (expressed by verbs such as ηεύεεζκ, ἐπζηεύεεζκ, ηνύπηεζκ) is likewise 
opposed to the notion of truth and highlights the active role of the subject in the distortion. 
Later, the idea of crookedness (as in ζημθζόξ) may characterize the deceit or the deceiver. 
One may also emphasize the purpose of deceit – in particular the attempt to profit in any way. 
This nuance can be found in terms such as δόθμξ (which may also designate the ruse one 
employs) or ηένδμξ.
1214
 Other terms, such as ι῅ηζξ, may designate the cleverness one uses to 
deceive and attain one‟s personal goals.
1215
 Finally, there are also terms that focus on the 
objective side of untruth and express the lack of consistency (or reality) of something, 
regardless of any intent to deceive. For instance, an untrue thing may be said to be a mere 
dream (ὄκαν) or something adulterated (ηίδαδθμξ). 
These are the main terms used to designate truth and untruth. Their consideration 
shows some important aspects of the pre-Platonic understanding of truth, but now we have to 




                                                 
1210
 See e.g. Iliad, XXIV.247, Odyssey, XI.507, XVI.61. 
1211
 Cp. in particular Iliad, XII.433, where Homer talks of a βοκὴ ἀθδεήξ. The precise meaning of the word in 
this context is uncertain. It may mean careful, honest, accurate or reliable. At any rate, it seems to apply to her 
way of being. 
1212
 See e.g. Iliad, IX.115, 24.222, Odyssey, III.20.  
1213
 Cp. Iliad, II.114 
1214
 Cp. Iliad, III.202, and Odyssey, XXIII.140. 
1215
 An example of this is the qualification of Odysseus as πμθύιδηζξ (e.g., Iliad, III.200). 
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b) The pre-Platonic understanding of truth and untruth 
 
The topic of truth and untruth in pre-Platonic thought is very complex and a full 
discussion of it would take us too far afield. But, as was said, we will confine ourselves to 
some essential aspects that paved the way for the discussions we find in the Platonic corpus. 
Some of these aspects are hinted at by the very vocabulary used to express the ideas of truth 
and untruth. The term ἀθήεεζα in particular points to the alternative between something being 
hidden or manifest (i.e. unconcealed, uncovered). This is indeed an essential distinction that 
lies at the core of the ideas of untruth and truth. Untruth is associated with covering or hiding 
something, and thereby disguising it or changing its meaning. Truth, in turn, is the opposite 
of hiding. It implies that something is brought to light and revealed as what it is.  
The alternative in question concerns things, persons and situations, as well as our 
perception of them. Indeed, grasping the meaning of something or not, and reacting 
accordingly, is of special importance in human life. We can clearly see this in the context to 
which several of the terms mentioned above allude. Truth and untruth are usually what one 
says to others. To put it differently, they are normally experienced in our dealings with 
others. Truth is a matter of factuality or veracity, of being sincere, frank or straightforward. 
People are expected to be honest and truthful to each other. Truth is in a way a duty, 
something we owe each other and expect from each other. This is particularly so in the 
context of the aristocratic morality, which holds a firm view on the value of truth and lies. 
Achilles embodies this moral and is presented as a role model of truthfulness. He says he 
hates lies and is in general characterized as being simple and truthful. This stands in contrast 
with Odysseus‟ cleverness and wiliness.
1216
 It is true that in many contexts we find a praise of 
cleverness and resourcefulness.
1217
 But in general truthfulness is more highly valued, 
including in the social and political domains. The ideal of ἰζδβμνία, for instance, implies 
equality and freedom of speech, which allows the citizens to express their views. The ideal of 
παννδζία, in turn, implies that one can tell everything one thinks without fear of reprisals.
1218
 
                                                 
1216
 Cp. Iliad IX.307-313: “ηὸκ δ᾽ ἀπαιεζαόιεκμξ πνμζέθδ πόδαξ ὠηὺξ Ἀπζθθεύξ·/„δζμβεκὲξ Λαενηζάδδ 
πμθοιήπακ᾽ ὆δοζζεῦ/ πνὴ ιὲκ δὴ ηὸκ ιῦεμκ ἀπδθεβέςξ ἀπμεζπε῔κ,/ ᾗ πεν δὴ θνμκές ηε ηαὶ ὡξ ηεηεθεζιέκμκ 
ἔζηαζ,/ ὡξ ιή ιμζ ηνύγδηε πανήιεκμζ ἄθθμεεκ ἄθθμξ./ ἐπενὸξ βάν ιμζ ηε῔κμξ ὁι῵ξ Ἀΐδαμ πύθῃζζκ/ ὅξ π᾽ ἕηενμκ 
ιὲκ ηεύεῃ ἐκὶ θνεζίκ, ἄθθμ δὲ εἴπῃ.” 
1217
 For more on this, cp. e.g. M. DETIENNE & J. P. VERNANT, Les ruses de l’intelligence. La métis des 
Grecs, Paris, Flammarion, 1974. 
1218
 For more on the notion of παννδζία, cp. e.g. E. PETERSON, Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von παννδζία, in 
W. KOEPP (ed.), Reinhold Seeberg Festschrift, vol. 2, Leipzig, Deichert, 1929, 283-297; H. SCHLIER, 
παννδζία, παννδζζάγμµαζ, in: TWNT, sub voce; M. FOUCAULT, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres, Paris, 
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There are thus many positive appraisals of truthfulness, which result from the fact that human 
beings may be honest or deceitful, and this is especially important because of the role of 
language in our lives. We can use it to intervene in reality and in the way things. What we say 
can affect how others see things and our own access to reality is often mediated by what 
others say. But language can be used both to uncover things and to disguise them, so its value 
is ambiguous. 
This ambiguity and the idea that the same thing can be used in different ways plays an 
important role in the reflection about truth. Truth and untruth are not just relevant in 
intersubjective contexts, and they are not just caused by human agents. They can also be 
caused by the gods, which may help people see things clearly (for instance, by revealing them 
something) or they may deceive people by driving them mad or creating an illusion. Other 
times, truth and untruth may be random or the result of natural elements, such as mist or 
night. The latter in particular, and its contrast with daylight, played an important role in 
poetry and later even in philosophy. Darkness and light are perhaps the most basic experience 
of hiddenness and its opposite, and they are often used as a metaphor for all forms of truth 
and untruth.
1219
 Moreover, gods and natural elements resemble language insofar as they are 
ambiguous and can either hide things or reveal things as they are. They can produce truth or 
untruth. This, in turn, is not without consequences for our life. What results from these agents 
is very relevant for our circumstances and to determine how to act. We need to see things 
correctly in order to act properly. Truth and untruth, in all its forms, can thus have a serious 
impact on our lives. This is particularly clear in the most extreme cases. The degree of 
untruth or distortion may indeed vary and one may come to the point where one entirely fails 
to recognize one‟s situation. It is something of the sort that happened with Ajax or with 
Oedipus in Sophocles‟ plays. In both cases, the delusion is circumscribed to something 
particular, but that was nevertheless enough to completely hide the meaning of their situation, 
and it ends up having the direst consequences for their lives.  
But despite the different possible degrees of untruth, the Greeks were in general very 
aware of how the space of things revealed to human beings was very confined, especially in 
the Archaic period. The sphere of ἀθήεεζα was regarded as a small domain surrounded by the 
vast unknown – so much so that Archaic Greeks felt they were exposed to obscure powers 
and helpless in face of them. They were indeed very conscious of the fact that there were 
                                                                                                                                                        
Gallimard/Seuil, 2008; IDEM, Le courage de la verité, Paris, Gallimard/Seuil, 2009; IDEM, Discours et verité. 
Précédé de La parrêsia, Paris, Vrin, 2016. 
1219
 For bibliographical references on this topic, cp. footnote 548 above. 
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many things they did not know, even regarding themselves. For instance, they regarded the 
future as being fundamentally opaque.
1220
 Furthermore, the domain of manifest things as such 
was seen as being under threat. Night was experienced as a massive invasion of hiddenness, 
and they were aware that we can very well forget things, make mistakes or be deceived. 
Indeed, untruth can replace truth. More precisely, mere appearances or semblances can 
disguise themselves as truth. As Simonides says, “ηὸ δμηε῔κ ηαὶ ηὰκ ἀθάεεζακ αζ᾵ηαζ”.
1221
 
Truth can be conquered by its opposite, especially insofar as there is a resemblance between 
untruth and truth. We find an expression of this in Hesiod‟s Theogonia, when the Muses say 
that they know how to say many lies that are similar to the truth.
1222
 It is therefore no wonder 
that one can easily be persuaded of something untrue – especially given the power of θόβμξ 
and the way poetry or rhetoric made use of it. 
All this raises the question of what criterion one may use to differentiate truth from 
any form of untruth. How can one be sure of anything? But this is not our only problem. In 
addition to the need to confirm the few things we might know, we also need to expand our 
knowledge and reach a larger and deeper truth. The Greeks tried indeed to overcome the 
hiddenness of things in different ways, which lead to several different forms of special 
knowledge or ζμθία. We already considered this above, when we discussed the old and new 
forms of ζμθία and their relevance in the framework of Socrates‟ trial.
1223
 But let us consider 
this again, from a different angle. As M. Detienne shows, there were in Archaic culture 
several figures that had an important relation with truth.
1224
 The most obvious example is the 
poet. He is seen as the one that preserves and transmits events and knowledge. But poets 
themselves point to the Muses, the daughters of Μκδιμζύκδ, as what guarantees the truth of 
what they say. The Muses witnessed things first hand and preserved the knowledge of it. 
Then, they speak to the poet and impart their knowledge to him.
1225
 Truth is thus a report that 
is not forgotten. The poets are the depositories of knowledge, and this is particularly 
important in an oral culture. Truth depends on those that communicate it and on their power 
to preserve it.  
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 Simonides, for instance, says: “ἄκενςπμξ ἐὼκ ιή πμηε θάζδζξ ὅ ηζ βίκεηαζ [αὔνζμκ],/ ιδδ‟ ἄκδνα ἰδὼκ 
ὄθαζμκ ὅζζμκ πνόκμκ ἔζζεηαζ (...).” Cp. fr. 15 (Page). 
1221
 See fr. 93 (Page). 
1222
 See v. 27: “ἴδιεκ ρεύδεα πμθθὰ θέβεζκ ἐηύιμζζζκ ὁιμ῔α”. 
1223
 Cp. Chap. 1, Sect. 2. 
1224
 See M. DETIENNE, Les maîtres de la verité dans la Grèce archaïque, Paris, Maspero, 1967. 
1225
 Cp. in particular Iliad, II.484-487: “ἔζπεηε κῦκ ιμζ Μμῦζαζ ὆θύιπζα δώιαη᾽ ἔπμοζαζ·/ ὏ιε῔ξ βὰν εεαί ἐζηε 




However, truth includes more than preservation, and so another figure that appears 
associated with it is the seer. His prophetic word can fail or, on the contrary, come to 
fulfillment (i.e., it can hit the target, as a weapon, and become reality). Prophecies refer to 
something we are deeply concerned with: what will happen and what will become of us. 
Truth is here experienced as the confirmation of a prophecy.
1226
 Finally, truth is also 
connected with the figure of the king, insofar as one of his functions is to determine what 
happened, settle questions, and impart justice. Truth is thus manifest in the correctness of 
judgment and justice – which will bring back order to the community. 
All these forms of expert knowledge were regarded as bringing more truth to human 
life. But with time they also came to be questioned, especially by the Sophists. The latter 
developed a new form of knowledge in which rhetoric plays an important role. However, 
their knowledge and the truth that corresponds to it are particularly problematic. They can be 
used to manipulate truth or to deceive, in order to attain one‟s own personal goals. Their 
worldview is indeed relativistic, and this in turn deeply affects life in the πόθζξ. But still the 
development of rhetoric (and the Sophistic revolution in general) was connected with an 
attempt to better understand the circumstances in which our life takes place, in order to better 
guide it. It was in a way a cognitive project, even if its application was based on the 
awareness of how defective human knowledge in general is, and how one can use that in 
one‟s favor. 
But this is not the only attempt to develop a new form of knowledge and achieve a 
better or more solid truth. Several other cultural practices developed one‟s awareness of truth 
and of the problems it involves. Historiography, for instance, was concerned with how one 
could determine what happened and whether one could trust reports.
1227
 Tragedy was also 
very sensitive to matters of truth and illusion (as we can well see in Sophocles‟ Ajax and in 
Oedipus Tyrannus). The same holds for philosophy. Like other cultural practices of the time, 
it tried to unmask things and reveal what they are.
1228
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 Seers were indeed regarded as depositaries of an exceptional knowledge. Cp. e.g. Iliad I.68-70: “(...) ημ῔ζζ δ᾽ 
ἀκέζηδ/ Κάθπαξ Θεζημνίδδξ μἰςκμπόθςκ ὄπ᾽ ἄνζζημξ, / ὃξ ᾔδδ ηά η᾽ ἐόκηα ηά η᾽ ἐζζόιεκα πνό η᾽ ἐόκηα.” 
1227
 Cp. e.g. THUCYDIDES, Historiae, 1.19-20: “ηὰ ιὲκ μὖκ παθαζὰ ημζαῦηα δὗνμκ, παθεπὰ ὄκηα πακηὶ ἑλ῅ξ 
ηεηιδνίῳ πζζηεῦζαζ. μἱ βὰν ἄκενςπμζ ηὰξ ἀημὰξ η῵κ πνμβεβεκδιέκςκ, ηαὶ ἠκ ἐπζπώνζα ζθίζζκ ᾖ, ὁιμίςξ 
ἀααζακίζηςξ παν᾽ ἀθθήθςκ δέπμκηαζ. (...) μὕηςξ ἀηαθαίπςνμξ ημ῔ξ πμθθμ῔ξ ἟ γήηδζζξ η῅ξ ἀθδεείαξ, ηαὶ ἐπὶ ηὰ 
ἑημ῔ια ι᾵θθμκ ηνέπμκηαζ.”  
1228
 In this sense, there is a strong affinity between all these cultural forms. They have a common concern with 
truth (whether they express it in these terms or not), though they pursue it in different ways and may even 
conceive it in different ways. 
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However, philosophy tends to develop a more complex notion of truth (which is no 
longer empirical or everyday truth) and to reflect more deeply about what it consists in. In 
fact, philosophers sometimes even talk of an absolute or divine truth, to which the humans 
may have more or less access. This is not to be understood as something other than ordinary 
truth, but what really corresponds to truth, according to them. Indeed, the immediate way of 
seeing things is discredited as being constitutively deceitful. One is required to think in order 
to reach the truth of things. Parmenides in particular seems to emphasize that being is 
something that is reached by thinking (κμε῔κ) or reveals itself in it.
1229
 This separates truth 
(now taken as an absolute reality (ηὸ ἐόκ) from the domain of the senses. Heraclitus likewise 
stresses that most people forget or do not notice the θόβμξ (i.e., the structure of reality and its 
expression).
1230
 One needs to pay special attention and make a special effort to find out the 
truth (or at least to come closer to it). We will see that the same holds for Plato. One must 
perform a careful inquiry in order to determine the truth that underlies all things we see and 
that makes them possible.  
This may suggest that truth now comes to be viewed as abstract and merely 
theoretical. However, all these different conceptions of truth (including the philosophical) are 
intrinsically connected with the practical interest. The question is the same since Homer: 
where are we and what should we do. But, as we said, we will not consider the practical 
interests of the ροπή for now. 
 
2.2. Plato’s description of the formal structure of ἀιήζεηα 
 
We will now see how Plato conceives of truth as such and how his conception is in 
fact a development of the aspects just mentioned. We will consider his description of the 
formal structure of truth. This is different from determining what Plato takes to be true. We 
will rather try to determine what it means to say of something that it is “true” or what it 
means to say that there is truth.  
In order to determine Plato‟s notion of truth as such, we will contrast it with what we 
saw in Section 1 – namely, the appearing as such. Either in its simplest form (which reduces 
it to a sphere of mere sensations) or in its more complex form (which resembles Descartes‟ 
cogito and includes all psychic activities), the most important feature of the sphere of 
                                                 
1229
 See DK B3: “ηὸ βὰν α὎ηὸ κμε῔κ ἐζηίκ ηε ηαὶ εἶκαζ.”  
1230
 For more on this, see Chap. 7, Sect. 2.1 above. 
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appearance is that its contents are neither true nor false, and hence this sphere cannot 
determine its own situation – i.e., whether it is an unsubstantial appearance or the appearance 
of something real. But this is something very different from what we normally experience. 
We are usually in contact with more than the mere manifestation or showing of something 
absolutely indeterminate as to its own status. We are always beyond this sphere, in a 
particular situation, determined by our judgments or knowledge claims. This is so even if one 
were to believe that the sphere of appearance as such is all reality (for instance, if one 
advocates some sort of subjective idealism). We determine things and that puts us in relation 
with a particular truth. So the act of determining things and truth is what we must now 
consider.  
 
a) Plato’s “proofs” of the impossibility of reducing our experience of things to a 
pure appearance 
 
 First of all, let us look more closely at the contrast between the appearance as such 
and what is involved in our relation to truth. There are some passages in which Plato tries to 
conceive simple appearances, but he also shows how our experience is always more complex 
than that and how we cannot reduce it to that domain, even if we try. Normally these 
passages try to isolate a sphere of αἴζεδζζξ as such and then show how we cannot entirely 
conceive it. Our experience is very different and this means not only that we can perform 
other kind of operations besides sensing or feeling, but also that we always perform these 
other operations. In fact, we always have many judgments that define things in a certain way 
and establish something as being true for us. As a result, everything that appears to us is 
affected by the alternative between truth and untruth, and this is why we are condemned to 
having more than pure appearances. 
We will now briefly consider the different kinds of arguments Plato puts forward, 
especially in Philebus and Theaetetus, to prove that we are always irrevocably beyond the 
sphere of appearing. This will give us some indications about the structure of what is always 
added to the appearing in our experience of things. Then, in the following subsections, we 
will consider this structure in more detail. 
Let us start with the arguments in Philebus. In this dialogue, Plato focus primarily on 
the most subjective sensations (namely, the sensations of pleasure and pain), which seem to 
be absolutely immediate. As was said, Socrates argues that without δόλα and similar 
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cognitive components we would not even be aware of sensing or feeling something.
1231
 But 
this is not all. Socrates determines that our judgments and pleasures as such always appear 
and this appearance cannot be doubted. Judgments are additionally qualified as true or false. 
This is something they cannot escape. They refer to something beyond themselves and they 
can either miss it or hit it.
1232
 But what about our feelings? Socrates says that they too can be 
true or false, and in order to confirm the possibility of pleasures being false, Socrates goes on 
to show how our feelings are always intimately intertwined with δόλαζ. First, he points out 
that we take pleasure from something. Our emotions refer to some object that is determined 
by δόλαζ, and the latter can be either true or false.
1233
 We may even anticipate that something 
will happen and experience an anticipatory pleasure.
1234
 Secondly, our emotions are not 
atoms completely isolated from one another, but we also compare our present emotions 
(which are closer to us) to our distant past and future (i.e., anticipated) emotions. This 
includes a decision (or δόλα) about their relative intensity, which helps us define what we are 
feeling, and this decision goes beyond the mere fact of a subjective appearance.
1235
 Thirdly, 
we also have a δόλα about what pleasure itself is. We conceive pleasure in a certain way (for 
instance, as a relief from pain) and we interpret what immediately appears to us in light of 
such a conception. If it were not so, we would have no determinate feeling.
1236
  
                                                 
1231
 See 21c-d: “[΢Ω] κμῦκ δέ βε ηαὶ ικήιδκ ηαὶ ἐπζζηήιδκ ηαὶ δόλακ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμξ ἀθδε῅, πν῵ημκ ιὲκ ημῦημ 
α὎ηό, εἰ παίνεζξ ἠ ιὴ παίνεζξ, ἀκάβηδ δήπμο ζε ἀβκμε῔κ, ηεκόκ βε ὄκηα πάζδξ θνμκήζεςξ; [ΠΡΩ] ἀκάβηδ. [΢Ω] 
ηαὶ ιὴκ ὡζαύηςξ ικήιδκ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἀκάβηδ δήπμο ιδδ᾽ ὅηζ πμηὲ ἔπαζνεξ ιεικ῅ζεαζ, η῅ξ η᾽ ἐκ ηῶ 
παναπν῅ια ἟δμκ῅ξ πνμζπζπημύζδξ ιδδ᾽ ἟κηζκμῦκ ικήιδκ ὏πμιέκεζκ· δόλακ δ᾽ αὖ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἀθδε῅ ιὴ 
δμλάγεζκ παίνεζκ παίνμκηα, θμβζζιμῦ δὲ ζηενόιεκμκ ιδδ᾽ εἰξ ηὸκ ἔπεζηα πνόκμκ ὡξ παζνήζεζξ δοκαηὸκ εἶκαζ 
θμβίγεζεαζ, γ῅κ δὲ μ὎η ἀκενώπμο αίμκ, ἀθθά ηζκμξ πθεύιμκμξ ἠ η῵κ ὅζα εαθάηηζα ιεη᾽ ὀζηνεΐκςκ ἔιροπά ἐζηζ 
ζςιάηςκ.” 
1232
 See 37a-e, especially 37d-e: “[΢Ω] ηί δ᾽, ἂκ ὀνεόηδξ ἠ ημ὎κακηίμκ ὀνεόηδηζ ηζκὶ ημύηςκ πνμζβίβκδηαζ; ι῵κ 
μ὎η ὀνεὴκ ιὲκ δόλακ ἐνμῦιεκ, ἂκ ὀνεόηδηα ἴζπῃ, ηα὎ηὸκ δὲ ἟δμκήκ; [ΠΡΩ] ἀκαβηα῔μκ. [΢Ω] ἂκ δέ βε 
ἁιανηακόιεκμκ ηὸ δμλαγόιεκμκ ᾖ, ηὴκ δόλακ ηόηε ἁιανηάκμοζάκ βε μ὎η ὀνεὴκ ὁιμθμβδηέμκ μ὎δ᾽ ὀνε῵ξ 
δμλάγμοζακ; [ΠΡΩ] π῵ξ βὰν ἄκ;” 
1233
 Cp. 37c-40e. It is particularly relevant when Socrates asks (37e): “ηί δ᾽, ἂκ αὖ θύπδκ ἢ ηζκα ἟δμκὴκ πενὶ ηὸ 
ἐθ᾽ ᾧ θοπε῔ηαζ ἠ ημ὎κακηίμκ ἁιανηάκμοζακ ἐθμν῵ιεκ, ὀνεὴκ ἠ πνδζηὴκ ἢ ηζ η῵κ ηαθ῵κ ὀκμιάηςκ α὎ηῆ 
πνμζεήζμιεκ;” Then, in 38b, he expressly says: “ἕπεηαζ ιὴκ ηαύηαζξ, ὃ κοκδὴ ἐθέβμιεκ, ἟δμκὴ ηαὶ θύπδ 
πμθθάηζξ, ἀθδεε῔ ηαὶ ρεοδε῔ δόλῃ θέβς.” 
1234
 See 39d: “[΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ αἵ βε δζὰ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ α὎η῅ξ ἟δμκαὶ ηαὶ θῦπαζ ἐθέπεδζακ ἐκ ημ῔ξ πνόζεεκ ὡξ πνὸ η῵κ 
δζὰ ημῦ ζώιαημξ ἟δμκ῵κ ηαὶ θοπ῵κ πνμβίβκμζκη᾽ ἄκ, ὥζε᾽ ἟ι῔κ ζοιααίκεζ ηὸ πνμπαίνεζκ ηε ηαὶ πνμθοπε῔ζεαζ 
πενὶ ηὸκ ιέθθμκηα πνόκμκ εἶκαζ βζβκόιεκμκ; [ΠΡΩ] ἀθδεέζηαηα.” Socrates then shows that these anticipatory 
pleasures and pains are based on ἐθπίδεξ, which are the work of the soul‟s scribe (i.e., the δμλάγεζκ). See 39d-
40a. 
1235
 See 41c-42c, especially 41e-42b: “ηί μὖκ; ἐκ ιὲκ ὄρεζ ηὸ πόννςεεκ ηαὶ ἐββύεεκ ὁν᾵κ ηὰ ιεβέεδ ηὴκ 
ἀθήεεζακ ἀθακίγεζ ηαὶ ρεοδ῅ πμζε῔ δμλάγεζκ, ἐκ θύπαζξ δ᾽ ἄνα ηαὶ ἟δμκα῔ξ μ὎η ἔζηζ ηα὎ηὸκ ημῦημ βζβκόιεκμκ; 
[ΠΡΩ] πμθὺ ιὲκ μὖκ ι᾵θθμκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ. (...) [΢Ω] κῦκ δέ βε α὎ηαὶ δζὰ ηὸ πόννςεέκ ηε ηαὶ ἐββύεεκ ἑηάζημηε 
ιεηαααθθόιεκαζ εεςνε῔ζεαζ, ηαὶ ἅια ηζεέιεκαζ παν᾽ ἀθθήθαξ, αἱ ιὲκ ἟δμκαὶ πανὰ ηὸ θοπδνὸκ ιείγμοξ 
θαίκμκηαζ ηαὶ ζθμδνόηεναζ, θῦπαζ δ᾽ αὖ δζὰ ηὸ παν᾽ ἟δμκὰξ ημ὎κακηίμκ ἐηείκαζξ. [ΠΡΩ] ἀκάβηδ βίβκεζεαζ ηὰ 
ημζαῦηα δζὰ ηαῦηα.” 
1236
 For the discussion of this aspect and the kind of false pleasures that result from it, cp. 42c-53c, where 
Socrates compares two models of understanding pleasure and applies the model he takes to be right to many 
422 
 
These three kinds of judgment correspond to different layers of definition of our 
feelings and each layer may include many decisions. In fact, each feeling may be associated 
to (and dependent on) our entire way of seeing things. This may surprise us, since we do not 
seem to judge things when we feel, but these judgments may be (and often are) tacit. Either 
way, we must determine what appears and it is precisely this act of determining it that 
constitutes our emotions as we experience them. Now, the fact that they are determined in 
this way means that they can be true or false (even if we do not notice that they are 
essentially marked by this alternative). Consequently, our feelings cannot be conceived as a 
simple appearance. They are always integrated in a version of things that defines them.  
 Let us now consider what is said in Theaetetus on this topic. Socrates and Theaetetus 
are trying to define knowledge and Theaetetus‟ first defines it as αἴζεδζζξ, which is an 
ambiguous term. It can have the general sense of grasping something or having an 
appropriate access to it, but Socrates and Theaetetus go on to define it as sensation and thus 
as an immediate form of appearing.
1237
 They then consider Protagoras‟ reductionist view of 
knowledge and interpret it as an attempt to reduce everything to the subjective appearing or 
to one‟s own immediate state or ἕλζξ, which would then be used as a basis for guiding oneself 
in life.
1238
 This is presented as a novelty, since normally we think we have access to more. 
Protagoras, however, tries to release us from that illusion – at least up to a point, because this 
reduction still implies something more than the simple appearance of sensations. Indeed, 
appearance itself is here defined as knowledge and truth.
1239
  
 Socrates, however, does not focus on this. He rather tries to show that the way we 
experience things involves more than a simple appearing, and also that we cannot remove the 
additional layer without deeply changing our experience of things. Reducing everything to 
our subjective sphere of appearance (admitting that is possible) would produce an absolute 
relativism and destroy the notions of knowledge and being as we normally understand them. 
                                                                                                                                                        
instances of pleasure. For our discussion, it is especially relevant what he says in 44a: “[΢Ω] πόηενμκ μὖκ ηαὶ 
παίνεζκ μἴμκηαζ ηόηε ὅηακ ιὴ θοπ῵κηαζ; [ΠΡΩ] θαζὶ βμῦκ. [΢Ω] μ὎ημῦκ μἴμκηαζ ηόηε παίνεζκ· μ὎ βὰν ἂκ ἔθεβόκ 
πμο. [ΠΡΩ] ηζκδοκεύεζ. [΢Ω] ρεοδ῅ βε ιὴκ δμλάγμοζζ πενὶ ημῦ παίνεζκ, εἴπεν πςνὶξ ημῦ ιὴ θοπε῔ζεαζ ηαὶ ημῦ 
παίνεζκ ἟ θύζζξ ἑηαηένμο.” This δμλάγεζκ πενὶ ημῦ παίνεζκ is indeed a component of our experience of pleasure 
and it may be either correct or false. 
1237
 Cp. 151d-152c. 
1238
 The practical side of this reduction is particularly stressed in 166d-167d, where Protagoras‟ views (which 
imply that what appears to different persons is equally valid) are conciliated with the idea of ζμθία, which in 
this context does not consist in having more true judgments than others, but rather in being able to improve 
one‟s subjective state. See in particular 166d: “ηαὶ ζμθίακ ηαὶ ζμθὸκ ἄκδνα πμθθμῦ δές ηὸ ιὴ θάκαζ εἶκαζ, ἀθθ᾽ 
α὎ηὸκ ημῦημκ ηαὶ θέβς ζμθόκ, ὃξ ἄκ ηζκζ ἟ι῵κ, ᾧ θαίκεηαζ ηαὶ ἔζηζ ηαηά, ιεηααάθθςκ πμζήζῃ ἀβαεὰ θαίκεζεαί 
ηε ηαὶ εἶκαζ.” 
1239
 Cp. e.g. 167a-b: “ἐπεὶ μὔ ηί βε ρεοδ῅ δμλάγμκηά ηίξ ηζκα ὕζηενμκ ἀθδε῅ ἐπμίδζε δμλάγεζκ· μὔηε βὰν ηὰ ιὴ 
ὄκηα δοκαηὸκ δμλάζαζ, μὔηε ἄθθα παν᾽ ἃ ἂκ πάζπῃ, ηαῦηα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀθδε῅.” 
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In order to show this, Socrates points to different facts or experiences that evince that we are 
always beyond the simply subjective sphere. These facts have different meanings and 
different strengths. Some of them are rather abstract, others more connected with our 
practical interests. In general, they are associated with δόλαζ, but Plato only discusses this 
notion later in the dialogue. At this point he is only stressing how we need to interpret our life 
in light of the notions of knowledge, truth and being, and also how these notions cannot be 
reduced to pure sensations.  
The first thing Socrates refers to is the fact that we see things as determined. As we 
saw above, the sphere of pure sensation would be in permanent flux, and that would prevent 
any firm conception and any being in a strict sense. In other words, nothing could be said to 
be thus and not otherwise. All we could say is that things are “not even thus”.
1240
 But this is 
very different from what we normally experience, and in fact we cannot even conceive what 
such a way of experiencing things would correspond to.  
Secondly, Socrates refers to what happens in dreams, diseases and madness, and 
furnishes the example of thinking we are gods or that we have wings.
1241
 Although these are 
exceptional cases, Socrates points to the fact that we all acknowledge we can mishear, 
missee, misperceive – i.e., we acknowledge we can have false perceptions and false 
judgments. In some circumstances, we may fail to know things as they are, and what appears 
to us may be false. But appearances as such cannot account for the difference between 
illusion and reality, so there must be something more.  
 Thirdly, we recognize experts and authorities in different domains. There are people 
that are wiser, know better, and can teach others, whereas other are more ignorant.
1242
 We all 
think so. This is particularly evident in cases of danger, as war, diseases, being at sea. We 
trust in people that we regard as better qualified to determine our course of action.
1243
 Yet, if 
there were only appearances, then no one appearance could be considered better or worse 
than the rest. There would be no difference between laypeople and experts. 
 Fourthly, our access to language (either spoken or written) also includes an important 
difference between simple appearance of a sound or a letter and the ability to understand 
them. This is particularly clear in the case of foreign languages. If we do not know them, then 
                                                 
1240
 See in particular 183a-b. 
1241
 See 157e-158d. 
1242
 See 161c-e, where Socrates stresses that Protagoras himself, although defending that the human being is the 
standard (ιέηνμκ) of all things, would have to assume that he is a better standard that the others. Otherwise, no 
one would need to learn from him. He would be as competent as all other people (and also as competent as 
animals), insofar as they also come in contact with sensations.  
1243
 Cp. 169d-170b. 
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the simple fact that they appear is not sufficient for us to understand them.
1244
 The senses by 
themselves are analphabet.
1245
 The meaning of sounds and letters does not appear 
immediately, and yet we can understand them in many cases. 
 Fifthly, the fact that we have memory is itself a form of access different from the 
immediate appearing. It refers back to a past appearing – and as such overcomes the 
instantaneous and atomic nature of pure sensation.
1246
 However, this is still referred to a 
sensation (though a past one) – and so in this instance the presence of a different structure is 
not as clear as in the other facts Socrates alludes to. 
 The sixth fact concerns the way states legislate – i.e., how they determine what is just, 
admirable, pious. At the center of their legislation is the concern with what is best or more 
advantageous. But if we have no more than sensations or appearances, then we cannot 
account for the fact that states often make mistakes and fail to achieve what is more 
advantageous. Indeed, such mistakes and failures imply that what appeared to be best turned 
out not to be so. Thus, what a state aims at is not a matter of appearance, and the way of 
seeing things that guides the state may be confirmed or denied by reality itself.
1247
 
 Based on this idea, Socrates then considers the whole class of things related with the 
future and emphasizes how experts (such as the physician, the vine-grower, the musician, the 
athletic trainer, the chef, the prophet) are those that can better predict what will happen in a 
certain domain, in virtue of the knowledge they possess. Therefore, appearances do not all 
have the same status. There is something that distinguishes them and determines their value. 
In the case of predictions, this something that is beyond them and to which they refer is the 
future reality or what will come to pass – and the expert is able to determine it beforehand.
1248
 
 Finally, at a later stage, when defining the act of judging (δμλάγεζκ) as that which lies 
beyond sensation and determines it, Socrates will present another important feature that 
distinguishes our experience of things from a simple appearing of something. As was already 
mentioned, Socrates points out that the ροπή not only connects the different sensations, but it 
also reflects about them and determines them by using general predicates (ηὰ ημζκά), which 
are not taken from any of our senses. These predicates actually pervade the multiplicity of 
                                                 
1244
 See 163b-c. 
1245
 Cp. HERACLITUS DK B107: “ηαημὶ ιάνηονεξ ἀκενώπμζζζκ ὀθεαθιμὶ ηαὶ ὦηα ααναάνμοξ ροπὰξ 
ἐπόκηςκ.” 
1246
 See 163d-164b. 
1247
 See 172a-b and 177c-178a. 
1248
 See 178a-179a. 
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sensations or appearances and determine their identity.
1249
 Therefore, we always have more 
than an immediate appearing of something. 
 All the components of our regular being mentioned by Socrates imply a structure 
more complex than sensation and simple appearance. In other words, they imply a more 
complex notion of knowledge and being or a more complex notion of truth, which deeply 
transforms the simple appearing as such. This is what we must now consider.  
 
b) The truth status as a radical modification of the appearing 
 
 How does Plato then conceive of truth and of its relation to knowledge and being? We 
saw that the ροπή is more than a simple appearing of something. It always determines what 
appears in some way and, as a result, the appearance is the appearance of something    
definite – i.e., something that is more than a simple appearance and that lies somehow beyond 
the mere fact of appearing and somehow reveals itself in the appearing. In other words, the 
ροπή is more than sensations and more than its mental acts in general. It is primarily related 
to a different domain, and its immediacy is integrated in this different plain, of which we may 
or may not have a right and clear notion (as we shall see), but that is at any rate different from 
the simple appearing as such. This is so even if we were to determine that the sphere of pure 
appearance is all that there is. In that case, the appearance would be defined only as the 
appearing of itself and of nothing else. This would in a way locate the appearance (insofar as 
it would be everything that there is), and therefore it would exceed the mere fact that there is 
an appearance. Indeed, the appearance as a pure fact is undefined with respect to its status. 
We can only see it as being everything that there is (or at least everything we come into 
contact with) if we determine it as being precisely that. But we can also determine it in a 
different manner, and in fact we always determine it in some way (even if only in a tacit 
manner). Therefore, the appearing is always beyond itself, and this beyond is what defines it. 
To put it differently, the ροπή is primarily related to what lies beyond the simple 
appearing. As Plato says, it lays out a target and tries to hit it. The target it tries to hit is truth, 
and so the ροπή is constitutively directed towards truth.
1250
 This is not something occasional 
or regional. It pervades and transforms the entire appearing, which is never a simple 
appearing. It is always related to a certain version of things. The appearing as we experience 
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 See 185a-187a. 
1250
 See Sph. 228c-d. For an analysis of this passage, cp. Chap. 8, Sect. 1.2 above. 
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it contains this structure. It is referred to something different from the mere appearance or 
from the subjective sphere – i.e., it is related to something objective. By itself, the appearing 
does not determine what things are and because of this it is neither true nor false. It simply 
appears as it appears. But things for us are never that indeterminate. The absolute givenness 
of appearing is shaped by something more. We determine what appears in a particular way 
(or at the very least have the notion that what appears must be determined in a particular 
way), and this is added to any particular appearance, thereby putting us in relation with more 
than an appearance. 
 In other words, the way we determine what appears constitutes a kind of light and a 
domain of illumination. It makes the appearance more complex. It lets something determinate 
appear in the appearance or reveals it. It also gives rise to the possibility of there being an 
appearance in the negative sense (that hides what there is), and which is a presentation of 
something illusory, that does not correspond to what there is. In any case, the appearing is the 
appearing of something defined (ηζκόξ). It is beyond itself. It shoots towards something, 
which is somehow manifesting or showing itself. In other words, the appearance is 
subordinate to something or is grounded in it. It is not strictly subjective or relative only to 
whom it appears to. It refers to something else that determines its content. There is something 
appearing to us, revealing itself to us. This may still be to a large extent indeterminate, but we 
are already related to it as something that calls for definition. To be sure, this definition of 
what appears is something we are normally not expressly aware of. We only notice it at 
moments of crisis, when we cannot define things. However, the appearance as such is always 
referred to a reality and this reality is determined in one way or another. It appears as being 
thus and not otherwise. Things appear and appear as something specific. They are no longer 
indeterminate. One has already adopted a version of things, of what appears, and this version 
may correspond to what things are or not. But it is in all cases taken as true. It receives a 
special status or a seal that guarantees its quality. It is seen as having good credentials and as 
a decipherment of what appears. It is experienced as knowledge and its correlate is 
experienced as being. This is precisely what characterizes δόλαζ or knowledge claims in the 
neutral sense. They are constitutively related to truth and, once adopted as beliefs, they 






c) The correlation of being and knowledge as the inner structure of ἀιήζεηα 
 
 The appearing is radically changed by the notion that there is something more beyond 
it (namely truth), and our ροπή is thus not confined to the subjective and indeterminate 
sphere. Its structure is more complex and this complexity is what we must now consider. As 
was said, the ροπή is related to truth, and the main feature of truth is its twofoldness. Truth is 
both a subjective state (in the sense that it occurs in the ροπή) and the objective correlate of 
it.
1251
 In other words, the term “truth” may designate our access to reality (or, more precisely, 
the possession of knowledge) and the reality we have access to. Both components refer to 
each other.  
This is made particularly clear in a passage of the Republic which we discussed 
above.
1252
 When defining the philosophers and distinguishing them from the lovers of sight or 
spectacles, Socrates discusses what characterizes knowledge (as well as δόλα and ignorance, 
which are variations of the same structure). Knowledge is always referred to being (ὄκ) and 
being relates to knowledge, since the latter is the way of having access to being. This 
correlation is fundamental, and as we saw Plato considers it in two different ways. First, he 
focuses on being, which is also what we most easily conceive, since we regard ourselves as 
being surrounded by beings. Plato then determines what is enabled by it: namely knowledge. 
Knowledge depends on being, and thus ignorance is the result of non-being and the 
intermediate between the two (δόλα) is the result of the object that lies between being and 
non-being (namely, what is δμλαζηόκ).
1253
 However, this starting-point implies that one 
cannot be ignorant of what really is nor have a δόλα about it. In order to account for these 
possibilities, Plato changes his approach and adopts a new starting-point. While in the first 
approach he seems to presuppose a kind of external witness that compares the subjective 
states and the kinds of object, he now focuses on the subjective states (which he defines 
primarily as δοκάιεζξ) and sees what corresponds to them. Each δύκαιζξ is subordinated to 
something (i.e., it has an objective correlate) and produces something (namely, a particular 
psychic state).
1254
 Knowing depends on being, is referred to it, has it as its own content, and 
what it produces in the ροπή is knowledge. Γμλάγεζκ is referred to a δμλαζηόκ, sees a 
                                                 
1251
 Even if we were to determine that our ροπή is all that there is, this would still imply looking at it as a sort of 
object. 
1252
 See 474b ff. and cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 above. 
1253
 See 476e-477a. 
1254
 See 477c-d: “δοκάιεςξ βὰν ἐβὼ μὔηε ηζκὰ πνόακ ὁν῵ μὔηε ζπ῅ια μὔηε ηζ η῵κ ημζμύηςκ μἷμκ ηαὶ ἄθθςκ 
πμθθ῵κ, πνὸξ ἃ ἀπμαθέπςκ ἔκζα δζμνίγμιαζ παν᾽ ἐιαοηῶ ηὰ ιὲκ ἄθθα εἶκαζ, ηὰ δὲ ἄθθα· δοκάιεςξ δ᾽ εἰξ ἐηε῔κμ 
ιόκμκ αθέπς ἐθ᾽ ᾧ ηε ἔζηζ ηαὶ ὃ ἀπενβάγεηαζ (...).” 
428 
 
δμλαζηόκ (which differs from being) and brings about a δόλα. Not knowing is referred to 
non-being and produces ignorance.
1255
  
This passage thus shows that the ροπή is always characterized by the correlation of an 
objective content and a subjective state. This is the basic structure on which any particular 
reality and any particular representation of it are based, and it is also what the simple 
appearing lacks. An appearance as such does not determine any reality and thus it does not 
have a particular cognitive state (be it knowledge, δόλα in negative sense or ignorance). The 
objective pole (be it something absolute or just the correlate of an internal δύκαιζξ) is indeed 
essential and the reference to it deeply changes the appearing as such and the ροπή. Our soul 
has a notion of reality and it is characterized by this particular intentionality or directedness. 
The mental acts are referred to something or they are ηζκόξ. This characterizes perceptions, 
opinions, ἐπζζη῅ιαζ, and so on.
1256
 The δμλάγεζκ, for instance, is intrinsically related to a 
δμλαγόιεκμκ, as we see in Philebus.
1257
 In the passage of the Republic discussed above, 
Socrates says that knowledge knows something or is subordinated to something.
1258
 In sum, 
all these psychic activities have a content. They are not simple and self-contained, but they 
rather imply a scission or unfolding. To use phenomenological language, there is an intentio 
(a being directed to something) and an intentum (that to which one is directed). The 
intentional object may be real or unreal, and it may be something other than the mind or not, 
but the ροπή is nevertheless referred to it. It tries to know this object and it may or may not 
be convinced of doing so. In other words, the soul sets reality (or, as Plato says, ηὰ πνάβιαηα, 
ηὰ πνήιαηα or ηὰ ὄκηα) as its target or it is directed to an objective domain. However, this 
objective domain as such is not to be understood as a thing in itself – i.e., a reality absolutely 
independent of the ροπή. Its precise nature is still to be determined. What is nonetheless 
implied is the idea of something more than the mere appearing. The ροπή is related to this 
something more and bound to it.
1259
  
                                                 
1255
 See 477e-478e. 
1256
 Cp. Chrm. 167c ff., where Socrates considers several psychic operations and how they are always related to 
something other than themselves. 
1257
 See 37a: “[΢Ω] (...) ἔζηζκ βάν πμύ ηζ δμλάγεζκ ἟ι῔κ; [ΠΡΩ] καί. (...) [΢Ω] ηαὶ ιὴκ ηαὶ ηὸ δμλαγόιεκόκ ἐζηί 
ηζ; [ΠΡΩ] π῵ξ δ᾽ μὔ;” 
1258
 See 476e: “ὁ βζβκώζηςκ βζβκώζηεζ ηὶ ἠ μ὎δέκ; ζὺ μὖκ ιμζ ὏πὲν ἐηείκμο ἀπμηνίκμο.     ἀπμηνζκμῦιαζ, ἔθδ, 
ὅηζ βζβκώζηεζ ηί.” 
1259
 This something more (i.e., objectivity) is normally interpreted as something non-arbitrary, independent from 
our will, and to a point even independent from how we conceive it. It is something autonomous, self-sufficient, 
and in this sense “divine” (i.e., more than merely human or subjective). In fact, even if objectivity turned out to 
be something intra-psychic, its status would still be different from a mere appearance.  
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 However, although the ροπή is always referred to an objective domain in this sense, 
this does not mean that the subjective or psychic dimension as such disappears. The latter in 
fact surpasses or transcends itself and comes therefore to situate itself in an objective sphere 
(or at the least in the representation one has of such a sphere). It is integrated in reality or has 
its place there. But truth still contains a subjective pole (even if it is always understood in 
correlation with the objective side and subordinated to it). Ἀθήεεζα involves (and can even be 
understood as) an activity of the soul. In other words, it involves an ἀθδεεύεζκ in broader 
sense, which is defined as ηὰ ὄκηα δμλάγεζκ (in the neutral sense of δμλάγεζκ – i.e., as a 
judging or deciding what really is).
1260
 This corresponds to the notion of knowledge, which 
we briefly considered before, as that which we are often convinced of having or often claim 
to possess.
1261
 Ἀθήεεζα therefore involves a perfect access, which has contact with or 
accompanies its object (to use the metaphors from the Cratylus).
1262
 In other words, truth is 
something that reaches the object it is referred to and is certain of having reached it. It is 
infallible and stable, it has full transparency, it lets reality appear as it is, it is lucid or sane, 
and excludes any subjective distortions. 
 As mentioned above, Plato uses different notions to designate this – such as εἰδέκαζ, 
βζβκώζηεζκ, ζοκζέκαζ, ιακεάκεζκ, κμῦξ, θνόκδζζξ, ζςθνμζύκδ, ηέπκδ, ζμθία, ἐπζζηήιδ, ὀνεὴ 
δόλα, θμβζζιόξ, βκ῵ζζξ, δζάκμζα, ἐπαΐεζκ.
1263
 These notions complement each other. They 
were originally taken from different contexts and carry different connotations. They may 
denote a simple knowledge or some pre-eminent form of knowledge, and some of them may 
have a stronger relation to the practical sphere, which implies that the knowledge in question 
enables one to act efficiently or well. We will not consider their precise meaning here, but it 
is clear that all these forms of access refer basically to the same: the correlation of knowledge 
and being that constitutes truth. However, this is only a possibility, and our access may also 
be deficient. There is the possibility of deviation – i.e., of not reaching things and of wrongly 
thinking we have reached them. This can be denoted with terms as ἄβκμζα, ἀθνμζύκδ, 
ἀιαεία, ἄκμζα, amongst others. However, even these deficient forms of knowledge are 
referred to the perfect one. They are a variation of the fundamental correlation between 
knowledge and being, as we will see below. But before we move on to that question, there is 
one final component of the formal notion of truth that we must briefly consider. 
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 Cp. Rep. 413a: “ἠ μ὎ ηὸ ηὰ ὄκηα δμλάγεζκ ἀθδεεύεζκ δμηε῔ ζμζ εἶκαζ;” 
1261
 Cp. Chap. 5, Sect. 2.3. 
1262
 Cp. the etymologies of ἐπζζηήιδ, ζύκεζζξ and ζμθία in Cra. 412a-b. 
1263




d) The truth of ιόγνο 
 
 Truth may also be contained in the θόβμζ (i.e., in speech, statements or assertions, 
which are employed to verbalize one‟s knowledge). It is then experienced as ἀθδεεύεζκ in the 
usual sense of the word – namely, as telling the truth, which corresponds to θέβεζκ ηὰ ὄκηα 
(i.e., saying what is the case) or θέβεζκ ηὰ ὄκηα ὡξ ἔζηζκ (saying things as they are).
1264
 This 
sense of truth can be labeled as an imitation or an image (εἴδςθμκ) of the truth in the 
ροπή.
1265
 The former is a derived form of truth and knowledge, whereas the latter is 
knowledge and truth proper. In this sense, θόβμξ seems to be an inferior form of truth, 
although the relation between the two components may actually be more complex. Indeed, 
when one formulates a truth, one renders it explicit and brings it into the spotlight of one‟s 
mind. This truth thus becomes explicit knowledge, which is more present to us, and also 
clearer or more distinct than tacit knowledge.
1266
 
 One may, moreover, wonder about the precise role of θόβμξ in the acquisition and 
possession of knowledge. Do we need elaborate θόβμζ to reach truth and does truth consist in 
what is expressed by these θόβμζ?
1267
 The question becomes especially relevant if we 
consider that the soul in general and knowledge in particular are understood as having a 
logical and perhaps even a verbal structure. One‟s δόλαζ in the neutral sense are conceived as 
inner θόβμζ or assertions that result from an inner conversation of the soul, in which it asks 
questions and gives answers.
1268
 But perhaps one could also say that it is the other way 
around: assertions are conceived based on what inner or silent thoughts are. The nature and 
role of θόβμξ in our ροπή (and in our experience of ἀθήεεζα) is thus somewhat problematic. 
But we will leave that aside for now. 
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 Cp. e.g. Cra. 385b: “[΢Ω] θένε δή ιμζ ηόδε εἰπέ· ηαθε῔ξ ηζ ἀθδε῅ θέβεζκ ηαὶ ρεοδ῅; [ΔΡΜ] ἔβςβε. [΢Ω] 
μ὎ημῦκ εἴδ ἂκ θόβμξ ἀθδεήξ, ὁ δὲ ρεοδήξ; [ΔΡΜ] πάκο βε. [΢Ω] ἆν᾽ μὖκ μὗημξ ὃξ ἂκ ηὰ ὄκηα θέβῃ ὡξ ἔζηζκ, 
ἀθδεήξ· ὃξ δ᾽ ἂκ ὡξ μ὎η ἔζηζκ, ρεοδήξ; [ΔΡΜ] καί. [΢Ω] ἔζηζκ ἄνα ημῦημ, θόβῳ θέβεζκ ηὰ ὄκηα ηε ηαὶ ιή; 
[ΔΡΜ] πάκο βε.” This is related with the Homeric use of ἀθήεεζα along with verbs of saying (in the sense of 
ἀθδεεύεζκ) to express the idea of truthfulness. 
1265
 Cp. Rep. 382b-c, where Socrates says as much about falsehood in θόβμζ and falsehood in the soul: “ἀθθὰ 
ιὴκ ὀνεόηαηά β᾽ ἄκ, ὃ κοκδὴ ἔθεβμκ, ημῦημ ὡξ ἀθδε῵ξ ρεῦδμξ ηαθμ῔ημ, ἟ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ ἄβκμζα ἟ ημῦ ἐρεοζιέκμο· 
ἐπεὶ ηό βε ἐκ ημ῔ξ θόβμζξ ιίιδιά ηζ ημῦ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ ἐζηὶκ παεήιαημξ ηαὶ ὕζηενμκ βεβμκὸξ εἴδςθμκ, μ὎ πάκο 
ἄηναημκ ρεῦδμξ.” We may infer that the same holds for truth in θόβμζ and truth in the soul 
1266
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 1.3 b). 
1267
 In other words, does knowledge consist in a simple beholding of truth (or some other non-verbal 
experience), or is it rather a modality of θόβμξ and something based on speech? 
1268
 Cp. Chap. 5, Sect. 1.3. 
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 It is, however, important to consider that Plato also analyzes θόβμξ separately (i.e., 
apart from its relation to a particular ροπή), as a simple statement or assertion. We find some 
very illuminating indications in Sophist, where θόβμξ is reduced it to its simplest form, to 
better analyze it. The Visitor shows that in order for θόβμξ to have sense and be more than a 
mere sequence of words without sense, it must consist of a particular synthesis of elements 
(and, more precisely, of a subject and a verb) that is able to show something about 
something.
1269
 In other words, θόβμξ is referred to something or, as Plato says, it is about 
something (ηζκόξ or πενὶ ηζκόξ).
1270
 Λόβμξ has its own intentionality. But it does not simply 
name something. It is more than naming something, ὀκμιάγεζκ. It says something about        
it – i.e., it articulates what this thing is or further defines it. This articulation or definition may 
correspond to what the thing really is or not (i.e., it may be true or false).
1271
 But θόβμξ (like 
our soul) is nonetheless directed to reality, and as such it mirrors the inner structure of the 
soul. 
 
2.3. The identification of truth and its usually social character 
 
 We have always some notion of truth, and are somehow related to it, but this does not 
mean that we immediately and automatically know what the truth is. Truth is first and 
foremost a formal notion. It contains particular features, but these features do not specify 
what corresponds to it – i.e., what kind of contents are true. The structure of truth and the 
correlation between knowledge and being still require us to deformalize, specify or identify 
what the truth is. Only so will we attain a material truth or a version of truth, which will be 
seen as what fulfills the formal definition. 
 This identification of truth is complex and composed of many different layers, which 
are interconnected with one another. We must determine several things: for instance, whether 
what appears to our mind is all that there is or if there is some reality beyond the appearing of 
what appears; we must also determine, using certain predicates, what appears or what is real; 
we must determine the alphabet of predicates we use to determine things; we must determine 
the status of the alphabet; and so on. The structure of truth requires us to determine these and 
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 Cp. Sph. 261d-262e. 
1270
 See Sph. 262e: “θόβμκ ἀκαβηα῔μκ, ὅηακπεν ᾖ, ηζκὸξ εἶκαζ θόβμκ, ιὴ δὲ ηζκὸξ ἀδύκαημκ.” 
1271
 Cp. Sph. 263a-b: “[ΞΔ] πμζὸκ δέ βέ ηζκά θαιεκ ἀκαβηα῔μκ ἕηαζημκ εἶκαζ η῵κ θόβςκ. [ΘΔΑΙ] καί. [ΞΔ] 
ημύηςκ δὴ πμ῔όκ ηζκα ἑηάηενμκ θαηέμκ εἶκαζ; [ΘΔΑΙ] ηὸκ ιὲκ ρεοδ῅ πμο, ηὸκ δὲ ἀθδε῅. [ΞΔ] θέβεζ δὲ α὎η῵κ ὁ 
ιὲκ ἀθδεὴξ ηὰ ὄκηα ὡξ ἔζηζκ πενὶ ζμῦ. [ΘΔΑΙ] ηί ιήκ; [ΞΔ] ὁ δὲ δὴ ρεοδὴξ ἕηενα η῵κ ὄκηςκ. [ΘΔΑΙ] καί. [ΞΔ] 
ηὰ ιὴ ὄκη᾽ ἄνα ὡξ ὄκηα θέβεζ.” 
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many other questions. However, this does not mean that we necessarily have an identification 
(either explicit or implicit) of all these things. In effect, we may be unsure about many things 
(or even all of them) and not know the truth about them. But the formal structure as such 
raises Pilatus‟ question – quid est veritas? This question echoes in the depths of our ροπή and 
is a constitutive moment of our being. Normally we do not notice it or concern ourselves with 
it, but there are some moments in which it becomes clearer – for instance, when we have 
strong doubts about what something is or when we have no clue whatsoever about what a 
mysterious apparition is. In that case, the pure θαίκεζεαζ is haunted by the lack of truth and, 
faced with it, we can notice more clearly not only the question concerning truth, but also what 
we usually have and at that moment lack – namely, a version of truth. 
 As was said, we will not discuss at this point exactly what need the ροπή has for truth 
and for an identification of it. We will not see the scope of our need for truth and whether this 
is a theoretical or practical need (i.e., whether it is only concerned with truth or rather with 
some practical end that requires us to know certain things). We will also not discuss here 
whether the soul only needs to adopt a particular version of things or if it intrinsically desires 
the correct version – i.e., the one that is not illusory, but corresponds to reality.
1272
 There can 
indeed be multiple versions of truth (both with respect to a particular thing or reality in 
general) and they may have different values, as we will see in the following subsection. But 
whatever need we may have for the correct version and whatever its scope, there is no doubt 
that we often feel the need to decide what things are (i.e., to adopt a particular version of 
truth). At least in certain domains we are not used to indetermination. We need to determine 
the truth. 
 Generally, however, we are not faced with this need to solve conflicts between 
different versions of truth and determine what things are. But this does not mean that we do 
not have an answer to Pilatus‟ question. On the contrary: usually we experience it as being 
already solved. The truth is already identified and we have no doubts, or they concern only 
some minor, irrelevant details. There is an established version, which is actually so automatic 
and self-evident that we do not even think about it. We are occupied with other things, with 
our life in general, and do not think about the problem of truth. This is why normally we do 
not notice the relation with truth as something constitutive of our ροπή, and may even have 
doubts about it when we come into contact with such a description. We know enough about 
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 The question assumes that there is something as a correct version of things, which is itself problematic. But 
we will not discuss this here. What we can say is that normally it is presupposed in our being that there is 
something as a correct version of things and we are frequently related to this idea. 
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the truth to not concern ourselves with Pilatus‟ question. Like him, we do not need to stay for 
an answer. The truth status is normally attributed, and in fact it tends to be merged with a 
certain version of things, and as a result any dissociation between the two (the truth status as 
such and this version of things) seems artificial. We only notice any difference between them 
when there are problems with the regular version of things. When everything seems to be 
fine, there is no reflection about what reality, knowledge or truth are. We are (or we think we 
are) in immediate contact with things, we do not need to concern ourselves, and we can just 
attend to other matters. 
 The identification of truth we normally adopt is not just any identification, and this is 
very important. As we saw above, we normally adopt the socially accepted version of 
things.
1273
 It does not matter whether it is shared by absolutely everyone, by just a majority 
(μἱ πμθθμί) or by a confined group. The number of subscribers of different truths may vary, 
but in general the truths we adopt are intrinsically referred to other people. These truths are 
shared views or shared truths, which are taken to be simply the way things are, or how one is 
to think and behave. There is something like social values and social normativity – and to be 
lucid or aware of things (θνμκε῔κ) is to share in the social values and the social truth. 
 Many of the views that compose this social truth are received through the educational 
process (παζδεία). The latter consists in a very complex process which teaches us the right 
way to think and behave. We come into contact with (or grow into) a set of social views and 
social values, and in order to be seen as someone lucid and as grown ups, we must share in 
these views and values. By adopting a shared version of truth one is acknowledged, and 
becomes autonomous and self-sufficient. One is then qualified to act and share in 
deliberations. This is an essential component in families and public life. One must be seen as 
lucid or as having knowledge (θνμκε῔κ), if one is to be trusted by others, and this θνμκε῔κ is 
primarily defined by what people in general think – or, in case one goes beyond the common 
views and has some special knowledge, one must still conform to what all (or at least most 
people) recognize as a socially acknowledged form of exceptional knowledge or ζμθία. In 
sum, we are aware of other people‟s δόλαζ and we tend to determine truth in conformity with 
them. To see things as they are, to be in one‟s right mind, is to see according to one‟s group 
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 See Chap. 7, Sect. 2.2. We will now return to some of the aspects discussed above and show how they tend 
to affect the question of truth and actually distract us from it. 
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or community. People who do not share in this do not have any credit. They are either 
ignorant, insane, or both.
1274
 
 There is thus a certain prescription or normativity of truth. Truth tends to be 
something shared. However, as we saw above, Plato puts this social truth in question. It may 
have many different contents, and there is no guarantee that any shared version of truth is 
actually true. It may be adopted by many, but the many are also the laypeople. We may also 
assume it is adopted by all, but this is usually a projection that derives of our own conviction. 
We do not actually know if there is a universal consensus. Indeed, any social truth depends 
on us as individuals. But we tend not to think about it, which means that the social truth is 
usually embraced and left unexamined. It may well be false, but we do not put it in question. 
We are thus completely exposed to the possibility of falsity or untruth, and this possibility is 
what we must now consider. 
 
2.4. The possibility of untruth, falsity or illusion 
 
 Our relation to truth requires us to identify it or to give it a precise content; otherwise 
we would be reduced to an indeterminate θαίκεζεαζ. But the fact that we take something as 
true does not guarantee that we reach the actual truth. Plato is very aware of this. There is 
also the very significant possibility that we adopt a wrong version of true or wrongly attribute 
the truth status. This possibility helps us better understand what the structure of the truth 
status is and how truth is something that is difficult to attain and must often (if not always) be 
conquered in a conflict with its opposite. Indeed, in many cases there are multiple possible 
versions of truth in conflict with each other. These identifications are either true or false (i.e., 
they either hit the target or stray from it), but we are not clearly aware of which is which. We 
may fail to notice that a certain version fails the target. This means we may adopt a false 
version and take it as true. We may experience truth or untruth. In fact, this may happen even 
when we are aware only of one possible version. The fact that we aim and shoot at truth 
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 Indeed, the notion of ιακία is normally opposed to social θνόκδζζξ and to the conventional ζςθνμζύκδ (i.e., 
to having good sense, being of sound mind, thinking straight, which implies self-mastery or not being subdued 
to one‟s impulses or desires). It is worth noting that this opposition between a social θνόκδζζξ and ιακία plays a 
central role in the first two speeches in Phaedrus, which follow ordinary conceptions about ἔνςξ. By falling in 
love, one changes one‟s way of thinking and behaving, and in the eyes of the community one is no longer in 
one‟s senses. For more on the matter, cp. F. SERRANITO, Lovers and Madmen. The Μακία-Φνμκε῔κ 




opens both possibilities. There can be two relations with the target. Untruth or falsity is a 
constitutive risk. 
 But in general untruth is more than a risk or a possibility. We may be aware of false 
versions without being in a state of untruth or falsity. In order to experience the latter, it is 
necessary to determine an untrue version as true. Untruth must be taken as knowledge and 
being. In other words, falsehood must speak the language of truth. This is what produces the 
state of double deviation we considered above, which corresponds to the notion of 
blameworthy ignorance or ἀιαεία.
1275
 A false version of things, when adopted, violates truth, 
hides being and produces an increased state of unawareness. It escapes our notice (θακεάκεζ) 
that we do not know things or that we do not reach them. We have only a subjective version 
of things that is no more than a fiction (ἀπάηδ). What we see (or how we see) is unreal,    
non-existent. We are related to something that is not.
1276
 It is a deceptive appearance or 
semblance (i.e., a θαίκεζεαζ or a δμηε῔κ in negative sense). Its object is illusory. It is not what 
we are really in relation with or what we are really directed at. 
 This description may be abstract, but it corresponds to a frequent and trivial 
experience of ours. We all detect errors and incomprehension in views that seemed solid and 
of which we were fully convinced. It is true that this tends to be a limited experience, and it 
tends not to raise serious questions. However, the occasional experience of untruth may also 
cast a shadow of suspicion over our other views. There can indeed be different ranges of 
falsity in our way of seeing things, as we considered above.
1277
 We may have adopted a few 
untruths, there may be many, or perhaps all our views are untrue. In the latter case we would 
then have no knowledge and see no reality, even if we are always referred to them. To be 
sure, this does not normally seem to be the case. But it is important to bear in mind that there 
are different kinds of falsity. We may think we know everything about something and there 
may be gaps. We may also be mistaken in attributing a certain predicate to something (i.e., 
we may commit an error in the strict sense). Finally, even if we tend not to contemplate this 
possibility, we may have a muddled or wrong understanding of a predicate, which will affect 
all attributions of it to particular things. Another complicating factor is the way our views are 
intertwined, and so one false view may affect many other or even all. On the other hand, a 
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 Cp. Chap. 7 Sect. 1, and Chap. 8, Sect. 1.3. 
1276
 Cp. Phlb. 40c: “μ὎ημῦκ ἤκ δμλάγεζκ ιὲκ ὄκηςξ ἀεὶ ηῶ ηὸ πανάπακ δμλάγμκηζ, ιὴ ἐπ᾽ μὖζζ δὲ ιδδ᾽ ἐπὶ 
βεβμκόζζ ιδδὲ ἐπ᾽ ἐζμιέκμζξ ἐκίμηε.” 
1277
 See Chap. 7, Sect. 1.3. 
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particular view may be affected by many untruths. The distortion in our way of seeing things 
may thus be extreme, even if some and many views are still somehow correct. 
The different degrees of untruth are possible due to our relation to truth. But there is 
still one possibility that Plato does not consider in detail – and to which Nietzsche in 
particular calls our attention. It can happen that there is no truth at all (or at least it may not 
be possible for us to properly identify it). In fact, it may happen that the concept of truth itself 
is untrue – i.e., it may be a false concept and it may even involve inner contradiction. The 
project of identifying truth may therefore be false.
1278
 It is, however, very difficult to 
conceive how it can be so, and we must wonder whether it is possible to nullify our relation 
to truth. What would that correspond to? Would we then be reduced to something like the 
abstract appearing described in Section 1 (which was itself very problematic), or would we be 
able to manipulate judgments and create all truths at will (which in a way would still preserve 
the notion of truth, and would thus raise the question of how we can believe it when we know 
there is no truth)? Plato never considers these questions – so let us likewise leave them aside 
for now. 
 We are discussing the possibility of untruth as such and Plato not only calls the 
reader‟s attention to this possibility and to the fact that we adopt views that are false or 
untrue, but he also discusses two major sources of perplexity associated with this possibility. 
The first pertains to the very possibility of conceiving untruth or falsehood. What is untruth 
and what makes it possible? How can we conceive the opposite of knowledge and being (i.e., 
false views and non-being)? The problem is complex. Plato discusses untruth several times 
and the attempts to conceive it are affected by the kind of falsity the characters have in mind. 
It is not the same to discuss the false attribution of predicates and the false understanding of a 
predicate. The analyses, however, tend to focus on the former. The most conspicuous 
example is probably the discussion of falsehood in the Theaetetus.
1279
 In contrast, the 
discussion in the Sophist is more refined, since it considers the general predicates.
1280
 An 
analysis of these passages would take us too far afield, but it is important to at least consider 
some of their most important aspects. 
 The main problem is how it is possible to think, judge or say something false. How 
can that still be an act of thinking, judging or saying? All these acts seem to imply an 
intentional object. We judge something or say something – i.e., something that is. How can 
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 For more on this, see Chap. 20, Sect. 3.4 below. 
1279
 Cp. 187d ff. 
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 Cp. 236e ff. 
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we think or say something that is not or something that is nothing?
 
In doing so, the act in 
question seems to have absolutely no object, and it would thus be empty and meaningless. 
There would be no judgment and no assertion. At the most, there would be only noise 
(assuming the judgment was pronounced out loud).
1281
 In effect, a false judgment or a false 
statement judges or thinks that what-is is not or that what-is-not is, and so non-being is 
involved in both cases.
1282
 
 Plato then tries to explain that non-being can in some way be. The notions of being 
and non-being can be intertwined. At least that is how the problem is presented in the 
Sophist.
1283
 Both here and in Theaetetus, Plato tries to conceive falsity as a judging or saying 
things differently from what they are – i.e., as a mistake or misidentification. In Theaetetus, 
Socrates speaks of ἀθθμδμλία and ἑηενμδμλία.
1284
 But how can this deceive us? How can we 
experience untruth or falsehood as their opposite? We cannot simply swap one thing for 
another – because then we would simply be thinking or saying this other thing, and not 
confusing one with the other. In other words, the alternative in this case seems to be between 
knowing and not knowing something, or between thinking or not thinking about it, but it is 
not clear how we can have access to something and at the same time mistake it with 
something else. Therefore, in order for us to take untruth as truth, it is necessary to assume 
something as an imperfect access to something. This is what the discussion in Theaetetus 
tries to identify, although it does not clearly express it in those terms. Socrates and Theaetetus 
consider the examples of seeing someone from afar or not remembering something 
precisely.
1285
 Only so can we convince ourselves that what we are thinking is something else. 
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 Cp. Cra. 429c-430a: “[΢Ω] ἆνα ὅηζ ρεοδ῅ θέβεζκ ηὸ πανάπακ μ὎η ἔζηζκ, ἆνα ημῦηό ζμζ δύκαηαζ ὁ θόβμξ; 
ζοπκμὶ βάν ηζκεξ μἱ θέβμκηεξ, ὦ θίθε Κναηύθε, ηαὶ κῦκ ηαὶ πάθαζ. [ΚΡΑ] π῵ξ βὰν ἄκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, θέβςκ βέ ηζξ 
ημῦημ ὃ θέβεζ, ιὴ ηὸ ὂκ θέβμζ; ἠ μ὎ ημῦηό ἐζηζκ ηὸ ρεοδ῅ θέβεζκ, ηὸ ιὴ ηὰ ὄκηα θέβεζκ; [΢Ω] ημιρόηενμξ ιὲκ ὁ 
θόβμξ ἠ ηαη᾽ ἐιὲ ηαὶ ηαηὰ ηὴκ ἐιὴκ ἟θζηίακ, ὦ ἑηα῔νε. ὅιςξ ιέκημζ εἰπέ ιμζ ημζόκδε· πόηενμκ θέβεζκ ιὲκ μ὎ 
δμηε῔ ζμζ εἶκαζ ρεοδ῅, θάκαζ δέ; [ΚΡΑ] μὔ ιμζ δμηε῔ μ὎δὲ θάκαζ. [΢Ω] μ὎δὲ εἰπε῔κ μ὎δὲ πνμζεζπε῔κ; μἷμκ εἴ ηζξ 
ἀπακηήζαξ ζμζ ἐπὶ λεκίαξ, θααόιεκμξ η῅ξ πεζνὸξ εἴπμζ· „πα῔νε, ὦ λέκε Ἀεδκα῔ε, ὏ὲ ΢ιζηνίςκμξ ἗νιόβεκεξ,‟ 
μὗημξ θέλεζεκ ἂκ ηαῦηα ἠ θαίδ ἂκ ηαῦηα ἠ εἴπμζ ἂκ ηαῦηα ἠ πνμζείπμζ ἂκ μὕης ζὲ ιὲκ μὔ, ἗νιμβέκδ δὲ ηόκδε; ἠ 
μ὎δέκα; [ΚΡΑ] ἐιμὶ ιὲκ δμηε῔, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ἄθθςξ ἂκ μὗημξ ηαῦηα θεέβλαζεαζ. [΢Ω] ἀθθ᾽ ἀβαπδηὸκ ηαὶ ημῦημ. 
πόηενμκ βὰν ἀθδε῅ ἂκ θεέβλαζημ ηαῦηα ὁ θεεβλάιεκμξ ἠ ρεοδ῅; ἠ ηὸ ιέκ ηζ α὎η῵κ ἀθδεέξ, ηὸ δὲ ρεῦδμξ; ηαὶ 
βὰν ἂκ ηαὶ ημῦημ ἐλανημ῔. [ΚΡΑ] ρμθε῔κ ἔβςβ᾽ ἂκ θαίδκ ηὸκ ημζμῦημκ, ιάηδκ α὎ηὸκ ἑαοηὸκ ηζκμῦκηα, ὥζπεν ἂκ 
εἴ ηζξ παθηίμκ ηζκήζεζε ηνμύζαξ.” 
1282
 Cp. Sph. 236e-237a: “[ΞΔ] (...) ηὸ βὰν θαίκεζεαζ ημῦημ ηαὶ ηὸ δμηε῔κ, εἶκαζ δὲ ιή, ηαὶ ηὸ θέβεζκ ιὲκ ἄηηα, 
ἀθδε῅ δὲ ιή, πάκηα ηαῦηά ἐζηζ ιεζηὰ ἀπμνίαξ ἀεὶ ἐκ ηῶ πνόζεεκ πνόκῳ ηαὶ κῦκ. ὅπςξ βὰν εἰπόκηα πνὴ ρεοδ῅ 
θέβεζκ ἠ δμλάγεζκ ὄκηςξ εἶκαζ, ηαὶ ημῦημ θεεβλάιεκμκ ἐκακηζμθμβίᾳ ιὴ ζοκέπεζεαζ, πακηάπαζζκ, ὦ Θεαίηδηε, 
παθεπόκ. [ΘΔΑΙ] ηί δή; [ΞΔ] ηεηόθιδηεκ ὁ θόβμξ μὗημξ ὏πμεέζεαζ ηὸ ιὴ ὂκ εἶκαζ· ρεῦδμξ βὰν μ὎η ἂκ ἄθθςξ 
ἐβίβκεημ ὄκ.” 
1283
 Cp. 241d: “ηὸκ ημῦ παηνὸξ Πανιεκίδμο θόβμκ ἀκαβηα῔μκ ἟ι῔κ ἀιοκμιέκμζξ ἔζηαζ ααζακίγεζκ, ηαὶ αζάγεζεαζ 
ηό ηε ιὴ ὂκ ὡξ ἔζηζ ηαηά ηζ ηαὶ ηὸ ὂκ αὖ πάθζκ ὡξ μ὎η ἔζηζ πῃ.” 
1284
 Plato also uses the verbs ἀθθμδμλε῔κ and ἑηενμδμλε῔κ. See 189b, 189d, 190e, 193d. 
1285
 See 191b and 193b-c. 
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 In sum, we can only conceive the adoption of a falsehood if we assume that there are 
different degrees of knowledge (or access to something) and different degrees of being – i.e., 
there must be an intermediate state between knowledge and ignorance and between being and 
non-being. It is because we have no perfect access to empirical realities or to eidetic contents 
that we can make a mistake and think it as being something other than what it is. This implies 
that we are somehow related to a reality, but we are not absolutely clear about it. There is a 
target for our judgment, but our relation to it is not perfect. In other words, we are already 
related to the thing itself, but we have no more than an image of it, i.e., something that refers 
to it, but still falls short of reaching it. This image may then distort what the thing is and hide 
it. We may mistake the thing for something else. But for that to happen, the soul must try to 
determine something – despite the fact that it has only a hazy awareness of it – and it must 
also become convinced that it has determined it. Falsehood implies an excess over what is 
given. If one would simply recognize the limitations of one‟s access, one would still be 
ignorant, but one would not make a mistake or misunderstand anything.  
 This applies to all beings, including the εἴδδ. Plato defends that we always have some 
glimpse or partial recollection of them (i.e., that there is always some ἀθήεεζα in our soul), 
and that this is constitutive of a human being.
1286
 We must then develop the vague 
understanding of an εἶδμξ, and this development may distort the content and make us 
misunderstand it. But we are still convinced we understand it, and so it may be difficult to 
dissociate the glimpse from the false development of a particular εἶδμξ. However, both 
moments are constitutive of the experience of falsehood at this level. Such a falsehood or 
untruth in our access to the εἴδδ then affects all attributions, which may be additionally 




 This points to a different source of perplexity associated with untruth or falsehood. 
How do we come to accept a false judgment or a false assertion? What leads us to untruth? 
What is our motivation? The ροπή seems to be directed at truth and to require an 
identification of it – and yet it is full of baseless or false views. Why do we not reach truth 
and do not recognize it? Why do we accept something less and mistake it for the real thing? 
Why do we accept views without sufficient grounds? These questions are important to 
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 See Phdr. 249b-c. 
1287
 This is, for instance, the difficulty the philosopher experiences when returning to the cave. His eyes are not 
used to seeing sensible realities and distinguish between them. See Rep. 516e-517a. However, even when his 
eyes (or the mind that sees through them) are accustomed to this level of reality, there may still be unfavorable 
perceptive conditions (such as weak light, distance, and so on). 
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determine our relation to untruth. However, they are too complicated to be tackled now and 
we will have to return to them later, after we discuss the inner motivations or desires of the 
soul.
1288
 Then we will be able to see how our experience of untruth is not caused by an 
external source. There is an inner motivation, which is precisely what lies at the basis of the 
unexamined life. 
 But the important thing for now is that we are always subjected to the alternative 
between truth and untruth in all moments of our being and in many moments we cannot 
distinguish between the both. Fallibility pervades our being. This is something of which we 
are often reminded. We often find ourselves in error (either attributing wrong predicates or 
wrongly thinking we understand these predicates), and we would find many more errors if we 
were to embrace philosophical examination. We may in fact live full of illusions. The 
consideration of untruth thus raises the question of how true or untrue our usual 
representation of things is, and also of how we can know something and be certain of it.  
 
2.5. The main features and the problems of the Platonic identification of the 
truth 
 
 After discussing Plato‟s understanding of the notion of truth and distinguishing the 
truth status as such from the specification or identification of truth, it is now important to 
consider what Plato takes to be true – i.e., what is his outlook on reality and on how we can 
know it. This will allow us to better understand all that may be involved in the identification 
of truth. So we will briefly try to determine the main features of Plato‟s identification of truth 
and the problems associated with it. This task, however, is not simple, in virtue of the nature 
of the Platonic corpus. As we saw in the Introduction, it is not clear what exactly Plato views 
were or what he regarded as true. He does not talk in his own voice. His writings rather 
present a multitude of characters with different viewpoints, and we do not know if the author 
endorsed any of them. Moreover, many arguments are unclear and apparently fallacious. The 
dialogues themselves are often aporetic, and even those arguments that go unopposed in a 
dialogue tend to be contradicted somewhere else. Therefore, it is not clear whether there is an 
underlying unity to all of this (either in the corpus itself or as a set of hidden doctrines the 
texts only allude to).
1289
 At any rate, even if we do not find a unitary and complete theory in 
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 See in particular Chaps. 16 and 17 below. 
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 For more on this, see Introduction, Sect. 4.  
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the texts, we saw that there are some indications which we can collect and order, and which 
present something as a general tendency of the texts. 
 In general, the texts point to an identification of truth that is very different from our 
usual way of seeing things, and even from all that we are prepared to accept. Many things 
will seem unreasonable, if not outright insane. Plato himself is aware of how most people 
tend to find the philosopher‟s views implausible and unsensible.
1290
 But Plato‟s writings do 
not simply present strange views. They also try to refute many views to which we are 
naturally inclined. There is therefore a conflict between the natural way of seeing things and 
many of the conceptions put forward in the corpus. It seems that according to Plato the main 
aspects of truth are usually hidden from us. We are far from the truth and our usual outlook 
on reality is actually a form of madness. Consequently, we can only be lucid if we break with 
our ordinary views.  
 This does not mean that the Platonic corpus defends that there is something like a               
super-knowledge or a super-reality, different from the one we normally recognize (even if 
some passages may suggest so). The version of truth suggested by Plato‟s texts is so different 
from the ordinary views because our ordinary access to things is very deficient, as we saw in 
Chapter 7. We do not have proper knowledge, and we are not in contact with reality proper. 
What we take to be knowledge and reality is actually something that lies between absolute 
ignorance and perfect knowledge and also between non-being and being. More than that: this 
defective way of seeing things already implies and points to more than what is immediately 
recognized in it. The truth Plato seems to be referring to is not a super-truth, but rather the 
truth of what we normally take as true. This is why normally there seems to be no room for 
any new version of things. We think we already know things (or at least the essentials about 
them), so any other truth is superfluous. But Plato strongly contests our alleged knowledge, 
and he gives clues about what should replace it. 
But what does Plato say (or suggest) is the truth? Which clues do we find in the texts? 
In some of the most elaborate passages, truth seems to be primarily connected with the 
general modes of being or εἴδδ, which he discusses especially in Phaedo, Phaedrus, 
Republic, Sophist, Parmenides and Timaeus. But what Plato says about them in these and 
other texts is far from corresponding to a univocal and clear doctrine. He presents different 
characterizations or descriptions of them (some of which mythological), and he also presents 
a robust criticism of them in Parmenides (whereby he anticipates much of the criticism of 
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 Cp. e.g. Grg. 473e-474b, 481b-c, Phd. 64a-b, Tht. 173b-175b. 
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later authors). The reader must therefore decide how the different passages are to be brought 
together and what results from their combination. 
We already considered the notion of εἶδμξ above, but let us reconsider some aspects of 
it, in light of the question we are now discussing.
1291
 The εἴδδ are presented as that which 
fulfills the main requirements of knowledge or truth. Plato argues or tries to show that truth 
must be stable and clear. It cannot be always changing and it cannot be mixed in a confused 
whole either. It must be clearly defined as something that is what it is. In other words, it must 
be itself by itself (α὎ηὸ ηαε‟ α὏ηό) – i.e., it must be absolute, independent from 
circumstances, standpoint, time, and space.
1292
 This is what constitutes objectivity in the 
highest sense, and the εἴδδ are presented precisely as what corresponds to this description. 
They pervade everything and appear everywhere, but cannot be reduced to individual 
beings.
1293
 They are a kind of being very different from the ones we normally recognize. In 
fact, they are described as transcendent, which mainly stresses their autonomy from all 
sensible reality (i.e., from each of their occurences in empirical reality). They must be 
conceived in themselves, independently of individual beings and also of the other εἴδδ. In 
other words, they must be independent, monoeidetic and changeless. Only so can they have 
their own distinct content, which they must have if they are to determine things. Therefore, 
the εἴδδ are not simply a different kind of being. They are what most fulfills the truth criteria 
and, as such, they are what is primarily or pre-eminently true. The access to them is 
knowledge proper, and they are the most real beings – the μ὎ζία ὄκηςξ μὖζα.
1294
 
 In other words, the εἴδδ are what is most real. They are not subjective fictions. They 
really exist and have a clear content, even if one is unable identify it. However, Plato appears 
to go further and at times he seems to hypostasize the εἴδδ and to describe (usually under 
mythological garments) a peculiar geography of truth, according to which there would be a 
plane of reality different from this one, in which one could leave sensible reality behind and 
simply contemplate the εἴδδ by themselves. This plain of truth (ηὸ Ἀθδεείαξ πεδίμκ) would 
be something only accessible after death (or before life) – i.e., a kind of intelligible world to 
which only the κμῦξ has access.
1295
 But how is this to be interpreted? Should we read these 
passages in a more literal sense, or do they admit of a more nuanced interpretation? We could 
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 Cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 2.2. 
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 Cp. Phd. 78d, Smp. 210e-211b and Phdr. 247c-e. 
1293
 See Rep. 476a: “ηαὶ πενὶ δὴ δζηαίμο ηαὶ ἀδίημο ηαὶ ἀβαεμῦ ηαὶ ηαημῦ ηαὶ πάκηςκ η῵κ εἰδ῵κ πένζ ὁ α὎ηὸξ 
θόβμξ, α὎ηὸ ιὲκ ἓκ ἕηαζημκ εἶκαζ, ηῆ δὲ η῵κ πνάλεςκ ηαὶ ζςιάηςκ ηαὶ ἀθθήθςκ ημζκςκίᾳ πακηαπμῦ 
θακηαγόιεκα πμθθὰ θαίκεζεαζ ἕηαζημκ.” 
1294
 For the expression “μ὎ζία ὄκηςξ μὖζα”, see Phdr. 247c 
1295
 Cp. Phdr. 247c and 248b. 
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indeed understand this “otherworldly” experience as a different perspective over reality. 
Usually our perspective is centered in sensible beings and only confusedly aware of the εἴδδ 
that determine them. But we may try to isolate the εἴδδ and see them by themselves, which 
would also allow us to better understand the individual beings that partake in them. The 
vision of the εἴδδ and their separate existence might thus correspond to this clearer 
perspective over reality as a whole. But let us leave this question aside. 
 Another ambiguous aspect in the representation of a world of εἴδδ concerns their 
interrelation. Are the εἴδδ just juxtaposed, or do they interact and determine each other? This 
points to the problems we considered above. The εἴδδ are supposed to be simple or 
monoeidetic contents that are the basis of all composite realities, but it appears that, in a way, 
they are also complex. Some εἴδδ partake in other εἴδδ, and there may be one or several that 
determine all others.
1296
 In Sophist, Plato singles out the ιέβζζηα βέκδ (sc. being, movement, 
rest, sameness, otherness).
1297
 In the Republic, the good is described as being beyond all 
being (ἐπέηεζκα η῅ξ μ὎ζίαξ) and also as what provides knowledge and being to anything. In 
short, it is the ultimate root of truth.
1298
 But it is not clear what exactly the form of good is 
and how it relates to the other εἴδδ. Plato simply points to the possibility of there being an 
ultimate ground of truth. 
 The problems concerning the εἴδδ are thus many and diverse, and there is still one that 
we must consider. According to Plato‟s description, it is not clear if we ever can have a 
perfectly clear access to them. We do not even know how such an access would be structured. 
For instance, we do not know whether it would be purely intuitive or discursive. What seems 
certain is that our ordinary relation to them seems to be imagetic. We have a defective 
understanding of them, and do not realize it. We are partially forgotten of them or they are 
concealed from us.
1299
 In general, we can only notice this defect if we perform philosophical 




 But this is not all. Although the εἴδδ are the protagonists of Plato‟s conception of 
truth, they do not account for everything. We still have to consider empirical reality as     
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 For more on this, see Chap. 6, Sect. 2.3. 
1297
 See 251a-259e. 
1298
 See 508e-509b. 
1299
 This corresponds precisely to the Platonic notion of dreaming (Rep. 476c), and more specifically to the 
notion of dreaming about being (Rep. 533b-c). For an analysis of these notions, cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 above. 
1300
 In other words, philosophical examination reduces the untruth of our views by showing their limitations 
(which in a way is already an experience of ἀθήεεζα) and it may perhaps reveal the full ἀθήεεζα about them, 
insofar as it may lead us to discover how things really are. 
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such – i.e., the way individual beings are determined and how we come to know them. 
According to Plato‟s texts, it seems the empiric truth is an intermediate form of truth. It is an 
intermediate form of knowledge, related to an intermediate form of being. Individual beings 
are not totally unreal or a mere dream image. They are a part of reality. But their essence or 
their predicates are constitutively referred to the εἴδδ. In this sense they compose a derived 
domain and admit only of a derived truth, which is wholly based on the εἴδδ and on the 
correct attribution of them). Still, this derived domain has its own specificity. Each being is 
composed of many εἴδδ and this poses its own problems. For instance, it is not easy to 
understand how the predicates are present in things, how they come to be synthesized with 




 There are also some more general problems concerning the empirical domain as a 
whole, such as the nature of matter and how it comes to be arranged in a particular order, or 
whether there is any god and how he relates to the ηόζιμξ.
1302
 Furthermore, the empirical or 
sensible domain is also the domain in which our concrete life takes place. We must act in it or 
at least relate to it in some way. But since it is still a derived domain, we must use the 
practical or ethical εἴδδ (along with all other εἴδδ insofar as they also help define our action 
and its context) to determine things and to determine how we live. Thus, by having a perfect 
access to the εἴδδ, we can also lead a true or authentic life. But according to the Platonic 
corpus it seems that even if we do not have a perfect access to the εἴδδ, we can still have 
some truth in our lives, if we remain faithful to the need for truth and pursue it (i.e., if we 
dedicate ourselves to philosophical examination). But let us leave this matter aside for now. 
 The questions just considered give us an idea of the conception of truth that is 
suggested in the corpus, though this is still a very vague or formal presentation. It alludes to 
some general features of what truth might be, but it leaves many things undetermined. For 
instance, it does not provide a complete definition of the different εἴδδ, it does not determine 
exactly how they relate to each other, it does not say what empirical reality is, and it does not 
explain how life is to be lived. These are very difficult matters and in order to define them 
one must fully embrace the challenge of philosophical examination. In fact, the appeal to 
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 The fact that these things are not monoeidetic seems to be the cause of their constitutive unintelligibility. 
They cannot fulfill the requirements for truth we considered above. For more on this, cp. once more Chap. 7, 
Sect. 2.4. 
1302
 Questions such as these are tackled in Statesman (269c ff.), the Timaeus and in Laws X, but we will not 
discuss them here. It is only important to bear in mind that they too are related to the sensible, non-eidetic 
sphere and are in fact seen as essential for determining it. 
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examine things is precisely one of the most important aspects of Plato‟s writings. But that is 
something we will only discuss at a later point. 
 
3. The cognitive powers (δπλάκεηο) of the ςπρή 
 
After seeing how the ροπή is characterized not only by a sphere of pure appearing 
(θαίκεζεαζ), but also by the constitutive reference to truth, knowledge and being, we will 
now consider the cognitive dimension of the ροπή from a different angle. More precisely, we 
will focus on the activity or the self-movement of the ροπή that is responsible for our access 
to things or our experience of them. Indeed, the soul is not inert. It has several cognitive 
powers, capacities or abilities (δοκάιεζξ) that correspond to different ways of accessing to 
things, and are thus the source of all our experience. We will try to determine these δοκάιεζξ. 
But first let us begin with the notion of δύκαιζξ as such.  
Besides its general use to designate physical strength or political power, the term 
δύκαιζξ also played an important role in Hippocratic medicine, where it was connected with 
the identification of the elements or letters of reality (or at least of the reality that is relevant 
for the human body), which were designated by the notions of εἶδμξ or ἰδέα.
1303
 These 
elements become manifest in their effects (e.g., in their coldness or hotness, sweetness or 
bitterness, etc.) and having these effects is actually an essential feature of them. Hence, these 
elements could also be called δοκάιεζξ.
1304
  
Plato, in turn, isolates this notion and applies it to the human ροπή. There are two 
passages in particular that are important for us to understand his use of the notion. Plato uses 
it in Sophist to explain (among other things) knowledge in general, since a power implies 
both an active and a passive component, and knowledge implies an act of knowing and 
something that is known.
1305
 More importantly, the notion of δύκαιζξ is at the center of the 
analysis of δόλα in Republic V. As we saw above, Plato distinguishes δόλα from knowledge 
and ignorance and says that they are different δοκάιεζξ. He says that powers are not 
something visible, defined by color and shape. They cannot be hypostasized, as if they were 
concrete objects somehow lying within the soul. Each δύκαιζξ is rather defined by that on 
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 For more on the relation between Hippocratic medicine and the notion of εἶδμξ, cp. Chap. 6 Sect. 2.2. 
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 For more on this, cp. e.g. H. MILLER, Dynamis and Physis in On Ancient Medicine, Transactions and 
Proceedings of the American Philological Association 83 (1952), 184-197; M. SCHIEFSKY (ed.), Hippocrates 
Ŕ On Ancient Medicine, Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2005, 26-27, 31, 52, 69, 154-156, 163-164, 167-168, 179,       
226-234, 246-248, 251-254, 257, 262, 264-265, 267-269, 273, 275-276, 280, 288-289, 293, 316, 321, 327, 341-
342. 
1305
 See Sph. 247d ff. 
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which it depends or to which it is subordinated (i.e., its ἐθ‟ ᾧ) and by what it accomplishes or 
brings about (ὃ ἀπενβάγεηαζ).
1306
 In other words, each δοκάιζξ has some content or is related 
to some kind of object, and it produces some kind of effect (just like in the case of the 
Hippocratic concept of δύκαιζξ) – namely, it produces some kind of psychic state. The object 
to which this psychic state refers may or may not be something independent from the ροπή, 
but the important thing here is that each mental state has a particular content or is related to 
something. This is the inner structure of each δύκαιζξ.
1307
 
Plato then applies this model to describe knowledge, δόλα and ignorance. But this is 
just one of the passages in which he considers cognitive powers (whether he uses the word 
δύκαιζξ or not). There are several other relevant passages, which we will consider in the 
following. But we must bear in mind that these passages are far from presenting an 
established and univocal doctrine. In fact, they often vary their approach. Some of them 
consider a particular power, others try to distinguish several powers and even make an 
inventory of them (though the criteria and number of cognitive powers vary). Moreover, the 
nature of the distinctions can be different. In some cases, Plato is considering cognitive 
powers in a stricter sense (i.e., a sort of inner “faculties” of the soul), in other cases he is 
considering different degrees of knowledge or different ways of seeing reality and what 
characterizes them.
1308
 In the latter cases, he is more concerned with what would constitute 
knowledge in the full sense, but some of the aspects considered in this context are 
nevertheless relevant for the question we are now going to discuss. 
We will focus our attention primarily on the different sources of our experience of 
things. Our way of seeing things derives from more than one power. We will thus consider 
the several cognitive powers that coexist in us at any given moment and the kind of content 
they provide. More specifically, we will see how we have αἴζεδζζξ, ικήιδ, δόλα and one 
other power (to which Plato calls δζάκμζα, θόβζζιμξ or κμῦξ).
1309
 These powers are different 
from each other and irreducible to each other. In order to distinguish them, we will follow the 
indications given in the Republic. As we saw, different powers have different subjective and 
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 See Rep. 476c-d, and cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 above. 
1307
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 7 Sect. 2.4 above. 
1308
 To some extent, that is what is in question in Rep. V. It is also what happens in the simile of the line in the 
Republic (see 509c ff. and 533b ff.). Δἰηαζία, πίζηζξ, δζάκμζα and κόδζζξ (or ἐπζζηήιδ) are not different powers 
of the soul, but different ways of representing the whole of reality. For more on this, cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 1.3 a). 
1309
 Such an analysis complements what we have seen in Chapter 5, when we considered the notions of μἴεζεαζ 
εἰδέκαζ and δόλα. At that point, we did not discuss the sources and composition of our way of seeing things – 
even though the term δόλα designates one of the cognitive powers of the ροπή. Actually, the fact that we 




objective sides – i.e., they produce different effects in the ροπή and are related to different 
kinds of “appearing” or reality. We will thus consider them in light of this correlation. 
 It is also important to bear in mind that the powers are not entirely unrelated. They 
have different degrees of complexity, and in fact they constitute a kind of sequence or 
cognitive scale where the simpler forms are integrated or implied in the more complex. To 
put it differently, each layer of the scale introduces additional components that deeply 
transform the simpler forms.
1310
 Moreover, when we think of such a scale, we tend to assume 
the simpler forms can be conceived in isolation. However, we will see that we cannot fully 
represent them apart from the more complex δοκάιεζξ, since we are always marked by the 
effect of the more complex forms, which determine our whole way of seeing things. They are 
the central powers on which everything depends – including our experience of the simpler 
ones. So in order to identify the latter, we have to dismantle or tear apart our access to beings. 
This will produce an artificial result that does not correspond to the way we normally 
experience these powers. 
 We will look at each of the cognitive powers separately (though each complex form 
presupposes the simpler ones). We will see the way they represent things – or to be more 
precise, we will see how things appear differently in each layer of the scale. Then we will 
briefly consider their interplay – i.e., how they are always associated and compose what we 
have before us and what we are.  
 
3.1. Αἴζζεζηο as the simplest form of access to something 
 
 As we considered, the minimal or basic form of awareness or access to something is 
αἴζεδζζξ – and it is thus the result of the simplest cognitive power of the soul. Some of its 
essential features were already considered above in Section 1. We saw that in Philebus, 
Socrates contrasts it with a state he calls ἀκαζζεδζία, in which things would fully escape our 
notice (θακεάκεζκ).
1311
 When an αἴζεδζζξ occurs, something reaches the ροπή or something 
appears to it – even if this appearing is indeterminate with respect to its content and status. 
But what does this minimal form of reaching the soul exactly amount to? 
                                                 
1310
 This corresponds to Aristotle‟s characterization of the parts of the soul in comparison with geometrical 
figures. The latter produce a sequence (ἐθελ῅ξ) in which the figures with more angles integrate the figures with 
less angles in them. Something similar characterizes the parts of the soul or, in our present context, its cognitive 
δοκάιεζξ. See De anima 414b: “παναπθδζίςξ δ‟ ἔπεζ ηῶ πενὶ η῵κ ζπδιάηςκ ηαὶ ηὰ ηαηὰ ροπήκ· ἀεὶ βὰν ἐκ ηῶ 
ἐθελ῅ξ ὏πάνπεζ δοκάιεζ ηὸ πνόηενμκ ἐπί ηε η῵κ ζπδιάηςκ ηαὶ ἐπὶ η῵κ ἐιρύπςκ, μἷμκ ἐκ ηεηναβώκῳ ιὲκ 
ηνίβςκμκ, ἐκ αἰζεδηζηῶ δὲ ηὸ ενεπηζηόκ.” 
1311
 See 33d-34a. 
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 Let us start by considering the meaning of the term αἴζεδζζξ and of the corresponding 
verb, αἰζεάκεζεαζ. They can be used in a broader or in a stricter sense, and this can 
contribute to certain misunderstandings (such as the one that affects the analysis of 
Theaetetus‟ first definition of knowledge in the eponymous dialogue). The terms in question 
can be used for any kind of noticing, apprehending or grasping. They refer to any kind of 
immediate access to something that is fully given to us, and can thus apply for instance to 
mathematical intuition. It is probably in this sense that Theaetetus puts it forward as a 
definition of knowledge. But the term can be used in a stricter sense, for the reception of 
sensory contents (such as colors, sounds, etc.) – and Socrates takes advantage of this in 
Theaetetus.
1312
 These are the most immediate forms of awareness and it is in this sense that 
αἴζεδζζξ is the most basic cognitive power of the ροπή. 
 Usually we interpret a sensation as an affection (πάεμξ) or an impression of something 
external on the body. Some object acts on the body (more precisely, on its sensory         
organs – αἰζεδηήνζα) and this is perceived by the soul. Plato himself suggests this model in 
Philebus, when he describes αἴζεδζζξ as a stirring or shaking (ζεζζιόξ) in the body that is not 
extinguished before reaching the ροπή.
1313
 Such a conception, however, presupposes a sort of 
external witness that simultaneously sees the “ensouled” body and the objects that affect       
it – and is thus able to situate the αἰζεήζεζξ in a broader reality. But even in this model an 
αἴζεδζζξ is always something completely new. The reality it refers to is there, but the 
sensation caused by it is something different from this reality and not reducible to it. It 
implies a subjective power of the ροπή. But what characterizes this power and the psychic 
state it produces? Regardless of what causes it and of what happens in the body, what 
characterizes the αἴζεδζζξ as such? What is a sensation experienced in its pure state, without 
an interpretation of it that already implies more than sensation?
1314
 
 Plato‟s characterization of αἴζεδζζξ stresses mainly the limitations of this subjective 
psychic state and its content. We briefly considered some aspects of this in Section 1, but 
now we have to reconsider them in more detail. First, we can say that the entire sphere of 
sensations is personal or private. Each ροπή only has direct access to its own sensations and, 
as Socrates stresses in the discussion of Protagoras‟ views in Theaetetus, different people 
may have different sensations (i.e., they may see, hear, smell, touch and taste things 
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 For the definition of knowledge as αἴζεδζζξ and Socrates‟ inflection in the discussion, see 151e ff. 
1313
 Cp. once more 33d-34a. 
1314
 We must indeed take into account that at a primary level our awareness of external objects and of the body 
itself as an object among others is itself mediated by sensation. External reality in general depends on our power 





 In addition, the contents of αἴζεδζζξ are scattered through different sensory 
fields. The five senses (vision, audition, olfaction, touch, taste) furnish contents such as 
colors, acute and grave sounds, smells, softness and hardness, sweetness and bitterness, etc., 
and these sensory contents are radically heterogeneous.
1316
 There are also the inner subjective 
states (ἕλεζξ) of pleasure and pain.
1317
 The manifestation of all these sensory contents 
constitutes the sphere of the experienced or lived body, which is composed of several fluxes 
of sensation. However, each of these fluxes presupposes a center that unifies them all. The 
soul must reach the different sensible contents in some way, because the soul is that with 
which we hear, see, and so on.
1318
 All contents appear to the soul. But it is unclear how the 
different sensations relate to each other and how the soul can unify them. Sensations as such 
are autonomous. Each of them is an atom, completely isolated from the others, and each 
sensory field is simply juxtaposed to the others. If there were only sensations, then all of them 
would lie in the soul as soldiers in a wooden horse.
1319
 The mediation between them requires 
therefore a different kind of psychic power. 
 Actually, in a strict sense, we cannot even speak of a flux. Although sensations are 
constantly changing, each sensation by itself is instantaneous. This is what distinguishes it 
from the second power: memory. It occurs and vanishes without a trace. Therefore, an 
exclusively sensitive ροπή would only be aware of its present sensations and they would 
constitute its entire world (if we can speak of world at this level). This is very different from 
                                                 
1315
 Cp. 152a-c. 
1316
 Cp. Tht. 184e-185a: “ἤ ηαὶ ἐεεθήζεζξ ὁιμθμβε῔κ ἃ δζ᾽ ἑηέναξ δοκάιεςξ αἰζεάκῃ, ἀδύκαημκ εἶκαζ δζ᾽ ἄθθδξ 
ηαῦη᾽ αἰζεέζεαζ, μἷμκ ἃ δζ᾽ ἀημ῅ξ, δζ᾽ ὄρεςξ, ἠ ἃ δζ᾽ ὄρεςξ, δζ᾽ ἀημ῅ξ;” 
1317
 Plato himself includes them in the list of αἰζεήζεζξ. See Tht. 156b: “αἱ ιὲκ μὖκ αἰζεήζεζξ ηὰ ημζάδε ἟ι῔κ 
ἔπμοζζκ ὀκόιαηα, ὄρεζξ ηε ηαὶ ἀημαὶ ηαὶ ὀζθνήζεζξ ηαὶ ρύλεζξ ηε ηαὶ ηαύζεζξ ηαὶ ἟δμκαί βε δὴ ηαὶ θῦπαζ ηαὶ 
ἐπζεοιίαζ ηαὶ θόαμζ ηεηθδιέκαζ ηαὶ ἄθθαζ, ἀπένακημζ ιὲκ αἱ ἀκώκοιμζ, παιπθδεε῔ξ δὲ αἱ ὠκμιαζιέκαζ (...).” 
These feelings are indeed an immediate manifestation or appearing. However, it is important to remark that, at 
the level of sensation, they are still rather indeterminate. The specific nuances we recognize in our emotional life 
imply more complex powers. The simple αἰζεήζεζξ would perhaps correspond to Plato‟s characterization of 
pleasure and pain in Philebus. Using medical terms, he says that pain is a moving away from our right state or 
condition (a movement πανὰ θύζζκ) and pleasure a restoration of it (a ηαηάζηαζζξ). He also speaks of a 
depletion (ηέκςζζξ) and a repletion (πθήνςζζξ). Cp. 31d, 32a-b, 35b, 42c-d. But even this description seems to 
presuppose that there is something as an objective body, that has a right state and may move away from it. Thus, 
a pure pleasure and a pure pain could perhaps require an even more abstract description.   
1318
 Cp. Tht. 184b-d: “[΢Ω] εἰ μὖκ ηίξ ζε ὧδ᾽ ἐνςηῴδ· „ηῶ ηὰ θεοηὰ ηαὶ ιέθακα ὁνᾶ ἄκενςπμξ ηαὶ ηῶ ηὰ ὀλέα 
ηαὶ αανέα ἀημύεζ;‟ εἴπμζξ ἂκ μἶιαζ „ὄιιαζί ηε ηαὶ ὠζίκ.‟ [ΘΔΑΙ] ἔβςβε. [΢Ω] ηὸ δὲ ε὎πενὲξ η῵κ ὀκμιάηςκ ηε 
ηαὶ ῥδιάηςκ ηαὶ ιὴ δζ᾽ ἀηνζαείαξ ἐλεηαγόιεκμκ ηὰ ιὲκ πμθθὰ μ὎η ἀβεκκέξ, ἀθθὰ ι᾵θθμκ ηὸ ημύημο ἐκακηίμκ 
ἀκεθεύεενμκ, ἔζηζ δὲ ὅηε ἀκαβηα῔μκ, μἷμκ ηαὶ κῦκ ἀκάβηδ ἐπζθααέζεαζ η῅ξ ἀπμηνίζεςξ ἡκ ἀπμηνίκῃ, ᾗ μ὎η 
ὀνεή. ζηόπεζ βάν· ἀπόηνζζζξ πμηένα ὀνεμηένα, ᾧ ὁν῵ιεκ ημῦημ εἶκαζ ὀθεαθιμύξ, ἠ δζ᾽ μὗ ὁν῵ιεκ, ηαὶ ᾧ 
ἀημύμιεκ ὦηα, ἠ δζ᾽ μὗ ἀημύμιεκ; [ΘΔΑΙ] δζ᾽ ὧκ ἕηαζηα αἰζεακόιεεα, ἔιμζβε δμηε῔, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ι᾵θθμκ ἠ 
μἷξ. [΢Ω] δεζκὸκ βάν πμο, ὦ πα῔, εἰ πμθθαί ηζκεξ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ ὥζπεν ἐκ δμονείμζξ ἵππμζξ αἰζεήζεζξ ἐβηάεδκηαζ, ἀθθὰ 
ιὴ εἰξ ιίακ ηζκὰ ἰδέακ, εἴηε ροπὴκ εἴηε ὅηζ δε῔ ηαθε῔κ, πάκηα ηαῦηα ζοκηείκεζ, ᾗ δζὰ ημύηςκ μἷμκ ὀνβάκςκ 
αἰζεακόιεεα ὅζα αἰζεδηά.” 
1319
 See ibidem. 
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how we see things. For us there is always temporal continuity and any instant is located 




 But there is more. As we considered above, sensations by themselves do not 
determine things as being so or so, and they cannot be true or false. They simply appear and 
are therefore a hazy presentation. The sensible contents may have certain predicates (such as 
softness, whiteness, and so on), but they say nothing about reality. In order to do so, we need 
a different operation, which will integrate these predicates in a particular reality (and thus let 
us perceive what things there are in reality).  
Moreover, Plato stresses that we need to make judgements about sensations to be 
aware of them as such – so the strictly sensible predicates would still depend on more than 
sensation to be noticed as such. And there are other operations that normally accompany our 
sensations. For instance, our experience of sense data (such as softness or whiteness) also 
seems to imply a comparison of any particular sensation with the range of sensations of the 
same kind. This kind of comparison would be absent at the level of pure sensation.
1321
 
 A ροπή composed only of αἴζεδζεζξ would therefore have a very impoverished 
experience of things in general and of itself. It would be fragmented in many moments, it 
would last only an instant, and it would not see anything defined or clear. Furthermore, it 
would not be aware of any physical body or any external reality. But this is very far from our 
experience of things and of ourselves. In fact, even the way we usually experience our 
sensations is very different from this, and it already implies other kinds of operation or 
power. These powers make us aware of the passing of time, they unify the sensory fields 
(thereby constituting a more complex subject – or at least a more complex self-awareness), 
and they constitute an objective domain to which all sensations and feelings are then referred. 
These other powers that influence our sensations can even produce new sorts of αἰζεήζεζξ. In 
Philebus, Plato says that we have a sort of painter in the soul (i.e., a power or capacity of 
imagination) that creates quasi-sensations with respect to something we did not experience 
directly. These created images may still refer back to other sensory contents, but they require 
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 For the difficulties of conceiving it, cp. Prm.156d-e. 
1321
 In Philebus, Socrates speaks of the operation of judgment that compares different pleasures and pains and 
determines their intensity – or rather makes us aware of their respective intensity. See 41c-42c. The same 
applies to many (if not all) sensible contents. Our experience of hardness and softness, for instance, is also 
determined by a comparison of multiple sensations. In Phlb. 44d-e, Plato stresses that if we would like to see the 
nature of hardness, we should direct our attention to the hardest things (which implies a comparison between 





 And this is not the only sensations that more complex operations of the 
ροπή may create. They can also develop more elaborate feelings, and even feelings that do 
not refer to any bodily condition.
1323
 
Finally, it is important to remind once more that the term αἴζεδζζξ can also have a 
broad sense and, accordingly, one may speak of an αἴζεδζζξ of mental contents – like in the 
case of the contemplation of the εἴδδ. The latter form of αἴζεδζζξ, however, involves a much 
more complex kind of operation, which we will consider in Section 3.4, and thus it is only an 
αἴζεδζζξ in a figurative sense. It is true that there are certain similarities between these two 
operations (especially insofar as they both refer to a kind of givenness or presence), but there 
are also important differences, which we will have to consider afterwards. 
 
3.2. Μλήκε as a preservation of αἴζζεζηο 
 
A different source of our access to things is ικήιδ. Memory constitutes a form of 
indirect access to something. Although something is not directly before our mind in the 
present moment, we had some direct access to it in the past and we still have some notion of 
it. This stands in contrast with our αἰζεήζεζξ in their pure state. We saw that they vanish in 
the precise moment they occur, since the present moment is constantly being annihilated, and 
so everything that occurs in it is lost or disappears. But things do not disappear completely 
for the ροπή. Something remains. This is so because the ροπή possesses a power of retaining 
or preserving what appears at a given moment – namely, the power of remembering or 
memory (ικήιδ).
1324
 Therefore, instead of having access only to a moment or atom of time, 
the ροπή has a synopsis of different moments. It is aware of multiple moments and, 
consequently, it is aware of time as something extended.  
To be sure, this second power of the ροπή, in its pure state, still refers back to 
αἴζεδζζξ. It is a widening of the soul‟s sensory fields. Despite the bodily stirring as such 
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 See 39b-c. 
1323
 Cp. in particular 47d ff., where Plato considers the mixtures of pleasure and pain that result solely from the 
soul, without the aid of the body. 
1324
 See Phlb. 34a: “ζςηδνίακ ημίκοκ αἰζεήζεςξ ηὴκ ικήιδκ θέβςκ ὀνε῵ξ ἄκ ηζξ θέβμζ ηαηά βε ηὴκ ἐιὴκ δόλακ.” 
See also Cra. 437b: “ἔπεζηα δὲ ἟ „ικήιδ‟ πακηί πμο ιδκύεζ ὅηζ ιμκή ἐζηζκ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ ἀθθ᾽ μ὎ θμνά.” For the 
association of memory with preservation (ζςηδνία), cp. Tht. 163d: “(...) „ἆνα δοκαηὸκ ὅημο ηζξ ἐπζζηήιςκ 
βέκμζηό πμηε, ἔηζ ἔπμκηα ικήιδκ α὎ημῦ ημύημο ηαὶ ζῳγόιεκμκ, ηόηε ὅηε ιέικδηαζ ιὴ ἐπίζηαζεαζ α὎ηὸ ημῦημ ὃ 
ιέικδηαζ;‟ (...).” The idea of preservation is also what is emphasized in two images that Plato uses to describe 
memory. He compares the latter to a wax tablet, in which something is impressed or engraved, leaving traces 
behind. See Tht. 191c ff. He also compares memory to a bird-cage in which the instances or pieces of 
knowledge we captured are stored. See Tht. 197c ff. 
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having disappeared, it left traces. The sensation was modified and preserved in a modified 
form.
1325
 It is replaced by an image of the stirring that took place.
1326
 As a result, memory is 
and is not radically different from what it refers to. It is a preservation of the past αἴζεδζζξ, 
but it is also something new and different from it. This does not mean that it has a different 
content (it is still a memory of what was sensed), but it is a different form of presence and it 
adds a particular time index to this content. It is thus a very different power from αἴζεδζζξ. 
This power of not letting the past instants disappear is something difficult to explain.
1327
 We 
can only notice it as a fact. We have access not only to sensations, but also to something like 
a memoryscape within which each new αἴζεδζζξ emerges. Our access to beings thus becomes 
something extended. All αἰζεήζεζξ appear to the same subject which sees and remembers 
them.  
However, by being based on αἴζεδζζξ, ικήιδ still shares many of its limitations. In 
particular, it is also unable to determine the things that appear and reality in general. Thus, 
someone who is only capable of αἰζεήζεζξ and ικ῅ιαζ will only see sensations changing and 
being replaced by other sensations, and not things changing through the course of time. In 
fact, one may still not be aware of these sensations as such, if it is true that awareness of 
sensations requires a judgment about them (as was said above). So memory only gives us an 
awareness of time – and even this awareness of time is limited. It concerns only the past and 
a being that has only sensation and memory will not at all be aware of the future. The latter 
requires a different power. But this is not all. Memory has its own limitations. We do not 
remember everything perfectly. We forget many things, other become blurry. The degree of 
this forgetfulness may vary from person to person, insofar as different ροπαί may have 
different capacities for remembering, but there seems to be always some degree of 
defectiveness in our ability to remember.
1328
 In addition, it is also important to distinguish 
between what we may call a patent and a latent memory – i.e., we may have a past event in 
the spotlight of our mind, or it may be somehow stored in our ροπή.
1329
 We do not possess an 
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 Cp. Tht. 166b: “α὎ηίηα βὰν δμηε῔ξ ηζκά ζμζ ζοβπςνήζεζεαζ ικήιδκ πανε῔καί ηῳ ὧκ ἔπαεε, ημζμῦηόκ ηζ 
μὖζακ πάεμξ μἷμκ ὅηε ἔπαζπε, ιδηέηζ πάζπμκηζ; πμθθμῦ βε δε῔.” 
1326
 The notion of image (εἴδςθμκ) is used in the comparison of the memory to a wax tablet. See Tht. 191d: “ηαὶ 
ὃ ιὲκ ἂκ ἐηιαβῆ, ικδιμκεύεζκ ηε ηαὶ ἐπίζηαζεαζ ἕςξ ἂκ ἐκῆ ηὸ εἴδςθμκ α὎ημῦ (...).” 
1327
 Plato even speaks of memory as being a divine gift from Μκδιμζύκδ. See Tht. 191d. It is indeed a sort of 
miracle we cannot easily conceive and explain. 
1328
 Socrates says in the Theaetetus (191c-d) that the wax tablets in our minds may be purer or dirtier, as well as 
harder or more liquid. 
1329
 This is what is at issue in the metaphor of the bird-cage in the Theaetetus and the two modes of relation we 
may have to the birds. We may simply possess them (ηεηη῅ζεαζ) without holding them in our hands or we may 
hold them (ἔπεζκ). See 197b ff. 
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entire synopsis of all we remember. But we may also retrieve or recall things – i.e., we may 
have an ἀκάικδζζξ.
1330
 This may happen either because something or someone reminds us of 
something or someone else.
1331
 But we can also make an active effort to remember or, as 
Socrates says in Philebus, we may revolve the earth and bring something back to the 
surface.
1332
 The attempt of bringing something back may require more or less effort and it 
may be more or less efficient. It may require a complex process with many intermediate 
stages. But we may also be unable to remember something. In fact, there can be multiple 
forms of forgetfulness. We may lose sight of something and not think about it, and we may 
be unable to remember it, even if we try. We may even have forgotten (or at least not noticed) 
that we forgot something. All these forms of forgetfulness are common and, as a result, the 
mere fact of retrieving something may make no significant difference at all. If we recollect 
something, we may still forget it again. Forgetfulness is always a possibility and we must 
fight against it. This is why Plato emphasizes the importance of exercising our memory.
1333
 
 Our usual experience of memory is marked by all these factors. However, when we 
talk of memory in this sense, we are already conceiving it in a modified sense. It is not 
memory in a pure state, but it is already transformed by the higher powers of the soul. Our 
memories and recollections are then referred to things or notions, and not just simple sensory 
contents.
1334
 They include a different experience of time – and, in particular, anticipations of 
the future, which are created by a different power (even if their content is then filled with 
what we remember from pasts experiences, whereby we assume their repetition in the 
future).
1335
 These memories may be more or less complex, and they may be either individual 
or shared by several people. There may indeed be something like a collective memory, which 
preserves and transmits certain judgments and notions.
1336
 One may even conceive 
knowledge in terms of memory (as a preservation of experience or of the wisdom 
accumulated during a long period of time). But all these forms of memory differ from the 
simple form of memory we tried to isolate above. 
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 See Phlb. 34b: “ὅηακ ἃ ιεηὰ ημῦ ζώιαημξ ἔπαζπέκ πμε᾽ ἟ ροπή, ηαῦη᾽ ἄκεο ημῦ ζώιαημξ α὎ηὴ ἐκ ἑαοηῆ ὅηζ 
ιάθζζηα ἀκαθαιαάκῃ, ηόηε ἀκαιζικῄζηεζεαί πμο θέβμιεκ.” 
1331
 For the idea of something prompting an ἀκάικδζζξ, cp. Phd. 73c ff.  
1332
 Cp. Phlb. 34b-c: “ηαὶ ιὴκ ηαὶ ὅηακ ἀπμθέζαζα ικήιδκ εἴη᾽ αἰζεήζεςξ εἴη᾽ αὖ ιαεήιαημξ αὖεζξ ηαύηδκ 
ἀκαπμθήζῃ πάθζκ α὎ηὴ ἐκ ἑαοηῆ, ηαὶ ηαῦηα ζύιπακηα ἀκαικήζεζξ ηαὶ ικήιαξ πμο θέβμιεκ.” 
1333
 Cp. e.g. Smp. 208a and Phdr. 274e-275a. 
1334
 Plato relates memory with notions (ἔκκμζαζ) in Tht. 191d and with teachings (ιαεήιαηα) in Phlb. 34b. 
1335
 Cp. Phlb. 34e-35d. 
1336
 This is what seems to be implied in the fact that the poets‟ knowledge comes from the daughters of 
Μκδιμζύκδ. Cp. 2.1 b) above. It also leads to the conception that those that have lived longer or have more 
experience have therefore more knowledge. On this conception, cp. Rep. 328d-e. 
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It is also important to remark here that Plato uses the notions of memory and 
recollection (as well as forgetfulness) in a broader or figurative sense, to describe our relation 
to the εἴδδ. In Meno and Phaedrus, Socrates speaks of a pre-natal vision (an αἴζεδζζξ, as it 
were) of the εἴδδ, of which we preserve some memory, though it is also marked by a partial 
amnesia or θήεδ.
1337
 In fact, our relation with the εἴδδ, like memory, can be characterized as 
an indirect access to something, which falls short of what characterizes αἴζεδζζξ in the broad 





3.3. Δόμα as the central cognitive ςπρή of the soul 
 
 We have considered above the term δόλα in its neutral and negative sense.
1339
 Now 
we will reconsider it from a different angle – namely, as a cognitive δύκαιζξ among others, 
which relates to the other δοκάιεζξ in a certain way and plays a specific role in our access to 
beings. This power corresponds to the neutral and broad sense of the term. It is in this sense 
that δόλα deeply transforms αἴζεδζζξ and ικήιδ, and it is at the center of what we are. In a 
way, δόλα denotes the superior power of the soul. But Plato‟s analysis of this power is 
somewhat ambiguous, and sometimes he seems to understand it in a more restrictive sense, 
which allows for a contrast with yet another psychic power, on which δόλα in this restrictive 
sense actually depends. We will have to see what is the meaning of this ambiguity. But first 
let us consider the broader sense of the term and how it transforms the previous powers.  
As we saw, δόλα can be translated as judgment. This judgment may be more active or 
more passive (i.e., we may let ourselves be influenced by appearances or common views). It 
may also be express or tacit. But it always involves a decision (ηνίζζξ). It is opposed to a state 
of doubting (δζζηάγεζκ) or oscillating between alternatives.
1340
 It establishes that things are in 
a certain way. This is what the power of judging adds to sensation and memory. Plato 
explains this in Philebus using the example of someone seeing something from afar without 
being able to make out whether it is a man or a statue.
1341
 At that point, one has αἴζεδζζξ and 
even memory, but one still has no decision about what is being seen. Such a decision is δόλα. 
                                                 
1337
 Cp. Men. 81a ff. and Phdr. 248a ff. Plato also describes this ἀκάικδζζξ in Phd. 72e ff., but in this case he 
does not describe it as a vision. 
1338
 We will discuss this figurative form of memory or recollection in Section 3.4 below. 
1339
 See Chap. 5, Sect. 2, and Chap. 7, Sect. 2. 
1340
 See Phlb. 38b-d, and Tht. 189e-190a. Cp. Chap. 5, Sect. 1.2 above. 
1341
 See the above mentioned passage. 
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We always have many decisions about what things are and when we do not, we strive 
towards it. We are thus marked by the advent of δόλα and cannot revert to a previous state. 
Plato compares this operation to a conversation of the soul with itself, and he says that 
the soul asks questions and answers them, by affirming or denying something.
1342
 Γόλα is 
thus a sort of θόβμξ that is embraced by the ροπή, or as Plato says, a completion of thinking 
(δζακμίαξ ἀπμηεθεύηδζζξ).
1343
 Plato also says that the act of judging resembles a scribe 
writing a text in the book of our soul.
1344
 It involves both a fixation of sensation and memory 
and a transition to a different medium. Like one converts sound into symbol, through δόλα 
one converts sensation into δόλα. This brings about new features. Things are seen as defined, 
stable and in relation with one another. In fact, the sequences of sensations are thereby 
integrated in a single narration. 
But most importantly, δόλα has a content or an intentional object – namely, the thing 
judged. This is not just something that appears to the soul, but it appears as being a real thing. 
In other words, δόλα refers to reality. It is actually what puts us in relation with reality and 
truth. As Plato says, δόλα is directed to a target, and this allows for different possibilities. Our 
δόλαζ may hit their target or miss it – i.e., they may be true or false.
1345
 Because of the power 
to judge, we strive to know things, we create different versions of events and choose between 
them, but we may choose the correct or wrong versions. Γόλα may reveal things as they are 
or hide them. But be that as it may, the power to judge is what is added to the pure 
appearances and deeply changes them, thereby locating everything in a particular version of 
reality. 
Γόλα is thus a central power of the ροπή, and it affects or pervades everything. In a 
sense, we could even say that everything is based on δόλα. All sensations and memories are 
interpreted in light of one‟s δόλαζ and even our feelings of pleasure and pain are referred to 
them. As is shown in Philebus, we need to judge that we are having pleasure to be aware of 
any pleasure.
1346
 Moreover, we take pleasure with things that are determined by our δόλαζ, 
                                                 
1342
 See once more the above mentioned passages, and cp. Chap. 5, Sect. 1.3. 
1343
 See Sph. 264a-b. 
1344
 See Phlb. 39a, and cp. Chap. 5, Sect. 1.4. 
1345
 The image of the target appears in Sph. 228c-d. For an analysis of this passage, cp. Chap. 5, Sect. 1.5, and 
Chap. 8, Sect. 1.2. 
1346
 See 21b-c: “[΢Ω] κμῦκ δέ βε ηαὶ ικήιδκ ηαὶ ἐπζζηήιδκ ηαὶ δόλακ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμξ ἀθδε῅, πν῵ημκ ιὲκ ημῦημ 
α὎ηό, εἰ παίνεζξ ἠ ιὴ παίνεζξ, ἀκάβηδ δήπμο ζε ἀβκμε῔κ, ηεκόκ βε ὄκηα πάζδξ θνμκήζεςξ; [ΠΡΩ] ἀκάβηδ. [΢Ω] 
ηαὶ ιὴκ ὡζαύηςξ ικήιδκ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἀκάβηδ δήπμο ιδδ᾽ ὅηζ πμηὲ ἔπαζνεξ ιεικ῅ζεαζ, η῅ξ η᾽ ἐκ ηῶ 
παναπν῅ια ἟δμκ῅ξ πνμζπζπημύζδξ ιδδ᾽ ἟κηζκμῦκ ικήιδκ ὏πμιέκεζκ· δόλακ δ᾽ αὖ ιὴ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἀθδε῅ ιὴ 
δμλάγεζκ παίνεζκ παίνμκηα, θμβζζιμῦ δὲ ζηενόιεκμκ ιδδ᾽ εἰξ ηὸκ ἔπεζηα πνόκμκ ὡξ παζνήζεζξ δοκαηὸκ εἶκαζ 
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we determine the relations of our affections to each other, and we also determine what 
pleasure means.
1347
 But our inner feelings are not the only thing determined by δόλαζ. Our 
five senses and their contents are also determined by δόλαζ and, consequently, referred to 
objects. Γόλα indeed unites different sensations. As Socrates implies in Theaetetus, our 
sensations are not contained in us as if they were sat in a wooden horse.
1348
 In Philebus, when 
Socrates introduces the image of the scribe, he also talks of a coincidence between different 
sensory moments and memory.
1349
 They fall together and constitute one object. The different 
sensory moments are seen as moments of the same thing, which is determined by a δόλα or 
set of δόλαζ. In other words, our judgments establish relations between our sensations and this 
brings about things as we normally experience them. Reality is thus the result of many 
different δόλαζ, which are intertwined in a very complex manner, as we considered in Chapter 
6. The system of δόλαζ determines everything – including our own life and the way we lead 
it. 
But δόλα does not only unify what is given by the previous powers and puts 
sensations and memories in relation with reality. It also goes way beyond them and creates 
entirely new contents. For instance, we saw that sensations and memories open us to the 
present and the past (even if the present and the past must be determined by δόλα), but it is 
δόλα that constitutes our relation to the future. It allows us to anticipate things.
1350
 Likewise, 
it allows us to have some access to things in the present and the past of which we have had no 
sensation. As we saw above, the soul also contains a sort of painter, which obeys the scribe 
(i.e., our power of judging) and creates quasi-sensory contents, already shaped by δόλα.
1351
 
                                                                                                                                                        
θμβίγεζεαζ, (...).” Although δόλα is just one of the operations mentioned here, it is responsible for being aware 
of pleasure while we have it, and in this sense the other operations depend on it. 
1347
 See 37c-53c and, for a brief analysis of this passage, cp. Sect. 2.2 a) above. 
1348
 See 184d: “δεζκὸκ βάν πμο, ὦ πα῔, εἰ πμθθαί ηζκεξ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ ὥζπεν ἐκ δμονείμζξ ἵππμζξ αἰζεήζεζξ ἐβηάεδκηαζ, 
ἀθθὰ ιὴ εἰξ ιίακ ηζκὰ ἰδέακ, εἴηε ροπὴκ εἴηε ὅηζ δε῔ ηαθε῔κ, πάκηα ηαῦηα ζοκηείκεζ, ᾗ δζὰ ημύηςκ μἷμκ ὀνβάκςκ 
αἰζεακόιεεα ὅζα αἰζεδηά.” 
1349
 See 39a: “἟ ικήιδ ηα῔ξ αἰζεήζεζζ ζοιπίπημοζα εἰξ ηα὎ηὸκ ηἀηε῔κα ἃ πενὶ ηαῦη᾽ ἐζηὶ ηὰ παεήιαηα 
θαίκμκηαί ιμζ ζπεδὸκ μἷμκ βνάθεζκ ἟ι῵κ ἐκ ηα῔ξ ροπα῔ξ ηόηε θόβμοξ (...).” 
1350
 In 21c, Socrates seems to distinguish δόλα from θμβζζιόξ. The former would allow us to be aware of present 
pleasure, whereas the latter would allow us to calculate the pleasure to come. However, in 39c-40d, Socrates 
reconsiders our relation to the future and shows that our expectations (ἐθπίδεξ) are likewise grounded in δόλα or, 
to be more precise, they are a modality of δόλα, which is a power that may refer to the past, the present or the 
future. This becomes particularly clear in 40a, where, after comparing our δόλαζ to θόβμζ written in the soul, it is 
said: “[΢Ω] Λόβμζ ιήκ εἰζζκ ἐκ ἑηάζημζξ ἟ι῵κ, ἃξ ἐθπίδαξ ὀκμιάγμιεκ; [ΠΡΩ] καί.”  
1351
 See Phlb. 39b-c: “[΢Ω] ἀπμδέπμο δὴ ηαὶ ἕηενμκ δδιζμονβὸκ ἟ι῵κ ἐκ ηα῔ξ ροπα῔ξ ἐκ ηῶ ηόηε πνόκῳ 
βζβκόιεκμκ. [ΠΡΩ] ηίκα; [΢Ω] γςβνάθμκ, ὃξ ιεηὰ ηὸκ βναιιαηζζηὴκ η῵κ θεβμιέκςκ εἰηόκαξ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ ημύηςκ 
βνάθεζ. [ΠΡΩ] π῵ξ δὴ ημῦημκ αὖ ηαὶ πόηε θέβμιεκ; [΢Ω] ὅηακ ἀπ᾽ ὄρεςξ ἢ ηζκμξ ἄθθδξ αἰζεήζεςξ ηὰ ηόηε 
δμλαγόιεκα ηαὶ θεβόιεκα ἀπαβαβώκ ηζξ ηὰξ η῵κ δμλαζεέκηςκ ηαὶ θεπεέκηςκ εἰηόκαξ ἐκ α὏ηῶ ὁνᾶ πςξ. ἠ ημῦημ 
μ὎η ἔζηζ βζβκόιεκμκ παν᾽ ἟ι῔κ; [ΠΡΩ] ζθόδνα ιὲκ μὖκ.” 
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But this is not all that δόλα does. Plato points out in Theaetetus that δόλα also reflects 
about sensible moments and makes calculations, whereby it puts them in relation with 
common predicates.
1352
 This is essential for it to unify sensations and to put them in relation 
with a complex reality. The soul must determine what appears (i.e., our sensations and 
memories), and the way it does so is by attributing common predicates to the things that 
appear – i.e., by seeing them in light of the εἴδδ. This is what the power of judging does and 
we can thus see how it deeply affects and transforms sensation and memory. As mentioned, 
our usual experience is always pervaded by δόλαζ and we cannot properly conceive what an 
experience composed solely of sensations and of memories would correspond to. Our 
sensation and memory are always doxastic. Γόλα is our starting-point and all sensations and 
memories we deal with are shaped by it. 
However, despite overcoming the limitations of αἴζεδζζξ and ικήιδ, δόλα has its own 
limitations. It is fallible and we may therefore make many false judgments. But these false 
judgments may also be corrected if we expand our experience or examine things carefully. 
We may even constitute new forms of knowledge or ηέπκαζ, based on more elaborate 
δόλαζ.
1353
 However, as we saw, δόλα was also characterized by Plato as a constitutively 
defective way of seeing things, which was strongly influenced by sensible reality and 
individual beings, failing to understand the specificity and content of the εἴδδ that determine 
them.
1354
 This association with sensible reality is not incidental. Γόλα often seems to consist 
in the attribution of general predicates to sensible beings – and therefore we may contrast it 
with a different psychic power that puts us in relation with εἴδδ and that is the basis on which 
the power of judging depends. Γόλα is then what connects our understanding of εἴδδ with 
sensible reality. It is an intermediary power, which connects the two extremes: αἴζεδζζξ and 
κμῦξ. It has a sensory basis, which relates it to particular beings, but it also taps in the 
intelligible contents of our mind, thus connecting both dimensions.
1355
  
This is one way of understanding δόλα. However, δόλα can also be understood in a 
broader sense, as an activity of the human mind that tries to determine something – and in 
                                                 
1352
 See 185a-187a. 
1353
 Cp. e.g. Grg. 464b-465a, Rep. 533b-c, Phlb. 55e-56a. In these three passages, Plato considers forms of 
developing our knowledge that take place at the level of δόλα. 
1354
 Cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2. 
1355
 This is what is implied in the description of δόλα as a decision of what some concrete being is or as an 
attribution of general predicates (which may be correctly or incorrectly attributed). Cp. Phlb. 38b-39a, Tht. 185a 
ff. Moreover, the defect of a δόλα ὀνεή, as we saw, consists precisely in this: it attributes a predicate without 
focusing on and understanding its meaning. Cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.3. 
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this sense it can also be applied to notions or eidetic contents.
1356
 In other words, we may also 
make judgments about the εἴδδ – perhaps because we can attribute them predicates. But in 
certain passages Plato seems to admit the possibility of a different kind of access to them. In 
doing so, he also highlights our constant relation to them as a specific moment of our 
cognitive apparatus, and this is precisely what we must now consider. 
 
3.4. Δηάλνηα, ινγηζκόο or λνῦο as our access to the εἴδε 
 
 As was just said, it is not clear whether we may talk of a different cognitive power in 
the case of our relation to the εἴδδ (at least in the same sense we talked of power in the other 
cases), especially because of the intimate connection between our understanding of the εἴδδ 
and the power of judging. In some passages (especially in Philebus and Theaetetus), Plato 
seems either to neglect our relation to the εἴδδ or he lumps it together with δόλα as what 
determines sensible beings. However, we find some interesting indications in texts where the 
characters try to isolate our understanding of the εἴδδ or our access to them. 
 In Phaedo, Plato contrasts αἴζεδζζξ with δζάκμζα, and the latter is precisely what 
allows us to understand εἴδδ.
1357
 In Sophist, the Visitor stresses that we have access to the 
εἴδδ through θμβζζιόξ.
1358
 In Phaedrus, Socrates says that εἴδδ can only be seen by our 
κμῦξ.
1359
 In Theaetetus, Socrates associates the access to the common predicates (ηὰ ημζκά) 
with δόλα, but the latter is conceived as a form of calculation, reflection or reasoning.
1360
 All 
these terms designate non-immediate (i.e., non-sensible) forms of access. They are a form of 




                                                 
1356
 The descriptions of δόλα in Tht. 189e-190a and Sph. 263d-264b, for instance, are rather vague and admit a 
broader meaning of δόλα. 
1357
 See 65e, 66a, 67c, and especially 79a, where immediately after distinguishing between the εἴδδ and ηὰ 
πμθθά, Socrates says: “μ὎ημῦκ ημύηςκ ιὲκ ηἂκ ἅραζμ ηἂκ ἴδμζξ ηἂκ ηα῔ξ ἄθθαζξ αἰζεήζεζζκ αἴζεμζμ, η῵κ δὲ 
ηαηὰ ηα὎ηὰ ἐπόκηςκ μ὎η ἔζηζκ ὅηῳ πμη᾽ ἂκ ἄθθῳ ἐπζθάαμζμ ἠ ηῶ η῅ξ δζακμίαξ θμβζζιῶ, ἀθθ᾽ ἔζηζκ ἀζδ῅ ηὰ 
ημζαῦηα ηαὶ μ὎π ὁναηά;” 
1358
 See 248a: “[ΞΔ] πνὸξ δὴ ημὺξ ἑηένμοξ ἴςιεκ, ημὺξ η῵κ εἰδ῵κ θίθμοξ· ζὺ δ᾽ ἟ι῔κ ηαὶ ηὰ πανὰ ημύηςκ 
ἀθενιήκεοε. [ΘΔΑΙ] ηαῦη᾽ ἔζηαζ. [ΞΔ] βέκεζζκ, ηὴκ δὲ μ὎ζίακ πςνίξ πμο δζεθόιεκμζ θέβεηε; ἤ βάν; [ΘΔΑΙ] καί. 
[ΞΔ] ηαὶ ζώιαηζ ιὲκ ἟ι᾵ξ βεκέζεζ δζ᾽ αἰζεήζεςξ ημζκςκε῔κ, δζὰ θμβζζιμῦ δὲ ροπῆ πνὸξ ηὴκ ὄκηςξ μ὎ζίακ, ἡκ 
ἀεὶ ηαηὰ ηα὎ηὰ ὡζαύηςξ ἔπεζκ θαηέ, βέκεζζκ δὲ ἄθθμηε ἄθθςξ.” 
1359
 See 247c: “἟ βὰν ἀπνώιαηόξ ηε ηαὶ ἀζπδιάηζζημξ ηαὶ ἀκαθὴξ μ὎ζία ὄκηςξ μὖζα, ροπ῅ξ ηοαενκήηῃ ιόκῳ 
εεαηὴ κῶ (...).” 
1360
 Socrates uses different terms to designate our relation to the common predicates, such as δζακμε῔ζεαζ (185a), 
ἐπζζημπε῔κ (185e), ἀκαθμβίγεζεαζ (186a), ζοθθμβζζιόξ (186d). See 185a-190a.  
1361
 See 185d-e: “ἀθθὰ ιὰ Γία, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ἔβςβε μ὎η ἂκ ἔπμζιζ εἰπε῔κ, πθήκ β᾽ ὅηζ ιμζ δμηε῔ ηὴκ ἀνπὴκ μ὎δ᾽ 
εἶκαζ ημζμῦημκ μ὎δὲκ ημύημζξ ὄνβακμκ ἴδζμκ ὥζπεν ἐηείκμζξ, ἀθθ᾽ α὎ηὴ δζ᾽ α὏η῅ξ ἟ ροπὴ ηὰ ημζκά ιμζ θαίκεηαζ 
πενὶ πάκηςκ ἐπζζημπε῔κ.” See also 187a: “ἀθθ᾽ μὔ ηζ ιὲκ δὴ ημύημο βε ἕκεηα ἞νπόιεεα δζαθεβόιεκμζ, ἵκα 
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This other power thus refers to a different kind of content and a higher form of truth, 
namely the true beings (i.e., the predicates we attribute to sensible beings or the alphabet with 
which our understanding of reality is written). Our access to the εἴδδ requires a different 
power, and this power is very important for our δόλαζ. It allows us to see things as we do, and 
we have no idea of what δόλα would be in its pure state, without reasoning or intelligence. 
Our understanding of εἴδδ is always active and is a permanent and all-pervasive feature of 
our way of seeing things. This is so despite all the problems involved in the notion of εἴδδ. 
Regardless of how we conceive them, our relation to them seems to be a necessary 
component of our way of seeing things. 
In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the relation to the εἴδδ is not 
uniform. To be sure, our relation to them is permanent, and Plato even describes it as 
constitutive of our ροπή.
1362
 We always have some contact with them. They constitute our 
experience and all δόλαζ (understood as attributions of predicates) are based on them. But this 
awareness of the εἴδδ (which may be said to be a cognitive power of the ροπή) can assume 
different forms. 
Usually, we have some notion of what these εἴδδ are (or, as we could also say, some 
opinions or δόλαζ about them) and these are often (if not always) hazy, imprecise, 
inconsistent, or outright wrong. As Plato says in the Republic, we dream about being.
1363
 
Normally we do not have a perfect access to them. Our understanding of the εἴδδ is muddled 
and we have no more than a glimpse or inkling of them. We may think we know them, but if 
we are questioned about them, we will realize that our views about them are unclear, 
inconsistent, or wrong.
1364
 Our access to them is obstructed and so our understanding of them 
                                                                                                                                                        
εὕνςιεκ ηί πμη᾽ μ὎η ἔζη᾽ ἐπζζηήιδ, ἀθθὰ ηί ἔζηζκ. ὅιςξ δὲ ημζμῦηόκ βε πνμαεαήηαιεκ, ὥζηε ιὴ γδηε῔κ α὎ηὴκ 
ἐκ αἰζεήζεζ ηὸ πανάπακ ἀθθ᾽ ἐκ ἐηείκῳ ηῶ ὀκόιαηζ, ὅηζ πμη᾽ ἔπεζ ἟ ροπή, ὅηακ α὎ηὴ ηαε᾽ α὏ηὴκ πναβιαηεύδηαζ 
πενὶ ηὰ ὄκηα.” 
1362
 See Phdr. 249b-c: “ἔκεα ηαὶ εἰξ εδνίμο αίμκ ἀκενςπίκδ ροπὴ ἀθζηκε῔ηαζ, ηαὶ ἐη εδνίμο ὅξ πμηε ἄκενςπμξ 
ἤκ πάθζκ εἰξ ἄκενςπμκ. μ὎ βὰν ἣ βε ιήπμηε ἰδμῦζα ηὴκ ἀθήεεζακ εἰξ ηόδε ἣλεζ ηὸ ζπ῅ια. δε῔ βὰν ἄκενςπμκ 
ζοκζέκαζ ηαη᾽ εἶδμξ θεβόιεκμκ, ἐη πμθθ῵κ ἰὸκ αἰζεήζεςκ εἰξ ἓκ θμβζζιῶ ζοκαζνμύιεκμκ· ημῦημ δ᾽ ἐζηὶκ 
ἀκάικδζζξ ἐηείκςκ ἅ πμη᾽ εἶδεκ ἟ι῵κ ἟ ροπὴ ζοιπμνεοεε῔ζα εεῶ ηαὶ ὏πενζδμῦζα ἃ κῦκ εἶκαί θαιεκ, ηαὶ 
ἀκαηύραζα εἰξ ηὸ ὂκ ὄκηςξ.” 
1363
 Socrates is talking about what happens in the case of particular sciences, but the same holds for our ordinary 
relation to εἴδδ. See 533b-c: “ἀθθ᾽ αἱ ιὲκ ἄθθαζ π᾵ζαζ ηέπκαζ ἠ πνὸξ δόλαξ ἀκενώπςκ ηαὶ ἐπζεοιίαξ εἰζὶκ ἠ 
πνὸξ βεκέζεζξ ηε ηαὶ ζοκεέζεζξ, ἠ πνὸξ εεναπείακ η῵κ θομιέκςκ ηε ηαὶ ζοκηζεειέκςκ ἅπαζαζ ηεηνάθαηαζ· αἱ δὲ 
θμζπαί, ἃξ ημῦ ὄκημξ ηζ ἔθαιεκ ἐπζθαιαάκεζεαζ, βεςιεηνίαξ ηε ηαὶ ηὰξ ηαύηῃ ἑπμιέκαξ, ὁν῵ιεκ ὡξ 
ὀκεζνώηημοζζ ιὲκ πενὶ ηὸ ὄκ, ὕπαν δὲ ἀδύκαημκ α὎ηα῔ξ ἰδε῔κ, ἕςξ ἂκ ὏πμεέζεζζ πνώιεκαζ ηαύηαξ ἀηζκήημοξ 
ἐ῵ζζ, ιὴ δοκάιεκαζ θόβμκ δζδόκαζ α὎η῵κ.” 
1364
 Cp. Chapter 7, Sections 1.2 and 2.4. 
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is a mixture of hiddenness and truth (θήεδ and ἀθήεεζα). This is why Plato describes this 
access to the εἴδδ as a kind of obstructed recollection.
1365
  
However, we can also try to develop our understanding of the εἴδδ. We may try to 
isolate these contents and purify our view of them, liberating us from the sensible realities in 
which they appear and which only confuse us. We will then focus on our understanding of 
the εἴδδ and we may either realize that we do not really understand them, or gain actual 
insight into them. We may indeed come to understand the εἴδδ better, which means that there 
can be different proportions of θήεδ and ἀθήεεζα in our access to them.
1366
 In fact, we may 
perhaps even reach a perfect knowledge of them. As we saw, this would constitute the 
highest form of knowledge (i.e., the full actualization of the cognitive nature of the ροπή), 
which Plato designates in different ways – such as κμῦξ, θνόκδζζξ, or ἐπζζηήιδ.
1367
  
 However, the fact that Plato refers to this does not mean that his texts present a clear 
description of what these εἴδδ correspond to, as we saw. We already considered some of the 
problems involved with the notion of εἴδδ above.
1368
 Their actual existence, their interrelation 
with one another, and their participation in sensible beings is problematic. Moreover, it is not 
clear whether we can ever reach a perfect insight into them. It is even difficult to conceive 
what a perfect access to them would correspond to – for instance, whether it would be 
intuitive or discursive (i.e., mediated by θόβμξ in some way). As was said, one may even 
doubt whether the εἴδδ really exist. They could also be a subjective illusion of ours. But be 
that as it may, the reference to something like an alphabet of reality deeply determines the 
way we see things. We must have some awareness of general predicates to judge and 
determine sensible reality.  
 
3.5. The interplay of the soul’s cognitive δπλάκεηο 
 
 In the previous pages, we considered each δύκαιζξ separately (although the simpler 
powers were always implied in the more complex). Still, this analysis was artificial, because 
what we actually experience is the interplay or entanglement of all δοκάιεζξ. They are always 
mixed with each other. They constitute a system of forces in which they are all active and 
                                                 
1365
 See e.g. Phd. 75c-e, and Phdr. 248c-d. 
1366
 This is actually what determines the scale of αίμζ in Phdr. 248c-e. Each αίμξ has a different understanding of 
life and reality, according to how much it remembers of the εἴδδ. 
1367
 The perfect access is a perfect access to εἴδδ, which are the ultimate root of knowledge and what is most 
knowable. On this topic, cp. Section 2.5 above. 
1368
 See Chap. 6, Sect. 2.2, and also Sect. 2.5 of this chapter. 
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produce life as we know it. This does not prevent us from focusing our attention on one or 
other of these forces (i.e., powers) in their transformed forms, and trying to develop it. They 
can indeed have different weights in how we see and experience things, and we may in part 
determine their relative weight or importance. But this is something that always happens 
within the framework of the whole. We cannot have a pure experience of any of them. 
 Each power can have its own strength, be more or less developed, and this may be so 
by nature or by our own efforts.
1369
 However, each one is unconceivable by itself – at least 
for us. It is true that δζάκμζα at some points seems to be conceivable without the others, since 
a soul without body is represented as not having αἴζεδζζξ, and it would probably also lack 
ικήιδ and δόλα, insofar as they refer to αἴζεδζζξ.
1370
 But that is not how we experience it. 
For us it is always intertwined with the other powers, and so our understanding of the εἴδδ is 
always intertwined with concrete beings or attributed to them. This is then what constitutes 
the world – i.e., all the things that appear to us, to which we are related, over which we have 
some perspective. The complexity of things is the primary correlate of our experience and it 
is constituted by these different powers, which are responsible for more immediate or more 
mediated (i.e., more sensible or more intelligible) components. 
 Still, such a artificial dismantling of our ροπή into different cognitive powers lets us 
better understand the cognitive dimension of our being, and it complements the above 
analysis of appearing and truth. But this is not enough to account for the ροπή‟s experience of 
things and of itself. The practical dimension in the broadest sense (i.e., the dimension 
constituted by the ροπή‟s desires and the way it guides itself in life) is also a central 
component of our ροπή. We must then try to determine it, and we must also see how exactly 
the two dimensions relate to each other.  
 
                                                 
1369
 Different persons may indeed have more or less developed powers (i.e., they may have more acute sense 
organs, more memory, better judgments, more noetic insight), and these differences may be inborn or the result 
of practice. 
1370
 This is what seems to be implied in some passages of the Phaedo or in Socrates‟ palinode in the Phaedrus. 
Αἴζεδζζξ and the particular beings to which it refers are an essential feature of life, but not something that 






The ροπή‟s practical dimension as a unitary pursuit of a superlative good 
 
 
“Nonne ipsa est beata vita, quam omnes volunt et omnino qui nolit 
nemo est? Ubi noverunt eam, quod sic volunt eam? Ubi viderunt, ut 
amarent eam? Nimirum habemus eam nescio quomodo.”  




 As we just saw, the ροπή has a cognitive dimension. It has some access to things and 
sees them in a certain way. However, the ροπή is not a purely cognitive subject. It is not 
absolutely disinterested or indifferent to everything. It has some interest in seeing or knowing 
things, and it also has other interests. In fact, the ροπή is marked by many practical tensions, 
which move it in many different ways.
1372
 It desires, it pursues things, and it acts. In sum, it 
has a practical dimension, and this is what we must now explore. In doing so, it is important 
to bear in mind that the distinction between a cognitive and a practical dimension is 
somewhat artificial. As mentioned, both dimensions are deeply intertwined and this will 
become patent during our analysis. On the one hand, our desires are guided by our way of 
seeing things and some of our desires are even directed at knowledge (mostly because we 
need it to guide our actions, but perhaps also because we are somehow interested in it for its 
own sake). On the other hand, our way of seeing things is deeply influenced by our desires, as 
we will see in the following chapters. Therefore, the distinction between the two domains has 
the sole aim of letting us see more clearly what is normally experienced as a whole. We will 
later try to determine the soul as a unitary whole, but first we will consider its practical side. 
  
                                                 
1371
 See L. VERHEIJEN (ed.), Sancti Augustini Confessionum libri XIII, Turnhout, Brepols, 1981. 
1372
 The notion of “practical” here includes all kinds of interest and desire, or all that is relevant for how we 
guide our life. In this sense, it also includes any theoretical or speculative interest, which is concerned with 
knowledge solely for its own sake.  
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1. The multiple actions, desires, and concerns of the ςπρή. The problem of their 
connection 
 
 There are many manifestations of the practical dimension of the ροπή. We are all 
familiarized with these manifestations and they are illustrated, mentioned and discussed 
throughout the Platonic corpus. The vocabulary used to refer to them is very diverse and a 
brief consideration of some of the main terms helps us understand the complex phenomena 
we will now analyze and try to explain.  
The fundamental words in this context are πνάηηεζκ and πν᾵λζξ, which mostly mean 
“acting” and “action”. Their etymology is associated with the ideas of passing through or 
crossing something, and also of accomplishing something, reaching a goal, or succeeding.
1373
 
These words thus express the fact that life is intrinsically connected with the attempt to attain 
certain goals and is also determined by how one is faring in the pursuit of these goals. Of 
course, this presupposes that the ροπή has the power (δύκαιζξ) to act (πνάηηεζκ) and make 
things (πμζε῔κ, ἐνβάγεζεαζ).
1374
 It is not reduced to the domain of thoughts and words (θόβμζ), 
but it is also characterized by deeds (ἔνβα).
1375
 It moves or changes itself, and it also moves 
or changes other things.
1376
 These movements may imply more or less effort, but in all cases 
the ροπή has particular targets (ζημπμί) or purposes. These practical targets, in turn, raise 
questions about the soul‟s motivations, the way it steers itself and also its responsibility in 
what happens to it.
1377
 
  Some other significant aspects about the soul‟s agency can be easily seen. First of all, 
the different actions performed by the soul seem to be based on some kind of lack or need 
(ἔκδεζα or πνεία). Human nature is not self-sufficient (i.e., it is not α὎ηάνηδξ or characterized 
by a ιδδεκὸξ δε῔ζεαζ); rather, it is indigent and lacks many things.
1378
 At the physiological 
level, it is permanently being depleted (or in a process of ηέκςζζξ) and requires replenishing 
                                                 
1373
 Cp. e.g. H. SCHMIDT, Synonymik der griechischen Sprache, vol. 1, Leipzig, Teubner, 1876, 397ff., and C. 
MAURER, πνάζζς, πν᾵βµα, πναβµαηεία, πναβµαηεύμµαζ, δζαπναβµαηεύμµαζ, πνάηηςν, πν᾵λζξ, in: TWNT, sub 
voce. 
1374
 The characters in the corpus constantly use the verbs πνάηηεζκ, πμε῔κ and ἐνβάγεζεαζ, and in some passages 
they even try to distinguish them (cp. e.g. Chrm. 163b-c).  
1375
 For this contrast, cp. e.g. Ap. 32a, and La. 188c-189a. 
1376
 See Phdr. 245c-246a. 
1377
 The idea of targets of our action appears in many passages. For instance, we considered above (Chap. 8, 
Sect. 1.2) that the soul targets truth, and this targeting has important practical implications, as we will see. Cp. 
Sph. 228c-d. For more uses of the notion of target (ζημπόξ), see e.g. Grg. 507d, Rep. 519c, and Phlb. 60a. 
1378
 According to Rep. 369b, this is precisely what creates the need to belong to a political community. Socrates 
says: “Γίβκεηαζ ημίκοκ, ἤκ δ‟ ἐβώ, πόθζξ, ὡξ ἐβᾦιαζ, ἐπεζδὴ ηοβπάκεζ ἟ι῵κ ἕηαζημξ μ὎η α὎ηάνηδξ, ἀθθὰ πμθθ῵κ 





 Moreover, it has other, more complex wants.
1380
 These wants give rise to 
many desires (ἐπζεοιίαζ), which have many different objects (which may be more or less 
refined).
1381
 In other words, the soul wants things (which may be expressed by the verbs 
αμύθεζεαζ or ἐεέθεζκ), it strives towards them (ἐθίεζεαζ), pursues them (γδηε῔κ, δζώηεζκ) and 
may even feel a passionate love (ἔνςξ) or yearning (πόεμξ) for them.
1382
 Desires can indeed 
have different intensities, and they can also be positive or negative desires – i.e., we may 
want to pursue or attain something, and we may want to avoid or escape it.
1383
 All this raises 
the question of whether or not we have the power (δύκαιζξ) to achieve what we desire, as 




 In addition, all these desires deeply affect the way things appear to us or our relation 
to them. We are not indifferent to other beings. Instead, we “love” (θζθε῔κ) and hate (ιζζε῔κ) 
many of them.
1385
 The terms θζθε῔κ and θζθία are actually very important in this context, and 
their meaning is rather complex. There has been much discussion in the secondary literature 
as to whether the term θίθμξ is originally a possessive pronoun or a designation of familiarity 
and attachment, such as the English adjective “dear”.
1386
 At any rate, it denotes the particular 
kind of relation that makes something relevant for us. In general, it refers to persons: one‟s 
family and friends (who, in turn, may be fellow citizens or foreigners).
1387
 It may also 
designate an ally or simply someone relatively close who is not an antagonist in the battle for 
survival, possesions, or honor. The degree of attachment may vary. It may be rather small, 
                                                 
1379
 See e.g. Phlb. 34e ff. 
1380
 Indeed, surviving is not enough for us. We also require a good life. For this contrast, cp. e.g. Cri. 48b.  
1381
 For the idea that there are many different desires, see e.g. Cra. 403c-d, Rep. 580d ff., Phlb. 45b 
1382
 Cp. e.g. Cra. 419e ff., Prt. 358d, Phdr. 250c, Rep. 437b-c, Smp. 205a, Tht. 169c. 
1383
 The idea of escaping something is usually expressed by θεύβεζκ. For the contrast between wanting to attain 
and wanting to avoid something, cp. e.g. Grg. 507b, Rep. 437b, Tht. 176b. 
1384
 For the question of δύκαιζξ in this sense, cp. e.g. Grg. 456a-c, 476d. On the topic of expectation, see e.g. 
Phlb. 35e-36c. 
1385
 On this contrast, cp. e.g. Rep. 334c. 
1386
 The bibliography on the proper meaning of θίθμξ is vast. See e.g. P. KRETSCHMER, Griech. θίθμξ, 
Zeitschrift für Indogermanistik und historische Sprachwissenschaft 45 (1927), 267-271; G. STÄHLIN, θζθές, 
ηαηαθζθές, θίθδµα, θίθμξ, θίθδ, θζθία, in: TWNT, sub voce; A. ADKINS, “Friendship” and  “Self-Sufficiency” 
in Homer and Aristotle, The Classical Quarterly 13 (1963), 30-45; M. LANDFESTER, Das griechische Nomen 
“philos”, Hildesheim, Georg Holms, 1966; E. BENVENISTE, Le Vocabulaire des Institutions                      
indo-européennes, vol. 1, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969, 335-353; J. HOOKER, Homeric θίθμξ, Glotta 65 
(1987), 44-65; D. ROBINSON, Homeric θίθμξ. Love of Life and Limbs, and Friendship with One‟s εοιόξ, in: 
E. CRAIK, “Owls to Athens”. Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1990; H. PERDICOYIANNI, Philos chez Euripide, Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 74 (1996),    
5-26. 
1387
 In this sense, θίθμξ comes close to terms such as ἑηα῔νμξ, ἴδζμξ, μἰηε῔μξ, βκώνζιμξ, ζοββεκήξ and even λέκμξ.  
464 
 
but the word may also express a strong fondness, to the point of obsession or monomania.
1388
 
It is something of this kind that may then mediate our relation to other beings. We may be 
fond of them and this fondness may have different degrees. However, we may also hate them 
and desire to repel them from us, or we may feel indifferent towards them. In sum, everything 
that appears occupies a certain place in one‟s life. It has greater or lesser worth for us, 
according to the role they play in our life.
1389
 Things are seen as beneficial (πνήζζιμξ, 
ὠθέθζιμξ, ζοιθένςκ), detrimental (αθααένμξ) or neutral (which is still a way of being 
functionally determined).
1390
 This means that our relation with other beings is fundamentally 
one of concern.
1391
 We may pursue or avoid them, according to their value for us. But there is 
more. Beings can be in a better or worse state, and they can change for the better or for the 
worse. Therefore, we may also try to improve them or care for them (ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ or 
εεναπεύεζκ), we may harm them, or we may simply neglect them (ἀιεθε῔κ).
1392
 In other 
words, we may deal with other beings in many different ways. 
These are some of the most important traits of the ροπή‟s practical dimension. But 
when we look at it, one of the first things that stands out is the fact that the practical 
dimension is composed of a multitude of tensions or desires.
1393
 These desires have many 
different objects, and they can be more or less intense, more or less prolonged, and more or 
less frequent. In fact, they are so diverse that it is very difficult to be simultaneously aware of 
all of them and to see how they relate to each other. At first sight, all these phenomena seem 
to be largely disconnected and chaotic. Even if some desires and concerns are somehow 
interconnected (for instance, in the sense that we do something for the sake of something 
else, ἕκεηά ηζκμξ), there seems to be many unconnected chains of desires and concerns. But 
are these practical phenomena really unrelated, apart from the fact that they arise in the same 
ροπή?
1394
 Do they have different sources? Or is it rather the case that they all have the same 
origin and are therefore the result of a unitary desire? 
                                                 
1388
 For more on θζθία, see Chap. 13, Sect. 3 below. 
1389
 This recognition of worth can be denoted in different ways, such as πενὶ πμθθμῦ πμζε῔ζεαζ, ηζι᾵κ, 
πνεζαεύεζκ, and so on (cp. e.g. Cri. 46c-e, Smp. 212b). It can also be expressed in a negative form, with such 
words as ἀηζιάγεζκ or ὀθζβςνε῔ζεαζ, among others (cp. e.g. Rep. 364a, Phd. 68c)  
1390
 Cp. e.g. Ly. 221b, Cra. 417a ff., Grg. 468c, 499d.  
1391
 Plato employs verbs such as ιέθεζκ, θνμκηίγεζεαζ or ηήδεζεαζ to express the idea of concern with 
something. See e.g. Ap. 24c, Cri. 44c, Phd. 82d, Smp. 210c, Tht. 199a. 
1392
 Cp. e.g. Ap. 25c, 29d-e, Grg. 485e. 
1393
 In fact, the ροπή is a kind of πόθζξ of desires, to use an image employed by Plato that we will discuss in 
Chap. 13, Sect. 4.4 below. 
1394
 In reference to a passage from Theaetetus considered above, we could even ask if our desires “sit inside us 
as if we were Wooden Horses”. Cp. Tht. 184d: “δεζκὸκ βάν πμο, ὦ πα῔, εἰ πμθθαί ηζκεξ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ ὥζπεν ἐκ 
δμονείμζξ ἵππμζξ αἰζεήζεζξ ἐβηάεδκηαζ, ἀθθὰ ιὴ εἰξ ιίακ ηζκὰ ἰδέακ, εἴηε ροπὴκ εἴηε ὅηζ δε῔ ηαθε῔κ, πάκηα ηαῦηα 
465 
 
If we look at the Platonic corpus, we find several decisive passages that endeavor to 
show how our actions, desires and concerns are not something dispersed and sporadic, but 
rather something unified. They are all manifestations and variations of a permanent or 
constitutive desire, which is in fact responsible for the entire practical domain. But how is 
this unitary desire to be conceived and how does it determine the structure of the soul‟s 
practical dimension?  
 
2. The reference to one’s self as a form of unity of the soul’s practical phenomena 
 
At first sight, there seems to be a rather obvious unity of our actions, desires and 
concerns. They all belong to the same ροπή and are thus referred to the same entity: one‟s 
self (α὎ηόξ). But how is this self to be determined?  
The self is not simply a cognitive subject, and it is also something more than a mere 
container of desires and interests. There is actually a constitutive relation between one‟s 
identity and one‟s desires. The self is marked by desires and they are not something 
adventitious, but rather the core of one‟s self. Moreover, one‟s desires are not only referred to 
something else, but they are also related to the very self that desires something. The self is 
interested in itself or is fond of itself – i.e., it is essentially marked by self-love (θζθία 
ἑαοημῦ) or self-benevolence (ε὎κμία ἑαοημῦ).
1395
 This love or benevolence may have 
different degrees, but it is always felt in some way. We are always concerned with    
ourselves – or, more precisely, with what we have and with what will become of us. Indeed, 
our life is in many respects open. It may come to have different contents or be determined in 
different ways. In other words, we are always referred to the domain of what is to come, and 
we want our self to exist in the future, and also want it to have a good life (i.e., we want it to 
become an enlarged or enriched self).
1396
 
However, despite how evident all this may be for us when we act and perhaps even 
when we think about it, it is still difficult to know exactly what the self is. We can better 
understand this difficulty if we consider what is said in Alcibiades I.
1397
 In 127e ff., Socrates 
                                                                                                                                                        
ζοκηείκεζ, ᾗ δζὰ ημύηςκ μἷμκ ὀνβάκςκ αἰζεακόιεεα ὅζα αἰζεδηά.” I use Levett‟s translation, revised by Myles 
Burnyeat, published in PCW. 
1395
 We find these expressions in Lg. 731e and Grg. 485a. In both cases, Plato is referring to an excessive 
modality of self-love and self-benevolence, but we are always marked by some degree of this love and 
benevolence. 
1396
 On this topic, cp. Phlb. 39e: “(...) ἟ιε῔ξ δ᾽ αὖ δζὰ πακηὸξ ημῦ αίμο ἀεὶ βέιμιεκ ἐθπίδςκ (...).” 
1397
 The text may not have been written by Plato, as many defend, but it nevertheless lets us see something 
important about the questions discussed in other works. Moreover, in this respect, as in many others, what is 
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and Alcibiades are trying to determine what caring for one‟s self (ἑαοημῦ ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ) 
consists in, and this requires them to identify the self, which is not an easy thing to do. After 
some discussion, they identify the self (or the human being) with the ροπή.
1398
 However, the 
ροπή as such is not something to which we have direct access. It is always related to other 
things – or as Socrates stresses, it uses the body to do things and affect other beings.
1399
 This 
means that the self is related to other entities, which are seen in light of their relation to the 
self and thus become things that belong to the self (ηὰ α὏ημῦ) or even things that belong to 
the things that belong to the self (ηὰ η῵κ ἑαοημῦ).
1400
 There may be several layers of 
interrelation. Given the fact that Socrates ends up identifying the self with the ροπή, it is 
natural for him to talk of the body as what belongs to the self and material possessions as 
what belongs to what belongs to the self.
1401
 But the notions of “belonging to the self” and 
“belonging to what belongs to the self” can be taken in a much broader sense. For instance, 
our thoughts (just like our words) may in a way be something that belong to              
ourselves – insofar as we relate to them in some way. Likewise, anything to which we relate 
via our body (such as other persons or our political community) can also be said to “belong” 
to what belongs to ourselves. But be that as it may, the decisive point here is the fact that the 
self is not an abstract or empty content. It contaminates things and changes their status. They 
become “mine” in a way, or as Plato also says, they become “my own” (μἰηε῔μκ). It is true 
that this may be move evident in some cases than others. In fact, things can also be seen as 
something alien (ἀθθόηνζμκ) to us. However, this is still a way of determining them in 
function of the self.
1402
 In general, everything has some relation to one‟s self, which may then 
be of very different kinds. Socrates thus identifies several spheres or layers which may refer 
to each other, but ultimately they are all referred to the self. We could also say that there are 
several concentric circles and the self lies at their center. At first these circles may seem to be 
regional, which would imply that there are some distant things that are not related to the self 
and do not belong to it in any way. Later we will see that the question is actually more 
                                                                                                                                                        
said in Alcibiades I is closely related to questions discussed elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, especially in the 
Apology. For more on what we will now briefly consider and its relation with the Apology, cp. Chap. 2, Sect. 
2.3, and Chap. 13, Sect. 2.1. 
1398
 See 130c: “ἐπεζδὴ δ᾽ μὔηε ζ῵ια μὔηε ηὸ ζοκαιθόηενόκ ἐζηζκ ἄκενςπμξ, θείπεηαζ μἶιαζ ἠ ιδδὲκ αὔη᾽ εἶκαζ, 
ἠ εἴπεν ηί ἐζηζ, ιδδὲκ ἄθθμ ηὸκ ἄκενςπμκ ζοιααίκεζκ ἠ ροπήκ.” 
1399
 See 129b-130a. 
1400
 Plato starts precisely by distinguishing these three domains, in order to isolate the self as such and try to 
identify it. See 128a-129a. 
1401
 See ibidem. 
1402
 The notions of μἰηε῔μκ and ἀθθόηνζμκ do not appear in the passage of Alcibiades I we are considering, but 
they play an important role in several other passages of the corpus (such as Ly. 221d ff., Smp. 205e, Phdr.   
229d-230a, and so on) and they apply to what is being described here. 
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complex and that everything is somehow integrated in this system. But be that as it may, it 
seems plain that there is always a certain domain of beings with which the self is in contact 
and by which it is determined. 
Now, an essential point in Alcibiades I, which we also find in the Apology, is the fact 
that we are always caring for the self in some way, trying to improve it and thus trying to 
make our life better. But this is not only directed at the center of our being. We may try to 
care for the sphere of the self in all spheres that are referred to it – i.e., we may care for other 
beings, but in a way that we are still (or at least we think we are still) caring for ourselves in 
doing so.
1403
 Perhaps this is what we always do. All care for anything may be a variation of 
our self-care in a broad sense. But Socrates calls our attention to the fact that we may mistake 
the self for something that belongs to it, and we may focus our care entirely on this peripheral 
thing, without properly caring for self. In other words, we may fail to understand what is at 
the center of our life, and as a result we may have wrong priorities.
1404
 This is possible 
because of the self‟s complexity and also because of the interconnection of its different 
spheres. Therefore, in order for us to correctly care for the self, we must be aware of what 
exactly the self consists in (i.e., we must know ourselves).
1405
 As was said, Plato identifies 
our being with the ροπή, but the notion is itself mysterious. An important component of it is 
the fact that it desires things. But how are these desires constituted, and what exactly does the 
soul desire? This is what we must now consider, in order to better understand the unity of the 
soul‟s practical dimension. 
 
3. The good and happiness (εὐδαηκνλία) as formal objects of our desires 
 
 Let us then consider the nature of our desire. As a being that desires, the soul is 
directed to something. It is like a projectile and it aims at a particular target (ζημπόξ).
1406
 But 
                                                 
1403
 Cp. Alc. I 127e-128a: “[΢Ω.] θάεςιεκ μ὎π ἟ι῵κ α὎η῵κ ἐπζιεθμύιεκμζ, μἰόιεκμζ δέ – ηαὶ πόη᾽ ἄνα α὎ηὸ 
πμζε῔ ἅκενςπμξ; ἆν᾽ ὅηακ η῵κ α὏ημῦ ἐπζιεθ῅ηαζ, ηόηε ηαὶ α὏ημῦ; [ΑΛ.] ἐιμὶ βμῦκ δμηε῔.” 
1404
 In Alcibiades I, Socrates starts precisely by considering this possibility of our self-care disregarding the self 
in a strict sense (as can be seen in the passage cited in the previous footnote), and then he goes on to establish 
that one is actually neglecting the self while doing so, because the ηέπκαζ that care for the self‟s possessions and 
what belongs to them are different from the ηέπκδ that cares for the self (see 128a-129a). This is connected with 
what we find in the Apology (see 29d-30b, 36e and 41e), where Socrates discusses whether one should first care 
for self or rather the self‟s body and possessions. Socrates argues that most people neglect their self and first 
care for what is secondary and less important. 
1405
 See in particular Alc. I 129a: “βκόκηεξ ιὲκ α὎ηὸ ηάπ᾽ ἂκ βκμ῔ιεκ ηὴκ ἐπζιέθεζακ ἟ι῵κ α὎η῵κ, ἀβκμμῦκηεξ δὲ 
μ὎η ἄκ πμηε.” See also 132b ff. 
1406
 On the idea of ζημπόξ, cp. footnote 1377 above.  
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what is this target? How is it to be defined? And to what extent can we find a unity in the 
objective side of our desires?  
At first sight, it may seem in fact that our desires are directed at very different things. 
However, the things we desire are not totally unrelated. They have something in common, 
and they are all desired for the same reason. In other words, they all fulfill the same function 
or the same formal conditions, and in this sense we may say that our desire has a formal 
object, which may be identified with the most diverse concrete objects. We must therefore 
consider this formal object. Plato identifies different layers of it and we will start with the 
most immediate and superficial layer. Then we will proceed to its core, in order to see the 
precise manner in which it determines all our particular desires and all our life.   
 
3.1. The pursuit of the good (ηἀγαζόλ) 
 
 Our desire is always directed at some good. In the Republic, Socrates says that ηὸ 
ἀβαεόκ is “what every soul pursues and it does everything for the sake of this”.
1407
 Indeed, 
we want what is good or “the good”.
1408
 We accept it and do not want to be deprived of it.
1409
 
Alternatively, if we do not have the good, we pursue it, and this is actually the source of all 
our desires. All things desired are viewed as good, and thus all our movements are directed at 
the good as such. This is our permanent target or goal (ζημπόξ). To be sure, we also try to 
avoid or escape what is bad (ηὸ ηαηόκ). However, both kinds of movement are 
interconnected. Although they usually refer to very different objects, it may also be said that 
what is bad moves us away from the good we pursue (and hence we avoid it) or that not 
attaining the good is itself bad (and in this sense we try to avoid missing out on the good). 
 But before considering these movements and their interrelation, it is important to 
consider the meaning of the terms “good” and “bad” in Ancient Greece, in order to avoid 
misunderstandings. Indeed, “ἀβαεόξ” and “ηαηόξ” are not primarily moral terms. Their 
traditional sense in Greek is first of all functional. This can be more easily seen in the case of 
the term πνδζηόξ, which is often used as a direct equivalent of ἀβαεόξ and is etymologically 
connected with the verb πνάμιαζ (“to use”). Both ἀβαεόξ and πνδζηόξ are often associated 
                                                 
1407
 See Rep. 505d-e: “ὃ δὴ δζώηεζ ιὲκ ἅπαζα ροπὴ ηαὶ ημύημο ἕκεηα πάκηα πνάηηεζ”. 
1408
 The Greek “ηὸ ἀβαεόκ” is somewhat ambiguous. It may convey the notions of “what is good” (thus applying 
to any particular good), “the supreme good” (i.e. what is better than anything else) or even “goodness as such” 
(the ἰδέα ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ). These three different meanings are in fact intimately connected and in this chapter we 
will try to determine their precise relation. 
1409
 Cp. Alc. I 115c-d: “[΢Ω.] (...) ζὺ πόηεν᾽ ἂκ δέλαζό ζμζ εἶκαζ, ἀβαεὰ ἠ ηαηά; [ΑΛ.] ἀβαεά. [΢Ω.] μ὎ημῦκ ηὰ 
ιέβζζηα ιάθζζηα. [ΑΛ.] καί. [΢Ω.] ηαὶ ἣηζζηα η῵κ ημζμύηςκ δέλαζμ ἂκ ζηένεζεαζ; [ΑΛ.] π῵ξ βὰν μὔ;” 
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with terms such as ζοιθένμκ, θοζζηεθμῦκ, ὠθέθζιμκ, or ηενδαθέμκ, which qualify something 
as beneficial, advantageous, helpful, or profitable.
1410
 All these terms can be applied to 
objects, animals, persons and situations, in order to describe their value and their positive role 
in our life. But this does not mean that “ἀβαεόξ” can only be used when our personal profit is 
at issue. The term can also be used to express approval or commendation, and it can even 
acquire a moral sense, when applied to actions or persons.
1411
 However, in traditional Greek 
culture one‟s goodness consisted primarily in one‟s usefulness to the household and to the 
πόθζξ, which required one to be able to perform certain fundamental tasks with excellence 
(ἀνεηή). In addition, the term may single out a particular social class – namely, the noble 
men, which are supposed to have an innate superiority and thus be better qualified to perform 
the most important tasks in the πόθζξ. Once more, the sense of ἀβαεόξ is primarily functional, 
and only later did it come to be linked with intrinsic moral value – and even then the 
functional sense is still felt.
1412
  
 Something similar can be said of ηαηόξ. It expresses the idea that something has low 
quality and is therefore useless (ἄπνδζημκ). It does not perform its function properly and it 
can even be detrimental, harmful, prejudicial, or damaging (αθααενόκ, γδιζ῵δεξ). It comes 
close in meaning to ιμπεδνόξ and πμκδνόξ – which also have the sense of being toilsome or 
causing grief. When applied to persons, ηαηόξ means primarily that someone is incapable, 
poor at his job or function, or even weak and coward. It can also denote an inferior or base 
person in general – i.e., someone who is loathsome to others. Only later does the term come 
to mean evil and wicked in a moral sense, thus coming close to such other terms as αἰζπνόξ, 
πακμῦνβμξ, ιζανόξ. But that is a derived sense. The badness expressed by ηαηόξ is primarily 




                                                 
1410
 Cp. e.g. Alc. I 116a, c, Cra. 416e ff., Tht. 177c-d. 
1411
 In this case, it comes close to ηαθόξ, which is another important term of commendation and can be 
translated as “beautiful, fine, noble, laudable.” The two could even be associated in the qualification ηαθὸξ 
ηἀβαεόξ and were in some cases hard to distinguish from one another. 
1412
 This is, for instance, why Plato often associates moral ἀνεηαί with the idea that they are beneficial. See e.g. 
Alc. I 116c, Hp. Ma. 296e, Grg. 477a, Rep. 505a. For more on the use of “ἀβαεόξ”, cp. e.g. M. HOFFMANN, 
Die ethische Terminologie bei Homer, Hesiod und den altern Elegikern und Jambographen, Tübingen, Kloeres, 
1914, 71 ff., 115-116, 124, 127-128, 131ff.; J. GERLACH, Ἀκήν ἀβαεόξ, Diss. München, 1932; C. CLASSEN, 
Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens, München, Beck, 1959, 
138ff.; P. HUART, Le vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 
1968, 462-465; A. ADKINS, Moral Values and Political Behavior in Ancient Greece. From Homer to the End 
of the Fifth Century, London, Chatto & Windus, 1972, passim. 
1413
 For more on the term “ηαηόξ”, see e.g. M. HOFFMANN, op. cit., 82 ff., 116-117, 124, 127-128, 131 ff.; W. 
GRUNDMANN, ηαηόξ, ἄηαημξ, ηαηία, ηαηός, ηαηoῦνβμξ, ηαημήεεζα, ηαημπμζές, ηαημπμζόξ, ἐβηαηζές, 
ἀκελίηαημξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; A. ADKINS, op. cit., passim; K. DOVER, Greek Popular Morality in the 
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The terms ἀβαεόξ and ηαηόξ thus describe how things in the broadest sense of the 
word relate to us (either as individuals or as members of a community), and how they can 
contribute to our life. This implies that our being is not impervious to things in general. 
Rather, it is affected and determined by them – i.e., they affect the quality of one‟s life. 
Therefore, we pursue things that benefit us. We try to attain or acquire them, in order to reach 
the state of self-sufficiency (α὎ηάνηεζα) or of not needing anything (ιδδεκὸξ δε῔ζεαζ).
1414
 But 
such a pursuit raises the question of whether we have the power (δύκαιζξ) and means to attain 
the good we pursue.
1415
 Moreover, we may make mistakes about what we desire (as we will 
see below) – and in this sense we may fail to pursue the real good. This is why sometimes we 
find statements in the corpus saying that we should pursue the good, which implies that in 
some cases we do not do so.
1416
 What is meant is that we should pursue the real good. But we 
are always pursuing what appears to be good. Our concern with ourselves is always directed 
to what we regard as the good – i.e., as good for us, as something that improves our being, 
and makes our life better. This is implied in all our desires. They all perform the same 
function in our life: they try to improve it. These desires are thus not sparse or discontinuous, 
and they are not simply concerned with our immediate future. They are all part of a global 
project. The concern with oneself implies – nay, demands – these desires. This means that our 
concerns, desires, are not primarily directed to their apparent objects, but rather to the good. 
They are all integrated in this unitary pursuit of the good as what improves us. 
Still, there are many things that we regard as good – things such as money, health, 
friends, the admiration of others, knowledge, and so on.
1417
 Additionally, we do not pursue 
just one good at a time. We are constantly fighting on multiple fronts and pursuing different 
goods. This does not mean that they all have the same importance. In general, we establish a 
scale of values. Some things are better than others. But there is more. Goods are also 
                                                                                                                                                        
Time of Plato and Aristotle, Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1974, 52-53, 65, 82; I. 
SLUITER & R. ROSEN (ed.), Kakos. Badness and Anti-Value in Classical Antiquity, Leiden/Boston, Brill, 
2008. 
1414
 The idea of self-sufficiency has a primarily social or political meaning. It is used of a household or a πόθζξ 
that does not need to import goods, since it produces everything it needs and is therefore materially independent. 
The term can also express the idea of being in a state of sufficiency, without lacking anything – and what we 
strive to achieve is precisely self-sufficiency in this more general sense. For more on this subject, cp. e.g. M. 
WHEELER, Self-Sufficiency and the Greek City, Journal of the History of Ideas 16 (1955), 416-420; G. 
WIDMANN, Autarkie und Philia in den aristotelischen Ethiken, Diss. Tübingen, 1967, especially 27ff.; T. 
KRISCHNER, Der Begriff der Autarkie im Rahmen der Griechischen Kulturgeschichte, Hyperboreus 6 (2000), 
253-262; P. BOSMAN, Ancient Debates on autarkeia and our Global Impasse, Phronimon 16 (2015), 16-28. 
1415
 The question of having or not the power to attain one‟s ends is particularly stressed in the Gorgias, when 
rhetoric is presented as the ηέπκδ that gives one superlative power and allows one to manipulate all other ηέπκαζ 
and all persons. See e.g. 447c, 452d ff., 455d ff., 466b ff. 
1416
 Cp. e.g. Grg. 499e-500a and 507d. 
1417
 Cp. e.g. Men. 78c, Euthd. 279ff., Grg. 467e. 
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distinguished according to their intrinsic or derived value. Some values are intrinsically good 
and desired by themselves, others pursued for the sake of something else (ἕκεηά ηζκμξ).
1418
 In 
fact, we may even pursue things that are otherwise seen as bad, just because in a particular 
situation they appear to be conducive to something good. One thus creates a chain of goods, 
that may in fact be more or less complex, and include more or less intermediate terms. 
However, all these intermediate goods refer to a main good or to what is called “first 
beloved” (πν῵ημκ θίθμκ) in Lysis, which is what we actually desire.
1419
 Something similar 
happens with what is bad. Something may be intrinsically bad, or it may be bad because it 
leads to some greater evil or pushes us away from the good (even if in itself it is not bad). 
 The different beings we come in contact with are thus integrated in complex chains of 
desire, which lets these beings appear as beneficial or harmful for us. The goods and evils are 
connected in many different ways, and it all depends on what we actually pursue. On this 
account, the attempt to understand our desires raises the question concerning the final goal or 
goals of our actions and pursuits – i.e., that for the sake of which all actions are done. Is this 
final good one or are there many final goods? And is there ultimately only one chain of goods 
(and evils) or are there several? What is it we truly want? What are all our efforts and pains 
about?  
The good we pursue is indeed a problem, and so we must try to better determine it. 
This can be done in two different ways. First, since the good has primarily a formal character 
(i.e., it is whatever we pursue), we can try to better determine its formal structure (i.e., the 
general criteria anything must fulfill to be seen as desirable or good). We can also try to 
identify what specifically corresponds to it – i.e., what fulfills the criteria just mentioned. In 
what follows, we will discuss these two questions, and we will start precisely by discussing in 
                                                 
1418
 For the notion of ἕκεηά ηζκμξ, see Grg. 467d-e: “ἐάκ ηίξ ηζ πνάηηῃ ἕκεηά ημο, μ὎ ημῦημ αμύθεηαζ ὃ πνάηηεζ, 
ἀθθ᾽ ἐηε῔κμ μὗ ἕκεηα πνάηηεζ;” See also Phlb. 54c: “ηό βε ιὴκ μὗ ἕκεηα ηὸ ἕκεηά ημο βζβκόιεκμκ ἀεὶ βίβκμζη᾽ ἄκ, 
ἐκ ηῆ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ ιμίνᾳ ἐηε῔κό ἐζηζ· ηὸ δὲ ηζκὸξ ἕκεηα βζβκόιεκμκ εἰξ ἄθθδκ, ὦ ἄνζζηε, ιμ῔νακ εεηέμκ.” For a 
distinction of different kinds of goods, see Rep. 357b-d: “ἆνά ζμζ δμηε῔ ημζόκδε ηζ εἶκαζ ἀβαεόκ, ὃ δελαίιεε᾽ ἂκ 
ἔπεζκ μ὎ η῵κ ἀπμααζκόκηςκ ἐθζέιεκμζ, ἀθθ᾽ α὎ηὸ α὏ημῦ ἕκεηα ἀζπαγόιεκμζ, μἷμκ ηὸ παίνεζκ ηαὶ αἱ ἟δμκαὶ ὅζαζ 
ἀαθααε῔ξ ηαὶ ιδδὲκ εἰξ ηὸκ ἔπεζηα πνόκμκ δζὰ ηαύηαξ βίβκεηαζ ἄθθμ ἠ παίνεζκ ἔπμκηα;    ἔιμζβε, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, δμηε῔ 
ηζ εἶκαζ ημζμῦημκ.     ηί δέ; ὃ α὎ηό ηε α὏ημῦ πάνζκ ἀβαπ῵ιεκ ηαὶ η῵κ ἀπ᾽ α὎ημῦ βζβκμιέκςκ, μἷμκ αὖ ηὸ θνμκε῔κ 
ηαὶ ηὸ ὁν᾵κ ηαὶ ηὸ ὏βζαίκεζκ; ηὰ βὰν ημζαῦηά πμο δζ᾽ ἀιθόηενα ἀζπαγόιεεα.     καί, εἶπμκ.     ηνίημκ δὲ ὁνᾶξ ηζ, 
ἔθδ, εἶδμξ ἀβαεμῦ, ἐκ ᾧ ηὸ βοικάγεζεαζ ηαὶ ηὸ ηάικμκηα ἰαηνεύεζεαζ ηαὶ ἰάηνεοζίξ ηε ηαὶ ὁ ἄθθμξ 
πνδιαηζζιόξ; ηαῦηα βὰν ἐπίπμκα θα῔ιεκ ἄκ, ὠθεθε῔κ δὲ ἟ι᾵ξ, ηαὶ α὎ηὰ ιὲκ ἑαοη῵κ ἕκεηα μ὎η ἂκ δελαίιεεα 
ἔπεζκ, η῵κ δὲ ιζζε῵κ ηε πάνζκ ηαὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ ὅζα βίβκεηαζ ἀπ᾽ α὎η῵κ.     ἔζηζκ βὰν μὖκ, ἔθδκ, ηαὶ ημῦημ ηνίημκ.”  
1419
 The first beloved is the basis that allows other things to be object of θζθία. But, as Socrates says, these other 
beloved things are images of the first beloved, which means that they are intrinsically referred to it and at the 
same time fall short of it. The examples provided in the text let us understand this. For instance, a father loves 
his son and because of this he loves also the remedy that saves his son‟s life. However, he has no particular love 
for the remedy or its container as such. See 219b-220b. 
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more detail the formal structure of our desire. We will consider the pursuit of the good from 
other angles and we will try to determine the real criteria of the good we pursue.  
   
3.2. The desire of having a good life as a pursuit of εὐδαηκνλία 
 
 One essential feature of our desire, which helps us define it, is the fact that it is 
constitutively related to ε὎δαζιμκία. We all want to be happy.
1420
 But this is not just another 
desire of ours, different from our desire for the good. In Symposium, Diotima asks Socrates 
why anyone wants to have or possess good things, and they go on to determine that one wants 
them in order to be happy (ε὎δαίιςκ).
1421
 They even define ε὎δαζιμκία as the possession of 
good things.
1422
 Moreover, we do not want to be happy for the sake of anything else. 
Happiness is the final end of all our pursuits.
1423
 Whatever we do and whatever we pursue, 
we all want the good and we all want to be happy. The desire for happiness is thus referred to 
the good, but it also lets us better understand our pursuit of the good. We want to possess the 
good. Our life is to be filled by it and this is what will allow us to have a good life or live well 
(εὖ γ῅κ).
1424
 Indeed, we do not just want to live, and we do not just want to pursue the good, 




It is, however, important to understand what is implied in this formal definition of 
happiness, because the Platonic and Greek understanding of happiness is considerably 
different from the usual way of understanding it nowadays. We can catch a first glimpse of 
this difference if we briefly consider the Greek terms Plato uses to express the idea of 
happiness and the cultural contexts to which they are associated. The most common term is 
ε὎δαζιμκία, but Plato also uses ιαηανία (in particular the adjective ιαηάνζμξ) and εὖ 
                                                 
1420
 See e.g. Euthd. 278e: “ἆνά βε πάκηεξ ἄκενςπμζ αμοθόιεεα εὖ πνάηηεζκ; ἠ ημῦημ ιὲκ ἐνώηδια ὧκ κοκδὴ 
ἐθμαμύιδκ ἓκ η῵κ ηαηαβεθάζηςκ; ἀκόδημκ βὰν δήπμο ηαὶ ηὸ ἐνςη᾵κ ηὰ ημζαῦηα· ηίξ βὰν μ὎ αμύθεηαζ 
ἀκενώπςκ εὖ πνάηηεζκ;     μ὎δεὶξ ὅζηζξ μὔη, ἔθδ.” Cp. also Smp. 205a. 
1421
 See 204e-205a: “θένε, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ἐνᾶ ὁ ἐν῵κ η῵κ ἀβαε῵κ· ηί ἐνᾶ;     βεκέζεαζ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, α὏ηῶ.     ηαὶ ηί 
ἔζηαζ ἐηείκῳ ᾧ ἂκ βέκδηαζ ηἀβαεά;     ημῦη᾽ ε὎πμνώηενμκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ἔπς ἀπμηνίκαζεαζ, ὅηζ ε὎δαίιςκ        
ἔζηαζ.    ηηήζεζ βάν, ἔθδ, ἀβαε῵κ μἱ ε὎δαίιμκεξ ε὎δαίιμκεξ, ηαὶ μ὎ηέηζ πνμζδε῔ ἐνέζεαζ ἵκα ηί δὲ αμύθεηαζ 
ε὎δαίιςκ εἶκαζ ὁ αμοθόιεκμξ; ἀθθὰ ηέθμξ δμηε῔ ἔπεζκ ἟ ἀπόηνζζζξ.” 
1422
 See the passage quoted in the previous footnote. We find in the same idea in Alc. I, 116b: “μ὎ημῦκ 
ε὎δαίιμκεξ δζ᾽ ἀβαε῵κ ηη῅ζζκ;” In Euthd. 279a, the following is asked (and then confirmed): “ἐπεζδὴ 
αμοθόιεεα εὖ πνάηηεζκ, π῵ξ ἂκ εὖ πνάηημζιεκ; ἆν᾽ ἂκ εἰ ἟ι῔κ πμθθὰ ηἀβαεὰ εἴδ;” Finally, see also 280b 
“ὡιμθμβήζαιεκ βάν, ἔθδκ, εἰ ἟ι῔κ ἀβαεὰ πμθθὰ πανείδ, ε὎δαζιμκε῔κ ἂκ ηαὶ εὖ πνάηηεζκ.” 
1423
 See once more Smp. 205a. 
1424
 Cp. Rep. 354a: “ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ὅ βε εὖ γ῵κ ιαηάνζόξ ηε ηαὶ ε὎δαίιςκ, ὁ δὲ ιὴ ηἀκακηία.     π῵ξ βὰν μὔ;” 
1425





 Δ὎δαζιμκία generally means good fortune or success, which may correspond to 
different things. In the popular understanding, it was mostly identified with concrete things: 
wealth, good reputation, health, comfort, good progeny, and so on. All these things were 
originally understood as the result of a divine favor, as is shown by the etymological 
connection of ε὎δαζιμκία with δαίιςκ. The term δαίιςκ designates primarily a divine or 
superhuman power. In contrast with εεόξ, the deity in question is generally unnamed and has 
no other personal traits. A δαίιςκ can also be considered a minor deity.
1427
 Among other 
things, δαίιμκεξ were regarded as a sort of guardians or guiding spirits.
1428
 However, they 
could be either benevolent or malevolent, and could thus bring good or bad things. They were 
responsible for the content of one‟s life – i.e., for one‟s lot or destiny. But this is not all. In 
what was perhaps a later stage of popular understanding, the magical or animist 
understanding of life became more abstract, and the term δαίιςκ came to mean also what 
happens in one‟s life or one‟s particular destiny.
1429
 This destiny can be either good or bad, 
and accordingly one can be either ε὎δαίιςκ or δοζδαίιςκ.
1430
 The latter are not just states 
one finds oneself in, but they are also possibilities to which we are always exposed and to 
which we always relate, even when our life already seems pretty determined. As ephemeral 
beings, we are always open to sudden changes, and hence the theme of ε὎δαζιμκία is closely 
associated with the idea that the value of a life can only be defined at its end.
1431
 Happiness is 
indeed referred to the totality of one‟s life and it is the value of this totality that is at issue.  
The idea of totality is further stressed by a different understanding of happiness 
developed in the context of Orphism and of the Mysteries, where ε὎δαζιμκία and ιαηανία 
designate the blissful state the initiates will enjoy after dying. This is in keeping with the old 
                                                 
1426
 We will leave out the adjective ὄθαζμξ, which is only found in two less relevant passages (namely, Ly. 212e 
and Prt. 337d). 
1427
 For this meaning of δαίιςκ, cp. Ap. 27d-e and Smp. 202d-203a.  
1428
 See e.g. HESIOD, Opera et dies, 122-126: “ημὶ ιὲκ δαίιμκεξ ἁβκμὶ ἐπζπεόκζμζ ηεθέεμοζζκ/ ἐζεθμί, 
ἀθελίηαημζ, θύθαηεξ εκδη῵κ ἀκενώπςκ,/ μἵ ῥα θοθάζζμοζίκ ηε δίηαξ ηαὶ ζπέηθζα ἔνβα/ ἞ένα ἑζζάιεκμζ πάκηδ 
θμζη῵κηεξ ἐπ᾽ αἶακ,/ πθμοημδόηαζ (...).” Cp. also Phd. 107d, 108b, Rep. 617e, 620d-e, Plt. 271d-e. 
1429
 On this use of the word, see e.g. E. FRAENKEL (ed.), Aeschylus – Agamemnon, vol. 3, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1950, ad 1341f. 
1430
 For more on the meaning of δαίιςκ, see e.g. E. OWEN, Γαίιςκ and Cognate Words, The Journal of 
Theological Studies 32 (1931), 133-153; H. SCHLIER, δαίµςκ, δαζµόκζμκ, δαζµμκίγμµαζ, δαζµμκζώδδξ, 
δεζζζδαίµςκ, δεζζζδαζµμκία, in: TWNT, sub voce; P. van der HORST, Γαίιςκ, Mnemosyne 10 (1941), 61-68; M. 
DETIENNE, La notion de daïmôn dans le Pythagorisme ancien, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1963; F. WILFORD, 
Γαίιςκ in Homer, Numen 12 (1965), 217-232; S. DARCUS, Daimon as a Force Shaping Ethos in Heraclitus, 
Phoenix 28 (1974), 390-407; R. MIRELLI, Der Daimon und die Figur des Sokrates. Entstehung einer 
gegenwärtigen, akademischen Subjektivität am Leitfaden von Platon und Nietzsche, Würzburg, Königshausen 
& Neumann, 2013. 
1431
 See e.g. HERODOTUS, Historiae, 1.32, AESCHYLUS, Agamemnon, 928f., SOPHOCLES, Oedipus 
Tyrannus, 1524-1530, EURIPIDES, Andromacha, 100-102. Cp. also R. JEBB (ed.), Sophocles Ŕ The Plays and 
Fragments, vol. 1, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 1883-1896, ad 1529. 
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myth of the Elysian Fields or the Isles of the Blessed (ιαηάνςκ κ῅ζμζ). As we saw above, 
some heroes were taken there instead of going to Hades, thereby avoiding death and the 
phantasmagorical state that corresponds to it.
1432
 The Isles of the Blessed, in turn, were 
represented as a land of mild weather, where there was no work and no suffering.
1433
 The 
initiated believed that they would achieve something similar. If they had purified their soul, 
they would attain a better lot after dying.
1434
 This religious conception implies therefore a less 
passive understanding of happiness, and Plato further stresses one‟s active role therein when 
he uses the expression εὖ πνάηηεζκ. Δὖ πνάηηεζκ originally conveys the idea of faring well, 
succeeding, or being prosper. Plato, however, often interprets it in the sense of acting 
competently, behaving correctly, or “being good”, “having ἀνεηή” – which corresponds to his 
own understanding of what ε὎δαζιμκία consists in.
1435
  
However, let us leave aside for now Plato‟s identification of what happiness consists 
in. We are trying to determine the formal notion of happiness, and there is one central aspect 
that is present in all these different conceptions of happiness. This aspect is actually at the 
heart of the difference between Ancient and contemporary conceptions. Whatever the specific 
content of happiness, it is always understood as something objective. It implies that one 
actually achieves what one truly desires – namely, what is truly good. A good life consists 
precisely in this. One must achieve one‟s goal and become fulfilled. Otherwise, one will be 
miserable or wretched (ἄεθζμξ). Indeed, misery is the opposite of happiness and it consists in 
the failure to reach what one desires. If one falls short of it or even reaches the opposite of 
what was desired, one‟s life will be marked by the bad things one wanted to avoid, and it will 
therefore be pointless and no better (or even worse) than being dead. 
In sum, for the Greeks happiness is primarily the fulfillment of a project. But the fact 
that it is so can be easily lost on us, since we normally conceive happiness as a subjective 
state that depends on one‟s emotions. Happiness seems to be primarily a matter of sensation 
or of feeling good. This presupposes that one has an immediate experience of the value of 
one‟s life and so, in order to be happy, one must feel happy. For the Greeks, however, 
happiness could even be conceived as something totally independent from the strictly 
subjective (i.e., sensible or affective) component of our being. It could consist in honor or 
                                                 
1432
 Cp. Chap. 10, Sect. 1.1. 
1433
 See e.g. HESIOD, Opera et dies 167-73. 
1434
 Cp. Chap. 10, Sect. 1.2 above. 
1435
 Cp. e.g. Alc. I 116b and Grg. 507c. For more on this, see e.g. C. CLASSEN, Sprachliche Deutung als 
Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens, München, Beck, 1959, 138, 108f.; R. CAIN, The 
Socratic Method. Plato‟s Use of Philosophical Drama, London/New York, Continuum, 2007. 
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wisdom, for instance. It all depended on what was defined as being objectively good. To be 
sure, one would still want to avoid pain, but in general that was not the main goal. A life 
without a subjectively (i.e. affectively) bad state would still fall short of what one truly 
desired, and if one had the chance to have more than such a painless state, one would always 
accept it. On the other hand, if someone happened to see happiness as consisting in a good 
(i.e., pleasant) subjective state (as sometimes seems to be the case), one would still want this 
pleasure to be real. An illusory pleasure would not be sufficient. In other words, what one 
wants to attain or possess is an objective state that is intrinsically desirable and good. The 
idea of objectivity or reality is at the center of the Ancient understanding of happiness, and it 
is essential for Plato‟s conception of happiness. Happiness is always referred to a specific 
program or plan. One pursues a particular good, and one must really attain it. For now, we do 
not know exactly what this good consists in, and it may even include a particular subjective 




Such a conception thus raises the question of whether we really know what we desire. 
It seems possible for us to be unaware of our true desires and wrongly think that we have 
achieved our goals. We would then possess an illusory happiness. As Socrates says in the 
Apology, we may seem to be happy (δμηε῔κ ε὎δαίιςκ εἶκαζ) without that being the case.
1437
 
We may fail to reach what is really good and reach something bad instead (or something less 
good), all the while thinking it is the good. We may be convinced that one‟s life is turning out 
well and all the while it may be a failure. In other words, it is possible for us to be miserable 
without knowing.
1438
 Our situation could then be described as a “beauty festering with evils” 
                                                 
1436
 For more on the Ancient notion of “happiness”, see e.g. F. HAUCK & G. BERTRAM, µαηάνζμξ, µαηανίγς, 
µαηανζζµόξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; B. GLADIGOW, Zum Makarismos des Weisen, Hermes 95 (1967), 404-433; 
P. HUART, Le vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, 
66-67; C. de HEER, Μάκαρ, εὐδαίμφν, ὄλβιος, εὐηστής. A Study of the Semantic Field Denoting Happiness in 
Ancient Greek to the End of the 5th Century B. C., Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1969; K. DOVER, Greek Popular 
Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle, Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1974, 174; 
M. McDONALD, Terms for Happiness in Euripides, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978; R. KRAUT, 
Two Conceptions of Happiness, The Philosophical Review 88 (1979), 167-197; K. DOVER,                        
Plato Ŕ Symposium, Cambridge, University Press, 1980, ad 180b7; W. SCHADEWALDT, Die Anfänge der 
Geschichtschreibung bei den Griechen, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1982, 122-123; S. SLINGS, Plato’s Apology of 
Socrates, Leiden/New York, Brill, 1994, 77; J. MIKALSON, The daimon of eudaimonia, in: J. MILLER et al. 
(eds.), Vertis in usum. Studies in Honour of E. Courtney, München/Leipzig, Saur, 2002, 250-258; R. MIRELLI, 
Der Daimon und die Figur des Sokrates. Entstehung einer gegenwärtigen, akademischen Subjektivität am 
Leitfaden von Platon und Nietzsche, Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 2013, 44-47. 
1437
 See 36d-e: “μ὎η ἔζε᾽ ὅηζ ι᾵θθμκ, ὦ ἄκδνεξ Ἀεδκα῔μζ, πνέπεζ μὕηςξ ὡξ ηὸκ ημζμῦημκ ἄκδνα ἐκ πνοηακείῳ 
ζζηε῔ζεαζ, πμθύ βε ι᾵θθμκ ἠ εἴ ηζξ ὏ι῵κ ἵππῳ ἠ ζοκςνίδζ ἠ γεύβεζ κεκίηδηεκ ὆θοιπίαζζκ· ὁ ιὲκ βὰν ὏ι᾵ξ πμζε῔ 
ε὎δαίιμκαξ δμηε῔κ εἶκαζ, ἐβὼ δὲ εἶκαζ (...).” 
1438
 Polus ironically alludes to this possibility in Grg. 471b, saying that Archelaus “ἔθαεεκ ἑαοηὸκ ἀεθζώηαημξ 
βεκόιεκμξ”. These words express with precision what is in question here. 
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(ηάθθμξ ηαη῵κ ὕπμοθμκ), to borrow an expression from Sophocles‟ Oedipus Tyrannus.
1439
 
The cognitive component is indeed very important, and we will consider it in more detail 
below. Happiness requires us to really possess what we really desire, and the possibility of 
being deluded about our happiness or misery results from the fact that both of them 
correspond primarily to objective states, defined by our true desires. We do not just want to 
feel something, nor do we want the illusion of possessing the good. Perhaps in some cases we 
may wonder if the illusion of happiness is not preferable, but that is not what we are directed 
to. No one wants to have what only appears to be good, as Socrates says in the Republic. We 
want what is truly good.
1440
 
This whole description raises several questions. First, it is not easy to determine what 
an objective state is. It is also not clear how we can determine whether we have really 
achieved what is objectively good or not. It depends on what we really desire. But at this 
point it is not clear what we really desire, and whether we all desire the same thing. 
Moreover, does happiness require us to fully attain the good? Or can we partially attain it and 
still be happy? In other words, can there be different degrees of happiness? And, if so, do we 
need to be fully happy, or can we be content with a lesser happiness? It seems that any lesser 
degree would imply a certain degree of failure, and so accepting it it would be a form of 
renunciation to our deepest desires. But can we really reach absolute happiness? And what 
would it correspond to? 
We will have to return to all these questions later. They all require a more refined 
analysis of the structure of our desire – and of our life in general. Above all, we must 
determine better what we truly desire, according to the indications we find in the Platonic 
corpus. But before discussing those questions, there are some aspects regarding the general 
structure of our desire that we should consider. 
 
3.3. The unity of desire and the intermediate (κεηαμύ) character of human soul 
 
We saw that our desires are not atomic or discontinuous. Rather, they are integrated in 
the unitary pursuit of the good and of happiness. This desire pervades our whole being and it 
is what moves us at all times. But we can better understand what this means if we consider 
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 See v. 1396. Cp. also Grg. 480b, where Plato speaks of a ροπὴ ὕπμοθμξ. 
1440
 See 505d: “ηόδε μ὎ θακενόκ, ὡξ δίηαζα ιὲκ ηαὶ ηαθὰ πμθθμὶ ἂκ ἕθμζκημ ηὰ δμημῦκηα, ηἂκ εἰ ιὴ εἴδ, ὅιςξ 
ηαῦηα πνάηηεζκ ηαὶ ηεηη῅ζεαζ ηαὶ δμηε῔κ, ἀβαεὰ δὲ μ὎δεκὶ ἔηζ ἀνηε῔ ηὰ δμημῦκηα ηη᾵ζεαζ, ἀθθὰ ηὰ ὄκηα 
γδημῦζζκ, ηὴκ δὲ δόλακ ἐκηαῦεα ἢδδ π᾵ξ ἀηζιάγεζ;     ηαὶ ιάθα, ἔθδ.” 
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some essential points of what is said by Socrates in Symposium. In his speech, Socrates (with 
the help of Diotima) identifies the desire of goods and happiness with ἔνςξ in a broader 
sense.
1441
 According to him, the usual sense of the word ἔνςξ as a designation of passion or 
romantic love is just one possible manifestation of our constitutive ἔνςξ, and all other 
pursuits (such as the pursuit of money, honor or knowledge) also deserve the name.
1442
 They 
are all modalities of the same thing. Their unity does not simply consist in the fact that they 
are all desires of ours and somehow relate to the self‟s pursuit of a better version of itself. 
Rather, the self (or the ροπή) is determined as desire, and more specifically as the desire of 
the good and of happiness in the senses above mentioned. On this account, we can better 
understand the desiderative nature of human soul by considering Diotima‟s and Socrates‟ 
analysis of ἔνςξ.  
Socrates and Diotima first define ἔνςξ as a kind of being that lies between two poles 
and is essentially characterized by this intermediate position. Then, they identify our ροπή 
with ἔνςξ and show how the former can likewise be characterized as an intermediate being. 
But before considering how it is so, it is important to consider how the question is introduced. 
Socrates‟ words are preceded and prepared by Agathon‟s speech (194e-197e), where ἔνςξ is 
qualified by many positive predicates and described as a fullness of being.
1443
 But after the 
speech, Socrates cross-examines Agathon and they agree that, though ἔνςξ is directed at 
something characterized by the positive predicates Agathon mentioned, it is actually based on 
desire and lack.
1444
 Socrates thus isolates the component of desire and then, during the course 
of his speech, he tries to define it as something that is not sporadic or adventitious, but rather 
permanent and intrinsic (just as Aristophanes had shown previously).
1445
 
It is at this point that Socrates (recalling his past conversation with Diotima) 
introduces the notion of intermediacy (ιεηαλύ). Ἔνςξ is intrinsically related to beauty (or to 
goodness), but it is deprived of it.
1446
 Indeed, he is partially determined by its opposite, 
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 See 205d: “μὕης ημίκοκ ηαὶ πενὶ ηὸκ ἔνςηα. ηὸ ιὲκ ηεθάθαζόκ ἐζηζ π᾵ζα ἟ η῵κ ἀβαε῵κ ἐπζεοιία ηαὶ ημῦ 
ε὎δαζιμκε῔κ ὁ „ιέβζζηόξ ηε ηαὶ δμθενὸξ ἔνςξ‟ πακηί (...).” 
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 See 205a-d, where Diotima mentions the restriction of the word “πμίδζζξ” to poetry and says that the same 
happened with the word “ἔνςξ”, who was restricted only to a few of its forms – especially amorous pursuits. 
1443
 For more on this, cp. Section 4.3 below. 
1444
 See 199e-200b: “ὁ Ἔνςξ ἔνςξ ἐζηὶκ μ὎δεκὸξ ἠ ηζκόξ;     πάκο ιὲκ μὖκ ἔζηζκ.     ημῦημ ιὲκ ημίκοκ, εἰπε῔κ ηὸκ 
΢ςηνάηδ, θύθαλμκ πανὰ ζαοηῶ ιεικδιέκμξ ὅημο· ημζόκδε δὲ εἰπέ, πόηενμκ ὁ Ἔνςξ ἐηείκμο μὗ ἔζηζκ ἔνςξ, 
ἐπζεοιε῔ α὎ημῦ ἠ μὔ;     πάκο βε, θάκαζ.     πόηενμκ ἔπςκ α὎ηὸ μὗ ἐπζεοιε῔ ηε ηαὶ ἐνᾶ, εἶηα ἐπζεοιε῔ ηε ηαὶ ἐνᾶ, ἠ 
μ὎η ἔπςκ;     μ὎η ἔπςκ, ὡξ ηὸ εἰηόξ βε, θάκαζ.     ζηόπεζ δή, εἰπε῔κ ηὸκ ΢ςηνάηδ, ἀκηὶ ημῦ εἰηόημξ εἰ ἀκάβηδ 
μὕηςξ, ηὸ ἐπζεοιμῦκ ἐπζεοιε῔κ μὗ ἐκδεέξ ἐζηζκ, ἠ ιὴ ἐπζεοιε῔κ, ἐὰκ ιὴ ἐκδεὲξ ᾖ; ἐιμὶ ιὲκ βὰν εαοιαζη῵ξ δμηε῔, 
ὦ Ἀβάεςκ, ὡξ ἀκάβηδ εἶκαζ· ζμὶ δὲ π῵ξ;     ηἀιμί, θάκαζ, δμηε῔.” 
1445
 For a brief analysis of Aristophanes‟ speech, cp. Section 4.2 below. 
1446
 See 201a-c. 
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without reducing itself to it. In this sense, it lies between the two opposite poles. This 
“betweenness”, however, is not to be understood in a geographical sense. It is not an extrinsic 
property of something. Ἔνςξ is not a particular being that has its own essence and also 
happens to lie between these two extremes. Its intermediacy is its essence. Ἔνςξ is 
something intermediate insofar as it is intrinsically composed by the two poles and by the 
way they restrict or negate each other. In other words, ἔνςξ can only be conceived by 
reference to these two poles. It is neither one nor the other, but it is somehow the two. 
Moreover, ἔνςξ is also ιεηαλύ in the sense that it is in the middle (or in course) of doing 
something – namely, it moves away from the negative pole (or at least tries to) and is directed 
at the positive pole, which it strives to attain. The intermediateness in question is thus a form 
of pursuit. 
This is the general model of intermediacy presented in the text. But Plato does not 
only define a general notion of intermediacy or “betweenness”. He also identifies different 
kinds of intermediacy, defined by different sets of opposite poles and also by different ways 
of understanding the poles in question. The latter point is quite significant, as can be seen in 
the case of mortality and immortality. Socrates starts by describing ἔνςξ as something that 
lies between what-is-mortal and what-is-immortal in the traditional sense of these terms. 
Consequently, ἔνςξ is said to be a δαίιςκ ιέβαξ, which connects mortals and immortals or, 
as Plato also says, binds the whole closer together.
1447
 This means that ἔνςξ is an entity 
different from us and superior to us. But then Plato introduces a significant shift, and presents 
a different kind of intermediate between what-is-mortal and what-is-immortal, based on a 
reinterpretation of the meaning of these poles. Being mortal is now interpreted as being 
instantaneous and being immortal corresponds to being eternal and changeless. As a result, 
the intermediate between the two is generation, insofar as it provides a way of somehow 
surviving the passage of time.
1448
 This shift is very meaningful because generation is an 
essential condition of our life and, according to Plato, it pervades our entire body and soul.
1449
 
The intermediate in question is thus something that essentially characterizes us as human 
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 See 202d-202e: “π῵ξ ἂκ μὖκ εεὸξ εἴδ ὅ βε η῵κ ηαθ῵κ ηαὶ ἀβαε῵κ ἄιμζνμξ;     μ὎δαι῵ξ, ὥξ β᾽ ἔμζηεκ.     
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΢ώηναηεξ· ηαὶ βὰν π᾵κ ηὸ δαζιόκζμκ ιεηαλύ ἐζηζ εεμῦ ηε ηαὶ εκδημῦ.     ηίκα, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, δύκαιζκ ἔπμκ;     
ἑνιδκεῦμκ ηαὶ δζαπμνειεῦμκ εεμ῔ξ ηὰ παν᾽ ἀκενώπςκ ηαὶ ἀκενώπμζξ ηὰ πανὰ εε῵κ, η῵κ ιὲκ ηὰξ δεήζεζξ ηαὶ 
εοζίαξ, η῵κ δὲ ηὰξ ἐπζηάλεζξ ηε ηαὶ ἀιμζαὰξ η῵κ εοζζ῵κ, ἐκ ιέζῳ δὲ ὂκ ἀιθμηένςκ ζοιπθδνμ῔, ὥζηε ηὸ π᾵κ 
α὎ηὸ α὏ηῶ ζοκδεδέζεαζ.” 
1448
 See 206b ff. 
1449
 See in particular 207d-208b. 
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beings. The same applies to the other forms of intermediacy identified by Plato, which we 
will consider in more detail below.
1450
 They all characterize both ἔνςξ and our own being, 
which means that the two are henceforth identified with one another. 
We are indeed defined by the pursuit of something that we lack, and this essence of 
ours is made clearer in the mythological genealogy of ἔνςξ. Plato presents ἔνςξ as the 
offspring of Πόνμξ (who is the personification of abundance or of the resourcefulness 
required to reach it) and Πεκία (who personifies poverty and want).
1451
 This means that he 
shares the nature of both parents, but in him each nature restricts the other, and so ἔνςξ is not 
a simple form of poverty nor a simple form of abundance. It is a form of abundance 
intrinsically limited by poverty and the converse.
1452
 In other words, ἔνςξ is an intermediate 
entity and as such it is essentially in relation with these two poles. Moreover, it relates to 
them differently. Ἔνςξ is directed to the positive pole. More precisely, it is a project of 
attaining or becoming the positive pole. Yet, it is still withheld by its relation to the opposite, 
from which it desires to release itself. Precisely the same characterizes our relation to the 
good (which we considered above and is also one of the intermediacies considered in 
Symposium). We do not have the good, but we are essentially related to it and directed to it. 
There is a longing for the good at the core of our being. Regardless of whether or not we will 
ever attain it, we are always defined by the desire of it, and this is in turn the basis for all our 
particular desires. They all irrupt from our ιεηαλύ-character. A particular object cannot by 
itself create any desire in us. It can only channel it. If we are to desire something, we must 
already be marked by lack and by the project of attaining something. In fact, a being marked 
by this lack and this project sees and experiences everything in light of its desire, as helpful, 
detrimental and indifferent to its satisfaction. 
Being an intermediate is therefore the essence of our being. It determines our whole 
life and everything in it. We are always in this intermediate position and even our contact 
with the extremes is determined by it. We do not know exactly what pure lack or absolute 
fullness are, because our experience of them is always shaped by our intermediate character. 
However, our intermediate nature is not necessarily something of which we are fully aware. 
We may relate to it in different ways. We may come to possess what we desire (which would 
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 See Sect. 4.3. 
1451
 See 203b-e. 
1452
 In fact, this mixture of the two predicates can even be found in the way Ἔνςξ‟ parents are characterized – at 
least at the moment of Ἔνςξ‟ conception. Πεκία reveals her resourcefulness by taking advantage of Πόνμξ, who 
is in turn found wanting (at least in that particular instance). This points to the fact that we cannot easily 
conceive absolute poverty nor the opposite. What we experience is always a mixture or intertwinement of both. 
480 
 
probably change our condition, although we could still be marked by lack, in the sense that 
we would still need to attain something in the following moments, or at least preserve what 
we have, as Socrates also mentions in his speech).
1453
 We could also think we already possess 
what we pursue (and thus think we are happy) when that is not the case. In other words, we 
may fail to notice our intermediate character. Finally, we may be aware of the lack that 
constitutes us, and then we will be more aware of our condition and of what we need – which 
would also allow us to better search for it.
1454
  
But perhaps the most important question in this context concerns the content of the 
positive pole we are directed to, which is what actually determines the real extension of our 
desire. We may be inclined to think our lacks are relatively limited, and some analyses in the 
corpus also seem to point in that direction. In Lysis, for instance, one of the main attempts at 
defining θζθία explains it as the result of specific lacks that appear at a certain moment (in 
particular bodily lacks, such as hunger and thirst) and thus create the need to pursue 
something that could satisfy them. Such lacks are bad and the good is then conceived as what 
satisfies them (i.e., as a θάνιαημκ ημῦ ηαημῦ).
1455
 This corresponds to the model of ε὎ελία 
(i.e., good condition or good health) presented in Gorgias.
1456
 Such a conception considers 
the object of our desire (i.e., the state we aim to reach) as a kind of neutral state. But although 
it may be so at the level of bodily states and bodily desires (which is what probably inspired 
this model), it is not clear that all our desires can be conceived in these terms. Plato himself 
explores a different possibility. He considers us as being constitutively directed at the      
good – and not just at any good, but rather at a superlative good. This is what is expressed in 
Aristophanes‟ speech, for instance. It is true that Aristophanes also refers to a previous loss 
and lack, but this reference is actually used to explain something very different, as we will 
see. Let us then consider in more detail the most essential features of the good we desire, 
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 See 200b-d. 
1454
 This alternative between an unperceived and a perceived intermediate character actually determines how we 
relate to ourselves, to our life, and to what we may attain in it (i.e., to how we may come to fulfill our desires or 
not). Socrates himself expressly points to this alternative when he considers the intermediate between ignorance 
and knowledge, as we will see in Sect. 4.3 below. 
1455
 See 220b-e. 
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 See 464a. 
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4. The desire of a superlative good 
 
We find an important indication about the good we desire in Philebus. Plato stresses 
that the good must be something sufficient, perfect, complete.
1457
 Such a good would bring 
about a state of self-sufficiency (α὎ηάνηεζα). We would be fully satisfied and at rest, without 
needing anything else.
1458
 This is what we are really directed at. However, this is not a feature 
of the goods we ordinarily pursue. Some of them might be better than others, but they usually 
do not fully satisfy us or do not quench all our desires. We need something more to be fully 
satisfied, and this demand for more is what we must now consider. According to Plato, we 
not only desire something comparatively better than most of what we normally attain. The 
soul‟s inborn desire is a desire of optimization or maximization. We aim at something 
unsurpassable or an unqualified maximum – i.e., something superlatively or absolutely good 
(which Plato designates as ηὸ ἄνζζημκ or ηὸ αέθηζζημκ). 
This idea may cause some surprise, given the fact that we are usually not aware of 
having such a superlative desire. At first, it is not even clear what Plato means. A superlative 
good is not easy to conceive or define, and the same holds true for a desire directed at it. 
However, despite the unclear character of such a good and such a desire, Plato argues at some 
decisive points that this is a central component of our ροπή. It is always present and it 
constantly exerts pressure over us, thereby determining our whole life. We must therefore try 
to see how Plato describes this desire of a superlative good and how he tries to derive our 
whole practical dimension from it. In order to do so, we will consider some essential aspects 
of Plato‟s analyses of ἔνςξ in Symposium and Phaedrus. But before coming to these texts, it 
is helpful to see how the fundamental structure Plato is alluding to is not just a philosophical 
construction of his. In fact, several Archaic forms of expression foreshadowed Plato‟s 
analyses and by considering them we can better understand how the structure in question is 
something with which we always have some contact. 
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 In 20d, we read: “[΢Ω.] ηὴκ ηἀβαεμῦ ιμ῔νακ πόηενμκ ἀκάβηδ ηέθεμκ ἠ ιὴ ηέθεμκ εἶκαζ; [ΠΡΩ.] πάκηςκ 
δήπμο ηεθεώηαημκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ. [΢Ω.] ηί δέ; ἱηακὸκ ηἀβαεόκ; [ΠΡΩ.] π῵ξ βὰν μὔ; ηαὶ πάκηςκ βε εἰξ ημῦημ 
δζαθένεζκ η῵κ ὄκηςκ.” See also 22a-b: “ι῵κ μὖκ μ὎η ἢδδ ημύηςκ βε πένζ δ῅θμκ ὡξ μ὎δέηενμξ α὎ημ῔κ εἶπε 
ηἀβαεόκ; ἤκ βὰν ἂκ ἱηακὸξ ηαὶ ηέθεμξ ηαὶ π᾵ζζ θοημ῔ξ ηαὶ γῴμζξ αἱνεηόξ, μἷζπεν δοκαηὸκ ἤκ μὕηςξ ἀεὶ δζὰ αίμο 
γ῅κ (...).” 
1458
 See Phlb. 20e: “δε῔ βάν, εἴπεν πόηενμκ α὎η῵κ ἔζη᾽ ἀβαεόκ, ιδδὲκ ιδδεκὸξ ἔηζ πνμζδε῔ζεαζ· δεόιεκμκ δ᾽ ἂκ 
θακῆ πόηενμκ, μ὎η ἔζηζ πμο ημῦη᾽ ἔηζ ηὸ ὄκηςξ ἟ι῔κ ἀβαεόκ.” See also 60b-c: “[΢Ω.] ηὴκ ηἀβαεμῦ δζαθένεζκ 
θύζζκ ηῶδε η῵κ ἄθθςκ. [ΠΡΩ.] ηίκζ; [΢Ω.] ὧζ πανείδ ημῦη᾽ ἀεὶ η῵κ γῴςκ δζὰ ηέθμοξ πάκηςξ ηαὶ πάκηῃ, ιδδεκὸξ 
ἑηένμο πμηὲ ἔηζ πνμζδε῔ζεαζ, ηὸ δὲ ἱηακὸκ ηεθεώηαημκ ἔπεζκ. μ὎π μὕηςξ; [ΠΡΩ.] μὕης ιὲκ μὖκ.” 
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4.1. The Archaic identification of superlatives. The θάιιηζηνλ πάλησλ and the 
priamel 
 
 Since the Archaic period, Greek culture showed a clear interest in superlative 
qualities. We find such an interest in the oracular, the gnomic and the poetical traditions. 
Indeed, one of the things that stands out in these traditions is the constant reference to 
superlatives – such as ηὸ ἄνζζημκ, ηὸ ιέβζζημκ, ηὸ δζηαζόηαημκ, ηὸ θένηαημκ, ηὸ ῥᾶζημκ, ηὸ 
θῶζημκ, ηὸ ἣδζζημκ, ηὸ ηενπκόηαημκ, ηὸ πνεζαύηαημκ, ηὸ ζμθώηαημκ, and so on.
1459
 Often, 
these references assume the form of a question and an answer. One wonders what might 
possess a particular property in the highest degree and then something is put forward as the 
quintessence of the property in question. We considered an example of this above – namely, 
the inquiries posed to the oracle about who is the wisest, the most just, the most pious.
1460
 It 
was also common to create riddles about these matters, as tests of wisdom. People (especially 
reputed sages) were required to give a quick answer about what is the height of something, 
and the answer was supposed to help understand what the predicate in question consists 
in.
1461
 In keeping with this general tendency, there are many passages in Greek poetry which 
reflect about ηὸ ηάθθζζημκ πάκηςκ – i.e., about what is the most beautiful or most admirable 
thing of all.
1462
 Such reflections are actually a variant of a broader model that could refer to 
any superlative – even negative ones.  
 Reflections about the superlative therefore played an important role in Greek culture, 
and we can understand why. These are not just abstract questions. These are questions about 
life itself, whose answers are very important. Declarations about superlatives express intense 
fascination with certain things in life and strong aversion to others. They also teach us how to 
navigate life, by assessing our possibilities and determine what we should value or desire. 
This is what oracles, sages and poets (as well as older people in general) tried to impart to 
                                                 
1459
 For bibliographical references, see the following footnotes. 
1460
 See Chap. 2 Sect. 1.1. Cp. R. HERZOG, Das delphische Orakel als ethischer Preisrichter, in: E. 
HORNEFFER, Der junge Platon. I: Sokrates und die Apologie, Giessen, Töpelmann, 1922, 149-170. 
1461
 For an example of this, see PLUTARCH, Septem sapientium convivium, 152f.-153d, in: F. BABITT (ed.), 
Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 2, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1928. For more on this topic, cp. e.g. K. 
OHLERT, Rätsel und Rätselspiele der alten Griechen, Berlin, Mayer & Müller, 1912, 105ff. 
1462
 On the idea of ηάθθζζημκ πάκηςκ, see e.g. See Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, in: T. ALLEN (ed.), Homeri 
opera, vol. 5, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1912 (re-pr. 1961), 228: “Ἡζίμδμξ ηὸ δεύηενμκ·/ εἴπ‟ ἄβε ιμζ ηαὶ ημῦημ 
εεμ῔ξ ἐπζείηεθ‟ Ὅιδνε,/ ηί εκδημ῔ξ ηάθθζζημκ μἴεαζ ἐκ θνεζίκ εἶκαζ;/ ὁ δέ· ὁππόη‟ ἂκ ε὎θνμζύκδ ιὲκ ἔπῃ ηαηὰ 
δ῅ιμκ ἅπακηα,/ δαζηοιόκεξ δ‟ ἀκὰ δώιαη‟ ἀημοάγςκηαζ ἀμζδμῦ/ ἣιεκμζ ἑλείδξ, πανὰ δὲ πθήεςζζ ηνάπεγαζ/ 
ζίημο ηαὶ ηνεζ῵κ, ιέεο δ‟ ἐη ηνδη῅νμξ ἀθύζζςκ/ μἰκμπόμξ θμνέῃζζ ηαὶ ἐβπείῃ δεπάεζζζκ./ ημῦηό ηί ιμζ 
ηάθθζζημκ ἐκὶ θνεζὶκ εἴδεηαζ εἶκαζ.” See also SAPPHO, fr. 16, in: E. LOBEL & D. PAGE (eds.), Poetarum 
lesbiorum fragmenta, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1955 (re-ed. 1968): “μ]ἰ ιὲκ ἰππήςκ ζηνόημκ μἰ δὲ πέζδςκ/ μἰ δὲ 
κάςκ θα῔ζ‟ ἐπ[ὶ] β᾵κ ιέθαζ[κ]ακ/ ἔ]ιιεκαζ ηάθθζζημκ, ἔβς δὲ η῅κ‟ ὄη/ης ηζξ ἔναηαζ.” 
483 
 
others in very concrete and spontaneous terms. But these are not simple questions. Some of 
the declarations about the superlatives were perhaps more commonsensical, others more 
unexpected. In fact, the different notions whose superlative is at issue are often ambiguous 
and as such they can be associated with different things. In other words, the context in which 
the superlatives are mentioned is one of dispute or controversy (ἀιθζζαήηδζζξ). There is a 
fundamental disagreement and many opposing claims, which proclaim different things as the 
best. Oracles, wise people and poets were thus taking a stance in this contest of claims about 
the superlative values of life. 
 We can better understand these controversies if we consider the use in Ancient Greek 
poetry of a literary device that later came to known as “priamel” (and which is where many 
of the reflections about ηὸ ηάθθζζημκ πάκηςκ appear).
1463
 The precise structure of a priamel 
has been object of much discussion.
1464
 W. Race describes it in the following terms: “A 
priamel is a poetic/rhetorical form which consists, basically, of two parts: „foil‟ and „climax‟. 
The function of the foil is to introduce and highlight the climactic term by enumerating or 
summarizing a number of „other‟ examples, subjects, times, places, or instances, which then 
yield (with varying degrees of contrast or analogy) to the particular point of interest or 
importance.”
1465
 This form can be applied to different contents and one of these contents is 
people‟s values, which is precisely what we are considering. The “Priamel der Werte” (as U. 
Schmid calls it) compares different valuable things that share a desirable quality, in order to 
show that one of them possesses this quality in the highest degree and is therefore the most 
desirable. 
 However, the specific priamels may vary in some important respects. They may 
simply single out a particular object that eclipses all others in a particular domain.
1466
 They 
may also outline a sort of ranking that orders different things with respect to the quality in 
question. In this sense, other things may occupy the second or third place, insofar as they are 
                                                 
1463
 Though not all priamels employ adjectives in the superlative degree, many of them do and those are the ones 
we will mainly focus on here. 
1464
 Cp. e.g. F. DORNSEIFF, Pindars Stil, Berlin, Weidmann, 1921, 97ss.; W. KRÖHLING, Die Priamel 
(Beispielreihung) als Stilmittel in der griechischrömischen Dichtung, Greifswald, Dallmeyer, 1935; W. van 
OTTERLO, Beitrag zur Kenntnis der griechischen Priamel, Mnemosyne 8 (1940), 145-176; E. BUNDY, Studia 
Pindarica, vol. 1, Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962, 5ff.; U. SCHMID, Die Priamel 
der Werte im Griechischen. Von Homer bis Paulus, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1964; W. RACE, The Classical 
Priamel from Homer to Boethius, Leiden, Brill, 1982.  
1465
 See W. RACE, op. cit., IX. 
1466
 See e.g. TYRTAEUS, 12.1-20 – especially 10-14: “μ὎ βὰν ἀκὴν ἀβαεὸξ βίκεηαζ ἐκ πμθέιςζ/ εἰ ιὴ ηεηθαίδ 
ιὲκ ὁν῵κ θόκμκ αἱιαηόεκηα,/ ηαὶ δδίςκ ὀνέβμζη‟ ἐββύεεκ ἱζηάιεκμξ./ ἣδ‟ ἀνεηή, ηόδ‟ ἄεεθμκ ἐκ ἀκενώπμζζζκ 
ἄνζζημκ/ ηάθθζζηόκ ηε θένεζκ βίκεηαζ ἀκδνὶ κέςζ.” 
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still good, but not what is most desirable.
1467
 In some cases, objects may complement each 
other, and thus two or more things together are the best. In this case, the cumulation of goods 
(especially goods from different spheres, such as health, beauty, wisdom) is better than any 
particular thing.
1468
 In other cases, something may not be particularly good in itself, but it 
may be a condition for us to enjoy what is best. An example of this is health. It is a sort of 
auxiliary good, but it is not the best thing in itself.
1469
 
 All these different identifications of the superlative let us see that the superlative is 
first of all a formal position that can be occupied by different things, but is not necessarily 
identified with any one in particular. There can be different versions of the best thing and 
some may even be complex and combine different objects. However, this diversity can itself 
be problematic. Some passages admit that different persons have different tastes, which 
means that the superlative is flexible. It can very well happen that ηὸ ηάθθζζημκ is to attain 
what one happens to love, as Sappho says.
1470
 But other authors identify something as the 
best for everybody. They have a claim to universal truth and may even try to convince others 
about it.
1471
 This pressuposes that people may have a clouded judgment about what is best 
and may not know what they really want. But regardless of these differences, the formal 
structure of desire is always the same. We are always concerned with maximizing our life, 
even if we have different views about what this maximization consists in. 
                                                 
1467
 A good example can be found in the scolion to which Socrates alludes in Grg. 451e: “὏βζαίκεζκ ιὲκ ἄνζζημκ 
ἀκδνὶ εκάηῳ,/ δεύηενμκ δὲ θοὰκ ηαθὸκ βεκέζεαζ,/ηὸ ηνίημκ δὲ πθμοηε῔κ ἀδόθςξ/ ηαὶ ηὸ ηέηανημκ ἟α᾵κ ιεηὰ η῵κ 
θίθςκ.” See Carmina Convivialia, fr. 7, in: D. PAGE (ed.), Poetae melici graeci, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1962 (re-ed. 1967). 
1468
 See e.g. PINDAR, Pythia, 1.99-100: “ηὸ δὲ παεε῔κ εὖ πν῵ημκ <ἀέ>εθςκ· εὖ δ᾽ ἀημύεζκ δεοηένα ιμ῔ν᾽· 
ἀιθμηένμζζζ δ᾽ ἀκὴν/ ὃξ ἂκ ἐβηύνζῃ, ηαὶ ἕθῃ, ζηέθακμκ ὕρζζημκ δέδεηηαζ.” The idea of cumulation, however, 
also raises a problem. It may not be possible for us to cumulate all goods. A common topos in Greek literature 
was precisely the idea that the gods do not bestow all good things to the same person. See e.g. HOMER, Iliad 
IV.318: “ἀθθ᾽ μὔ πςξ ἅια πάκηα εεμὶ δόζακ ἀκενώπμζζζκ (...).” See also Odyssey VIII.168f.: “μὕηςξ μ὎ 
πάκηεζζζ εεμὶ πανίεκηα δζδμῦζζκ ἀκδνάζζκ, μὔηε θοὴκ μὔη᾽ ἂν θνέκαξ μὔη᾽ ἀβμνδηύκ.” We may then be forced 
to choose between different goods and accept only part of the superlative (at least for a time). However, that 
does not change the fact that we are directed at all that composes the best.  
1469
 See e.g. Ariphron‟s poem in D. PAGE (ed.), Poetae melici graeci, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962: “὘βίεζα 
ανμημ῔ζζ πνεζαίζηα ιαηάνςκ, ιεηὰ ζεῦ/ καίμζιζ ηὸ θεζπόιεκμκ αζμη᾵ξ, ζὺ δέ ιμζ πνόθνςκ λοκείδξ·/ εἰ βάν ηζλ ἠ 
πθμύημο πάνζξ ἠ ηεηέςκ/ ἠ η᾵ξ ἰζμδαίιμκμξ ἀκενώπμζξ ααζζθδίδμξ ἀνπ᾵ξ ἠ πόεςκ/ μὓξ ηνοθίμζξ Ἀθνμδίηαξ 
ἕνηεζζκ εδνεύμιεκ,/ ἠ εἴ ηζξ ἄθθα εεόεεκ ἀκενώπμζζζ ηένρζξ ἠ πόκςκ/ ἀιπκμὰ πέθακηαζ,/ ιεηὰ ζε῔μ, ιάηαζν‟ 
὘βίεζα,/ ηέεαθε ηαὶ θάιπεζ Χανίηςκ ὀάνμζξ·/ ζέεεκ δὲ πςνὶξ μὔηζξ ε὎δαίιςκ ἔθο.” In this respect, cp. 
ANAXANDRIDES, fr. 17, in: T. KOCK (ed.), Comicorum atticorum fragmenta, vol. 2, Leipzig, Teubner, 
1884: “ὁ ηὸ ζηόθζμκ ε὏νὼκ ἐηε῔κμξ, ὅζηζξ ἤκ,/ ηὸ ιὲκ ὏βζαίκεζκ πν῵ημκ ὡξ ἄνζζημκ ὂκ/ ὠκόιαζεκ ὀνε῵ξ, 
δεύηενμκ δ‟ εἶκαζ ηαθόκ,/ ηνίημκ δὲ πθμοηε῔κ, ημῦε‟, ὁνᾶξ, ἐιαίκεημ·/ ιεηὰ ηὴκ ὏βίεζακ βὰν ηὸ πθμοηε῔κ 
δζαθένεζ·/ ηαθὸξ δὲ πεζκ῵κ ἐζηζκ αἰζπνὸκ εδνίμκ.” 
1470
 See the verses quoted above, in footnote 1462. For this idea of relativity, cp. e.g. EURIPIDES, Andromacha, 
368f.: “εὖ δ᾽ ἴζε᾽, ὅημο ηζξ ηοβπάκεζ πνείακ ἔπςκ,/ημῦη᾽ ἔζε᾽ ἑηάζηςζ ιε῔γμκ ἠ Σνμίακ ἑθε῔κ.” Euripides does not 
use a superlative in this passage, but the comparative ιε῔γμκ and that to which it is compared strongly suggest 
the idea of superlativeness. 
1471
 See, for instance, the above quoted verses of Tyrtaeus and Pindar. 
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 A different problem raised by the passages we are considering results from the fact 
that different passages refer to different superlatives, and some of them even compare various 
superlatives.
1472
 But what is the meaning of this diversity? Does it express that there are 
different objects of desire? If so, are some of them more desirable than others? Or are these 
simply different aspects of the object we desire, which would then be the actual best? In sum, 
how are the different superlatives to be unified? This is not clear – but the lack of clarity is 
itself meaningful, since it mirrors our own relation to the superlative object of our desire, 
which, as we shall see, is marked precisely by confusion and lack of reflection. 
 One last thing we must consider is the fact that the discussion about the positive 
superlatives is complemented with a discussion about the negative superlatives, which tries to 
determine what is the worst thing of all, the most terrible, the most ugly, etc.
1473
 This 
discussion is also full of controversy, and it contains the same components we saw above: it 
compares multiple evils, it identifies the worst, it may also outline a ranking, and the criterion 
used may be subjective or allegedly objective (and thus universally valid). This concern with 
the negative superlative or the superlatively bad thing is an expression of how human beings 
are vulnerable to many evils. There are many things we desire to avoid and it may even be 
the case that life is incompatible with our demand of a superlative (which means that there is 
at least the evil of not being able to reach what we want). In the final analysis, one may 
consider that the worst thing in life is having been born and the second worst to go on living. 
In this case, one will also consider that never being born is the best thing of all and dying as 
soon as possible is the second best thing.
1474
  
 We can therefore see that the two forms of superlative, with their possible rankings, 
belong together and determine our entire life. Pre-Platonic thinking had already recognized it 
(even if in a vague manner) and this deeply influenced Plato. We even find a direct reference 
                                                 
1472
 See e.g. THEOGNIS, Elegiae, 255-256: “Κάθθζζημκ ηὸ δζηαζόηαημκ· θ῵ζζημκ δ‟ ὏βζαίκεζκ· πν᾵βια δὲ 
ηενπκόηαημκ, ημῦ ηζξ ἐν᾵ζ, ηὸ ηοπε῔κ.” The verses are quoted according to: D. YOUNG (ed.), Theognis, Leibzig, 
Teubner, 1961 (1971
2
). See also SOPHOCLES, fr. 356: “ηάθθζζηόκ ἐζηζ ημὔκδζημκ πεθοηέκαζ·/ θῶζημκ δὲ ηὸ 
γ῅κ ἄκμζμκ· ἣδζζημκ δ‟ ὅηῳ/ πάνεζηζ θ῅ρζξ ὧκ ἐνᾶ ηαε‟ ἟ιένακ.” 
1473
 See e.g. THEOGNIS, op. cit., 271-278: “ἴζςξ ημζ ηὰ ιὲκ ἄθθα εεμὶ εκδημ῔ξ ἀκενώπμζξ/ β῅ναξ η᾽ μ὎θόιεκμκ 
ηαὶ κεόηδη᾽ ἔδμζακ./ η῵κ πάκηςκ δὲ ηάηζζημκ ἐκ ἀκενώπμζξ – εακάημο ηε/ ηαὶ παζέςκ κμύζςκ ἐζηὶ 
πμκδνόηαημκ –/ πα῔δαξ ἐπεὶ ενέραζμ ηαὶ ἄνιεκα πάκηα πανάζπμζξ,/ πνήιαηα δ᾽ ἐβηαηαε῅ζξ πόθθ᾽ ἀκζδνὰ 
παεώκ,/ ηὸκ παηέν᾽ ἐπεαίνμοζζ, ηαηαν῵κηαζ δ᾽ ἀπμθέζεαζ,/ ηαὶ ζηοβέμοζ᾽ ὥζπεν πηςπὸκ ἐζενπόιεκμκ.” See 
also HOMER, Odyssey, XII.341-342: “πάκηεξ ιὲκ ζηοβενμὶ εάκαημζ δεζθμ῔ζζ ανμημ῔ζζ,/ θζιῶ δ‟ μἴηηζζημκ 
εακέεζκ ηαὶ πόηιμκ ἐπζζπε῔κ.”  
1474
 See Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, in: T. ALLEN (ed.), Homeri opera, vol. 5, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1912 
(repr. 1961), 228: “(...) ηί θένηαηόκ ἐζηζ ανμημ῔ζζκ;/ Ὅιδνμξ·/ ἀνπὴκ ιὲκ ιὴ θῦκαζ ἐπζπεμκίμζζζκ ἄνζζημκ,/ 
θύκηα δ‟ ὅιςξ ὤηζζηα πύθαξ Ἀίδαμ πεν῅ζαζ.” See also THEOGNIS, op. cit., 425-428: “πάκηςκ ιὲκ ιὴ θῦκαζ 
ἐπζπεμκίμζζζκ ἄνζζημκ/ ιδδ᾽ ἐζζδε῔κ α὎βὰξ ὀλέμξ ἞εθίμο,/ θύκηα δ᾽ ὅπςξ ὤηζζηα πύθαξ Ἀίδαμ πεν῅ζαζ/ ηαὶ 
ηε῔ζεαζ πμθθὴκ β῅κ ἐπαιδζάιεκμκ.” Cp. PLUTARCH, Consolatio ad Apollonium, 115b-d, in: F. BABITT 
(ed.), op. cit. 
486 
 
to these questions in Gorgias. In 451e, Socrates quotes part of a scolion that contains a 
priamel and goes as follows: “to enjoy good health is the best thing; second is to have turned 
out beautiful; and third (...) is to be honestly rich.”.
1475
 He then puts this in relation with the 
ηέπκαζ that ensure each of these goods: namely, the ηέπκδ of the doctor, the physical trainer, 
and the financial expert.
1476
 The goal is to define ῥδημνζηή, which Gorgias had said was 
concerned with “the greatest and best of the human affairs”.
1477
 The subsequent dialogue then 
discusses this question, and also the question of what is worst of all. Polus and Socrates 
present different (and even diametrically opposed) versions of what is best and what is worst. 
Polus praises the figure of Archelaus, who committed the greatest injustices without being 
punished for it, and he considers suffering injustices the worst thing. Socrates, in turn, praises 
a kind of Anti-Archelaus and defends that to commit injustices without being punished is the 
worst thing, whereas the best thing is to be just, regardless of whether or not one suffers 
injustices.
1478
 This inversion, according to which what is best for Polus is the worst for 
Socrates, and vice versa, shows how the superlative good and the negative superlative are 
correlative and defined in function of the same basic principle. 
 The whole system of goods and evils is indeed based on the same principle, and it has 
at its center the superlative good we are directed at. This does not mean that we know exactly 
what corresponds to it. It is true that we normally experience the question as being already 
solved. But it is also possible to dissociate a particular identification from the formal position 
as such, thus rendering the superlative good wholly problematic. It may be the case that we 
are directed to a superlative that is solely formal and cannot be really identified with anything 
in particular (although we may deceive ourselves about it). But even in that case, the 
superlative is not something inert or irrelevant. It still contains a prescription and it pressures 
us to pursue the absolute best, thereby determining our relation with everything else. We may 
be mistaken about it or we may have to compromise, but we still desire the best. This is what 
was already alluded to in pre-Platonic reflections, and now we have to see in more detail the 
terms in which the question of the superlative good is posed in the Platonic corpus. 
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 See 451e: “μἴμιαζ βάν ζε ἀηδημέκαζ ἐκ ημ῔ξ ζοιπμζίμζξ ὾δόκηςκ ἀκενώπςκ ημῦημ ηὸ ζημθζόκ, ἐκ ᾧ 
ηαηανζειμῦκηαζ ὿δμκηεξ ὅηζ „὏βζαίκεζκ ιὲκ ἄνζζηόκ‟ ἐζηζκ, ηὸ δὲ „δεύηενμκ ηαθὸκ βεκέζεαζ, ηνίημκ δέ‟, ὥξ θδζζκ 
ὁ πμζδηὴξ ημῦ ζημθζμῦ, „ηὸ πθμοηε῔κ ἀδόθςξ‟.” The translation is based on D. Zeyl‟s version (see PCW). 
Socrates omits the fourth verse of the scolion: “ηαὶ ηὸ ηέηανημκ ἟α᾵κ ιεηὰ η῵κ θίθςκ.” For a brief discussion of 
the whole scolion and of this passage in particular, see E. DODDS (ed.), Plato Ŕ Gorgias, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1959, ad 451e2. 
1476
 See 452a-c. 
1477
 See 451d: “[΢Ω.] θέβε δὴ η῵κ πενὶ ηί; ηί ἐζηζ ημῦημ η῵κ ὄκηςκ, πενὶ μὗ μὗημζ μἱ θόβμζ εἰζὶκ μἷξ ἟ ῥδημνζηὴ 
πν῅ηαζ; [ΓΟΡ.] ηὰ ιέβζζηα η῵κ ἀκενςπείςκ πναβιάηςκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ηαὶ ἄνζζηα.”  
1478




4.2. The desire of a superlative good in Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium 
 
As was said, Plato‟s reflection about the real extension of the soul‟s desire and about 
the nature of the good it desires can be found in his analyses of romantic love or ἔνςξ.
1479
 
This deeply meaningful human experience reveals something essential about ourselves. 
Although our experience of it is rather sporadic, Plato argues that it is actually a variation of a 
permanent structure of our being. We are marked by a form of latent and transcendental ἔνςξ, 
as it were, which becomes more patent in the moment one falls in love with another human 
being. In other words, ἔνςξ is always present, but we fail to notice it because it is usually 
scattered by many objects. It is only when we fall in love that our constitutive desire becomes 
concentrated in one sole object, and this object then appears as everything we desire. This is 
why we can more easily notice our permanent desire at that moment. 
Let us then see how Plato expresses this idea. We can divide Plato‟s consideration of 
ἔνςξ in two moments. Aristophanes‟ speech in Symposium presents the formal structure of 
our desire for a superlative good. This structure is then developed in Socrates‟ speech in 
Symposium and his second speech in Phaedrus. We will now consider the first moment and 
in the following subsection we will explore the second. 
In order to better understand Aristophanes‟ speech, it is important to make a few 
remarks about its general context. What we find in Symposium is a collective exercise of 
praising ἔνςξ. Such an exercise has here an epideictic nature and is a sort of paradoxical 
praise. The characters are supposed to show their rhetoric prowess by praising something that 
can hardly be praised. It is precisely in these terms that Eryximachus outlines the task. He 
places ἔνςξ side by side with things that are difficult to praise.
1480
 This may be strange for us, 
given the positive light in which romantic love is seen in contemporary culture. But in Greek 
                                                 
1479
 The term ἔνςξ actually has a broad meaning that includes any desire (such as hunger, curiosity, and so on), 
but it can also be used in a more restricted sense to designate sexual desire, physical attraction or even romantic 
love. In all its senses, ἔνςξ has a connotation of intensity, though romantic love is possibly the form of ἔνςξ that 
is most intensely felt. For this connotation of intensity, see PRODICUS, DK 7: “ἐπζεοιίακ ιὲκ δζπθαζζαζεε῔ζακ 
ἔνςηα εἶκαζ, ἔνςηα δὲ δζπθαζζαζεέκηα ιακίακ βίβκεζεαζ.” The analyses we will now consider refer primarily to 
the restricted sense of ἔνςξ, though they also consider other forms of intense desire. 
1480
 See 177b-c: “εἰ δὲ αμύθεζ αὖ ζηέραζεαζ ημὺξ πνδζημὺξ ζμθζζηάξ, Ἡναηθέμοξ ιὲκ ηαὶ ἄθθςκ ἐπαίκμοξ 
ηαηαθμβάδδκ ζοββνάθεζκ, ὥζπεν ὁ αέθηζζημξ Πνόδζημξ – ηαὶ ημῦημ ιὲκ ἥηημκ ηαὶ εαοιαζηόκ, ἀθθ᾽ ἔβςβε ἢδδ 
ηζκὶ ἐκέηοπμκ αζαθίῳ ἀκδνὸξ ζμθμῦ, ἐκ ᾧ ἐκ῅ζακ ἅθεξ ἔπαζκμκ εαοιάζζμκ ἔπμκηεξ πνὸξ ὠθεθίακ, ηαὶ ἄθθα 
ημζαῦηα ζοπκὰ ἴδμζξ ἂκ ἐβηεηςιζαζιέκα – ηὸ μὖκ ημζμύηςκ ιὲκ πένζ πμθθὴκ ζπμοδὴκ πμζήζαζεαζ, ἔνςηα δὲ 
ιδδέκα πς ἀκενώπςκ ηεημθιδηέκαζ εἰξ ηαοηδκὶ ηὴκ ἟ιένακ ἀλίςξ ὏ικ῅ζαζ (...).” 
488 
 
culture ἔνςξ had a bad reputation. It was seen as a disease or a form of madness.
1481
 It is 
something that robs us of lucidity (θνμκε῔κ), and, as a result, sets our life in disarray, makes 
us be remiss in our duties, makes us act against our interests, and renders us slaves of 
someone else. It is thus opposed to the ideal of the citizen.
 1482 
But this is not all that renders 
the praise of ἔνςξ a particularly hard task. Given the aristocratic context in which the 
symposium takes place, the characters would naturally have in mind a particular modality of 
ἔνςξ – namely, παζδεναζηία. This modality had itself a very bad reputation. It was associated 
with the moral and political decadence of the πόθζξ, and there was strong criticism of it.
1483
 
The different speeches must therefore face these tacit accusations, and Aristophanes‟ speech 
is no exception. Like the others, he tries to rehabilitate ἔνςξ, and he does so by revealing 
something about it that people are normally not aware of.
1484
 
 There is still one additional factor that increases the challenge the characters have to 
face. The sequence of speeches in the Symposium follows the model of δέπεζεαζ ηὸκ ζημθζόκ, 
which means that each symposiast is expected to pick up elements of the previous speech and 
built on them, in order to surpass what came before. This determines the whole itinerary of 
the text. To put it very briefly, we begin with Phaedrus‟ praise of pederastic ἔνςξ. Then 
Pausanias distinguishes two different forms of ἔνςξ and renders the question more complex. 
Eryximachus presents in turn a medical model that extends ἔνςξ to the whole of reality. 
Aristophanes, who adopts the medical tone of the previous speech, in a way inverts the 
tendency of expansion and restricts once more ἔνςξ to the human being. However, at the 
same time he expands the presence of ἔνςξ in us. Instead of regarding it as a sporadic 
phenomenon (as in Phaedrus‟ and Pausanias‟ speech), he describes it as a permanent feature 
of our being – and this is why his speech is relevant for our problem. We are considering the 
structure of human desire and Aristophanes describes erotic desire not just as one desire 
                                                 
1481
 Cp. e.g. SOPHOCLES, Antigona, 790 and EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 38-40. 
1482
 This is precisely what we see in the first two speeches in Phaedrus, which give voice to these criticisms of 
ἔνςξ. For more on the bad reputation of ἔνςξ, see e.g. A. CARSON, Eros the Bittersweet, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1986; M. CYRINO, In Pandora’s Jar. Lovesickness in Early Greek Poetry, Lanham, 
University Press of America, 1995; F. SERRANITO, Lovers and Madmen. The ιακία-θνμκε῔κ Opposition in 
Plato‟s Phaedrus, Diss. Univ. Nova de Lisboa, 2015, 131-144. 
1483
 For more on παζδεναζηία and its appraisal, see e.g. K. DOVER, Greek Homosexuality, London, Duckworth, 
1978; F. BUFFIÈRE, Éros adolescent. La pédérastie dans la Grèce antique, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1980; W. 
PERCY, Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic Greece, Urbana/Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1996, T. 
HUBBARD, Popular Perceptions of Elite Homosexuality in Classical Athens, Arion 6 (1998), 48-78; F. 
SERRANITO, op. cit., 146-158. 
1484
 Cp. 189c-d: “ἐιμὶ βὰν δμημῦζζκ ἅκενςπμζ πακηάπαζζ ηὴκ ημῦ ἔνςημξ δύκαιζκ μ὎η ᾐζε῅ζεαζ, ἐπεὶ 
αἰζεακόιεκμί βε ιέβζζη᾽ ἂκ α὎ημῦ ἱενὰ ηαηαζηεοάζαζ ηαὶ αςιμύξ, ηαὶ εοζίαξ ἂκ πμζε῔κ ιεβίζηαξ, μ὎π ὥζπεν 
κῦκ ημύηςκ μ὎δὲκ βίβκεηαζ πενὶ α὎ηόκ, δέμκ πάκηςκ ιάθζζηα βίβκεζεαζ. ἔζηζ βὰν εε῵κ θζθακενςπόηαημξ, 
ἐπίημονόξ ηε ὢκ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ ηαὶ ἰαηνὸξ ημύηςκ ὧκ ἰαεέκηςκ ιεβίζηδ ε὎δαζιμκία ἂκ ηῶ ἀκενςπείῳ βέκεζ εἴδ. 
ἐβὼ μὖκ πεζνάζμιαζ ὏ι῔κ εἰζδβήζαζεαζ ηὴκ δύκαιζκ α὎ημῦ, ὏ιε῔ξ δὲ η῵κ ἄθθςκ δζδάζηαθμζ ἔζεζεε.” 
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among others, but as the fundamental human desire, on which everything else in our life 
depends. We will consider how it is so, but a full discussion of all points of Aristophanes‟ 
speech would take us too far afield, so we will restrict ourselves to the points that are more 
directly relevant for our problem.
1485
 
The first striking aspect of the speech is the fact that it tries to explain our present 
condition by referring it to a past condition or nature (἟ πάθαζ ἟ι῵κ θύζζξ) and what 
happened to it (ηὰ παεήιαηα α὎η῅ξ).
1486
 The purpose of the speech seems therefore to be 
serious, but at the same time the etiological account presented by Aristophanes is 
mythological in form and cannot be taken as a serious hypothesis about human pre-history. 
This may lead us to think that the text has no relevance whatsoever for our own                 
self-understanding. However, it is not necessarily so. Although mythological, the terms in 
which the explanation of our condition is presented imply a certain description of what is to 
be explained, and this “etiological description” may show us something important about 
ourselves. This is why we must try to isolate this descriptive component.
1487
 
Let us then focus on the starting point of the explanation. The myth first describes 
human beings as they once were. This old condition, however, is not simply different from 
our present condition. It is a better condition and in fact our right or proper condition, as is 
expressed by the notion of ἀνπαία θύζζξ. In medical language, ἀνπαία θύζζξ does not 
properly mean “old condition”, but rather the healthy state or natural condition, from which 
one may deviate (thus coming to a state that is πανὰ θύζζκ) and which (at least in principle) 
can be restored.
1488
 The new condition is thus a form of disease, whereas the old one 
corresponds to an ideal or utopian state (indeed, a kind of Golden Age) which was lost.
1489
 
 But what are then the main features of the primitive human beings? What is our 
healthy state? In order to properly answer these questions, we must distinguish the mythical 
description from its actual meaning. The primitive human beings are described as the 
                                                 
1485
 For a much more complete analysis, which inspired much of what follows, see M. de CARVALHO, Die 
Aristophanesrede in Platons Symposium. Die Verfassung des Selbst, Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 
2009. 
1486
 See 189d: “δε῔ δὲ πν῵ημκ ὏ι᾵ξ ιαεε῔κ ηὴκ ἀκενςπίκδκ θύζζκ ηαὶ ηὰ παεήιαηα α὎η῅ξ. ἟ βὰν πάθαζ ἟ι῵κ 
θύζζξ μ὎π α὏ηὴ ἤκ ἣπεν κῦκ, ἀθθ᾽ ἀθθμία.” 
1487
 For a more exhaustive consideration of this question, cp. M. de CARVALHO, op. cit., 24-28. 
1488
 See e.g. K. LATTE (ed.), Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon, vol. 1, Hauniae, Munksgaard, 1953, A7572: 
“ἀνπαία θύζζξ· ἟ πνὸ ημῦ κμζε῔κ ηαηάζηαζζξ.” For other uses of the expression in the corpus, see Rep. 611c-d 
and Ti. 90c-d. Cp. also Grg. 518c-d, for the closely related notion of ἀνπα῔αζ ζάνηεξ. For more on this notion, 
see M. de CARVALHO, op. cit., 29ff., 501ff. 
1489
 The presentation made by the Platonic Aristophanes is thus completely in keeping with the comic utopias 
we find in the works of the real Aristophanes. On the topic of comic utopias, see e.g. F. HEBERLEIN, 
Pluthygieia. Zur Gegenwelt bei Aristophanes, Frankfurt, Haag Herchen, 1980. 
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constitutive union of two human bodies. They have four arms, four legs, two faces, and so on. 
They are orbicular and this allows them to move faster than us, by circling around. They also 
have a field of vision of 360 degrees, which means they can see everything around them.
1490
 
These are very important traits, especially in the context of Ancient societies. Indeed, for a 
Greek these were immediately seen as characteristics of the ultimate warrior. The primitive 
humans could hold double the weapons, could pursue or escape their enemies much more 
easily, and could not be caught off guard. They seemed to possess a superlative form of 
power, swiftness and knowledge. Moreover, they had the elation or high spirits proper of 
someone who is always close to his or her beloved and thus completely fused with what one 
finds most fascinating. In other words, they were in a state of overabundance of being, 
marked by confidence, pride and exuberance. This is what lead to their daring attempt to 
overtake the heaven and occupy the place of the gods.
1491
 Our original and healthy state 
(ἀνπαία θύζζξ) – or, as Plato says, our wholeness or intactness (ηὸ ὄθμκ, 192e) – is therefore 
far from being a neutral state, as was suggested by the model of desire mentioned above.
1492
 
Rather, it is a state of supreme vigor and self-affirmation. In other words, it follows the 




 However, their daring and insolent enterprise was thwarted and Zeus then needed to 
punish the primitive humankind for their crime (ἀδζηία). Since he did not want to destroy 
humanity, he decided to cut each human being in twain. Such a measure would render them 
much weaker and much more restrained. Otherwise, they would be once again cut in two.
1494
 
Thus, human beings assumed their current form, which is deceiving. We seem to be a whole, 
                                                 
1490
 See 189e-190b. 
1491
 See 190b-c: “ἤκ μὖκ ηὴκ ἰζπὺκ δεζκὰ ηαὶ ηὴκ ῥώιδκ, ηαὶ ηὰ θνμκήιαηα ιεβάθα εἶπμκ, ἐπεπείνδζακ δὲ ημ῔ξ 
εεμ῔ξ, ηαὶ ὃ θέβεζ Ὅιδνμξ πενὶ ἖θζάθημο ηε ηαὶ Ὤημο, πενὶ ἐηείκςκ θέβεηαζ, ηὸ εἰξ ηὸκ μ὎νακὸκ ἀκάααζζκ 
ἐπζπεζνε῔κ πμζε῔κ, ὡξ ἐπζεδζμιέκςκ ημ῔ξ εεμ῔ξ.” This was indeed the expression of the highest possible 
insolence. These beings tried to fully bridge the gap between humans and gods. For this gap, see e.g. Iliad 
V.440-2: “θνάγεμ Σοδεΐδδ ηαὶ πάγεμ, ιδδὲ εεμ῔ζζκ/ ἶζ᾽ ἔεεθε θνμκέεζκ, ἐπεὶ μὔ πμηε θῦθμκ ὁιμ῔μκ/ ἀεακάηςκ 
ηε εε῵κ παιαὶ ἐνπμιέκςκ η᾽ ἀκενώπςκ.” 
1492
 See the end of Sect. 3.3. 
1493
 This goes against the already mentioned Greek idea that the gods do not grant everything to one human 
being. Cp. footnote 98 above. 
1494
 See 190c-d: “ὁ μὖκ Εεὺξ ηαὶ μἱ ἄθθμζ εεμὶ ἐαμοθεύμκημ ὅηζ πνὴ α὎ημὺξ πμζ῅ζαζ, ηαὶ ἞πόνμοκ· μὔηε βὰν 
ὅπςξ ἀπμηηείκαζεκ εἶπμκ ηαὶ ὥζπεν ημὺξ βίβακηαξ ηεναοκώζακηεξ ηὸ βέκμξ ἀθακίζαζεκ – αἱ ηζιαὶ βὰν α὎ημ῔ξ 
ηαὶ ἱενὰ ηὰ πανὰ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ ἞θακίγεημ – μὔηε ὅπςξ ἐῶεκ ἀζεθβαίκεζκ. ιόβζξ δὴ ὁ Εεὺξ ἐκκμήζαξ θέβεζ ὅηζ 
„δμη῵ ιμζ,‟ ἔθδ, „ἔπεζκ ιδπακήκ, ὡξ ἂκ εἶέκ ηε ἅκενςπμζ ηαὶ παύζαζκημ η῅ξ ἀημθαζίαξ ἀζεεκέζηενμζ βεκόιεκμζ. 
κῦκ ιὲκ βὰν α὎ημύξ, ἔθδ, δζαηει῵ δίπα ἕηαζημκ, ηαὶ ἅια ιὲκ ἀζεεκέζηενμζ ἔζμκηαζ, ἅια δὲ πνδζζιώηενμζ ἟ι῔κ 
δζὰ ηὸ πθείμοξ ηὸκ ἀνζειὸκ βεβμκέκαζ· ηαὶ ααδζμῦκηαζ ὀνεμὶ ἐπὶ δομ῔κ ζηεθμ῔κ. ἐὰκ δ᾽ ἔηζ δμη῵ζζκ ἀζεθβαίκεζκ 
ηαὶ ιὴ 'εέθςζζκ ἟ζοπίακ ἄβεζκ, πάθζκ αὖ, ἔθδ, ηει῵ δίπα, ὥζη᾽ ἐθ᾽ ἑκὸξ πμνεύζμκηαζ ζηέθμοξ    
ἀζηςθζάγμκηεξ.‟ ” This possibility of a new cut actually lets us imagine how it was for the primitive humans to 
be cut in twain. It carried with it a loss similar to the one we would experience if we were to be cut in two. 
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but we are in fact only half of a real human being. In other words, what we call human beings 




 However, this does not mean that the new beings automatically forgot their previous 
condition. In fact, Zeus ordered Apollo to twist around the faces of the divided human beings, 
so that they would always contemplate the cut and what they lacked.
1496
 This became a 
permanent sight for them and the backdrop against which everything else appeared. Life was 
now a contemplation of what was lost, and everything appeared in the place of what is 
missing, being thus compared to it and called to fill its void. This means that, despite being 
cut in two, the identity of these beings remained the same. They still saw themselves as what 
they were (i.e., as the superlative being), and their present state was just a fragment 
(ζύιαμθμκ) of their actual self. In other words, the totality of their being did not coincide 
with their actual boundaries, but was located outside of them, and hence they permanently 
desired and pursued it. 
  This desire and pursuit (which Aristophanes describes as a ημῦ ὅθμο ἐπζεοιία ηαὶ 
δζώλζξ) will henceforth be a permanent feature of these beings.
1497
 But their state will still 
undergo further variations. Immediately after the cut, they longed for their lost being and 
embraced their other half, desperately trying to grow back together. But they were unable to 
assimilate each other. They could only contemplate their loss. This left them paralyzed (in a 
state of ἀνβία) and unable to fight for their survival. They could not turn their attention to 
anything else and, consequently, they started dying of hunger.
1498
 This meant that human 
beings now had to face a new problem. Many of them had lost their corresponding halves, 
and they had thus reached the height of loss and helplessness. They were now completely 
alone (in a state of double emptiness, as it were), and since they could not accept their present 
condition, they started search for someone that could act as a substitute or surrogate half.
1499
 
But it was not the same thing. 
                                                 
1495
 See 191d: “ἕηαζημξ μὖκ ἟ι῵κ ἐζηζκ ἀκενώπμο ζύιαμθμκ, ἅηε ηεηιδιέκμξ ὥζπεν αἱ ρ῅ηηαζ, ἐλ ἑκὸξ δύμ· 
γδηε῔ δὴ ἀεὶ ηὸ α὏ημῦ ἕηαζημξ ζύιαμθμκ.” 
1496
 See 190e: “(...) ὅκηζκα δὲ ηέιμζ, ηὸκ Ἀπόθθς ἐηέθεοεκ ηό ηε πνόζςπμκ ιεηαζηνέθεζκ ηαὶ ηὸ ημῦ α὎πέκμξ 
ἣιζζο πνὸξ ηὴκ ημιήκ, ἵκα εεώιεκμξ ηὴκ α὏ημῦ ηι῅ζζκ ημζιζώηενμξ εἴδ ὁ ἄκενςπμξ, ηαὶ ηἆθθα ἰ᾵ζεαζ 
ἐηέθεοεκ.” 
1497
 See 192e-193a: “(...) ημῦ ὅθμο μὖκ ηῆ ἐπζεοιίᾳ ηαὶ δζώλεζ ἔνςξ ὄκμια.” 
1498
 See 191a-b: “ἐπεζδὴ μὖκ ἟ θύζζξ δίπα ἐηιήεδ, πμεμῦκ ἕηαζημκ ηὸ ἣιζζο ηὸ α὏ημῦ ζοκῄεζ, ηαὶ 
πενζαάθθμκηεξ ηὰξ πε῔ναξ ηαὶ ζοιπθεηόιεκμζ ἀθθήθμζξ, ἐπζεοιμῦκηεξ ζοιθῦκαζ, ἀπέεκῃζημκ ὏πὸ θζιμῦ ηαὶ η῅ξ 
ἄθθδξ ἀνβίαξ δζὰ ηὸ ιδδὲκ ἐεέθεζκ πςνὶξ ἀθθήθςκ πμζε῔κ.” 
1499




 Humanity‟s punishment was therefore devastating – so much so that, in seeing it, 
Zeus pitied us and tried to mitigate the effects of what he had done. This mitigation is 
essential to define our present condition, which is actually a combination of the original loss 
and its mitigation. But it is important to bear in mind that the countermeasures did not aim at 
altogether removing the evil brought about by splitting apart each human being. They are 
palliative measures and only give some relief from the suffering in question. What were these 
measures, then?  
Aristophanes mentions that Zeus created the possibility of sexual relations, which 
could bring about a certain satisfaction (πθδζιμκή) of the soul‟s longing and allowed human 
beings to turn to their works.
1500
 But this is just one factor of mitigation, and the myth 
presupposes another, which is not expressly mentioned, but is even more decisive. 
Humanity‟s suffering is mostly relieved by the passing of time and the ensuing forgetfulness. 
After a while, the half-humans forgot their other halves, they forgot that they were merely 
ζύιαμθα, and started identifying themselves with the beings that they currently were. This is 
why Aristophanes presents himself as a kind of prophet that is revealing a hidden truth about 
ourselves. We forgot who we are and what happened to us. But this does not mean that we 
stopped being who we were. Our essence did not change. We are still deeply determined by 
our past history, with which we now have a very hazy relation. At the surface, everything 
may appear to be well and we may experience a superficial health. Yet, at the heart of our 
being, we are still half of what we are. We are still connected to the ὅθμκ we once were. We 
forgot what we are pursuing, but we keep longing for it. Therefore, any apparent wellness is 
no more than a “beauty festering with evils” (a ηάθθμξ ηαη῵κ ὕπμοθμκ), to use Sophocles‟ 
phrase once more.
1501
 We still do not have what we desire, and – if anything – our situation 
has become more precarious and indeterminate, because now we do not know what we are 
searching for and we do not know whether it exists or not – i.e., whether there is a 
corresponding half for us or not. We may never have met them or they may not exist 
altogether. But still there is a latent longing for them, and as a result the persons we          
meet – and in a way also all other things that appear to us – are tacitly compared to our vague 
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 See 191b-c: “ἐθεήζαξ δὲ ὁ Εεὺξ ἄθθδκ ιδπακὴκ πμνίγεηαζ, ηαὶ ιεηαηίεδζζκ α὎η῵κ ηὰ αἰδμ῔α εἰξ ηὸ πνόζεεκ 
– ηέςξ βὰν ηαὶ ηαῦηα ἐηηὸξ εἶπμκ, ηαὶ ἐβέκκςκ ηαὶ ἔηζηημκ μ὎η εἰξ ἀθθήθμοξ ἀθθ᾽ εἰξ β῅κ, ὥζπεν μἱ ηέηηζβεξ – 
ιεηέεδηέ ηε μὖκ μὕης α὎η῵κ εἰξ ηὸ πνόζεεκ ηαὶ δζὰ ημύηςκ ηὴκ βέκεζζκ ἐκ ἀθθήθμζξ ἐπμίδζεκ, δζὰ ημῦ ἄννεκμξ 
ἐκ ηῶ εήθεζ, η῵κδε ἕκεηα, ἵκα ἐκ ηῆ ζοιπθμηῆ ἅια ιὲκ εἰ ἀκὴν βοκαζηὶ ἐκηύπμζ, βεκκῶεκ ηαὶ βίβκμζημ ηὸ βέκμξ, 
ἅια δ᾽ εἰ ηαὶ ἄννδκ ἄννεκζ, πθδζιμκὴ βμῦκ βίβκμζημ η῅ξ ζοκμοζίαξ ηαὶ δζαπαύμζκημ ηαὶ ἐπὶ ηὰ ἔνβα ηνέπμζκημ 
ηαὶ ημῦ ἄθθμο αίμο ἐπζιεθμ῔κημ.” 
1501
 See Oedipus Tyrannus, v. 1396. 
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notion of our corresponding half, in order to see if they can somehow fill the hole within us 
(even if only as substitutes or makeshifts of our actual half). 
 Now, when we meet someone that seems to satisfy this latent longing, we are 
overpowered by feelings of familiarity, belonging and love. We intensively gaze at this 
person, and refuse to be separated from him or her.
1502
 This is precisely what romantic love 
consists in. The beloved seems to surpass all other beings and makes us forget of everything 
else. Falling in love is thus the feeling of discovering (and coming closer to) what we have 
longed for all along. It is a first taste and a promise of the superlative state that characterized 
the primitive human beings. But according to Aristophanes, we do not necessarily understand 
what is happening to us. Indeed, if we are asked about what we really expect from the 
beloved, it would not be easy for us to explain.
1503
 This does not mean we have no notion of 
what we want. As Aristophanes says, we sort of divine or have an enigmatic representation of 
what we desire.
1504
 This is why the lovers, in the Gedankenexperiment presented by 
Aristophanes, can understand and accept Hephaestus‟ proposed answer. What they want is to 
be fused or melted into one and spend as much time as possible in this state – more precisely, 
the whole life and even after dying.
1505
 They want to incorporate the beloved, whom they 
regard as the quintessence of beauty, into themselves. They want to become a superlative 
being or achieve the superlative state of yore. This is what they desire now and what they 
always desired. In other words, we are always marked by a permanent or primordial ἔνςξ, 
which corresponds precisely to the desire and pursuit of the whole (ημῦ ὅθμο ἐπζεοιία ηαὶ 
δίςλζξ). We are always desiring and pursuing the superlative condition we lost and romantic 
love is only one possible manifestation of this constitutive desire and pursuit. 
 In effect, our permanent ἔνςξ allows for several different manifestations, of which 
romantic love (the form of ἔνςξ we most immediately recognize) is just one. But 
Aristophanes also mentions non-passionate forms of erotic desire, such as the ones that 
                                                 
1502
 See 192b-c: “ὅηακ ιὲκ μὖκ ηαὶ α὎ηῶ ἐηείκῳ ἐκηύπῃ ηῶ α὏ημῦ ἟ιίζεζ ηαὶ ὁ παζδεναζηὴξ ηαὶ ἄθθμξ π᾵ξ, ηόηε 
ηαὶ εαοιαζηὰ ἐηπθήηημκηαζ θζθίᾳ ηε ηαὶ μἰηεζόηδηζ ηαὶ ἔνςηζ, μ὎η ἐεέθμκηεξ ὡξ ἔπμξ εἰπε῔κ πςνίγεζεαζ 
ἀθθήθςκ μ὎δὲ ζιζηνὸκ πνόκμκ.” 
1503
 See 192c: “ηαὶ μἱ δζαηεθμῦκηεξ ιεη᾽ ἀθθήθςκ δζὰ αίμο μὗημί εἰζζκ, μἳ μ὎δ᾽ ἂκ ἔπμζεκ εἰπε῔κ ὅηζ αμύθμκηαζ 
ζθίζζ παν᾽ ἀθθήθςκ βίβκεζεαζ.” 
1504
 In 192d Aristophanes says precisely that the ροπή “ιακηεύεηαζ ὃ αμύθεηαζ, ηαὶ αἰκίηηεηαζ.” 
1505
 See 192d-e: “ηαὶ εἰ α὎ημ῔ξ ἐκ ηῶ α὎ηῶ ηαηαηεζιέκμζξ ἐπζζηὰξ ὁ Ἥθαζζημξ, ἔπςκ ηὰ ὄνβακα, ἔνμζημ· „ηί ἔζε᾽ 
ὃ αμύθεζεε, ὦ ἄκενςπμζ, ὏ι῔κ παν᾽ ἀθθήθςκ βεκέζεαζ;‟ ηαὶ εἰ ἀπμνμῦκηαξ α὎ημὺξ πάθζκ ἔνμζημ· „ἆνά βε ημῦδε 
ἐπζεοιε῔ηε, ἐκ ηῶ α὎ηῶ βεκέζεαζ ὅηζ ιάθζζηα ἀθθήθμζξ, ὥζηε ηαὶ κύηηα ηαὶ ἟ιένακ ιὴ ἀπμθείπεζεαζ ἀθθήθςκ; 
εἰ βὰν ημύημο ἐπζεοιε῔ηε, εέθς ὏ι᾵ξ ζοκη῅λαζ ηαὶ ζοιθοζ῅ζαζ εἰξ ηὸ α὎ηό, ὥζηε δύ᾽ ὄκηαξ ἕκα βεβμκέκαζ ηαὶ 
ἕςξ η᾽ ἂκ γ῅ηε, ὡξ ἕκα ὄκηα, ημζκῆ ἀιθμηένμοξ γ῅κ, ηαὶ ἐπεζδὰκ ἀπμεάκδηε, ἐηε῔ αὖ ἐκ Ἅζδμο ἀκηὶ δομ῔κ ἕκα 
εἶκαζ ημζκῆ ηεεκε῵ηε· ἀθθ᾽ ὁν᾵ηε εἰ ημύημο ἐν᾵ηε ηαὶ ἐλανηε῔ ὏ι῔κ ἂκ ημύημο ηύπδηε·‟ ηαῦη᾽ ἀημύζαξ ἴζιεκ ὅηζ 
μ὎δ᾽ ἂκ εἷξ ἐλανκδεείδ μ὎δ᾽ ἄθθμ ηζ ἂκ θακείδ αμοθόιεκμξ, ἀθθ᾽ ἀηεπκ῵ξ μἴμζη᾽ ἂκ ἀηδημέκαζ ημῦημ ὃ πάθαζ 
ἄνα ἐπεεύιεζ, ζοκεθεὼκ ηαὶ ζοκηαηεὶξ ηῶ ἐνςιέκῳ ἐη δομ῔κ εἷξ βεκέζεαζ.” 
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characterize θζθμβύκαζηεξ, ιμζπμί, θζθακδνμί, ιμζπεύηνζαζ, ἑηαζνίζηνζαζ.
1506
 These may seem 
to be entirely unconnected with the desire and pursuit of the whole, but they are just another 
expression of our broken being – one which, instead of concentrating our desire on just one 
person (who is then seen as unsurpassable), tries to collect many objects of desire in order to 
attain, through their combination, the wholeness we all pursue.
1507
 This is indeed a very 
important possibility allowed by the structure of our life and desire. We may try to achieve 
the good by combining different things.  
But this is not all. Though Aristophanes does not mention it, the pursuit of this 
superlative may assume yet other forms. It may be directed to things other than            
persons – such as possessions, pleasure in general, honor, or knowledge.
1508
 It may also 
combine several of these things. Moreover, it is also possible for us (as we will see in the 
following) to accept something we take to be less than superlatively good, in case we cannot 
find or attain what we truly desire. We may pursue the second or third best thing – i.e., some 
substitute or makeshift which we will abandon as soon as something better comes along. If 
nothing better comes along and we lose hope of it ever coming, we may then be faced with 
the question of whether we still accept to live or not.
1509
 In sum, the model presented by 
Aristophanes accounts for all possible configurations of human life. There is a permanent 
desire that can be channeled in many different ways – although we usually only notice it 
when it is embodied in someone or in some particular thing. Otherwise, such a desire seems 
dormant or absent, although it is still moving us at every moment and shaping our whole life. 
We are always pursuing the superlative good and, therefore, there is actually no increase in 
desire during our life – not even when we fall in love. There is only concentration of our 
permanent desire in one thing, which makes us more aware of our own desire. 
                                                 
1506
 Cp. 191d-e: “ὅζμζ ιὲκ μὖκ η῵κ ἀκδν῵κ ημῦ ημζκμῦ ηι῅ιά εἰζζκ, ὃ δὴ ηόηε ἀκδνόβοκμκ ἐηαθε῔ημ, 
θζθμβύκαζηέξ ηέ εἰζζ ηαὶ μἱ πμθθμὶ η῵κ ιμζπ῵κ ἐη ημύημο ημῦ βέκμοξ βεβόκαζζκ, ηαὶ ὅζαζ αὖ βοκα῔ηεξ θίθακδνμί 
ηε ηαὶ ιμζπεύηνζαζ ἐη ημύημο ημῦ βέκμοξ βίβκμκηαζ. ὅζαζ δὲ η῵κ βοκαζη῵κ βοκαζηὸξ ηι῅ιά εἰζζκ, μ὎ πάκο αὗηαζ 
ημ῔ξ ἀκδνάζζ ηὸκ κμῦκ πνμζέπμοζζκ, ἀθθὰ ι᾵θθμκ πνὸξ ηὰξ βοκα῔ηαξ ηεηναιιέκαζ εἰζί, ηαὶ αἱ ἑηαζνίζηνζαζ ἐη 
ημύημο ημῦ βέκμοξ βίβκμκηαζ.” For more on these forms of erotic desire, see e.g. R. BURY, The Symposium of 
Plato, Cambridge, Heffer, 1909, ad loc. 
1507
 In short, the difference between romantic love and the non-passionate forms of erotic desire corresponds to 
the difference between Romeo and Don Juan. In a way, both are in love, but the direction of their erotic drive is 
different. One has only one object of love, the other combines hundreds of objects of desire and regards such 
combination as the good. 
1508
 For descriptions of a superlative desire directed at other things, see e.g. Alc. I 105a ff. (where Socrates 
describes Alcibiades‟ desire and hope of becoming universally famous), Grg. 483c ff. (where Callicles describes 
strong men, who are characterized by an unsatiable πθεμκελία), and Rep. 474c ff. (where different forms of 
θζθία, and especially θζθμζμθία, are described as a desire for all possible objects of a field). For more on the 
latter passage, cp. Chap. 7 Sect. 2.4 and Chap. 13 Sect. 3.  
1509
 For more on these possibilities, cp. Sect. 5.3 below. 
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What is then the real object of our love? What are we really pursuing? What can 
satisfy our desire? The goods we normally attain are far from fully satisfying us. Even our 
greatest desires tend to be insufficient once fulfilled. We desire more. But we do not simply 
desire to overcome what we have and achieve a better state. Our desire is already directed at 
the highest possible good – i.e., to something that would fully satisfy us or something about 
which we could say Faust‟s famous words: “Verweile doch! du bist so schön”.
1510
 It is, 
however, very difficult to conceive what might correspond to such a thing, or how we would 
experience it.
1511
 It is even difficult to determine if there really is an object that could fulfill 
our desire. It may well be a mirage, a vain dream, a fata morgana, and we may be condemned 
to eternal frustration.
1512
 If that is the case, then what Aristophanes describes is a kind of 
θύζζξ that is constitutively sick or inviable. Human life would consist in nothing more than a 
way of constantly attending to our constitutive disease, without any prospect of a cure. We 
would all be like Herodicus, who according to the Republic spent his entire life taking care of 




In Aristophanes‟ speech, erotic love may seem to be the solution and the cure to our 
constitutive disease. It would make us whole again. But is it really so? Aristophanes initially 
presents it as a form of temporary satisfaction.
1514
 Later, he admits the possibility of wanting 
to spend our life with someone, but it is not clear how one‟s feelings would develop with 
time. How can anyone ever fully satisfy our desire, how can anyone be seen as a superlative 
being and continue being seen as such? Aristophanes‟ solution to our desire is problematic 
and places an extraordinary demand on one‟s beloved – a demand that probably no one 
would be able to live up to. Aristophanes‟ words do not help much. He talks of great hopes of 
being healed and thus becoming blessed and happy – but it is not clear how this happens and 
                                                 
1510
 See W. GOETHE, Werke, vol. 14, Weimar, Böhlau, 1887, vv. 1699-1702: “Werd‟ ich zum Augenblicke 
sagen:/ Verweile doch! du bist so schön!/ Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen,/ Dann will ich gern zu 
Grunde gehn!” 
1511
 For instance, would it be something as a static superlative (a kind of repos, to use Pascal‟s expression) or 
would it have to be a dynamic superlative? Our temporal nature seems to require a renewal of our experience of 
the superlative good, but would we need it to increase permanently, in order not to be bored? It is difficult to 
say, especially because such a thing would be very different from what we normally experience. On the notion 
of repos, see B. PASCAL, Pensées, edited by M. Le Guern, Gallimard, Paris, 1977, fragments 126 (=Br. 139, 
Laf. 136, T. A. 134), 386 (=Br. 465, Laf. 407, T. A. 407), and 529 (=Br. 131 Laf. 622 T. A. 672). 
1512
 It may indeed happen that there is no such a thing. It may even be a self-contradictory idea. 
1513
 See 406a ff. (especially 406b and 407b).  
1514
 See once more 191c. 
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whether or not it requires some kind of divine help.
1515
 What seems clear, though, is that 
falling in love awakens in us the awareness of what we really desire – but this may also mean 
that it prepares us to be more aware of how we probably cannot fulfill this desire and are 
condemned to disappointment and frustration. 
Be that as it may, Aristophanes provides us a description of ἔνςξ and of our present 
condition. According to him, we are constitutively dissatisfied with our present state, whether 
we are aware of it or not. Our desire surpasses what we have and is directed at the wholeness 
or super-health metaphorically represented by the orbicular beings. We always have some 
memory or premonition (however vague) of it, and that is why we have (whether we clearly 
realize it or not) an oversized or overdimensioned being, and are unable to be satisfied with 
our actual boundaries. We always view them as an intolerable contraction or prison, we 
always surpass them, and we always aim at more. In other words, there is a disproportion 
between our present contracted form and the expanded form we see as our own (or, as we 
could also say, between our actual and our desired being). The self is insufficient for itself, 
because it is affected by this disease of wanting more, and as such it requires a cure, a 
restoration of its healthy state. The self is a task or a project of itself. It pursues itself, and this 
means it pursues a superior form of itself – i.e., a super-self or a whole self. This whole self is 
not achieved by improving our condition a little. The self we desire is a superlative self. It 
implies the maximized form of ourselves.  
 Our self is thus marked at its core by a desire for what belongs to us or what is our 
own (ηὸ μἰηε῔μκ), but this μἰηε῔μκ is not just a physiological part of us, as appears in 
Aristophanes‟ myth. As Socrates underscores later in Symposium, what we desire is the   
good – and so we must say that what is proper to us or belongs to, what we are always 
directed to, is the superlative good.
1516
 We want to achieve the best thing of all, we want to 
incorporate it in ourselves, we want to be fused with it, in order to expand our own self. The 
search for the self is thus a search for the superlative good, and this is what makes us 
dissatisfied with everything that falls short of it.  
                                                 
1515
 See 193c-d: “μὗ δὴ ηὸκ αἴηζμκ εεὸκ ὏ικμῦκηεξ δζηαίςξ ἂκ ὏ικμ῔ιεκ ἔνςηα, ὃξ ἔκ ηε ηῶ πανόκηζ ἟ι᾵ξ 
πθε῔ζηα ὀκίκδζζκ εἰξ ηὸ μἰηε῔μκ ἄβςκ, ηαὶ εἰξ ηὸ ἔπεζηα ἐθπίδαξ ιεβίζηαξ πανέπεηαζ, ἟ι῵κ πανεπμιέκςκ πνὸξ 
εεμὺξ ε὎ζέαεζακ, ηαηαζηήζαξ ἟ι᾵ξ εἰξ ηὴκ ἀνπαίακ θύζζκ ηαὶ ἰαζάιεκμξ ιαηανίμοξ ηαὶ ε὎δαίιμκαξ πμζ῅ζαζ.” 
1516
 See 205d-206a: “ηαὶ θέβεηαζ ιέκ βέ ηζξ, ἔθδ, θόβμξ, ὡξ μἳ ἂκ ηὸ ἣιζζο ἑαοη῵κ γδη῵ζζκ, μὗημζ ἐν῵ζζκ· ὁ δ᾽ 
ἐιὸξ θόβμξ μὔηε ἟ιίζεόξ θδζζκ εἶκαζ ηὸκ ἔνςηα μὔηε ὅθμο, ἐὰκ ιὴ ηοβπάκῃ βέ πμο, ὦ ἑηα῔νε, ἀβαεὸκ ὄκ, ἐπεὶ 
α὏η῵κ βε ηαὶ πόδαξ ηαὶ πε῔ναξ ἐεέθμοζζκ ἀπμηέικεζεαζ μἱ ἄκενςπμζ, ἐὰκ α὎ημ῔ξ δμηῆ ηὰ ἑαοη῵κ πμκδνὰ εἶκαζ. 
μ὎ βὰν ηὸ ἑαοη῵κ μἶιαζ ἕηαζημζ ἀζπάγμκηαζ, εἰ ιὴ εἴ ηζξ ηὸ ιὲκ ἀβαεὸκ μἰηε῔μκ ηαθε῔ ηαὶ ἑαοημῦ, ηὸ δὲ ηαηὸκ 
ἀθθόηνζμκ· ὡξ μ὎δέκ βε ἄθθμ ἐζηὶκ μὗ ἐν῵ζζκ ἅκενςπμζ ἠ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ.” 
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Such a description has a formal character, though, and it corresponds to the way we 
normally experience this desire for the superlative. At first, we are not aware of what exactly 
we desire. It is a certain nescio quid, and we may come to identify this object of desire with 
many different things – not only different persons, but even different occupations or things in 
general. However, the primarily formal and open character of the superlative good does not 
mean that absolutely anything can occupy its place. Our desire requires something to appear 
as the absolute best and as what absolutely fulfils our being – and this requirement is enough 
to disqualify most things, though some pretty strange identifications may still occur. When 
seen from a distance (i.e., before we come to possess or experience them), non-superlative 
things may appear to us wrapped in an aura of superlativeness. But in general they are sooner 
or later unmasked as something that falls drastically short of what we need. It is indeed 
difficult to know what exactly may correspond to this formal desire and we may make many 
mistakes about it.  
All this analysis lets us define with more precision what was said above about our 
intermediate nature. In particular, we can now better define the positive pole towards which 
we are always striving. We are always on route to the superlative, trying to achieve it, and 
this means that all good states that fall short of it are still bad. The tension and restlessness at 
the heart of our being is thus much greater than it seemed at first. It is not simply directed to a 
good condition (ε὎ελία), and it cannot be explained as a removal of bad things (as a removal 
of some kind of sickness). It is rather the pursuit of a maximization of ourselves. The relation 
to the optimum is primordial and all particular desires (which may inclusively be desires of 
removing bad things from us) are derived from and subordinate to it. The superlative good is 
the first beloved which is left undetermined in Lysis.
1517
 We are always related to it and 
defined by this relation – and this in turn pervades our whole experience and everything we 
come in contact with. We are restless because we are related or directed to the superlative, 
even if we are normally not expressly aware of this fact. Explicit awareness is not required 
for our desire of a superlative good to direct all our steps and determine how everything 
appears to us. Such a desire is always at the core of our ροπή, it underpins our whole life, and 
all differences in the way we live are only differences in how we relate to this desire of a 
superlative good. 
 
                                                 
1517
 Cp. 219c-220b. 
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4.3. The inner complexity of the superlative good. The desire for a superlative 
combination of superlatives in Symposium and Phaedrus 
 
 We saw in Section 3 how our desires are all directed to the good. We want to possess 
it and be happy. Now we established that all our desires are in fact variations of a single 
desire for a superlative good. Whether or not we are able to determine what the superlative 
good is (i.e., which particular being or set of beings corresponds to it), we are always 
pressured to pursue more, and in fact to pursue the best. This is the essential trait of our 
desire. But this is not all that Plato has to say about the formal structure of our desire and of 
its object. Plato presents other formal traits of our desire and its object, which reveal their 
complexity and are thus important to better define them. This complexity has already been 
suggested before. We saw that Greek poetry talked of several different superlatives, and 
Aristophanes‟ mythological representation of the superlative also consisted in several 
different predicates. Now, we will see how Plato determines the complexity of ἔνςξ and its 
object in Socrates‟ speech in Symposium and in Socrates‟ second speech in Phaedrus. In both 
passages the object of ἔνςξ is defined not simply as a superlative good, but rather as a 
superlative combination of superlatives, and we have to see what is implied therein. 
 Let us begin with Socrates‟ speech in Symposium. We already discussed some of its 
most essential aspects.
1518
 We saw, for instance, how the beginning of the speech is 
determined by Agathon‟s speech – and this is once more relevant for what we will now 
consider. Agathon‟s speech gives voice to the way lovers see their beloved. He identifies 
ἔνςξ with the beloved, and then superlatively praises the superlative beauty and all the other 
superlative predicates (both physical and moral) of the beloved.
1519
 In this sense, ἔνςξ is 
described as a superlative combination of all superlatives.
1520
 Now, Socrates will adopt 
precisely this idea, but with some important modifications. As we already saw, Socrates 
                                                 
1518
 See Sect. 3.3 above. 
1519
 This identification of ἔνςξ is actually in keeping with the use of the word ἔνςξ in Archaic Greek to 
designate not the love or desire one feels for something, but rather an objective (and in many cases divine) 
power that invades and subjugates us. This idea of ἔνςξ as an invading force can also be found in the fantastic 
etymology of ἔνςξ in Cra. 420a-b: “ „ἔνςξ‟ δέ, ὅηζ εἰζνε῔ ἔλςεεκ ηαὶ μ὎η μἰηεία ἐζηὶκ ἟ ῥμὴ αὕηδ ηῶ ἔπμκηζ 
ἀθθ᾽ ἐπείζαηημξ δζὰ η῵κ ὀιιάηςκ, δζὰ ηαῦηα ἀπὸ ημῦ ἐζνε῔κ „ἔζνμξ‟ ηό βε παθαζὸκ ἐηαθε῔ημ – ηῶ βὰν μὖ ἀκηὶ 
ημῦ ὦ ἐπνώιεεα – κῦκ δ᾽ „ἔνςξ‟ ηέηθδηαζ δζὰ ηὴκ ημῦ ὦ ἀκηὶ ημῦ μὖ ιεηαθθαβήκ.”  
1520
 Agathon says indeed that the god Ἔνςξ is the happiest, the most beautiful and the best (195a). He then 
explains its beauty by saying that he is young (in fact the youngest), most delicate (ἀπαθώηαημξ), fluid or supple 
in form (὏βνὸξ ηὸ εἶδμξ), superlatively graceful (἟ ε὎ζπδιμζύκδ, ὃ δὴ δζαθενόκηςξ ἐη πάκηςκ ὁιμθμβμοιέκςξ 
Ἔνςξ ἔπεζ), and has a beautiful complexion (πνόαξ δὲ ηάθθμξ ἟ ηαη᾽ ἄκεδ). See 195a-196b. Finally, Ἔνςξ is 
also most excellent, insofar as it does not commit or suffer any injustice, it does not force anyone or anything, it 
is superlatively sound-minded or moderate (ζςθνμζύκδξ πθείζηδξ ιεηέπεζ), most courageous, wisest, and the 
best guide. See 196b-197e. 
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focuses on the fact that ἔνςξ is primarily desire of what one lacks and has therefore an 
intermediate (ιεηαλύ) character. It lies between two poles: namely, between what it desires 
and the opposite of that.
1521
 But when we considered the question before, we mostly treated 
this intermediate character as if it were simple – i.e., as if the ἔνςξ that is at the core of our 
being was just related to two poles: badness and goodness. However, Socrates‟ description 
identifies several forms of intermediacy, between several different sets of poles. He talks of 
intermediates between what is good and bad, between what is “beautiful” and “ugly”, 
between what is mortal and what is immortal, and between what is ignorant and what is 
wise.
1522
 This means that ἔνςξ is directed to different things (or to different respects of the 
same thing) and is in fact a blending of different pursuits or of different forms of 
“inbetweenness”. Each of them is directed at a superlative and all together they aim at a 
superlative combination of superlatives, which is thus the actual object of ἔνςξ. 
 But let us see this in more detail. The intermediacy between the bad and the good 
(which is in fact between what is worst and what is best) is one of the those identified by 
Socrates in this passage. It also plays an important role in Lysis, and we can better understand 
it if we consider what is said there. According to the text, we cannot be entirely bad, 
otherwise we would have no relation to the good. Likewise, we cannot be entirely good, or 
else there would be no desire or pursuit of it.
1523
 We would simply be good. Thus, if we are to 
desire something, we must lie between the two extremities and be essentially characterized by 
both of them, without having any pure contact with one or the other. This is what we saw 
before. Now we must consider how this intermediacy relates to the others identified by 
Socrates. 
 An essential intermediacy (determined precisely by the theme in question: romantic 
love) is the intermediacy between what is αἰζπνόκ and what is ηαθόκ (or, as is implied, 
between ηὸ αἴζπζζημκ and ηὸ ηάθθζζημκ).
1524
 These terms are notoriously difficult to 
translate. In general, they qualify something as abject or admirable, and they have esthetic 
and moral connotations. According to the context, “ηαθόξ” can then mean “beautiful”, “fine”, 
                                                 
1521
 See in particular 202b: “ιὴ ημίκοκ ἀκάβηαγε ὃ ιὴ ηαθόκ ἐζηζκ αἰζπνὸκ εἶκαζ, ιδδὲ ὃ ιὴ ἀβαεόκ, ηαηόκ. 
μὕης δὲ ηαὶ ηὸκ ἔνςηα ἐπεζδὴ α὎ηὸξ ὁιμθμβε῔ξ ιὴ εἶκαζ ἀβαεὸκ ιδδὲ ηαθόκ, ιδδέκ ηζ ι᾵θθμκ μἴμο δε῔κ α὎ηὸκ 
αἰζπνὸκ ηαὶ ηαηὸκ εἶκαζ, ἀθθά ηζ ιεηαλύ, ἔθδ, ημύημζκ.” 
1522
 In Greek: ιεηαλὺ ἀβαεμῦ ηαὶ ηαημῦ, ιεηαλὺ ηαθμῦ ηαὶ αἰζπνμῦ, ιεηαλὺ εκδημῦ ηαὶ ἀεακάημο (202d), 
ιεηαλὺ ζμθμῦ ηαὶ ἀιαεμῦξ (204b). 
1523
 Cp. 217e-218a: “ηαὶ ηὸ ιήηε ηαηὸκ ἄνα ιήη᾽ ἀβαεὸκ ἐκίμηε ηαημῦ πανόκημξ μὔπς ηαηόκ ἐζηζκ, ἔζηζκ δ᾽ ὅηε 
ἢδδ ηὸ ημζμῦημκ βέβμκεκ.     πάκο βε.     μ὎ημῦκ ὅηακ ιήπς ηαηὸκ ᾖ ηαημῦ πανόκημξ, αὕηδ ιὲκ ἟ πανμοζία 
ἀβαεμῦ α὎ηὸ πμζε῔ ἐπζεοιε῔κ· ἟ δὲ ηαηὸκ πμζμῦζα ἀπμζηενε῔ α὎ηὸ η῅ξ ηε ἐπζεοιίαξ ἅια ηαὶ η῅ξ θζθίαξ ημῦ 
ἀβαεμῦ. μ὎ βὰν ἔηζ ἐζηὶκ μὔηε ηαηὸκ μὔηε ἀβαεόκ, ἀθθὰ ηαηόκ· θίθμκ δὲ ἀβαεῶ ηαηὸκ μ὎η ἤκ.     μ὎ βὰν μὖκ.” 
1524
 See the above mentioned passage in 202b. 
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“noble”, whereas “αἰζπνόξ” may mean “ugly”, “base” or “shameful”.
1525
 In the context in 
question, though, the adjective “ηαθόξ” refers primarily to the beauty or resplendence of the 
beloved, which renders him or her absolutely enticing and fascinating. However, the 
predicate ηαθόκ is not restricted to romantic love, and it can qualify any object of ἔνςξ in a 
broader sense. Plato himself mentions the “beauty” of activities, laws or knowledge.
1526
 
These different forms of “beauty” vary in degree of knowledge and reality, and Plato in fact 
presents a scale of different forms of “beauty” (the so-called scala amoris) in Symposium, 
which is also a scale of different ways of recognizing ηὸ ηάθθζζημκ. At the basis of the scale, 
one recognizes the beauty of particular body, and its top one recognizes ηὸ ηαθόκ itself, 
whose contemplation is described as the highest form of fulfillment.
1527
 But regardless of the 
different kinds of “beauty”, the important thing is that we are always directed to it – and in 
fact to the highest form of it. Thus, the connection of our desire with ηὸ ηαθόκ renders more 
explicit how we do not just want something that is good, but also something that is 
maximally radiant and fascinating. This becomes clear in Symposium and even more in 
Phaedrus, as we shall see. 
This twofold goal then raises the question of how they relate to one another. In fact, 
the terms are often associated and in some cases they may even be used alternatively. This 
points to a very close relation between them, but Plato does not say anything very clear about 
it. At some points (including Socrates‟ speech in Symposium), Plato seems to understand 
them as direct equivalents and as interchangeable.
1528
 It is as if they were two ways of 
looking at the same thing, even if they perhaps emphasize different aspects of it. Indeed, 
ἀβαεόκ has a functional sense, as we saw, and ηαθόκ expresses the fact that something is 
admirable and thus affects us in a particular way. But it is not clear that all that is admirable is 
good and vice versa. These terms are complex, and sometimes they do not coincide.
1529
 
                                                 
1525
 For more on these terms (and especially ηαθόξ), see e.g. M. HOFFMANN, Die ethische Terminologie bei 
Homer, Hesiod und den altern Elegikern und Jambographen, Tübingen, Kloeres, 1914, 48 f., 113, 124, 131, 
144-145; G. BERTRAM, ηαθόξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; C. CLASSEN, Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft 
platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens, München, Beck, 1959, 138, 145ff.; H. WANKEL, Kalos kai 
agathos, Diss. Wuppertal, 1961, especially 16-21; P. HUART, Le vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans 
l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, 455-461; W. DONLAN, The Origin of ηαθὸξ ηἀβαεόξ, The 
American Journal of Philology 94 (1973), 365-374; K. DOVER, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato 
and Aristotle, Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1974, 69-73. 
1526
 See Smp. 210c. 
1527
 See 210a-212a. 
1528
 See e.g. Men. 77b, Smp. 204d-e. 
1529
 See e.g. the argument in Grg. 474c-475b, where things may be “beautiful” either because they are beneficial 
(i.e., good) or because they give pleasure when we look at them. However, the relation between beauty and 
goodness is not always conceived along these lines, and there are many discussions in secondary literature about 
this topic. For a few examples, cp. e.g. K. KATSIMANIS, Étude sur le rapport entre le beau et le bien chez 
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However, according to the Symposium, the ηαθόξ we are related to is superlative, and this 
means that it must contain all positive predicates and all goodness. Therefore, the two terms 
appear as having a very close meaning. 
But so much about the good and the “beautiful”. Another very important form of 
intermediacy underlined by Socrates and Diotima is the one between what is mortal and what 
is immortal. As we considered above, Socrates‟ speech presents two versions of this 
intermediacy, which are the result of two different interpretations of the poles.
1530
 First, the 
intermediate is a minor deity or δαίιςκ, who lies between mortals (i.e., ourselves) and the 
gods.
1531
 But then Socrates and Diotima redefine the poles. Being mortal is redefined as 
lasting only an instant and being immortal is reinterpreted as “being always the same” 
(πακηάπαζζκ ηὸ α὎ηὸ ἀεὶ εἶκαζ).
1532
 As a result, the intermediate is also redefined, and now 
corresponds to pregnancy (ηοήζζξ) and generation (βέκκδζζξ).
1533
 Generation in particular is 
what characterizes ἔνςξ, and it is also something that characterizes us. We lie between what 
is mortal and immortal in this sense. We do not cease to be at each instance, but we also do 
not always remain the same. We continue to exist and change, which means that we must 
somehow reproduce ourselves at each new moment and leave something similar to ourselves 
behind when we vanish.
1534
 We must transfer ourselves from one instant to the next, and we 
are always being replaced by a new version of ourselves that emanates from us. We are 
constantly generating ourselves, and this applies both to our body and our ροπή.
1535
 We thus 
produce something that is and is not us, and this whole process can be described as a mortal 
form of immortality (i.e., a way of remaining) or an immortal form of mortality. 
 Our continued existence in time is thus a form of intermediacy between what is mortal 
and what is immortal. However, our renewal at each moment is not guaranteed – nor is the 
quality of what we leave behind. We must take care of the body and the ροπή, and even when 
we do so we are still subject to a definite and absolute death. Now, the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Platon, Diss. Lille, 1974; R. BARNET, Notes on Plato on the kalon and the Good, Classical Philology 105 
(2010), 363–377; A. KOSMAN, Beauty and the Good. Situating the kalon, Classical Philology 105 (2010), 
341-367. 
1530
 Cp. Sect. 3.3 above. 
1531
 See 202d-203a. 
1532
 Cp. 207d-208b. 
1533
 See 206c: “ἔζηζ δὲ ημῦημ εε῔μκ ηὸ πν᾵βια, ηαὶ ημῦημ ἐκ εκδηῶ ὄκηζ ηῶ γῴῳ ἀεάκαημκ ἔκεζηζκ, ἟ ηύδζζξ ηαὶ 
἟ βέκκδζζξ.” 
1534
 See 207c-d: “ἐκηαῦεα βὰν ηὸκ α὎ηὸκ ἐηείκῳ θόβμκ ἟ εκδηὴ θύζζξ γδηε῔ ηαηὰ ηὸ δοκαηὸκ ἀεί ηε εἶκαζ ηαὶ 
ἀεάκαημξ. δύκαηαζ δὲ ηαύηῃ ιόκμκ, ηῆ βεκέζεζ, ὅηζ ἀεὶ ηαηαθείπεζ ἕηενμκ κέμκ ἀκηὶ ημῦ παθαζμῦ (...).” See also 
208a-b: “ημύηῳ βὰν ηῶ ηνόπῳ π᾵κ ηὸ εκδηὸκ ζῴγεηαζ, μ὎ ηῶ πακηάπαζζκ ηὸ α὎ηὸ ἀεὶ εἶκαζ ὥζπεν ηὸ εε῔μκ, ἀθθὰ 
ηῶ ηὸ ἀπζὸκ ηαὶ παθαζμύιεκμκ ἕηενμκ κέμκ ἐβηαηαθείπεζκ μἷμκ α὎ηὸ ἤκ.” 
1535
 See once more 207d-208a. 
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disappearing entirely is not irrelevant for us. We are deeply concerned with the possibility of 
dying, and this shows the connection between this form of intermediacy and the others. We 
are concerned with the future and in particular with when we will die. We want to live, but 
this does not mean we want to live as long as possible, regardless of how good or how bad 
our life is. Instead, we want to have a good life, we want to possess the good, and we want to 
possess it not just for a moment or a few moments. We want the good (and the beautiful) for 
the maximum possible time. More precisely, we want to possess the good and be happy 
forever.
1536
 In sum, our relation to the superlative good (and to superlative beauty) is also a 
relation to a superlative time – and this means that the superlative we desire is not only a 
qualitative superlative, but also a quantitative superlative. 
According to Socrates and Diotima, this is only possible through procreation and, 
more precisely, procreation in what is beautiful (ηίηηεζκ ἐκ ηῶ ηαθῶ).
1537
 Such a procreation 
constitutes a different intermediacy between the mortal and immortal. Instead of simply 
creating a similar version of ourselves from one moment to the next, it creates something 
(either a child or a work of ours) that may outlast us and may also be an improved form of 
ourselves (hence the importance of generating in what is beautiful). This is still different from 
an absolute immortality, but is a more elaborate form of fulfilling our desire for a superlative 
time – and the decisive point here is the fact that, regardless of whether we can continue to be 
or not, our desire also includes this other superlative requirement. 
Finally, Socrates and Diotima consider the intermediacy between knowledge and 
ignorance (ιεηαλύ ηζ ζμθίαξ ηαὶ ἀιαείαξ). We already discussed several important aspects of 
this ιεηαλύ and of the terms it refers to.
1538
 In Symposium, however, Plato introduces new 
aspects, which we will now briefly consider and to which we will return in the following 
chapters. Like in the case of the previous intermediacy, Plato provides two versions of what 
lies between knowledge and ignorance. First, the intermediate between the two is correct 
judgment (ὀνεὴ δόλα), which “hits” being or reality, but is unable to provide an account of 
it.
1539
 Indeed, it is a mixture of ignorance and knowledge. It appears to be knowledge, 
                                                 
1536
 See 206a: “ἆν᾽ μὖκ, ἤ δ᾽ ἣ, μὕηςξ ἁπθμῦκ ἐζηζ θέβεζκ ὅηζ μἱ ἄκενςπμζ ηἀβαεμῦ ἐν῵ζζκ;     καί, ἔθδκ.     ηί δέ; 
μ὎ πνμζεεηέμκ, ἔθδ, ὅηζ ηαὶ εἶκαζ ηὸ ἀβαεὸκ α὏ημ῔ξ ἐν῵ζζκ;     πνμζεεηέμκ.     ἆν᾽ μὖκ, ἔθδ, ηαὶ μ὎ ιόκμκ εἶκαζ, 
ἀθθὰ ηαὶ ἀεὶ εἶκαζ;     ηαὶ ημῦημ πνμζεεηέμκ.     ἔζηζκ ἄνα ζοθθήαδδκ, ἔθδ, ὁ ἔνςξ ημῦ ηὸ ἀβαεὸκ α὏ηῶ εἶκαζ 
ἀεί.” Cp. 200c-e. 
1537
 See 206b ff. 
1538
 The whole Chap. 7 deals with this notion – especially Sects. 2.3 and 2.4. 
1539
 See 202a: “ηὸ ὀνεὰ δμλάγεζκ ηαὶ ἄκεο ημῦ ἔπεζκ θόβμκ δμῦκαζ μ὎η μἶζε᾽, ἔθδ, ὅηζ μὔηε ἐπίζηαζεαί         
ἐζηζκ – ἄθμβμκ βὰν πν᾵βια π῵ξ ἂκ εἴδ ἐπζζηήιδ; – μὔηε ἀιαεία – ηὸ βὰν ημῦ ὄκημξ ηοβπάκμκ π῵ξ ἂκ εἴδ 
ἀιαεία; – ἔζηζ δὲ δήπμο ημζμῦημκ ἟ ὀνεὴ δόλα, ιεηαλὺ θνμκήζεςξ ηαὶ ἀιαείαξ.” 
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because it hits its target (or corresponds to it), which is an essential feature of knowledge. 
However, it lacks another essential feature of the knowledge – namely, an understanding or a 




But Socrates and Diotima later refer to a new kind of intermediate between 
knowledge and ignorance, which corresponds to a different mode of relation between the 
two. This new intermediate is the love or pursuit of knowledge (θζθμζμθε῔κ).
1541
 One desires 
to know when one is not fully ignorant nor fully knowledgeable. In other words, one must 
have some awareness of what one does not know, but one must at the same time fail to know 
it.
1542
 This is different from correct judgment, because the latter is already settled and does 
not lead us to search for something. It is a form of static ιεηαλύ. In fact, all forms of defective 
cognitive access to something (even completely false δόλαζ) are in a way static intermediates 
between ignorance and knowledge. One must have some notion of the target or the truth, 
even if one misidentifies it, and one must also have a desire to attain it. In other words, we are 
also marked by some degree of θζθμζμθία at that moment, and the only thing that prevents us 
from actively searching for the truth about something is the fact that we think we already 
know it. In turn, when we are aware of our ignorance, we must pursue knowledge (which 
constitutes a form of dynamic ιεηαλύ). But in both cases we are not indifferent to knowing or 
not. We desire to know and this is thus an essential feature of ἔνςξ.
1543
  
The connection between this and the other forms of intermediacy or desire is not 
entirely clear, but Plato nevertheless provides some indications about it. He says that 
knowledge is an “admirable” or “beautiful” thing, and as such is desirable.
1544
 In the 
Republic, he further stresses that we want to possess a true good and not something 
                                                 
1540
 Cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 2.3. 
1541
 For a brief consideration of this notion, see Chap. 4, Sect. 2.5 above.  
1542
 See 204a-b: “εε῵κ μ὎δεὶξ θζθμζμθε῔ μ὎δ᾽ ἐπζεοιε῔ ζμθὸξ βεκέζεαζ – ἔζηζ βάν – μ὎δ᾽ εἴ ηζξ ἄθθμξ ζμθόξ, μ὎ 
θζθμζμθε῔. μ὎δ᾽ αὖ μἱ ἀιαεε῔ξ θζθμζμθμῦζζκ μ὎δ᾽ ἐπζεοιμῦζζ ζμθμὶ βεκέζεαζ· α὎ηὸ βὰν ημῦηό ἐζηζ παθεπὸκ 
ἀιαεία, ηὸ ιὴ ὄκηα ηαθὸκ ηἀβαεὸκ ιδδὲ θνόκζιμκ δμηε῔κ α὏ηῶ εἶκαζ ἱηακόκ. μὔημοκ ἐπζεοιε῔ ὁ ιὴ μἰόιεκμξ 
ἐκδεὴξ εἶκαζ μὗ ἂκ ιὴ μἴδηαζ ἐπζδε῔ζεαζ.     ηίκεξ μὖκ, ἔθδκ ἐβώ, ὦ Γζμηίια, μἱ θζθμζμθμῦκηεξ, εἰ ιήηε μἱ ζμθμὶ 
ιήηε μἱ ἀιαεε῔ξ;     δ῅θμκ δή, ἔθδ, ημῦηό βε ἢδδ ηαὶ παζδί, ὅηζ μἱ ιεηαλὺ ημύηςκ ἀιθμηένςκ, ὧκ ἂκ εἴδ ηαὶ ὁ 
Ἔνςξ. ἔζηζκ βὰν δὴ η῵κ ηαθθίζηςκ ἟ ζμθία, Ἔνςξ δ᾽ ἐζηὶκ ἔνςξ πενὶ ηὸ ηαθόκ, ὥζηε ἀκαβηα῔μκ ἔνςηα 
θζθόζμθμκ εἶκαζ, θζθόζμθμκ δὲ ὄκηα ιεηαλὺ εἶκαζ ζμθμῦ ηαὶ ἀιαεμῦξ.” On this topic, cp. Ly.                       
218a-b: “(...) θα῔ιεκ ἂκ ηαὶ ημὺξ ἢδδ ζμθμὺξ ιδηέηζ θζθμζμθε῔κ, εἴηε εεμὶ εἴηε ἄκενςπμί εἰζζκ μὗημζ· μ὎δ᾽ αὖ 
ἐηείκμοξ θζθμζμθε῔κ ημὺξ μὕηςξ ἄβκμζακ ἔπμκηαξ ὥζηε ηαημὺξ εἶκαζ· ηαηὸκ βὰν ηαὶ ἀιαε῅ μ὎δέκα θζθμζμθε῔κ. 
θείπμκηαζ δὴ μἱ ἔπμκηεξ ιὲκ ηὸ ηαηὸκ ημῦημ, ηὴκ ἄβκμζακ, ιήπς δὲ ὏π᾽ α὎ημῦ ὄκηεξ ἀβκώιμκεξ ιδδὲ ἀιαεε῔ξ, 
ἀθθ᾽ ἔηζ ἟βμύιεκμζ ιὴ εἰδέκαζ ἃ ιὴ ἴζαζζκ.” 
1543
 For more on this desire to know and its modalities, cp. Chap. 13 Sect. 3.3 and Chap. 14. 
1544
 See 204b: “ἔζηζκ βὰν δὴ η῵κ ηαθθίζηςκ ἟ ζμθία, Ἔνςξ δ᾽ ἐζηὶκ ἔνςξ πενὶ ηὸ ηαθόκ, ὥζηε ἀκαβηα῔μκ ἔνςηα 





 Truth and knowledge seem to be implied in our relation to the good. They also 
seem to be implied in our relation to the beautiful, as we can see in the already mentioned 
scala amoris (which is also a scala pulchritudinis). The different forms of beauty that 
compose the scale correspond to different degrees of reality and different forms of 
knowledge. But we are directed to their superlative form. It thus seems that our desire for a 
superlative and indeed for a superlative combination of superlatives also includes the desire 
of a superlative (i.e., perfect) knowledge.
1546
 
 In sum, Socrates and Diotima present the human soul as a confluence or 
intertwinement of multiple intermediacies, directed at different superlatives. We desire to 
possess a superlative good, a superlative beauty, a superlative time and a superlative 
knowledge. These different desires are merged in one or, as we could also say, we are the 
intermediate between them all, insofar as we are essentially marked by their mixture and 
never experience them in a pure state. We always desire a superlative combination of 
superlatives and this is the source and framework of all our particular desires. Whether or not 
there really is something that may correspond to this complex and immense desire of ours, we 
are nonetheless marked by it.  
 After considering this description, though, we may wonder whether these are the only 
modalities of ιεηαλύ that characterize us and the only formal scopes of our superlative desire, 
or if there are others. The latter seems to be the case, at least if we give credence to what is 
said in Phaedrus. In Socrates‟ palinode (244a-257a) we find once more the idea that romantic 
love is an expression of a deeper and more complex form of love, whose object is very 
complex and can also be described as a superlative combination of superlatives. Let us then 
consider the aspects of this speech that are more directly relevant for this question.
1547
 
 As was the case in Aristophanes‟ speech, Socrates presents an etiological account of 
our present condition in the form of a myth. In fact, these two myths resemble each other in 
many respects. In Phaedrus, Plato compares our soul to a winged creature and says that 
before birth it traveled through the sky and periodically ascended to the top of heaven, in 
order to see the perfect and true beings, and feast with the sight of them.
1548
 But the ascent in 
question is particularly hard and the soul is not guaranteed a vision of the supracelestial 
                                                 
1545
 See the already mentioned passage in 505d: “ηόδε μ὎ θακενόκ, ὡξ δίηαζα ιὲκ ηαὶ ηαθὰ πμθθμὶ ἂκ ἕθμζκημ ηὰ 
δμημῦκηα, ηἂκ εἰ ιὴ εἴδ, ὅιςξ ηαῦηα πνάηηεζκ ηαὶ ηεηη῅ζεαζ ηαὶ δμηε῔κ, ἀβαεὰ δὲ μ὎δεκὶ ἔηζ ἀνηε῔ ηὰ δμημῦκηα 
ηη᾵ζεαζ, ἀθθὰ ηὰ ὄκηα γδημῦζζκ, ηὴκ δὲ δόλακ ἐκηαῦεα ἢδδ π᾵ξ ἀηζιάγεζ;     ηαὶ ιάθα, ἔθδ.” 
1546
 This is indeed essential for the problem of the unexamined life, and we will return to it later. See in 
particular Chap. 19, Sects. 2.1 and 2.2. 
1547
 For more on Socrates‟ palinode, cp. Chap. 13 Sect. 2.3, Chap. 16 Sect. 5.1 a), and Chap. 17 Sect. 3.1 b). 
1548
 See 246a ff. 
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beings. It may actually fail to contemplate them properly, and start to forget them. After a 
point, forgetfulness will cause the soul to lose its wings and fall into earth and the body.
1549
 
This is what brings about our present condition, which is therefore marked by loss and partial 
forgetfulness, as was the case in Aristophanes‟ speech. We lost something and forgot about it 
– even if not entirely. As a matter of fact, we always preserve some memory of it (and some 
may remember more than others).
1550
 We are still related to the supracelestial vision and it 
still shapes our entire life. Therefore, our life here on earth is described as a kind of exile, 
though we are familiarized with it and experience it as if it were our homeland. In other 
words, we think we are directly related to concrete beings, and do not notice that we are 
primarily related to something else. But what exactly are we related to? What did we lose?  
 First of all, the possibility we lost is represented by the wings (of which we now have 
no more than stumps). Wings in general allow unlimited passage and liberty of movement. In 
particular, they give access to the heights, from whence one can see much more than what we 
normally see, and encompass it all with one gaze.
1551
 Such a perspective is something 
normally inaccessible and unknown to us (and of course it was all the more so in Ancient 
Greece). But the wings of the soul do not simply drive upwards. They drive towards an 
absolute above or the absolute zenith – i.e., something that is perfect and unsurpassable.
1552
 
But what can be found in this absolute above?   
The absolute above is the region above the heavens (὏πενμονάκζμξ ηόπμξ), which is 
described as the plain of truth, which nurtures the soul.
1553
 It is composed of all the beings the 
soul really longs for – i.e., the perfect or true beings (or as we could also say, the superlative 
beings), which are divine (249d), holy (250a) and lovable (250d).
1554
 Socrates connects them 
with our ability to see multiple instances of something, so they seem to correspond to what he 
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 Cp. 248c: “(...) ὅηακ δὲ ἀδοκαηήζαζα ἐπζζπέζεαζ ιὴ ἴδῃ, ηαί ηζκζ ζοκηοπίᾳ πνδζαιέκδ θήεδξ ηε ηαὶ ηαηίαξ 
πθδζεε῔ζα αανοκεῆ, αανοκεε῔ζα δὲ πηενμννοήζῃ ηε ηαὶ ἐπὶ ηὴκ β῅κ πέζῃ (...).”  
1550
 Socrates says that some saw more than others (248a), and during life people may forget more (cp. e.g. 250a) 
or they may also start to remember (as is the case when one falls in love or when one philosophizes). These 
different degrees of recollection are then what determines the kind of αίμξ one leads, as is seen in the scale of 
αίμζ presented in 248d-e. 
1551
 The image of wings is actually quite expressive in Greek culture in general. It can also express arousal, 
elation, exultation, as well as fickleness and the ramblings of an errant mind – and the myth‟s use of the image 
actually refers to all these different usages. 
1552
 The myth‟s core is exactly this reference to an absolute ἄκς. It is different from a merely comparative ἄκς, 
which would be superior to our ordinary condition, but could still be inferior to something else (even if one does 
not realize it). On this respect, cp. Rep. 584d ff., where Socrates distinguishes between a middle position (which 
may appear as superior by contrast with a downward region) and an absolute above. 
1553
 See 248b-c: “μὗ δ᾽ ἕκεπ᾽ ἟ πμθθὴ ζπμοδὴ ηὸ ἀθδεείαξ ἰδε῔κ πεδίμκ μὗ ἐζηζκ, ἣ ηε δὴ πνμζήημοζα ροπ῅ξ ηῶ 
ἀνίζηῳ κμιὴ ἐη ημῦ ἐηε῔ θεζι῵κμξ ηοβπάκεζ μὖζα, ἣ ηε ημῦ πηενμῦ θύζζξ, ᾧ ροπὴ ημοθίγεηαζ, ημύηῳ ηνέθεηαζ.” 
1554
 Socrates uses expressions such as μ὎ζία ὄκηςξ μὖζα or ηὰ ὄκηα ὄκηςξ. See 247c, 247e, 249c. 
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in other texts calls εἴδδ.
1555
 He also gives several examples of these true beings. He talks of 
beauty, wisdom (ηὸ ζμθόκ, ἐπζζηήιδ, θνόκδζζξ), goodness, justice, sound-mindedness 
(ζςθνμζύκδ) – but there are more.
1556
 Indeed, Socrates does not try to be systematic or 
exhaustive. He is vague, which is also a characteristic of our usual relation to the general 
predicates to which our soul is directed.
1557
  
The most important aspect, though, is the fact that Plato presents this “world of εἴδδ” 
as the correlate of a permanent desire of ours, and in fact as the combination of all that we 
truly desire. We are permanently related to it and when we fall in love our primarily relation 
is also to this place. In this sense, the perfect beings are not just the correlates of a perfect 
knowledge, but they are also the correlate of our deepest desires. We desire the superlative 
combination of all these superlative beings – even if the way they relate to each other is not 
clear. In the myth, they appear side by side, as being all present in the same region. This may 
refer to the fact that they always constitute a kind of system, in which one element implies 
many others or even all.
1558
 At any rate, what we desire is precisely the combination of 
positive superlatives. We want a perfect access and perfect possession of them, and also the 
fullness or completeness they provide. Only so could we fully nourish our soul and attain 
perfect happiness.  
Of course, such a description raises many questions about the ontological status of 
these objects, their actual existence, and the kind of access that we may ever have to them. 
But regardless of all these questions, it seems to be clear that Plato conceives our desire as 
being primarily directed to something of this kind. In this sense, he also compares us to a 
caged bird that is looking above and trying to escape from our everyday domain, where none 
of these perfect objects can be found.
1559
 Our longing goes beyond all we usually deal with 
(all the ἀκενώπζκα ζπμοδάζιαηα, 249d). We are pulled by the region above the heavens and 
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Cp. 249b-c: “μ὎ βὰν ἣ βε ιήπμηε ἰδμῦζα ηὴκ ἀθήεεζακ εἰξ ηόδε ἣλεζ ηὸ ζπ῅ια. δε῔ βὰν ἄκενςπμκ ζοκζέκαζ 
ηαη᾽ εἶδμξ θεβόιεκμκ, ἐη πμθθ῵κ ἰὸκ αἰζεήζεςκ εἰξ ἓκ θμβζζιῶ ζοκαζνμύιεκμκ· ημῦημ δ᾽ ἐζηὶκ ἀκάικδζζξ 
ἐηείκςκ ἅ πμη᾽ εἶδεκ ἟ι῵κ ἟ ροπὴ ζοιπμνεοεε῔ζα εεῶ ηαὶ ὏πενζδμῦζα ἃ κῦκ εἶκαί θαιεκ, ηαὶ ἀκαηύραζα εἰξ 
ηὸ ὂκ ὄκηςξ.” 
1556
 See 246d-e and 247d. 
1557
 One is left to wonder, for instance, if all εἴδδ are part of the ὏πενμονάκζμξ ηόπμξ understood as the correlate 
of our desire. If so, what does this say about our desire? Does it imply that we desire to contemplate or have 
access to all perfect forms of being, including forms such as “equality” or “oneness”? And if so, do we have the 
same desire for all forms of being or do we have a greater longing for some of them? 
1558
 We saw above (Chap. 6, Sect. 2.3) that the εἴδδ themselves are also in a way intertwined, in the sense that at 
least some εἴδδ partake in other εἴδδ. Now we are seeing that there is also an intertwinement between the 
different aspects of our desire. Plato may therefore be alluding to one of these forms of intertwinement (or even 
to both). 
1559
 See 249d. Although Socrates is here talking about someone who fell in love, the description is valid for all 
souls – though we normally do not realize that we are just like this bird, because we are distracted about what 
we actually desire. 
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thus subjected to a strange form of reverse gravity that counteracts our attachment to the most 
immediate beings around us. Those superlative objects are what we love, what we long for, 
what we hunger for.
1560
  
This seems very distant from our usual experience, but according to Socrates it all 
becomes patent in the experience of romantic love. When we see someone whose beauty 
captivates us, we are actually reminded of the superlative beauty we once saw.
1561
 In fact, we 
are reminded of the whole mythical experience and this means of the whole region above the 
heavens. Σὸ ηαθόκ works as a window for all the superlative beings. Indeed, it seems to be a 
privileged access to that region, since it is the most shining (ἐηθακέζηαημκ).
1562
 But this is 
not necessarily the way we interpret our experience of ἔνςξ. Ἔνςξ is a rather ambiguous 
experience. It reveals something, but it also conceals its meaning. We can therefore see the 
beloved in different ways and be differently aware of what we desire. For instance, we can 
follow weaker impulses and lose sight of beauty as such.
1563
 We can also somehow follow the 
potential of ἔνςξ, but even in that case we may have different experiences, especially insofar 
as we may have different kinds of access to the superlative combination of superlatives. This 
is why Socrates talks of the soul having once followed one of several different gods while it 
was ascending to the region above the heavens.
1564
 Each god seems to represent a different 
kind of temperament or personality, and also different modes of relation to beauty and, 
consequently, to the whole region of perfect and superlative beings. But despite all these 
differences in the experience of ἔνςξ, one thing seems certain. Ἔνςξ makes us more aware 
of the kind of object we really desire and of how it exceeds what we normally deal with. 
 But Socrates does not talk only of romantic love. He stresses how there are several 
other perfect beings besides beauty, such as justice and sound-mindedness, and says that their 
earthly likenesses are seen through dull organs and are difficult to observe, because they lack 
the luster or splendor (θέββμξ) that is characteristic of beauty.
1565
 The same happens with 
knowledge, intelligence, or lucidity (θνόκδζζξ). However, if we could see a clear sensible 
image of these other perfect beings, it would also trigger a form of ἔνςξ. According to 
                                                 
1560
 Cp. 248b-c, 250c, 250d. 
1561
 See 249d: “ἔζηζ δὴ μὖκ δεῦνμ ὁ π᾵ξ ἣηςκ θόβμξ πενὶ η῅ξ ηεηάνηδξ ιακίαξ – ἡκ ὅηακ ηὸ ηῆδέ ηζξ ὁν῵κ 
ηάθθμξ, ημῦ ἀθδεμῦξ ἀκαιζικῃζηόιεκμξ, πηεν῵ηαί ηε ηαὶ ἀκαπηενμύιεκμξ πνμεοιμύιεκμξ ἀκαπηέζεαζ, 
ἀδοκαη῵κ δέ, ὄνκζεμξ δίηδκ αθέπςκ ἄκς, η῵κ ηάης δὲ ἀιεθ῵κ, αἰηίακ ἔπεζ ὡξ ιακζη῵ξ δζαηείιεκμξ (...).” 
1562
 See 250d-e: “(...) κῦκ δὲ ηάθθμξ ιόκμκ ηαύηδκ ἔζπε ιμ῔νακ, ὥζη᾽ ἐηθακέζηαημκ εἶκαζ (...).” 
1563
 Cp. 250e-251a and 255e ff. 
1564
 See 246e-247a, 250b, 252c-253c. 
1565
 See 250b: “δζηαζμζύκδξ ιὲκ μὖκ ηαὶ ζςθνμζύκδξ ηαὶ ὅζα ἄθθα ηίιζα ροπα῔ξ μ὎η ἔκεζηζ θέββμξ μ὎δὲκ ἐκ 
ημ῔ξ ηῆδε ὁιμζώιαζζκ, ἀθθὰ δζ᾽ ἀιοδν῵κ ὀνβάκςκ ιόβζξ α὎η῵κ ηαὶ ὀθίβμζ ἐπὶ ηὰξ εἰηόκαξ ἰόκηεξ εε῵κηαζ ηὸ ημῦ 
εἰηαζεέκημξ βέκμξ· ηάθθμξ δὲ ηόη᾽ ἤκ ἰδε῔κ θαιπνόκ (...).” 
508 
 
Socrates, this is particularly true of θνόκδζζξ, whose clear perception would cause in us 
terrible feelings of love (δεζκμὶ ἔνςηεξ).
1566
 Socrates seems therefore to admit superior forms 
of ἔνςξ, which would be centered on other, perhaps more important εἴδδ. We can even 
conceive of an absolute ἔνςξ, that would be equally directed to all the positive superlatives. 
In fact, such a desire (in its latent form) is what actually characterizes the human soul. We are 
connected to the whole region above the heavens and this connection is precisely what makes 
us human. As Socrates says, a soul that caught no glimpse of the true beings cannot assume 
human form.
1567
 Recollecting the superlative combination of positive superlatives is thus at 
the heart of what we are – even if this memory is partially blocked and something we 
normally do not notice.  
 In sum, the soul forgets to a certain degree what it really loves and what it is really 
pursuing. It always longs for the superlative combination of superlatives, but such a desire 
only becomes more manifest when it falls in love. However, falling in love is concentrated on 
one particular superlative and leaves the others in the background. It is still not the full 
manifestation of the ἔνςξ that characterizes us, since it is not fully aware of what we truly 
desire. Perhaps only the philosopher is aware of it. Indeed, Socrates seems to be able to relate 
to the totality of this supracelestial region and talks about it with deep longing (πόεμξ η῵κ 
ηόηε).
1568
 He seems to overcome the limited ἔνςξ of lovers and consciously relate to the 
totality of superlative beings we are directed to. He seems to experience a form of hyper-
ἔνςξ. This does not mean, however, that he has heightened desires, since we all desire the 
same. The difference is that in his case he is wholly focused on our true object of desire, 
whereas other people are normally distracted from it and do not realize what they really 
desire. Thus they experience more mundane desires, that are directed only at a form of 
apparent nourishment (ηνμθὴ δμλαζηή, 248b).  
 The analysis of Phaedrus thus complements what we saw above and further 
determines the nature of our pursuit of the good. Our constitutive desire is complex, as well 
as the object it is directed to. This means that instead of being directed to the four formal 
objects identified in Symposium, we are related to many more, even if Plato does not specify 
their number, identity, and precise connection. What at any rate seems clear is that the 
superlative good we are directed to is in fact a superlative combination of superlatives. In 
                                                 
1566
 See 250d: “ὄρζξ βὰν ἟ι῔κ ὀλοηάηδ η῵κ δζὰ ημῦ ζώιαημξ ἔνπεηαζ αἰζεήζεςκ, ᾗ θνόκδζζξ μ὎π                
ὁν᾵ηαζ – δεζκμὺξ βὰν ἂκ πανε῔πεκ ἔνςηαξ, εἴ ηζ ημζμῦημκ ἑαοη῅ξ ἐκανβὲξ εἴδςθμκ πανείπεημ εἰξ ὄρζκ ἰόκ (...).” 
1567
 See 249b-c. 
1568
 Cp. 249c-d and 250b-c. 
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other words, it must fulfill several formal requirements. This does not necessarily mean that 
we desire many objects. All superlatives may converge in one object (or at least we may 
think they do). When we fall in love, for instance, the same object seems to correspond to all 
that we desire. However, the formal structure of our desire also admits the possibility of 
combining different objects in order to be fully satisfied. It all depends on what we identify as 
being a superlative good – and such an identification is what we must consider in the 
following section. 
 There is, however, one last issue that we must still consider about the nature of our 
desire. Our tension or desire always consists in pursuing something (δζώηεζκ) and escaping 
something else (θεύβεζκ). Indeed, the positive tension always implies the negative. In this 
sense, we are not only related to positive superlatives, but also to negative superlatives. We 
have already observed this dichotomy in pre-Platonic thinking, and it also plays an important 
role in Plato. He also identifies and discusses the question of a superlative form of badness, 
which would make us superlatively miserable. The clearest reference to this is precisely in 
the passages of Gorgias we mentioned above. Socrates and Polus discuss what is the worst 
thing of all and, and whereas Polus defends that the worst thing is to suffer the greatest 
injustice, Socrates advocates that the worst thing is to commit the greatest injustice and not to 
be punished for it.
1569
 Regardless of which one is right, we are in any case sensitive to the 
question of extreme badness, which is not only a neutral state, deprived of the good, but the 
actual opposite of it. Moreover, the negative superlative is also formally complex. In fact, it 
contains the counterparts to all positive superlatives – namely, the superlatively bad, the 
superlatively repulsive (αἰζπνόκ), the superlatively mortal, the superlatively ignorant, and so 
on. It is a superlative combination of negative superlatives, and this is something we are 
always moving away from. It is true that we may not be able to properly represent a state that 
would correspond to such a formal description, especially because in such a state we would 
no longer lie between two poles, but rather coincide with the negative pole. Still, our 
intermediate position between the good and the bad is referred to such a state. We lie between 
these two complex poles and we need an identification of both, in order to guide ourselves in 
life. This does not mean that we must make two wholly unrelated identifications. In fact, they 
seem to depend on one and the same principle (as we see in the above mentioned passages of 
Gorgias, where Socrates and Polus each presents a coherent view about what is superlatively 
bad and what is superlatively good). In other words, the identification of the superlative good 
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 See 468e ff. 
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to which we are constitutively directed brings with it an identification of what is superlatively 
bad. This is why we may focus primarily on the former. Let us then see how this 
identification of the good works and what results from it.  
 
5. The complex process of identifying and pursuing the good. Life (βίνο) as a practical 
system based on a system of beliefs 
 
The desire for a superlative good (or the “ημῦ ὅθμο ἐπζεοιία ηαὶ δζώλζξ”) is at the 
heart of the ροπή, but this still does not fully determine the way we normally relate to the 
superlative good. Indeed, we have not yet considered a very important feature of this   
relation – namely, the fact that normally the desire in question is not a formal and vague 
desire. We tend to identify some particular thing (or set of things) as the superlative good and 
we pursue it. Such a description, however, may be surprising, since usually we do not seem to 
be concerned with a superlative good. As we saw, we have many different desires, which 
seem to be largely uncoordinated. We are normally concerned with particular goods and it is 
not clear that everything is part of the same pursuit. Therefore, we must see how the 
desiderative structure of the soul is constituted, how it brings about its particular moments, 
and which inner variations it admits of. The superlative good is what ultimately steers us and 
guides our steps, but we must also determine what mechanism brings about each step, each 
act, each motion of the soul. In other words, we must determine the whole practical 
movement of the soul (i.e., its whole αίμξ) and how it relates to the desire of the superlative 
good. In order to do so, we have to see how the practical dimension of human life is 
underpinned by cognitive components and we have to determine the structure of this 
cognitive components that shape our relation to the superlative good and bring about our 
αίμξ.   
 Life is indeed more than a matter of sensation or memory. It implies beliefs (δόλαζ or 
knowledge claims), and some of these beliefs are what gives us direction and guidance. We 
cannot act blindly. We need many questions to be settled or defined in some way before we 
act. Otherwise, we would be in a state of practical ἀπμνία and practical πθακή. We would be 
paralyzed or roam about without destination. We would have no sense of direction and no 
way of responding to the extraordinary pressure exerted by the desire of a superlative good. 
But this is not our usual condition. Normally, we are engaged in many things and our 
practical domain is very complex. This complexity is what actually corresponds to the notion 
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of αίμξ, as we will see, and it is based on an equally complex cognitive system. There are 
several layers of beliefs guiding our steps (and this means that we may also experience 
several different forms of disorientation, according to the kind of doubts and errors we find in 
them). We briefly considered these practical views or beliefs above, but now we have to 




5.1. The identification of the superlative good as the fundamental practical belief 
 
 As was said, there are many practical views or beliefs that underpin the practical 
domain and define the way we pursue the superlative good. But one of them is fundamental: 
namely, the identification of the superlative good itself. We must deformalize or specify the 
notion of superlative good (understood precisely as the superlative combination of 
superlatives) and define what is the best thing or the best possession.
1571
 In other words, we 
must equate the superlative good with something in particular or we must establish for 
ourselves a version of the good (or of what perfect happiness consists in). This is what makes 
something seem to us to be the best.
1572
 It is also what allows us to guide ourselves in life. 
We need to be convinced that something somehow corresponds to our desire in order to 
channel our superlative desire in that particular direction. 
 The identification of the superlative good is thus a fundamental question of life and 
one whose answer is not pre-decided or fixed. There are many different things in life and we 
must see which object or which kind of object (such as pleasure, honor or knowledge) is the 
most desirable. We must also see if this object by itself can satisfy our desire, or if we must 
combine different objects – which may be equally good or may have different degrees of 
                                                 
1570
 Cp. Chap. 6, Sects. 1.2 a) and 2.5. The complex cognitive structure of the practical domain is very important 
for our general question, since it implies that everything in the practical domain can be either true or false. The 
general possibility of falsity thus renders philosophical examination particularly useful, insofar as the latter 
allows us to identify and correct false beliefs. But we will leave aside this question for now (for its discussion, 
see Chaps. 16-19) and focus instead on the structure of the practical domain (namely, the practical system 
corresponding to our life or αίμξ) and the views that underpin it. 
1571
 In Rep. 562b, Plato speaks of proposing or setting something up as the good (ὁ πνμύεεκημ ἀβαεόκ) or 
defining something as the good (ὃ ὁνίγεηαζ ἀβαεόκ). This is precisely what is discussed in Philebus. The 
characters both say the good is something in particular – namely pleasure or knowledge. See 11b-c. Later, 
Protarchus even formulates the question as a matter of discerning what is the best human possession (δζεθέζεαζ 
ηί η῵κ ἀκενςπίκςκ ηηδιάηςκ ἄνζζημκ). See 19c. 
1572
 This is an important structure of our desire that is, for instance, identified in Gorgias, when Socrates speaks 
of ἃ δμηε῔ α὎ηῶ αέθηζζηα εἶκαζ. See 466d-467b. 
512 
 
goodness (in which case there will be a sort of scale or ranking of intrinsic goods).
1573
 
Whatever the modality, one must identify something as the superlative good, and that thing 
will then become the main or true love of the soul. In other words, it will become the target 
one will aim at and it will determine one‟s entire life. 
This does not necessarily mean that we must always have some firm belief about what 
the superlative good is. It may happen that in some cases we are completely clueless about it. 
However, if that happens, we will be completely disoriented. We will not know where to 
pursue and find the superlative good. But normally that is not the case. We know what the 
superlative good we are aiming at is and we are engaged in its pursuit. This does not 
necessarily mean that we have thought deeply about the matter. We may not have expressly 
thought about it at all. Our belief about what the superlative good is may be tacit, and it may 
be very difficult for us to see that we have it and expound it. Such a difficulty may also be 
partly due to the vagueness or haziness of the belief in question. Considering that we may 
never have expressly thought about it, our notion of it may be rather blurry. In this sense, it 
would correspond to the divination (ιακηεύεζεαζ) or hinting at (αἰκίηηεζεαζ) Plato mentions 
in the Symposium and the Republic.
1574
 We have some idea (some general belief) about what 
the good is, even if we cannot explain it. In contrast, it may become more and more clear and 
precise, especially if we examine it. 
But the belief in question is not necessarily stable and true. In fact, our views about 
the superlative good may change (either because we reflect about them, or because something 
induces us to change them) and we may adopt many different beliefs about it. This mutability 
and changeability is indeed an essential feature of our δόλαζ. But the latter may also be     
false – i.e., they may be δόλαζ in a negative sense or baseless knowledge claims. We may be 
mistaken about the superlative good – or, as is said in Gorgias, what we truly want may not 
coincide with what seems to us to be the best.
1575
 This possibility is particularly important for 
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 We find something of the sort in Philebus. The two initial candidates (pleasure and knowledge) are 
considered insufficient to satisfy our desire (see 20e ff.) and are then combined in a way that will allow Socrates 
to define a ranking of goods at the end (see 66aff.). 
1574
 We have already considered the two passages in question. In Rep. 505d-e, Socrates says about that good that 
it is “ὃ δὴ δζώηεζ ιὲκ ἅπαζα ροπὴ ηαὶ ημύημο ἕκεηα πάκηα πνάηηεζ, ἀπμιακηεομιέκδ ηζ εἶκαζ, ἀπμνμῦζα δὲ ηαὶ 
μ὎η ἔπμοζα θααε῔κ ἱηακ῵ξ ηί πμη᾽ ἐζηὶκ μ὎δὲ πίζηεζ πνήζαζεαζ ιμκίιῳ μἵᾳ ηαὶ πενὶ ηἆθθα, δζὰ ημῦημ δὲ 
ἀπμηοβπάκεζ ηαὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ εἴ ηζ ὄθεθμξ ἤκ (...).” In Smp. 192c-d, Aristophanes says about the lovers that “ἄθθμ 
ηζ αμοθμιέκδ ἑηαηένμο ἟ ροπὴ δήθδ ἐζηίκ, ὃ μ὎ δύκαηαζ εἰπε῔κ, ἀθθὰ ιακηεύεηαζ ὃ αμύθεηαζ, ηαὶ αἰκίηηεηαζ.” 
1575
 See once more 466d-467b 
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us, since – as Plato stresses in the Republic – we do not simply want what appears to be good, 
but we want the real good, which would constitute real happiness.
1576
 
To be sure, we may not be very aware of this fundamental belief about the good, or of 
its changeability and fallibility. But, according to Plato, we usually endorse a particular view 
about it and are convinced of it. The matter is settled for us. This view or belief is then at the 
center of our practical views, as we will see. In a way, they all result from it or they are all 
based on it. Our view of the superlative good ultimately determines all our pursuits, all our 
actions, and the place of everything in our life. But this is not all. In a way, our view of the 
good may also be at the center of all our non-practical views, insofar as it shapes how we see 
things or how they appear to us. We will not consider this question now, but our whole way 
of seeing things may be based on our beliefs about the superlative good (at least insofar as it 
determines our way of relating to their contents). If it is so, then these beliefs will be the 
fundamental ὏πμεέζεζξ of our cognitive system.  
However, our view about the superlative good may also depend on other views. 
Usually it does not occur in a vacuum, and it may actually presuppose other views. For 
instance, it may imply a certain understanding of what is identified as the superlative good. It 
may also imply an understanding of general predicates or εἴδδ – and especially goodness as 
such or the ἰδέα ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ.
1577
 The precise interrelation between our different views is 
indeed difficult to determine, but they seem at any rate to be somehow intertwined, which 
means that the defects of one of them will also affect the others. More precisely, our 
representation of the superlative good may be distorted in itself or by the views it 
presupposes, but it may also distort our others views. We will see this in more detail in 
Section 5.4. For now, the most important point though is the central role of our view (or 
views) about the superlative good. 
 
5.2. The complex pursuit of the superlative good. Life (βίνο) as a practical system 
and the underlying system of views  
 
 We are always directed at the superlative good, we have a certain view about what it 
is, and we pursue it with urgency. This is what unifies our desire. However, our desire does 
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 See 505d: “ηόδε μ὎ θακενόκ, ὡξ δίηαζα ιὲκ ηαὶ ηαθὰ πμθθμὶ ἂκ ἕθμζκημ ηὰ δμημῦκηα, ηἂκ εἰ ιὴ εἴδ, ὅιςξ 
ηαῦηα πνάηηεζκ ηαὶ ηεηη῅ζεαζ ηαὶ δμηε῔κ, ἀβαεὰ δὲ μ὎δεκὶ ἔηζ ἀνηε῔ ηὰ δμημῦκηα ηη᾵ζεαζ, ἀθθὰ ηὰ ὄκηα 
γδημῦζζκ, ηὴκ δὲ δόλακ ἐκηαῦεα ἢδδ π᾵ξ ἀηζιάγεζ;     ηαὶ ιάθα, ἔθδ.”  
1577
 For more on this, see Section 6.3 below. 
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not seem to be exclusively directed at such an object. We desire many things, and not just in 
turn (as if we were always changing our view about what the superlative good is). Our desires 
are often directed at smaller things or relative goods, and it is not even sure that we ever 
directly pursue something of the magnitude implied before: namely, a superlative 
combination of superlatives. But what about the relative gods we pursue? Are they 
completely unrelated to the superlative good, or are they somehow related to it?  
We already alluded to the fact that the desire for these goods is actually based on (or 
derived from) the desire for a superlative good. These goods are not desired for themselves, 
but because they play a role in our pursuit of the superlative. Our relation to them is mediated 
by our relation to the superlative good. They are somehow a part of the latter. This is what we 
must now consider in more detail. At the same time, we must consider the cognitive basis that 
enables these particular desires of ours. 
 First, these other desires are possible because normally we cannot reach the 
superlative good (or what we take to be the superlative good) at once. We tend to identify it 
with something in particular, but the thing in question is usually not within our immediate 
reach. This does not mean, however, that we immediately give up. We resign ourselves, 
accept that we cannot attain it instantly, and assume that the superlative is deferred or 
delayed. Moreover, we do not sit down twiddling our thumbs and simply wait for it to fall 
onto our laps. The superlative good becomes a task. We pursue it and try to find our way to it. 
It may not be clear to us how we will ever be able to reach it, but at any rate we try to outline 
a strategy or plan, which may require several or even many intermediate stages. 
 This plan of pursuit requires us to accept, for the time being, something less than the 
superlative good. This does not mean, however, that we accept anything. In fact, we bargain 
or compromise.
1578
 If we cannot have it all, we try to have as much as possible. In other 
words, we search for what is best given the circumstances, and take it as an installment or a 
part of the superlative good. We try to accumulate goods, and this is still a way of coming 
closer to the superlative good. The structure of our desire is therefore permanent. We are 
always related to the superlative good and we always pursue it. However, it is also possible to 
integrate other pursuits in the main pursuit. We accept what is not superlative as a pathway to 
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 Saul Bellow provides a pointed description of this when he says: “People are beaten at last with their 
solitary longings and intolerable isolation. They need the right, the missing portion to complete themselves, and 
since they can‟t realistically hope to find that they must accept a companionable substitute. Recognizing that 
they can‟t win, they settle. The marriage of true minds seldom occurs.” See S. BELLOW, Ravelstein, London, 
Penguin, 2001, 120. 
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the superlative or a means of acquiring it.
1579
 As a result, our desire becomes scattered or 
dispersed through many objects, instead of focusing only on one. Instead of one good, there 
are many, with different degrees and different roles. But our different desires and our acts are 
still unified, and not only because they are ours, but because they are what is required by our 
desire of superlative good. All moments are integrated in the general pursuit, which is thus 
far from being simple and monolithic. It is complex and creates something like a system of 
interrelated moments and interrelated objects of desire – or, as we could also say, a practical 
system.  
But let us consider in more detail the origin and structure of this system. First of all, 
we constantly diagnose our situation. We see which beings surround us and which lines of 
actions are available to us. Beings in general may have intrinsic value, if they happen to be 
identified with the superlative good, or with the superlative evil. But that is not the case for 
most things, and consequently they are in themselves neutral, as Plato says. They are neither 
good nor bad.
1580
 But this does not mean that they are completely indifferent for us. On the 
contrary: we incorporate them in our pursuit of the good. In general, we see them as useful 
(ὠθέθζια) or harmful (αθααενά), and accordingly they become things we love or things we 
hate (θίθα or ἔπενα).
1581
 We may also see them as something indifferent, that is neither useful 
nor harmful – but even in that case our indifference to them is functionally determined and 
based on our desire for something else. Everything is determined in light of its role in our 
pursuit of the superlative good. In other words, everything is somehow an instrument (an 
ὄνβακμκ) of our pursuit of happiness. We use things to attain something else, and thus they 
become intermediate goods or intermediate evils. They are not good or bad in themselves, but 
for the sake of something else.
1582
 What we do in a given context thus refers to something 
else. Ultimately, it refers to the superlative good. As is said in Gorgias, “it‟s because we 
pursue what‟s good that we walk whenever we walk; we suppose that it‟s better to walk. And 
conversely, whenever we stand still, we stand still for the sake of the same thing, what‟s 
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 The mechanism of resignation and compromise is in fact complex and admits different modalities. We will 
consider them in more detail in subsection 5.3. However, the general structure of all resignation is precisely this: 
we aim at the absolute best, but our inability to immediately attain it turns us to a relative best. 
1580
 Plato actually says that they lie between what is good and what is bad, but this is a sense of ιεηαλύ different 
from the one we considered above. Now, it just stresses the neutrality of these things. See in particular Grg. 
467e: “[΢Ω.] ἆν᾽ μὖκ ἔζηζκ ηζ η῵κ ὄκηςκ ὃ μ὎πὶ ἢημζ ἀβαεόκ β᾽ ἐζηὶκ ἠ ηαηὸκ ἠ ιεηαλὺ ημύηςκ, μὔηε ἀβαεὸκ 
μὔηε ηαηόκ; [ΠΩΛ.] πμθθὴ ἀκάβηδ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ.” As examples of these intermediate things, Plato enumerates 
both actions (such as walking, running, making sea voyages) and things (such as stones and sticks). See 468a. 
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 Cp. e.g. Grg. 468c: “μ὎η ἄνα ζθάηηεζκ αμοθόιεεα μ὎δ᾽ ἐηαάθθεζκ ἐη η῵κ πόθεςκ μ὎δὲ πνήιαηα 
ἀθαζνε῔ζεαζ ἁπθ῵ξ μὕηςξ, ἀθθ᾽ ἐὰκ ιὲκ ὠθέθζια ᾖ ηαῦηα, αμοθόιεεα πνάηηεζκ α὎ηά, αθααενὰ δὲ ὄκηα μ὎ 
αμοθόιεεα.” For the notions of θίθμκ and ἐπενόκ in this context, cp. e.g. Ly. 218d ff. 
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 All our actions and all our desires are unified in this. There is a first beloved (a 
πν῵ημκ θίθμκ, as is said in Lysis) and then there is a secondary or subordinate loved object 
that refers to it.
1584
 We pursue the second in order to attain the first.  
This is the general model of remission that constitutes our actions and our relation to 
particular beings. But the structure of these remissions can be very complex. The first 
beloved may require (and in general it requires) several instruments or several acts. Thus a 
complex chain of actions and desires is constituted, and this chain may be subdivided in 
many different chains, which we pursue simultaneously. In Lysis, Plato seems to identify only 
particular chains, caused by a particular evil and the attempt to suppress it.
1585
 But all our 
chains are part of the greater chain of the superlative good. They are subdivisions of the main 
chain and they complement each other. In short, they all refer to the same principle or ἀνπή. 
The value of things, situations, and actions stems from the pursuit of the superlative good. It 
is regressive and the desire of the good (as well as our identification of it) holds everything 
together. This is how many things, persons and actions that are not the superlative good 
become relevant. We try, through them, to achieve the superlative good or come closer to it. 
They occupy a particular place in our practical chains, and this place determines whether they 
are good, bad or neutral. They become relative goods and relative evils – always according to 
the circumstances and their role in our pursuit of the superlative good. 
This is the basic structure of the complex practical system in which we usually find 
ourselves. We may not be fully aware of the system, and it may be hazy or indeterminate in 
many respects. However, we are always calculating our route and integrating beings in 
different stages of our pursuit of the good. Such a calculation gives rise to a complex system 
of practical views or beliefs. These views presuppose a certain identification of what we 
ultimately pursue, but this is not all. They also require a diagnosis of our own situation, of 
what is around us and what possibilities are available to us. We must then conceive a 
strategy, which may be very complex and integrate many different moments. We must also 
see how each being or each act fits into it. This in turn determines the value of each thing or 
its relevance. In sum, we have views about everything we must do and about the role each 
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 See 468b: “ηὸ ἀβαεὸκ ἄνα δζώημκηεξ ηαὶ ααδίγμιεκ ὅηακ ααδίγςιεκ, μἰόιεκμζ αέθηζμκ εἶκαζ, ηαὶ ηὸ ἐκακηίμκ 
ἕζηαιεκ ὅηακ ἑζη῵ιεκ, ημῦ α὎ημῦ ἕκεηα, ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ (...).” 
1584
 See Ly. 219c-d: “μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ ἐηε῔κμ θίθμκ αὖ ἔζηαζ ἕκεηα θίθμο;     καί.     ἆν᾽ μὖκ μ὎η ἀκάβηδ ἀπεζπε῔κ 
἟ι᾵ξ μὕηςξ ἰόκηαξ ἠ ἀθζηέζεαζ ἐπί ηζκα ἀνπήκ, ἡ μ὎ηέη᾽ ἐπακμίζεζ ἐπ᾽ ἄθθμ θίθμκ, ἀθθ᾽ ἣλεζ ἐπ᾽ ἐηε῔κμ ὅ ἐζηζκ 
πν῵ημκ θίθμκ, μὗ ἕκεηα ηαὶ ηὰ ἄθθα θαιὲκ πάκηα θίθα εἶκαζ;     ἀκάβηδ.     ημῦημ δή ἐζηζκ ὃ θέβς, ιὴ ἟ι᾵ξ 
ηἆθθα πάκηα ἃ εἴπμιεκ ἐηείκμο ἕκεηα θίθα εἶκαζ, ὥζπεν εἴδςθα ἄηηα ὄκηα α὎ημῦ, ἐλαπαηᾶ, ᾖ δ᾽ ἐηε῔κμ ηὸ 
πν῵ημκ, ὃ ὡξ ἀθδε῵ξ ἐζηζ θίθμκ.” 
1585
 See 219b ff. 
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thing plays in our life. These views depend on each other and, ultimately, on our view about 
the good. They thus constitute a very complex system of views and this system of views is 
what guides each step we take. 
 These views or beliefs may presuppose many other beliefs that are not practical in a 
strict sense – i.e., that are not directly connected with our pursuit of the good. For instance, 
we must have views about what the beings around us are. We must determine their identity 
and their predicates. This requires us to understand these predicates as such. We must also 
understand practical predicates, such as good, bad, and all ethical predicates, which determine 
how we should regard other beings and how we should act. In fact, we might need the whole 
system of views discussed in Chapter 6 in order to properly guide ourselves in life. This 
complexity raises the question of the relation between the strictly practical views and all the 
other views. If, in a way, we need other views to determine what to do and the role different 
beings may play in our life, it is also true that the way we see things and the attention we give 
them is determined by our practical views.  
But let us leave aside this question for the moment. Whatever the relations of 
dependency between our views, we need a complex system of practical views to act. These 
practical views may be explicit, but they may also be tacit, and in general we do not need to 
think much about them. Some doubts may occasionally occur, and in some cases we may 
require a more elaborate way of seeing things (such as an ἐιπεζνία or even a ηέπκδ) in order 
to know what to do.
1586
 But in general the system is already defined, and we are simply 
executing it. This does not mean that our views are clear and correct. In fact, they are often 
hazy and maybe even wrong (as we will consider in Section 5.4 below). Still, we need to hold 
these views or beliefs in order act. Otherwise, we would be completely disoriented and in a 
state of despair. We would perhaps have a general direction for our life, if we happened to 
have any idea about what the superlative good is, but we would not know how to pursue it. 
We would not even know where to start. As a result, our whole situation and everything 
around us would be indeterminate. We would be completely lost and we would urgently need 
to define our life. But usually we do not feel such an urgency, and for a good reason. In 
general, we already defined these matters and we are therefore engaged in a complex system 
of pursuits directed at the superlative good. 
 This is thus a central structure of our being, and at this point we may catch a first 
glimpse of a notion that is crucial for our entire discussion (and which is what we are actually 
                                                 
1586
 For more on the notions of ἐιπεζνία and ηέπκδ, see in particular Grg. 463b ff. 
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trying to determine in this Part III) – namely, the notion of αίμξ. Plato‟s understanding of this 
notion is essentially connected with what we just saw (though it also involves some aspects 
that we will only consider in the following chapter). As mentioned earlier, the word αίμξ does 
not denote an absolutely generic life. Rather, it refers to a particular form of life, which 
results from a contraction of possibilities.
1587
 A αίμξ has a certain content and one relates to 
this content in a particular way. In other words, a life has a certain course or destiny, it may 
include different stages, and as a whole it may good or bad, happy or unhappy. Our relation 
to life is indeed a relation to the whole of it, though this whole is always open for us while we 
are alive. As ephemeral beings, we are exposed to what happens and determined by it. This 
means that the content and value of a life is shifting, and hence the idea that one can only 
determine whether a αίμξ was happy or unhappy at its end.
1588
 
 A αίμξ is thus a particular configuration of life and it is determined by what happens 
in it. But a αίμξ is not entirely passive. It is also marked by one‟s behavior or attitude – which 
in turn essentially affects the content of such a life. We find many crossroads in life and we 
must make choices or determine our path.
1589
 In other words, we must decide how to live and 
we must guide our life in a certain way. In order to do so, we adopt a certain pattern or way 
of life. This is essential for Plato. He recognizes that different persons may follow different 
tendencies in their life and thus end up having very different lives. But people may also have 
similar ways of life. In fact, all lives are a variation of a small number of general patterns, 
which Plato identifies and determines, based on our inner constitution. We will consider these 
different ways of life in the following chapter.
1590
 But for now we can already define the 
general structure of each of them. Regardless of whether there are few or many αίμζ, each one 
is a way of pursuing the superlative good and, as such, it depends on a particular view about 
what this superlative good is. However, it must also determine how to pursue such a good. It 
must determine its subordinate goals and the relevance of everything in it. A αίμξ depends 
therefore on a complex system of views and it creates or unfolds a complex practical system 
that somehow integrates all beings in it. In other words, a αίμξ includes a certain way of 
behaving and also a certain way of seeing everything. Such a behavior and such a way of 
seeing are then what determines all the particular acts and contents of life.  
                                                 
1587
 See Chap. 3 Sect. 2 and Preface to Part III. 
1588
 Cp. footnote 1429. 
1589
 For more on the image of crossroads, see Chap. 13, Sect. 6.1 f). 
1590
 Cp. Chap. 13 Sect. 6. 
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 Of course, we may be more or less successful in attaining our goals – and, as we shall 
see, we may be more or less hopeful of attaining them. This does not seem to depend entirely 
on us. Different lives may have different outcomes, and these outcomes are what we tend to 
consider when we think of a life. However, Plato stresses how life is primarily determined by 
our views of the good and the kind of desires they constitute. This is what guides our steps 
and what constitutes the whole practical dimension. Therefore, the different αίμζ are just 
variations of this fundamental structure, and their value (even their success) depends not only 
on external factors, but also on their inner constitution, as we will see in the following 
chapter. 
 
5.3. Expectation, abdication and rejection of life as different modes of relating to 
the superlative good 
 
 The description of a permanent pursuit of a superlative good may seem strange, given 
the fact that normally we do not seem to have such high ambitions. Even if we take into 
account the dispersion of our desire by many objects and many temporal stages, it is difficult 
to see that what we are actually pursuing is a superlative good (or superlative combination of 
superlatives). In general, we appear to accept and expect less from life. Our desires are pretty 
modest and we seem to gladly accept something suboptimal. Does this then mean that Plato is 
wrong and that the superlative desire is not a constitutive component of our ροπή, or is there 
a way of conciliating Plato‟s views with the apparently moderate scope of our desires?  
The fact is Plato‟s model admits different modes of relation to the superlative good, 
according to the circumstances one finds oneself in. This is what we must now consider. 
Although Plato does not expressly systematize these different possibilities, he alludes to them 
at different points and their conjoined consideration lets us better understand what was said 
and how we normally experience the pursuit of the superlative good.  
 We already saw that normally the superlative good is not immediately available, and it 
may even be unclear to us how to reach it or what it consists in. We must thus resign 
ourselves and try to cope with this fact. We must search for the best option available or for a 
relative best. But still there are different ways of experiencing this resignation and the 
alternative pursuit it generates. One of them is the one we considered in the previous chapter. 
We may regard the superlative good as being simply delayed or deferred, and we make a plan 
of how to achieve it. We pursue intermediate goods, but with something else in mind or for 
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the sake of something else – namely, the superlative good. In this case, we have some sort of 
expectation or hope (ἐθπίξ) of coming to attain it.
1591
 Our pursuit is indeed based on this 
expectation, which may have different degrees. We may be fully convinced we are on our 
way to perfect happiness, we may think it is viable, or we may just strongly wish it. At any 
rate, we are optimistic that we will somehow achieve the superlative good and be effectively 
happy.  
 It is, of course, important to bear in mind that hope or expectation may have different 
values, as was stressed in Greek Archaic thinking. First, it may be justified or not – in the 
sense that the good we are pursuing may or may not be viable. If it is viable, the hope of 
attaining it is a good thing, since it motivates us to pursue it. But if it is unviable or if we end 
up not achieving it, then hope‟s value becomes questionable. It may be good, if it is somehow 
a form of comfort or consolation that takes our mind from the good we lack (though it is still 
illusory). But it may also be something dangerous, that leads us to excessive acts and dire 
consequences.
1592
 In the particular question we are considering, our expectation of attaining 
the good may be based on a wrong identification of the superlative good, and in that case any 
vehement pursuit of it (based on a strong hope of achieving it) may take us even further away 
from what we really desire. The value of our ἐθπίξ is thus highly problematic. 
 However, it is not necessary for us to be hopeful of attaining the superlative good. We 
may also be pessimistic about our chances of reaching the superlative good. We may not be 
able to identify it with something specific, or we may see no possible road to it (at least from 
the situation we find ourselves in). We may thus have lost all hope and be in a state of 
disillusionment.
1593
 But if it is so, we will then have to come to terms with a very important 
and central question of life – namely, whether we accept to live or not, whether our life is 
worth living or not, whether it is better for us to live or to die.
1594
 In fact, we are constantly 
making a general assessment of our life – of what we have attained and what we expect to 
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 In the dialogues, this notion of ἐθπίξ (along with its cognates) is often referred to what will happen after 
death. Cp. e.g. Ap. 41c-d, Phd. 63c-64a, 114c, and possibly Smp. 193d. It can also be used in a more generic 
sense (see in particular Phlb. 39e-40a, where it is said that “἟ιε῔ξ δ‟ αὖ δζὰ πακηὸξ ημῦ αίμο ἀεὶ βέιμιεκ 
ἐθπίδςκ”). But the most relevant use of the word for the present discussion can be found in Alc. I 105a-e. For 
the general meaning of the term in Greek, see in particular O. LACHNIT, Elpis. Eine Begriffsuntersuchung, 
Diss. Tübingen, 1965, and V. LEINIEKS, ἖θπίξ in Hesiod, Works and Days 96, Philologus 128 (1984), 1-8 
(especially 1-3). 
1592
 On this double value of ἐθπίξ, cp. e.g. F. WEHRLI, Λάθε βιώζας. Studien zur ältesten Ethik bei den 
Griechen, Leipzig/Berlin, Teubner, 1931, 6-10; W. VERDENIUS, A “Hopeless” Line in Hesiod. Works and 
Days 96, Mnemosyne 24 (1971), 225-231, V. LEINIEKS, op. cit., especially 3-4. 
1593
 One may be in a state of ἀκεθπίζηςξ ἔπεζκ, as is said in Phlb. 36b. 
1594
 Plato indeed expresses the question in these different ways. See e.g. Cri. 47c-e, La. 195c-d, Alc. I 105a, Grg. 
483b, 512a-b, Phd. 62a, 65a, Rep. 406d ff. For more on the this, cp. Chap. 18, Sect. 1 below. 
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attain. This assessment is mostly tacit, and it may be wrong, but it nonetheless determines our 
existence, and allows us to decide whether our life is worth living or not. We must have a 
view or belief about it, and this view is closely related with our assessment of our life in 
general. If we think we are on our way to the superlative good, we will very gladly accept to 
live. If, in turn, we regard the superlative good as being out of reach, we may desire to die. 
But this is not the only possibility. We do not only accept life if we regard ourselves as being 
on route to what we regard as the superlative good. It seems possible to be satisfied with less. 
We may compromise – and this is the possibility we must now consider, since it seems to 
correspond to a state we often find ourselves in. 
 Plato refers to this possibility at some points. For instance, in Gorgias, Callicles 
describes most of us as weak-willed human beings who renounce their desires to make a sort 
of social contract.
1595
 Although Callicles is presupposing a certain view of the superlative 
good (namely, that it consists in doing what one wants and achieving as much pleasure as 
possible), he nevertheless outlines the possibility of settling for less. This stands in marked 
contrast to the figure of Alcibiades, according to Socrates‟ description of him in the first 
eponymous dialogue. Alcibiades only accepts to live because he has the expectation of 
achieving all that he wants – namely, a superlative honor among human beings.
1596
 This is 
why Socrates now comes to him as someone who can help him.
1597
 There is something 
extraordinary about Alcibiades‟ high ambitions. He does not abdicate from the superlative 
good (even if he may misidentify it and thus misdirect his efforts, as is strongly suggested in 
the course of the dialogue).  
Many of us, however, seem to renounce what we really desire and accept less. We 
accept the best available option and just desire to avoid greater evils. This does not mean that 
we are fully aware that we are doing so, and it may even happen that deep down there is still 
some sort of latent expectation of a superlative good. In other words, we may experience our 
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 See 483a ff. 
1596
 See 105a-c: “δμηε῔ξ βάν ιμζ, εἴ ηίξ ζμζ εἴπμζ εε῵κ· „ὦ Ἀθηζαζάδδ, πόηενμκ αμύθεζ γ῅κ ἔπςκ ἃ κῦκ ἔπεζξ, ἠ 
α὎ηίηα ηεεκάκαζ εἰ ιή ζμζ ἐλέζηαζ ιείγς ηηήζαζεαζ;‟ δμηε῔ξ ἄκ ιμζ ἑθέζεαζ ηεεκάκαζ· ἀθθὰ κῦκ ἐπὶ ηίκζ δή πμηε 
ἐθπίδζ γῆξ, ἐβὼ θνάζς. ἟βῆ, ἐὰκ ε᾵ηημκ εἰξ ηὸκ Ἀεδκαίςκ δ῅ιμκ πανέθεῃξ – ημῦημ δ᾽ ἔζεζεαζ ιάθα ὀθίβςκ 
἟ιεν῵κ – πανεθεὼκ μὖκ ἐκδείλεζεαζ Ἀεδκαίμζξ ὅηζ ἄλζμξ εἶ ηζι᾵ζεαζ ὡξ μὔηε Πενζηθ῅ξ μὔη᾽ ἄθθμξ μ὎δεὶξ η῵κ 
πώπμηε βεκμιέκςκ, ηαὶ ημῦη᾽ ἐκδεζλάιεκμξ ιέβζζημκ δοκήζεζεαζ ἐκ ηῆ πόθεζ, ἐὰκ δ᾽ ἐκεάδε ιέβζζημξ ᾖξ, ηαὶ ἐκ 
ημ῔ξ ἄθθμζξ Ἕθθδζζ, ηαὶ μ὎ ιόκμκ ἐκ Ἕθθδζζκ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ ἐκ ημ῔ξ ααναάνμζξ, ὅζμζ ἐκ ηῆ α὎ηῆ ἟ι῔κ μἰημῦζζκ 
἞πείνῳ. ηαὶ εἰ αὖ ζμζ εἴπμζ ὁ α὎ηὸξ μὗημξ εεὸξ ὅηζ α὎ημῦ ζε δε῔ δοκαζηεύεζκ ἐκ ηῆ Δ὎νώπῃ, δζαα῅καζ δὲ εἰξ ηὴκ 
Ἀζίακ μ὎η ἐλέζηαζ ζμζ μ὎δὲ ἐπζεέζεαζ ημ῔ξ ἐηε῔ πνάβιαζζκ, μ὎η ἂκ αὖ ιμζ δμηε῔ξ ἐεέθεζκ μ὎δ᾽ ἐπὶ ημύημζξ 
ιόκμζξ γ῅κ, εἰ ιὴ ἐιπθήζεζξ ημῦ ζμῦ ὀκόιαημξ ηαὶ η῅ξ ζ῅ξ δοκάιεςξ πάκηαξ ὡξ ἔπμξ εἰπε῔κ ἀκενώπμοξ· ηαὶ 
μἶιαί ζε πθὴκ Κύνμο ηαὶ Ξένλμο ἟βε῔ζεαζ μ὎δέκα ἄλζμκ θόβμο βεβμκέκαζ. ὅηζ ιὲκ μὖκ ἔπεζξ ηαύηδκ ηὴκ ἐθπίδα, 
εὖ μἶδα ηαὶ μ὎η εἰηάγς.” 
1597
 See 105e-106a. 
522 
 
abdication as a strategic retreat. But be that as it may, the structure of our life remains the 
same. Our real desire is the superlative good and our abdication is just a modality of it. We 
continue to be directed at a superlative good (even if we accept we cannot reach it) and in 
case it would suddenly appear to be within reach, we would gladly accept it. If we could have 
more (or even have it all, as it were), we would.
1598
 
The possibility of abdication could thus explain why often we do not seem to have 
high ambitions. It lets us lose sight of what we truly desire. However, such a possibility also 
raises questions. For one, we may wonder whether it is something under our control or not. 
Do we consciously choose to abdicate our true desires, or is this rather something that 
happens to us? Moreover, if it is under our control, should we restrict our desires? Should we 
aim at less, to avoid dissatisfaction and vain efforts? We find several appeals to do so in 
Greek culture. The whole “ethics of moderation”, associated with the wisdom of Delphi, 
seems to consist in a limitation of our desires by accepting our finitude.
1599
 But what is 
implied in such a limitation, if it is really carried through? Would we need to numb our 
relation to ourselves? Would we even have to deny ourselves? And, more importantly, is such 
a life really worth living?
1600
 Can we really embrace it as such? Perhaps we need to embrace 
our high ambitions and have high expectations, if we are ever to have a meaningful life. 
Perhaps we cannot truly renounce to the superlative good, and only by pursuing it can we 
ever attain it. It all seems to hinge on whether the superlative good is attainable or not. But 
regardless of whether we should foster high ambitions or rather curb them, we seem to 
always do one thing or the other, and thus we experience life as a pursuit of the superlative 
good or a more or less resigned form of trying to reach the best available option. 
 
5.4. False practical views and practical failure 
 
 We saw how the pursuit of the superlative good unfolds into a complex practical 
system that is underpinned by practical views. This is what constitutes our αίμξ and all our 
acts and desires take place within this αίμξ. Without our practical views, we would be 
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 The abdication of a superlative good is indeed a variation of the structure we considered above. Our αίμξ 
will then be based on an identification of a substitute good (i.e., a relative best) and we will determine the way 
of pursuing (or maintaining) it, as well as the role objects will play in this pursuit. But this is not all. We must 
still have some idea (however vague) about what the superlative good could be and how the relative best differs 
from it – otherwise we would not know that we were pursuing a substitute good.  
1599
 On this topic, cp. Chap. 2 Sect. 1. 
1600
 As we will see, this is indeed an essential problem for the question concerning the value of the unexamined 
life, whose acceptance could very well be based on some sort of abdication. 
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disoriented or lost at sea. Our engagement in a particular course of action depends on these 
views. We must define what the superlative is. Then, we must define our situation and see 
what the best option available for us is. We must outline a plan for achieving the greatest 
possible good and we must determine the role all beings play therein. Finally, we must assess 
what we attained and what we expect to attain, and decide whether our life is worth living or 
not. All these views constitute a system of practical views. Some of them are more 
fundamental than others (as we saw), and they may also depend on other, non-practical 
views. But whatever their exact interrelation may be, they are the basis of our whole life and 
each step we take therein. Moreover, they also account for changes in behavior and way of 
living. Indeed, our views are not immutable. We may change them and adopt new views, 
which may in turn have a greater or a smaller impact in the way we live and act, according to 
which views were changed and to the role they play in the system of practical views. 
 But the fact that our life is based on a system of views also means that it is in many 
respects exposed to the possibility of being false. Our views are exposed to the limitations we 
discussed above.
1601
 We may lack discernment, make mistakes, confound things, and 
misunderstand them. This is precisely what we must now briefly consider. We must see how 
the different kinds of practical views we have identified may be false and what the 
consequences of such a falsehood might be. 
It is important to bear in mind that there may be cognitive mistakes at the different 
levels of our system of practical views. First, we may misidentify the superlative good in 
several different ways. For instance, we may think that something is superlatively good and it 
may not be so, or it may be only a part of the superlative good. We may even mistake 
something superlatively bad for the superlative good, as Socrates and Polus accuse each other 
of doing in Gorgias.
1602
 This means that one can be mistaken about what one really wants (ἃ 
αμύθεηαζ). One‟s true desire may not coincide with what is taken to be the best (ἃ δμηε῔ α὎ηῶ 
αέθηζζηα εἶκαζ).
1603
 But this is not all. There are several other mistakes we may make. We 
may wrongly determine the course to the superlative good or we may misidentify the means 
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 See Chap. 7. 
1602
 See 472d ff. 
1603
 See Grg. 466d-e: “[΢Ω.] (...) μ὎δὲκ βὰν πμζε῔κ ὧκ αμύθμκηαζ ὡξ ἔπμξ εἰπε῔κ, πμζε῔κ ιέκημζ ὅηζ ἂκ α὎ημ῔ξ δόλῃ 
αέθηζζημκ εἶκαζ. [ΠΩΛ.] μ὎ημῦκ ημῦημ ἔζηζκ ηὸ ιέβα δύκαζεαζ; [΢Ω.] μὔπ, ὥξ βέ θδζζκ π῵θμξ. [ΠΩΛ.] ἐβὼ μὔ 
θδιζ; θδιὶ ιὲκ μὖκ ἔβςβε. [΢Ω.] ιὰ ηὸκ – μ὎ ζύ βε, ἐπεὶ ηὸ ιέβα δύκαζεαζ ἔθδξ ἀβαεὸκ εἶκαζ ηῶ δοκαιέκῳ. 
[ΠΩΛ.] θδιὶ βὰν μὖκ. [΢Ω.] ἀβαεὸκ μὖκ μἴεζ εἶκαζ, ἐάκ ηζξ πμζῆ ηαῦηα ἃ ἂκ δμηῆ α὎ηῶ αέθηζζηα εἶκαζ, κμῦκ ιὴ 
ἔπςκ; ηαὶ ημῦημ ηαθε῔ξ ζὺ ιέβα δύκαζεαζ; [ΠΩΛ.] μ὎η ἔβςβε.” 
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to achieve it. In other words, we may lack the instrumental knowledge required to attain it.
1604
 
We may also wrongly determine the best course to attain some intermediate good. Likewise, 
we may wrongly determine the role a particular being can play in our life.
1605
 Moreover, we 
may make a wrong diagnosis of our own situation and of our prospects. For instance, we may 
think we have attained more than we really did and we may have false expectations about our 
future. Finally, we may also wrongly determine whether our life is worth living or not.
1606
 
 Any one of our practical views may thus be wrong, but the cognitive faults need not 
be circumscribed to just one of our views. They may indeed affect many different layers at 
the same time, and in fact all our practical views may be defective – either because they are 
all wrong or because the most fundamental views are wrong and the others end up being 
affected by their falsehood. Furthermore, the fact that our practical views may depend on 
other, non-practical views (such as the views about non-practical properties of beings or the 
meaning of a general predicate – be it practical or not) means that our practical views may 
also be affected by any distortion in these other views. This is particularly clear in the case of 
general predicates (and especially the predicate “good”). Our access to things (both in general 
and with respect to their practical relevance) depends on them, but if our understanding of 
these general predicates is hazy or wrong, then we will also have a defective access to all 
things to which we attribute these predicates. A correct attribution of a predicate or a correct 
δόλα will thus be insufficient for us to know what we are dealing with.
1607
 
 The many possible forms of falsehood or untruth that may affect our practical views 
are not without consequences. They may cause (and in fact do cause) many practical mistakes 
or failures. On account of them, we may fail to achieve our intermediate goals or even our 
ultimate goal: the superlative good. They may case our ruin and turn our life into a tragedy. 
More precisely, we may become miserable because of them. Our success or failure in life 
depends essentially on our perspective on things. It is not random or a matter of luck. We 
need lucidity or θνόκδζζξ.
1608
 To be sure, we may also wonder if in some cases a correct δόλα 
                                                 
1604
 This is precisely the problem with Alcibiades in Alciabiades I. He wants to be admired by all (see 105a-e), 
but then Socrates shows him throughout the dialogue that he lacks the knowledge required to attain what he 
desires, which culminates in 127d, when Alcibiades says: “ἀθθὰ ιὰ ημὺξ εεμύξ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, μ὎δ᾽ α὎ηὸξ μἶδ᾽ 
ὅηζ θέβς, ηζκδοκεύς δὲ ηαὶ πάθαζ θεθδεέκαζ ἐιαοηὸκ αἴζπζζηα ἔπςκ.” 
1605
 In other words, we may think that something is helpful, harmful or indifferent when that is not the case. 
1606
 Plato admits that we may fail to notice that we should either change our ways or give up living. As a matter 
of fact, this is precisely what is implied in the assertion that the unexamined life is not worth living, which is 
presented by Socrates as something that people will almost certainly not believe. See Ap. 38a. 
1607
 On this topic, see in particular Chap. 7 Sects. 2.3 and 2.4. 
1608
 Cp. e.g. Chrm. 171d ff., Men. 88a-c, Prt. 356c-e. 
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is not enough for us to reach our goal (just like it seems to be enough to reach Larissa).
1609
 In 
some particular cases, that may be sufficient. But it is difficult to imagine an entire life that is 
lived without insight and still gets everything right. Moreover, one has no control over one‟s 
correct δόλαζ, and one may easily change one‟s views (and thus adopt incorrect ones). It 
seems, therefore, that we need to avoid all forms of cognitive defect in our views (and 




 But things are more complex than this, since we may not notice that we have defective 
views, and we may also fail to notice that we commit some practical mistake. This possibility 
is particularly concerning in the case of our view of the superlative good. Everything may 
seem fine, at least for a while, and we will then think we are happy or on our way to 
happiness (although our state is actually bad).
1611
 The same may happen with any 
intermediate good. We may not notice we have a false view about it or about how to attain it. 
Likewise, we may not notice that we have a false judgment about whether a resigned life is 
worth living. In all these cases, we will act, we will be engaged, we will seem to be taking 
care of ourselves, but this care will be superficial and will correspond to what Socrates calls 
adulation or flattery (ημθαηεία) in Gorgias.
1612
 Later we will have to consider in more detail 
the meaning of these unnoticed errors (and of the illusion that accompanies them). We must 
ascertain whether they are always undesirable – especially because the value of philosophical 
examination depends on this, as we will see. But for now we are just considering different 
possibilities. 
We may thus fail to notice defects in our practical views and we may also fail to 
notice we committed practical mistakes. But it is also possible for us to notice (either 
immediately or retrospectively) that something is wrong. There may be some recognition 
(ἀκαβκώνζζζξ) of our situation, and in that case the meaning of our actions and of our 
possessions (i.e., of all we attained) will change – or, better still, we will become aware of 
                                                 
1609
 Cp. Men. 97a ff. 
1610
 Indeed, if one has false views about the most fundamental questions (and especially about the superlative 
good), then the truth or falsity of the subordinate views may be wholly irrelevant. In some cases, errors in those 
subordinate views may even be a good thing, if they prevent us from attaining a bad thing that we mistake for a 
good one. 
1611
 Cp. Ap. 36d, where Socrates talks of δμηε῔κ ε὎δαίιμκα εἶκαζ, and Grg. 471b, where Polus ironically says of 
Archelaus that he “ἔθαεεκ ἑαοηὸκ ἀεθζώηαημξ βεκόιεκμξ”. For more on this possibility, cp. Sect. 3.2 above. 
1612
 Socrates indeed distinguishes between true ἐπζιέθεζα or true ηέπκαζ, which know how to effectively take 
care of something and improve it, and ημθαηεία (along with the corresponding semblances of ηέκπδ), which 
only appear to take care of the body and soul (or, as is said in 464a-b: πμζε῔ ιὲκ δμηε῔κ εὖ ἔπεζκ ηὸ ζ῵ια ηαὶ ηὴκ 
ροπήκ, ἔπεζ δὲ μ὎δὲκ ι᾵θθμκ). For the whole contrast between ηέπκδ and ημθαηεία, see 463a ff. 
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their true meaning. As a result, we will disavow the views we had and possibly become 




5.5. “No one does wrong willingly”. A first consideration of the problem of 
ἀθξάηεηα 
 
 There is one final aspect we must consider about how we guide ourselves in life and 
how we act. We have hitherto considered how the pursuit of the superlative good creates a 
practical system based on a system of practical views. In other words, our acts and our life in 
general are based on our views. This also implies that if our views are true, we will be able to 
properly guide ourselves in life. If, however, they are false, we are bound to make practical 
mistakes. In fact, all practical mistakes result from our ignorance – i.e., from having baseless 
knowledge claims. But there is one fundamental objection against this model: namely, one 
may argue that in many cases we seem to act against our better judgment (i.e., against our 
views), and this implies that we do something other than what we think best. But if this is 
true, if we are able to avoid something we think is good or to pursue something we think is 
evil, then the account of our behavior and of our practical failures that we considered in the 
previous sections is at least incomplete and cannot fully explain how we act and how we live. 
It is, at best, just part of the story, and it must be restricted. 
 The Platonic dialogues are very aware of this problem, but before considering their 
response to it, let us see in more detail what is implied in this objection and the way it was 
formulated in Greek culture. Euripides seems to have conceived the possibility of acting 
against our better judgment. Medea, in the eponymous play, says: “(...) evil conquers me. I 
understand the evil I‟m about to do, and yet my raging heart is stronger than my plans – the 
heart which causes mortal kind the greatest evils.”
1614
 In Hippolytus, Phaedra says: “(...) I 
have pondered before now in other circumstances in the night's long watches how it is that 
                                                 
1613
 At this moment, we could perhaps find some guidance in others, especially if we recognized them as 
knowledgeable and if we entrusted ourselves to them. Plato mentions this possibility several times. See e.g. Ly. 
209c ff. and Alc. I 117c-e. However, we would still depend on practical views. We would have to believe that 
the other who guides us has true views about how we should live. Moreover, by following the other‟s 
instructions, we would adopt certain correct δόλαζ about how to live – though we would lack proper insight into 
what we would be doing and why. This could be a problem (especially if we need true insight in order to attain 
the superlative good), but we will not discuss the question here. 
1614
 See Medea 1077-1080: “(...) κζη῵ιαζ ηαημ῔ξ./ ηαὶ ιακεάκς ιὲκ μἷα ημθιήζς ηαηά,/ εοιὸξ δὲ ηνείζζςκ η῵κ 
ἐι῵κ αμοθεοιάηςκ,/ ὅζπεν ιεβίζηςκ αἴηζμξ ηαη῵κ ανμημ῔ξ.” I follow R. Blondell‟s translation. See R. 
BLONDELL et aliae, Women on the Edge. Four Plays by Euripides: Alcestis – Medea – Helen – Iphigenia at 
Aulis, New York/London, Routledge, 1999. 
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the lives of mortals are in ruins. I think that it is not owing to the nature of their wits that they 
fare worse than they might, since many people possess good sense. Rather, one must look at 
it this way: we know and understand what is noble but do not bring it to completion. Some 
fail from laziness, others because they give precedence to some other pleasure than being 
honorable.”
1615
 In keeping with this idea, Ovid will later describe the possibility in question 
in the following terms: “video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor”.
1616
 There has been much 
discussion about these passages, but we will not engage with it.
1617
 What matters here is the 
way these passages express the possibility of strong passions and desires mastering one‟s soul 
and forcing it to go against our calculation and what we know – i.e., our views about what is 
best. It is not simply a matter of being free to choose between following our views or 
embracing our passions. There is no indifferent will that is primarily neutral and entirely free 
to choose between different possibilities. The will is always motivated in some way – and 
what one may argue based on Euripides is that we may be unable to do what we want and 
what seems best to us. Our rational motivation (in the broad sense of the word “rational”) 




                                                 
1615
 Cp. 375-383: “(...) ἢδδ πμη᾽ ἄθθςξ κοηηὸξ ἐκ ιαην῵ζ πνόκςζ/ εκδη῵κ ἐθνόκηζζ᾽ ἥζ δζέθεανηαζ αίμξ./ ηαί ιμζ 
δμημῦζζκ μ὎ ηαηὰ βκώιδξ θύζζκ/ πνάζζεζκ ηάηζμκ‟· ἔζηζ βὰν ηό β᾽ εὖ θνμκε῔κ/ πμθθμ῔ζζκ· ἀθθὰ ηῆδ᾽ ἀενδηέμκ 
ηόδε·/ ηὰ πνήζη᾽ ἐπζζηάιεζεα ηαὶ βζβκώζημιεκ,/ μ὎η ἐηπμκμῦιεκ δ᾽, μἱ ιὲκ ἀνβίαξ ὕπμ,/ μἱ δ᾽ ἟δμκὴκ πνμεέκηεξ 
ἀκηὶ ημῦ ηαθμῦ/ ἄθθδκ ηζκ᾽ (...).” I follow D. Kovacs translation. See EURIPIDES, Children of               
Heracles Ŕ Hippolytus Ŕ Andromache Ŕ Hecuba, Cambridge (MA.)/London, Harvard University Press, 1995. 
On this matter, see also EURIPIDES, fr. 840: “θέθδεεκ μ὎δὲκ η῵κδέ ι‟ ὧκ ζὺ κμοεεηε῔ξ, βκώιδκ δ‟ ἔπμκηά ι‟ ἟ 
θύζζξ αζάγεηαζ.” 
1616
 See Metamorphoses, 7.17-21: ”excute virgineo conceptas pectore flammas,/ si potes, infelix! si possem, 
sanior essem;/ sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque cupido,/ mens aliud suadet: video meliora 
proboque,/deteriora sequor!” I quote from W. ANDERSON (ed.), Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Books 6-10, Norman, 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1972. 
1617
 For discussions of the passages in Euripides (and its possible relation with the historical Socrates), see e.g. 
E. DODDS, Euripides the Irrationalist, The Classical Review 43 (1929), 97-104; B. SNELL, Das früheste 
Zeugnis über Sokrates, Philologus 97 (1948), 125-134; B. SNELL, Scenes from Greek Drama, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1964, 23-69; J. MOLINE, Euripides, Socrates and Virtue, Hermes 103 (1975), 
45-67; T. IRWIN, Euripides and Socrates, Classical Philology 78 (1983), 183-197; G. RICKERT, Akrasia and 
Euripides‟ Medea, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 91 (1987), 91-117; H. FOLEY, Medea‟s Divided 
Self, Classical Antiquity 8 (1989), 61-85; G. CUPIDO, L’anima in conflitto. “Platone tragico” tra Euripide, 
Socrate e Aristotele, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002. 
1618
 In this sense, it is not a question of our will as such being weak (as we see in later authors and in much of 
the contemporary reflection on the problem), but rather of our rational motivation being weak and unable to 
assert itself. For more on the notion of “weakness of will”, see e.g. J. MÜLLER, Willenschwäche in Antike und 
Mittelalter. Eine Problemgeschichte von Sokrates bis Johannes Duns Scotus, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 
2009 and S. STROUD, Weakness of Will, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 




 This is precisely what is expressed by the term ἀηνάηεζα.
1619
 It designates the lack of 
mastery or control (ηνάημξ or ηναηε῔κ) that renders us slaves to our passions. As such, it is 
opposed to the term “ἐβηνάηεζα”, which means self-control or self-mastery, and implies that 
one rules oneself (ἑαοημῦ ἄνπεζκ) and is not overtaken by feeling. One has self-restraint and 
is thus able to endure pain and withstand the attraction of pleasure without changing one‟s 
course of action. One does what one deems best and not what one‟s affections dictate. In 
sum, one is free and autonomous, and this played a very important role in Greek social life. A 
citizen must be able to do the best for his family and his πόθζξ – both in times of war and in 
times of peace. Ἀηνάηεζα, on the contrary, is a form of powerlessness or impotence. Insofar 
as one is a slave to one‟s passions, one can be forced to do disastrous things. One can break 
one‟s compromises and neglect one‟s duties, thereby becoming wholly unreliable. In this 




But can we really act against our views and knowledge claims about what is best? The 
historical Socrates is supposed to have denied such a possibility.
1621
 However, we will leave 
aside the views of the historical Socrates (following the principles we laid out at the 
beginning).
1622
 We find several denials of ἀηνάηεζα in the Platonic corpus and this is what we 
will now consider. Since losing control often translates into errors and missteps, it is no 
wonder that these denials are in some cases associated with the notorious tenet that “no one 
errs willingly (or of one‟s own accord)” – μ὎δεὶξ ἑηὼκ ἁιανηάκεζ.
1623
 All practical errors 
occur in spite of ourselves (ἀηώκ). We cannot give our assent to something that is a mistake 
or, to be more precise, we cannot give our assent to something that we know is a mistake. 
                                                 
1619
 Plato speaks only of ἀηνάηεζα (see e.g. Rep. 461b, Ti. 86d, Lg. 636c), but Aristotle and much of the 
subsequent tradition rather use the term ἀηναζία (cp. e.g. Ethica Nichomachea 1145a35 ff.), and hence its 
predominance in secondary literature.  
1620
 Cp. e.g. Grg. 491d-e: “[΢Ω.] ηί δέ; α὏η῵κ, ὦ ἑηα῔νε, ηί; ἤ ηζ ἄνπμκηαξ ἠ ἀνπμιέκμοξ; [ΚΑΛ.] π῵ξ θέβεζξ; 
[΢Ω.] ἕκα ἕηαζημκ θέβς α὎ηὸκ ἑαοημῦ ἄνπμκηα· ἠ ημῦημ ιὲκ μ὎δὲκ δε῔, α὎ηὸκ ἑαοημῦ ἄνπεζκ, η῵κ δὲ ἄθθςκ; 
[ΚΑΛ.] π῵ξ ἑαοημῦ ἄνπμκηα θέβεζξ; [΢Ω.] μ὎δὲκ πμζηίθμκ ἀθθ᾽ ὥζπεν μἱ πμθθμί, ζώθνμκα ὄκηα ηαὶ ἐβηναη῅ 
α὎ηὸκ ἑαοημῦ, η῵κ ἟δμκ῵κ ηαὶ ἐπζεοιζ῵κ ἄνπμκηα η῵κ ἐκ ἑαοηῶ.” 
1621
 Cp. e.g. XENOPHON, Memorabilia, 3.9.4, and ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nichomachea, 1145b25-27. 
1622
 See Sect. 4 of the Introduction. 
1623
 See Prt. 345d-e: “ἐβὼ βὰν ζπεδόκ ηζ μἶιαζ ημῦημ, ὅηζ μ὎δεὶξ η῵κ ζμθ῵κ ἀκδν῵κ ἟βε῔ηαζ μ὎δέκα ἀκενώπςκ 
ἑηόκηα ἐλαιανηάκεζκ μ὎δὲ αἰζπνά ηε ηαὶ ηαηὰ ἑηόκηα ἐνβάγεζεαζ, ἀθθ᾽ εὖ ἴζαζζκ ὅηζ πάκηεξ μἱ ηὰ αἰζπνὰ ηαὶ 
ηὰ ηαηὰ πμζμῦκηεξ ἄημκηεξ πμζμῦζζκ (...).” Cp. also Ap. 25e-26a, Grg. 488a, Rep. 336e, 589c, Phlb. 22b. We 
leave out the discussion in Hippias Minor, which considers the conditions for doing wrong willingly, but does 
not affirm the possibility of it happening. In fact, the whole discussion ends with Socrates questioning such 
possibility by saying: “ὁ ἄνα ἑηὼκ ἁιανηάκςκ ηαὶ αἰζπνὰ ηαὶ ἄδζηα πμζ῵κ, ὦ Ἱππία, εἴπεν ηίξ ἐζηζκ μὗημξ, μ὎η 
ἂκ ἄθθμξ εἴδ ἠ ὁ ἀβαεόξ.” See 376b. It is also important to note that the above mentioned tenet is closely 
associated with the idea that no one is bad willingly (cp. Ti. 86d-e and Lg. 860d), as well as with the tenet that 
“no one does injustice willingly” (see Grg. 509e, Lg. 731c, 860d), but we can leave that aside here. 
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When we err, we do it unknowingly or out of ignorance. We have a wrong judgment or view 
about what is best, and that is why we make a practical mistake. We can never decide to do 
the wrong thing (i.e., something other than what is best) knowing that it is wrong. This would 
imply desiring and pursuing something that we know (or at least think) is bad – and we find 
many passages in the corpus that are adamant about such a thing being impossible.
1624
 
Nothing can overtake us and force us to go against our better judgment. In other words, we 
never lose control. There is no ἀηνάηεζα. We cannot even be divided (in a state of ζηάζζξ) 
between what we think is best and our other desires. Our entire being follows our views about 
what is best (both in general and in a particular situation), and all practical errors are caused 
by these views. Our views are always in control and we automatically follow what they say. 
If we did something wrong, then we did not know better. 
This is the core of the so-called Socratic intellectualism, which was already prefigured 
in several aspects of Greek culture (as some have noted). Ever since Homer, the vocabulary 
of knowledge was used to explain action in general, and there seemed to be no gap between 
knowledge, intention and action.
1625
 Deliberation in particular was conceived as a rational 
discussion in which advantages are calculated.
1626
 All errors are thus the result of clouded 
judgment. The gods must attack our θνέκεξ in order to lead us to our ruin.
1627
 But those are 
extraordinary circumstances. In general, one is able to control oneself and follow reason. This 
is the aristocratic model, according to which one cannot succumb to passions if one is to 
correctly perform one‟s role. Later the same model was adopted by the Sophists, who 
emphasize precisely the importance of knowledge for a good life. This is why Protagoras, in 
the eponymous dialogue, accepts Socrates‟ views so easily.  
But Socrates also stresses that the many believe in ἀηνάηεζα – i.e., that we may be 
controlled by our passions.
1628
 To be sure, there are many cases in which we clearly seem to 
                                                 
1624
 In Prt. 358b-c, Socrates says: “(...) μ὎δεὶξ μὔηε εἰδὼξ μὔηε μἰόιεκμξ ἄθθα αεθηίς εἶκαζ ἠ ἃ πμζε῔, ηαὶ δοκαηά, 
ἔπεζηα πμζε῔ ηαῦηα, ἐλὸκ ηὰ αεθηίς (...).” In 358e, it is said: “ἃ δὲ ἟βε῔ηαζ ηαηά, μ὎δέκα μὔηε ἰέκαζ ἐπὶ ηαῦηα μὔηε 
θαιαάκεζκ ἑηόκηα.” See also Men. 77b-e and Grg. 468c. 
1625
 On this matter, see e.g. W. NESTLE, Intellektualismus und Mystik in der Griechischen Philosophie, Neue 
Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum 49 (1922), 137-157, especially 138; E. DODDS, The Greeks and the 
Irrational, Berkeley/etc., University of California Press, 1951, 16-17; M. O‟BRIEN, The Socratic Paradoxes 
and the Greek Mind, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1967, 22ff. 
1626
 See e.g. F. DIRLMEIER, Vom Monolog der Dichtung zum “inneren” Logos bei Platon und Aristoteles, 
Gymnasium 67 (1960), 26-41, especially 27-30; H. PELLICCIA, Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar, 
Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995, 213-216. 
1627
 See e.g. J. STALLMACH, Ate. Zur Frage des Selbst- und Weltverständnisses des frühgriechischen 
Menschen, Meisenheim, Anton Hain, 1968; N. YAMAGATA, Homeric Morality, Leiden/etc., Brill, 1994, 50 ff. 
1628
 See 352d-e: “μἶζεα μὖκ ὅηζ μἱ πμθθμὶ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ ἐιμί ηε ηαὶ ζμὶ μ὎ πείεμκηαζ, ἀθθὰ πμθθμύξ θαζζ 
βζβκώζημκηαξ ηὰ αέθηζζηα μ὎η ἐεέθεζκ πνάηηεζκ, ἐλὸκ α὎ημ῔ξ, ἀθθὰ ἄθθα πνάηηεζκ· ηαὶ ὅζμοξ δὴ ἐβὼ ἞νόιδκ 
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err or do the wrong thing out of ignorance. Oedipus, for instance, would not have killed his 
father and married his mother had he known what he was doing. Yet, in other cases, the 
intellectualist model is not so obvious. In fact, it seems to go against empirical evidence and 
is as such counter-intuitive or paradoxical (as Aristotle stresses).
1629
 We all have felt divided 
between our thoughts and feelings, and our passions may at some points overtake us and 
force us to do something. Consequently, the Socratic intellectualism we find in many 
dialogues seems to be very far from what happens in life. It seems obvious that ἀηνάηεζα is 
possible. How could Plato not have seen that? 
However, what we find in Plato is not a denial of all those moments that we interpret 
as an occurrence of ἀηνάηεζα. Rather, he endeavors to show that these only appear to be an 
occurrence of ἀηνάηεζα. What happens is actually something else. Plato reinterprets the 
phenomena in light of the above mentioned Socratic intellectualism and flatly denies any 
shadow of ἀηνάηεζα. This is manifest in several passages. Of course there are other passages 
that are more problematic. In the context of soul‟s tripartition (and especially in Republic IV), 
Plato seems to admit the possibility of true ἀηνάηεζα. This has often been interpreted as a 
later revision of the views Plato initially adopted from Socrates. But the matter is actually 
more complicated. As we will see in the following chapter, the developments introduced in 
the framework of the soul‟s partition can be conciliated with the so-called intellectualism. 
The “more Socratic phase” and the “Platonic phase” can be interpreted as corresponding to 
two different presentations of a single way of looking at our ροπή. But for now we will leave 
aside the question of the tripartition. We will consider the arguments that reject the possibility 
of ἀηνάηεζα without making any reference to the tripartition and later, after discussing the 
tripartition as such, we will revise the analysis of this section.
1630
 
                                                                                                                                                        
ὅηζ πμηε αἴηζόκ ἐζηζ ημύημο, ὏πὸ ἟δμκ῅ξ θαζζκ ἟ηηςιέκμοξ ἠ θύπδξ ἠ ὧκ κοκδὴ ἐβὼ ἔθεβμκ ὏πό ηζκμξ ημύηςκ 
ηναημοιέκμοξ ηαῦηα πμζε῔κ ημὺξ πμζμῦκηαξ.” 
1629
 See Ethica Nichomachea, 1145b25-28: “΢ςηνάηδξ ιὲκ βὰν ὅθςξ ἐιάπεημ πνὸξ ηὸκ θόβμκ ὡξ μ὎η μὔζδξ 
ἀηναζίαξ· μ὎εέκα βὰν ὏πμθαιαάκμκηα πνάηηεζκ πανὰ ηὸ αέθηζζημκ, ἀθθὰ δζ‟ ἄβκμζακ. μὗημξ ιὲκ μὖκ ὁ θόβμξ 
ἀιαζζαδηε῔ ημ῔ξ θαζκμιέκμζξ ἐκανβ῵ξ (...).” 
1630
 For a reconsideration of the problem of ἀηνάηεζα in light of the soul‟s tripartition, see Chap. 13, Sect. 5.3 
below. For other discussions of the problem of ἀηνάηεζα in Plato, see e.g. C. BOBONICH, Akrasia and Agency 
in Plato‟s Laws and Republic, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 76 (1994), 3-36; T. PENNER, Socrates on 
the Strength of Knowledge. Protagoras 351b-357e, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79 (1997), 117-149; 
M. MORRIS, Akrasia in the Protagoras and the Republic, Phronesis 51 (2006), 195-229; C. BOBONICH & P. 
DESTRÉE (ed.), Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. From Socrates to Plotinus, Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2007, 1-138; R. 
LEFEBVRE, & A. TORDESILLAS (eds.), Faiblesse de la volonté et maîtrise de soi. Doctrines antiques, 
perspectives contemporaines, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009, 31-75; J. MÜLLER, 
Willenschwäche in Antike und Mittelalter. Eine Problemgeschichte von Sokrates bis Johannes Duns Scotus, 
Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2009, 64-108. 
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As was said above, a central component of Plato‟s arguments is that we do not want 
what is bad or harmful – unless we think that something good comes from it, and in that case 
it is not truly bad.
1631
 We do not want to be miserable. This would be in contradiction with 
life‟s structure. We only pursue what is good.
1632
 More precisely, we pursue what we think is 
good.
1633
 We want to be happy and that guides all our acts.
1634
 Therefore, if we happen to 
make a practical error and direct ourselves to something bad, it is only because we did not 
know better. Otherwise, we would not have done it. We always follow our own calculation of 
what is better. But this is very problematic, as Plato himself recognizes. In Protagoras, where 
we find the most elaborate discussion of the question, Plato formulates it as a problem 
concerning the strength of knowledge. He asks if knowledge has authority and power of 
command or if it can be overpowered by feelings, passions, and be dragged by them.
1635
 If 
one knows what is good, can one be somehow forced to act against it?  
In order to answer this question, we should bear in mind that the concept “knowledge” 
can be used in a weaker and in a stronger sense. Indeed, it can designate anything that is 
experienced as knowledge (i.e., our knowledge claims or δόλαζ) – or it can refer to 
knowledge proper. The difference between the two is that the first may be only apparent (i.e., 
we may actually have a false knowledge claim), whereas the second is infallible. In a way, 
this makes little difference for the question of whether we always follow knowledge, because 
we always follow our views (whether they are true or false). The difference lies in the result. 
If we follow true views, we will be excellent and happy. If we have wrong views (i.e., simple 
knowledge claims), we will make practical errors and be miserable.
1636
 But this is not the 
                                                 
1631
 This is the case of physical exercises and medical treatments. Both may imply pain and seem bad, but their 
effects ultimately benefit us. See e.g. Prt. 354a-b. 
1632
 See e.g. Rep. 438a: “πάκηεξ βὰν ἄνα η῵κ ἀβαε῵κ ἐπζεοιμῦζζκ (...).”  
1633
 Cp. Men. 77d-e: “μ὎ημῦκ δ῅θμκ ὅηζ μὗημζ ιὲκ μ὎ η῵κ ηαη῵κ ἐπζεοιμῦζζκ, μἱ ἀβκμμῦκηεξ α὎ηά, ἀθθὰ 
ἐηείκςκ ἃ ᾤμκημ ἀβαεὰ εἶκαζ, ἔζηζκ δὲ ηαῦηά βε ηαηά· ὥζηε μἱ ἀβκμμῦκηεξ α὎ηὰ ηαὶ μἰόιεκμζ ἀβαεὰ εἶκαζ δ῅θμκ 
ὅηζ η῵κ ἀβαε῵κ ἐπζεοιμῦζζκ.” 
1634
 This is what constitutes the so-called “psychological eudaimonism”. Cp. e.g. Euthd. 278e-279a: “ἆνά βε 
πάκηεξ ἄκενςπμζ αμοθόιεεα εὖ πνάηηεζκ; ἠ ημῦημ ιὲκ ἐνώηδια ὧκ κοκδὴ ἐθμαμύιδκ ἓκ η῵κ ηαηαβεθάζηςκ; 
ἀκόδημκ βὰν δήπμο ηαὶ ηὸ ἐνςη᾵κ ηὰ ημζαῦηα· ηίξ βὰν μ὎ αμύθεηαζ ἀκενώπςκ εὖ πνάηηεζκ;    μ὎δεὶξ ὅζηζξ μὔη, 
ἔθδ ὁ Κθεζκίαξ.” 
1635
 352b-c: “π῵ξ ἔπεζξ πνὸξ ἐπζζηήιδκ; πόηενμκ ηαὶ ημῦηό ζμζ δμηε῔ ὥζπεν ημ῔ξ πμθθμ῔ξ ἀκενώπμζξ, ἠ ἄθθςξ; 
δμηε῔ δὲ ημ῔ξ πμθθμ῔ξ πενὶ ἐπζζηήιδξ ημζμῦηόκ ηζ, μ὎η ἰζπονὸκ μ὎δ᾽ ἟βειμκζηὸκ μ὎δ᾽ ἀνπζηὸκ εἶκαζ· μ὎δὲ ὡξ 
πενὶ ημζμύημο α὎ημῦ ὄκημξ δζακμμῦκηαζ, ἀθθ᾽ ἐκμύζδξ πμθθάηζξ ἀκενώπῳ ἐπζζηήιδξ μ὎ ηὴκ ἐπζζηήιδκ α὎ημῦ 
ἄνπεζκ ἀθθ᾽ ἄθθμ ηζ, ημηὲ ιὲκ εοιόκ, ημηὲ δὲ ἟δμκήκ, ημηὲ δὲ θύπδκ, ἐκίμηε δὲ ἔνςηα, πμθθάηζξ δὲ θόαμκ, 
ἀηεπκ῵ξ δζακμμύιεκμζ πενὶ η῅ξ ἐπζζηήιδξ ὥζπεν πενὶ ἀκδναπόδμο, πενζεθημιέκδξ ὏πὸ η῵κ ἄθθςκ ἁπάκηςκ. 
ἆν᾽ μὖκ ηαὶ ζμὶ ημζμῦηόκ ηζ πενὶ α὎η῅ξ δμηε῔, ἠ ηαθόκ ηε εἶκαζ ἟ ἐπζζηήιδ ηαὶ μἷμκ ἄνπεζκ ημῦ ἀκενώπμο, ηαὶ 
ἐάκπεν βζβκώζηῃ ηζξ ηἀβαεὰ ηαὶ ηὰ ηαηά, ιὴ ἂκ ηναηδε῅καζ ὏πὸ ιδδεκὸξ ὥζηε ἄθθ᾽ ἄηηα πνάηηεζκ ἠ ἃκ 
ἐπζζηήιδ ηεθεύῃ, ἀθθ᾽ ἱηακὴκ εἶκαζ ηὴκ θνόκδζζκ αμδεε῔κ ηῶ ἀκενώπῳ;” 
1636
 Cp. e.g. Men. 88c: “[΢Ω.] μ὎ημῦκ ζοθθήαδδκ πάκηα ηὰ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ἐπζπεζνήιαηα ηαὶ ηανηενήιαηα 
἟βμοιέκδξ ιὲκ θνμκήζεςξ εἰξ ε὎δαζιμκίακ ηεθεοηᾶ, ἀθνμζύκδξ δ᾽ εἰξ ημ὎κακηίμκ; [ΜΔΝ.] ἔμζηεκ.” 
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only difference. According to Plato, what we often interpret as ἀηνάηεζα is only possible if 
we have knowledge in a weaker sense. Basically, Plato argues that what we regard as being 
overtaken by our passions is actually a change of view caused by the circumstances we find 
ourselves in and the limitations of our way of seeing things. 
We can better understand how it is so if we consider what is said in Protagoras. 
According to Socrates, all ἀηνάηεζα seems to be diachronic. Using a hedonist framework, 
Socrates argues that our actions always pursue what we see as most pleasant or least 
painful.
1637
 It is therefore a matter of how we see things. However, our relation to pleasure 
and pain is affected by the same problem as our vision of objects in space. Our acuity varies 
according to how distant the objects are from us. Likewise, if the pleasures and pains we are 
considering happen to be far away in time, we fail to properly assess them. Temporal distance 
introduces distortions, and so we lose sight of other possibilities and also of the long-run 
consequences of what we do. Moreover, the affections determining us at the present will 
seem greater and have a greater impact in how we see things.
1638
 We find a similar idea in 
Philebus. What we feel in a particular moment distorts our past and future affections, and as a 
result we wrongly estimate the intensity of our present, past and future affections.
1639
 This 
shows that our present affections may change our views and δόλαζ. In fact, Plato admits in the 
Republic that we can be deprived of a δόλα in three ways: we can be robbed (by being 
persuaded by someone else or forgetting what we think), we may be charmed by pleasure or 
fear, and we may be forced by pain.
1640
 Our affections may thus change our δόλαζ, at least 
temporarily. There is an oscillation of judgment, according to what affections are nearer at 
the time. In other words, everything appears in light of one‟s affections. As a result, 
something may seem bad when seen from a distance, but when we were close, it temporarily 
appears to be good.
1641
 So we act based on our judgment, but we do not notice that it 
                                                 
1637
 See 354a ff. 
1638
 See 356a-e.  
1639
 See 41d ff., especially 42b: “κῦκ δέ βε α὎ηαὶ δζὰ ηὸ πόννςεέκ ηε ηαὶ ἐββύεεκ ἑηάζημηε ιεηαααθθόιεκαζ 
εεςνε῔ζεαζ, ηαὶ ἅια ηζεέιεκαζ παν᾽ ἀθθήθαξ, αἱ ιὲκ ἟δμκαὶ πανὰ ηὸ θοπδνὸκ ιείγμοξ θαίκμκηαζ ηαὶ 
ζθμδνόηεναζ, θῦπαζ δ᾽ αὖ δζὰ ηὸ παν᾽ ἟δμκὰξ ημ὎κακηίμκ ἐηείκαζξ.” 
1640
 See 413a-c: “(...) ηαί ιμζ δμημῦζζκ ἄημκηεξ ἀθδεμῦξ δόλδξ ζηενίζηεζεαζ.     μ὎ημῦκ ηθαπέκηεξ ἠ 
βμδηεοεέκηεξ ἠ αζαζεέκηεξ ημῦημ πάζπμοζζκ;     μ὎δὲ κῦκ, ἔθδ, ιακεάκς.     ηναβζη῵ξ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ηζκδοκεύς 
θέβεζκ. ηθαπέκηαξ ιὲκ βὰν ημὺξ ιεηαπεζζεέκηαξ θέβς ηαὶ ημὺξ ἐπζθακεακμιέκμοξ, ὅηζ η῵κ ιὲκ πνόκμξ, η῵κ δὲ 
θόβμξ ἐλαζνμύιεκμξ θακεάκεζ· κῦκ βάν πμο ιακεάκεζξ;     καί.     ημὺξ ημίκοκ αζαζεέκηαξ θέβς μὓξ ἂκ ὀδύκδ ηζξ 
ἠ ἀθβδδὼκ ιεηαδμλάζαζ πμζήζῃ.     ηαὶ ημῦη᾽, ἔθδ, ἔιαεμκ, ηαὶ ὀνε῵ξ θέβεζξ.     ημὺξ ιὴκ βμδηεοεέκηαξ, ὡξ 
ἐβᾦιαζ, ηἂκ ζὺ θαίδξ εἶκαζ μἳ ἂκ ιεηαδμλάζςζζκ ἠ ὏θ᾽ ἟δμκ῅ξ ηδθδεέκηεξ ἠ ὏πὸ θόαμο ηζ δείζακηεξ.     ἔμζηε 
βάν, ἤ δ᾽ ὅξ, βμδηεύεζκ πάκηα ὅζα ἀπαηᾶ.” 
1641
 Cp. 356d: “(...) αὕηδ [namely, ἟ ημῦ θαζκμιέκμο δύκαιζξ] ιὲκ ἟ι᾵ξ ἐπθάκα ηαὶ ἐπμίεζ ἄκς ηε ηαὶ ηάης 




temporarily changed, and so we later interpret the action as akratic, since it contradicted the 
views we have about what is best when we are not in the circumstances we were at the time 
of the action.  
This is possible only because our representation of things (in this case, our 
representation of pleasures and pains) can be deceived by the appearances – i.e., by how they 
appear in virtue of their proximity and distance. Socrates talks precisely of “the power of 
what appears” (἟ ημῦ θαζκμιέκμο δύκαιζξ).
1642
 But if one were to develop a precise 
knowledge of all affections (such as would result from the measuring expertise Socrates 
briefly describes), then it would not be possible for our views to be temporarily distorted and 
we would not seem to act against our better judgment.
1643
 It is the mere doxastic nature of our 
views about what is best that allows the temporary transmutation of our views due to our 
affections.  
In sum, what seems to be acting against our better judgment is actually a temporary 
change of our “better judgment”. In the moment when we do not follow what we recognize as 
the best, we are actually in a state of temporary clouding. It corresponds to the traditional 
model of a disturbance of one‟s θνέκεξ or ἀηή, which we mentioned above. Plato thus allows 
our views to keep control in a particular way. Each practical decision is based on judgments 
and has a cognitive basis. Such is the intrinsic structure of our desire. Thus, if there is 
something like a “deteriora sequor”, it must be based on practical judgments. Akratic actions, 
as well as all forms of inner conflicts (ζηάζεζξ), are never a conflict between a judgment and 
something deprived of judgment. There must be two practical judgments or two practical 
views and one of them must prevail over the other. Our mind must be somehow split, but 
there is only one tribunal. We must adopt one of the views, and therefore our action will 
always be based on knowledge. If (as was said) we have only knowledge in a weaker sense 
(which is not actually knowledge, but just a knowledge claim), then our views may change 
and we may perform actions that seem akratic.
1644
 But if we were to attain actual knowledge, 
                                                 
1642
 See once more 356d. 
1643
 See See 356d-e: “(...) ἟ δὲ ιεηνδηζηὴ ἄηονμκ ιὲκ ἂκ ἐπμίδζε ημῦημ ηὸ θάκηαζια, δδθώζαζα δὲ ηὸ ἀθδεὲξ 
἟ζοπίακ ἂκ ἐπμίδζεκ ἔπεζκ ηὴκ ροπὴκ ιέκμοζακ ἐπὶ ηῶ ἀθδεε῔ ηαὶ ἔζςζεκ ἂκ ηὸκ αίμκ (...).” 
1644
 A cognitive limitation is indeed essential. As we saw in Chap. 7, our way of seeing things is often full of 
errors, inaccuracies and contradictions, and this is what allows for the oscillations of judgment we are now 
considering.   
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Ἀηνάηεζα is thus the conflict between two different views about the good, which 
prevail in different moments. It is an experience of changing our mind, and not of losing 
rational control. The δόλαζ about the superlative good and about the particular goods always 
guide us, and it is not within our power to act against them – nor do we want to. What we 
may want is to act against a particular δόλα, but we only want this because of other δόλαζ we 
have. The only cause of errors is our ignorance, and so the general model of action described 
above is preserved.
1646
 Of course, all this still has to be reconsidered in light of the tripartition 
of the soul. But we will see that when talking about the three parts of the soul, Plato shows 
that all of them are to a certain extent rational or have a semblance of rationality. 
Consequently, the inner scission in some of our acts is a scission of different reasons. In some 
cases, the reasons of our affections may gain the upper hand – but they are still a modality of 
reason.  
 
6. The different layers of the Platonic identification of the good 
  
 We have hitherto considered the structure of the soul‟s practical dimension according 
to Plato. We saw that the soul always desires a superlative good and that it must identify it 
with something, in order to pursue it. This pursuit may then unfold in a complex practical 
system, based on a system of practical views. However, this is only part of Plato‟s description 
of the soul‟s practical dimension. As was just mentioned, Plato also considers the soul as 
being tripartite and this tripartition renders the structure we just considered much more 
complex. However, before considering the soul‟s tripartition, it is important to discuss one 
last question: namely, the Platonic identification of the good. We saw that we all pursue the 
good (and, in fact, a superlative good), but what is the good according to Plato? This is 
indeed the question on which the secondary literature most often focuses, and there are good 
reasons for it. The abstract structure we just saw is often presented by Plato in a more 
concrete form and already identified with a particular understanding of what the superlative 
good is. Moreover, we all have the greatest interest in knowing specifically what we should 
                                                 
1645
 Of course none of this means that we cannot against our better judgment because of some kind of disease or 
physical imbalance, as is admitted in Ti. 86b ff. However, even in that case the disease must first affect our mind 
and change our views, or else it will only produce a random movement, which cannot really be imputed to us. 
1646
 A different question is whether or not we are to blame for this ignorance, and whether we can do something 
to correct it. For a discussion of this question, see Chap. 17 below. 
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pursue in life. Therefore, it is natural to wonder exactly what is Plato‟s identification of the 
good.  
 In the following, we will consider some of the most important aspects of such an 
identification. We will try to determine what Plato regards as the highest good for each of us, 
and we also see how Plato‟s discussion of the good is not restricted to our individual good. 
Plato considers also the “intersubjective” good, the cosmic good and the ἰδέα of the good as 
such. This raises many questions about the relation between all these kinds of good. Indeed, 
Plato‟s identification of the good is a very complex question and notoriously complicated. 
This was acknowledged even in Antiquity, as the phrase “the Platonic good” was a proverbial 
designation for something particularly obscure.
1647
 The question is further complicated by the 
fact that, even if Plato possessed a completely developed and coherent doctrine about the 
good, it is not clear that he somehow conveyed it in the corpus. We do find some important 
indications in the dialogues, but they fall significantly short of a complete exposition. Plato 
himself stresses this insufficiency several times.
1648
 Nevertheless, we will try to systematize 
(even if very succinctly) the different aspects presented, in order to see their interconnection 
and the questions they raise.  
 
6.1. The good for an individual ςπρή 
 
 The first important question we must consider is Plato‟s identification of the 
superlative good for the individual ροπή – at least insofar as it can be isolated from any other 
consideration. We must try to determine what the best thing or the greatest possession is. In 
other words, we must see what our full happiness may consist of, which in turn determines 
how we shall pursue it or how we should live our life. However, it is difficult to define what 
exactly the superlative good is for Plato. As was said, he provides us only with some 
indications, and these are often vague. In some cases, they even seem to be contradictory, so 
it is not clear whether they can be reconciled in a single doctrine. However, we may regard 
                                                 
1647
 See e.g. DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Vitae philosophorum, III.27: “Ἄιθζξ Ἀιθζηνάηεζ· ηὸ δ᾽ ἀβαεὸκ ὅ ηζ πμη᾽ 
ἐζηίκ, μὗ ζὺ ηοβπάκεζκ/ ιέθθεζξ δζὰ ηαύηδκ, ἥηημκ μἶδα ημῦη᾽ ἐβώ,/ ὦ δέζπμη᾽, ἠ ηὸ Πθάηςκμξ ἀβαεόκ.” The 
phrase probably originates from Plato‟s enigmatic lecture on the Good. Cp. R. da RIOS (ed.), Aristoxeni 
elementa harmonica, Roma, Polygraphica, 1954, 39-40; H. DIELS (ed.), Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum 
libros octo commentaria, vol. 1, Berlin, Reimer, 1882, 453-454. 
1648
 For instance, in the most developed discussion of the good in the Republic, Socrates is very clear about the 
fact that he will be referring to the good only indirectly. As he says, he will only present the offspring or issue of 
the good. See 506d-e. In Philebus, Socrates adopts a likewise indirect method in order to think about the good. 
See in particular 61a-b and 64d-65a. We also find several important references to the good in Timaeus 
(especially in 29e ff.), but the entire discussion is presented as a likely account. See Ti. 29b-d. 
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them as contributions to the problem at hand. They present several essential components and 
outline several important possibilities, and that is what we will now consider. We will bring 
these indications together and consider the broadest lines of Plato‟s analysis.
1649
 
 First, it is important to bear in mind that our life needs a direction. It normally has 
one, but for Plato this direction is deficient in many regards, as we will consider in Chapter 
18 below, when we discuss the limitations of the unexamined life as such. For now, we may 
say that life as we normally live it is defined by a great lack. Consequently, we stand in need 
of care (εεναπεία). We cannot leave things as they are. We need to correct and improve our 
immediate state.
1650
 In order to do this, we need a ηέπκδ – and, more precisely, a ηέπκδ ημῦ 
αίμο.
1651
 We need an insight into life‟s structure that allows us to arrange it in the best 
possible way and thus live correctly – i.e., live a good life. This implies not only knowing 
what the best thing is, but also knowing how to pursue it – i.e., which αίμξ we should lead in 
order to be happy. In fact, it may imply knowing many other things that are not directly 
connected with how we should live. But regardless of the kinds of knowledge it implies, such 
a ηέπκδ will allow us to correct our practical views and thus avoid practical mistakes.
1652
 
Plato is thus clear about the need to improve our life through knowledge, though he is not 
very clear about what knowledge is implied here. He does not present a full ηέπκδ ημῦ αίμο, 
though he does offer some contributions to it – and this is what we must now consider.  
 One of the things often stressed in the dialogues is that ε὎δαζιμκία is not simply 
something we receive from the outside, but it rather has an active sense – as is implied in the 
already mentioned interpretation of faring well (εὖ πνάηηεζκ) as acting correctly (ὀνε῵ξ 
πνάηηεζκ).
1653
 The way we act is indeed decisive, but our actions do not stand by themselves. 
They are rather the result of our inner disposition or character, which may be marked by 
excellence (ἀνεηή) or badness (ηαηία). Consequently, happiness depends on our own inner 
worth.
1654
 This idea had already been defended by other authors – and some of them (such as 
                                                 
1649
 This will allow us to better understand some aspects we briefly considered in our analysis of the Apology, 
such as the importance of ἀνεηή, philosophical examination and knowledge or truth. Cp. in particular Chap. 3. 
However, several of the aspects we will now briefly explore will have to be revised later – especially in light of 
the question of the soul‟s partition.  
1650
 In other words, we are in the same situation as Alcibiades and stand in need of special care. See Alc. I 127d 
ff., and cp. the analysis of this passage in Sect. 2 above. 
1651
 Plato never uses the expression ηέπκδ ημῦ αίμο, but he refers to what is involved in it: namely, the idea of 
determining our life based on a knowledge of its structure. This idea was already present in the Sophistic 
project, to which the dialogues often refer, but Plato further develops it. 
1652
 This lack of errors is precisely what characterizes ηέπκδ as such. See e.g. Rep. 340d-341a. 
1653
 See e.g. Alc. I 116b and Grg. 507c. Cp. Sect. 3.2. 
1654
 Cp. e.g. Grg. 470e: “(...) ηὸκ µὲκ βὰν ηαθὸκ ηἀβαεὸκ ἄκδνα ηαὶ βοκα῔ηα ε὎δαίµμκα εἶκαί θδµζ, ηὸκ δὲ 
ἄδζημκ ηαὶ πμκδνὸκ ἄεθζμκ.” 
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Heraclitus and Democritus) even affirmed that the δαίιςκ that determines our lot is actually 
within us.
1655
 However, in Plato‟s dialogues we find elaborate arguments in favor of this 
view, and our happiness or misery seems to depend entirely on ἀνεηή and ηαηία. All other 
things, such as external goods and health, play no important role in our life. We are thus 
immune to luck and to what others may do to us.
1656
 Happiness depends solely on us. It is a 
task, and a particularly difficult one, since ἀνεηή is not easy to attain. This had already been 
stressed long before Plato.
1657
 Ἀνεηή implies much training. But what exactly is ἀνεηή and 
how does Plato conceive of it? 
 In general, ἀνεηή means excellence and it applies not only to persons, but also to 
animals and utensils. It is what renders someone or something good (ἀβαεόκ), and as such the 
sense of the word ἀνεηή is primarily functional, as was the sense of ἀβαεόκ.
1658
 It refers to a 
particular task (ἔνβμκ) and implies the ability to perform it perfectly.
1659
 In fact, the word 
often implies not only that a particular being is fit for a task, but also that it is so fit that it 
stands out from among other similar beings. In other words, ἀνεηή carries a certain 
connotation of superlativeness. In the case of human beings, its sense was at first socially 
determined. It implied success and renown. Initially, this success was connected with some 
sort of competition and being better than the others.
1660
 It was also associated with the most 
important roles in the community. In an aristocratic context, ἀνεηή implies the ability to 
govern one‟s household and the πόθζξ. This ability may or may not depend on one‟s birth and 
breeding, but it is at any rate related to certain functions in the πόθζξ. Later, however, the 
word starts to gain an increasingly moral sense and then it comes to correspond to an intrinsic 
standard that is valid for all human beings. Ἀνεηή is our best version or our best self.
1661
  
                                                 
1655
 Heraclitus states that “ἤεμξ ἀκενώπςζ δαίιςκ” (DK B119). Democritus, in turn, says (DK B171): 
“ε὎δαζιμκίδ μ὎η ἐκ αμζηήιαζζκ μἰηε῔ μ὎δὲ ἐκ πνοζ῵ζ· ροπὴ μἰηδηήνζμκ δαίιμκμξ.” 
1656
 Cp. e.g. Ap. 30b, Cri. 44d, Grg. 469b-c. 
1657
 Cp. in particular HESIOD, Opus et dies, 287-292: “ηὴκ ιέκ ημζ ηαηόηδηα ηαὶ ἰθαδὸκ ἔζηζκ ἑθέζεαζ/ ῥδζδίςξ· 
θείδ ιὲκ ὁδόξ, ιάθα δ᾽ ἐββύεζ καίεζ·/ η῅ξ δ᾽ ἀνεη῅ξ ἱδν῵ηα εεμὶ πνμπάνμζεεκ ἔεδηακ/ ἀεάκαημζ· ιαηνὸξ δὲ ηαὶ 
ὄνεζμξ μἶιμξ ἐξ α὎ηὴκ/ ηαὶ ηνδπὺξ ηὸ πν῵ημκ· ἐπὴκ δ᾽ εἰξ ἄηνμκ ἵηδηαζ,/ ῥδζδίδ δὴ ἔπεζηα πέθεζ, παθεπή πεν 
ἐμῦζα.” Plato himself quotes this passage several times. See Prt. 340d, Rep. 364d, Lg. 718e. For the difficulty of 
ἀνεηή, cp. also XENOPHON, Memorabilia. 2.1.21 ff.  
1658
 See Grg. 506d: “ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ἀβαεμί βέ ἐζιεκ ηαὶ ἟ιε῔ξ ηαὶ ηἆθθα πάκηα ὅζ᾽ ἀβαεά ἐζηζκ, ἀνεη῅ξ ηζκμξ 
παναβεκμιέκδξ;     ἔιμζβε δμηε῔ ἀκαβηα῔μκ εἶκαζ, ὦ Καθθίηθεζξ.” For the functional sense of ἀβαεόκ, see Sect. 
3.1 above. 
1659
 Cp. Rep. 353a-b: “κῦκ δὴ μἶιαζ ἄιεζκμκ ἂκ ιάεμζξ ὃ ἄνηζ ἞νώηςκ, ποκεακόιεκμξ εἰ μ὎ ημῦημ ἑηάζημο εἴδ 
ἔνβμκ ὃ ἂκ ἠ ιόκμκ ηζ ἠ ηάθθζζηα η῵κ ἄθθςκ ἀπενβάγδηαζ.     ἀθθά, ἔθδ, ιακεάκς ηε ηαί ιμζ δμηε῔ ημῦημ 
ἑηάζημο πνάβιαημξ ἔνβμκ εἶκαζ.     εἶεκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ. μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ ἀνεηὴ δμηε῔ ζμζ εἶκαζ ἑηάζηῳ ᾧπεν ηαὶ ἔνβμκ ηζ 
πνμζηέηαηηαζ;” 
1660
 It basically consisted in what Homer expressed as “αἰὲκ ἀνζζηεύεζκ ηαὶ ὏πείνμπμκ ἔιιεκαζ ἄθθςκ”. See Iliad 
VI.208 and XI.784. 
1661
 For more on the notion of ἀνεηή, see e.g. J. LUDWIG, Quae fuerit vocis ἀρεηή vis ac natura ante 
Demosthenis exitum, Diss. Leipzig, 1906; M. HOFFMANN, Die ethische Terminologie bei Homer, Hesiod und 
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 However, this does not mean that ἀνεηή is simple. There are several different ἀνεηαί 
and they are associated with different contexts. In the Homeric world, for instance, courage 
or “virility” (ἀκδνεία) played a central role. To use Adkins‟ distinction, this is an essentially 
competitive excellence, in contrast with other excellences that are rather cooperative or quiet, 
and are thus essential for social life.
1662
 Justice (δζηαζμζύκδ) in particular is required for one 
to do what is right, respect the rights of others, and punish those that transgress them.
1663
 This 
implies sound-mindedness or self-control (ζςθνμζύκδ). One must curb one‟s desires and 
avoid excesses, in order not to commit acts of ὕανζξ.
1664
 Justice and sound-mindedness are 
indeed intimately connected and sometimes they are difficult to distinguish (even in 
Plato).
1665
 They may also be combined with ἀκδνεία, or simply opposed to it.
1666
 But there is 
more. The Greeks also identified other excellences, such as magnanimity (ιεβαθμθνμζύκδ) 
and piety or holiness (which qualified one‟s relation to the gods).
1667
 But one other ἀνεηή is 
                                                                                                                                                        
den altern Elegikern und Jambographen, Tübingen, Kloeres, 1914, 92 ff., 118ff. 124, 128 ff., 147 ff.; O. 
BAUERNFEIND, ἀνεηή, in: TWNT, sub voce; P. HUART, Le vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans 
l’œuvre de Thucydide, Paris, Klincksieck, 1968, 447-451; A. ADKINS, Moral Values and Political Behavior in 
Ancient Greece. From Homer to the End of the Fifth Century, London, Chatto & Windus, 1972, passim; S. 
DARCUS SULLIVAN, Psychological and Ethical Ideas. What Early Greeks Say, Leiden/etc., Brill, 1995,   
123-173; M. FINKELBERG, Timē and Aretē in Homer, The Classical Quarterly 48 (1998), 14-28. 
1662
 Cp. A. ADKINS, Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960, 6-7, 
31ff. 
1663
 In this sense, justice implied a concern with the good of other people (the ἀθθόηνζμκ ἀβαεόκ), as 
Thrasymachus stresses in Rep. 343c. But this is just one aspect of the Archaic sense of δίηδ and δζηαζμζύκδ. For 
more on these notions, cp. e.g. R. HIRZEL, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
Rechtsidee bei den Griechen, Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1907; G. VLASTOS, Equality and Justice in Early Greek 
Cosmologies, Classical Philology 42 (1947), 156-178; L. PALMER, The Indo-European Origins of Greek 
Justice, Transactions of the Philological Society 49 (1950), 149-168; E. HAVELOCK, Dikaiosune. An Essay in 
Greek Intellectual History, Phoenix 23 (1969), 49-70; H. HOMMEL, Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit. Zur 
Geschichte und Deutung eines Begriffspaars, Antike und Abendland 15 (1969), 159-186, especially 168ff.; V. 
RODGERS, Some Thoughts on δίηδ, The Classical Quarterly 21 (1971), 289-301; M. GAGARIN, Dike in the 
Works and Days, Classical Philology 68 (1973), 81-94; IDEM, Dike in Archaic Greek Though, Classical 
Philology 69 (1974), 186-197; M. DICKIE, Dike as a Moral Term in Homer and Hesiod, Classical Philology 73 
(1978), 91-101; E. HAVELOCK, The Greek Concept of Justice. From its Shadow in Homer to its Substance in 
Plato, Cambridge (MA)/London, Harvard University Press, 1978; S. DARCUS SULLIVAN, Psychological and 
Ethical Ideas. What Early Greeks Say, Leiden/etc., Brill, 1995, 174-228; W. ALLAN, Divine Justice and 
Cosmic Order in Early Greek Epic, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 126 (2006), 1-35. 
1664
 For more on ζςθνμζύκδ, see e.g. G. DE VRIES, ΢ςθνμζύκδ en grec classique, Mnemosyne 11 (1943),    
81-101; D. LANZA, ΢μθία e ζςθνμζύκδ alla fine dell‟Atene periclea, Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 37 
(1965), 172-188; H. NORTH, Sophrosyne. Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaca 
(N.Y.), Cornell University Press, 1966; T. TUOZZO, Plato’s Charmides. Positive Elenchus in a “Socratic” 
Dialogue, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 2011, 90-98. 
1665
 See in particular Rep. 430d ff., where these two excellences are defined and brought into close connection. 
For more on the relation between the δζηαζμζύκδ and ζςθνμζύκδ, see e.g. R. HIRZEL, Über den Unterschied 
der δζϰαζμζύκδ und der ζςθϱμζύκδ in der Platonischen Republik, Hermes 8 (1874), 379-411; C. LARSON, 
The Platonic Synonyms, δζηαζμζύκδ and ζςθνμζύκδ, The American Journal of Philology 72 (1951), 395-414. 
1666
 On the possibility of combining ἀκδνεία and ζςθνμζύκδ, cp. Plt. 306a ff. 
1667
 For the notion of ιεβαθμθνμζύκδ, see e.g. Alc. I 122c (where several other qualities are enumerated), Ly. 
210d, Smp. 194b. Holiness is the object of discussion in Euthyphro and mentioned in several other dialogues 
(see e.g. La. 199d, Me. 78e, Prt. 329c). 
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very important, especially for Plato. This ἀνεηή is ζμθία or θνόκδζζξ. It was important 
already in Homer, insofar as using words and being able to counsel was thought as a 
complement to one‟s acts or deeds.
1668
 In the time of the Sophists, it became even more 
decisive, since it allowed one to control everybody else.
1669
 But it was probably Socrates who 
first reflected about the central role of ζμθία in human life and its importance for all other 
ἀνεηαί. We find a similar reflection in the Platonic corpus and that is what we must now 
consider. 
 According to several passages, all excellences are interconnected and constitute a 
unity. Consequently, we can only have one of them if we have all.
1670
 But this does not mean 
that they all have an equal status. In fact, knowledge lies at the center of ἀνεηή and it 
connects the different ἀνεηαί. They all require knowledge and are based on it.
1671
 In this 
sense, ἀνεηή is a kind of expert knowledge or ηέπκδ. It can be taught and learned, and it 
allows one to act excellently and intervene properly in reality.
1672
 However, it is not clear 
what exactly this knowledge is. We do not even know whether it is restricted to the practical 
domain, or whether it implies other forms of knowledge (and perhaps even a superlative form 
of knowledge, which includes the contemplation of the εἴδδ). At any rate, true ἀνεηή is 
essentially a form of knowledge. We need to have ζμθία and then we will also have ἀκδνεία, 
δζηαζμζύκδ and ζςθνμζύκδ. They are all different sides of the same inner disposition.
1673
   
   This does not mean that all moral differences between persons can be reduced to 
whether or not one has this knowledge. It is not a matter of all or nothing. Plato admits 
weaker forms of ἀνεηή, which he calls “popular or civic excellence” (δδιμηζηὴ ηαὶ πμθζηζηὴ 
ἀνεηή) in Phaedo.
1674
 But these are only semblances of excellence, and they are actually 
based on their opposites. As Socrates says, one is restrained (ζώθνςκ) because one fears pain 
                                                 
1668
 See e.g. Iliad IX.438-443, where the Homeric ideal is presented as: “ιύεςκ ηε ῥδη῅ν᾽ ἔιεκαζ πνδηη῅νά ηε 
ἔνβςκ”. For more on this, cp. e.g. C. BARCK, Wort und Tat bei Homer, Hildesheim/etc., Olms, 1976. 
1669
 For this idea, cp. e.g. Grg. 452d-e. 
1670
 For the discussion of this idea, see in particular La. 198a ff., Prt. 329d ff., 349b ff. and 358d ff. 
1671
 See e.g. Prt. 361a-b: “(...) κῦκ ζεαοηῶ ηἀκακηία ζπεύδεζξ, ἐπζπεζν῵κ ἀπμδε῔λαζ ὡξ πάκηα πνήιαηά ἐζηζκ 
ἐπζζηήιδ, ηαὶ ἟ δζηαζμζύκδ ηαὶ ζςθνμζύκδ ηαὶ ἟ ἀκδνεία, ᾧ ηνόπῳ ιάθζζη᾽ ἂκ δζδαηηὸκ θακείδ ἟ ἀνεηή.” See 
also Men. 88a ff. 
1672
 For the question of whether ἀνεηή can be taught of not, cp. Men. 70a and 86c ff. 
1673
 This is valid even for the passages in which the tripartition of the soul is presupposed, although in that case 
the question is a bit more complicated. Strictly speaking, justice and ζςθνμζύκδ do not consist in knowledge, 
but rather in the right arrangement of the soul‟s drives. However, this right arrangement is based on the 
development of our desire of knowledge and it brings about knowledge. For more on this, cp. Chap. 13, Sect. 
6.4. 
1674
 See Phd. 82a-b: “(...) μἱ ηὴκ δδιμηζηὴκ ηαὶ πμθζηζηὴκ ἀνεηὴκ ἐπζηεηδδεοηόηεξ, ἡκ δὴ ηαθμῦζζ ζςθνμζύκδκ 
ηε ηαὶ δζηαζμζύκδκ, ἐλ ἔεμοξ ηε ηαὶ ιεθέηδξ βεβμκο῔ακ ἄκεο θζθμζμθίαξ ηε ηαὶ κμῦ (...).” See also Rep. 500d. 
This is indeed the kind of excellence that characterizes all non-philosophers in the ideal πόθζξ. It is not based on 
true knowledge, but rather on good habits and correct δόλαζ. 
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or desires pleasure, which is itself a form of unrestraint – or one is courageous because one 
fears greater evils, and so one is courageous because one is frightened.
1675
 They are thus far 
from being true excellences, which can only be based on knowledge. They may imitate one‟s 
proper behavior, but they have no insight into why that must actually be done.
1676
 
 One could perhaps wonder why we need such an insight, but Plato often points to the 
fact that the superlative good requires true ἀνεηή. In fact, he even argues that it does not need 
any other goods – especially those that are intrinsically connected with the subjective sphere, 
such as pleasure or possessions. We only need to have knowledge of how to act and how to 
live. This will provide us with ἀνεηή, and ἀνεηή is sufficient for us to be happy. We will 
know how to guide ourselves and how to attain the good.
1677
 We will also be able to avoid 
making any practical mistakes (including those that seem to result from ἀηναζία). 
Consequently, we will be invulnerable to evil. In fact, the only evil is the opposite of      
ἀνεηή – namely, ηαηία. We can only be harmed by being ignorant or unjust. All other things 
cannot really harm us.
1678
  
 All this implies a radical inversion of our natural way of seeing things, as Callicles 
himself stresses in Gorgias, when he says to Socrates: “(...) if you are in earnest, and these 
things you‟re saying are really true, won‟t this human life of ours be turned upside down, and 
won‟t everything we do evidently be the opposite of what we should do?”
1679
 But the real 
nature of ἀνεηή and of the knowledge it implies is still somewhat vague, and thus we cannot 
yet fully understand what the possession of the superlative good corresponds to. We could 
perhaps think it consists in acting in a certain way and attaining certain goods, but it is not 
clear which good could really satisfy our desire – and knowing that seems to be an essential 
part of the knowledge of how to live. 
 In the dialogues, we find several discussions about what might be the superlative 
good. Sometimes different candidates are compared – especially pleasure and knowledge (but 
also honor). This is often determined by the soul‟s partition. But in some cases Plato simply 
compares the views that defend that these objects are the superlative good, and shows that 
they are all problematic. For instance, in the Republic Socrates briefly mentions that 
pleasures do not all have the same value. There are bad and undesirable pleasures, and thus 
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 See Phd. 68d ff. 
1676
 This means that a correct δόλα cannot provide ἀνεηή and the good. It can only help one behave correctly and 
attain certain goals. 
1677
 Cp. e.g. Men. 88a-d and Grg. 507b-c. 
1678
 See e.g. Ap. 41d: “(...) μ὎η ἔζηζκ ἀκδνὶ ἀβαεῶ ηαηὸκ μ὎δὲκ μὔηε γ῵κηζ μὔηε ηεθεοηήζακηζ (...).” 
1679
 See 481c: “εἰ ιὲκ βὰν ζπμοδάγεζξ ηε ηαὶ ηοβπάκεζ ηαῦηα ἀθδε῅ ὄκηα ἃ θέβεζξ, ἄθθμ ηζ ἠ ἟ι῵κ ὁ αίμξ 
ἀκαηεηναιιέκμξ ἂκ εἴδ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ ηαὶ πάκηα ηὰ ἐκακηία πνάηημιεκ, ὡξ ἔμζηεκ, ἠ ἃ δε῔;” 
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the criterion for the good must be something other than simple pleasure.
1680
 On the other 
hand, it is not clear which knowledge is the good. Socrates stresses that there is a tendency to 
say that the good is the knowledge of the good, but this appears to be circular.
1681
 Hence, we 
cannot easily say what the superlative good corresponds to. We could perhaps adopt the 
solution put forward in Philebus, when both views are also denied because neither pleasure 
nor knowledge seem to be sufficient by itself to fully satisfy our desire.
1682
 Socrates and 
Protarchus then consider the possibility of blending these two things and their mixture would 
then be the greatest good. This raises many questions (such as how they are to be mixed and 
which one plays a more important role in the mixture), and at the end it is also not entirely 
clear how their mixture can fully satisfy our desire.
1683
 
 However, there are several passages in the corpus that seem to describe (even if 
mostly in mythological terms) something like a superlative state – namely, the state in which 
one contemplates the superlative beings such as the good itself, the beautiful itself, and so on. 
This is what the guardians strive to achieve in the Republic and it is described as a state of 
private happiness.
1684
 It is also presented as a state of perfect happiness in Symposium and 
Phaedrus.
1685
 The vision of the perfect beings would allow us to fully satisfy our desires. 
However, the often mythological terms of the descriptions make it particularly difficult to 
understand what exactly such a state consists in.
1686
 It is also difficult to determine how we 
can pursue such a state and what a αίμξ based on such a pursuit may amount to.
1687
 As a 
matter of fact, it is not even clear we can ever attain such a state. However, Plato‟s texts 
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 See 505c: “ηί δὲ μἱ ηὴκ ἟δμκὴκ ἀβαεὸκ ὁνζγόιεκμζ; ι῵κ ιή ηζ ἐθάηημκμξ πθάκδξ ἔιπθεῳ η῵κ ἑηένςκ; ἠ μ὎ 
ηαὶ μὗημζ ἀκαβηάγμκηαζ ὁιμθμβε῔κ ἟δμκὰξ εἶκαζ ηαηάξ;     ζθόδνα βε.     ζοιααίκεζ δὴ α὎ημ῔ξ μἶιαζ ὁιμθμβε῔κ 
ἀβαεὰ εἶκαζ ηαὶ ηαηὰ ηα὎ηά.” 
1681
 See 505b-c: “(...) μἱ ημῦημ ἟βμύιεκμζ μ὎η ἔπμοζζ δε῔λαζ ἣηζξ θνόκδζζξ, ἀθθ᾽ ἀκαβηάγμκηαζ ηεθεοη῵κηεξ ηὴκ 
ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ θάκαζ.     ηαὶ ιάθα, ἔθδ, βεθμίςξ.     π῵ξ βὰν μ὎πί, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, εἰ ὀκεζδίγμκηέξ βε ὅηζ μ὎η ἴζιεκ ηὸ 
ἀβαεὸκ θέβμοζζ πάθζκ ὡξ εἰδόζζκ; θνόκδζζκ βὰν α὎ηό θαζζκ εἶκαζ ἀβαεμῦ, ὡξ αὖ ζοκζέκηςκ ἟ι῵κ ὅηζ θέβμοζζκ, 
ἐπεζδὰκ ηὸ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ θεέβλςκηαζ ὄκμια.     ἀθδεέζηαηα, ἔθδ.” 
1682
 Cp. 20b ff. 
1683
 The discussion is indeed imprecise in several respects. Socrates and Protarchus mix all sciences with the 
pure pleasures (see 61b ff.), and they determine the ranking of goods (66a ff). The result, however, takes for 
granted that we need knowledge and pleasure, but it does not explain why. It also does not explain how much 
pure pleasure and how perfect a knowledge we need.  
1684
 See Rep. 498b-c and 519b ff. 
1685
 Cp. Phdr. 246d ff. (especially 250b-c) and Smp. 210d ff. 
1686
 For instance, it is not clear whether we can reach such a state during life. It is also unclear whether such a 
state would require us to do something. Some passages point in that direction. In the Republic, one would have 
to rule the πόθζξ (see 519c ff.). In Smp. 206b ff., Plato speaks about procreating in what is beautiful. In 
Phaedrus, the soul is said to move the ηόζιμξ (see 246b-c). For more on what may be implied in the access to 
the εἴδδ and the difficulty in conceiving it, cp. Chap. 11, Sect. 2.5 and 3.4.  
1687
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 13, Sect. 6.4 and Chap. 14, Sect. 5.  
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suggest that such a form of contemplation would be the superlative good for all human 
beings.  
This does not mean that Plato completely disregards everything else, though. In fact, 
he admits the possibility that certain people, given their nature or circumstances, do not have 
access to this contemplation. But they can still achieve a kind of second-best state. In a way, 
philosophical examination as a pursuit of knowledge is a kind of substitute for the superlative 
good. That is perhaps why Socrates, in the Apology, identifies the greatest good with an 
unimpeded and perpetual examination of all persons and things.
1688
 But this may still 
presuppose that one will be able to contemplate truth. The same does not apply to other 
substitutes of the superlative good. In a way, the modalities of romantic love that include 
sensual pleasures and fail to lead us to a full contemplation of the true beings are a form of 
substitute of the superlative good.
1689
 They do not fully satisfy us, but are still better than our 
everyday concerns. Another substitute for the superlative good seems to be a life of popular 
excellence. One will be able to guide oneself in life and avoid making serious mistakes. Plato 
even seems to admit at some points that most people cannot aim at more than a weaker form 
of excellence. They can have no more than a correct δόλα about what they should do, because 
of their limited understanding and their limited ability to contemplate the εἴδδ that should 
determine our behavior and whose contemplation is the most desirable possession.
1690
 This is 
an improvement in comparison to a life full of false knowledge claims and vicious behavior. 
But it cannot fully satisfy us. It is at best a substitute of the superlative good and one will 
either be dissatisfied or one will have to resign oneself to the fact that this is all one can 
attain.  
 
6.2. The communal and the cosmic good. The problem of their interrelation with 
the individual good 
 
 The whole consideration of the good until now has neglected the fact that we as 
individuals belong to larger domains that are themselves related to goodness and badness. 
The good is not just a private affair, and thus the individual good is not the only good that is 
relevant for our life. Plato is very aware of this. He considers two domains that are essential 
parts of who we are – namely the social or “intersubjective” domain and the cosmic domain. 
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 See 40e ff. For an analysis of the passage, cp. Chap. 3 Sect. 3.1 above. 
1689
 See e.g. Phdr. 256a-e. 
1690
 See e.g. Phd. 82a-b. 
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We must therefore briefly consider how each of these domains is essentially related to 
goodness and badness, and then we must consider how – according to Plato – that may affect 
our own individual pursuit of the good.  
 Let us see the first domain. We are always related to others, since birth. In general, we 
have a family and friends, by whom we are helped, educated and influenced. We need them. 
But they have their own private relation to the superlative good, which may or may not be at 
odds with our own pursuit of the good. Indeed, some goods may be shared, others not. We 
may thus be faced with the choice between helping them or fighting with them for what we 
take to be the good. In this context, the cooperative ἀνεηαί we have considered (namely 
justice and sound-mindedness) play an important role. In their traditional conception, they 
imply respect for the others‟ pursuit of the good. In Plato‟s conception, things are more 
complex – especially insofar as his own version of the superlative good allows one to share 
the good with others and help them. One can thus promote the ἀνεηή and the ζμθία of others, 
as Socrates tries to do in the dialogues. The question is whether we should do it and what our 
motivation to do so might be. Should we do it out of self-interest (i.e., because it is somehow 
advantageous for us to do so) or is it rather a matter of benevolence (εὔκμζα) and pity 
(ἔθεμξ)? But let us leave aside this question for now.
1691
 The important thing here is the fact 
that we may have to choose between pursuing the superlative good and helping others, and it 
may even be required by our own pursuit of the good that we help others.  
 But the question is actually more complicated, because we are not just in contact with 
a few other people. Normally, we belong to a political entity – be it a πόθζξ or a country. 
According to Plato, this is not a simple fact, but rather a natural or constitutive need of ours. 
We all lack many things that are necessary not only for our survival, but also for living a 
good life, and so we need to cooperate with others, in order to better achieve them. This is 
what brings about and sustains a πόθζξ.
1692
 But normally we do not have to decide whether 
we will ally ourselves with others or not. We are born in political communities and our lives 
are shaped by their laws and customs (κόιμζ). As is stressed in Crito, we are educated by the 
κόιμζ and our possibilities are determined by them.
1693
 In the Republic, Plato goes further and 
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 For more on it, see Chap. 19, Sect. 5.1. 
1692
 See Rep. 369b: “βίβκεηαζ ημίκοκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, πόθζξ, ὡξ ἐβᾦιαζ, ἐπεζδὴ ηοβπάκεζ ἟ι῵κ ἕηαζημξ μ὎η α὎ηάνηδξ, 
ἀθθὰ πμθθ῵κ ὢκ ἐκδεήξ (...).” 
1693
 See 50d-e: “μ὎ πν῵ημκ ιέκ ζε ἐβεκκήζαιεκ ἟ιε῔ξ, ηαὶ δζ᾽ ἟ι῵κ ἔθααε ηὴκ ιδηένα ζμο ὁ παηὴν ηαὶ 
ἐθύηεοζέκ ζε; θνάζμκ μὖκ, ημύημζξ ἟ι῵κ, ημ῔ξ κόιμζξ ημ῔ξ πενὶ ημὺξ βάιμοξ, ιέιθῃ ηζ ὡξ μ὎ ηαθ῵ξ ἔπμοζζκ;‟ 
„μ὎ ιέιθμιαζ,‟ θαίδκ ἄκ. „ἀθθὰ ημ῔ξ πενὶ ηὴκ ημῦ βεκμιέκμο ηνμθήκ ηε ηαὶ παζδείακ ἐκ ᾗ ηαὶ ζὺ ἐπαζδεύεδξ; ἠ 
μ὎ ηαθ῵ξ πνμζέηαηημκ ἟ι῵κ μἱ ἐπὶ ημύηῳ ηεηαβιέκμζ κόιμζ, παναββέθθμκηεξ ηῶ παηνὶ ηῶ ζῶ ζε ἐκ ιμοζζηῆ ηαὶ 
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characterizes our existence as a permanent interaction between two isomorphic entities (our 
ροπή and the πόθζξ) that depend on each other in many different ways.
1694
 
This raises the question of which one is the more important. We saw that individual 
ροπαί pursue their own good, but Plato also argues that the πόθζξ has its own good and its 
own happiness, which are different from the good and happiness of the individuals.
1695
 The 
lawgiver should precisely aim at the good of the πόθζξ.
1696
 But what about individuals in 
general? How do they relate to the common and shared good? Individuals are indeed 
members of the πόθζξ or citizens and play a certain role in it. There is even an excellence of 
the citizen, that may differ from individual ἀνεηή.
1697
 The πόθζξ has its own requirements, 
and one requirement in particular is very important: the πόθζξ needs an order and it needs 
rulers. We must therefore decide between accepting the rule of others or fighting for 
power.
1698
 When we rule, we must also decide between seeking our own good or promoting 
the good of others (be it of individual others or of the πόθζξ in general).
1699
 
Obviously, the private and the public pursuit of the good may be in conflict. This 
becomes particularly clear in the ideal city of the Republic, where a particular class has the 
privilege of pursuing knowledge and possibly contemplating the truth – which means that 
they would attain what seems to be the superlative good and supreme happiness. Plato indeed 
describes this state as a state of individual happiness.
1700
 However, they are required to 
abandon this contemplation and govern the πόθζξ. They must preserve political order and 
stability, promote popular excellence in others, protect the philosophically gifted, and defend 
the πόθζξ from external threats. They are the only ones qualified to do so. But all this leaves 
little time to contemplation, which means that they must sacrifice their own happiness for the 
happiness of the πόθζξ. The problem then is why they should abdicate from philosophical 
contemplation and accept to rule the πόθζξ. Plato says that the philosophers in the ideal πόθζξ 
would owe a debt of gratitude to their πόθζξ and should therefore govern it when it needs 
                                                                                                                                                        
βοικαζηζηῆ παζδεύεζκ;‟ „ηαθ῵ξ,‟ θαίδκ ἄκ. „εἶεκ. ἐπεζδὴ δὲ ἐβέκμο ηε ηαὶ ἐλεηνάθδξ ηαὶ ἐπαζδεύεδξ, ἔπμζξ ἂκ 
εἰπε῔κ πν῵ημκ ιὲκ ὡξ μ὎πὶ ἟ιέηενμξ ἤζεα ηαὶ ἔηβμκμξ ηαὶ δμῦθμξ, α὎ηόξ ηε ηαὶ μἱ ζμὶ πνόβμκμζ;” 
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 For more on this, see Chap. 13, Sect. 4.4. 
1695
 See in particular Rep. 419a ff., 465d-466c, 519b ff. 
1696
 See e.g. Rep. 420b: “(...) μ὎ ιὴκ πνὸξ ημῦημ αθέπμκηεξ ηὴκ πόθζκ μἰηίγμιεκ, ὅπςξ ἕκ ηζ ἟ι῔κ ἔεκμξ ἔζηαζ 
δζαθενόκηςξ εὔδαζιμκ, ἀθθ᾽ ὅπςξ ὅηζ ιάθζζηα ὅθδ ἟ πόθζξ.” See also Lg. 875a-b: “(...) πμθζηζηῆ ηαὶ ἀθδεε῔ 
ηέπκῃ μ὎ ηὸ ἴδζμκ ἀθθὰ ηὸ ημζκὸκ ἀκάβηδ ιέθεζκ – ηὸ ιὲκ βὰν ημζκὸκ ζοκδε῔, ηὸ δὲ ἴδζμκ δζαζπᾶ ηὰξ πόθεζξ – ηαὶ 
ὅηζ ζοιθένεζ ηῶ ημζκῶ ηε ηαὶ ἰδίῳ, ημ῔κ ἀιθμ῔κ, ἠκ ηὸ ημζκὸκ ηζε῅ηαζ ηαθ῵ξ ι᾵θθμκ ἠ ηὸ ἴδζμκ (...).”  
1697
 In Apology, Socrates mentions the two. See 20b: “κῦκ δ᾽ ἐπεζδὴ ἀκενώπς ἐζηόκ, ηίκα α὎ημ῔κ ἐκ κῶ ἔπεζξ 
ἐπζζηάηδκ θααε῔κ; ηίξ η῅ξ ημζαύηδξ ἀνεη῅ξ, η῅ξ ἀκενςπίκδξ ηε ηαὶ πμθζηζη῅ξ, ἐπζζηήιςκ ἐζηίκ;” 
1698
 Cp. e.g. Rep. 347b-d. 
1699
 Cp. e.g. Rep. 343b ff. 
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 But does this mean that in a non-ideal city there would be no necessity to govern 
others? In Republic I, Plato says that one might want to rule in order to avoid being governed 
by worse people.
1702
 However, it is also conceivable that one would understand that there is a 
duty of governing others – for instance, because rendering life better for everyone (and thus 
promoting the good as much as possible) is the just thing to do.
1703
 The texts do not seem to 
give us a definite answer. They just show that there might be a conflict between one‟s own 
pursuit of the good and the communal good. 
 These are not the only problems with respect to others. The πόθζξ, as Plato conceives 
it, is also related to other πόθεζξ, to the Hellenic world in general, and even to the whole of 
humanity. Therefore, one may also need to promote the good of all others, which would at 
least partially annul the tribal or πόθζξ-centered view of reality. Plato sometimes considers 
this possibility. In Theaetetus, he contrasts a life dedicated to judicial and political matters in 
the πόθζξ to a life dedicated to the contemplation of the whole of space and time (which 
would also contemplate humanity and justice as such, instead of considering particular 
persons and particular events).
1704
 In Statesman, he critizes the division of humanity between 
Greeks and barbarians.
1705
 One may thus relate to an idea of humanity and such an idea may 
contain its own demands. Plato, however, never considers the question in depth. There are 
only a few moments where he seems to present an ideal of θζθακενςπία – for instance, when 
Socrates says in the Apology that, despite being closer to his fellow citizens, he examined 
everybody.
1706
 But is this something we should do? Should we promote the good of all 
human beings? And why?  
 These are the main questions concerning the relation between individual and 
communal good. But, as was said, we belong to still another domain to which the difference 
between goodness and badness seems to be relevant – namely, the universe at large (or in 
Plato‟s words “ηὸ π᾵κ”, “ηὸ ὅθμκ”, “ὁ μ὎νακόξ” or “ὁ ηόζιμξ”).
1707
 We normally do not pay 
much attention to it, since we are occupied with our everyday affairs or, at best, with the 
domain of the πόθζξ as a whole (as is described in the passage from Theaetetus above 
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 For all this, see once more Rep. 519c ff. 
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 See the above mentioned passage at Rep. 347b-d. 
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 See Rep. 520e: “(...) δίηαζα βὰν δὴ δζηαίμζξ ἐπζηάλμιεκ.” 
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 See the excursus in 172c ff.  
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 See 262b-263e. 
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ημ῔ξ ἀζημ῔ξ, ὅζῳ ιμο ἐββοηένς ἐζηὲ βέκεζ.” 
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 Moreover, the domain of nature at large was traditionally seen as something 
that was not our business. It was the domain of the gods and one should not meddle in it.
1709
 
However, we can also identify a kind of good in this domain – namely, the cosmic good or 
the good of the whole. 
 Plato describes in several passages, and especially in Timaeus, how the universe is not 
chaotic or random (even if it may contain a chaotic element). It contains an order and, 
according to the texts, this means that it is constituted by intelligent design. There is a divine 
intelligence or a divine craftsman that wants things to be as good as possible, and so this 
being disposes things in the best possible manner. In other words, there is something like a 
final cause for the sake of which things are as they are. At least this is what is outlined in the 
several passages of the Platonic corpus. The characters describe something like a cosmic plan 
and define its relation with god and the εἴδδ – especially with goodness as such.
1710
 But 
regardless of the precise nature of the cosmic order (i.e., regardless of whether it has an 
objective foundation, as Plato argues, or whether this order is a subjective illusion), we seem 
nevertheless able to identify something like the good of nature or the good of the cosmos, and 
we may then wonder what its meaning for our own life and for the πόθζξ is. Both seem to 
depend on nature and the cosmos at large.  
 According to Plato, we may contemplate the ηόζιμξ in order to better understand our 
place in it and what we should do. This contemplation of the whole plays an important role in 
Timaeus. By contemplating celestial orbits or revolutions we can bring order to our own mind 
and its inner orbits or revolutions.
1711
 We will then be able to better understand things, 
because we will be able to better attribute general predicates to empirical reality (and thus we 
will come closer to resemble the divine demiurge and the way he used the εἴδδ as the models 
to create the ηόζιμξ).
1712
 In Theaetetus, Plato also establishes a connection between the 
contemplation of the whole and the understanding of εἴδδ.
1713
 It seems that turning our 
attention to the cosmos and its good can help us better understand particular things. Perhaps it 
may also help us lead a better life, insofar as it helps us understand what we should do. It may 
for instance let us see the importance of order and goodness in all domains. Finally, the 
ordered whole is also something constitutively ηαθόξ and thus it may help us satisfy our 
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 See 172c ff. 
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 We considered how this idea played an important role in the Apology. Cp. Chap. 1, Sect. 2.2. 
1710
 See Phd. 97c ff., Phlb. 28d-e, Plt. 269c ff. and the whole Timaeus. 
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 See in particular 90c-d. Cp. also 43a ff., 47c-d. 
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 Cp. 28a ff. and 47c. 
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 Plato does not say much about these matters, but it seems clear that our 
relation to the individual and the public good may be affected by our contemplation of the 
cosmos and of its relation to the good. 
In sum, the different domains (individual ροπή, πόθζξ and ηόζιμξ at large) are 
somehow interconnected and this interconnection affects our private pursuit of the good. We 
could be tempted to have an excessively individualistic notion of the good, but Plato stresses 
the importance of having these other domains in mind when we try to determine what is best 
for us. This raises difficult questions about whether and to what extent the individual should 
be subordinated to the community and to the whole. The corpus (as usual) does not say 
anything definitive about the matter, but at least it reveals the importance of having these 
questions in mind.  
 
6.3. The ἰδέα ηνῦ ἀγαζνῦ and its structural position in knowledge and reality 
 
 We have seen that there are several kinds of good. There are intermediate goods and 
the superlative good of the individual, but there are also the public and the cosmic good 
(which may in turn imply their own intermediate goods). But now we have to consider one 
final question: namely, the fact that for Plato these multiple goods seem to presuppose 
something like the ἰδέα ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ – i.e., the mode of being that corresponds to goodness as 
such, which informs all particular manifestations of the good and is not reducible to them.
1715
 
In other words, we need to have some understanding of goodness as such if we are to 
experience all other goods as such.   
 Plato briefly discusses this general mode of being in the Republic and refers to it in 
several other texts. However, his conception of goodness itself is indeterminate in many 
respects.
1716
 He presents only some formal traits of the good itself, which raise several 
questions, especially concerning its relevance for our practical life and for knowledge in 
general. Aristotle notoriously criticized Plato‟s emphasis on goodness as such, since by itself 
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 There are many references in the texts to the beauty of the universe and of its parts. See e.g. Ti. 28a-b, 29a, 
30a-b, 92c. 
1715
 Plato often mentions goodness itself when listing different εἴδδ – see e.g. Phd. 75c-d, 76d 100b, Phdr.  
246d-e, Prm. 130b, 134c. For its relation with particular things, see e.g. See Rep. 505a: “ἐπεὶ ὅηζ βε ἟ ημῦ 
ἀβαεμῦ ἰδέα ιέβζζημκ ιάεδια, πμθθάηζξ ἀηήημαξ, ᾗ δὴ ηαὶ δίηαζα ηαὶ ηἆθθα πνμζπνδζάιεκα πνήζζια ηαὶ 
ὠθέθζια βίβκεηαζ.” 
1716
 Cp. footnote 1648 above. 
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it does not seem to be able render anything better.
1717
 Plato, however, describes it as 
something essential for our practical life. Moreover, he stresses its importance for knowledge. 
He considers it the highest teaching and seems to ascribe to it a central role among the 
general forms of being or εἴδδ.
1718
 We must therefore consider what is involved in this notion 
and what its relevance might be. In particular, we must see how we experience it and how the 
understanding of goodness as such may shape our life and perhaps even reality (or at the very 
least the way we see it). At first sight, we may tend to agree with Aristotle. Goodness itself 
may seem useless. However, we must take into account the possibility of it playing a tacit 
role in our life. It may determine the way we act and how we see things, and if we happen to 
have a defective understanding of it, it may also cause practical mistakes and cognitive 
distortions.  
 If we look at the texts, we see that Plato seems to admit different levels of influence of 
the good itself. First, there is the level we considered in Section 3-5. Our ροπή tries to reach 
the superlative good and it must identify it with something. In other words, we need to have a 
particular view or judgment about the good and this is what guides us in life. Based on such a 
view, we will also determine many other things and form many other beliefs, which will 
determine our situation and the value different things may play in our life. But the view about 
the superlative good does not necessarily coincide with goodness itself, even if it is somehow 
referred to it. Indeed, if we had no understanding of the predicate “good”, we would probably 
not be able to desire anything, or at least we would not be able to direct our desire at 
anything.
1719
 But our understanding of it may be defective, as may be our identification of the 
superlative good and, consequently, of everything else that depends on it. 
 Plato is very aware that our view of the superlative good and all subordinate views 
may be wrong. But he also admits that we may have a true view about the superlative good, 
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 For Aristotle‟s criticism of the good itself, see Ethica Nichomachea 1096a11 ff. For the particular criticism 
above mentioned, see in particular 1096b31ff.: “ὁιμίςξ δὲ ηαὶ πενὶ η῅ξ ἰδέαξ· εἰ βὰν ηαὶ ἔζηζκ ἕκ ηζ ηὸ ημζκῆ 
ηαηδβμνμύιεκμκ ἀβαεὸκ ἠ πςνζζηὸκ α὎ηό ηζ ηαε᾽ α὏ηό, δ῅θμκ ὡξ μ὎η ἂκ εἴδ πναηηὸκ μ὎δὲ ηηδηὸκ ἀκενώπῳ· 
κῦκ δὲ ημζμῦηόκ ηζ γδηε῔ηαζ. ηάπα δέ ηῳ δόλεζεκ ἂκ αέθηζμκ εἶκαζ βκςνίγεζκ α὎ηὸ πνὸξ ηὰ ηηδηὰ ηαὶ πναηηὰ η῵κ 
ἀβαε῵κ· μἷμκ βὰν πανάδεζβια ημῦη᾽ ἔπμκηεξ ι᾵θθμκ εἰζόιεεα ηαὶ ηὰ ἟ι῔κ ἀβαεά, ηἂκ εἰδ῵ιεκ, ἐπζηεολόιεεα 
α὎η῵κ. πζεακόηδηα ιὲκ μὖκ ηζκα ἔπεζ ὁ θόβμξ, ἔμζηε δὲ ηα῔ξ ἐπζζηήιαζξ δζαθςκε῔κ· π᾵ζαζ βὰν ἀβαεμῦ ηζκὸξ 
ἐθζέιεκαζ ηαὶ ηὸ ἐκδεὲξ ἐπζγδημῦζαζ παναθείπμοζζ ηὴκ βκ῵ζζκ α὎ημῦ. ηαίημζ αμήεδια ηδθζημῦημκ ημὺξ ηεπκίηαξ 
ἅπακηαξ ἀβκμε῔κ ηαὶ ιδδ᾽ ἐπζγδηε῔κ μ὎η εὔθμβμκ. ἄπμνμκ δὲ ηαὶ ηί ὠθεθδεήζεηαζ ὏θάκηδξ ἠ ηέηηςκ πνὸξ ηὴκ 
α὏ημῦ ηέπκδκ εἰδὼξ ηὸ α὎ηὸ ημῦημ ἀβαεόκ, ἠ π῵ξ ἰαηνζηώηενμξ ἠ ζηναηδβζηώηενμξ ἔζηαζ ὁ ηὴκ ἰδέακ α὎ηὴκ 
ηεεεαιέκμξ. θαίκεηαζ ιὲκ βὰν μ὎δὲ ηὴκ ὏βίεζακ μὕηςξ ἐπζζημπε῔κ ὁ ἰαηνόξ, ἀθθὰ ηὴκ ἀκενώπμο, ι᾵θθμκ δ᾽ ἴζςξ 
ηὴκ ημῦδε· ηαε᾽ ἕηαζημκ βὰν ἰαηνεύεζ. ηαὶ πενὶ ιὲκ ημύηςκ ἐπὶ ημζμῦημκ εἰνήζες.”  
1718
 See Rep. 504c ff., 509b, 517b-c. 
1719
 Cp. Rep. 505d-e: “ὃ δὴ δζώηεζ ιὲκ ἅπαζα ροπὴ ηαὶ ημύημο ἕκεηα πάκηα πνάηηεζ, ἀπμιακηεομιέκδ ηζ εἶκαζ, 
ἀπμνμῦζα δὲ ηαὶ μ὎η ἔπμοζα θααε῔κ ἱηακ῵ξ ηί πμη᾽ ἐζηὶκ μ὎δὲ πίζηεζ πνήζαζεαζ ιμκίιῳ μἵᾳ ηαὶ πενὶ ηἆθθα, δζὰ 
ημῦημ δὲ ἀπμηοβπάκεζ ηαὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ εἴ ηζ ὄθεθμξ ἤκ (...).” 
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which will be the basis for true views of everything in life. Indeed, if we have real knowledge 
about the superlative good, we will also be able to determine how to follow it and what the 
role of everything in our life is. As Socrates says in the Republic, if we correctly determine 
what the real good is, then we will be able to act lucidly and correctly, and this is then the 
cause of all correct and commendable things.
1720
  
In saying this, Plato seems to restrict the good mainly to the practical domain and the 
views more directly connected with it. But in his texts he goes much further, and describes 
goodness as such as a condition for all knowledge and even for all reality. In fact, goodness 
as such seems to be the basis of all particular beings (πμθθά), of the general modes of being 
(εἴδδ) and even of the ηόζιμξ at large. This is what Socrates outlines in the Republic, when 
he presents the simile of the sun (though the simile may be construed in different ways, as we 
will see).
1721
 Socrates describes the good itself as something that belongs to the domain of 
true beings, and in fact as something that is even beyond this domain (ἐπέηεζκα η῅ξ 
μ὎ζίαξ).
1722
 One immediately associates this with what is later said in the simile of the line, 
when Socrates talks of an ultimate principle (ἀνπή) of all knowledge, whose knowledge 
would be fully transparent and would not presuppose anything else. This is what is implied in 
the notion of ἀκοπόεεημκ.
1723
 All other εἴδδ (and also all empirical beings) would be based in 
this first principle. It is not clear whether this means that they would be deduced from it (as if 
they were wholly contained in it) or just decisively determined by it. But at any rate this first 
principle seems to correspond to the ἰδέα ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ (even if in other texts other general 
modes of being seem to be at the center – such as beauty in Phaedrus or being itself in 
Sophist). Indeed, when comparing the good itself to the sun, Plato stresses that it illuminates 
things and allows us to know them.
1724
 This means that it lets us see all εἴδδ (both the 
practical εἴδδ and the others) and the ηόζιμξ in general. The same idea is then further 
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 See Rep. 517b-c: “ηὰ δ᾽ μὖκ ἐιμὶ θαζκόιεκα μὕης θαίκεηαζ, ἐκ ηῶ βκςζηῶ ηεθεοηαία ἟ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ ἰδέα ηαὶ 
ιόβζξ ὁν᾵ζεαζ, ὀθεε῔ζα δὲ ζοθθμβζζηέα εἶκαζ ὡξ ἄνα π᾵ζζ πάκηςκ αὕηδ ὀνε῵κ ηε ηαὶ ηαθ῵κ αἰηία, ἔκ ηε ὁναηῶ 
θ῵ξ ηαὶ ηὸκ ημύημο ηύνζμκ ηεημῦζα, ἔκ ηε κμδηῶ α὎ηὴ ηονία ἀθήεεζακ ηαὶ κμῦκ παναζπμιέκδ, ηαὶ ὅηζ δε῔ 
ηαύηδκ ἰδε῔κ ηὸκ ιέθθμκηα ἐιθνόκςξ πνάλεζκ ἠ ἰδίᾳ ἠ δδιμζίᾳ.” 
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 See Rep. 506e ff. 
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 See Rep. 509b: “ηαὶ ημ῔ξ βζβκςζημιέκμζξ ημίκοκ ιὴ ιόκμκ ηὸ βζβκώζηεζεαζ θάκαζ ὏πὸ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ πανε῔καζ, 
ἀθθὰ ηαὶ ηὸ εἶκαί ηε ηαὶ ηὴκ μ὎ζίακ ὏π᾽ ἐηείκμο α὎ημ῔ξ πνμζε῔καζ, μ὎η μ὎ζίαξ ὄκημξ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ, ἀθθ᾽ ἔηζ 
ἐπέηεζκα η῅ξ μ὎ζίαξ πνεζαείᾳ ηαὶ δοκάιεζ ὏πενέπμκημξ.” 
1723
 See Rep. 510b and 511b. For more on this, cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 1.3 a) and Chap. 9, Sect. 3.2 
1724
 See 508d-e: “μὕης ημίκοκ ηαὶ ηὸ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ὧδε κόεζ· ὅηακ ιὲκ μὗ ηαηαθάιπεζ ἀθήεεζά ηε ηαὶ ηὸ ὄκ, εἰξ 
ημῦημ ἀπενείζδηαζ, ἐκόδζέκ ηε ηαὶ ἔβκς α὎ηὸ ηαὶ κμῦκ ἔπεζκ θαίκεηαζ· ὅηακ δὲ εἰξ ηὸ ηῶ ζηόηῳ ηεηναιέκμκ, ηὸ 
βζβκόιεκόκ ηε ηαὶ ἀπμθθύιεκμκ, δμλάγεζ ηε ηαὶ ἀιαθοώηηεζ ἄκς ηαὶ ηάης ηὰξ δόλαξ ιεηααάθθμκ, ηαὶ ἔμζηεκ αὖ 
κμῦκ μ὎η ἔπμκηζ.     ἔμζηε βάν.     ημῦημ ημίκοκ ηὸ ηὴκ ἀθήεεζακ πανέπμκ ημ῔ξ βζβκςζημιέκμζξ ηαὶ ηῶ βζβκώζημκηζ 
ηὴκ δύκαιζκ ἀπμδζδὸκ ηὴκ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ ἰδέακ θάεζ εἶκαζ· αἰηίακ δ᾽ ἐπζζηήιδξ μὖζακ ηαὶ ἀθδεείαξ, ὡξ 
βζβκςζημιέκδξ ιὲκ δζακμμῦ (...).” 
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emphasized by the fact that, as the sun is said to generate and nurture all things, goodness 
itself is said to give them existence.
1725
 Goodness as such seems therefore responsible not 
only for truth and knowledge, but also for the existence of everything.  
 Such a description, however, leaves many questions open. The text does not say how 
exactly the good itself relates to the other general modes of being or εἴδδ. In fact, it is not 
even clear whether all εἴδδ are interrelated and how. Therefore, we do not know if according 
to Plato all the other εἴδδ are supposed to be contained in the good, nor do we know whether 
the good is completely independent from the other εἴδδ or is still somehow determined by 
them. The notion of ἀκοπόεεημξ ἀνπή seems to suggest that the good stands only in itself, but 
it is not clear. Likewise unclear is the relation between good itself and the ηόζιμξ. In 
Timaeus, the whole cosmic system seems to be at least partly deduced from something 
similar to the ἰδέα ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ, but the analyses are still rather vague.
1726
 
 In sum, Plato stresses the fundamental role played by the good itself in the structure of 
reality, but he does not explain in detail how the good relates to other beings. But this is not 
the only limitation of Plato‟s description. He also talks of the notion of good as something 
that must have its own content, but he does not determine it with precision either. In the 
Republic he says very little of what the good itself is. In Philebus, he tries to understand the 
good by considering the closely related notions of beauty, proportion or fitness (ζοιιεηνία), 
and truth, but this is still vague.
1727
 In general, the good itself seems to have some connection 
to the ideas of functionality, order, measure, perfection, and oneness. Hence, all good things 
must also be somehow characterized by these properties.  
However, goodness as such also seems to be intimately connected with our life, and 
all these analyses do not let us understand whether goodness as such is the same thing as the 
superlative good we pursue or not. Goodness as such may be an object of contemplation and, 
if the whole of reality is somehow deduced from it, then contemplating it would amount to 
contemplating the whole of reality. Such a contemplation may actually be the only thing that 
satisfies our superlative desire. However, Plato is never very explicit about this.  
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 See 509b: “ηὸκ ἣθζμκ ημ῔ξ ὁνςιέκμζξ μ὎ ιόκμκ μἶιαζ ηὴκ ημῦ ὁν᾵ζεαζ δύκαιζκ πανέπεζκ θήζεζξ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ 
ηὴκ βέκεζζκ ηαὶ αὔλδκ ηαὶ ηνμθήκ, μ὎ βέκεζζκ α὎ηὸκ ὄκηα.    π῵ξ βάν;     ηαὶ ημ῔ξ βζβκςζημιέκμζξ ημίκοκ ιὴ 
ιόκμκ ηὸ βζβκώζηεζεαζ θάκαζ ὏πὸ ημῦ ἀβαεμῦ πανε῔καζ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ ηὸ εἶκαί ηε ηαὶ ηὴκ μ὎ζίακ ὏π᾽ ἐηείκμο α὎ημ῔ξ 
πνμζε῔καζ (...).” 
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 Timaeus stresses the importance of goodness several times throughout the text. See in particular 29e ff. 
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 See 64e ff. – and especially 65a: “μ὎ημῦκ εἰ ιὴ ιζᾶ δοκάιεεα ἰδέᾳ ηὸ ἀβαεὸκ εδνεῦζαζ, ζὺκ ηνζζὶ θααόκηεξ, 
ηάθθεζ ηαὶ ζοιιεηνίᾳ ηαὶ ἀθδεείᾳ, θέβςιεκ ὡξ ημῦημ μἷμκ ἓκ ὀνεόηαη᾽ ἂκ αἰηζαζαίιεε᾽ ἂκ η῵κ ἐκ ηῆ ζοιιείλεζ, 
ηαὶ δζὰ ημῦημ ὡξ ἀβαεὸκ ὂκ ημζαύηδκ α὎ηὴκ βεβμκέκαζ.” 
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 In sum, the good itself may be more practical, and thus emphasize the constitutive 
relation of the whole of reality to our life, but it may also be the ultimate reality that is the 
basis of all being and all knowledge. Both things are somehow intertwined, though it is 
difficult to say which (if any) has precedence. At any rate, Plato seems to recognize that there 
is something like a general understanding of goodness as such, which may be more or less 
imprecise, but at any rate shapes both our life and reality in general. He also suggests two 
things: first, that our practical dimension and our practical views are somehow connected 
with all other questions (including the first principle of reality); and, second, that practical 
questions have a central importance for the understanding of reality in general. These are 
very important indications. However, Plato‟s texts never fully define the precise connection 










“Minha alma é uma orchestra occulta; não sei que instrumentos 
tangem e rangem, cordas e harpas, timbales e tambores, dentro de mim. 
Só me conheço como symphonia.” 





According to the model considered in the previous chapter, the soul‟s desire has a 
coherent and unified structure. The soul pursues the superlative good and this pursuit (along 
with our views about the good) accounts for all our particular desires and all our actions. 
There are, however, several important passages of the corpus that speak of a constitutive 
diversity of our desires or motivations. We have drives or urges that are directed at different 
objects and are irreducible to each other. Plato not only affirms this diversity, but he also 
produces a typology that identifies the main kinds of desire or, as we could also say, the 
alphabet of our motivations. These motivations are referred back to different principles or 
parts of our ροπή, which constitute the basis for the differentiation of motivations or drives. 
Our soul is in itself fragmented and such a fragmentation determines all our actions and our 
entire life or αίμξ.  
Thus, we seem to have a second model for understanding the ροπή‟s practical 
dimension, and the existence of these two models raises the question of their compatibility. It 
is not immediately clear whether these are alternate models or whether they somehow 
complement each other. The corpus just presents them side by side, and it is up to us to 
decide how they relate to each other. The developmentalist reading of Plato, for instance, 
regards the first model as a purely intellectualist model inspired by the historical Socrates, 
whereas the second model is seen as a model that is aware of the limitations of our intellect 
and thus corrects the Socratic model. Some passages do indeed suggest a conflict of models. 
But there are also passages that suggest that they can be combined and integrated in a unitary 
                                                 
1728
 See F. PESSOA, Livro do Desasocego, vol. 1, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda, 2010, 13. 
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model, and this is a possibility we are going to explore in the following pages. Our analysis 
of the tripartition will aim to develop what we saw in the previous chapter and not to refute it. 





1. The idea of a partition of the ςπρή 
 
 The very idea of a partition of the soul poses a problem, insofar as it is at odds with 
passages that emphasize the ροπή‟s simplicity, uniformity or homogeneity (in contrast with 
the body‟s complexity and mutability).
1730
 A partition of the soul threatens the soul‟s identity 
and brings about a sort of divided or fragmented self. Consequently, the Platonic corpus 
seems to contradict itself in this respect, as in many others. But are the ideas of identity and 
partition actually incompatible? How are the parts of the soul conceived and how they can be 
connected and compose a single being? These are decisive questions and in order to answer 
them we have to consider the general model of the partition. There are many important 
indications throughout the corpus, but the most developed discussion of this question is found 
in Republic IV, in the passage where the tripartition of the soul is first introduced.
1731
 Let us 
then see how the partition is conceived in this text.  
 First of all, it is important to consider the language used in the Republic. The term 
“part” (which translates the Greek word ιένμξ) might suggest the idea of pieces or      
                                                 
1729
 The bibliography on this topic is extremely vast. See e.g. F. CORNFORD, Psychology and Social Structure 
in the Republic of Plato, The Classical Quarterly 6 (1912), 246-265; A. GRAESER, Probleme der platonischen 
Seelenteilungslehre. Überlegungen zur Frage der Kontinuität im Denken Platons, München, Beck, 1969; T. 
ROBINSON, Plato‟s Psychology, Toronto & Buffalo, Toronto University Press, 1970; J. MOLINE, Plato on the 
Complexity of the Psyche, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (1978), 1-26; J. ANNAS, An Introduction 
to Plato’s Republic, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, 109-152; J. de ROMILLY, Les conflits de l‟âme 
dans le Phèdre de Platon, Wiener Studien 16 (1982), 100–113; L. GERSON, A Note on Tripartition and 
Immortality, Apeiron 20 (1987), 81-96; C. KAHN, Plato‟s Theory of Desire, The Review of Metaphysics 41 
(1987), 77-103; J. CONSTÂNCIO, Percepção e Compreensão em Platão. Um Estudo Fenomenológico com 
Especial Referência ao Teeteto, Diss. Univ. Nova de Lisboa, 1995, 334-511; S. BÜTTNER, Die 
Literaturtheorie bei Platon und ihre anthropologische  egr ndung, Tübingen, Francke, 2000, 18-130; H. 
LORENZ, The Brute Within. Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford/etc., Clarendon Press, 2006,       
1-110; C. SHIELDS, Plato‟s Divided Soul, in M. McPHERRAN (ed.), Plato’s Republic. A Critical Guide, 
Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 2010, 147-170; R. BARNEY et al. (eds.), Plato and the Divided 
Self, Cambridge/etc., Cambridge University Press, 2012; N. NOTOMI & L. BRISSON (eds.), Dialogues on 
Plato’s Politeia (Republic). Selected Papers from the Ninth Symposium Platonicum, Sankt Augustin, Academia, 
2013, 161-220.    
1730
 See e.g. Phd. 78b-80e – and in particular 80a-b: “(...) ηῶ ιὲκ εείῳ ηαὶ ἀεακάηῳ ηαὶ κμδηῶ ηαὶ ιμκμεζδε῔ ηαὶ 
ἀδζαθύηῳ ηαὶ ἀεὶ ὡζαύηςξ ηαηὰ ηα὎ηὰ ἔπμκηζ ἑαοηῶ ὁιμζόηαημκ εἶκαζ ροπή, ηῶ δὲ ἀκενςπίκῳ ηαὶ εκδηῶ ηαὶ 
πμθοεζδε῔ ηαὶ ἀκμήηῳ ηαὶ δζαθοηῶ ηαὶ ιδδέπμηε ηαηὰ ηα὎ηὰ ἔπμκηζ ἑαοηῶ ὁιμζόηαημκ αὖ εἶκαζ ζ῵ια.” 
1731
 See 435b ff. 
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portions – i.e., of entities that are spatial and external to each other.
1732
 However, what is at 
issue is something else entirely. Μένδ is also the Greek word for members or organs of the 
body, which are characterized by performing a particular function, and the idea of function is 
indeed central in Plato‟s use of the notion of ιένμξ to designate the “parts” of the soul. This 
can be seen in the fact that Plato also refers to these “parts” as “that which does something” 
or “that with which the soul does something”.
1733
 But this is not all. Plato also uses the 
language of classification to designate the parts as such. He describes them as types or classes 
of being (εἴδδ or βέκδ). These terms belong to medical and biological contexts, as we saw 




 The most decisive aspect, though, is the fact that the parts of the soul have an active 
nature. In this sense, Plato‟s conception echoes the already mentioned model of deliberation 
we find already in Homer. In moments of great tension, characters are presented as talking to 
a part of them (to some “soul organ”) as if it were an external agent with its own ideas and its 
own will, which would be impelling them to act in a certain way.
1735
 As we will see, Plato 
also develops the idea of an interaction and dialogue between different principles of action. 
At some points, these principles are even described as a kind of inner agents, psychological 
subjects, or homunculi – which raises questions about whether this model really is really able 
to explain our behavior, since each part seems to replicate within itself the very structure they 
were supposed to explain.
1736
 But in order to discuss this question, we must first see how 
Plato identifies and defines each part of the soul. 
 In Republic IV, Socrates starts by referring to the previously established isomorphism 
between the soul and the πόθζξ, which leads one to expect the soul to be composed of parts 
similar to those that have just been identified as parts of the πόθζξ (namely, its three social 
classes).
1737
 Then, he asks whether all our actions are performed with the same “part” of the 
soul (which would thus correspond to the whole soul), or whether different actions are 
                                                 
1732
 For the use of ιένμξ in this context, cp. e.g. Rep. 442b, 442c, 444b, 577d, 581a, 583a. 
1733
 Designations such as ηὸ θμβζζηζηόκ (e.g. 439d) and ηὸ ἐπζεοιδηζηόκ (e.g. 439e) have an active sense. The 
parts are also said to be ηὸ ᾧ εοιόοιεεα (439e), ηὸ ᾧ θμβίγεηαζ (439d), ηὸ ᾧ ιακεάκεζ ἄκενςπμξ (580d), and so 
on.  
1734
 For the use of these words in this context, see e.g. 435c, 435e, 441c. For more on their sense (especially the 
sense of εἶδμξ), cp. Chap. 6 Sect. 2.2. 
1735
 See e.g. Iliad XI.403-12; XXII.98-131, Odyssey XX.1-30. For some secondary literature on the subject, cp. 
footnote 1626 above. 
1736
 For more on this, see in particular Sect. 5.2 below. 
1737
 See 434d-436a. We will carefully consider this isomorphism and what it implies in Sect. 4.4 below. 
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performed with different parts.
1738
 The answer is not easy. As we saw above, Plato often 
stresses the invisibility of the soul and how we have no direct access to its inner constitution 
or θύζζξ.
1739
 Hence we cannot immediately see how it makes us act. We need an indirect 
method, and this is what Socrates provides us in this passage. He introduces what is often 
called “the principle of opposites”, according to which “the same thing won‟t be willing at 
the same time to do or suffer opposites with respect to the same part and in relation to the 
same thing”.
1740
 This means, for instance, that something can only stand still and move if one 
part of it stands still and another part moves.
1741
 Therefore, if we are to distinguish parts of 
the soul, we need to identify actions of the soul that oppose each other. More precisely, we 
need to see the soul assenting, longing for, embracing, and at the same time refusing, 
rejecting, thrusting away the same thing.
1742
 It is like the archer which “thrust[s] the bow 
away and draw[s] it near”, but he does so insofar as “one hand pushes it away and the other 
pulls it in”.
1743
 One part must bid something and another forbid it.
1744
 In other words, it is 
necessary to find moments of great tension (like the ones found in Homer), when the soul is 
pulled in different directions or when it is in conflict with itself (or in a kind of civil         
strife – ζηάζζξ). This is when we can identify different parts of the soul in action. Such inner 
                                                 
1738
 See 436a-b: “ηόδε δὲ ἢδδ παθεπόκ, εἰ ηῶ α὎ηῶ ημύηῳ ἕηαζηα πνάηημιεκ ἠ ηνζζὶκ μὖζζκ ἄθθμ ἄθθῳ· 
ιακεάκμιεκ ιὲκ ἑηένῳ, εοιμύιεεα δὲ ἄθθῳ η῵κ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ, ἐπζεοιμῦιεκ δ᾽ αὖ ηνίηῳ ηζκὶ η῵κ πενὶ ηὴκ ηνμθήκ ηε 
ηαὶ βέκκδζζκ ἟δμκ῵κ ηαὶ ὅζα ημύηςκ ἀδεθθά, ἠ ὅθῃ ηῆ ροπῆ ηαε᾽ ἕηαζημκ α὎η῵κ πνάηημιεκ, ὅηακ ὁνιήζςιεκ. 
ηαῦη᾽ ἔζηαζ ηὰ παθεπὰ δζμνίζαζεαζ ἀλίςξ θόβμο.     ηαὶ ἐιμὶ δμηε῔, ἔθδ.     ὧδε ημίκοκ ἐπζπεζν῵ιεκ α὎ηὰ 
ὁνίγεζεαζ, εἴηε ηὰ α὎ηὰ ἀθθήθμζξ εἴηε ἕηενά ἐζηζ.” 
1739
 See Chap. 10 Sect. 2. 
1740
 See 436b-c: “δ῅θμκ ὅηζ ηα὎ηὸκ ηἀκακηία πμζε῔κ ἠ πάζπεζκ ηαηὰ ηα὎ηόκ βε ηαὶ πνὸξ ηα὎ηὸκ μ὎η ἐεεθήζεζ 
ἅια, ὥζηε ἄκ πμο ε὏νίζηςιεκ ἐκ α὎ημ῔ξ ηαῦηα βζβκόιεκα, εἰζόιεεα ὅηζ μ὎ ηα὎ηὸκ ἤκ ἀθθὰ πθείς.” Once more, I 
follow A. Bloom‟s translation. See also 436c: “(...) ἑζηάκαζ, εἶπμκ, ηαὶ ηζκε῔ζεαζ ηὸ α὎ηὸ ἅια ηαηὰ ηὸ α὎ηὸ ἆνα 
δοκαηόκ;     μ὎δαι῵ξ.” A similar principle plays a central role in the differentiation of the cognitive powers in 
book V (see 477c-d). Later, in 602e, Plato formulates the principle as “ηῶ α὎ηῶ ἅια πενὶ ηα὎ηὰ ἐκακηία 
δμλάγεζκ ἀδύκαημκ εἶκαζ.” All these formulations have some resemblance to Aristotle‟s so-called principle of 
contradiction (see Metaphysics 1005a19 ff.), but we will leave that question aside.   
1741
 Plato gives the example of a human being that moves his hands and a top that spins and stays in the same 
place. See 436c-e. 
1742
 Cp. 437b-d: “ἆν᾽ ἂκ μὖκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ηὸ ἐπζκεύεζκ ηῶ ἀκακεύεζκ ηαὶ ηὸ ἐθίεζεαί ηζκμξ θααε῔κ ηῶ ἀπανκε῔ζεαζ 
ηαὶ ηὸ πνμζάβεζεαζ ηῶ ἀπςεε῔ζεαζ, πάκηα ηὰ ημζαῦηα η῵κ ἐκακηίςκ ἀθθήθμζξ εείδξ εἴηε πμζδιάηςκ εἴηε 
παεδιάηςκ; μ὎δὲκ βὰν ηαύηῃ δζμίζεζ.     ἀθθ᾽, ἤ δ᾽ ὅξ, η῵κ ἐκακηίςκ.     ηί μὖκ; ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ· δζρ῅κ ηαὶ πεζκ῅κ ηαὶ 
ὅθςξ ηὰξ ἐπζεοιίαξ, ηαὶ αὖ ηὸ ἐεέθεζκ ηαὶ ηὸ αμύθεζεαζ, μ὎ πάκηα ηαῦηα εἰξ ἐηε῔κά πμζ ἂκ εείδξ ηὰ εἴδδ ηὰ 
κοκδὴ θεπεέκηα; μἷμκ ἀεὶ ηὴκ ημῦ ἐπζεοιμῦκημξ ροπὴκ μ὎πὶ ἢημζ ἐθίεζεαζ θήζεζξ ἐηείκμο μὗ ἂκ ἐπζεοιῆ, ἠ 
πνμζάβεζεαζ ημῦημ ὃ ἂκ αμύθδηαί μἱ βεκέζεαζ, ἠ αὖ, ηαε᾽ ὅζμκ ἐεέθεζ ηί μἱ πμνζζε῅καζ, ἐπζκεύεζκ ημῦημ πνὸξ 
α὏ηὴκ ὥζπεν ηζκὸξ ἐνςη῵κημξ, ἐπμνεβμιέκδκ α὎ημῦ η῅ξ βεκέζεςξ;     ἔβςβε.     ηί δέ; ηὸ ἀαμοθε῔κ ηαὶ ιὴ 
ἐεέθεζκ ιδδ᾽ ἐπζεοιε῔κ μ὎η εἰξ ηὸ ἀπςεε῔κ ηαὶ ἀπεθαύκεζκ ἀπ᾽ α὎η῅ξ ηαὶ εἰξ ἅπακηα ηἀκακηία ἐηείκμζξ   
εήζμιεκ;     π῵ξ βὰν μὔ; 
1743
 See 439b: “ὥζπεν βε μἶιαζ ημῦ ημλόημο μ὎ ηαθ῵ξ ἔπεζ θέβεζκ ὅηζ α὎ημῦ ἅια αἱ πε῔νεξ ηὸ ηόλμκ ἀπςεμῦκηαί 
ηε ηαὶ πνμζέθημκηαζ, ἀθθ᾽ ὅηζ ἄθθδ ιὲκ ἟ ἀπςεμῦζα πείν, ἑηένα δὲ ἟ πνμζαβμιέκδ.” 
1744
 See 439c: “ηί μὖκ, ἔθδκ ἐβώ, θαίδ ηζξ ἂκ ημύηςκ πένζ; μ὎η ἐκε῔καζ ιὲκ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ α὎η῵κ ηὸ ηεθεῦμκ, ἐκε῔καζ 
δὲ ηὸ ηςθῦμκ πζε῔κ, ἄθθμ ὂκ ηαὶ ηναημῦκ ημῦ ηεθεύμκημξ;     ἔιμζβε, ἔθδ, δμηε῔.” 
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conflicts are a fight between these different parts, and therefore the existence of the latter is 
revealed by the former.
1745
 
 Socrates then gives three examples of inner conflicts that allow him to distinguish 
between three different parts of the soul. First, he describes the situation of someone very 
thirsty, but that for some reason does not want to drink. In this case, his sensible desire or 
appetite fights with reason or calculation (θμβζζιόξ).
1746
 Secondly, he mentions Leontius, 
who was passing by the corpses of people that had been executed and desired to look at them, 
but was also angered with himself, because that was a reprehensible act. This anger (ὀνβή) or 
spiritedness (εοιόξ) is thus opposed to desire.
1747
 Finally, Socrates distinguishes spiritedness 
from reason, first by saying that animals and children can experience the former without 
having the latter, and then he recalls a passage of Homer in which reason or calculation 
rebukes one‟s irrational spiritedness.
1748
  
 We will consider the particular features of each part later.
1749
 For now we are just 
trying to determine the model of partition as such, and the conflicts identified let us better 
understand it. Above all, they show how the identification of the soul‟s parts is based on 
different kinds of drives. Plato considers extreme situations, where these drives appear in a 
state as pure as possible. These are not just conflicts between different courses of action or 
views. One is not hesitant about what better corresponds to a particular principle. Rather, one 
is actually torn apart between completely different drives or principles, which cannot be 
compatibilized in any way. Whether this means that in these situations our drives actually 
exist in a pure state (i.e., completely unaffected by each other) or just close to a pure state, is 
something we will leave aside for now.
1750
 
One thing is clear, though. Most moments in our life (and even most moments of 
inner conflict) do not correspond to these situations. We may be divided between two objects 
of desire without being impelled by two different principles of action, and for the most part 
we are not divided at all. But what happens in these moments of calm? How do the different 
                                                 
1745
 The identification of the parts of the soul is thus associated with the kind of inner conflicts that are described 
as a psychic disease in the Sophist (see 228a-b) and that give rise to experience usually interpreted as ἀηνάηεζα. 
One fights with oneself and one may win or lose (according to whether the best or the worst part wins). For 
more on this experience and how it is interpreted in the framework of the soul‟s partition, see Sect. 5.3 below. 
1746
 See 437d-439d. 
1747
 See 439e-440e. Plato does not explain why it is reprehensible or shameful, and we can only speculate about 
it. However, regardless of why Leontius resisted the desire to see those corpses, we can understand that there are 
two orders of reason at play and one of them is associated with anger, which is the relevant point here. 
1748
 See 440e-441c. Plato quotes from Odyssey XX.17, which is precisely one of the passages we mentioned 
above (footnote 1735) as an example of inner dialogue in Homer. 
1749
 See Sect. 2 below. 
1750
 For a discussion of this question, see Sect. 5.1 below. 
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parts of the soul and their drives affect us when no such an extreme inner conflict is taking 
place? The description may suggest that in those moments we are simply pulled by one of the 
drives and that they pull us alternately or by turns. But what happens to these drives when 
they are not pulling us? Are they simply dormant? Plato does sometimes talk of the drives as 
being asleep and awakening.
1751
 But does this mean that at some points they are completely 
satisfied and need nothing? Or are they always active? 
As we will see, Plato describes them as constitutive or permanent desires that impel us 
at all times. We can understand this if we consider that it is not always clear which drive is 
pulling us. In fact, they often cooperate in the pursuit of their particular ends. Plato points 
precisely in this direction, but at the same time he defends that only one of them can take the 
lead, and when it does so, it subjects the others to its rule. This means that life, in a sense, is 
always a contest or fight (we could also say a power struggle) between them, even if for the 
most part this contest is not patent.
1752
 The drives are always combined in some way, though 
their influence in the whole of our desire may vary. 
 Of course, such a description raises the question of how can Plato prove any of this, 
given the fact that we have no pure or transparent contact with these drives apart from the 
moments of extreme conflict between them. All other interactions take place in the depths of 
our inner being or ροπή and not on its surface. However, Plato is precisely trying to explain 
what takes place at the surface. According to him, we are the result of the interaction of these 
drives. Our behavior and our entire life is determined by them. Therefore, our desire for the 
good must be understood within this framework. But in order to understand how our pursuit 
of the good and our entire life (αίμξ) is determined by these drives, we must first consider 
how the drives are characterized and how they interact with each other. As we saw, they are 
intimately connected with the different parts of the soul, which means that in order to better 
understand our drives we must see in more detail the way Plato conceives the parts of the 
soul. 
 
2. The different presentations of the soul’s partition 
 
We find several different versions of the soul‟s partition in the corpus and they differ 
in some important respects. Sometimes Plato distinguishes two parts, other times he adds a 
                                                 
1751
 Cp. e.g. 440c5, 571c-572a.  
1752
 Cp. Lg. 626d-e, where Plato says that we are enemies of ourselves (α὎ηῶ δὲ πνὸξ α὏ηὸκ ὡξ πμθειίῳ πνὸξ 
πμθέιζμκ) and are always at war with ourselves (ὡξ πμθέιμο ἐκ ἑηάζημζξ ἟ι῵κ ὄκημξ πνὸξ ἟ι᾵ξ α὎ημὺξ). 
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third one. The definition of each part also varies, as well as the kind of discourse used to talk 
about them. Indeed, some descriptions are metaphorical while others are conceptual. In 
addition to this, there are also moments in which the characters introduce a partition of our 
being, but not of our soul. Finally, there are passages that do not mention a partition of our 
being, but describe aspects intrinsically connected with the partition of the soul – in particular 
the constitutive partition of our interest or desire, and how it can be directed to different 
objects. All this diversity means that we cannot identify a canonical presentation of the 
partition. However, this is not necessarily a bad thing, because it also means that the texts 
provide us with many complementary angles on the complexity of our motivations or desires, 
and this may help us better understand these motivations or desires. It is thus important to 
consider the most important aspects of each passage. This consideration, however, will be 
brief. We will not attend to the context of each passage and the finer details of the model 
presented therein. We will likewise disregard questions of chronology and of how Plato 
developed these ideas. Our goal is rather to get an idea of the complexity of these models and 
of their interrelation, in order to prepare a more refined analysis of their most decisive 
aspects. We will start with the more imprecise presentations, which have only a few aspects 
in common with the idea of the soul‟s partition, and then proceed to the more explicit and 
developed presentations of this idea. 
 
2.1. The different possible objects of care and the different kinds of goods 
(Apology, Alcibiades, Philebus) 
 
 As was said, there are several passages that make no explicit reference to a partition of 
our inner being, but still consider aspects that are intrinsically connected with what is implied 
in the partition of the soul. These passages consider how our concerns or interests can be 
directed to different kinds of objects or different kinds of goods. These different directions 
are not necessarily exclusive, but in general one of them must hold primacy over the other(s).  
 One example of this can be found in passages of the Apology and of Alcibiades I that 
we already considered above.
1753
 In the Apology, Socrates contrasts two general directions of 
care: one can either care for one‟s body, one‟s possessions, one‟s reputation, or one can care 
for one‟s soul and for making it the best possible (i.e., as excellent and wise as possible). If 
                                                 
1753
 Cp. Chap. 2 Sect. 2.3 and Chap. 12 Sect. 2.  
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one follows one direction or gives it more importance, then the other will be neglected.
1754
 In 
Alcibiades I, the contrast is between caring for the self (which is identified precisely with the 
soul), caring for the things that belong to the self (namely, the body) and the things that 
belong to what belongs to the self (i.e., one‟s possessions).
1755
 Our being is constitutively 
related to these three domains and to the possibilities they offer. However, we can relate to 
them in different ways. In fact, all of them require care, but we cannot dedicate ourselves 
equally to all of them. We must thus choose between them and prioritize, which will 
determine our life and our general condition. Moreover, as Socrates stresses in this passage, it 
is possible to have a hazy relation to these domains and to how they relate to each other. We 
may for instance think we are caring for the self when we are caring for something else that 
belongs to it. It is therefore important to properly distinguish these domains and to determine 
their relative importance. 
 A different division (to which we also referred above) can be found in Philebus. 
Socrates and Protarchus discuss what is the best possible possession for a human being and 
two candidates are put forward: pleasure and knowledge (in the broad sense of the word).
1756
 
In order to determine which one is the best, Socrates makes a thought experiment and asks 
Protarchus whether one would accept any of them in its pure state, absolutely separated from 
the opponent. Protarchus recognizes that a life of pleasure deprived of any knowledge or 
awareness would be undesirable, as well as a complete apathetic life of knowledge (even if 
Socrates later compares the divine condition with such a state).
1757
 Thus, it seems that our 
desire cannot be reduced just to one object or one good. We need some mixture of them or a 
mixed life. In other words, the good itself is not simple, and the question then is how we are 




2.2. Different principles of action and different parts of our being (Phaedrus, 
Laws, Gorgias and Phaedo) 
 
 In several other texts, Plato recognizes that our being contains different parts or 
principles, which in turn account for different kinds of desire. These parts or principles are 
                                                 
1754
 See 29d-30b, 36c-d, 41e. 
1755
 See 127e ff. These three domains and the goods (as well as the evils) that correspond to them are 
distinguished in several other passages throughout the Platonic corpus. See Grg. 477b f., Euthd. 279a-c, Men. 
87e ff., Phlb. 48c ff., Lg. 631b-d, 743e. 
1756
 See 11a-d. 
1757
 See 20e ff., 60c-61a, and, for the praise of an apathetic life, see 33a-b. 
1758
 This is precisely how the question is formulated in 11d-12a, 22b ff., and 61a ff. 
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not expressly presented as different parts of the soul, but they already involve much of what 
is implied in the partition of the soul.  
A good example of this can be found in Socrates‟ first speech in Phaedrus, which 
presents a more traditional model of human motivation.
1759
 Socrates does not mention the 
soul at this point, but identifies “two kinds of thing which rule and lead us” (δύμ ηζκὲ ἰδέα 
ἄνπμκηε ηαὶ ἄβμκηε), either at the same time (when they are in accord) or separately (when 
they are at variance). These principles that guide us are “the inborn desire for pleasure” 
(ἔιθοημξ ἐπζεοιία ἟δμκ῵κ), on the one hand, and the “acquired judgment which aims at the 
best” (ἐπίηηεημξ δόλα, ἐθζειέκδ ημῦ ἀνίζημο).
1760
 Socrates does not specify how the latter is 
acquired and what exactly is the best.
1761
 However, he stresses the heterogeneity of the two 
principles. The first is irrational, compulsive and can guide us to many different pleasurable 
objects, whereas the second guides us by means of θόβμξ and directs us to the best.
1762
 We 
have, therefore, these two tensions within us and they always relate to each other in some 
way, which is then what accounts for our behavior, especially with respect to others, as 
Socrates endeavors to show. 
In the Laws, Plato presents an image of the human being that has several aspects in 
common with the one we just saw.
1763
 Human beings are compared to a puppet that is pulled 
by two different kinds of string. One kind of string corresponds to our pleasures and pains, as 
well as the expectations we have of them. Opposed to this is the string that corresponds to our 
calculation or reasoning (θμβζζιόξ) about which affection is better and which is worse.
1764
 
There is a certain continuity between the two kinds of string, insofar as both refer to our 
affections, but they imply different relations to it and different kinds of motivation (one more 
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 See 237a-241d. 
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 During the speech, the best seems to correspond to what is becoming or what is traditionally expected of a 




 See 644c ff. 
1764
 Plato first describes these elements separately and then integrates them in the image of the puppet as the 
strings that pull us. For their characterization, see 644c-d: “[ΑΘ.] δύμ δὲ ηεηηδιέκμκ ἐκ α὏ηῶ ζοιαμύθς 
ἐκακηίς ηε ηαὶ ἄθνμκε, ὣ πνμζαβμνεύμιεκ ἟δμκὴκ ηαὶ θύπδκ; [ΚΛ.] ἔζηζ ηαῦηα. [ΑΘ.] πνὸξ δὲ ημύημζκ ἀιθμ῔κ 
αὖ δόλαξ ιεθθόκηςκ, μἷκ ημζκὸκ ιὲκ ὄκμια ἐθπίξ, ἴδζμκ δέ, θόαμξ ιὲκ ἟ πνὸ θύπδξ ἐθπίξ, εάννμξ δὲ ἟ πνὸ ημῦ 
ἐκακηίμο· ἐπὶ δὲ π᾵ζζ ημύημζξ θμβζζιὸξ ὅηζ πμη᾽ α὎η῵κ ἄιεζκμκ ἠ πε῔νμκ, ὃξ βεκόιεκμξ δόβια πόθεςξ ημζκὸκ 




immediate, the other mediate).
1765
 Our movement is then determined by what results from the 
different pulls and the way we relate to them. 
In both these texts, the principles of action are not expressly attributed to different 
parts of our being. The case is different with Gorgias, where we find some references to the 
partition of our being, and even of our soul, though these references are still vague. Socrates 
starts by distinguishing the body from the soul. He says that the body is no more than a tomb. 
It limits the soul, but it is not an active principle by itself.
1766
 Then Socrates mentions “that 
part of the soul in which appetites reside.”
1767
 This part lacks a specific designation, but 
Socrates says that it is “the sort of thing to be open to persuasion and to shift back and 
forth”.
1768
 The idea that this part is open to persuasion is further emphasized by a comparison 
based on wordplay. Socrates says that it is called a jar (πίεμξ), because of how persuadable it 
is (δζὰ ηὸ πζεακόκ ηε ηαὶ πεζζηζηὸκ).
1769
 In the case of fools (ἀκμήημζ), this jar is unrestrained 
and not watertight, and thus resembles a leaking jar that cannot be filled.
1770
 But if one is 
ζώθνςκ, then one will have one‟s containers full and will thus avoid dissipation and 
frustration.
1771
 In sum, it seems clear that the soul‟s relation to desires will determine how 
one acts, what one values, and ultimately how one lives.
1772
 What is not clear in this passage, 
though, is how the soul may resist its desires, whether such a resistance involves another part 
of the soul, and how this other part of the soul should be characterized.  
A much more complex model can be found in the Phaedo, where Plato says that we 
are composed of two parts that cannot be reduced to each other: namely, ζώια and ροπή. The 
analysis starts by presenting them as two distinct entities, with their own properties, that are 
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 These different relations are also expressed by the way the two kinds of strings are characterized: one is 
tough, made of steel, and has all shapes, whereas the other is golden, holy and pliable. See 645a. 
1766
 See 493a: “ἢδδ βάν ημο ἔβςβε ηαὶ ἢημοζα η῵κ ζμθ῵κ ὡξ κῦκ ἟ιε῔ξ ηέεκαιεκ ηαὶ ηὸ ιὲκ ζ῵ιά ἐζηζκ ἟ι῔κ 
ζ῅ια (...).” 
1767
 I follow D. Zeyl‟s translation (PCW), but the Greek is more vague and says only “that something of the 
soul”. See 493a: “η῅ξ δὲ ροπ῅ξ ημῦημ ἐκ ᾧ ἐπζεοιίαζ εἰζὶ”. Later, in 493b, he also says: “ημῦημ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ μὗ αἱ 
ἐπζεοιίαζ εἰζί”. 
1768
 See 493a: “(...) ηοβπάκεζ ὂκ μἷμκ ἀκαπείεεζεαζ ηαὶ ιεηαπίπηεζκ ἄκς ηάης (...).” 
1769
 See ibidem. 
1770
 See 493b: “(...) η῵κ δ᾽ ἀκμήηςκ ημῦημ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ μὗ αἱ ἐπζεοιίαζ εἰζί, ηὸ ἀηόθαζημκ α὎ημῦ ηαὶ μ὎ ζηεβακόκ, 
ὡξ ηεηνδιέκμξ εἴδ πίεμξ, δζὰ ηὴκ ἀπθδζηίακ ἀπεζηάζαξ.” The image of this part of the soul as a leaking jar is 
then developed into the image of the whole soul as a sieve (493c) that cannot fill its jar because it is also leaky. 
Finally, Socrates introduces another image according to which the soul possesses many containers and for some 
people they are leaky and rotten, so that one is forced to fill them day and night, and in doing so one ends up 
having great pleasures, but also great pains. See 493e-494a.  
1771
 Indeed, the moderate have sound containers and are able to retain what they acquire. They are not in a 
constant movement of filling and emptying the part of the soul where desires are contained. See 493e. 
1772
 In other words, it determines whether one is ζώθνςκ/ηόζιζμξ or ἀηόθαζημξ, sound or unsound, happy or 





 However, during life they are constitutively intertwined or bound 
together. They affect each other and create our unitary experience of things. Still, Plato is 
able to differentiate several elements or possibilities of this experience, which he then refers 
to the opposition between body and soul. He distinguishes two forms of knowledge (αἴζεδζζξ 
and δζάκμζα or θμβίγεζεαζ), which he associates with two ways of seeing reality as a whole 
(namely, one which only recognizes bodily reality, and another that focus on the εἴδδ).
1774
 He 
also distinguishes two forms of desire – the love of body and the love of knowledge.
1775
 This 
is indeed an essential distinction, since it also determines one‟s cognitive attitude.
1776
 We 
could even say that there are two different desires at the center of our being. These desires are 
associated with the two parts of our being, but are experienced alongside one another and in 
tension with one another. The body by itself has no desire (it is in fact no more than a 
corpse), but when the soul is combined with it, it can attract us. Consequently, the soul must 
then decide whether it surrenders to the body or whether it draws away from it and tries to 
“collect itself”.
1777
 The resulting relation between our two components will then determine 
the way we act, how we live and how we see things. Therefore, although the Phaedo does not 
identify a partition within the soul, it does talk of two different interests within us (associated 
with a pure soul and a pure body) that fight with one another for control, and at least in this 
regard the analysis comes very close to what we find in the texts in which a tripartition of the 
soul is introduced. 
   
2.3. The tripartition of the soul (Phaedrus, Republic, Timaeus) 
 
 The tripartition of the soul appears in three different texts, which have very different 
features and actually complement each other. One of these texts is the Phaedrus. In Socrates‟ 
palinode (which we already considered above), Plato refers to the ροπή in metaphorical terms 
and compares the soul to the “combined power of a winged team of horses and their 
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 See in particular 64c: “἟βμύιεεά ηζ ηὸκ εάκαημκ εἶκαζ;     πάκο βε, ἔθδ ὏πμθααὼκ ὁ ΢ζιιίαξ.     ἆνα ιὴ ἄθθμ 
ηζ ἠ ηὴκ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ἀπὸ ημῦ ζώιαημξ ἀπαθθαβήκ; ηαὶ εἶκαζ ημῦημ ηὸ ηεεκάκαζ, πςνὶξ ιὲκ ἀπὸ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ 
ἀπαθθαβὲκ α὎ηὸ ηαε᾽ α὏ηὸ ηὸ ζ῵ια βεβμκέκαζ, πςνὶξ δὲ ηὴκ ροπὴκ ἀπὸ ημῦ ζώιαημξ ἀπαθθαβε῔ζακ α὎ηὴκ ηαε᾽ 
α὏ηὴκ εἶκαζ; ἆνα ιὴ ἄθθμ ηζ ᾖ ὁ εάκαημξ ἠ ημῦημ;     μὔη, ἀθθὰ ημῦημ, ἔθδ.” 
1774
 See 65a ff., 78d-79a, 79c-d, 81b, 82d ff. 
1775
 See in particular 68b-c: “μ὎ημῦκ ἱηακόκ ζμζ ηεηιήνζμκ, ἔθδ, ημῦημ ἀκδνόξ, ὃκ ἂκ ἴδῃξ ἀβακαηημῦκηα 
ιέθθμκηα ἀπμεακε῔ζεαζ, ὅηζ μ὎η ἄν᾽ ἤκ θζθόζμθμξ ἀθθά ηζξ θζθμζώιαημξ; ὁ α὎ηὸξ δέ πμο μὗημξ ηοβπάκεζ ὢκ 
ηαὶ θζθμπνήιαημξ ηαὶ θζθόηζιμξ, ἢημζ ηὰ ἕηενα ημύηςκ ἠ ἀιθόηενα.” 
1776
 See in particular 81b and 82e-83e. 
1777





 This image contains two contrasts which are very important to define the 
soul‟s partition: namely, the contrast between the charioteer and the horses and the contrast 
between the wings and the soul‟s weight. Let us start with the first contrast. The horses are a 
symbol of power and they are capable of the strongest pulls. But they can have different 
natures or characters, and they can be more or less tamed or trained. Socrates explains that 
the human soul is composed of two very different horses: a good and a bad one. He describes 
their external and internal traits, and the latter are particularly relevant. The good horse is 
defined as an ally of the charioteer and of reason; it easily obeys the spoken command 
(θόβμξ); it is a lover of honor; it is sensitive to ζςθνμζύκδ and αἰδώξ; and it is a companion 
of true glory.
1779
 The bad horse, in turn, is unruly and recalcitrant, deaf (hence it cannot 
properly hear the orders of the charioteer) and “a companion of excess and boastfulness”.
1780
 
These are all traits we can find in ourselves, and according to Plato they come from one of 
these two horses. But there is also the charioteer. He is the part responsible for steering the 
soul and giving it a direction. He is responsible for training the horses, especially the bad 
one.
1781
 He is also identified with the κμῦξ – i.e., with the part of us that contemplates the true 
beings or the εἴδδ and recognizes them in particular beings.
1782
 The charioteer thus plays a 
central role in our life. He must interact with the horses and establish a particular relation 
with them. At times, they can come into conflict, which is presented both as a physical and a 
dialectical contest.
1783
 But they must always work together in order to determine the soul‟s 
movement. But this is not all that determines our behavior. As was said, Plato also considers 
the contrast between lightness (which is represented by the wings) and weight. The first is 
associated with the charioteer‟s contemplation of the εἴδδ, the second with the inability to see 
or remember them (in which the bad horse plays an important role). Both these elements are 
variable and they can increase or decrease, according to the relation between the different 
“parts” of the soul. This will then affect what one does and how one lives. 
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 See 246a: “πενὶ δὲ η῅ξ ἰδέαξ α὎η῅ξ [i.e., η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ] ὧδε θεηηέμκ. μἷμκ ιέκ ἐζηζ, πάκηῃ πάκηςξ εείαξ εἶκαζ 
ηαὶ ιαην᾵ξ δζδβήζεςξ, ᾧ δὲ ἔμζηεκ, ἀκενςπίκδξ ηε ηαὶ ἐθάηημκμξ· ηαύηῃ μὖκ θέβςιεκ. ἐμζηέης δὴ ζοιθύηῳ 
δοκάιεζ ὏πμπηένμο γεύβμοξ ηε ηαὶ ἟κζόπμο.” For more on the palinode, see Chap. 12 Sect. 4.3, Chap. 16 Sect. 
5.1 a), and Chap. 17 Sect. 3.1 b). 
1779
 See 253d-e: “ὁ ιὲκ ημίκοκ α὎ημ῔κ ἐκ ηῆ ηαθθίμκζ ζηάζεζ ὢκ ηό ηε εἶδμξ ὀνεὸξ ηαὶ δζδνενςιέκμξ, ὏ραύπδκ, 
ἐπίβνοπμξ, θεοηὸξ ἰδε῔κ, ιεθακόιιαημξ, ηζι῅ξ ἐναζηὴξ ιεηὰ ζςθνμζύκδξ ηε ηαὶ αἰδμῦξ, ηαὶ ἀθδεζκ῅ξ δόλδξ 
ἑηα῔νμξ, ἄπθδηημξ, ηεθεύζιαηζ ιόκμκ ηαὶ θόβῳ ἟κζμπε῔ηαζ (...).” 
1780
 See 253e: “(...) ὁ δ᾽ αὖ ζημθζόξ, πμθύξ, εἰηῆ ζοιπεθμνδιέκμξ, ηναηεναύπδκ, αναποηνάπδθμξ, 
ζζιμπνόζςπμξ, ιεθάβπνςξ, βθαοηόιιαημξ, ὕθαζιμξ, ὕανεςξ ηαὶ ἀθαγμκείαξ ἑηα῔νμξ, πενὶ ὦηα θάζζμξ, ηςθόξ, 
ιάζηζβζ ιεηὰ ηέκηνςκ ιόβζξ ὏πείηςκ.” 
1781
 Cp. in particular 247b. 
1782
 See in particular 247c: “἟ βὰν ἀπνώιαηόξ ηε ηαὶ ἀζπδιάηζζημξ ηαὶ ἀκαθὴξ μ὎ζία ὄκηςξ μὖζα, ροπ῅ξ 
ηοαενκήηῃ ιόκῳ εεαηὴ κῶ, πενὶ ἡκ ηὸ η῅ξ ἀθδεμῦξ ἐπζζηήιδξ βέκμξ (...).” Cp. 249b-c. 
1783
 See 253e ff. 
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 A similar partition of the soul is found in the Republic, though in this case the 
presentation is more conceptual and more developed. Plato introduces the tripartition in book 
IV, in the passage we considered above, and this provides the basis for the extremely refined 
analyses in books VIII and IX. We saw how the conflicts of motivations allow Socrates to 
distinguish irrational desire, anger and reasoning, which are seen as manifestations of three 
different parts of the soul. The first part is the appetitive part (ηὸ ἐπζεοιδηζηόκ), which is 
primarily referred to our necessary desires, to the pleasures associated with them, and to the 
possessions that guarantee our survival – though it can also be concerned with more than 
survival and thus strive for as much pleasure and as much possessions as possible. This part 
is thus defined by a love of gain (θζθμηένδεζα).
1784
 The second part of the soul, in turn, is the 
spirited element (ηὸ εοιμεζδέξ), which is particularly noticeable in moments of anger or 
righteous indignation, and is marked by a love of victory (θζθμκζηία) and a love of honor 
(θζθμηζιία).
1785
 Finally, there is also the rational part (ηὸ θμβζζηζηόκ), which is not only a 




 Besides this conceptual characterization, Plato also uses several images in order to 
stress their particular features. He compares them to metals (gold, silver and bronze), thereby 
distinguishing their value.
1787
 He also portrays them as different living beings, in order to best 
show their behavior. The appetitive part is compared to a many-headed beast (which brings to 
mind the figure of Hydra) or simply to a wild beast (εδνίμκ) – which emphasizes its wild and 
unruly character.
1788
 The spirited part is said to resemble a lion, though it is also compared to 
a serpent and even a monkey.
1789
 The rational part, in turn, is compared to a human being, 
thereby emphasizing its heterogeneity to the other parts and its central importance in defining 
us.
1790
 All these living beings compose our soul, which (as Socrates remarks) resembles one 
of those fantastic or monstrous creatures that are composed of different animals, such as the 
Chimera, Scylla or Cerberus.
1791
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 See in particular 439d and 580d-581a (where Plato also characterizes this part as θζθμπνήιαημξ). For the 
distinction between necessary and non-necessary desires or pleasures, see 558d ff. 
1785
 See 441a and 581a-b. 
1786
 See in particular 439d and 581b. 
1787
 See e.g. 546e ff (and cp. 415a-c). 
1788
 See 588c, 588e, 589b. 
1789
 See 588d and 590b. 
1790
 See 588d and 589a-b. 
1791
 See 588b-c. 
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 But this is not all. Besides characterizing each part of the soul by reference to different 
loves or different kinds of drive (which we will consider in more detail in the next section), 
Plato also associates the parts of the soul with the social classes of a πόθζξ: namely, the 
money-making class (ηὸ πνδιαζηζζηζηόκ), the auxiliary class (ηὸ ἐπζημονδηζηόκ) and the 
deliberative class (ηὸ αμοθεοηζηόκ).
1792
 Their identification is in fact based on this 
isomorphism between the πόθζξ and the individual soul, which implies that both these things 
must have the same parts.
1793
 In addition, these parts account for the different characters or 
different types of human being, as well as the different ways of life, according to the part that 
prevails over the others. Finally, they are also the principle that explains the different political 
systems or πμθζηε῔αζ, according to Plato.
1794
 In this sense, the tripartition of the soul accounts 
for almost everything in human life.  
 In Timaeus, Plato once again presents a tripartition of our inner being, which is not 
strictly speaking a tripartition of the soul, since he rather talks of two different                  
souls – namely, an immortal soul and a mortal soul.
1795
 But one of these parts is divided in 
two and the result is that we are composed of three psychical parts as was the case in 
Phaedrus and in the Republic. What varies is the framework. All psychological analyses are 
part of a rational cosmology, which allows Plato to associate the soul not only with the whole 
universe and the gods, but also the body and its different parts. In fact, the bodily parts are 
now seen as being primarily different seats for the different parts of our soul or souls.  
But let us see how this is presented. Timaeus starts by distinguishing an immortal 
soul, directly made by the Demiurge, and a mortal one, fashioned by the created gods.
1796
 The 
first can exist in a separate state, is composed of the same ingredients as the cosmic soul (to 
wit, sameness, difference and being) and has thus knowledge of the εἴδδ.
1797
 It also has inner 
revolutions, which can be harmonious or chaotic, and thus make true or false judgments 
about individual beings.
1798
 Furthermore, it is taught the laws of the universe and of 
embodiment (or of reincarnation).
1799
 It is thus primarily marked by knowledge. After the 
embodiment, which greatly disturbs the inner revolutions of this soul, it is that which 
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 The classes and their relation are defined in books II-IV. For their designations, see 440e-441a.  
1793
 See 434a-435c 
1794
 All these questions are object of an extensive analysis in books VIII and IX. For a brief systematization of 
what is here implied, see 4.4 c) below. 
1795
 For the partition of the soul in Timaeus, see 41b ff. and 69a ff. 
1796
 Cp. 41c-d, 69c-e. 
1797
 See 41d (and cp. 35a, 37a-c). 
1798
 This is what is implied in 42a-44c.  
1799
 See 41e and ff. 
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deliberates and guides us.
1800
 Hence, it is housed in our head, which is our most divine part 
and the one that rules over the rest of the body.
1801
 This part is also sensitive to justice and 
injustice and lifts us up towards the heavens.
1802
 All this is in contrast with the mortal soul, 
which is not identified with the body, but is closer to it. This part is composed of affections 
and passions and has a different dwelling-place (namely, the trunk), in order not to pollute the 
rational part.
1803
 Plato thus stresses how different the two souls are. This second part is then 
divided in two. The first part is associated with courage and spiritedness, and is a lover of 
victory. It can hear rational discourse, obey it and enforce it with strong emotions, when it 
boils with anger. It has an intermediate role and is therefore seated in the heart.
1804
 The third 
part is the appetitive part of the soul. It is defined by its search of sustenance or nourishment 
and portrayed as an untamed beast that needs to be contained or tethered – which is why it is 
seated in the belly or stomach. This part of the soul does not understand rational discourse 
and does not heed it, but it can be affected by images, which allow it to have some contact 
with the other parts of the soul.
1805
 The different parts thus interact with each other – both by 
themselves and via the body.
1806
 Reason can control the other parts or lose control, and this 
will determine the whole course of life. The analysis of this interaction and its effects, 
however, is much more imprecise than what we find in the Republic or even in Phaedrus. 
 
2.4. Brief assessment 
 
 The different passages in which Plato discusses the partition of the soul or any other 
inner divisions of our being have significant differences, but also strong affinities. A detailed 
analysis of all discrepancies and commonalities would take us too far afield, but there are a 
few aspects whose consideration allows us to better see the connections between the different 
presentations and at the same time prepares what follows. 
One of the most salient differences concerns the number of parts (or desires) 
identified. Some texts follow a bipartite model, while others identify three components. 
These three components are not just distinct, but also one of them (namely, the spirited part) 
is often conceived as a kind of intermediate between the other two and shares some features 
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 See once more 42a-44c. 
1801
 See 44d-45b. 
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 Cp. 41c, 90a-b. 
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 See 69d-e. 
1804
 See 70a-c. 
1805
 See 70d-71c. 
1806
 There are indeed many indications of this interaction in the passage we are considering (70a-73a). 
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Another significant difference lies in the role played by the notion of ροπή in the 
different presentations we considered. Only some of the texts conceive the partition as a 
partition of the soul itself. Some do not mention the notion of ροπή at all, and others see it as 
an object of care or just as one component of our being. This is perhaps due to the fact that 
one part of us is more closely connected with our inner being and what characterizes it, 
whereas the others tend to be extroverted and neglect our inner state.  
Plato also emphasizes the qualitative difference between the parts that compose us. 
One of them is presented as being superior to the others, and this superiority determines how 
we should live (as we shall see in more detail below). In fact, Plato even defends that one of 
the parts (namely, the rational part) is more essential to us than the others, either by 
characterizing it as the inner human being or by discussing the possibility of us shedding the 
other parts after death. The latter are highly abstract metaphysical discussions, based on 
elaborate arguments. But in general the analyses have a more phenomenological character, 
based on what is immediately given in our own experience – namely the conflicts between 
different kinds of desire or different drives. As was said, this is what allows Plato to identify 
and define each part of our being. The soul‟s desires or drives are at the center of the whole 
analysis and it is therefore important to focus our attention on these drives and see how they 
are characterized in the texts. 
 
3. The characterization of the soul’s three constitutive drives 
 
 The different kinds of desire, motivation or drive within us are an immediate 
expression of our inner being or ροπή. Their occurrence does not depend on us. Rather, they 
are an internal fact, something that we can find within ourselves, shaping who we are. This 
means that we can describe the way we experience them or how they appear to us. However, 
our experience of them is not immediately clear. We tend not to notice them as such and, if 
we do, we may not be able to immediately describe them. In fact, their description requires a 
certain interpretation of what happens with us, and what we find in Plato‟s texts is precisely 
the main lines of such an interpretation. Plato determines the general structure of all our 
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 This is what happens in Phaedo. See in particular 68b-c. 
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motivations or drives, and he also distinguishes the different types of motivation or drive, as 
well as the way they interact with each other. 
 But let us first see the general structure of our motivations or drives. Plato usually 
describes them by using compound words with the prefix “θζθμ-”. In the Greek language, 
such compound words may express a propensity, predilection or fondness, but often they 
denote more than that – namely, a single-minded pursuit or an obsessive love, which becomes 
an excessive or exaggerated trait of someone‟s character. In this case, one‟s relation to 
something has become addictive or compulsive, and it produces a dehumanizing effect 
(which is why the compounds with θζθμ- could be used as emphatic reproaches or even 
insults).
1808
 We find a good illustration of this in Aristophanes‟ Wasps. At the beginning of 
the play, the slave Xanthias tries to explain the condition or disease (κόζμξ) of his masters‟ 
father and lets the audience guess what it is. He dismisses the first guess (being θζθόηοαμξ, 
addicted to gambling), but says that “θζθμ” is the beginning of the evil. He then rejects 
several other guesses, such as being θζθμπόηδξ, θζθμεύηδξ and θζθμλέκμξ, before revealing 
that the person in question is addicted to trials (θζθδθζαζηήξ) and describing how this 
obsession dominates all this person‟s actions and thoughts.
1809
 This is in line with what is said 
about θζθία at the end of Republic V.
1810
 In order to define the θζθόζμθμξ, Socrates associates 
him with such questionable figures as the lover of boys, the lover of wine and the lover of 
honor. All these are described as cherishing an entire class of objects and not neglecting any 
of it – that is, they do not discriminate between good and bad examples of something.
1811
 
They pursue any object of the desired kind and are not able to get enough of it. Likewise, the 
philosopher has an obsessive and insatiate desire for all kind of knowledge.
1812
  
 The compounds with “θζθμ-” express therefore a strong urge or a great need for 
something. Each drive impels or presses us to pursue as much as we can a particular kind of 
object. In this sense, they can also be described as a form of ἔνςξ – i.e., of intense and 
passionate desire. Thus, the immediate expression of each part of the soul is first and 
foremost something emotional, volitional and instinctive or irrational. We simply feel an urge 
                                                 
1808
 Some passages in Plato stress precisely this pejorative sense of such compounds. See e.g. Rep. 347b, 390d, 
391c. 
1809
 See vv. 67 ff. 
1810
 See 474b ff. 
1811
 Cp. 474c: “(...) ὃκ ἂκ θ῵ιεκ θζθε῔κ ηζ, δε῔ θακ῅καζ α὎ηόκ, ἐὰκ ὀνε῵ξ θέβδηαζ, μ὎ ηὸ ιὲκ θζθμῦκηα ἐηείκμο, 
ηὸ δὲ ιή, ἀθθὰ π᾵κ ζηένβμκηα;” Cp. also 475b: “ἆνα ὃκ ἄκ ηζκμξ ἐπζεοιδηζηὸκ θέβςιεκ, πακηὸξ ημῦ εἴδμοξ 
ημύημο θήζμιεκ ἐπζεοιε῔κ, ἠ ημῦ ιέκ, ημῦ δὲ μὔ;     πακηόξ, ἔθδ.” 
1812
 See 475b: “μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ ηὸκ θζθόζμθμκ ζμθίαξ θήζμιεκ ἐπζεοιδηὴκ εἶκαζ, μ὎ η῅ξ ιέκ, η῅ξ δ᾽ μὔ, ἀθθὰ    
πάζδξ;     ἀθδε῅.” 
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to have something, without possessing a strong justification for it or an account of why the 
desired object matters. This applies inclusively to drive characteristic of the rational part of 
the soul. The desire for knowledge is first and foremost an irrational or blind drive. In this 
sense, the tripartition is very far from the modern doctrine of the soul‟s faculties, which 
distinguishes between feeling, will and reason.
1813
 Each part is essentially marked by a 
specific desire, which produces its own feelings and, as we shall see, also ends up producing 
its own reasons.  
 Plato thus recognizes how the desiderative component is at the center of our being. 
But this is not all. He also distinguishes different types of motivation or drive and identifies 
their main traits. It is true that the distinctions and characterizations found in the texts do not 
always coincide, and the discrepancy is itself meaningful. But for now we will focus 
primarily on the model of the Republic. We will see how Plato distinguishes three types of 
drive and how he defines each one of them. In doing so, it is important to bear in mind that 
Plato‟s description of these drives is, to a great degree, abstract or artificial. He tries to 
identify them in their pure state, but this is not how we usually experience them. There may 
perhaps be some extreme situations in which they stand out (such as the conflicts described in 
Republic IV and considered above in section 1), and they may also become dominant traits of 
someone‟s character (which will correspond to an obsession in the sense described above). 
However, as we will see, the different drives are always present in each one of us and they 
affect and change each other. In other words, we experience them as blended with one 
another and not in their pure state. We have no direct access to what these drives are in 
themselves, and Plato‟s analysis is in fact an attempt to determine what these drives must be 
in order to account for our usual experience of them. The following discussion will try to 
follow this attempt, but it will also pay some attention to how each type of drive can be 
affected by the others and thus manifest itself in different ways.  
 
3.1. The love of gain (θηινθέξδεηα) and the domain of subjective appearance 
 
 The first type of drive is identified with the desires of the appetitive part of the soul 
(ηὸ ἐπζεοιδηζηόκ). This part of the soul is characterized as polymorphic or as having many 
                                                 
1813
 This modern distinction has indeed affected many interpretations of Plato, but there has also been several 
interpreters who endeavored to separate both things. See in particular S. BÜTTNER, Die Literaturtheorie bei 
Platon und ihre anthropologische  egr ndung, Tübingen, Francke, 2000, 18-111. 
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heads, and this is then reflected in its desires, which are themselves complex.
1814
 If we look at 
the texts (especially the Republic), these desires seem to be directed to gain, possessions, and 
pleasant sensations of different kinds – and the nexus between all these things is not 
immediately clear. Plato emphasizes the idea of gain, by describing this kind of desires or 
drives as θζθμηενδήξ. The term ηένδμξ means “benefit, advantage, profit, gain”. It is 
primarily used for material gain, though it can denote any other kind of gain – and it is in this 
broader sense that Plato talks of a love of gain. Money and wealth are not at the center of our 
θζθμηένδεζα. In fact, Plato explains that we desire money because it is necessary to satisfy the 
bodily desires (namely, the desire for food, drink and sex).
1815
 These desires are more closely 
linked to one‟s survival, but they can aspire to more, as we will see. What is decisive is the 
fact that they ultimately refer to our body (and in this sense they are all manifestations of a 
love for the body, as is said in the Phaedo).
1816
  
We must, however, be careful when we talk of body. As was seen above, Plato 
understands the body primarily as the immanent domain of our subjective condition or state 
(ἕλζξ), which is composed of the simple or immediate appearing (i.e., sensation).
1817
 This 
domain is pretty indeterminate, as we considered above, but it contains at least two kinds of 
movement. On the one hand, there is the emptying of the body (ηέκςζζξ), which is a 
deviation from our right condition (θύζζξ) and causes pain. On the other hand, we have the 
filling of the body (πθήνςζζξ), which is the restoring of the right condition and causes 
pleasure.
1818
 These are not just occasional movements, but the body is actually in constant 
flux, even if we only notice the most intense movements, which cause more noticeable 
affections.
1819
 The love of gain is thus concerned with these movements and the sensations 
                                                 
1814
 See Rep. 588c: “πθάηηε ημίκοκ ιίακ ιὲκ ἰδέακ εδνίμο πμζηίθμο ηαὶ πμθοηεθάθμο, ἟ιένςκ δὲ εδνίςκ 
ἔπμκημξ ηεθαθὰξ ηύηθῳ ηαὶ ἀβνίςκ, ηαὶ δοκαημῦ ιεηααάθθεζκ ηαὶ θύεζκ ἐλ α὏ημῦ πάκηα ηαῦηα.” 
1815
 See Rep. 580d-581a: “ηὸ δὲ ηνίημκ δζὰ πμθοεζδίακ ἑκὶ μ὎η ἔζπμιεκ ὀκόιαηζ πνμζεζπε῔κ ἰδίῳ α὎ημῦ, ἀθθὰ ὃ 
ιέβζζημκ ηαὶ ἰζπονόηαημκ εἶπεκ ἐκ α὏ηῶ, ημύηῳ ἐπςκμιάζαιεκ· ἐπζεοιδηζηὸκ βὰν α὎ηὸ ηεηθήηαιεκ δζὰ 
ζθμδνόηδηα η῵κ ηε πενὶ ηὴκ ἐδςδὴκ ἐπζεοιζ῵κ ηαὶ πόζζκ ηαὶ ἀθνμδίζζα ηαὶ ὅζα ἄθθα ημύημζξ ἀηόθμοεα, ηαὶ 
θζθμπνήιαημκ δή, ὅηζ δζὰ πνδιάηςκ ιάθζζηα ἀπμηεθμῦκηαζ αἱ ημζαῦηαζ ἐπζεοιίαζ.” 
1816
 Plato uses the expression θζθμζώιαημξ in 68b-c. 
1817
 See Chap. 10 Sect. 3.1 and Chap. 11 Sects. 1 and 3.1. 
1818
 See Phlb. 31d: “[΢Ω.] θέβς ημίκοκ η῅ξ ἁνιμκίαξ ιὲκ θομιέκδξ ἟ι῔κ ἐκ ημ῔ξ γῴμζξ ἅια θύζζκ η῅ξ θύζεςξ ηαὶ 
βέκεζζκ ἀθβδδόκςκ ἐκ ηῶ ηόηε βίβκεζεαζ πνόκῳ. [ΠΡΩ.] πάκο θέβεζξ εἰηόξ. [΢Ω.] πάθζκ δὲ ἁνιμηημιέκδξ ηε ηαὶ 
εἰξ ηὴκ α὏η῅ξ θύζζκ ἀπζμύζδξ ἟δμκὴκ βίβκεζεαζ θεηηέμκ, εἰ δε῔ δζ᾽ ὀθίβςκ πενὶ ιεβίζηςκ ὅηζ ηάπζζηα ῥδε῅καζ.” 
1819
 See Phlb. 43b-c: “[΢Ω.] (...) ζὺ δ᾽ ἀπόηνζκαζ πόηενμκ ἀεὶ πάκηα, ὁπόζα πάζπεζ ηζ η῵κ ἐιρύπςκ, ηαῦη᾽ 
αἰζεάκεηαζ ηὸ πάζπμκ, ηαὶ μὔη᾽ α὎λακόιεκμζ θακεάκμιεκ ἟ι᾵ξ α὎ημὺξ μὔηε ηζ η῵κ ημζμύηςκ μ὎δὲκ πάζπμκηεξ, ἠ 
π᾵κ ημ὎κακηίμκ. [ΠΡΩ.] ἅπακ δήπμο ημ὎κακηίμκ· ὀθίβμο βὰν ηά βε ημζαῦηα θέθδεε πάκε᾽ ἟ι᾵ξ. [΢Ω.] μ὎ ημίκοκ 
ηαθ῵ξ ἟ι῔κ εἴνδηαζ ηὸ κοκδὴ ῥδεέκ, ὡξ αἱ ιεηααμθαὶ ηάης ηε ηαὶ ἄκς βζβκόιεκαζ θύπαξ ηε ηαὶ ἟δμκὰξ 
ἀπενβάγμκηαζ. [ΠΡΩ.] ηί ιήκ; [΢Ω.] ὧδ᾽ ἔζηαζ ηάθθζμκ ηαὶ ἀκεπζθδπηόηενμκ ηὸ θεβόιεκμκ. [ΠΡΩ.] π῵ξ; [΢Ω.] 




caused by them. It aspires to obtain a better subjective state or ἕλζξ. What causes this state and 
its sensations is irrelevant. Plato indicates as much when he says that these gain-loving drives 
are primarily not qualified or specified. We desire some drink (i.e., something that suppresses 
thirst), but not any particular drink.
1820
 At their core, such desires are blind and irrational. 
They do not care about objective reality – not even about the objective reality of the “subject” 
(i.e., of the ροπή). They only care about immediate subjective states. Any additional layer of 
concern that may characterize such a drive is derived from and subordinate to this one. This 
does not mean we can represent such pure subjective states and the pure love of gain that is 
directed at them. Our reality and our desires are always more complex than this. As was 
mentioned several times, Plato even stresses that any subjective state requires at least a δόλα 
about its occurrence for us to experience it as such.
1821
 Our sensations are thus brought into 
connection with the idea of knowledge and truth, but still our desires can be directed at the 
sensation as such and neglect the rest as much as possible.  
Such is the core of all our gain-loving desires. But this does not mean that all        
gain-loving desires are the same. In fact, Plato distinguishes different kinds of gain-loving 
desire. The most important distinction is the one between necessary and non-necessary 
desires (or, as he also says, between frugal and lavish desires). The first are concerned only 
with survival, cannot be annulled and their satisfaction benefits us, whereas the second aim at 
something beyond survival, can be curbed and do not necessarily benefit us (in fact, they can 
be highly detrimental).
1822
 The latter class of desires can again be divided into lawful and 
lawless desires – the first being at least compatible with reason and the second being as 
opposed to it as possible.
1823
  
Our θζθμηένδεζα may thus assume different configurations and it may come to include 
all these forms of sensible desire. Its particular configuration, however, seems to depend on 
the interaction of the different drives and how they transform each other. In fact, such an 
interaction may also direct our gain-loving drive at more than sensual pleasures. It may come 
to desire honor and knowledge (which are actually the objects of the two other constitutive 
desires of the soul), but for the sake of the pleasure they may entail. In other words, there 
may be sublimated or spiritualized pleasures – and thus a sublimated or spiritualized love of 
gain. Moreover, one may try to be admired by others for the pleasure one has – or one may 
                                                 
1820
 See Rep. 437d ff. 
1821
 See Phlb. 21b-c. 
1822
 Plato discusses this distinction in Rep. 558d ff.  
1823
 See Rep. 571b ff. 
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try to have pleasures that are somehow true. There are multiple variations and any of them 
can become dominant in our life. 
Also significant in this context is the fact that our love of gain can have different 
dimensions and it can even become a desire for a superlative gain, both in quantitative and in 
qualitative terms. In other words, one can desire to have the greatest pleasure, for the longest 
time – which would constitute a life of maximized gain.
1824
 To be sure, Plato argues that such 
a life would never fully satisfy us and constitute true ε὎δαζιμκία, since our desires are not 
reducible to a desire of gain. But this desire of gain is nevertheless a permanent component of 
our being, which cannot be removed (at least during life), but only reduced and subordinated 
to the other components, as we will see below.  
 
3.2. The love of honor (θηινηηκία) or of victory (θηινληθία) and the domain of 
intersubjective appearance 
 
 The second kind of constitutive desire or drive of the soul comes from the spirited part 
of the soul (ηὸ εοιμεζδέξ) and is thus primarily associated with anger (εοιόξ), which 
manifests itself in the battlefield and in moments of righteous indignation. At the core of 
anger there seems to be a desire for self-affirmation in a context of conflicting claims. This 
desire is primarily irrational, but it can also answer to rational considerations about what is 
correct, noble and just (thus echoing the Homeric notion of εοιόξ, which was also 
responsible for thoughts and actions).
1825
 Either way, it constitutes a different form of 
motivation, irreducible to the concern with one‟s subjective state. We may try to ensure our 
survival and attain a pleasurable state, but we may also make many sacrifices (and even 
sacrifice our own life) for the sake of others, without any hope of improving our subjective 
state. Greek culture is very aware of this possibility and usually associates it with one‟s sense 
of honor, and even with the desire to conquer everlasting fame.
1826
 Plato has this in mind 
when describing the second kind of drive, which is characterized as honor-loving (θζθόηζιμξ) 
                                                 
1824
 This pursuit of a maximized gain corresponds to the notions of πθέμκ ἔπεζκ or πθεμκελία as they are used in 
Grg. 483c ff., Rep. 343b ff., 359b ff. These notions do not simply mean “have more than one‟s share”, but they 
also denote a kind of desire that leads one to overstep any boundary and to pursue always more. For more on the 
meaning and use of this notion, see e.g. H.-O. WEBER, Die Bedeutung und Bewertung der Pleonexie von 
Homer bis Isokrates, Diss. Bonn, 1967, 5 ff. It is also important to bear in mind that the purest θζθμηένδεζα 
would desire a superlative gain in the purest sense of the word, which would be as deprived of honor and 
knowledge as possible. The only thing that seems to vaguely correspond to such description is the ideal of 
eternal drunkenness mentioned in Rep. 363d. 
1825
 Cp. Chap. 10, Sect. 1.1 above. 
1826
 For more on this, see Sect. 6.3 below. 
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and victory-loving (θζθόκζημξ). In Greek, these adjectives can express the idea of ambition 
and competitiveness, which in turn can have a positive or a negative connotation, according 
to the context. However, this is a very generic description of the two terms. We have to 
consider them in more detail, see what characterizes each one and what they have in 
common.  
Let us start with the love of victory (θζθμκζηία). This term denotes a desire to 
overcome others and show superiority over them. In its extreme form, it coincides with the 
instructions given to Glaucus by his father, according to Homer: “ever to excel, to do better 
than others”.
1827
 But according to Plato, this is a general trait of human personality or 
something to which we are always sensitive. We tend to compare ourselves with others 
around us or to compete with them, and we are not indifferent to the outcome of this 
competition. But our relation with others is usually more complex and it is also marked by 
what Plato calls a love of honor (θζθμηζιία). We desire to be acknowledged and even admired 
by others. We want to be seen as having merit or value (which is indeed one of the senses of 
ἀνεηή in Greek) and as having a noble or commendable life. We also want to avoid any 
shame and dishonor.
1828
 These are desires we sometimes notice in ourselves, but according to 
Plato they not limited to a particular moment of interaction with others or to a particular 




These kinds of concerns were perhaps clearer in Plato‟s time than in our own. The life 
of Greek men was indeed marked by many contests and one‟s rights in the πόθζξ were 
intrinsically connected with what one did and how one was regarded by others. However, 
Plato is talking of a permanent feature of human nature, which is expressed both in the love 
of victory and the love of honor – namely, the concern with how one is seen by others, how 
one appears to them and which relations of power are established. We are not indifferent to 
                                                 
1827
 See Iliad, VI.208. We find also a good expression of this desire in a prayer that appears at the end of several 
of Euripides‟ plays: “ὦ ιέβα ζεικὴ Νίηδ ηὸκ ἐιὸκ/ αίμημκ ηαηέπμζξ/ ηαὶ ιὴ θήβμζξ ζηεθακμῦζα”. See Iphigenia 
Taurica 1499-1501; Orestes 1691-3; Phoenisae 1764-6. 
1828
 Cp. e.g. Smp. 178d: “θέβς δὲ δὴ ηί ημῦημ; ηὴκ ἐπὶ ιὲκ ημ῔ξ αἰζπνμ῔ξ αἰζπύκδκ, ἐπὶ δὲ ημ῔ξ ηαθμ῔ξ θζθμηζιίακ· 
μ὎ βὰν ἔζηζκ ἄκεο ημύηςκ μὔηε πόθζκ μὔηε ἰδζώηδκ ιεβάθα ηαὶ ηαθὰ ἔνβα ἐλενβάγεζεαζ.” 
1829
 Thus, the love of honor seems to have a broader scope than the love of victory, since it is concerned with 
one‟s place in the πόθζξ, as well as with one‟s life as a whole. It is in this sense that Zeno seems to understand 
the meaning of these terms in Prm. 128c-e. However, victory and honor can also be intimately connected, since 
one can try to conquer honor through victory and a frequent consequence of victory is honor. But since honor 
seems to be a more encompassing designation, it is therefore more frequently used by Plato to designate the kind 
of drive we are now considering. 
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the difference between being respected or feared and being despised or laughed at, and this is 
why we pursue victory and honor.  
These drives are thus directed to something beyond our individual appearing or our 
subjective state. In fact, they require us to represent others outside our subjective state and 
these others must represent ourselves outside their own state. Cognitive elements are always 
implied here. However, our concern is with how one appears to the others or what is their 
impression of us. In this sense, the concern with objectivity or truth is very limited. One is 
mainly concerned with what one seems to be. It is a matter of seeming (δμηε῔κ) and not 
necessarily being (εἶκαζ).
1830
 But in any case, our life is about more than our subjective state 
or our feelings. Our being also has an intersubjective dimension, we are aware of others and 
their views, and this affects our desires, our actions and our life at large.  
Our concern with others and how they regard us may, however, have different ranges 
and intensities. It may be restricted to the closest ones or extend to the majority or to 
everybody. It may also be something we hardly think about at all or it may be all we care for. 
In the latter case, one may want to conquer the world and be admired for it, as Socrates says 
about Alcibiades, who is precisely presented as the embodiment of θζθμηζιία.
1831
 If this is not 
possible, such a person will still want as much honor as possible.
1832
 This applies both to the 
degree of one‟s honor and to its duration, the ultimate goal being to achieve an immortal 
renown, which would allow one be remembered throughout all time.
1833
  
                                                 
1830
 For this idea, cp. e.g. Rep. 365b-c: “ηὰ ιὲκ βὰν θεβόιεκα δζηαίῳ ιὲκ ὄκηζ ιμζ, ἐὰκ ιὴ ηαὶ δμη῵ ὄθεθμξ 
μ὎δέκ θαζζκ εἶκαζ, πόκμοξ δὲ ηαὶ γδιίαξ θακενάξ· ἀδίηῳ δὲ δόλακ δζηαζμζύκδξ πανεζηεοαζιέκῳ εεζπέζζμξ 
αίμξ θέβεηαζ. μ὎ημῦκ, ἐπεζδὴ „ηὸ δμηε῔κ‟, ὡξ δδθμῦζί ιμζ μἱ ζμθμί, “ηαὶ ηὰκ ἀθάεεζακ αζ᾵ηαζ” ηαὶ ηύνζμκ 
ε὎δαζιμκίαξ, ἐπὶ ημῦημ δὴ ηνεπηέμκ ὅθςξ· πνόεονα ιὲκ ηαὶ ζπ῅ια ηύηθῳ πενὶ ἐιαοηὸκ ζηζαβναθίακ ἀνεη῅ξ 
πενζβναπηέμκ, ηὴκ δὲ ημῦ ζμθςηάημο Ἀνπζθόπμο ἀθώπεηα ἑθηηέμκ ἐλόπζζεεκ ηενδαθέακ ηαὶ πμζηίθδκ.”  
1831
 Cp. e.g. Prt. 336, where it is said that Alcibiades is always θζθόκζημξ πνὸξ ὃ ἂκ ὁνιήζῃ (Prot. 336e). In Alc. 
I 105a-c, Socrates says: “δμηε῔ξ βάν ιμζ, εἴ ηίξ ζμζ εἴπμζ εε῵κ· „ὦ Ἀθηζαζάδδ, πόηενμκ αμύθεζ γ῅κ ἔπςκ ἃ κῦκ 
ἔπεζξ, ἠ α὎ηίηα ηεεκάκαζ εἰ ιή ζμζ ἐλέζηαζ ιείγς ηηήζαζεαζ;‟ δμηε῔ξ ἄκ ιμζ ἑθέζεαζ ηεεκάκαζ· ἀθθὰ κῦκ ἐπὶ ηίκζ 
δή πμηε ἐθπίδζ γῆξ, ἐβὼ θνάζς. ἟βῆ, ἐὰκ ε᾵ηημκ εἰξ ηὸκ Ἀεδκαίςκ δ῅ιμκ πανέθεῃξ – ημῦημ δ᾽ ἔζεζεαζ ιάθα 
ὀθίβςκ ἟ιεν῵κ – πανεθεὼκ μὖκ ἐκδείλεζεαζ Ἀεδκαίμζξ ὅηζ ἄλζμξ εἶ ηζι᾵ζεαζ ὡξ μὔηε Πενζηθ῅ξ μὔη᾽ ἄθθμξ 
μ὎δεὶξ η῵κ πώπμηε βεκμιέκςκ, ηαὶ ημῦη᾽ ἐκδεζλάιεκμξ ιέβζζημκ δοκήζεζεαζ ἐκ ηῆ πόθεζ, ἐὰκ δ᾽ ἐκεάδε ιέβζζημξ 
ᾖξ, ηαὶ ἐκ ημ῔ξ ἄθθμζξ Ἕθθδζζ, ηαὶ μ὎ ιόκμκ ἐκ Ἕθθδζζκ, ἀθθὰ ηαὶ ἐκ ημ῔ξ ααναάνμζξ, ὅζμζ ἐκ ηῆ α὎ηῆ ἟ι῔κ 
μἰημῦζζκ ἞πείνῳ. ηαὶ εἰ αὖ ζμζ εἴπμζ ὁ α὎ηὸξ μὗημξ εεὸξ ὅηζ α὎ημῦ ζε δε῔ δοκαζηεύεζκ ἐκ ηῆ Δ὎νώπῃ, δζαα῅καζ 
δὲ εἰξ ηὴκ Ἀζίακ μ὎η ἐλέζηαζ ζμζ μ὎δὲ ἐπζεέζεαζ ημ῔ξ ἐηε῔ πνάβιαζζκ, μ὎η ἂκ αὖ ιμζ δμηε῔ξ ἐεέθεζκ μ὎δ᾽ ἐπὶ 
ημύημζξ ιόκμζξ γ῅κ, εἰ ιὴ ἐιπθήζεζξ ημῦ ζμῦ ὀκόιαημξ ηαὶ η῅ξ ζ῅ξ δοκάιεςξ πάκηαξ ὡξ ἔπμξ εἰπε῔κ ἀκενώπμοξ· 
ηαὶ μἶιαί ζε πθὴκ Κύνμο ηαὶ Ξένλμο ἟βε῔ζεαζ μ὎δέκα ἄλζμκ θόβμο βεβμκέκαζ. ὅηζ ιὲκ μὖκ ἔπεζξ ηαύηδκ ηὴκ 
ἐθπίδα, εὖ μἶδα ηαὶ μ὎η εἰηάγς.” 
1832
 See Rep. 475a-b: “ηαὶ ιὴκ θζθμηίιμοξ βε, ὡξ ἐβᾦιαζ, ηαεμνᾶξ ὅηζ, ἂκ ιὴ ζηναηδβ῅ζαζ δύκςκηαζ, 
ηνζηηοανπμῦζζκ, ηἂκ ιὴ ὏πὸ ιεζγόκςκ ηαὶ ζεικμηένςκ ηζι᾵ζεαζ, ὏πὸ ζιζηνμηένςκ ηαὶ θαοθμηένςκ ηζιώιεκμζ 
ἀβαπ῵ζζκ, ὡξ ὅθςξ ηζι῅ξ ἐπζεοιδηαὶ ὄκηεξ.     ημιζδῆ ιὲκ μὖκ.” 
1833
 Cp. Smp. 208c-e: “ἐπεί βε ηαὶ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ εἰ ἐεέθεζξ εἰξ ηὴκ θζθμηζιίακ αθέραζ, εαοιάγμζξ ἂκ η῅ξ ἀθμβίαξ 
πενὶ ἃ ἐβὼ εἴνδηα εἰ ιὴ ἐκκμε῔ξ, ἐκεοιδεεὶξ ὡξ δεζκ῵ξ δζάηεζκηαζ ἔνςηζ ημῦ ὀκμιαζημὶ βεκέζεαζ “ηαὶ ηθέμξ ἐξ 
ηὸκ ἀεὶ πνόκμκ ἀεάκαημκ ηαηαεέζεαζ”, ηαὶ ὏πὲν ημύημο ηζκδύκμοξ ηε ηζκδοκεύεζκ ἕημζιμί εἰζζ πάκηαξ ἔηζ 
ι᾵θθμκ ἠ ὏πὲν η῵κ παίδςκ, ηαὶ πνήιαηα ἀκαθίζηεζκ ηαὶ πόκμοξ πμκε῔κ μ὏ζηζκαζμῦκ ηαὶ ὏πεναπμεκῄζηεζκ. ἐπεὶ 
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In effect, our θζθμηζιία consents many variations, according to its own development 
and its interaction with the other drives. As we will see, each drive must be thought as part of 
a system of forces – and θζθμηζιία plays an important role therein, since it can work as ally of 
the other two. It can listen to reason and follow it, thus becoming concerned with objective 
goodness and helping θζθμζμθία to rule the soul. But it can also fall back in θζθμηένδεζα or 
in one‟s self-interest.
1834
 In some passages it is even entirely reduced to it (as in Phaedo, 
where it is seen simply as an inner variation of the concern with the body).
1835
 But by 
considering it as an autonomous or irreducible drive, Plato is able to provide a more complex 
picture of our being. Although the stronger contrast is between the two other drives, the 
soul‟s love of honor may also recruit them to its own ends. One may want to be admired by 
one‟s gains or by one‟s intelligence and philosophical prowess, and one‟s pursuit of gain and 
one‟s pursuit of knowledge will then be subordinated to one‟s desire for honor.
1836
 Thus, the 
identification of θζθμηζιία as a third basic drive of the soul makes our system of motivations 
significantly more complex. 
 
3.3. The love of wisdom (θηινζνθία) and the domain of objective reality 
 
 The contrast between the pursuit of pleasure and the pursuit of honor was indeed a 
topos in the pre-Platonic literature, but Plato identifies a third kind of pursuit (and 
consequently a third kind of drive) that is opposed to the other two. The third kind of pursuit 
or drive is associated with the rational or calculating part of the soul (ηὸ θμβζζηζηόκ), which is 
precisely that with which the soul thinks, learns or understands, and is “always entirely 
directed toward knowing the truth as it is”.
1837
 Our rational part is thus not simply a capacity 
to think, but also a form of desire. It is essentially defined by a drive, which is usually 
                                                                                                                                                        
μἴεζ ζύ, ἔθδ, Ἄθηδζηζκ ὏πὲν Ἀδιήημο ἀπμεακε῔κ ἄκ, ἠ Ἀπζθθέα Παηνόηθῳ ἐπαπμεακε῔κ, ἠ πνμαπμεακε῔κ ηὸκ 
὏ιέηενμκ Κόδνμκ ὏πὲν η῅ξ ααζζθείαξ η῵κ παίδςκ, ιὴ μἰμιέκμοξ ἀεάκαημκ ικήιδκ ἀνεη῅ξ πένζ ἑαοη῵κ ἔζεζεαζ, 
ἡκ κῦκ ἟ιε῔ξ ἔπμιεκ; πμθθμῦ βε δε῔, ἔθδ, ἀθθ᾽ μἶιαζ ὏πὲν ἀνεη῅ξ ἀεακάημο ηαὶ ημζαύηδξ δόλδξ ε὎ηθεμῦξ πάκηεξ 
πάκηα πμζμῦζζκ, ὅζῳ ἂκ ἀιείκμοξ ὦζζ, ημζμύηῳ ι᾵θθμκ· ημῦ βὰν ἀεακάημο ἐν῵ζζκ.” 
1834
 Cp. Phdr. 253d-e, Rep. 440a ff. Cp. also 546d ff., for the description of the honor-loving regime as an 
intermediate between a gain-loving regime and a knowledge-loving regime. 
1835
 See once more Phd. 68b-c. 
1836
 Plato not only argues that it is so, but he also portrays several characters that seem to discuss only for the 
sake of victory and honor, and not for the sake of knowledge. See, for instance, Plato‟s portrayal of the brothers 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in Euthydemus. Cp. also e.g. Chrm. 162c. For the contrast between discussing 
for the sake of victory and discussing for the sake of knowledge, cp. e.g. Chrm. 166c-d, Grg. 457c-e, 515b. 
1837
 See 581b: “ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ᾧ βε ιακεάκμιεκ, πακηὶ δ῅θμκ ὅηζ πνὸξ ηὸ εἰδέκαζ ηὴκ ἀθήεεζακ ὅπῃ ἔπεζ π᾵κ ἀεὶ 
ηέηαηαζ, ηαὶ πνδιάηςκ ηε ηαὶ δόλδξ ἣηζζηα ημύηςκ ημύηῳ ιέθεζ.” Cp. also Rep. 439d. 
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characterized as a love of wisdom (θζθμζμθία), though sometimes it is also sometimes 
described as a love of learning (θζθμιαεία) or a love of θόβμξ (θζθμθμβία).
1838
  
The use of the term θζθμζμθία in Plato is very complex and can be associated with 
different things, as we will see in detail in the following chapter. However, in the context of 
the tripartition the term is used to denote a form of desire – and not just any desire or 
fondness, but a form of obsessive love that can even be compared to madness.
1839
 This love is 
directed at knowledge in general, though the designation ζμθία associates it primarily with a 
superlative form of knowledge, which surpasses the regular access to things and is directed at 
the most important things.
1840
 In general, we can more easily identify this love of knowledge 
in someone engaged in the active pursuit of it. We can also see it in some psychological  
traits – such as being inquisitive (γδηδηζηόξ) and very fond of learning or acquiring 
knowledge (θζθμιαεήξ).
1841
 Such a person will probably also be fond of speeches or rational 
discussions (θζθόθμβμξ), since θόβμξ allows one to pursue knowledge and to grasp what 
things are.
1842
 These are just some of the manifestations of the third kind of desire or drive, 
which is directed at knowledge and wants to avoid ignorance.
1843
 But there are many other 
manifestations – for instance, in the fact that people do not want to be deceived and that they 
want to keep the knowledge they have and not lose it.
1844
 We are sensitive to the difference 
                                                 
1838
 See 581b, where this part of the soul is itself qualified as θζθμιαεέξ and θζθόζμθμκ. For its designation as 
θζθόθμβμξ, see 582e.  
1839
 See Rep. 501d: “πῆ βὰν δὴ ἕλμοζζκ ἀιθζζαδη῅ζαζ; πόηενμκ ιὴ ημῦ ὄκημξ ηε ηαὶ ἀθδεείαξ ἐναζηὰξ εἶκαζ 
ημὺξ θζθμζόθμοξ;     ἄημπμκ ιεκηἄκ, ἔθδ, εἴδ.” For the association of θζθμζμθία with ἔνςξ, see also e.g. Phd. 
66e and 68a. Φζθμζμθία is also associated with longing (πόεμξ) in Men. 84c, whereas in Hp. Ma. 297e, Socrates 
speaks of a ἐπζεοιία ημῦ εἰδέκαζ. For its association with madness, see e.g. Smp. 218b: “(...) πάκηεξ βὰν 
ηεημζκςκήηαηε η῅ξ θζθμζόθμο ιακίαξ ηε ηαὶ ααηπείαξ (...).”  
1840
 For the notion of ζμθία, see Chap. 1, Sect. 2 above. 
1841
 See 535c-d: “ηὸ βμῦκ κῦκ ἁιάνηδια, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ηαὶ ἟ ἀηζιία θζθμζμθίᾳ δζὰ ηαῦηα πνμζπέπηςηεκ, ὃ ηαὶ 
πνόηενμκ εἴπμιεκ, ὅηζ μ὎ ηαη᾽ ἀλίακ α὎η῅ξ ἅπημκηαζ· μ὎ βὰν κόεμοξ ἔδεζ ἅπηεζεαζ, ἀθθὰ βκδζίμοξ.     π῵ξ;   
ἔθδ.     πν῵ημκ ιέκ, εἶπμκ, θζθμπμκίᾳ μ὎ πςθὸκ δε῔ εἶκαζ ηὸκ ἁρόιεκμκ, ηὰ ιὲκ ἟ιίζεα θζθόπμκμκ ὄκηα, ηὰ δ᾽ 
἟ιίζεα ἄπμκμκ. ἔζηζ δὲ ημῦημ, ὅηακ ηζξ θζθμβοικαζηὴξ ιὲκ ηαὶ θζθόεδνμξ ᾖ ηαὶ πάκηα ηὰ δζὰ ημῦ ζώιαημξ 
θζθμπμκῆ, θζθμιαεὴξ δὲ ιή, ιδδὲ θζθήημμξ ιδδὲ γδηδηζηόξ, ἀθθ᾽ ἐκ π᾵ζζ ημύημζξ ιζζμπμκῆ· πςθὸξ δὲ ηαὶ ὁ 
ηἀκακηία ημύημο ιεηααεαθδηὼξ ηὴκ θζθμπμκίακ.” See also 485a ff., where Socrates describes the psychological 
qualities the philosophical guardians must have. 
1842
 Cp. 582d: “ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ηαὶ δζ᾽ μὗ βε δε῔ ὀνβάκμο ηνίκεζεαζ, μ὎ ημῦ θζθμηενδμῦξ ημῦημ ὄνβακμκ μ὎δὲ ημῦ 
θζθμηίιμο, ἀθθὰ ημῦ θζθμζόθμο.     ηὸ πμ῔μκ;     δζὰ θόβςκ πμο ἔθαιεκ δε῔κ ηνίκεζεαζ. ἤ βάν;     καί.     θόβμζ δὲ 
ημύημο ιάθζζηα ὄνβακμκ.” 
1843
 On this idea, see e.g. Sph. 228c: “(...) ροπήκ βε ἴζιεκ ἄημοζακ π᾵ζακ π᾵κ ἀβκμμῦζακ.” Immediately 
thereafter, the soul is said to be mobilized towards truth (ἐπ‟ ἀθήεεζακ ὁνιςιέκδξ ροπ῅ξ). For more on this 
passage, see Chap. 8 Sect. 1.2. 
1844
 What Plato describes in Rep. 485c as a trait of philosophically gifted natures (namely, “ηὴκ ἀρεύδεζακ ηαὶ ηὸ 
ἑηόκηαξ εἶκαζ ιδδαιῆ πνμζδέπεζεαζ ηὸ ρεῦδμξ ἀθθὰ ιζζε῔κ, ηὴκ δ᾽ ἀθήεεζακ ζηένβεζκ”) applies to a certain 
extent to everybody. See Rep. 382b: “ἐβὼ δὲ θέβς ὅηζ ηῆ ροπῆ πενὶ ηὰ ὄκηα ρεύδεζεαί ηε ηαὶ ἐρεῦζεαζ ηαὶ 
ἀιαε῅ εἶκαζ ηαὶ ἐκηαῦεα ἔπεζκ ηε ηαὶ ηεηη῅ζεαζ ηὸ ρεῦδμξ πάκηεξ ἣηζζηα ἂκ δέλαζκημ, ηαὶ ιζζμῦζζ ιάθζζηα 
α὎ηὸ ἐκ ηῶ ημζμύηῳ.” See also Rep. 412e-413a: “θαίκεηαί ιμζ δόλα ἐλζέκαζ ἐη δζακμίαξ ἠ ἑημοζίςξ ἠ ἀημοζίςξ, 
ἑημοζίςξ ιὲκ ἟ ρεοδὴξ ημῦ ιεηαιακεάκμκημξ, ἀημοζίςξ δὲ π᾵ζα ἟ ἀθδεήξ.     ηὸ ιὲκ η῅ξ ἑημοζίμο, ἔθδ, 
ιακεάκς, ηὸ δὲ η῅ξ ἀημοζίμο δέμιαζ ιαεε῔κ.     ηί δέ; μ὎ ηαὶ ζὺ ἟βῆ, ἔθδκ ἐβώ, η῵κ ιὲκ ἀβαε῵κ ἀημοζίςξ 
577 
 




According to Plato, this preference is the expression of a particular form of desire, 
which corresponds to what Nietzsche calls will to truth (Wille zur Wahrheit).
1846
 It is a desire 
for something that goes beyond our sensation or appearances as such.
1847
 It aims at something 
objective or absolute. This does not necessarily imply that there are “things in themselves”, 
completely independent from any subject and any appearing. Perhaps there is nothing outside 
consciousness. But such an idea is still a version of things that may be right or not – and the 
philosophical drive is directed precisely at a right version of things. It wants to define what 
reality is and it wants this definition to be correct.
1848
 It wants a full access to what there is or 
a perfect knowledge of it.
1849
  
Plato describes this love of knowledge as a permanent trait of the soul, irreducible to 
our love of gain and honor. At some points, he even seems to identify it as the essence of the 
soul.
1850
 This may be surprising, since most of us (if not all) are very far from corresponding 
to the description of the true philosophers we find at the end of Republic V. Philosophers 
desire to know all things, they are insatiable, and they cannot stand to be ignorant of 
something.
1851
 Our usual state, in turn, seems to be very different from this. We do not desire 
to know everything. We only want to know some things – namely, those that are more 
relevant for our practical concerns (which normally means those that are more relevant for 
the acquisition of gain or honor). Thus, we do not need to know things perfectly. We only 
need to know them well enough to achieve our goals. In other words, the love of knowledge 
tends indeed to be subordinated to the other drives. It is not a love of knowledge for 
knowledge‟s own sake. However, this does not mean it is entirely reducible to them. Our love 
of knowledge is directed at something different from mere gain or honor. Moreover, although 
                                                                                                                                                        
ζηένεζεαζ ημὺξ ἀκενώπμοξ, η῵κ δὲ ηαη῵κ ἑημοζίςξ; ἠ μ὎ ηὸ ιὲκ ἐρεῦζεαζ η῅ξ ἀθδεείαξ ηαηόκ, ηὸ δὲ 
ἀθδεεύεζκ ἀβαεόκ; ἠ μ὎ ηὸ ηὰ ὄκηα δμλάγεζκ ἀθδεεύεζκ δμηε῔ ζμζ εἶκαζ;     ἀθθ᾽, ἤ δ᾽ ὅξ, ὀνε῵ξ θέβεζξ, ηαί ιμζ 
δμημῦζζκ ἄημκηεξ ἀθδεμῦξ δόλδξ ζηενίζηεζεαζ.” 
1845
 In other words, we possess the trait Plato ascribes to the dogs – namely, we distinguish what we know from 
what we do not know and we are fond of the former and averse to the latter. See Rep. 376a-b. 
1846
 See e.g. KSA 3, 352, 574-577; KSA 5, 15f., 22-24, 145, 401; KSA 10, 87ff.; KSA 12, 323f., 364ff., 384f.; 
KSA 13, 226, 229, 500, 522. 
1847
 This “going beyond sensation” is precisely what is implied in a θμβζζιόξ or in the act of θμβίγεζεαζ, which 
is what first allows Socrates to identify the part of the soul characterized by θζθμζμθία. See 439c ff. 
1848
 The goal of this drive is what Plato describes as “βίβκεζεαζ ηαηαθακὲξ ἕηαζημκ η῵κ ὄκηςκ ὅπῃ ἔπεζ” (see 
Chrm. 166d) or as “θακενὸκ βεκέζεαζ α὎ηό” (namely, ηὸ ἀθδεὲξ ηί ἐζηζκ – see Grg. 505e. 
1849
 For more on the ideas of knowledge and truth, see Chap. 5 Sect. 2.3 and Chap. 11. 
1850
 See especially Rep. 611a-612a. 
1851
 See 475b-c: “μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ ηὸκ θζθόζμθμκ ζμθίαξ θήζμιεκ ἐπζεοιδηὴκ εἶκαζ, μ὎ η῅ξ ιέκ, η῅ξ δ᾽ μὔ, ἀθθὰ 
πάζδξ;     ἀθδε῅. (...) ηὸκ δὲ δὴ ε὎πεν῵ξ ἐεέθμκηα πακηὸξ ιαεήιαημξ βεύεζεαζ ηαὶ ἁζιέκςξ ἐπὶ ηὸ ιακεάκεζκ 
ἰόκηα ηαὶ ἀπθήζηςξ ἔπμκηα, ημῦημκ δ᾽ ἐκ δίηῃ θήζμιεκ θζθόζμθμκ (...).” 
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it is normally inconstant and weak, it can be stimulated and developed (as Plato often 
stresses) – even to the point of becoming stronger than the other drives and thus determining 
our whole life. In this case, it will also become much more demanding and much more 
rigorous, and therefore much more easy to recognize as such.
1852
 But according to Plato, even 
when we cannot recognize it, θζθμζμθία is a fundamental and inextirpable structure of our 
being.   
  
3.4. Brief reconsideration of the tripartition of our desire 
 
 This brief characterization of each drive lets us better understand some important 
aspects of the tripartition of the soul. As was said, the description is somewhat abstract. These 
drives or urges are normally not experienced in their pure state. They affect each other in 
many ways and, as a result, they may undergo many variations. Normally, we even tend not 
to recognize their manifestations as variations of the same basic and permanent drive. Plato, 
however, defends that there are three permanent tensions of our inner being and that they 
always affect us in some degree.  
 It is not clear whether these drives are absolutely innate or acquired at some point 
during our life. Plato sometimes describes them as constitutive and inborn. Other times he 
recognizes there is no reason in little children – and perhaps no gain-loving and honor-loving 
drive either.
1853
 At some stages he describes the soul of an infant as a chaos of inner 
movements, without coherent behavior.
1854
 It is not clear when and why an infant‟s soul 
becomes ordered and these drives develop. However, none of this makes the description any 
less valid for older human beings, who may recognize these tensions in themselves.  
 One thing is clear: Plato never describes the drives as being derived from one another 
(even if he sometimes seems to reduce θζθμηζιία to θζθμηένδεζα, or at least to a drive whose 
essential features are similar to the description of θζθμηένδεζα in the Republic).
1855
 The drives 
are often interconnected and they may be subordinated to each other, which will transform 
them, but each one has its own specificity. This does not mean that they all have the same 
value, though. In fact, Plato seems to establish a hierarchy of drives. Love of gain seems to be 
the lowest drive and love of knowledge the highest – even the most proper part of the 
                                                 
1852
 All these possible variations will be carefully analyzed in the following chapter. See also Chap. 17, Sect. 5. 
1853
 Cp. e.g. Rep. 441a-b. 
1854
 See in particular Ti. 42a ff. 
1855





 This outlines the task of developing the love of knowledge and repressing the other 
two drives. It also raises the above mentioned question of whether these other drives should 
be subordinated to θζθμζμθία and transformed by this subordination, or rather eliminated in 
some way. Plato seems to acknowledge that during life they are all inextricable, but the fact 
that sometimes he represents death as a shedding off of the other parts raises the question of 
whether or not that is the most desirable state. However, Plato‟s eschatological reflections are 
very problematic and we will therefore disregard them once more.
1857
 
At any rate, in order to better understand the different forms of each drive and their 
comparison we must consider their interrelation. This also allows us to understand how they 
are supposed to account for our behavior and our way of life in general.  
 
4. The combination of the different drives 
 
 According to Plato, the human ροπή is essentially marked by motivations or drives 
whose differentiation and identification require a state of conflict (ζηάζζξ), in which we are 
torn apart between two different drives. However, most of our actions are not preceded by 
such a conflict. This suggests that in general we are impelled by just one drive, while the 
others are inert or asleep, waiting for their turn to impel us. In this sense, our motivations 
seem to be for the most part simple. Our basic drives are usually separated from one another 
and each of them causes a certain kind of action. Then, on rare occasions, they may be 
simultaneously active and go into conflict. This may result in inaction or it may perhaps even 
lead one to act against the rational part and one‟s better judgment (i.e., it may lead to an 
akratic action). At least this is what is suggested by the way Plato first describes the soul‟s 
inborn drives in the Republic. Each drive seems to be responsible for certain acts and they are 
incapable of conciliation.  
 However, such a description is only a first approach to the nature of the drives and to 
their functioning. Later in the text (as well as in other dialogues) we find out that things are 
actually much more complex. Our drives are always active and this means that they must 
interact and blend with each other in some way. They are always combined or associated with 
one another, and this means that the alphabet of our motivations is not what we primarily deal 
with. Rather, we experience each letter of motivation (i.e., each drive) already as part of a 
                                                 
1856
 Cp. e.g. Rep. 611a-612a. 
1857
 For more on the problematic status of these reflections, cp. Chap. 10 Sect. 2. 
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motivational syllable, and within this syllable the different letters are arranged in a particular 
way.
1858
 The arrangements may vary and (as we will see) they can be more or less 




 It is very important to bear in mind here that the arrangement of drives is not 
completely new at each moment, but there is something like a usual arrangement (or a kind of 
character) that determines which drive normally prevails in us and how each one of them 
normally manifests itself. More precisely, this arrangement determines the drives‟ relative 
strength, the actions they motivate, and the way they affect the general pursuit of a 
superlative good. Then, at times, some unresolved tension between our drives may come to 
the fore and cause a conflict, which may be superficial and transitory, or it may call for a 
revision of the general arrangement. But such moments of conflict are indeed rare. The 
relation between our drives tends to be stable and their functions are relatively clear.  
 This is, in broad strokes, the general model of combination of drives that we find in 
Plato. But we must consider in more detail what is implied in it. In order to so, we must direct 
our attention to the way Plato illustrates this combination of drives. Instead of simply 
conceptualizing them, Plato employs several images to clarify the way our drives combine 
with each other. These images are of different kinds and to an extent they carry different 
implications. We could say that they present somewhat different models of the combination 
or interaction of the soul‟s constitutive drives, though they all share a common core. We must 
therefore start by considering each image (and the model that corresponds to it) and then we 
will try to better determine their common core and what they say about our motivations.   
 
4.1. The hydraulic model 
 
 In the Republic, Socrates says: “(...) we surely know that when someone‟s desires 
incline strongly to some one thing, they are therefore weaker with respect to the rest, like a 
                                                 
1858
 Our motivation for each action has therefore some of the features that characterize intermediate           
entities. Indeed, it always lies between different poles, without being entirely reduced to any of them. Moreover, 
we are never able to experience any of them in its simple form, without being already transformed by the others. 
For the notion of intermediate or ιεηαλύ, see Chap. 7 Sect. 2.4 and Chap. 12 Sects. 3.3 and 4.3. 
1859
 We must therefore distinguish the strategy used at first to identify and determine each drive (which tries to 
see them in their purest form) from the description of how these drives are present in our life or of how we 
normally experience them. The drives are constantly marked by their interaction with one another, which 
determines all their particular manifestations, and therefore when we notice one of them, the others are still 
present and active. 
581 
 
stream that has been channeled off in that other direction”.
1860
 By comparing the soul‟s drives 
to a flowing watercourse, Socrates stresses several things. First, our soul is in movement and 
has a strong tension (which, as we saw, is directed at the superlative good). Second, the 
tension in question – i.e., the stream – corresponds to a fixed quantity. It may be channeled in 
different ways, but the quantity of water is always the same. Third, this fixed quantity must 
always be divided between three channels, which correspond to our particular drives. The 
quantity of each channel is thus not predetermined and this means that the derived streams 
may be larger or smaller. However, the strength of each derived stream depends on the 
strength of the others. If one of these streams increases, the others must decrease. Indeed, 
though they are different streams, they are united by their correlation, which determines their 
possibilities. One of them may be strong and the other two weak, or the main stream may be 
more equally distributed by them. What is not clear in this model, though, is how the 
different streams affect each other or how they interact, apart from the fact that the intensity 
of each one is intimately connected to the intensity of the others. 
 
4.2. The traction model and the resulting force system 
   
Several passages express a different and more complex model. According to this 
model, the constitutive drives of the soul are like forces that oppose each other. We find one 
instance of this model in Phaedrus, when Plato describes the soul as the “combined power of 
a winged team of horses and their charioteer” (ζύιθοημξ δύκαιζξ ὏πμπηένμο γεύβμοξ ηε ηαὶ 
἟κζόπμο).
1861
 The horses and the charioteer have different interests and they pull in different 
directions – not only in life at large, but particularly when the soul sees someone very 
beautiful.
1862
 This image of the soul contains yet another instance of the same model, insofar 
as it also distinguishes the wings of the soul and its weight, which counteract each other.
1863
 
Another illustration of the model in question can be found in the Republic, when Plato 
compares the soul‟s drives (or, more precisely, what they are directed to) to different plates of 
a scale. Whatever is put in one of them, affects the other. When one sinks, the other rises.
1864
 
                                                 
1860
 See 485d: “ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ὅηῳ βε εἰξ ἕκ ηζ αἱ ἐπζεοιίαζ ζθόδνα ῥέπμοζζκ, ἴζιεκ πμο ὅηζ εἰξ ηἆθθα ημύηῳ 
ἀζεεκέζηεναζ, ὥζπεν ῥεῦια ἐηε῔ζε ἀπςπεηεοιέκμκ.” I follow once more A. Bloom‟s translation. 
1861
 See 246a. 
1862
 For the description of what happens when the soul is in face of someone it finds beautiful, see 253e ff. 
1863
 As was said above (Sect. 2.3), this contrast marks the entire palinode.  
1864
 See 550e-551a: “ημ὎κηεῦεεκ ημίκοκ, εἶπμκ, πνμσόκηεξ εἰξ ηὸ πνόζεεκ ημῦ πνδιαηίγεζεαζ, ὅζῳ ἂκ ημῦημ 
ηζιζώηενμκ ἟β῵κηαζ, ημζμύηῳ ἀνεηὴκ ἀηζιμηένακ. ἠ μ὎π μὕης πθμύημο ἀνεηὴ δζέζηδηεκ, ὥζπεν ἐκ πθάζηζββζ 
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Indeed, we are always inclined towards one drive, and its strength implies the weakness of 
the others. In the Republic, Plato also uses several times the image of pulling when referring 
to the drives of the soul. He compares the parts of the soul to different animals that try to pull 
or drag the others.
1865
 He describes the influence parents and other people have over the soul 
of a child as a way of being dragged by different principles.
1866
 He also interprets a tragic 
situation (like when someone loses a son) as a situation in which one is simultaneously pulled 
by the desire to cry and by the respect for the κόιμξ, which says one should not cry.
1867
 Aside 
from Phaedrus and from the Republic, the image of pulling is also important in the Laws, 
when the soul is compared to a puppet moved by different strings.
1868
 One last example of 
this model can be found in Phaedo, when Socrates discusses the possibility of the soul and 
the body opposing each other.
1869
 
The language of traction and force is indeed very frequently employed to talk about 
our motivations, our actions and the life we lead. The soul‟s drives or motivations are 
presented as forces that guide the soul (ἄβεζκ), that pull it or drag it (ἕθηεζκ) in a certain 
direction, and that resist each other (ἀκηζηείκεζκ, ἐκακηζμῦζεαζ).
1870
 In fact, each drive pursues 
its object with intensity and strives to be all-dominating, but it must always face the other 
drives and their counterpull. The resistance is constitutive and it can even fully paralyze the 
soul. This is what happens when there is a conflict or ζηάζζξ. At that point, one cannot 
determine which direction is to be followed. But these conflicts are not just something that 
sporadically takes place. In a way, they are a permanent condition of the soul, insofar as the 
drives are always active (even if they do not seem to directly motivate an action at a certain 
time). Our drives constitute an internal system of forces and it is within this permanent 
system of forces that each particular drive manifests itself. The system determines the 
strength of each drive and it also determines the system‟s resultant, which can be of different 
kinds. It can be a state of indecision, in which no particular drive prevails (and thus no clear 
direction is given to the soul), or it can be a state in which one drive dominates the other and 
therefore determines the soul to act in a particular way. The latter state is in fact the one we 
                                                                                                                                                        
γοβμῦ ηεζιέκμο ἑηαηένμο, ἀεὶ ημ὎κακηίμκ ῥέπμκηε;     ηαὶ ιάθ᾽, ἔθδ.     ηζιςιέκμο δὴ πθμύημο ἐκ πόθεζ ηαὶ η῵κ 
πθμοζίςκ ἀηζιμηένα ἀνεηή ηε ηαὶ μἱ ἀβαεμί.” 
1865
 See 588c ff. (and especially 589a). 
1866
 See e.g. 547b-c and 550a-b. 
1867
 See 603e-604e, especially 604a-b: “μ὎ημῦκ ηὸ ιὲκ ἀκηζηείκεζκ δζαηεθεοόιεκμκ θόβμξ ηαὶ κόιμξ ἐζηίκ, ηὸ δὲ 
ἕθημκ ἐπὶ ηὰξ θύπαξ α὎ηὸ ηὸ πάεμξ;     ἀθδε῅.” 
1868
 See 644c ff. and, for a brief consideration of the passage, Sect. 2.2 above. 
1869
 See 94b-94e. 
1870
 These verbs appear frequently in the passages just mentioned. 
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normally find ourselves in and it is also what we most immediately recognize as our 
motivation – though it is actually the result of the interplay of our constitutive motivations, 
which allows one of them to prevail. 
The prevalence in question may be either momentary or permanent. Life has many 
moments and sometimes one drive may prevail, at other times another. But (as was said) it 
can also produce (and in general it does produce) a habitual state, which may suffer small (or 
even great) variations, according to what happens in one‟s life. In other words, each drive is 
not constituted anew at each time, but it rather takes place within a general balance or 
arrangement of drives that determines the individual manifestations of each drive – even if 
we only see the result of the whole process. In effect, the true system of forces is something 
we are usually not aware of. We only recognize it when the drives somehow cancel each 
other out and we cannot determine how to act in a particular situation or even how to lead our 
life. In those moments we may notice an intense interaction between the drives, which results 
in our paralysis. But when one drive becomes preponderant, we lose sight of their interaction 
and of how our particular motivation always results from the combination of these drives. 
All these aspects are implied in the traction model and they account for important 
aspects of our action. However, the model as such leaves some questions open – especially 
the question of what determines the intensity of each drive within the system of drives and 
how its intensity may vary. On this account, the following model is far more illuminating. 
 
4.3. The biological model 
 
Another of Plato‟s models for the interaction of our constitutive drives is based on the 
comparison between the parts of the soul and living beings. The different parts of the soul are 
sometimes referred to as plants, or as corresponding to different kinds of animals (such as 
horses in the Phaedrus, a many-headed beast, a lion, a monkey or a snake in the Republic) 
and even to human beings (as is the case when Plato speaks of a charioteer in Phaedrus or of 
the inner human being in the Republic).
1871
 All these entities are characterized by the fact that 
they can grow or become stronger, but can also become weaker or wither away. This is a 
central feature of this new model, which complements what we just saw. 
                                                 
1871
 For more on this, see Sect.2.3 above. 
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Let us see this in more detail. Plato seems to talk of the gain-loving part of the soul as 
a plant when he says that it can be watered or parched.
1872
 In Timaeus he expressly compares 
the human being to a celestial plant and says that the philosophical part is its roots.
1873
 Other 
times, the soul is described as a society of animals. It is not simply a chimera, composed of 
different animals, but rather an ecosystem in which they have to relate to each other. The 
animals are of different kinds and are distinguished by their behavior, their tendencies and 
their wildness or mildness. In particular, they can have different relations to θόβμξ – i.e., they 
may or may not understand speech and obey it.
1874
 The relation between them can also be 
more or less peaceful. They can bite each other and fight for power, or they can become 
friends and allies (especially if the tamest one dominates).
1875
    
However, the most interesting aspect in this model is the fact that the parts of the soul 
and the corresponding drives may go through many states. Plato speaks of calming them 
down (πναΰκεζκ, ἟ζοπάγεζκ), letting them sleep, and he also speaks of moving, provoking or 
awakening them (ηζκε῔κ, ἐβείνεζκ).
1876
 They are compared to muscles, which may be relaxed 
or strained. It all depends on whether we train them properly or not.
1877
 Moreover, living 
beings are hungry and require sustenance. Plants may be watered or we can let them wither 
away, whereas animals may be fed or starved.
1878
 The same applies to the soul‟s drives. 
Finally, the idea of one part of the soul becoming stronger can also be expressed by the idea 
of generation or reproduction. In Philebus, Plato speaks of the children of reason (which 
would allow the soul to know more), and in the Republic Plato says that appetitive desires 
can reproduce themselves in the soul, thereby rendering the appetitive part even stronger.
1879
 
In sum, each part and each drive may develop in different ways. They all want to grow and 
prevent the development of the others, but they cannot all become equally strong. Their 
particular form and strength at any given time thus depends on what happens to it or what it 
                                                 
1872
 Cp. 606d “ηαὶ πενὶ ἀθνμδζζίςκ δὴ ηαὶ εοιμῦ ηαὶ πενὶ πάκηςκ η῵κ ἐπζεοιδηζη῵κ ηε ηαὶ θοπδν῵κ ηαὶ ἟δέςκ 
ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ, ἃ δή θαιεκ πάζῃ πνάλεζ ἟ι῔κ ἕπεζεαζ, ὅηζ ημζαῦηα ἟ι᾵ξ ἟ πμζδηζηὴ ιίιδζζξ ἐνβάγεηαζ· ηνέθεζ βὰν 
ηαῦηα ἄνδμοζα, δέμκ α὎πιε῔κ, ηαὶ ἄνπμκηα ἟ι῔κ ηαείζηδζζκ, δέμκ ἄνπεζεαζ α὎ηὰ ἵκα αεθηίμοξ ηε ηαὶ 
ε὎δαζιμκέζηενμζ ἀκηὶ πεζνόκςκ ηαὶ ἀεθζςηένςκ βζβκώιεεα.” 
1873
 See 90a-b: “ηὸ δὲ δὴ πενὶ ημῦ ηονζςηάημο παν᾽ ἟ι῔κ ροπ῅ξ εἴδμοξ δζακμε῔ζεαζ δε῔ ηῆδε, ὡξ ἄνα α὎ηὸ 
δαίιμκα εεὸξ ἑηάζηῳ δέδςηεκ, ημῦημ ὃ δή θαιεκ μἰηε῔κ ιὲκ ἟ι῵κ ἐπ᾽ ἄηνῳ ηῶ ζώιαηζ, πνὸξ δὲ ηὴκ ἐκ μ὎νακῶ 
ζοββέκεζακ ἀπὸ β῅ξ ἟ι᾵ξ αἴνεζκ ὡξ ὄκηαξ θοηὸκ μ὎η ἔββεζμκ ἀθθὰ μ὎νάκζμκ, ὀνεόηαηα θέβμκηεξ· ἐηε῔εεκ βάν, 
ὅεεκ ἟ πνώηδ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ βέκεζζξ ἔθο, ηὸ εε῔μκ ηὴκ ηεθαθὴκ ηαὶ ῥίγακ ἟ι῵κ ἀκαηνειακκὺκ ὀνεμ῔ π᾵κ ηὸ ζ῵ια.” 
1874
 This difference is particularly relevant in the contrast between the two horses in Phaedrus.  
1875
 See Rep. 588e-589b and Phdr. 253e ff. 
1876
 See in particular 571c-572b. They may never be fully asleep, but they may indeed become very calm. Cp. 
also 411c-d. 
1877
 See 590a-590c, 606a-b (and cp. also 411c-412a). 
1878
 Cp. 588e-589a and 606d. 
1879
 See Phlb.63d-64a and Rep. 560b. 
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does, and any variation in their form and strength determines the whole system of forces we 
considered above.  
Their development process can happen spontaneously (as a movement naturally 
resulting from our inner system of forces), but Plato also speaks of it as something in which 
we can intervene: either from the outside, by affecting the parts of the soul of someone else 
(especially children), or from within, affecting our own inner drives and their power. In this 
case, we must develop a sort of husbandry, that allows us to care for the living beings within 
us. We must take care of them like a farmer.
1880
 In this sense, our soul is like nature at large: 
it cannot be left to itself, it requires care. Fortunately, we can submit the souls drives to a 
ηνμθή – i.e., we can feed and rear them.
1881
 This applies to all parts of the soul. The inferior 
parts can be chastised, trained, domesticated (instead of being pandered or allowed to run 
wild).
1882
 The superior part, in turn, can be trained and exercised.
1883
 It seems therefore that it 
is in our power to intervene and determine the value of each part (and consequently of the 
soul as a whole). The problem is how we are to intervene, what means are we to employ and 
what exactly the consequences of our intervention will be. Furthermore, the possibility of 
intervening and determining our inner drives raises the question of what motivates us to do it. 
We are not something apart from these drives, but they determine us, so any kind of 




4.4. The political model 
 
 The final model compares the relation between the soul‟s drives to social and political 
relations. We find throughout the texts several social or political images that are used to 
describe psychological phenomena. In Phaedo, body and ροπή (which are associated with 
two different kinds of drives) relate to one another as master and slave.
1885
 In Phaedrus the 
charioteer and the bad horses deliberate, argue and compromise about what to do.
1886
 These 
are basic social or political relations. Some part holds the power or the command (ἀνπή) 
                                                 
1880
 For the image of the farmer, see in particular Rep. 589b. 
1881
 For the use of ηνμθή and ηνέθεζκ in this context, see e.g. Rep. 441a and Phdr. 247b. 
1882
 See e.g. Rep. 590a ff. 
1883
 See e.g. Rep. 571d and 591c. 
1884
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 17. 
1885
 See 79e-80a: “ὅνα δὴ ηαὶ ηῆδε ὅηζ ἐπεζδὰκ ἐκ ηῶ α὎ηῶ ὦζζ ροπὴ ηαὶ ζ῵ια, ηῶ ιὲκ δμοθεύεζκ ηαὶ ἄνπεζεαζ 
἟ θύζζξ πνμζηάηηεζ, ηῆ δὲ ἄνπεζκ ηαὶ δεζπόγεζκ· ηαὶ ηαηὰ ηαῦηα αὖ πόηενόκ ζμζ δμηε῔ ὅιμζμκ ηῶ εείῳ εἶκαζ ηαὶ 
πόηενμκ ηῶ εκδηῶ; ἠ μ὎ δμηε῔ ζμζ ηὸ ιὲκ εε῔μκ μἷμκ ἄνπεζκ ηε ηαὶ ἟βειμκεύεζκ πεθοηέκαζ, ηὸ δὲ εκδηὸκ 
ἄνπεζεαί ηε ηαὶ δμοθεύεζκ;     ἔιμζβε.” 
1886
 See once more the whole description in Phdr. 253e ff. 
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within us and guides our soul, while the others resist or obey. However, we find in the 
Republic (especially in books IV, VIII and IX) a much more refined presentation of this idea. 
The entire soul is regarded as a πόθζξ and the relations between its drives are described as 
very complex political interactions. This allows Plato to consider important psychological 
and anthropological problems from unusual and unexpected angles. Let us therefore see the 
most important traits of this model.  
 
a) The ςπρή as an inner πόιηο and a πνιηηεία 
 
 In Republic II, Plato says that the human ροπή and the πόθζξ resemble each other. 
They are like two texts written with the same characters, but in different sizes. This is 
important, given the difficulty in determining the ροπή. We can therefore better see what 
characterizes the ροπή (and in particular the way it relates to justice) if we consider the 
πόθζξ.
1887
 This is what much of the following discussion will do. Plato will define the 
structure of the πόθζξ and its relation to justice, and then he will transfer the                 
analysis – mutatis mutandis Ŕ to the domain of the ροπή. 
 But what exactly is a πόθζξ? What are its main traits? The word is usually translated as 
city-state, and it denotes an autonomous political community, composed of several clans or 
families, tied together by a common history, culture, and destiny. The cultural component is 
essential here. A πόθζξ is characterized by a particular way of life, based on a set of values 
and practices that solidified during time and constitute the πόθζξ‟ κόιμζ or its πμθζηεία.
1888
 
These two words are very important and they are at the core of any πόθζξ (hence the use of 
them as the titles for Plato‟s two major political works).
1889
 It is, however, important to bear 
in mind that these words do not primarily designate the positive laws of a state, but rather 
what was mentioned: the culture of a πόθζξ (i.e., its own way of seeing and doing things), 




                                                 
1887
 See 368c-369a and 434d-435c. 
1888
 Cp. the pseudo-Platonic work Definitiones, 415c: “Πόθζξ μἴηδζζξ πθήεμοξ ἀκενώπςκ ημζκμ῔ξ δόβιαζζκ 
πνςιέκςκ· πθ῅εμξ ἀκενώπςκ ὏πὸ κόιμκ ηὸκ α὎ηὸκ ὄκηςκ.” 
1889
 Isocrates even says that the πμθζηεία is the ροπή of the πόθζξ. See Areopagiticus, 14: “Ἔζηζ βὰν ροπὴ 
πόθεςξ μ὎δὲκ ἔηενμκ ἠ πμθζηεία, ημζαύηδκ ἔπμοζα δύκαιζκ ὅζδκ πεν ἐκ ζώιαηζ θνόκδζζξ. αὕηδ βάν ἐζηζκ ἟ 
αμοθεομιέκδ πενὶ ἁπάκηςκ ηαὶ ηὰ ιὲκ ἀβαεὰ δζαθοθάηημοζα, ηὰξ δὲ ζοιθμνὰξ δζαθεύβμοζα. Tαύηῃ ηαὶ ημὺξ 
κόιμοξ ηαὶ ημὺξ ῥήημναξ ηαὶ ημὺξ ἰδζώηαξ ἀκαβηα῔όκ ἐζηζκ ὁιμζμῦζεαζ ηαὶ πνάηηεζκ μὕηςξ ἑηάζημοξ μἵακ πεν 
ἂκ ηαύηδκ ἔπςζζκ.”  
1890
 For more on the notion of παζδεία, cp. Chap. 1, Sect. 2.2. 
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 But this is not all. Each of us lacks many things and a πόθζξ is supposed to help us 
suppress those lacks.
1891
 This is essential to understand what a πόθζξ is. Indeed, πόθζξ is also 
defined by its goals, and as Plato points out, its primary goals include protection from 
external threats (both natural or human), sustenance, and quality of life (εὖ γ῅κ).
1892
 This 
requires a division of labor (according to each one‟s ability) and ends up constituting 
different social classes, which are specialized in different kinds of work (ἔνβα) and thus 
complement each other. According to the Republic, there are three main classes that are 
necessary for a πόθζξ to attain its goals. He calls them the money-making part (ηὸ 
πνδιαηζζηζηόκ), the auxiliary part (ηὸ ἐπζημονδηζηόκ, which corresponds to the warrior-class) 
and the deliberative part (ηὸ αμοθεοηζηόκ).
1893
  
These classes do not simply exist side by side, without interaction. They relate to one 
another and, more than that, they are at odds with each other, insofar as they all try to 
increase their possessions and their influence in the πόθζξ. Ultimately, they all try to rule the 
others. But for a πόθζξ to work (nay, for it to exist), it must be somehow unified and not in 
conflict (ζηάζζξ) with itself. In other words, there must be some kind of order, and this means 
that the role of each class within the πόθζξ must be defined. In this context, the question of the 
rule (ἀνπή or ηναηε῔κ) is essential. Who will govern the πόθζξ and what will be the relations 
of power between its parts? In other words, what will be the precise arrangement between 
these parts? The decision of this matter is essential, and given the different profiles of each 
class, such a decision will shape the entire way of life of the πόθζξ. In other words, the social 
and political order of a πόθζξ is a central component of its κόιμζ and its πμθζηεία. This was 
particularly clear in the Ancient world: the order or arrangement of a πόθζξ was usually a part 
of the culture and traditions of said πόθζξ and it also played an important role in defining that 
same culture and those traditions. Hence, the word πμθζηεία encompasses both the political 
order and the way of life or culture that corresponds to it – and this is very important for 
Plato‟s use of the word. In fact, Plato stresses the central role of social order in determining 
the culture and the way of life of a πόθζξ.  
 In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the different kinds of social order 
might be better or worse. The πόθζξ may be well-ordered, it may have harmony (ἁνιμκία) 
and unanimity (ὁιόκμζα), or it may have a precarious order and be in permanent tension or 
                                                 
1891
 See Rep. 369b: “βίβκεηαζ ημίκοκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, πόθζξ, ὡξ ἐβᾦιαζ, ἐπεζδὴ ηοβπάκεζ ἟ι῵κ ἕηαζημξ μ὎η α὎ηάνηδξ, 
ἀθθὰ πμθθ῵κ ὢκ ἐκδεήξ· ἠ ηίκ᾽ μἴεζ ἀνπὴκ ἄθθδκ πόθζκ μἰηίγεζκ;     μ὎δειίακ, ἤ δ᾽ ὅξ.” 
1892
 See in particular Prt. 322a ff. and Rep. 369b ff. 
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open to serious conflicts (including all-out civil wars). If these tensions and conflicts are 
weak, the πόθζξ can still persist. But if they completely overtake the πόθζξ, then the latter will 
collapse.
1894
 A political order or arrangement is indeed a dynamic process. Each part 
continuously tries to have more power than the others, and their striving can lead to serious 
conflicts. But they may also be better (or even perfectly) integrated in a particular order. This 
is the ideal, and the question then is what may that perfect order amount to.  
 These are the main features of Plato‟s conception of πόθζξ in the Republic. The same 
features are then identified as essential features of the ροπή. Like the πόθζξ, the ροπή also has 
three classes of desire or three main drives. Each of these classes or drives can manifest itself 
in many particular desires, directed at many different things. As such, the drives and their 
particular desires may seem relatively independent. However, they all belong together and 
share a common destiny. In other words, they constitute an inner πόθζξ of drives or urges. But 
as was the case in the outer πόθζξ, the different parts of the inner πόθζξ want to guide it and 
they fight with one another for control. Consequently, they need to be ordered or arranged in 
some way. The soul needs a social order or a πμθζηεία, if it is to act and live.
1895
 It is 
necessary to decide which drive will rule – or, to use Plato‟s images, it is necessary to decide 
which one will occupy the throne of the soul or its acropolis, and thus be its leader 
(πνμζηάηδξ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ).
1896
 It is also necessary to determine which support it will have from 
the other drives and how they will be integrated in the polity or regime of the soul. In short, 
the balance of powers and the roles of each drive must be defined. As we will see, this is 
what then determines the main love (ἔνςξ) of the soul (i.e., its identification of the 
superlative good), and also how the soul pursues this good and the kind of life it leads.
1897
 
 The parallel with the πόθζξ shows therefore important traits of our ροπή. Like the 
πόθζξ, the ροπή requires these different classes of desire to work, and these classes of desire 
must be arranged in some way in order for us to act and live. Indeed, the different inner 
arrangements or inner πμθζηε῔αζ affect one‟s whole life. But the inner arrangements may also 
be better or worse. The criterion is basically the same as in the case of the outer πόθζξ. The 
drives constitutively strive for power and the social or political order established in the soul 
                                                 
1894
 Plato presents a similar alternative in Rep. 351c ff., when he distinguishes between those that are only partly 
unjust or partly bad (἟ιζιόπεδνμζ) and those that are completely unjust or bad (παιπόκδνμζ). A πόθζξ may still 
subsist if it is composed of the former, but not if it is composed of the latter. 
1895
 Cp. Rep. 352a: “ηαὶ ἐκ ἑκὶ δὴ μἶιαζ ἐκμῦζα ηα὎ηὰ ηαῦηα [namely, ηὸ ζηαζζάγεζκ ηαὶ δζαθένεζεαζ] πμζήζεζ 
ἅπεν πέθοηεκ ἐνβάγεζεαζ· πν῵ημκ ιὲκ ἀδύκαημκ α὎ηὸκ πνάηηεζκ πμζήζεζ ζηαζζάγμκηα ηαὶ μ὎π ὁιμκμμῦκηα 
α὎ηὸκ ἑαοηῶ, ἔπεζηα ἐπενὸκ ηαὶ ἑαοηῶ ηαὶ ημ῔ξ δζηαίμζξ (...).” 
1896
 See, respectively, 553c, 560b, 573b.  
1897
 For more on this, see 6.3 a) below. 
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may create a greater harmony or it may be laden with tensions and open to conflicts or 
ζηάζεζξ, which will paralyze the soul. These conflicts may be momentary (perhaps even 
circumscribed to the situations in which they arose) and if that is the case, then there will be 
no serious change in the inner arrangement of the soul. But they may also be serious conflicts 
and lead to profound changes in the relation of forces between the drives. This is what Plato 
illustrates in books VIII and IX, when considering what happens in the soul of young men 
and how the inner arrangement of their drives may change.  
 
b) The interaction between the inner and the outer πνιηηεῖαη  
 
 The relation between the soul and the πόθζξ is not simply one of isomorphism, as if 
they were two similar entities which are otherwise wholly unrelated. The soul as a small 
πόθζξ is an integral part of the large πόθζξ. As Plato says, the soul needs the πόθζξ in order to 
survive and to achieve a good life.
1898
 But what exactly is the interaction between the soul 
and the πόθζξ – or more precisely, between the inner πμθζηεία and the outer πμθζηεία? 
Plato shows that there are many interchanges between these two entities and this 
actually makes it difficult to draw definite boundaries between the two. The dialectic between 
these two entities that are themselves dialectical (insofar as they are both based on an inner 
interaction and dialogue) is quite intricate. If we consider the description of the changes of 
πμθζηεία in Republic VIII and IX, we see that each ροπή belongs to a household (and is thus 
related to father, a mother and the household slaves), but it also has friends and relates to 
other people at large.
1899
 In general, human beings are characterized precisely by this. We are 
almost always in contact with others, with their behaviors and even their views. But this is 
not all. These behaviors and views are not simple. Rather, they express a certain arrangement 
of drives (i.e., an inner πμθζηεία). Thus, one may have an inner arrangement of drives similar 
to those of the people around oneself, or one may differ from them. In the latter case, the 
different πμθζηε῔αζ may affect or influence each other – especially if one is particularly young. 
The dominant drive in a soul may stimulate the same drive in another soul, cooperate with it, 
become an ally (or an antagonist) – just like a state may assist a faction with similar ideas in a 
different state. One may even be pulled in different directions as a result of having close 
                                                 
1898
 Cp. footnote 1892. 
1899
 See e.g. 549c ff. 
590 
 
contact with different kinds of people. Plato describes this process in great detail and he 
shows how it tends to produce a compromise (insofar as one tends to fall in the middle).
1900
 
One is thus affected by the inner πμθζηε῔αζ of those around oneself. But the outer πόθζξ 
itself also has a πμθζηεία. Plato stresses how different πόθεζξ have different regimes, and these 
in fact correspond to the prevalence of one kind of drive – i.e., they are also defined in 
psychological terms.
1901
 This means that the inner πμθζηεία may resemble the outer one, and 
even if there is a significant difference between them, one will probably gravitate towards 
one‟s outer πμθζηεία. In other words, the outer πμθζηεία we live under is relevant for our life, 
even if not all-determining.
1902
 However, the communication between the ροπή and the πόθζξ 
is not unilateral. The individual soul also influences the other souls around it, as well as the 
πόθζξ at large. Each soul helps determine the outer πμθζηεία that encompasses them all. The 
different souls interact in a complex way and thus produce the general tendencies of the 
πόθζξ.
1903




 This still leaves out the broader question of the interaction between different πόθεζξ 
and how such an interaction may affect individual souls. Plato alludes several times to these 
interactions, but without going into much detail. At any rate, he provides us with a complex 
model of interaction between ροπαί and πόθεζξ, which allows for complex analyses of human 
life in general and politics in particular. Both domains are constitutively referred to one 
another and they cannot be understood separately. One may wonder about which one is 
primary and which is secondary. It is true that some ροπαί (especially the souls of 
philosophers) seem to become much less influenced by their political community. However, 
one might never be entirely free, if only because one was born and grew up within the 
complex system of relations described by Plato. 
 
                                                 
1900
 See e.g. Rep. 550a-b, 553a-b, 559e-560b, 572c-e. 
1901
 In Rep. 435e-436a, Plato outlines a kind of geography of predominant drives. In certain regions, certain 
drives prevail. This idea is later developed in books VIII and IX, where Plato tries to define the five possible 
kinds of regime and how they are all based on a particular arrangement of drives, which is in fact the 
arrangement of drives within the soul of the rulers of each πόθζξ. This constitute the main arrangement of drives 
and it then determines the inner πμθζηε῔αζ of all subordinate classes in the πόθζξ. 
1902
 Plato seems to admit that we can be influenced by others around us and even by the πόθζξ itself, but the 
question is actually more complex, because any external influence depends on our receptiveness. In other words, 
any external influence somehow depends on us. But we will not discuss this matter here. For a discussion of it, 
see Chap. 17, Sect. 4.2. 
1903
 The fact that it is so shows that the analysis of our psychological constitution is also used to understand what 
a πόθζξ is – and not just the other way around. 
1904
 See 435e-436a and 544c-e. 
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c) The different possible πνιηηεῖαη and the transition from one to the other 
 
Both the inner and the outer πμθζηε῔αζ are not rigid or fixed. Rather, they are dynamic 
systems. As was mentioned, the different drives and the different classes strive for more 
power and the particular circumstances a ροπή or a πόθζξ go through may lead to conflicts 
and crises. The latter may be easily solved, but in some cases the conflict may also result in a 
change or transition (ιεηάααζζξ or ιεηααμθή) of πμθζηεία.
1905
 The ruler of the soul or of the 
πόθζξ may be overthrown and replaced by a new ruler. This may result in the submission, 
enslavement or even banishment of the older ruling class.
1906
 As a result, the entire life of the 
soul or of the πόθζξ will change.  
The soul and the πόθζξ thus have a history. They are marked by what happens to them 
and they can go through deep changes. Plato describes the internal and external processes of 
change in very similar terms. In addition, the Republic shows how both processes can 
influence each other. Their reciprocal influence continues and, in addition, changes in one 
domain may have strong consequences in the other. Plato also describes how parts of the soul 
or even parts of the πόθζξ may receive help from the outside.
1907
 However, the core of the 
process must come from within. In fact, Plato says that all change comes from the governing 
class itself and some conflict within it.
1908
 This is what will shift the balance of power within 
the soul or the πόθζξ. In the soul, the relative power of the soul‟s drives will change and this 
change will affect all of the soul‟s actions and its way of living (as well as its way of seeing 
things). In the πόθζξ, the change will be equally radical. A new political and social order will 




                                                 
1905
 This kind of change or transition is precisely what Plato describes throughout books VIII and IX of the 
Republic. 
1906
 In the case of the soul, the banishment means that a certain part of it will become smaller – i.e., less 
effective. Cp. e.g. Rep. 560c-e. 
1907
 Cp. the references in footnote 1900. 
1908
 See 545c-d: “θένε ημίκοκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, πεζνώιεεα θέβεζκ ηίκα ηνόπμκ ηζιμηναηία βέκμζη᾽ ἂκ ἐλ ἀνζζημηναηίαξ. 
ἠ ηόδε ιὲκ ἁπθμῦκ, ὅηζ π᾵ζα πμθζηεία ιεηααάθθεζ ἐλ α὎ημῦ ημῦ ἔπμκημξ ηὰξ ἀνπάξ, ὅηακ ἐκ α὎ηῶ ημύηῳ ζηάζζξ 
ἐββέκδηαζ· ὁιμκμμῦκημξ δέ, ηἂκ πάκο ὀθίβμκ ᾖ, ἀδύκαημκ ηζκδε῅καζ;     ἔζηζ βὰν μὕης.” Later, Socrates also 
explains that this conflict may arise from excess. See 563e-564a: “ηα὎ηόκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ὅπεν ἐκ ηῆ ὀθζβανπίᾳ 
κόζδια ἐββεκόιεκμκ ἀπώθεζεκ α὎ηήκ, ημῦημ ηαὶ ἐκ ηαύηῃ πθέμκ ηε ηαὶ ἰζπονόηενμκ ἐη η῅ξ ἐλμοζίαξ 
ἐββεκόιεκμκ ηαηαδμοθμῦηαζ δδιμηναηίακ. ηαὶ ηῶ ὄκηζ ηὸ ἄβακ ηζ πμζε῔κ ιεβάθδκ θζθε῔ εἰξ ημ὎κακηίμκ 
ιεηααμθὴκ ἀκηαπμδζδόκαζ, ἐκ ὥναζξ ηε ηαὶ ἐκ θοημ῔ξ ηαὶ ἐκ ζώιαζζκ, ηαὶ δὴ ηαὶ ἐκ πμθζηείαζξ μ὎π ἣηζζηα.” 
1909
 Plato indeed describes how the meaning of the terms may change after a revolution. See e.g. 560d-e, 572d-e. 
We find a similar idea in THUCYDIDES, Historiae, 3.82, where he describes how civil conflicts (ζηάζεζξ) led 
to a change of the way certain words were understood and applied. As he says, at that point: “ηαὶ ηὴκ εἰςεο῔ακ 
ἀλίςζζκ η῵κ ὀκμιάηςκ ἐξ ηὰ ἔνβα ἀκηήθθαλακ ηῆ δζηαζώζεζ.” 
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However, the possibility of change does not imply that the soul or the πόθζξ may 
assume infinite different shapes. Their possibilities are pre-determined by their constituent 
parts. Moreover, even if there can be many different inner arrangements, they can all be 
reduced to a few basic ones,and it is precisely these basic arrangements that Plato describes in 
the Republic. He distinguishes five main kinds of outer πμθζηε῔αζ and five kinds of human 
being, leaving aside all the intermediate forms, which are more indistinct.
1910
 These main 
kinds are aristocracy (the rule of philosophers), timocracy (the rule of honor-loving people), 
oligarchy (the rule of money-loving people), democracy (the rule of people that love all 
pleasures) and tyranny (the rule of people that have a desire for lawless pleasures and 
sacrifice everything to it).
1911
 Likewise, the soul may be ruled by the love the knowledge, the 
love of honor, the love of money, the love of pleasure in general, or the love of lawless 
pleasures – and each of these possibilities corresponds to a different kind of human being.
1912
 
It may surprise us that there are five regimes and five kinds of human being when there are 
only three inner drives. In fact, the inner complexity of the soul‟s love of gain accounts for 
three different forms of regime and three different kinds of human being.
1913
 But let us not go 
into details. Plato‟s characterization of each political system and each kind of human being is 
very complex.  
It is important to note that the different possible πμθζηε῔αζ do not all have the same 
value. Some are better and others are worse. However, it is still not clear what is the criterion 
for determining their quality, apart from what we mentioned above. They may indeed have 
different susceptibilities to conflict, but it is not yet clear why. Plato speaks of different forms 
of unity and harmony, but he also distinguishes the quality of the parts of the soul and the 
best πμθζηεία would therefore be the one in which the best part rules. But all this is still very 
vague for now and we will return to it below.
1914
 For now we are just considering the 
question of how an inner or an outer πμθζηεία may change. Plato describes the inner and outer 
                                                 
1910
 Indeed, each main kind of πμθζηεία can have many variants, according to the different possible balances of 
power between the drives or the social classes. In some cases, it may even be difficult to define them. See   
544c-d: “ἢ ηζκα ἄθθδκ ἔπεζξ ἰδέακ πμθζηείαξ, ἣηζξ ηαὶ ἐκ εἴδεζ δζαθακε῔ ηζκζ ηε῔ηαζ; δοκαζηε῔αζ βὰν ηαὶ ὠκδηαὶ 
ααζζθε῔αζ ηαὶ ημζαῦηαί ηζκεξ πμθζηε῔αζ ιεηαλύ ηζ ημύηςκ πμύ εἰζζκ, εὕνμζ δ᾽ ἄκ ηζξ α὎ηὰξ μ὎η ἐθάηημοξ πενὶ ημὺξ 
ααναάνμοξ ἠ ημὺξ Ἕθθδκαξ.     πμθθαὶ βμῦκ ηαὶ ἄημπμζ, ἔθδ, θέβμκηαζ.” 
1911
 See in particular 543c ff. 
1912
 I.e., human beings can themselves be aristocratic, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic and tyrannical.  
1913
 For a consideration of this diversity, see Sect. 3.1 above, where we considered the division between 
necessary, lawful and lawless pleasures. It is, however, important to bear in mind that in Plato‟s account the 
democratic regime and the democratic human being do not confine their interest to lawful pleasures, but they 
pursue all different kinds of pleasures. See 561a-e.  
1914
 See Sect. 6.4. 
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transitions in great detail, and his description has several peculiar features that we should be 
kept in mind.
 
First, his description only goes one way. It pressuposes a perfect system at the start 
and describes a progressive degradation or entropy of political regimes and of human beings. 
This suggests something like a cycle of nature, that goes from the highest perfection to 
highest imperfection and back again.
1915
 However, nothing seems to prevent the process of 
decay from being counteracted midway through.
1916
 It may be an irregular process, constantly 
moving to and fro, and Plato‟s description may simplify it for the sake of presenting the 
different possible πμθζηε῔αζ and their relation to one another. 
A second relevant aspect is the fact that Plato presents a kind of continuous transition 
(à la Hegel) that goes through all mediations and does not jumps stages. As was mentioned, 
Plato even describes the transitions as the result of being pulled by different opposite drives 
and consequently falling in the middle, which is thus conceived by reference to its 
extremities.
1917
 This would exclude any sudden radical changes. However, there does not 
seem to be any reason for excluding such a possibility. We may go from one πμθζηεία to the 
other without first going through all πμθζηε῔αζ that lie between them. One interesting aspect of 
this gradual transition, though, is the tendency to inertia. The drives change slowly and each 
new πμθζηεία imitates as much as it can the features of the old one. In other words, the 
transformation of the views and behaviors of the old πμθζηεία tend to be very slow.
1918
 This 
happens when it changes for the worse, and probably also when the change is for the 
better.
1919
 There is always a strong resistance to any change. Plato further emphasizes this 
resistance by presenting a process of degradation that takes place over several        
generations – though in principle there can also be several important changes during the 
course of a single lifetime. 
It is also important to note that, according to Plato‟s description, a particular ροπή can 
begin at any point of the continuum of πμθζηε῔αζ, and it may grow up in a political community 
                                                 
1915
 In the Republic, Plato says that everything that comes into being must also decay (βεκμιέκῳ πακηὶ θεμνά 
ἐζηζκ), and this natural law is what leads to the fall of the perfect πόθζξ and the perfect human beings. Cp. 545d 
ff. For other descriptions of such a cycle, cp. Plt. 269c ff. and Lg. 676a ff. 
1916
 We will not consider here what may allow the fall to be counteracted and whether we have some control 
over it or not. For a discussion of this question, see Chap. 17 below. 
1917
 See e.g. 550b, 572c-d. 
1918
 See e.g. 547c-d: “ιεηααήζεηαζ ιὲκ δὴ μὕης· ιεηαα᾵ζα δὲ π῵ξ μἰηήζεζ; ἠ θακενὸκ ὅηζ ηὰ ιὲκ ιζιήζεηαζ ηὴκ 
πνμηένακ πμθζηείακ, ηὰ δὲ ηὴκ ὀθζβανπίακ, ἅη᾽ ἐκ ιέζῳ μὖζα, ηὸ δέ ηζ ηαὶ α὏η῅ξ ἕλεζ ἴδζμκ;     μὕηςξ, ἔθδ.” 
1919
 The allegory of the cave, for instance, describes παζδεία as a slow and gradual progress, with many 
intermediate stages (see 515c ff.), and this idea that all cognitive progress is slow can be found throughout the 
entire Platonic corpus. 
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that has any of the above mentioned πμθζηε῔αζ. The soul will partly be influenced by its πόθζξ, 
but it is also possible to go against the tendencies of one‟s surroundings.
1920
 At any rate, Plato 
does not say that all children are initially ruled by the simplest or inferior drive (namely, 
θζθμηένδεζα), and then develop the others. Rather, young children seem to be in a chaotic 
state, without inner order, and with time (as well as with certain help from the outside) they 
develop a certain arrangement of drives.
1921
 
In sum, Plato emphasizes that it is possible for the inner and outer πμθζηεία to change, 
though this is not an easy process. In general, there is a certain stability, though it is not 




 The different images present the combination of the soul‟s drives from different 
angles. They have varying degrees of complexity, but they all point in a similar direction. 
They all conceive the drives as interrelated forces, whether these forces be mechanical, 
organic or political. Their strength is always the strength they can achieve within the system. 
They can grow stronger or weaker, but they are always present, limiting the others – even 
when they seem to be absent. In sum, the combination of drives is present in all moments of 
our life and determines all manifestations of each drive. Our every action and our way of life 
in general result from the interaction of our three inborn drives.  
The different images also express how dynamic the relation of forces between the 
drives is. The intensity of each drive and their arrangement can change. What one goes 
through, the people we meet, and even our own self-examination may affect the strength of 
each drive. Indeed, any particular moment can prompt a conflict between the drives, by 
appealing to one of them and forcing the others to resist. These momentary conflicts may 
then have greater or smaller consequences for the general balance of the drives and for one‟s 
life in general. In any case, it seems the soul‟s inner order is always in movement and there 
are always at least small variations. As was said, this raises the question of whether we can 
directly intervene in the combination of drives and determine their relative strength. On the 
                                                 
1920
 Plato admits, for instance, that some may become philosophers despite the fact that they did not grow up in 
the ideal πόθζξ. See 520a-b: “ζηέραζ ημίκοκ, εἶπμκ, ὦ Γθαύηςκ, ὅηζ μ὎δ᾽ ἀδζηήζμιεκ ημὺξ παν᾽ ἟ι῔κ 
θζθμζόθμοξ βζβκμιέκμοξ, ἀθθὰ δίηαζα πνὸξ α὎ημὺξ ἐνμῦιεκ, πνμζακαβηάγμκηεξ η῵κ ἄθθςκ ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαί ηε ηαὶ 
θοθάηηεζκ. ἐνμῦιεκ βὰν ὅηζ μἱ ιὲκ ἐκ ηα῔ξ ἄθθαζξ πόθεζζ ημζμῦημζ βζβκόιεκμζ εἰηόηςξ μ὎ ιεηέπμοζζ η῵κ ἐκ 
α὎ηα῔ξ πόκςκ· α὎ηόιαημζ βὰν ἐιθύμκηαζ ἀημύζδξ η῅ξ ἐκ ἑηάζηῃ πμθζηείαξ (...).”   
1921
 Cp. e.g. Ti. 42a ff. 
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one hand, we cannot conceive ourselves as something external to this system of forces. Our 
motivation always depends on it – and so, in a way, the question is how the system can affect 
itself. On the other hand, Plato at some points seems to identify us with the philosophical 
drive and he assigns to it a decisive role in determining the relation of forces between the 
drives. It is therefore difficult to determine the exact way we relate to the system of forces 




5. The mutual contamination of the soul’s constitutive drives and their “impure” state 
 
 The whole description of the combination of drives in the soul allows us to see some 
central features of Plato‟s understanding of our actions and our way of living. However, it 
also leaves out a decisive aspect of the interrelation of drives as it is conceived in the 
dialogues – namely, the fact that the drives are not just combined, but also transform or 
contaminate each other. We need therefore to reconsider the general model of interaction just 
presented. 
 
5.1. The contamination model as the decisive aspect of the soul’s partition 
 
 According to what was just seen, it would be possible to conceive the soul‟s drives as 
being always combined in a system of forces, but in such a way that each drive in itself 
would still be in a pure state. It could be weaker or stronger, but it would always have the 
same identity, which would radically differ from the identity of the other drives. The result of 
their interaction (i.e., the inner πμθζηεία and the acts it brings about) would be mixed and 
depend on all of them, but the drives as such (regardless of whether we can have any direct 
access to them or not) would be simple. However, the matter is much more complex, and the 
mixture between the drives runs much deeper. According to Plato, each drive is itself 
experienced as a blending or intertwinement of drives. They are not just combined with one 
another, but – as is said in Phaedo – they are intimately associated (ὁιζθε῔κ, ημζκςκε῔κ) and 
they even contaminate or infect each other (ἀκαπίιπθαζεαζ).
1923
 In other words, each of them 
                                                 
1922
 See Chap. 17. 
1923
 See in particular 67a: “ηαὶ ἐκ ᾧ ἂκ γ῵ιεκ, μὕηςξ, ὡξ ἔμζηεκ, ἐββοηάης ἐζόιεεα ημῦ εἰδέκαζ, ἐὰκ ὅηζ ιάθζζηα 
ιδδὲκ ὁιζθ῵ιεκ ηῶ ζώιαηζ ιδδὲ ημζκςκ῵ιεκ, ὅηζ ιὴ π᾵ζα ἀκάβηδ, ιδδὲ ἀκαπζιπθώιεεα η῅ξ ημύημο θύζεςξ, 
ἀθθὰ ηαεανεύςιεκ ἀπ᾽ α὎ημῦ, ἕςξ ἂκ ὁ εεὸξ α὎ηὸξ ἀπμθύζῃ ἟ι᾵ξ (...).” Plato uses these terms to describe the 
relation between the body and the soul (and the tensions associated with each), but to a certain extent they also 
apply to the relation between the drives of the soul. It is important to remark that the notion of contamination 
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can be found in the others and in this sense the system of forces we considered lies at the very 
heart of each drive. They determine and transform each other.
1924
 Therefore, the apparently 
simple manifestation of each drive is already marked by reciprocal limitation and this not 
only affects its force, but also modifies its own essence. They are in themselves “impure” or 
contaminated. 
 This means that any manifestation of our love for gain is already determined by our 
love for honor (for instance, insofar as it may want its gain to be acknowledged by others) 
and also by our love of knowledge (which means that it is not indifferent to whether the gain 
is real or not). Our love of honor, in turn, is also concerned with gain (i.e., with how being 
honored translates in the subjective sphere) and knowledge (at least insofar as it wants to be 
really honored). Finally, our love of knowledge is never totally indifferent to gain and    
honor – at least during life. Our pursuit of truth always has some degree of concern with how 
this truth will feel and with how the pursuit is seen by others. Thus, each drive is contained in 
the others, transforms them and, as a result, determines the object it actually pursues.
1925
 
This fact makes it much harder – or even impossible – to see and conceive our 
constitutive drives in their pure state. In our experience of them, they are always mixed, and 
hence we have no direct access to what they are in themselves. Their simple existence is 
something we may postulate to explain our behavior, but it is not what we come into contact 
with. Each drive is affected by the others, even in the moments when they appear to manifest 
themselves as they are. In this sense, the conflicts mentioned in Republic IV should not be 
understood as conflicts between pure drives (though Plato presents them as such). They help 
us identify contrasting drives, but such conflicts are always between transformed versions of 
these drives. 
This has several consequences for our conception of each drive and for the role they 
play in our soul. Indeed, each drive can be more or less transformed by the others and, as a 
result, they can assume very different forms. The way they transform each other is 
                                                                                                                                                        
has a pejorative sense, and it implies that one part harms the other or renders it worse. In this sense, the soul is 
contaminated by the body, but the body is not properly speaking contaminated by the soul. However, we may 
also use the term in a broader sense, to express the fact that one thing transforms another and renders it impure 
(i.e., other than what it is when it is by itself). It is in this sense that we will use the term in the following. For 
the notion of ἀκαπίιπθαζεαζ, cp. e.g. J. BURNET (ed.), Plato’s Phaedo, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911, ad 
67a5. 
1924
 They are thus a kind of intermediate being – i.e., their actual configuration can only be conceived as 
something that lies between (ιεηαλύ) three extremities (i.e., three entities in their pure state), but is irreducible to 
them. For the notion of ιεηαλύ, cp. in particular Chap. 7 Sect.2.4 and Chap. 12 Sects. 3.3 and 4.3. 
1925
 We had already considered this possibility of transformation above, while describing each of drives (Sect. 
3), but now we will see in more detail how this is a constitutive feature of them. 
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determined by their general strength and by whether they rule the soul or are subordinated to 
another drive. However, even the ruling drive is affected by others, and it can be affected in 
different degrees, according to the strength of each drive. This implies that the subordinate 
drives also affect what the soul pursues in life and how it pursues it. They do not just restrict 
the intensity with which we pursue something, but they help shape how the soul lives. 
But this is not all. The reciprocal contamination of the soul‟s drives also raises a 
problem that is often discussed in the secondary literature. Some argued that each drive 
seems to contain within it the same parts as the soul, and in this sense they are all agent-like 
and a kind of homunculus. In other words, the explanations replicates what is to be explained, 
and if we try to determine the parts of each drive, we would perhaps have to presuppose once 
more the same three parts. Each homunculus would itself have to be explained by the 
presence within it of other homunculi, and as a result such a account of the drives may lead to 
an infinite regression.
1926
 But does Plato‟s description really entail such an infinite regress?  
It is important to bear in mind that the parallelism between the whole soul and the 
drives that compose it is not supposed to be understood as a perfect parallelism. In particular, 
the drives do not have their own inner conflicts, and so we do not have to subdivide them in 
order to account for them. Rather than multiplying the parts of the soul and its drives, Plato is 
trying to show how the three drives are much more intertwined than one would initially think. 
They cannot be easily distinguished from one another, and any strict separation of them is 
abstract and artificial.  
 A different question is whether it is possible to change this and come to completely 
purify one of the drives from the others – in particular θζθμζμθία, which is considered our 
highest drive and the one that would allow us to lead the best life. At some points, the 
dialogues seem to admit the possibility of getting rid of the other drives (though perhaps only 
after dying and getting rid of the body).
1927
 But in Phaedrus the soul is always tripartite, even 
when it is not in an embodied state.
1928
 All we can do is try to become as indifferent to gain 
and honor as possible, and then use these other drives as allies of the philosophical drive. But 
the texts are somewhat vague about these possibilities, perhaps because they are rather 
remote and it is not easy to see what they would amount to.
1929
 In our present condition, the 
                                                 
1926
 For more on the homunculus problem, see e.g. J. MOLINE, Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche, Archiv 
für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (1978), 1-26, especially 23-24; J. ANNAS, An Introduction to Plato’s 
Republic, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, 142 ff. 
1927
 See e.g. Phd. 66b-67b and Rep. 611b-612a. 
1928
 See e.g. 248a-b. 
1929
 For more on this, cp. Sect. 6.3 c) below. 
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drives are never in a pure state nor close to it. This means that our love for knowledge is 
always affected by other drives. But it also means that the other drives are constitutively 
contaminated by the love for knowledge. This is actually an essential point in Plato‟s 
analysis, which will be decisive for the discussion of the value of an unexamined life. 
Therefore, we must consider it in greater detail. 
 
5.2. The philosophical character of all drives and all inner πνιηηεῖαη 
 
 The model of the reciprocal contamination of the soul‟s drives entails that the soul‟s 
inborn θζθμζμθία is present in all drives. The gain-loving drive and the honor-loving drive 
also contain a knowledge-loving component that transforms them and renders them 
somewhat sensitive to what is true and to how we can determine it. At first sight, this seems 
to contradict the very characterization of the non-philosophical drives or urges. They are 
irrational (ἄθμβα or ἀθόβζζηα), thoughtless (ἀκόδηα), blind (ηοθθά) – and Plato himself 
compares them to animals.
1930
 But in what sense are these drives irrational? The word 
“irrational” may indeed mean that they are altogether incapable of speaking, discussing, 
calculating or presenting reasons. But it can also designate a defective or limited use of these 
abilities.
1931
 In this sense, ἀθμβία comes close to the notions of ἄκμζα or ἀιαεία, which also 
denote a distorted form of judgment and rationality.
1932
 
 Now, if we look carefully at the characterization both of the gain-loving drive and of 
the honor-loving drive in the texts, we see that they are not entirely deprived of rationality. 
Plato describes how all the three drives seem to be conscious of the others and even 
communicate with them. They use arguments, try to persuade the other drives, protest, 
imagine plots, and so on.
1933
 This is not entirely metaphorical. Plato is referring to the fact 
that each drive is intrinsically referred to particular views or beliefs. In other words, their 
manifestation is based on cognitive components and it develops and reinforces these 
cognitive components. The non-philosophical drives are therefore philosophical in the sense 
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 See e.g. Rep. 441c, 554b, 591c, 604d, 605b-c. For the comparison with animals, see in particular Phdr. 253c 
ff. and Rep. 588c ff. 
1931
 It is in this sense that the characters often use the terms ἀθμβία and ἄθμβμκ to designate some defective view 
or the resulting behavior – see e.g. Chrm. 175c, Hp. Ma. 303c, Men. 90e. 
1932
 For the notion of ἀιαεία and its relation with false knowledge claims and δόλα in the negative sense, cp. 
Chap. 7, Sect. 1. 
1933




that they are concerned with how things are. They are concerned with truth and they are 
essentially determined by knowledge claims.  
 We can better understand this if we consider that our love for gain and our love for 
honor are always directed at some particular thing, and this implies different kinds of views. 
To begin with, we must have a certain understanding of what gain and honor are. They both 
can be conceived in different ways, and our conception of them will determine the way we 
pursue them.
1934
 We must also regard gain and honor thus conceived as the good (either in 
particular circumstances or in life at large), and this is also based on views.
1935
 Moreover, we 
must identify how we may satisfy our desire for gain or honor, which implies knowing things 
around us and the possibilities they provide.
1936
 In this sense, we never experience an 
indeterminate desire for gain or for honor. Plato may suggest as much when he speaks of a 
desire for an indeterminate drink in the Republic, but such a desire is at any rate directed at a 
drink, which is itself something of which we have some memory and which we conceive in a 
certain way.
1937
 In other words, our experience of the simplest bodily desire is already 
integrated in a broader conception of our body, its needs, and what might satisfy them. 
Likewise, the desire of honor cannot be reduced to the simple subjective appearing (if only 
because we need to judge or believe that there are others and that they see us in a particular 
way). 
In sum, non-philosophical drives have always assumed the form of the philosophical 
drive. They have their own rationality (or at least a semblance thereof). They are dialectical, 
they ask and answer questions, or as we could also say, they use a philosophical language. 
Their occurrence in us depends on the views we have and, insofar as they contaminate our 
own love of knowledge, they also affect and shape the way we see things.
1938
 All these views 
(i.e., both the ones that shape our drives and the ones shaped by these drives) are not 
                                                 
1934
 For instance, we must think that gain consists either in satisfying the necessary desires or in having as much 
pleasure as possible. In the latter case, we must also have a notion of what pleasure is. Likewise, if we pursue 
honor, we must determine whether honor consists in being admired by some or by all, and we must also 
determine what exactly renders someone admirable. 
1935
 As is said in Rep. 562b, we must set something up as the good or define it as the good. This may also 
include a comparative component – i.e., we may regard other things (and in particular the things desired by the 
other drives) as inferior or even worthless. Cp. e.g. Rep. 581c-582a. 
1936
 Indeed, our desire is always directed at a superlative good and this means we desire either a superlative gain 
or a superlative honor. However, these are not easy to attain, and we need very complex plans in order to come 
closer to what we desire. 
1937
 See Rep. 437d-439b and cp. Phlb. 34e-35c, where Socrates argues that one needs to have some memory of 
the fulfillment brought about by something (including a drink) in order to desire the thing in question. 
1938
 As we will see in Sect. 6.2 and later in Chap. 16, the reciprocal contamination of the drives imply that   
“non-rational” drives can create their own views and persuade us of them. Though their influence over us 
depends on our own views, they can also shape how we see things, and this circularity is actually an expression 
of the close interconnection between our inborn drives.  
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necessarily explicit. In fact, they are for the most part tacit (which only renders them all the 
more effective).  
Thus, the non-philosophical drives do not simply exert brute force on the soul. We 
have no direct contact with something ἄθμβμκ. Even if there is something absolutely 
irrational at the root of our being, this is not what we experience. All drives are mediated by 
views or beliefs, as is the interaction between the different drives.
1939
 They try to persuade 
each other. In particular, both the love of gain and the love of honor try to persuade the soul‟s 
inborn love of knowledge. They try to install θόβμζ in the soul, and these θόβμζ will shape the 
configuration of each drive and also their relative force. This becomes particularly obvious 
when one of these drives becomes the ruling drive of the soul. As Plato‟s descriptions 
indicate, their rule is only possible if their θόβμζ overtake the citadel of the soul.
1940
 These 
θόβμζ will then determine our whole way of seeing things and our whole way of life.
1941
 
The logical or rational character of our inborn drives is indeed a central feature of the 
political model of the soul. This is a deliberative model, in which the drives try to persuade 
each other. The soul is a sort of assembly, in which different members try to persuade the 
whole gathering.
1942
 Consequently, we are completely philosophical or rational beings (even 
if this rationality is often very defective, as we will see). Our views or beliefs (regardless of 
whether they are express or tacit) pervade everything, and this means that our love of 
knowledge plays an essential role in the soul. As is said in Timaeus, we are a sort of celestial 
plant, rooted in the superior part of our soul – rationality – and the other drives, as well as our 
entire life, depend on it.
1943
  
This is implied in the contamination model, but we must bear in mind that the love of 
knowledge is itself contaminated by the other drives, and consequently it is also in itself 
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 This means that in a way our drives may be either true or false – i.e., they may be based either on baseless 
knowledge claims or on effective knowledge (which in turn may correspond to a correct δόλα or to full 
knowledge). It also means that we may examine them, correct them and educate them – i.e., these drives may be 
transformed by philosophical developments. In many dialogues, Socrates endeavors to do precisely this. He tries 
to identify and challenge the views that underpin one‟s love of gain or love of honor. See for instance Philebus 
or Alcibiades I.  
1940
 See Rep. 560b-c. 
1941
 For more on this, see Chap. 16. 
1942
 In this sense, Plato‟s model resembles the inner dialogues we find in Homer and other autors, where 
characters deliberate about what to do by addressing another part of themselves and discussing with it. Cp. 
footnote 1626. It also constitutes a variation of the soul‟s dialogue with itself, which is mentioned in Tht. 189e 
and Sph. 264a-b. There are several voices answering the soul‟s questions and they dialogue with each other, 
thereby constituting the soul‟s δόλαζ. 
1943
 See 90a-c. 
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sensitive to gain and honor.
1944
 This diminishes its concern with truth. In other words, our 
inborn θζθμζμθία is weak and imperfect. It is limited by the other drives, distorted by them, 
and even enslaved to them.
1945
 As a result, it loses precision, meticulousness and exigency. It 
accepts many views without carefully examining them and examination in general becomes 
no more than an instrument to acquire gain or honor. In this sense, our love of knowledge is 
not absolutely rational, and neither are we. Our rationality is limited by the other drives and 
therefore we are to a greater or less extent irrational.  
As we will see, the restriction of our philosophical drive is actually the basis of the 
unexamined life, and then we will also have to consider in more detail how this restriction of 
our inner θζθμζμθία comes about and discuss the possibility of reverting it by developing our 
inborn love of knowledge.
1946
 But for now the decisive aspect is that our drives always 
determine each other and this means that all drives (and thus our entire life) are pervaded by 
the concern with truth.  
 
5.3. Reconsideration of the problem of ἀθξάηεηα in light of the soul’s partition 
and of the reciprocal contamination of the soul’s drives 
 
 We discussed in the previous chapter several important aspects of the problem of 
ἀηνάηεζα. We saw that several passages in the corpus deny the possibility of losing rational 
control and acting against our better judgment. According to these passages, Ovid‟s words 
“video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor” can never apply to us – at least in their proper 
sense. We always do what we deem best – i.e., we always follow our practical views. We 
cannot pursue what we think is bad, all things considered. Thus, all practical mistakes are 
unwilling and done out of ignorance. This may seem to go against the facts, since we often 
seem to lose control and be driven by our passions, but according to the passages in question 
(and especially those in Protagoras), such losses of control actually correspond to a 
temporary change of views. The conflict that leads to the apparently akratic action is not a 
conflict between reason and feeling, but rather a conflict between two opposite sets of views. 
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 See e.g. Phlb. 21d-e, where it is said that a life of pure rationality without any feelings would not be 
desirable. Likewise, we are also not wholly indifferent to whether we are admired or despised.   
1945
 See in particular Rep. 553d: “ηὸ δέ βε μἶιαζ θμβζζηζηόκ ηε ηαὶ εοιμεζδὲξ παιαὶ ἔκεεκ ηαὶ ἔκεεκ παναηαείζαξ 
὏π᾽ ἐηείκῳ ηαὶ ηαηαδμοθςζάιεκμξ, ηὸ ιὲκ μ὎δὲκ ἄθθμ ἐᾶ θμβίγεζεαζ μ὎δὲ ζημπε῔κ ἀθθ᾽ ἠ ὁπόεεκ ἐλ ἐθαηηόκςκ 
πνδιάηςκ πθείς ἔζηαζ (...).” 
1946
 See Chap. 17. 
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 However, this is not all Plato says about ἀηνάηεζα. He also considers the problem in 
the framework of the soul‟s partition. As Plato stresses in Republic IV, the very notions of 
ἀηνάηεζα and ἐβηνάηεζα point to a partition, especially insofar as they are associated with the 
idea of being better than oneself or superior to oneself (ηνείηηςκ α὏ημῦ) and being weaker 
than oneself or inferior to oneself (ἣηηςκ α὏ημῦ). These notions presuppose that there are 
multiple parts in us, that these parts have different value, and that they can dominate each 
other. If the best part dominates, we are superior to ourselves, but if the weaker part triumphs, 
then we are inferior to ourselves.
1947
 Therefore, it all depends on which part rules. 
 After considering this, Plato goes on to discuss the conflicts (ζηάζεζξ) between the 
parts of the soul, which apparently may give rise to akratic actions. To be sure, one may be 
inclined to argue that in these passages of Republic IV Plato has reformulated the views on 
ἀηνάηεζα we previously considered and is now allowing for the possibility of us going against 
our better judgment (i.e., against the calculation of what is best). We may be controlled by 
blind appetite or irrational anger, and these may drive us to do something harmful.
1948
 But 
does Plato actually recognize the possibility of an akratic action? This is what we must now 
consider – especially since it has a direct bearing on our main question.
1949
 
We already considered that the views put forward in Republic IV introduce a model 
that is developed in later books, and the developments strongly restrict a prima facie 
interpretation of the conflicts mentioned by Plato. This means that the tripartition can actually 
be reconciled with the intellectualist conception of our behavior. Despite being composed of 
three different drives, we always follow what we deem best. Indeed, an akratic action would 
require a constitutively non-philosophical or irrational drive. However, we saw that the other 
drives are always, to a degree, philosophic. Not only are their concrete manifestations shaped 
by our views, but they also affect the way we see things. In other words, our love of gain and 
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 See Rep. 430e-431b: “μ὎ημῦκ ηὸ ιὲκ “ηνείηης α὏ημῦ” βεθμ῔μκ; ὁ βὰν ἑαοημῦ ηνείηηςκ ηαὶ ἣηηςκ δήπμο ἂκ 
α὏ημῦ εἴδ ηαὶ ὁ ἣηηςκ ηνείηηςκ· ὁ α὎ηὸξ βὰν ἐκ ἅπαζζκ ημύημζξ πνμζαβμνεύεηαζ.     ηί δ᾽ μὔ;     ἀθθ᾽, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, 
θαίκεηαί ιμζ αμύθεζεαζ θέβεζκ μὗημξ ὁ θόβμξ ὥξ ηζ ἐκ α὎ηῶ ηῶ ἀκενώπῳ πενὶ ηὴκ ροπὴκ ηὸ ιὲκ αέθηζμκ ἔκζ, ηὸ 
δὲ πε῔νμκ, ηαὶ ὅηακ ιὲκ ηὸ αέθηζμκ θύζεζ ημῦ πείνμκμξ ἐβηναηὲξ ᾖ, ημῦημ θέβεζκ ηὸ “ηνείηης α὏ημῦ” – ἐπαζκε῔ 
βμῦκ – ὅηακ δὲ ὏πὸ ηνμθ῅ξ ηαη῅ξ ἢ ηζκμξ ὁιζθίαξ ηναηδεῆ ὏πὸ πθήεμοξ ημῦ πείνμκμξ ζιζηνόηενμκ ηὸ αέθηζμκ 
ὄκ, ημῦημ δὲ ὡξ ἐκ ὀκείδεζ ρέβεζκ ηε ηαὶ ηαθε῔κ ἣηης ἑαοημῦ ηαὶ ἀηόθαζημκ ηὸκ μὕης δζαηείιεκμκ.” For a 
similar consideration, cp. Lg. 626c ff. 
1948
 More specifically, Socrates seems to admit that one may drink although one thinks it is better not to (see 
439b-d), and also that one may be angered despite one‟s better judgment – i.e., irrationally (441b-c). Later, in 
603e-604b, he also considers the case of a man who has lost his son and is torn apart between the desire to give 
in to pain and his rational part. Here too it seems one may go against one‟s views about what is best and simply 
follow one‟s irrational urges. 
1949
 To put it briefly: if our views directly determine our actions and our life, then we will need to have the best 
possible views, and hence philosophical examination will be very important. However, if our views do not 
entirely determine our life, then striving to have the best possible views may turn out to be useless. For more on 
this, see Chap. 17, Sect. 5. 
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our love of honor have their own views. Otherwise, they would not be able to influence our 
soul. They must try to persuade our philosophical drive and they can only do so by putting 
forward their own views about things. Consequently, there are many incompatible views 
within us, fighting with each other to establish their own way of seeing things.
1950
 The 
conflicts between our drives correspond precisely to conflicts between their respective views. 
The battle we experience between our love of gain, our love of honor, and our love of 
knowledge is actually a battle of δόλαζ.
1951
 Consequently, any triumph of a non-rational drive 
is always a triumph of the views of said drive – in particular, of its views about what is good. 
Whatever course of action we follow, we will always be guided by δόλαζ or knowledge 
claims – and in this sense we always do what we think is best at the moment we act. 
The philosophical drive is thus turned against itself by the other drives – or, more 
precisely, it lets itself be turned against itself. Our love of knowledge must indeed hand over 
the control to the other drives – and they can only assume the control insofar as they are 
themselves philosophic. Consequently, we are never overtaken by pleasure or anger, and our 
mistakes are never the result of irrational acts. All our acts are based on and sanctioned by 
our love of knowledge. This means that our best part never loses control and we are never 
truly inferior to ourselves. It also means that all practical errors result from a cognitive 
failure. At a certain moment, given the circumstances and our susceptibility, we are 
persuaded that pursuing gain or honor is the best. Then, when the situation changes, our 
views may also change, and as a result we will retrospectively interpret what happened as an 
akratic action. But what we view as ἀηνάηεζα is actually a deficient philosophical drive 
sanctioning other drives and their views. It is still a form of rational control, though the 
rationality in question is defective. It accepts bad views and can be deceived. This is what 
renders us susceptible to certain views in certain circumstances – and it is also what allows 
these views to take over the acropolis of the soul and determine our entire way of life. Later 
we will consider what renders our inborn θζθμζμθία weak and whether we may counteract 
it.
1952
 But for now what matters is that we always follow our views about what is best. These 
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 Plato directly refers to this conflict between diferent δόλαζ and their different origins in Rep. 602e-603a: 
“μ὎ημῦκ ἔθαιεκ ηῶ α὎ηῶ ἅια πενὶ ηα὎ηὰ ἐκακηία δμλάγεζκ ἀδύκαημκ εἶκαζ;     ηαὶ ὀνε῵ξ β᾽ ἔθαιεκ.     ηὸ πανὰ 
ηὰ ιέηνα ἄνα δμλάγμκ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ηῶ ηαηὰ ηὰ ιέηνα μ὎η ἂκ εἴδ ηα὎ηόκ.     μ὎ βὰν μὖκ.     ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ηὸ ιέηνῳ βε 
ηαὶ θμβζζιῶ πζζηεῦμκ αέθηζζημκ ἂκ εἴδ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ.     ηί ιήκ;     ηὸ ἄνα ημύηῳ ἐκακηζμύιεκμκ η῵κ θαύθςκ ἄκ ηζ 
εἴδ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ.     ἀκάβηδ.” 
1951
 This does not mean that there is no battle of pure drives at a deeper level, determining how persuasive the 
arguments of the different drives are and which one triumphs. But this is not the conflict we normally 
experience. For more on what determines the outcome of the soul‟s inner dialectic, see Chap. 17, Sect. 3. 
1952
 See Chap. 17. 
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views always have control and, insofar as we are identified with them, we always have     
self-control. At least this is the general model put forward in Plato‟s dialogues.  
One may, of course, object that there are several passages in which Plato seems to 
admit exceptions. In the Republic, for instance, Socrates mentions lawless desires that may be 
unleashed in our dreams, when reason is asleep.
1953
 In Timaeus, we find the idea that 
excessive pleasures and pains, caused by the body, may drive us mad.
1954
 We will not 
consider these passages in detail here, but it is important to remark that in both cases Plato 
associates what happens in those moments to an intrinsic deficiency of our love of knowledge 
(caused either by lack of mental exercise or a defective upbringing).
1955
 Even the 
physiological factors mentioned in Timaeus are said to limit reason. Consequently, we give in 
to other impulses because our reason is not developed enough, and not because we are forced 
to by our impulses.
1956
 Moreover, when we give in to these impulses, we may still be guided 
by views (however defective they may be). If it were not so, we would be moving blindly and 
without any awareness of what we were doing – which could hardly be called an action and 
be ascribed to us. But if we are guided by views, then this is still a form of rational control. 
 In sum, even admitting that we have multiple drives and we may sometimes be guided 
by appetite or anger, this is only possible because such drives have a cognitive structure. All 
action is intrinsically philosophical or rational – and therefore none of our actions is akratic in 
the strict sense of the word.  
 
6. Reconsideration of the notion of βίνο in light of the soul’s tripartition  
 
 The analysis of the soul‟s tripartition allows us to outline a picture of the soul‟s 
practical dimension that is more complex than the one we saw in the previous chapter. Each 
action is not only directed at the good, but it is always motivated by the interaction of our 
three constitutive drives, which determine not only our desire, but also how we see things. 
However, we have also considered in the previous chapter that our actions are not separated 
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 See Rep. 571b ff. 
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 See 86b ff. 
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 In the passage of the Republic, what happens during one‟s sleep is the result of how one lives and of whether 
one soothes or arouses each part of the soul. In Timaeus, one‟s badness is associated not only with one‟s 
physical constitution, but also with one‟s lack of education (ἀπαίδεοημξ ηνμθή, 86e). Moreover, it is admitted 
that one can flee from badness with help of education and knowledge (ηνμθή, ἐπζηδδεύιαηα, ιαεήιαηα – see 
87b). 
1956
 See in particular 86d-e: “ηαὶ ζπεδὸκ δὴ πάκηα ὁπόζα ἟δμκ῵κ ἀηνάηεζα ηαὶ ὄκεζδμξ ὡξ ἑηόκηςκ θέβεηαζ η῵κ 
ηαη῵κ, μ὎η ὀνε῵ξ ὀκεζδίγεηαζ· ηαηὸξ ιὲκ βὰν ἑηὼκ μ὎δείξ, δζὰ δὲ πμκδνὰκ ἕλζκ ηζκὰ ημῦ ζώιαημξ ηαὶ 
ἀπαίδεοημκ ηνμθὴκ ὁ ηαηὸξ βίβκεηαζ ηαηόξ, πακηὶ δὲ ηαῦηα ἐπενὰ ηαὶ ἄημκηζ πνμζβίβκεηαζ.” 
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from one another, but they are all moments of our pursuit of the superlative good. As was 
said, our desire of a superlative good creates a practical system and each part of this system is 
referred to the superlative good we desire. Moreover, our practical system is based on a 
complex system of views that determines what the superlative good is, what we must do in 
order to attain it, and which role each thing plays in the pursuit of the good. These two 
systems are actually the same system – namely, the system that corresponds to the notion of 
αίμξ.
1957
 But this is still an insufficient consideration of all that is implied in Plato‟s notion of 
αίμξ, and therefore we must now reconsider and develop the previous analysis in light of the 
tripartition of the soul. We have to see how the combination and reciprocal contamination of 
the soul‟s constitutive drives constitute a practical system and its underlying system of views. 
This will allow us to bring together everything we saw in this Part III about the structure of 
our ροπή. It will also serve as the basis for the subsequent discussion and appraisal of the 
unexamined life. In fact, we will have to anticipate some aspects that we will see in more 
detail later and whose brief consideration is necessary to properly understand what is 
involved in Plato‟s notion of αίμξ. 
 This intrinsic relation with what precedes and with what follows in our analysis goes 
to show that this is indeed a central question in the Platonic corpus, and it is important to 
properly discuss it. But before entering into the discussion of how the tripartition determines 
the constitution of a αίμξ, it is helpful to briefly consider the pre-Platonic understanding of 
this notion. We already made some allusions to decisive aspects of this understanding, but 
now we must discuss them in greater detail, as a preparation for our analysis of Plato‟s 
concept of αίμξ. This will allow us to recapitulate some aspects we discussed before (aspects 
which in many cases can also be found in Plato) and it also works as a contrast to some 
essential aspects of Plato‟s analysis.  
 
6.1. The pre-Platonic understanding of βίνο  
 
 We will consider the use of the word αίμξ in epic, lyric, dramatic and comic poetry, as 
well as by historians, medical writers, sophists and the so-called Pre-Socratic philosophers. 
To be sure, the texts under consideration are very heterogeneous. They come from different 
periods and have very different styles. All this makes it difficult to systematize them. It is 
also important to note that these texts do not provide us with a conceptual analysis of the 
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 For this analysis of αίμξ, see Chap. 12, Sect. 5.2. 
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structure of αίμξ as such. They refer in concrete and often imagetic terms to several different 
aspects of αίμξ, and though these references are often brief and one-sided, their combination 
allows us to compose a rich description of αίμξ as such. We will thus try to identify the main 
traits of this description. In doing so, we will fall drastically short of a full reconstruction of 
the pre-Platonic understanding of αίμξ. In particular, we will not consider in detail the context 
of each passage, the literary style of the text in question and the period in which it was 
composed. We will simply compare what is said in the different statements about αίμξ.  
 We will focus our attention on the term αίμξ and its cognates (αίμημξ, αζμηή, αζμῦκ, 
αζμηεύεζκ). These terms correspond to a certain way of seeing and understanding life, which 
is something we are always in contact with, though its aspects, structures and meaning are 
often unclear and can be conceived in different ways. We will see how the Greeks understood 
“life”. This analysis, however, will be one-sided insofar as we will not bring into 
consideration other terms that have a similar meaning. These other terms are sometimes used 
alongside αίμξ, and they can also be used in its stead. The best examples of this are the terms 
γ῅κ (which is the most generic term for “living”) and αἰώκ (which refers mainly to one‟s 
lifespan). In some cases, life may even be referred to by the term ροπή – especially in 
moments of risk or emotional tension.
1958
 But αίμξ can also be used in a sense similar to 
ιμ῔να or δαίιςκ, insofar as these terms designate one‟s lot or destiny – i.e., the content of our 
life. In other cases, αίμξ may come close to terms such as ηνόπμξ, ἤεμξ or θύζζξ, which 
denote a particular character or way of being that determines one‟s path in life. In addition, 
αίμξ may refer to a mode of living – i.e., a certain pattern of behavior or rule of life that 
becomes a habit. In this sense, it comes to resemble terms such as δίαζηα, ἐπζηήδεοια or 
ηνμθή. All these terms are frequently used by Greek authors, and also by Plato. We will, 
however, not consider them here. We will rather focus on the uses of αίμξ, partly because this 
is the most relevant term for our main question, and partly because its uses are themselves 
very meaningful and sufficient for our goal here. 
 
a) The uses of the word βίνο and its cognates 
 
Let us put aside for now the proximity between αίμξ and other terms and look more 
closely at what the word αίμξ designates or what it may be applied to. It is true that the word 
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αίμξ means “life”, but the term life is itself complex and multilayered, so we must define 
which aspects of life may be expressed by αίμξ.  
One point is immediately clear: the term αίμξ is used to designate more than the 
simple fact of being alive. It designates life as something we live or to which we relate. We 
experience life and this is not just one of the things we experience, alongside others. Rather, 
our experience of life integrates all our experiences. In other words, life has a content and in 
fact it includes all possible contents. But we do not simply notice life and things in it. We are 
not indifferent to life and to how we experience it. We want our experience of life to be   
good – i.e., we want to have a good life. This is an essential aspect of αίμξ and it pervades all 
its senses – even when the word is apparently used in a more neutral sense, closely associated 




The older uses of the word, however, often have a narrower sense and rather 
emphasize the fact that our life and our comfort are not guaranteed. We need to survive from 
one moment to the next and we want to do it without great discomfort. Βίμξ (or αίμημξ) then 
denote what we need to stay alive and to have some quality of life – i.e., our means of 
sustenance, which include food, clothes, housing and all other possessions that may ensure 
we have a safe and comfortable life.
1960
 The term αίμξ may also designate one‟s occupation or 
job, especially insofar as it is what allows one to find sustenance.
1961
 These occupations may 
be of different sorts. A πόθζξ needs many different workers, which complement each other, 
and usually one has to adopt one of these occupations. Furthermore, the term αίμξ may 
designate a certain pattern of behavior or lifestyle, which may or may not be directly 
connected with one‟s occupation.
1962
 This implies that there is a certain way of relating to 
one‟s life and its contents that permeates our experience of everything and is not necessarily 
determined by the things we come into contact with (at least not directly). 
We can therefore see that αίμξ is something that is open to other beings and to itself. 
But this is not all. Βίμξ is something that may characterize different kinds of beings (which 
                                                 
1959
 See e.g. De Prisca Medicina, 14.8-11: “὏πὸ βὰν ἑκὸξ ἑηάζημο ημοηέςκ πάζπεζ ηε ηαὶ ἑηενμζμῦηαζ ὁ 
ἄκενςπμξ ἠ ημ῔μκ ἠ ημ῔μκ· ηαὶ δζὰ ημοηέςκ π᾵ξ ὁ αίμξ ηαὶ ὏βζαίκμκηζ, ηαὶ ἐη κμύζμο ἀκαηνεθμιέκῳ, ηαὶ 
ηάικμκηζ.” 
1960
 The word αίμημξ is often used in the Odyssey, especially to designate what Penelope‟s suitors are constantly 
devouring. See e.g. II.122, III.299-302. We also find this use of the word later. Cp. e.g. EURIPIDES, Helena, 
512. 
1961
 For the association of αίμξ with one‟s occupation, see e.g. ARISTOPHANES, Pax, 1212f.: “ἀπώθεζάξ ιμο 
ηὴκ ηέπκδκ ηαὶ ηὸκ αίμκ,/ηαὶ ημοημοὶ ηαὶ ημῦ δμνολμῦ ‟ηεζκμοί.” Cp. also SOLON, fr. 13 (West), vv. 43 ff. 
1962




actually raises the question about their differences and their interrelation). In general, αίμξ is 
something individual and experienced in the first-person perspective. However, each 
individual comes into contact with many others – and thus we are all aware of (and 
distinguish ourselves from) many other αίμζ, which are all likewise experienced in the      
first-person perspective.
1963
 In other words, αίμξ is not just referred to an “I”, but also to 
others – the others that one knows, all others that exist at a certain time or even all others that 
were and ever will be.
1964
 In fact, one may contemplate the lives of others and compare one‟s 
own life with theirs.
1965
 And this is not the only form of “otherness” the term αίμξ may be 
referred to. One may also talk of the αίμξ of trees and animals, which may be a remnant of 
animism, but also stresses how the behavior or habits of other animate beings may illustrate a 
possibility of ours and thus reveal something about ourselves.
1966
 Moreover, the term may 
also be used in reference to gods, insofar as their existence is determined in some way.
1967
  
It is important to note that in most of these cases the term αίμξ is applied to individual 
beings, but this is not always the case. One may also speak of a common αίμξ, the αίμξ of a 
πόθζξ, the αίμξ of a people (such as the Hellenes), and – as was mentioned – the αίμξ of a 
certain epoch or even human life in general.
1968
 This may imply that the lives of a collective 
entity essentially relate to each other or that they all share similar traits. Indeed, some of these 
collectives are cultural or historical entities to which we belong, but the term αίμξ may also 
have a more universal sense – in which case it describes something like a unity of condition 
or something we all have in common. However, even if that is the case, the term is still 
referred to the first person. Life is always experienced from the standpoint of the individual, 
though all other instances mentioned may be an important part of our life. In general, we are 
related to a community, a people, an epoch and the human condition in general, and all this 
characterizes us. 
The term αίμξ can thus have different scopes. It can refer to the totality of one‟s life 
(i.e., to the interval between one‟s birth and one‟s death), and it can be applied to larger 
entities. But this is not all. Βίμξ may also refer to a particular period or phase of an 
                                                 
1963
 In general, we are essentially intertwined with these other lives and we may even depend on them. For more 
on this, cp. footnote 2061 below. 
1964
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Phoenisae, 1272 (ζ῵κ ηαζζβκήηςκ αίμξ), THUCYDIDES, Historiae, 6.16.5 (ἐκ ηῶ 
ηαη᾽ α὎ημὺξ αίῳ), HERODOTUS, Historiae, 6.109 (ηὸκ ἅπακηα ἀκενώπςκ αίμκ). 
1965
 Cp. DEMOCRITUS, DK B191. 
1966
 See SEMONIDES, fr. 13 (West), AESCHYLUS, Persae, 616-618, Agamemnon, 717-726, HERODOTUS, 
Historiae, 3.108, ARISTOPHANES, Plutus, 920-925. 
1967
 Cp. EURIPIDES, fr. 1075 (Nauck). 
1968
 In addition to the references in footnote 1693, see also e.g. ARISTOPHANES, Ecclesiazusae, 573-576,        
590-594, AESCHYLUS, fr. 181a (Radt), HERODOTUS, Historiae, 7.46. 
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individual‟s life and to what characterizes it.
1969
 These periods or phases (which may or not 
coincide with the ages of life) are marked by certain habits or certain events, and can greatly 
differ from one another. In general, they express how we go through different situations and 
how these situations shape our whole experience of life. Hence, we may say we live different 
lives. Furthermore, the idea of different phases is present in some references to afterlife as a 
kind of αίμξ or a different shape our life may assume.
1970
 
From all these uses we can already see that there can be many different αίμζ, with very 
different configurations. But insofar as they are forms of αίμξ, they must also have something 
in common, and we must now consider how the Greeks determined the most essential traits 
of life. 
 
b) The metaphors used to portray the structure of βίνο as such 
 
The texts employ many metaphors to describe αίμξ as such. This imagetic component 
is indeed a decisive feature of the pre-Platonic thinking about αίμξ. The metaphors employed 
show different aspects of life. Many of these aspects are connected with situations of crisis, 
where life‟s features become more manifest, while others refer to the usual features of life. 
We will now consider (even if briefly) these different metaphors and see what they imply. 
Although some of them are more frequent than others, they all help us understand what the 
term αίμξ means. 
Let us start with a set of images that is relatively common and very expressive. Life is 
often portrayed as a distance we must traverse and also the act of covering that distance. In 
other words, life is presented as a journey. The phrase “δζὰ αίμο” is often used and several 
verbs (such as δζάβεζκ, δζαηεθε῔κ, δζένπεζεαζ, ἐηπεναίκεζκ) express the idea of traversing 
life.
1971
 These verbs may emphasize the idea of movement and effort, or the idea of reaching 
the end of the journey. The latter idea can also be expressed by the verb ηεθεοη᾵κ, or by 
mentioning the endpoint of life (ηέθμξ, ηένια, πέναξ).
1972
 Moreover, the metaphor of the 
journey can be developed in different ways. Life can be compared to a path or a road we take 
                                                 
1969
 See e.g. SOPHOCLES, Trachiniae, 81, 168, Oedipus Coloneus, 1619, 1691-1692, EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 
1157-1158, GORGIAS, DK B11a (15).  
1970
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Medea, 1039, Hippolytus, 195. 
1971
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Coephoroe, 610, SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Coloneus, 1619, ARISTOPHANES, 
Lysistrata, 217-218, EURIPIDES, Hercules, 428-429, HIPPOCRATES, De dieta, 69. 
1972
 See e.g. HOMER, Iliad, XVI.786-790, THEOGNIS, Elegiae, 905-906, PINDAR, Isthmia 4.4-5, 





 Life can also be compared to a sea one must cross. Euripides, for 
instance, speaks of sailing life (ἐηπθε῔κ ηὸκ αίμκ).
1974
 There are also several descriptions of 
this sea. Sophocles mentions waves and compares a life full of toil to the agitated sea of Crete 
and Euripides speaks of a life without waves (ἄηοιμξ).
1975
 Euripides also compares youth to 
the prow of a ship (πνῶνα αζόημο).
1976
 Likewise meaningful in this context is the fact that 
Sophocles says that children are for mothers the anchor of life (ἄβηοναζ αίμο).
1977
 These 
images show how life may be long and full of risks. But life may also be compared to a short 
journey, as when Sophocles speaks of the narrow passage (ἰζειόξ) of life.
1978
 Finally, life 
may also be compared to a race, where one must show one‟s worth. This race is normally a 
race between two points, where one has to run to a certain point, turn around and return to 
where one departed from. Indeed, authors often speak of the last turn of life and there are 
several references to the finish point.
1979
  
Another set of images emphasize more directly the idea of effort. Life is something 
we may have to stretch (ηείκεζκ), often beyond a certain point where it could have ended.
1980
 
Life is also something we may wear out or consume (ηνίαεζκ, ἐηηνίαεζκ).
1981
 One may drag it 
out (ἕθηεζκ) or creep to its end (ἕνπεζκ).
1982
 We may also have to drain it as if it were a 
leaking ship, especially if one leads a life of suffering and tears.
1983
 All these images usually 
stress how hard life can be. The same idea can be expressed by comparing life to a burden 
one must carry and that may be easy to carry or may oppress us.
1984
 But the idea of effort may 
                                                 
1973
 Empedocles speaks of the harsh paths of life. See DK B115: “(...) δαίιμκεξ μἵηε ιαηναίςκμξ θεθάπαζζ 
αίμζμ,/ ηνίξ ιζκ ιονίαξ ὧναξ ἀπὸ ιαηάνςκ ἀθάθδζεαζ,/ θομιέκμοξ πακημ῔α δζὰ πνόκμο εἴδεα εκδη῵κ/ ἀνβαθέαξ 
αζόημζμ ιεηαθθάζζμκηα ηεθεύεμοξ.” Democritus, in turn, says: “αίμξ ἀκεόνηαζημξ ιαηνὴ ὁδὸξ ἀπακδόηεοημξ” 
(DK B230). Cp. also EURIPIDES, Hercules, 430-434, and PINDAR, Isthmia 6.15. 
1974
 See EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 169, and Hecuba, 1270. 
1975
 See SOPHOCLES, Trachiniae, 112-121, and EURIPIDES, Hercules, 698-699. 
1976
 See Troiades, 103. 
1977
 See fr. 685. 
1978
 See fr. 568. 
1979
 For comparisons of life to a race, see PINDAR, Nemea 6.7, SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Coloneus, 133,        
142-146, fr. 646-647, EURIPIDES, Hercules, 655-668, Medea, 1245, Electra, 952-956, Helena, 1666, Ion, 
1514. 
1980
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Prometheus vinctus, 537-539, Agamemnon, 1362-1363, EURIPIDES, Supplices, 
1108-1111. 
1981
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Heraclidae, 84f.; ARISTOPHANES, Pax, 586-589. 
1982
 See EURIPIDES, Orestes, 201-207 and Medea, 1245 
1983
 See EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 898. 
1984
 In Sophocles‟ Oedipus Tyrannus, we find the expression “ῥᾶζηα ηὸκ αίμκ θένεζκ”. Aeschylus, in turn, 
mentions a life difficult to carry (αίμξ δύζθμνμξ) in Agamemnon, 859. Sophocles speaks of being oppressed 
(αανύκεζεαζ) under the weight of evils (Trachiniae, 151-152). It is also said that we must carry or bear the 
necessary things of life (ηἀκαβηα῔α ημῦ αίμο) – see EURIPIDES, Helena, 253-254. In this context, we may also 
mention the idea of bearing (ἀκέπεζεαζ) life. See e.g. SOPHOCLES, fr. 568.  
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also be combined with the idea of skill. Life can be more like a manual work or a work of art, 
as when Herodotus says it is something one must weave (δζαπθέηεζκ).
1985
 
Other metaphors are taken from the domain of economics. Euripides compares life to 
a merchandise by saying that Phaedra is like a merchant of her own life (ἔιπμνμξ αίμο) if she 
killed herself in order to obtain something else.
1986
 Life is also compared to one‟s possessions 
or a quantity of money, insofar as it is something which we may spare (θείδεζεαζ), squander 
(ἀκαθίζηεζκ) or be robbed of (ζηένεζεαζ).
1987
 Anacreon and Aristophanes, in turn, compare 
life to a coin or a metal that can be falsified.
1988
 It is also meaningful that Sophocles compares 
life to a weighing scale, and death is then the critical moment when the scales tilt.
1989
 
Incidentally, the idea of a critical moment can likewise be expressed by the image of standing 
on the razor‟s edge.
1990
 
Several other metaphors are taken from the domain of nature. For instance, life is 
sometimes compared to a day with all its different phases, which emphasizes the idea of time 
and of a cycle of activity. This is closely connected with the Greek conception of being born 
as coming to light and death as a domain of darkness.
1991
 Old age is then compared to the 
nightfall.
1992
 But life can also be associated with different natural elements. Aeschylus speaks 
of the breath of life (πκεῦια αίμο), and
 
when one dies one is said to breathe one‟s last or 
expire (ἐηπκε῔κ or ἀπμροπε῔κ).
1993
 If, however, one still has some life in oneself, it can be said 
that one still breathes.
1994
 Life may still be compared to a liquid, as when Euripides describes 
the life of someone who is often crying as a life that melts.
1995
 Euripides also refers to the 
mixture of liquids (ζύβποζζξ) in order to describe a life marked by confusion.
1996
 
                                                 
1985
 See Historiae, 5.92, γ. 
1986
 See EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 964-965. 
1987
 See SOPHOCLES, Philoctetes, 931-934, HIPPOCRATES, Epistulae, 17.114 and EURIPIDES, Hecuba, 
338. 
1988
 We find the expression ηίαδδθμξ αίμξ in ANACREON, fr. 43 (Page), and Aristophanes uses the phrase 
ηζαδδθία ημῦ αίμο in Aves, 158. 
1989
 See Oedipus Coloneus, 1508-1509: “ῥμπὴ αίμο ιμζ· ηαί ζ᾽ ἅπεν λοκῄκεζα/ εέθς πόθζκ ηε ηήκδε ιὴ ρεύζαξ 
εακε῔κ.” 
1990
 See HOMER, Iliad, X.173-174: “κῦκ βὰν δὴ πάκηεζζζκ ἐπὶ λονμῦ ἵζηαηαζ ἀηι῅ξ/ ἠ ιάθα θοβνὸξ ὄθεενμξ 
Ἀπαζμ῔ξ ἞ὲ αζ῵καζ.” 
1991
 For the idea of life as being in the light, see e.g. EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 357-362, Hecuba, 167-168, 
Phoenisae, 1281. For the idea of death as something that hides life, see Oedipus Coloneus, 1551-1552. 
1992
 Cp. e.g. AESCHYLUS, Agamemon, 1121-1124, EMPEDOCLES DK B152.  
1993
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Persae, 506-507, Agamemnon, 1493, 1517, SOPHOCLES, Ajax, 1031, 
EURIPIDES, Heraclidae, 565-566, Helena, 142.   
1994
 See EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 1244-1246: “πὠ ιὲκ ἐη δεζι῵κ θοεεὶξ/ ηιδη῵κ ἱιάκηςκ μ὎ ηάημζδ᾽ ὅηςζ 
ηνόπςζ/ πίπηεζ, αναπὺκ δὴ αίμημκ ἐιπκέςκ ἔηζ (...).”  
1995
 See EURIPIDES, Medea, 139-143.  
1996
 See EURIPIDES, Andromacha, 291, and Iphigenia Aulidensis, 551. 
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Life can additionally be portrayed as a living being. It is like a plant, especially in its 
youth, when it is said to sprout, thrive or bloom (εάθθεζκ).
1997
 Life is also like a fruit one may 
reap.
1998
 Moreover, the description of human lives as leaves that fall from the trees is 
sometimes brought into connection with the description of αίμξ, to express its briefness and 
frailty.
1999
 Gorgias and Democritus, in turn, compare life to a living organism by saying that 
it can have diseases like the body.
2000
 Diseases imply a certain defect in one‟s natural 
constitution, and this idea of deviation can be further highlighted by saying that one‟s life is 
monstrous (ηέναξ) – i.e., a life that breaks with the natural order of things.
2001
 
Several of these images already referred to the idea of disturbance, but sometimes this 
idea is brought to the fore, often with social and political implications. Aristophanes indeed 
speaks of the disturbance of life (ηάναλζξ ημῦ αίμο) and several authors say that something 
may upset life or turn it upside down.
2002
 But one may also set it straight (ὀνε῵ζαζ αίμκ) or 
order it (ζοκηάλαζεαζ).
2003
 In a similar sense, one may speak both of an unsteady or wavering 
life, and of a firm life.
2004
 The latter idea may also be expressed by describing a life as being 
without danger (ἀηίκδοκμξ αίμξ).
2005 
These are the main groups of images, but there are still other images that appear to be 
isolated. For instance, Antiphon compares life to a board game where one cannot replay a 
move – i.e., there are no “do overs”.
2006
 This idea of non-repeatability can also be expressed 
by saying that life is a single race and we cannot run it twice.
2007
 Particularly expressive is the 
comparison of life with a theater play. As Democritus says: “the cosmos is the stage, life is 
the parodos, we come, see and go away.”
2008
 Life can also be compared to a religious rite, in 
which case youth is a ceremony of initiation to one‟s life (ἐκ αζόημο πνμηεθείμζξ).
2009
 
                                                 
1997
 See e.g. EMPEDOCLES, DK B20, v. 6, EURIPIDES, Electra, 951-953. 
1998
 See EURIPIDES, fr. 571, 1-3. 
1999
 See HOMER, Iliad, VI.146-149, MIMNERMUS, fr. 2, ARISTOPHANES, Aves, 685-687. 
2000
 See GORGIAS, DK B11a (35), and DEMOCRITUS, DK B288. 
2001
 See EURIPIDES, Helena, 255-261. 
2002
 Cp. ARISTOPHANES, Thesmophoriazusae, 137, and also ARCHILOCHUS, fr. 130 (West), EURIPIDES, 
Iphigenia Aulidensis, 24-27, Hercules, 735-736.   
2003
 See SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, 39, and DEMOCRITUS, fr. 61. 
2004
 See PINDAR, Nemea 7.98 (ἐιπεδμζεεκέα αίμημκ); GORGIAS DK B11a (17), (25), (29); EURIPIDES, 
Hippolytus, 785, fr. 916; ARISTOPHANES, fr. 899 (αέααζμκ αίμκ).  
2005
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Medea, 248, Iphigenia Aulidensis, 17-18. 
2006
 See ANTIPHON, DK B52: “ἀκαεέζεαζ δὲ ὥζπεν πεηηὸκ ηὸκ αίμκ μ὎η ἔζηζκ.” 
2007
 Cp. EURIPIDES, Supplices, 1080-1086 and Hercules, 655-672.  
2008
 See DK B115: “ὁ ηόζιμξ ζηδκή, ὁ αίμξ πάνμδμξ· ἤθεεξ, εἶδεξ, ἀπ῅θεεξ.” 
2009
 See AESCHYLUS, Agamemnon, 720. 
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Βίμξ is also associated with the idea of inhabiting a place. Euripides describes life as 
the act of inhabiting the body for a time, before returning it to earth.
2010
 The same author also 
speaks of life as a camp that one settles when arriving at a certain place (ηαεζδνύεζκ αίμκ).
2011
 
Moreover, Euripides sees life as a kind of army or city, insofar as it is something that may 
have a leader (πνμζηάηδξ).
2012
 More generally, life is something that can be seduced, as is 
implied when Euripides speaks of divination as a bait for one‟s life (αίμο δέθεαν).
2013
 Life 
may also be overtaken or possessed – for instance, by Victory.
2014
 But life is not just passive. 
It may possess us (in the sense that it keeps us alive or forces us to live), or it may be 
something we fight with and that gives us blows.
2015
 Euripides describes life as an entity that 
holds us or as a prison, when he speaks of it as something we may release ourselves from 
(ἀπαθθάηηεζεαζ).
2016
 It is also said to be something we may leave behind (θείπεζκ or 
ἐηθείπεζκ).
2017
 There are actually several expressions to designate the loss of life. Some are 
more generic and refer only to its destruction (which often implies violence).
2018
 But life can 
also be seen as something that can be cut in two in the battlefield or from which one may be 
severed, which seems to presuppose a certain identification with the body, at least at the 
moment of death.
2019







                                                 
2010
 See Supplices, 531-536: “ἐάζαη᾽ ἢδδ βῆ ηαθοθε῅καζ κεηνμύξ,/ ὅεεκ δ᾽ ἕηαζημκ ἐξ ηὸ θ῵ξ ἀθίηεημ,/ ἐκηαῦε᾽ 
ἀπεθεε῔κ, πκεῦια ιὲκ πνὸξ αἰεένα,/ ηὸ ζ῵ια δ᾽ ἐξ β῅κ· μὔηζ βὰν ηεηηήιεεα/ ἟ιέηενμκ α὎ηὸ πθὴκ ἐκμζη῅ζαζ 
αίμκ,/ ηἄπεζηα ηὴκ ενέραζακ α὎ηὸ δε῔ θααε῔κ.” 
2011
 See Bacchae1336-1339: “ὅηακ δὲ Λμλίμο πνδζηήνζμκ/ δζανπάζςζζ, κόζημκ ἄεθζμκ πάθζκ/ ζπήζμοζζ· ζὲ δ᾽ 
Ἄνδξ Ἁνιμκίακ ηε ῥύζεηαζ/ ιαηάνςκ η᾽ ἐξ αἶακ ζὸκ ηαεζδνύζεζ αίμκ.” 
2012
 See Iphigenia Aulidensis, 446-450: “἟ δοζβέκεζα δ᾽ ὡξ ἔπεζ ηζ πνήζζιμκ./ ηαὶ βὰν δαηνῦζαζ ῥᾳδίςξ α὎ημ῔ξ 
ἔπεζ,/ ἅπακηά η᾽ εἰπε῔κ. ηῶ δὲ βεκκαίῳ θύζζκ/ ἄκμθαα ηαῦηα. πνμζηάηδκ δὲ ημῦ αίμο/ ηὸκ ὄβημκ ἔπμιεκ ηῶ η᾽ 
ὄπθῳ δμοθεύμιεκ.” As we mentioned above, Plato uses a similar image to designate the ruling drive of the soul 
(see Rep. 573a-b). 
2013
 See Helena, 755. 
2014
 See EURIPIDES, Iphigenia Taurica 1499-1501, Orestes 1693-5, Phoenisae 1764-6. 
2015
 See, respectively, SOPHOCLES, Electra 223-225 (ὄθνα ιε αίμξ ἔπῃ), EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 426 
(ἁιζθθ᾵ζεαζ αίςζ), and AESCHYLUS, Eumenides, 933 (πθδβαὶ αζόημο). 
2016
 See Hippolytus, 356-357. 
2017
 See e.g. SOPHOCLES, Electra, 1131, and EURIPIDES, Supplices, 693. We also find the expression 
ἀπμζηάζζξ αίμο in EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 277. 
2018
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Supplices, 936-937 (ἀπμθαηηζζιμὶ αίμο), Persae, 464 (ἐλαπέθεεζνακ αίμκ), 
Agamemnon, 1453-1454 (ἀπέθεζζεκ αίμκ), EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 1367 (ὀθέζαξ αίμημκ), Iphigenia Taurica, 
674 (αίμκ ἀπμννήλεζκ), 691-692 (θῦζαζ αίμκ). 
2019
 See EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 1375-1377, and SOPHOCLES, Philoctetes, 1427. 
2020
 See e.g. SOPHOCLES, Trachiniae, 85, Electra, 768, DEMOCRITUS, DK B43. 
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c) The characterization of particular βίνη according to their content or way of 
being 
 
The metaphors we have just considered showed some important traits and some basic 
possibilities of all human lives, but there can be many different lives, and now we must see 
how particular lives are characterized and distinguished from one another. Greek authors 
often try to show the essential trait of a particular life by adding some attribute to the term 
αίμξ. This attribute may refer to what one does, what one possesses or to one‟s relation with 
others, and it distinguishes an individual life from other possibilities. However, these 
characterizations may apply to many different individuals. To be more precise, they are 
possibilities available to all of us. In this sense, their differentiation already foreshadows the 
question of the main ways of life, though it still recognizes a great diversity of possibilities. 
But what are then the attributes attributed to αίμξ throughout the texts?  
As was said, lives are often characterized according to what they do or do not do. 
Sometimes, the social function of someone is specified. One may lead the life of a man or of 
a female slave.
2021
 But one‟s life may also be defined by one‟s way of making a living, which 
is often associated to a certain way of being. Aristophanes talks of the life of a farmer 
(βεςνβζηόξ αίμξ) and of a rural life (ἄβνμζημξ αίμξ).
2022
 Archilochus, in turn, speaks of a 
maritime life (εαθάζζζμξ αίμξ), and Euripides of the life of an islander (κδζζώηδξ αίμξ).
2023
 
One may also do nothing. Archilochus speaks of a αίμξ ἀπνάβιςκ as something beneficial for 
the elderly. This describes a certain way of spending the time: namely, by doing nothing and 
having no concerns.
2024
 Other times authors speak of a vagrant life (αίμξ ἀθήηδξ or πθακήηδξ 
αίμξ), which is associated to lack of means, misery and disorientation.
2025
 Aristophanes also 
mentions the life of a beggar (αίμξ πηςπμῦ).
2026
 Such lives are characterized by the “ἀζεεκείδ 
αίμο” mentioned by Herodotus.
2027
 But one may also lead a dishonest life. As was mentioned, 
Anacreon speaks of a fraudulent life (ηίαδδθμξ αίμξ).
2028
 Herodotus accuses someone of 
acquiring the means of sustenance through the most impious deeds (ἀπ‟ ἔνβςκ 
                                                 
2021
 See EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 938, and Andromacha, 89-90. 
2022
 See Pax, 589, and Nubes, 43. 
2023
 See ARCHILOCHUS, fr. 116 (West) and EURIPIDES, Heraclidae, 84.  
2024
 See ARCHILOCHUS, fr. 330 (West). 
2025
 See HERODOTUS, Historiae, 3.52, EURIPIDES, Heraclidae, 873-878. See also EURIPIDES, Helena, 
520-527. 
2026
 See Plutus, 548, 552. 
2027
 See Historiae, 2.47 and 8.51. 
2028





 Aeschylus, in turn, uses the expression “ἀνβονμζηεν῅ αίμκ κμιίγεζκ” for 
someone who spends life stealing, whereas Aristophanes speaks of bringing false accusations 
(ζοημθακηε῔κ) as an ancestral αίμξ.
2030
 
Indeed, many characterizations of αίμξ have a broader moral sense. Euripides 
criticizes a useless and lawless life (ἀπνε῔μξ and ἄκμιμξ.)
2031
 Sophocles disparages a life full 
of envy (πμθογήθμξ αίμξ).
2032
 One may also turn to the soft side of life (ηὸ ιαθεαηὸκ αίμο), 
which is associated with the Muses, or one‟s life may also be associated with godlessness and 
injustice.
2033
 Gorgias, in turn, talks of a shameful (ἐπμκείδζζημξ) life.
2034
 In contrast, one may 
lead a life without blemish or reproach (ἀηέναζμξ ἀκεπίπθδηημξ αίμξ).
2035
 One‟s life may be 
moderate (ζαόθνςκ) or just.
2036
 It may be marked by peace or endurance.
2037
 It may also be a 
chaste (ἁβκόξ) or holy (ζεικόξ) life.
2038
 In some other cases, the attributes of life have a more 
intellectual sense. Pindar compares a young man good at counseling or deliberating (ἐκ 
αμοθα῔ξ) to the life of a one-hundred-year-old man. In this case, time expresses wisdom.
2039
 
Aristophanes, in turn, describes human beings as beings that spend their lives in darkness 




These material, moral and intellectual features of a particular life already point to 
many interactions between lives, but the social dimension of lives is further emphasized by 
the fact that lives are frequently determined by their interrelations – both in the domain of the 
family and the domain of the πόθζξ.  
Let us first consider relations between family members. Aeschylus speaks about how 
important it was for maidens to find a husband and have a ἀκδνμηοπήξ αίμξ.
2041
 Aristophanes 
stresses how pleasant the life of engaged people or newlyweds is (κοιθίςκ αίμξ).
2042
 
Euripides talks of a life sharing a table (λοκηνάπεγμξ αίμξ) to designate the way one treats a 
                                                 
2029
 See Historiae, 8.106. 
2030
 See AESCHYLUS, Choephoroe, 1001-1003 and ARISTOPHANES, Aves, 1152. 
2031
 See Hercules, 1301-1302. 
2032
 See Oedipus Tyrannus, 380-382. 
2033
 See EURIPIDES, Supplices, 883, Hercules, 433-434. 
2034
 See DK B11a (25). 
2035
 See EURIPIDES, Orestes, 922. 
2036
 See ARCHILOCHUS, fr. 328 (West), and ARISTOPHANES, fr. 899 (αέααζμκ ἕλεζξ ηὸκ αίμκ δίηαζμξ ὤκ). 
2037
 See ARISTOPHANES, Pax, 439-440 (ἐκ εἰνήκῃ δζαβαβε῔κ ηὸκ αίμκ), and EURIPIDES, Hercules, 1351 
(ἐβηανηενήζς αίμημκ). 
2038
 See EURIPIDES, fr. 472, and Ion, 56. Cp. also Bacchae, 75, and Helena, 9-10.  
2039
 See Pythia 4, 281-286. 
2040
 See Aves 685. 
2041
 See Eumenides, 956-960 
2042
 See Aves 161. 
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slave as a wife.
2043
 In contrast, we also find the resolution to lead un unwedded life in 
Aristophanes.
2044
 But this is not all. Having or not having children may likewise define a life. 
One may lament having an ἄπαζξ or ἄηεηκμξ αίμξ, but one may also consider having children 




As for political relations, one may live subordinated to someone else.
2046
 One may 
also lead the life of a slave – especially if one has lost the privileges one had.
2047
 Aeschylus 
praises an intermediate life that is neither a life without rule (ἀκάνπεημξ αίμξ) nor a life 
submitted to someone else (δεζπμημύιεκμξ αίμξ).
2048
 He also praises a grand and good life, 
under the rule of law.
2049
 In Euripides, the Cyclops talks about κόιμζ as a πμζηίθθεζκ of 




All these aspects may define a life and distinguish it from others. But this is not the 
only kind of characterization of particular lives that we find in the texts. 
 
d) The characterization of particular βίνη with respect to their value 
 
Often αίμξ is characterized with respect to the way one values its content – namely, 
whether it is positive or negative. This is a consequence of our interest in life, to which the 
texts refer in different ways. First of all, we are attached to our life and we desire to live it.
2051
 
Life is even said to be what we are most fond of.
2052
 Even those that disparage old age do not 
want to die, as is said in Euripides.
2053
 But our fondness for life is not unalterable. Under 
certain circumstances, life may become extremely undesirable or unlivable (μ὎ αζώζζιμξ or 
                                                 
2043
 See Andromacha, 658. 
2044
 See Lysistrata, 217-218. 
2045
 See EURIPIDES, Medea, 670-671, Ion, 488-491, 790-791, Phoenisae, 963-966. 
2046
 See AESCHYLUS, Agamemnon, 472-474. 
2047
 See SOPHOCLES, Trachiniae, 302, and EURIPIDES, Ion, 1373. 
2048
 See Eumenides, 526-531. 
2049
 See Persae, 852-853. 
2050
 See Cyclops, 338-340.  
2051
 Homer, for instance, uses the expression θζθαίεζεαζ αζόημζμ (Odyssey XII.328, XXIV.536), whereas 
Euripides speaks of a πόεμξ ημῦ αίμο (Hercules 316-318). Cp. also Alcestis, 715 (“ιαηνμῦ αίμο βὰν ἞ζζεόιεκ 
ἐν῵κηά ζε”) and fr. 816 (where he describes mortals as θζθόγςμζ and as having ἔνςξ αίμο). 
2052
 See SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, 611-612: “θίθμκ βὰν ἐζεθὸκ ἐηααθε῔κ ἴζμκ θέβς/ ηαὶ ηὸκ παν᾽ α὏ηῶ 
αίμημκ, ὃκ πθε῔ζημκ θζθε῔.” 
2053
 See Alcestis, 669-672: “ιάηδκ ἄν᾽ μἱ βένμκηεξ εὔπμκηαζ εακε῔κ,/ β῅ναξ ρέβμκηεξ ηαὶ ιαηνὸκ πνόκμκ αίμο·/ 





 We may be no more than a κεηνὸξ ἔιροπμξ, as Sophocles says.
2055
 We may 
desire to die or deem it best.
2056
 This stems from the fact that we do not simply want to live. 
We want a desirable life (ἱιενόεζξ αίμξ, πμεεζκὸξ αίμξ, ἀβαζηὸξ αίμξ).
2057
 We want to benefit 
from life or enjoy it (ὄκδζζξ ημῦ αίμο).
2058
 We are always marked by a concern with our life 
(ημῦ αίμο ηήδεζεαζ), and this means that we are always appraising what happens and what 
we expect to happen, and such an appraisal provides us with an essential predicate of life.
2059
 
We may also try to intervene. We may take many pains (πόκμζ) to improve our live and we 
may exercise ourselves or train (ἀζηε῔κ) to live in a certain way.
2060
 At any rate, the value of 
life fluctuates. It can improve or deteriorate, according to what we go through. There are 
indeed different factors that may determine it – such as what we have, what we do, and the 
others we come in contact with.
2061
 But now we must consider how the assessment of one‟s 
life is expressed in the texts we are dealing with. 
We find many value predicates in these texts and they can be organized in two     
poles – a positive pole, that expresses the desirability of life, and a negative one, that 
expresses how life can become unbearable. Several of these predicates have a formal 
character and do not specify what renders a life good or bad, while other reveal a particular 
criterion according to which one appraises one‟s life. These criteria are fundamentally of two 
sorts (which actually correspond to two of the soul‟s drives identified by Plato). Some 
predicates appeal to what we feel and other predicates appeal to the way one is seen and 
valued by others. To be sure, the boundaries between the general and the specific appraisals 
of life may sometimes be blurry. Yet, their diversity allows us to understand something 
important, to which we will return later – namely, that we may have different sensitivities in 
life. 
                                                 
2054
For the use of these and equivalent expressions, see e.g. HERODOTUS, Historiae, 3.109, SOPHOCLES, 
Antigone, 566, EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 242, Hercules, 1257, Ion 670, Hippolytus, 821, ARISTOPHANES, 
Plutus, 969, HIPPOCRATES, De dieta, 82, GORGIAS, DK B11a (20) 
2055
 See Antigone, 1165-1167: “ηὰξ βὰν ἟δμκὰξ/ ὅηακ πνμδ῵ζζκ ἄκδνεξ, μ὎ ηίεδι᾽ ἐβὼ/ γ῅κ ημῦημκ, ἀθθ᾽ 
ἔιροπμκ ἟βμῦιαζ κεηνόκ.”  
2056
 See e.g. MIMNERMUS, fr. 1 (West), vv. 1-9, fr. 2, vv. 9-11, AESCHYLUS, Agamemnon, 1314. 
2057





(attributed to Anacreon), SIMONIDES, fr. 79 (Page), EURIPIDES, Hecuba, 168-169.  
2058
 See H. BECKBY (ed.), op. cit., 7.516 (attributed to Simonides), and EURIPIDES, Medea, 254. 
2059
 For the expression ημῦ αίμο ηήδεζεαζ, cp. SOPHOCLES, Electra, 1327, Oedipus Tyrannus, 1061. 
2060
 Cp. e.g. EURIPIDES, Orestes, 922, and fr. 201. 
2061
 The last aspect is particularly important. The presence or absence of others in our life may be decisive. See 
e.g. HOMER, Odyssey, V.394-399, VIII.464-468, XVIII.254-256, HESIOD, Opera et dies, 397-400, 
SOPHOCLES, Antigone, 566. For others as cause of destruction of one‟s αίμξ, see e.g. AESCHYLUS, 
Agamemnon,          1453-1454. 
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Let us then start with the more formal attributes – which for the most part we have 
already discussed before. Life can be qualified as good or bad.
2062
 It can also be said to be 
happy or wretched.
2063
 Similarly, it can be enviable or not.
2064
 Sometimes we even find some 
general images of this. Life can be full of light or darkness.
2065
 It may also be marked by 
singing or wailing and tears.
2066
 In general, it can be loved or hated.
2067
 Finally, we may 
include here the contrast between a fortunate (ε὎ηοπήξ) or unfortunate (δοζηοπήξ) life, which 
expresses how we are normally exposed to what happens to us.
2068
  
As was said, all these characterizations are neutral about what defines the quality of 
one‟s life. But there are other characterizations of life that place the emphasis on one‟s 
subjective or emotional experience. These characterizations do not necessarily imply that one 
is only concerned with what one feels, especially because one‟s feelings are usually a 
reaction to what is happening in one‟s life. However, one still focus on how events make one 
feel. For instance, life can be said to be sweet or bitter.
2069
 It can also be pleasurable or 
painful.
2070
 One can say that there is no delight or gratification (πάνζξ) in one‟s life or that life 
has nothing pleasant (ηένπκμκ) in it.
2071
 Mimnermus in particular stresses that life is no life 
without the pleasures of Aphrodite.
2072
 One can also say life is not desirable without 
pleasures.
2073
 Enjoying (ἀπμθαῦζαζ or ε὎θναίκεζκ) life is indeed important for us.
2074
 It is also 
important to have a life without suffering or harm.
2075
 
                                                 
2062
 Cp. e.g. HOMER, Odyssey, XV.491 (ἀβαεὸξ αίμξ), THEOGNIS, Elegiae, 1.303-304 (idem), SEMONIDES, 
fr. 13 (West – ηάηζζημξ αίμξ), AESCHYLUS, fr. 90 (Radt – πμκδνὸξ αίμξ), SOPHOCLES, Electra, 599 (αίμξ 
ιμπεδνόξ).  
2063
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Persae, 711 (ε὎αίςκ αίμξ), EURIPIDES, Bacchae, 910-911 (αίμημξ ε὎δαίιςκ), 
EURIPIDES, Orestes, 1659 (ε὎δαίιςκ αίμξ), ARISTOPHANES, Plutus, 555 (ιαηανίηδξ αίμξ). We find the 
expression ἄεθζμξ αίμξ in passages such as EURIPIDES, Heraclidae, 878, Andromacha, 408 or Phoenisae, 
1454. See also EURIPIDES, Hecuba, 198 (δύζηακμξ αίμημξ) and Supplices, 960 (δοζαίςκ αίμξ). 
2064
 See SOPHOCLES, Trachiniae, 284 (ἄγδθμξ αίμξ) and ARISTOPHANES, Nubes, 464 (γδθςηόηαημξ αίμξ). 
2065
 See e.g. SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Coloneus (ηὸκ αίμκ θαιπνὸκ πμζε῔ζεαζ). 
2066
 Aeschylus, for instance, says that an Erinys gives songs to some and a life dim with tears to others (ημ῔ξ ιὲκ 
ἀμζδάξ, ημ῔ξ δ‟ αὖ δαηνύςκ αίμκ ἀιπθςπὸκ πανέπμοζαζ – see Eumenides, 950-955). See also SOPHOCLES, 
Philoctetes, 689-690 (πακδάηνοημξ αζμηά) and EURIPIDES, Hecuba, 457 (μἰηηνὰ αζμηά), Orestes, 201-207. 
2067
 See once more SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, 611-612 and EURIPIDES, Medea, 147 (ζηοβενὰ αζμηά). 
2068
 See e.g. HERODOTUS, Historiae, 1.32 (ημ῔ξ ιὲκ ἀμζδάξ͵ ημ῔ξ δ΄ αὖ δαηνύςκ αίμκ ἀιαθςπὸκ πανέπμοζαζ), 
and EURIPIDES, Phoenisae, 1582-1583 (ε὎ηοπέζηενμξ αίμξ). The expression δοζηοπὴξ αίμξ appears in 
SOPHOCLES, Electra, 602, and EURIPIDES, Iphigenia Taurica, 851. 
2069
 See PINDAR, Pythia 2.26 (βθοηὺξ αίμημξ), and SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, 1487 (πζηνὸξ αίμξ). See 
also ANACREON, fr. 50 (Page), and EURIPIDES, fr. 23. 
2070
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Medea, 1355 (ηενπκόξ αίμημξ), ARISTOPHANES, Nubes, 43 (ἣδζζημξ αίμξ), 
EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 940 (θοπνὸξ αίμημξ). 
2071
 See e.g. ARISTOPHANES, Lysistrata, 865-866: “ὡξ μ὎δειίακ ἔπς βε ηῶ αίῳ πάνζκ,/ ἐλ μὗπεν αὕηδ „λ῅θεεκ 
ἐη η῅ξ μἰηίαξ (...).” See also EURIPIDES, Cyclops, 522, Alcestis, 347, Medea, 226-227, Hippolytus, 1408. In 
this context, it is also relevant to mention Hecuba, 168-169: “μ὎ηέηζ ιμζ αίμξ/ ἀβαζηὸξ ἐκ θάεζ.” 
2072
 See MIMNERMUS, fr. 1, v. 1: “ηίξ δὲ αίμξ, ηί δὲ ηενπκὸκ ἄηεν πνοζ῅ξ Ἀθνμδίηδξ;” 
2073
 See SIMONIDES, fr. 78 (Page): “ἱιενόθςκ‟ ἀθέηηςν/ ηίξ βὰν ἁδμκ᾵ξ ἄηεν εκα/η῵κ αίμξ πμεεζκὸξ ἠ πμί/α 
ηονακκίξ;/ η᾵ζδ‟ ἄηεν μ὎δὲ εε῵κ γδθςηὸξ αἰώκ.”  
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 Other characterizations concern the way one is seen by others and also one‟s own 
worth. One may lead a glorious (ε὎ηθεήξ), irreproachable (ἀκεπίπθδηημξ) or admirable 
(πενίαθεπημξ, ηαθόξ) life.
2076
 This all depends on whether or not one fulfils one‟s duties and 
does what one should.
2077
 In any case, one must disregard one‟s feelings and one‟s immediate 




 These predicates thus correspond to two different kinds of concern and two different 
ways of seeing life. This is a fundamental difference in Greek culture, and it outlines two 
very different ways of life, as we will see in section f). 
 
e) The portraits of human life in general. The frailty of human life and the 
possible solutions 
 
After focusing on the different characterizations of particular lives, it is now important 
to consider how Greek authors try to describe features common to all human lives. In other 
words, they try to portrait what characterizes human life as such. The term αίμξ is indeed 
often used in passages where someone is reflecting about our common condition and trying to 
determine it. This reflection often takes place in a context of tension or distress, and the 
portraits painted tend therefore to be gloomy. Human life is mostly seen as frail and finite.
2079
 
But at the same time, the authors also try to find solutions to our limitations. This is what we 
must now consider. We will try to combine the main lines of the different passages, in order 
to draw something like a general portrait of human life.  
                                                                                                                                                        
2074
 See e.g. THUCYDIDES, Historiae, 2.53.4 (ημῦ αίμο ηζ ἀπμθαῦζαζ), SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Coloneus, 
1353-1354 (ε὎θνακε῔κ αίμκ), EURIPIDES, Ion, 1374-1477 (ηνοθ῅ζαζ ηαί ηζ ηενθε῅καζ αίμο), Cyclops, 451-453 
(αίμημκ ἟δέςξ ἄβεζκ), and Medea, 1354-1356 (ηενπκὸκ δζάλεζκ αίμημκ).  
2075
 Such a life can be designated in different ways. See e.g. PINDAR, Olympian 8.87 (ἀπήιακημξ αίμημξ), 
SOPHOCLES, Trachiniae, 168 (ἀθύπδημξ αίμξ), Electra, 650 (ἀαθααὴξ αίμξ), EURIPIDES, Bacchae, 1004 
(ἄθοπμξ αίμξ). In Euripides, Medea refuses a θοπνὸξ ε὎δαίιςκ αίμξ (see Medea 598-599). See also 
AISCHYLUS, fr. 29 (Radt): “ηί βὰν ηαθὸκ γ῅κ αίμ<ημ>κ ὃξ θύπαξ θένεζ.” Cp. also PINDAR, Olympia 2.62-63 
(ἀπμκέζηενμξ αίμξ) and SOPHOCLES, Trachiniae, 147 (἟δμκα῔ξ ἄιμπεμκ ἐλαίνεζ αίμκ).  
2076
 See SOPHOCLES, Electra, 393 (ηαθόξ αίμημξ), EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 623 (ε὎ηθεέζηενμξ αίμξ), Medea, 
810 (ε὎ηθεέζηαημξ αίμξ), Hippolytus, 717 (ε὎ηθεὴξ αίμξ), Hercules 1369-1370 (αίμο εὔηθεζακ), Andromaca,  
89-90 (πενίαθεπημξ αίμξ), Orestes, 922 (ἀκεπίπθδηημξ αίμξ). On this topic, cp. also PINDAR, Olympia        
1.97-100: “(...) ὁ κζη῵κ δὲ θμζπὸκ ἀιθὶ αίμημκ/ ἔπεζ ιεθζηόεζζακ ε὎δίακ/ ἀέεθςκ β᾽ ἕκεηεκ. ηὸ δ᾽ αἰεὶ πανάιενμκ 
ἐζθὸκ/ ὕπαημκ ἔνπεηαζ πακηὶ ανμη῵κ.”   
2077
 Cp. e.g. HOMER, Iliad IV.168-175, AESCHYLUS, Septem contra Thebas, 698-699, GORGIAS,               
DK B11a(29). 
2078
 Cp. e.g. HOMER, Iliad, XV.511-514, TYRTAEUS, fr. 40 (West), AESCHYLUS, fr. 90, SOPHOCLES, fr. 
952.  
2079
 This corresponds to the traditional sense of ἄκενςπμξ, which we considered above. See the introductory 
remarks to this Part III. 
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 Let us start with the diagnosis of our limitations. First of all, authors may emphasize 
the need for means of sustenance. Our survival is not guaranteed and, as Hesiod says, the 
gods have hidden our αίμξ (i.e., our means of sustenance) from us – otherwise we would 
work just one day and be workless (ἀενβμί) the rest of the year.
2080
 We must therefore work 
hard for our survival and even when we acquired a αίμξ in this sense, we still stand in risk of 
losing it.
2081
 Authors also stress the risks one may undertake to guarantee one‟s αίμξ. Sailing 
in particular is frequently associated with the idea of running serious risks.
2082
 But this is far 
from being the only risky endeavor. Solon says that there is danger in all works or 




Indeed, life often does not follow the course we want and it does not seem to be in our 
hands. We do not know what will happen.
2084
 Pindar even says that we cannot know when we 
are to have a tranquil day.
2085
 We are exposed to fortune (ηύπδ) and suffer many unexpected 
misfortunes (ζοιθμναί).
2086
 We do not know our destiny (ιμ῔να, αἶζα). We do not know if it 
brings something good or bad, as Solon says.
2087
 A god or a δαίιςκ may move things against 
us.
2088
 As Archilochus says, the gods set things aright or turn them upside down, which 
causes us to roam about and disturbs our mind.
2089
 In fact, everything we attain is still 
precarious. Life may seem to go well, but only in the end can we pronounce someone happy 
                                                 
2080
 See Opera et dies, 42-46: “ηνύρακηεξ βὰν ἔπμοζζ εεμὶ αίμκ ἀκενώπμζζζκ·/ ῥδζδίςξ βάν ηεκ ηαὶ ἐπ᾽ ἢιαηζ 
ἐνβάζζαζμ,/ ὥζηε ζε ηεἰξ ἐκζαοηὸκ ἔπεζκ ηαὶ ἀενβὸκ ἐόκηα·/ αἶρά ηε πδδάθζμκ ιὲκ ὏πὲν ηαπκμῦ ηαηαεε῔μ,/ ἔνβα 
αμ῵κ δ᾽ ἀπόθμζημ ηαὶ ἟ιζόκςκ ηαθαενβ῵κ.”  
2081
 We see this in the Odyssey, where the suitors are permanently consuming the αίμξ (i.e., the substance) of 
Odysseus‟ family. See e.g. I.160, I.377, XIII.396, XVII.378. Cp. also ARISTOPHANES, Nubes, 837-838: “(...) 
ζὺ δὲ/ ὥζπεν ηεεκε῵ημξ ηαηαθόεζ ιμο ηὸκ αίμκ.” 
2082
 See e.g. HESIOD, Opera et dies, 682-690. Likewise, Bias is supposed to have said: “ὁ πθςηζηὸξ ιήηε ἐκ 
ημ῔ξ ηεεκδηόζζκ ἐζηί, ιήη‟ ἐκ ημ῔ξ αζμῦζζ.” See SEPTEM SAPIENTES, Sententiae et apophthegmata, in: F. 
MULLACH (ed.), Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum, vol. 1, Paris, Didot, 1860, 230. 
2083
 See fr. 13 (West), vv. 63-76, and especially 63-66: “Μμ῔να δέ ημζ εκδημ῔ζζ ηαηὸκ θένεζ ἞δὲ ηαὶ ἐζεθόκ,/ 
δ῵να δ‟ ἄθοηηα εε῵κ βίβκεηαζ ἀεακάηςκ./ π᾵ζζ δέ ημζ ηίκδοκμξ ἐπ‟ ἔνβιαζζκ, μ὎δέ ηζξ μἶδεκ/ π῅ζ ιέθθεζ ζπήζεζκ 
πνήιαημξ ἀνπμιέκμο (...).” 
2084
 Cp. HERODOTUS, Historiae, 1.32: “΢ημπέεζκ δὲ πνὴ πακηὸξ πνήιαημξ ηὴκ ηεθεοηὴκ ηῆ ἀπμαήζεηαζ (...).” 
Cp. also EURIPIDES, fr. 304 (Nauck). 
2085
 See PINDAR, Olympia 2.30-34: “ἢημζ ανμη῵κ βε ηέηνζηαζ/ πε῔ναξ μὔ ηζ εακάημο,/ μ὎δ᾽ ἟ζύπζιμκ ἁιένακ 
ὁπόηε, πα῔δ᾽ ἁθίμο,/ ἀηεζνε῔ ζὺκ ἀβαεῶ ηεθεοηάζμιεκ· ῥμαὶ δ᾽ ἄθθμη᾽ ἄθθαζ/ ε὎εοιζ᾵κ ηε ιεηὰ ηαὶ πόκςκ ἐξ 
ἄκδναξ ἔαακ.” 
2086
 See in particular SOPHOCLES, Antigone, 1155-1160, EURIPIDES, Ion, 381-383. 
2087
 See once more fr. 13 (West), vv. 63-66. See also EURIPIDES, Ifigenia Taurensis, 912-914. In fact, we do 
not even know whether it is our destiny to live or die at any given moment. See e.g. HOMER, Odyssey, 
XIV.359: “(...) ἔηζ βάν κύ ιμζ αἶζα αζ῵καζ.” Cp. also PINDAR, Pythia 6.27, where we find the notion of alloted 
lifetime (αίμξ πεπνςιέκμξ). 
2088
 See e.g. HOMER, Odyssey, XVIII.256: “κῦκ δ᾽ ἄπμιαζ· ηόζα βάν ιμζ ἐπέζζεοεκ ηαηὰ δαίιςκ.”  
2089
 See fr. 130 (West): “ημ῔ξ εεμ῔ξ η‟ εἰεε῔άπακηα· πμθθάηζξ ιὲκ ἐη ηαη῵κ/ ἄκδναξ ὀνεμῦζζκ ιεθαίκδζ ηεζιέκμοξ 
ἐπὶ πεμκί,/ πμθθάηζξ δ‟ ἀκαηνέπμοζζ ηαὶ ιάθ‟ εὖ αεαδηόηαξ/ ὏πηίμοξ, ηείκμζξ <δ‟> ἔπεζηα πμθθὰ βίκεηαζ ηαηά,/ 





 Until then, one can only be considered fortunate (ε὎ηοπήξ), as is said in 
Herodotus.
2091
 Our future may indeed hold many evils in stock and in that case dying 




 But this refers to another constitutive problem of human life. Regardless of how 
fortunate or unfortunate we are, we always have to deal with death. Human life is too short 
and it soon ends.
2093
 In fact, it may end at any time. We do not know when we will die – and 
we do not understand the imminent danger we are often in.
2094
 If, however, we happen to 
escape death for a long time, we will have other problems. We will have to face old age and 
all the evils it brings.
2095
 Moreover, we also have to deal with the death of others around us, 
and this may even cause the meaning of our life to collapse.
2096
  
 Human life is thus very frail. However, we tend to forget all this.
2097
 We are usually 
full of expectations (ἐθπίδεξ), commit daring acts and act insolently.
2098
 This easily brings 
about further disasters and disappointments. Indeed, we all have to face many hardships and 
no one seems to escape them.
2099
 Consequently, we are often concerned or anxious.
2100
 
Sometimes we cannot even find any joy in life, and it seems to lack all meaning.
2101
 Life then 
becomes a burden too heavy to bear. It seems too long and is no longer dear.
2102
 We will thus 
desire to die or even not having been born at all. 
                                                 
2090
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Agamemnon, 928-929, SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, 1524-1530, Oedipus 
Coloneus, 1720-1723, fr. 646-647, HERODOTUS, Historiae, 1.30-33. 
2091
 See HERODOTUS, Historiae, 1.32: “πνὶκ δ᾽ ἂκ ηεθεοηήζῃ, ἐπζζπε῔κ ιδδὲ ηαθέεζκ ης ὄθαζμκ, ἀθθ᾽ 
ε὎ηοπέα.” Cp. also EURIPIDES, fr. 198. 
2092
 See AESCHYLUS, Persae, 709-712. 
2093
 SEE SOPHOCLES, fr. 572 (Radt), HERODOTUS, Historiae, 7.46, EMPEDOCLES, DK B2, 
PROTAGORAS, DK B4. In any case, we have an allotted time.  
2094
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 782-786: “ανμημ῔ξ ἅπαζζ ηαηεακε῔κ ὀθείθεηαζ,/ ημ὎η ἔζηζ εκδη῵κ ὅζηζξ 
ἐλεπίζηαηαζ/ ηὴκ αὔνζμκ ιέθθμοζακ εἰ αζώζεηαζ·/ ηὸ η῅ξ ηύπδξ βὰν ἀθακὲξ μἷ πνμαήζεηαζ,/ ηἄζη᾽ μ὎ δζδαηηὸκ 
μ὎δ᾽ ἁθίζηεηαζ ηέπκδζ.” See also THEOGNIS, Elegiae, 1.905-906. 
2095
 See e.g. MIMNERMUS, fr. 1 and 2 (West). 
2096
 Cp. the references in footnote 2061. 
2097
 For instance, in many cases we act as if we were to live forever, as Democritus says of thrifty people. Cp. 
DEMOCRITUS, DK B227. 
2098
 See e.g. PINDAR, Olympia 1.54-64: “εἰ δὲ δή ηζκ᾽ ἄκδνα εκαηὸκ ὆θύιπμο ζημπμὶ/ ἐηίιαζακ, ἤκ Σάκηαθμξ 
μὗημξ· ἀθ/θὰ βὰν ηαηαπέραζ/ ιέβακ ὄθαμκ μ὎η ἐδοκάζεδ, ηόνῳ δ᾽ ἕθεκ/ ἄηακ ὏πένμπθμκ, ἅκ μἱ παηὴν ὏πεν/ 
ηνέιαζε ηανηενὸκ α὎ηῶ θίεμκ,/ ηὸκ αἰεὶ ιεκμζκ῵κ ηεθαθ᾵ξ ααθε῔κ ε὎θνμζύκαξ ἀθ᾵ηαζ./ ἔπεζ δ᾽ ἀπάθαιμκ αίμκ 
ημῦημκ ἐιπεδόιμπεμκ,/ ιεηὰ ηνζ῵κ ηέηανημκ πόκμκ, ἀεακάηςκ ὅηζ ηθέραζξ/ ἁθίηεζζζ ζοιπόηαζξ/ κέηηαν 
ἀιανμζίακ ηε/ δ῵ηεκ, μἷζζκ ἄθεζημκ/ εέκ κζκ. εἰ δὲ εεὸκ ἀκήν ηζξ ἔθπεηαί/ ηζ θαεέιεκ ἔνδςκ, ἁιανηάκεζ.” 
2099
 Cp. e.g. AESCHYLUS, Choephoroe, 1018-1020, EURIPIDES, Hippolytus, 189-190, fr. 196. 
2100
 See PINDAR, Pythia 8.88-96: “ὁ δὲ ηαθόκ ηζ κέμκ θαπὼκ/ ἁανόηαημξ ἔπζ ιεβάθαξ/ ἐλ ἐθπίδμξ πέηαηαζ/ 
὏πμπηένμζξ ἀκμνέαζξ, ἔπςκ/ ηνέζζμκα πθμύημο ιένζικακ. ἐκ δ᾽ ὀθίβῳ ανμη῵κ/ ηὸ ηενπκὸκ αὔλεηαζ· μὕης δὲ ηαὶ 
πίηκεζ παιαί,/ ἀπμηνόπῳ βκώιᾳ ζεζεζζιέκμκ./ ἐπάιενμζ· ηί δέ ηζξ; ηί δ᾽ μὔ ηζξ; ζηζ᾵ξ ὄκαν/ ἄκενςπμξ.” 
2101
 See e.g. MIMNERMUS, fr. 1, v. 1, AESCHYLUS, fr. 177 (Radt). 
2102
 See e.g. HESIOD, fr. 276 (Merkelbach & West), MIMNERMUS, fr. 1, vv. 5-10, AESCHYLUS, Persae, 
263-265, HERODOTUS, Historiae, 7.46. 
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But the texts do not only show the difficulties of life. They also recommend possible 
solutions for these problems, which in turn may have their own limitations. We will now 
briefly consider these solutions and their limitations, and this will allow us to better 
understand the pre-Platonic understanding of life. 
First of all, some texts value work and painstaking (ἔνβμκ, πόκμξ) as a form of 
ensuring our survival and also a safe life.
2103
 This is opposed to laziness and dishonesty. 
However, it is also recognized in other passages that one‟s efforts may be in vain.
2104
  
One may also endeavor to attain ἀνεηή and glory, in order to give meaning to life.
2105
 
One will then have value and be acknowledged by others. This also requires great effort.
2106
 
But even if one is admired by others, one will still have to face old age and death.  
Other texts stress the importance of justice (δίηδ) and being just.
2107
 This prevents 
conflicts and even divine anger. It makes social life possible and will perhaps lead to a divine 
reward. Some texts indeed assume our life may continue after death and we may be 
rewarded.
2108
 However, there are also passages that state that justice does not guarantee a 
good life.
2109




We may therefore have to focus on this life, and in order to overcome its limitations 
one may try to develop ηέπκαζ. There are indeed several praises of ηέπκδ that highlight how it 
can improve human life.
2111
 Initially, human beings did not know how things were 
constituted, they could not discern them, and could not control nature.
2112
 It was the 
development of ηέπκαζ changed that. However, ηέπκαζ do not guarantee a full control of life. 
                                                 
2103
 See e.g. HESIOD, Opera et dies, 287ff., 493ff., 574-577.  
2104
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Hercules, 501-505, Hippolytus, 467. 
2105
 See in particular PINDAR, Olympian 1.97-100: “ὁ κζη῵κ δὲ θμζπὸκ ἀιθὶ αίμημκ/ ἔπεζ ιεθζηόεζζακ ε὎δίακ/ 
ἀέεθςκ β᾽ ἕκεηεκ. ηὸ δ᾽ αἰεὶ πανάιενμκ ἐζθὸκ/ ὕπαημκ ἔνπεηαζ πακηὶ ανμη῵κ.” See also TYRTAEUS, fr. 40 
(West), EURIPIDES, Ifigenia Aulidensis, 566-567, fr. 994. 
2106
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, fr. 238, 1052. 
2107
 See HESIOD, Opera et dies, 225ff., PINDAR, Olympian 2.51ff., AESCHYLUS, Eumenides, 517ff., 
EURIPIDES, Electra, 953-958. 
2108
 See in particular PINDAR, Olympia 2.58ff. 
2109
 See e.g. ARISTOPHANES, Plutus, 500-506. 
2110
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Supplices, 1080-1086, Hippolytus, 193-197. 
2111
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Prometheus vinctus, 442 ff., EURIPIDES, Supplices, 195ff. For more on these 
praises of ηέπκδ (or ζμθία), cp. Chap. 1, Sect. 2.2 above. 
2112
 See in particular AESCHYLUS, Prometheus vinctus, 445-450: “θέλς δέ, ιέιρζκ μὔηζκ᾽ ἀκενώπμζξ ἔπςκ,/ 
ἀθθ᾽ ὧκ δέδςη᾽ εὔκμζακ ἐλδβμύιεκμξ·/ μἳ πν῵ηα ιὲκ αθέπμκηεξ ἔαθεπμκ ιάηδκ,/ ηθύμκηεξ μ὎η ἢημομκ, ἀθθ᾽ 




Σέπκαζ require a very long effort to be constituted and life is too short.
2113
 Moreover, ηέπκδ is 
still powerless against death.
2114
 Thus, it does not seem able to fully solve our problems. 
Some passages thus advise us to moderate our desires, control our expectations 
(ἐθπίδεξ) and avoid excesses (ιδδὲκ ἄβακ).
2115
 We are mortal and we should entertain mortal 
thoughts (εκδηὰ θνμκε῔κ).
2116
 We must accept we cannot have all happiness (ε὎δαζιμκία 
π᾵ζα).
2117
 We should be satisfied with less. But can we really control our expectations and be 
satisfied with less? We may always aim at a superlative good, as we saw.
2118
 This means that 
any attempt to reduce our expectations would also render life too disappointing and too 
depressing. This is perhaps one of the main reasons some authors emphasize the importance 
of hope. It can sustain or console us.
2119
 It may even make us confident or glad.
2120
 It is true 
that it can be deceptive and destructive.
2121
 But it may also render life bearable. It may indeed 
be better not to know our own situation. We find such an idea in Sophocles‟ Ajax, when 
ignorance is praised.
2122
 In some cases, though, it may be impossible to repress our desire to 
know, as we see in Oedipus Tyrannus.
2123
 Life itself may force a revelation of its tragic 
character. 
This is in very broad terms the map of possibilities we find in pre-Platonic thinking 
about αίμξ, and it determines many of Plato‟s own discussions. But before returning to Plato, 
there still one last question we must consider. 
 
                                                 
2113
 See HIPPOCRATES, Aphorismi, 1: “὇ αίμξ αναπὺξ, ἟ δὲ ηέπκδ ιαηνή (...).” 
2114
 See e.g. SOPHOCLES, Antigone, 361-363, EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 782-786. 
2115
 See e.g. PINDAR, Pythia 2.21-52; Pythia 3.61-62; EURIPIDES, Supplices, 951-954; Iphigenia Aulidensis, 
920-925; Bacchae, 907-911; fr. 893; DEMOCRITUS, DK B246, 285. 
2116
 On εκαηὰ θνμκε῔κ, see e.g. EURIPIDES, Alcestis, 787-802, Bacchae, 386-401. 
2117
 See e.g. PINDAR, Nemea 7.54-58: “θοᾶ δ᾽ ἕηαζημξ δζαθένμιεκ αζμηὰκ θαπόκηεξ,/ ὁ ιὲκ ηά, ηὰ δ᾽ ἄθθμζ· 
ηοπε῔κ δ᾽ ἕκ᾽ ἀδύκαημκ/ ε὎δαζιμκίακ ἅπαζακ ἀκεθόιεκμκ· μ὎η ἔπς/ εἰπε῔κ, ηίκζ ημῦημ Μμ῔να ηέθμξ ἔιπεδμκ/ 
ὤνελε.” 
2118
 See Chap. 12, Sect. 4. On this topic, cp. e.g. SOLON, fr. 13 (West), vv. 71-73: “πθμύημο δ‟ μ὎δὲκ ηένια 
πεθαζιέκμκ ἀκδνάζζ ηε῔ηαζ· μἳ βὰν κῦκ ἟ι<ές>κ πθε῔ζημκ ἔπμοζζ αίμκ,/ δζπθάζζμκ ζπεύδμοζζ· ηίξ ἂκ ημνέζεζεκ 
ἅπακηαξ;” 
2119
 See e.g. PINDAR, Isthmia 8.11-15a: “ἀθθ‟ ἐιμὶ δε῔ια ιὲκ πανμζπόιεκμκ/ ηανηενὰκ ἔπαοζε ιένζικακ· ηὸ δὲ 
πνὸ πμδὸξ/ ἄνεζμκ ἀεὶ αθέπεζκ/ πν῅ια π᾵κ. δόθζμξ βὰν αἰ/ὼκ ἐπ᾽ ἀκδνάζζ ηνέιαηαζ,/ ἑθίζζςκ αίμο πόνμκ· ἰ/αηὰ 
δ᾽ ἔζηζ ανμημ῔ξ ζύκ β᾽ ἐθεοεενίᾳ/ ηαὶ ηά. πνὴ δ᾽ ἀβαεὰκ ἐθπίδ᾽ ἀκδνὶ ιέθεζκ.” 
2120
 See e.g. AESCHYLUS, Prometheus vinctus, 537-541: “἟δύ ηζ εανζαθέαζξ/ ηὸκ ιαηνὸκ ηείκεζκ αίμκ ἐθπίζζ, 
θακα῔ξ/ εοιὸκ ἀθδαίκμοζακ ἐκ ε὎θνμζύκαζξ (...).” 
2121
 See e.g. PINDAR, Pythia 8.73-96, SOPHOCLES, Antigone, 613-630, EURIPIDES, Bacchae, 902-910. 
2122
 See SOPHOCLES, Ajax, 552-555: “ηαίημζ ζε ηαὶ κῦκ ημῦηό βε γδθμῦκ ἔπς,/ ὁεμύκεη᾽ μ὎δὲκ η῵κδ᾽ 
ἐπαζζεάκεζ ηαη῵κ·/ ἐκ ηῶ θνμκε῔κ βὰν ιδδὲκ ἣδζζημξ αίμξ,/ ἕςξ ηὸ παίνεζκ ηαὶ ηὸ θοπε῔ζεαζ ιάεῃξ.”  
2123
 See in particular vv. 1056-1068: “[ΙO.] ηί δ᾽ ὅκηζκ᾽ εἶπε; ιδδὲκ ἐκηναπῆξ· ηὰ δὲ/ ῥδεέκηα αμύθμο ιδδὲ 
ιεικ῅ζεαζ ιάηδκ./ [ΟΙ.] μ὎η ἂκ βέκμζημ ημῦε᾽ ὅπςξ ἐβὼ θααὼκ/ ζδιε῔α ημζαῦη᾽ μ὎ θακ῵ ημ὎ιὸκ βέκμξ. [ΙΟ.] ιὴ 
πνὸξ εε῵κ, εἴπεν ηζ ημῦ ζαοημῦ αίμο/ ηήδεζ, ιαηεύζῃξ ημῦε᾽· ἅθζξ κμζμῦζ᾽ ἐβώ. [ΟΙ.] εάνζεζ· ζὺ ιὲκ βὰν μ὎δ᾽ 
ἐὰκ ηνίηδξ ἐβὼ/ ιδηνὸξ θακ῵ ηνίδμοθμξ, ἐηθακε῔ ηαηή./ [ΙΟ.] ὅιςξ πζεμῦ ιμζ, θίζζμιαζ· ιὴ δν᾵ ηάδε./ [ΟΙ.] 
μ὎η ἂκ πζεμίιδκ ιὴ μ὎ ηάδ᾽ ἐηιαεε῔κ ζαθ῵ξ./ [ΙΟ.] ηαὶ ιὴκ θνμκμῦζά β᾽ εὖ ηὰ θῶζηά ζμζ θέβς./ [ΟΙ.] ηὰ θῶζηα 
ημίκοκ ηαῦηά ι᾽ ἀθβύκεζ πάθαζ. [ΙΟ.] ὦ δύζπμηι᾽, εἴεε ιήπμηε βκμίδξ ὃξ εἶ.” 
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f) The main alternatives in life and the choice of life 
 
 We saw that pre-Platonic literature speaks about αίμξ in different ways. It outlines 
general traits of all human life, but it also identifies many distinguishing features of particular 
αίμζ. This tension between the general structure of life and its particular configurations is very 
important. We need to understand what life in general is in order to guide ourselves in it. This 
is particularly visible in the last group of passages we considered. Life is difficult, but we 
may try to intervene. Such a possibility then raises several questions: namely, what are our 
main options, which one should we choose and how free are we to choose it? We must now 
briefly consider how these questions are treated in pre-Platonic literature. In particular, we 




But first of all, it is important to reconsider the fact that there can be different αίμζ, 
and not only because we may be more or less successful in life (and thus our life can have 
more or less value for us). As we saw, there are many different livelihoods and we may also 
have many different characters or ways of being.
2125
 This is not necessarily conceived as 
something we choose. Nevertheless, it expresses the fact that life can have many different 
contents and we may relate to it in different ways. This is not just determined by one‟s 
circumstances, but also by our sensitivity – especially by what we regard as most important in 
life. In fact, the idea of what one values most in life is expressly stated in several        
passages – usually through metaphors. Pindar uses the idea of light to express what is 
meaningful in life.
2126
 Euripides, in turn, speaks of the most precious thing as the eye of life 
(ὀθεαθιὸξ αίμο), the greatest treasure in life (ιέβζζημκ ἐκ αίςζ ηεζιήθζμκ), or its leader 
(πνμζηάηδξ ημῦ αίμο).
2127
 This is also intrinsically connected with particular cultural 
practices, such as the questions about who is happy (or the happiest) or the ιαηανζζιμί which 
proclaimed a certain kind of life or a certain kind of person as happy.
2128
 In the questions and 
proclamations, a certain good was identified as the most important and this identification was 
                                                 
2124
 The expression αίμο αἵνεζζξ (used in Plato and Aristotle) is not frequently used during this period, but still 
we find it in EURIPIDES, Andromacha, 384-385. 
2125
 See Sect. c) above. 
2126
 See Olympia X, 22-23 (αζόηῳ θάμξ).  
2127
 See Andromacha, 406; Rhesus, 654; Iphigenia Aulidensis, 449. 
2128
 See e.g. ALCMAN, fr. 1 (Page), vv. 37-39, EURIPIDES, Bacchae, 73-82. For the questions about who is 
happy (which were just one of the many questions about positive predicates that were used as tests of wisdom), 
see e.g. K. OHLERT, Rätsel und Rätselspiele der alten Griechen, Berlin, Mayer & Müller, 1912. On the topic 
of ιαηανζζιμί, see e.g. G. DIRICHLET, De veterum macarismis, Gießen, Töpelmann, 1914; B. GLADIGOW, 
Zum Makarismos des Weisen, Hermes 95 (1967), 404-433. 
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an expression of a particular sensitivity. The idea of different sensitivities and different 
interests in life was also a central part of the priamels, as we considered above.
2129
 Whether 
or not they refer to something as a superlative good or as the ηάθθζζημκ πάκηςκ, priamels 
contrast many perspectives about what is desirable in life. In some cases, they seem to accept 
a diversity of that sort, while in others they argue in favor of a particular good being superior 
to all others. But, at any rate, they recognize that people pursue many different things, such as 
pleasure, beauty, health, wealth, glory, ἀνεηή, and so on. These different preferences then 
correspond to different αίμζ.
2130
 
This is not all. Many other passages (some of which mentioned in the previous 
section) oppose different possibilities of life and apparently try to convince us to live in a 
certain way. These passages (which do not necessarily mention the word αίμξ) tend not to be 
exhaustive or systematic, but at any rate they anticipate the Platonic (and Aristotelian) 
doctrine of the “choice” of life, and are therefore relevant for us. We will not consider all 
relevant passages here, but a few general considerations will help us prepare what follows.
2131
 
 We find one important antecedent of the choice of life in Homer: namely, the 
dilemmas. Characters are sometimes confronted with two very different destinies and they 
must choose between them, thus determining their whole life. The most famous case is 
Achilles‟ choice in Iliad between a glorious but short life, or a long and ordinary life.
2132
 
Ulysses himself must choose between staying with Calypso (who offers him an immortal life, 
full of beauty and ease) or returning home to Penelope, which implies great sufferings.
2133
 
Moreover, Homer also makes a reference to Paris‟ judgment, which may also be interpreted 
as a choice of life (insofar as each goddess embodies different values and a different course 
of life).
2134
 Later we find a similar idea of choosing between goddesses (and shaping one‟s 
                                                 
2129
 See Chap. 12, Sect. 4.1. 
2130
 This becomes particularly clear in EURIPIDES, fr. 659, which connects this diversity with the notion of 
αίμξ. Euripides says: “ἔνςηεξ ἟ι῔κ εἰζὶ πακημ῔μζ αίμο·/ ὃ ιὲκ βὰν ε὎βέκεζακ ἱιείνεζ θααε῔κ,/ ηῶ δ‟ μ὎πὶ ημύημο 
θνμκηίξ, ἀθθὰ πνδιάηςκ/ πμθθ῵κ ηεηθ῅ζεαζ αμύθεηαζ πάηςν δόιμζ·/ ἄθθῳ δ‟ ἀνέζηεζ ιδδὲκ ὏βζὲξ ἐη θνεκ῵κ/ 
θέβμκηζ πείεεζκ ημὺξ πέθαξ ηόθιῃ ηαηῆ·/ μἳ δ‟ αἰζπνὰ ηένδδ πνόζεε ημῦ ηαθμῦ ανμη῵κ/ γδημῦζζκ· μὕης αίμημξ 
ἀκενώπςκ πθάκδ./ ἐβὼ δὲ ημύηςκ μ὎δεκὸξ πνῄγς ηοπε῔κ,/ δόλακ <δὲ> αμοθμίιδκ ἂκ ε὎ηθείαξ ἔπεζκ.” 
2131
 For more on the topic, see e.g. N. TERZAGHI, La scelta della vita, Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica 1 
(1920), 364-400; R. JOLY, Le thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l’antiquité classique, Bruxelles, 
Palais des Académies, 1956; A. FESTUGIÈRE, Les trois vies, in: IDEM, Études de philosophie grecque, Paris, 
Vrin, 1971, 117-156; J. RUSTEN, Two Lives or Three? Pericles on the Athenian Character, The Classical 
Quarterly 35 (1985), 14-19; A. HARBACH, Die Wahl des Lebens in der antiken Literatur, Heidelberg, Winter, 
2010. 
2132
 See Iliad IX.410-416. As we saw, Socrates himself refers to this alternative in the Apology (see Chap. 2 
Sect. 2.2). 
2133
 See Odyssey, V.203-224. 
2134
 See Iliad, XXIV.25-30. 
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life accordingly) at the opening of Euripides‟ Hippolytus.
2135
 The alternatives presented 
correspond to very different αίμζ and the choice has therefore very serious consequences in 
one‟s life. 
 In addition to the dilemma and the contest between divinities, the idea of choice of life 
may also be expressed using the image of a juncture or crossroads (ηνίμδμξ). A juncture 
represents a decisive moment where one must decide one‟s path, and it can thus be used as a 
metaphor for a decisive choice or a turning-point in life.
2136
 Hesiod seems to have this in 
mind (though he does not explicitly mention the crossroads as such) when he presents the 
alternative between two paths or two roads: one that is difficult to traverse and leads to 
excellence (ἀνεηή) and another that is easy and leads to badness (ηαηόηδξ).
2137
 Theognis, in 
turn, mentions the crossroads between being thrifty and having possessions or wasting one‟s 
substance in order to live a life of pleasure.
2138
 However, the most emblematic and developed 
image of the crossroads is probably the one we find in the myth, attributed to Prodicus, of 
Heracles at the crossroads. According to Xenophon, Prodicus represented the young Heracles 
sitting and pondering about what road to take in life. Then two women (called Καηία and 
Ἀνεηή) appear and each praises a different road. The first praises a road of pleasure and ease, 
while the other praises a road of toil and effort, which will render him excellent and admired. 
The second woman also criticizes the road proposed by the first. She says that such a road 
would produce no happiness, and then she presents a different interpretation of what such a 
road would correspond to.
2139
 
 The contrast between ηαηία and ἀνεηή is indeed common in the texts and it may 
assume many shapes (some of which we considered before). For instance, it may be 
presented as a contrast between laziness and painstaking, between excesses and quiet 
(἟ζοπία), or between ὕανζξ and justice.
2140
 These and other pairs of opposites have some 
relation between them and they seem to correspond to a fundamental choice between two 
radically different ways of being. Also relevant here is the fact that these contrasts are 
generally established in exhortative passages, which try to convince someone to choose the 
virtuous path.  
                                                 
2135
 See in particular vv. 10-19. 
2136
 For more on the image of the ηνίμδμξ, see e.g. Laws 799c-d, and S. HALLIWELL, Where Three Roads 
Meet. A Neglected Detail in the Oedipus Tyrannus, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 106 (1986), 187-190. 
2137
 See Opera et erga, 287-292. 
2138
 See Elegiae, 903-932. 
2139
 See XENOPHON, Memorabilia, II.1.21-34. 
2140
 See e.g. EURIPIDES, Electra, 77-81, Bacchae, 386-401, AESCHYLUS, Eumenides, 517ff. 
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 But we also find other possibilities and other contrasts in pre-Platonic texts. Euripides, 
in the lost play Antiope, established an important contrast between Zethos and Amphion. 
Amphion is a musician and leads a life of ease. Zethos, in turn, censures him and defends a 
life of action and honor.
2141
 Later, this will be interpreted as a conflict between a 
contemplative and a practical life, as can be seen in Plato‟s Gorgias.
2142
 
Another interesting possibility in Euripides‟ plays is represented by Ion, who lives at 
the temple of Delphi and leads a religious life.
2143
 Religion could indeed have serious 
consequences in one‟s life, as was clearly seen in Orphic religion, which involved practices 
of purification and religious experiences that affected one‟s whole life.
2144
 The practices of 
purification played a likewise important role in the Pythagorean rule of life (which is also 
connected with the development of the idea of a contemplative life, as we will see).    
These are thus new forms of αίμξ that go beyond the identification of different 
livelihoods and also the traditional contrast between a life of ease and a life of effort and 
excellence. They are connected with the development of new forms of knowledge (or the new 
ζμθία we considered above), which brought about other ways of life.
2145
 Medicine, for 
instance, defined a particular δίαζηα, which included new behaviors, practices and concerns. 
Sophistry, likewise, deeply influenced the behavior, the values and the life of πόθεζξ at large. 
Knowledge in particular came to be more valued and one tried to guide one‟s life by it (which 
is a prefiguration of the idea of ηέπκδ ημῦ αίμο). In this context we also find the development 
of the idea of a life dedicated to knowledge, which we will consider in more detail in the 
following chapter. In many cases, the knowledge in question was mostly practical. 
Xenophanes, for instance, contrasts his wisdom with the honors of athletes, and this has 
strong ethical and political implications.
2146
 But we also find two figures directly associated 
with the acquisition of knowledge or with contemplation. One of them is the traveler that 
pursues knowledge by seeing different lands. Ulysses is a precursor of this model, and later 
Solon is presented by Herodotus as someone who travelled precisely for the sake of 
knowledge.
2147
 Another important figure in this context is the stargazer (ιεηεςνμζηόπμξ), 
                                                 
2141
 See EURIPIDES, frs. 179-227 (Nauck). 
2142
 See 485e ff. 
2143
 See Ion, 53-56, 82ff.,  
2144
 Plato himself refers to “ὀνθζημὶ αίμζ” in Lg. 782c. For more on Orphism and its effects on one‟s life, see 
Chap. 10, Sect. 1.2. 
2145
 See Chap. 1, Sect. 2.2. 
2146
 See DK B2. 
2147
 See Odyssey I.1-5, and Historiae, 1.30. For more on this passage, cp. also Chap. 14, Sect. 1. 
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who was someone purely consecrated to the contemplation of the cosmos and unconcerned 
with practical and political questions.
2148
  
These different figures will be merged by Plato in order to characterize the 
philosopher as such and define a new lifestyle. It is not clear, however, to what extent this 
was already conceived as a particular way of life, different from others, before Socrates and 
Plato. Later sources say that Pythagoras distinguished between a life dedicated to the 
acquisition of money and to luxuriousness, a life dedicated to the acquisition of honor and a 
life dedicated to contemplation.
2149
 It is, however, difficult to determine whether this 
testimonial has a true basis or is an anachronistic projection from a later phase. But for now 
we will leave aside this question.
2150
 Whether Pythagoras expressly distinguished these ways 
of life or not, it is clear that pre-Platonic authors were aware that there are fundamental 
alternatives in life from which we can choose 
 What is not so clear, though, is the way these choices are conceived and the kind of 
freedom that they might imply. In many cases the choices may be conceived as being 
determined by one‟s nature, by society, by destiny or even by the gods. But in other cases 
there seems to be some room to choose and to implement a certain life style.
2151
 This is 
indeed presupposed in any exhortation. Authors often try to influence the choices of others. 
They present new options and try to convince people of their desirability. This becomes 
particularly important with the development of new ηέπκαζ and their need to gain social 
validity. Thus, different thinkers developed elaborate protreptic strategies, which are actually 




 However, these authors are normally not interested in the question of how the choice 
of life as such is to be conceived and whether or not we are free to choose a αίμξ. For the 
most part, they are only concerned with the practical efficiency of their exhortations. But the 
                                                 
2148
 For this idea, cp. e.g. EURIPIDES, fr. 910 (Nauck): ““ὄθαζμξ ὅζηζξ η῅ξ ἱζημνίαξ/ ἔζπε ιάεδζζκ,/ ιήηε 
πμθζη῵κ ἐπὶ πδιμζύκδκ/ ιήη‟ εἰξ ἀδίημοξ πνάλεζξ ὁνι῵κ,/ ἀθθ‟ ἀεακάημο ηαεμν῵κ θύζεςξ/ ηόζιμκ ἀβήνςκ, 
πῆ ηε ζοκέζηδ/ ηαὶ ὅπῃ ηαὶ ὅπςξ./ ημ῔ξ δὲ ημζμύημζξ μ὎δέπμη‟ αἰζπν῵κ/ ἔνβςκ ιεθέδδια πνμζίγεζ.” See also H. 
KOLLER, Jenseitsreise des Philosophen, Asiatischen Studien 27 (1973), 35-57. 
2149
 Cp. CICERO, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.3, in: M. POHLENZ (ed.), M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta qvae 
mansuervnt omnia, Fasc. 44, Leipzig, Teubner, 1918, and L. DEUBNER & U. KLEIN (eds.), Iamblichi de vita 






 For more on this distinction attributed to Pythagoras, cp. Chap. 14, Sect. 1 below. 
2151
 For instance, in Nemea 7.54-55, Pindar speaks of αίμζ as something that is allotted to us (“αζμηὰκ 
θάπμκηεξ”), whereas Euripides, as we saw above, expressly speaks of a choice of αίμξ. For more on this 
question, see in particular N. TERZAGHI, op. cit. 
2152
 For more on this, see e.g. K. GAISER, Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon. Untersuchungen zur Form des 
platonischen Dialogs, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1959, 33-106. 
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fact that they consider these alternatives raises several questions. For instance, what exactly 
characterizes a particular αίμξ as such? Which kinds of αίμξ are there or can there be? And 
which one is the best? In fact, what criterion can we use to determine their quality? And are 
we entirely free to choose a life, or is our “choice” always somehow predetermined? These 
are very important questions, and we must now consider how they are treated in the Platonic 
corpus. 
 
6.2. The constitution of a βίνο within the framework of the soul’s partition 
 
 Plato describes in detail how a αίμξ is constituted. Some aspects of these description 
were already considered in the previous chapter. We saw that a αίμξ involves a certain 
identification of the superlative good and also of the path we must follow in order to attain 
the good. This path may imply many subordinate tasks and intermediate goals, and it is 
always redefining itself according to the circumstances. It is also what determines the role 
each being plays in our life. We called all this intertwinement of tasks, goals and instruments 
the practical system of life, and saw that it is based on a system of views that defines all the 
components mentioned. We hold views about the superlative good, about how we are to 
follow it, and also about the role everything plays in our life. These views may in turn be 
connected with many other non-practical views, which help us define our circumstances or 
the meaning of important general notions that affect how we see all particular things. In fact, 
a αίμξ implies a general way of seeing things. Thus, we can clearly see that life is a totality 
that integrates all our acts, all our behavior, and even all our views. We can also see that this 
totality is primarily determined by inner factors. It is our desire of the superlative good, the 
way we pursue it and the way we see things that define how we live. All other factors are 
subordinated to these.  
 This is the description made in the previous chapter. But now we have to reconsider it 
in light of the soul‟s tripartition. We saw that the soul is pervaded by the love of gain, the 
love of honor and the love of knowledge. These drives always combine with each other in a 
particular way. They have a relation of forces, which constitutes an inner arrangement or an 
inner πμθζηεία. This precedes and enables every action we perform and every moment of our 
life. Moreover, we saw that the drives contaminate each other. In particular, the two         
non-philosophical drives directly affect our rational drive and vice-versa. This means that our 
inner πμθζηεία determines how we see things – at least with respect to particular actions. 
630 
 
However, our life is much more than a sequence of actions. It is a unitary or systematic 
pursuit of the superlative good.  
According to Plato this whole pursuit is also determined by the drives we have been 
discussing and by their arrangement (i.e., by the inner polity of the soul). This is what we 
must now consider in some detail. Let us then start with the superlative good. We need to 
determine it in some way, in order to guide ourselves in life, and the three drives help us do 
it. It is true that they all tend toward different goods, and if they are in conflict, we cannot 
determine exactly what the good we pursue is. But one of the drives tends to subjugate the 
others, and this is then what gives us a direction in life. The relation of forces between the 
drives determines what we primarily desire in life (i.e., it determines our view about the 
superlative good) and it also determines how the other drives influence this desire (or this 
view of the good). It may happen that one of the drives strongly dominates the others and as a 
result we will single-mindedly pursue what it desires and we will pursue it in a pure state. If, 
however, the relation between them is more balanced, then the soul will be more divided and 
it will have a more mixed goal in life. There are many possible inner configurations, but in 
each case a particular view of the superlative good is outlined, and the role of each drive in 
life is defined.  
 The essential role of the inner πμθζηεία can also be noticed in the unfolding of the 
practical system of life. As was said, the greatest good we pursue (be it pleasure, honor, 
knowledge, or some mixture thereof) is not immediately available. We must pursue it, and 
this implies outlining a program. We determine the best means to achieve it, establish 
intermediary goals, determine many subordinate and coordinate actions, and define the role 
things may play in our pursuit of the good.
2153
 All this depends on our view of the superlative 
good, and to that extent, it also depends on the inner πμθζηεία of the soul. All our goals and 
all our actions are determined by the inner balance of the soul‟s drives, and the same holds 
for our relation to each object. The whole practical system emanates from the soul‟s πμθζηεία. 
The drive that holds the throne of the soul (however restricted and transformed by the 
subordinate drives) determines one‟s whole life. We will have very different systems, 
according to the soul‟s inner arrangement. They all have the same general structure, but this 
structure can vary significantly according to what is seen as the superlative good and the 
plans the soul outlines to reach it. 
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 This is so even if all we want in life is instant gratification. Cp. e.g. Grg. 491e f., where a life with such a 
goal is also described as a general project. 
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 It is especially important to note that the soul‟s inner πμθζηεία does not only determine 
life‟s practical system, but also the views that underpin it. We saw that any αίμξ implies a 
complex system of views. It requires us to define all practical moments, and this definition in 
turn presupposes other views, and even views about general predicates (both practical and 
non-practical). All these views are intimately connected with our love of knowledge (i.e., 
with that part of us that is interested in determining what things are). But we saw that the 
other drives are also “contaminated” by the philosophical drive and thus assume a 
philosophical form. This means that each drive forms its own views and when it rules the 
soul it tells us what to think and what to say, as it were.
2154
 In turn, the philosophical drive 
may also be contaminated by the other drives, and as a result it will pay less attention to what 
things are and it will more easily accept defective views (such as the ones dictated by the 
other drives). As we will see in Part IV, this is precisely what characterizes the unexamined 
life. Our way of seeing things may be hazy and it may even be full of cognitive defects in 
virtue of the interaction of the soul‟s constitute drives. But this interaction may also make us 
more demanding in cognitive terms and thus lead to a better understanding of our life and 
things in general. Our cognitive state may vary greatly and this is essential to determine our 
αίμξ. In Phaedrus, this is even the primary criterion for the differentiation of αίμζ. We may be 
more or less forgetful of the true beings (whose understanding affect our views of everything 
else) and this determines the kind of αίμξ we lead.
2155
  
 Our αίμξ is thus essentially determined by the soul‟s inborn drives, their particular 
arrangement, and the way this arrangement shapes our views and our pursuit of the good. In 
other words, the soul‟s πμθζηεία is the primary principle from which everything else derives. 
In this sense, the soul‟s πμθζηεία is just like the political regime of a particular πόθζξ. All the 
laws, institutions, customs and culture of the latter derive from the kind of rule that is 
established in it. This can be more clearly seen when there is a change of πμθζηεία – both in 
the πόθζξ or in the soul. A new governing body brings about a new representation of the good 
that determines all subordinate goods and the role everything plays in the pursuit of the good. 
                                                 
2154
 In this sense, our relation to our drives corresponds to the relation we may have to a beloved person, at least 
according to Socrates‟ description of the latter in Gorgias 481d-482a. Socrates says to Callicles that: 
“αἰζεάκμιαζ μὖκ ζμο ἑηάζημηε, ηαίπεν ὄκημξ δεζκμῦ, ὅηζ ἂκ θῆ ζμο ηὰ παζδζηὰ ηαὶ ὅπςξ ἂκ θῆ ἔπεζκ, μ὎ 
δοκαιέκμο ἀκηζθέβεζκ, ἀθθ᾽ ἄκς ηαὶ ηάης ιεηαααθθμιέκμο (...) ημ῔ξ βὰν η῵κ παζδζη῵κ αμοθεύιαζίκ ηε ηαὶ 
θόβμζξ μ὎π μἷόξ η᾽ εἶ ἐκακηζμῦζεαζ, ὥζηε, εἴ ηίξ ζμο θέβμκημξ ἑηάζημηε ἃ δζὰ ημύημοξ θέβεζξ εαοιάγμζ ὡξ ἄημπά 
ἐζηζκ, ἴζςξ εἴπμζξ ἂκ α὎ηῶ, εἰ αμύθμζμ ηἀθδε῅ θέβεζκ, ὅηζ εἰ ιή ηζξ παύζεζ ηὰ ζὰ παζδζηὰ ημύηςκ η῵κ θόβςκ, 
μ὎δὲ ζὺ παύζῃ πμηὲ ηαῦηα θέβςκ.” 
2155
 See 248c ff. 
632 
 
All views change and words may even acquire new meanings, as we saw.
2156
 The whole 
practical and cognitive system change. Life as a whole changes, as does reality as we know it. 
The difference between αίμζ is indeed a global difference. However, despite such a 
radical difference, these αίμζ are still based on the same inner constitution and on the same set 
of principles. This is a central aspect of the conception we find in the corpus – and especially 
in the Republic. Despite all possible differences between lives, they are all based on the same 
desire for a superlative good and the same inborn drives. The arrangement of the latter is 
what lies at the heart of each αίμξ, and all other features to which we usually pay more 
attention (such as the content of a particular life and its outcome) are secondary. They are all 
based on the soul‟s inner πμθζηεία.  
  
6.3. The multiple βίνη identified by Plato and the problem of their respective 
value 
 
Plato not only describes the constitution of any αίμξ, but he also identifies many 
different possibilities throughout the texts. Sometimes he mentions particular αίμζ, other 
times he contrasts two decisive αίμζ, and he also makes full inventories or typologies of the 
main kinds of αίμξ. In addition, Plato portrays the characters in such a way that they not only 
discuss different possible αίμζ, but also embody particular αίμζ and put forward the sort of 
views and arguments that such αίμζ would defend. Plato‟s discussion of αίμζ is thus very 
complex, and in many cases it is not directly connected with the partition of the soul. We will 
now briefly consider all this diversity, but we will pay closer attention to how this is 
presented in Republic. 
If we consider the uses of αίμξ throughout the corpus, we notice that there are many 
generic uses of the word and also that the word is sometimes associated to metaphors similar 
to those we identified in pre-Platonic thinking.
2157
 In many cases, however, these uses of the 
word are accompanied by some further characterization that we will not consider here. We 
will rather focus on the passages where a certain αίμξ is presented and defined in its main 
traits.  
A very important passage can be found in Republic X (617d ff.). Socrates tells the 
story of Er, who in his fictive journey through the afterlife witnessed how the souls choose 
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 Cp. footnote 1909. 
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 Cp. e.g. Euthphr. 16a, Ap. 31a, 33a, 37d, Cri. 43d, Phd. 85b, 85d. 
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their lives before birth. Lachesis puts forward many models of life, which are conceived not 
as general possibilities or kinds of life, but rather as individual lives. These models include 
lives of animals and of human beings, and many aspects of these lives (such as duration, 
birth, material conditions, talents, excellences, social or political role, and even some main 
events) are already defined. What is not defined is the inner arrangement of the soul that will 
characterize such lives.
2158
 In this sense, this description of lives is superficial. It focuses on 
the many details or the many contents that compose an individual life, but it leaves open how 
one will relate to its contents, which will depend on the soul itself.  
In other passages, Plato rather focuses on the essential features of a life or on its inner 
conditions, which may then be shared by many individuals. In some cases, he describes a 
particular kind of life by comparing it to something or someone, in order to emphasize a 
particular trait of such a life.
2159
 This is normally integrated in a broader contrast between 
fundamental alternatives. In Philebus, Socrates and Protarchus distinguish a life of pleasure 
from a life of knowledge. They first consider each one in absolute isolation, and then they try 
to determine a mixed life.
2160
 In Gorgias, the conflict is rather between a life that pursues 
power, honor and ultimately pleasure, and a philosophical life, which pursues knowledge and 
justice.
2161
 This contrast has some affinity with the contrast between a political and a 
philosophical life that we find at the end of Euthydemus (where a mixed life is also 
considered) or in Theaetetus.
2162
 The last text is particularly relevant, since Plato describes in 
it the features of a life dedicated to political contests and contrasts it with an apolitical life, 
concerned only with the contemplation of the whole.  
All these passages and the contrasts they present are very important, but they do not 
aim at being exhaustive. There can be other kinds of life than the ones that are being 
considered in each case. But we also find passages in the corpus that try to organize the 
diversity of lives and even outline something like a scale or hierarchy of lives according to 
their goodness or badness. In general, these passages are integrated in an eschatological 
context, where lives are judged according to their merits, and the judgment determines the 
next incarnation (which may also correspond to the life of an animal). In Timaeus, Plato 
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 See 618b: “ροπ῅ξ δὲ ηάλζκ μ὎η ἐκε῔καζ δζὰ ηὸ ἀκαβηαίςξ ἔπεζκ ἄθθμκ ἑθμιέκδκ αίμκ ἀθθμίακ βίβκεζεαζ.” 
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 In Gorgias, for instance, we find such expressions as the life of stone or the life of a dead man to describe a 
life that avoids pleasure, and a life dedicated to the pursuit of pleasure is compared to the life of a bird called 
παναδνζόξ, or the life of a robber (see 494b and 507e). In Philebus, Socrates compares a life without knowledge 
to the life of sea creatures (see 21c). 
2160
 See in particular 20b ff. 
2161
 See 484c ff. 
2162
 See 305b ff. and 172c-177b, respectively. 
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presents a very simple version of this.
2163
 In Phaedrus, Socrates briefly distinguishes between 
livelihoods and the kind of insight into the truth that they imply.
2164
 In Phaedo, Plato 
distinguishes many different possibilities according to the kind of relation between the 




 The most developed and detailed typology, however, is the one in books VIII and IX 
of the Republic. Here Plato distinguishes and characterizes in great detail five kinds of αίμξ 
(or, as he also says, five kinds of human being or five characters), which are correlated to five 
kinds of outer πμθζηεία. The whole description is based on the tripartition and on the relation 
between the soul‟s inborn drives. There is indeed a parallel between the soul‟s drives and the 
different lives, insofar as each life is dominated by a certain kind of drive. Plato thus 
describes a philosophical life, which is only concerned with acquiring truth and living 
according to it, and he also describes a honor-loving life, which is concerned with contests, 
reputation and the semblance of ἀνεηή.
2166
 The parallel only breaks down when we come to 
the rule of the third drive. This rule may constitute three different αίμζ, which are associated 
with the three kinds of pleasures we considered above: namely, the necessary pleasures, the 
non-necessary pleasures and the lawless pleasures.
2167
 Thus, Socrates distinguishes a money-
loving life, a life of anarchical pursuit of pleasure and a life of pursuit of the most extreme 
pleasures.
2168
 This distinction is very meaningful, because it shows how complex the love of 
gain is and how it can have very different relations with itself and the other parts of the soul. 
In particular, it can be more restrained or more unrestrained – which is probably connected 
with the greater or smaller strength the other two drives have in each of these lives.  
 The Republic thus provides us with a complex typology of αίμζ. It involves some 
simplification, since there can be many relations of force and thus many intermediate kinds of 
αίμξ. However, like in the case of political systems, these intermediate αίμζ would be more 
indistinct and thus more difficult to define.
2169
 According to Plato, these five kinds of αίμξ are 
the main ones. They have a clearer configuration, and for each αίμξ Plato describes the 
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 See Ti. 42b-c. 
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 See the already mentioned passage in Phdr. 248c ff. 
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 See Phd. 80e ff. 
2166
 The description of a philosophical life is scattered throughout books V-VII, whereas the description of an 
honor-loving life (or of a timocratic man) appears in 548d-550b. 
2167
 Cp. Sect. 3.1 above. 
2168
 See 553a-555a, 559d-562a and 571a-576b, respectively.  
2169
 Cp. Rep. 544c-d, where Socrates reduces all political regimes to five, because those are the only ones that 
present themselves “ἐκ εἴδεζ δζαθακε῔ ηζκζ.” 
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representation of the good, the values, the character, the kind of practices and the general 
outlook on life that characterizes it. He also describes how all these features derive from the 
soul‟s inner drives. We will not see their characterization here.
2170
 However, it is important to 
have in mind that for Plato our individuality always corresponds (even if only approximately) 
to one of these possibilities. Our life is never absolutely unique, but a variation of this system. 
In this sense, each particular kind of life described or illustrated in the corpus can be 
integrated in this framework and contributes to refining it. Indeed, despite the fact that we 
may find many differences between different lives, the main differences and the main 
possibilities are always prefigured in the soul‟s constitution. They may take place in very 
different circumstances, and thus seem very different, but their structure is always similar and 
in many cases they may correspond to the same pattern. 
 But this is not all. There is still one last distinction between αίμζ that is extremely 
important, and this distinction is precisely the main problem of this dissertation. In the 
Apology, when Socrates speaks of an unexamined life and opposes it to his own life, spent in 
philosophical examination, he reduces all possible lives to two different possibilities.
2171
 He 
merges all non-philosophical lives and presents them as being basically the same. To be sure, 
there may still be some differences between non-philosophical lives, including the degree of 
examination that they admit or carry out (some lives may indeed examine many things and 
still be unexamined). But Socrates opposes all these lives that do not examine enough to a life 
dedicated to philosophical examination, and in doing so he calls the attention to how decisive 
the philosophical drive is when it comes to defining our lives.  
 
6.4. The comparison of βίνη and Plato’s conception of the best βίνο 
 
 The fact that our ροπή may assume different inner configurations, which translate into 
different αίμζ, raises the question about their relative value. Is it indifferent which life we lead 
or are there some lives that are in themselves better than others? In the previous chapter, we 
saw that lives can be better or worse according to their proximity to or distance from the 
superlative good – i.e., they can be compared with respect to their degree of happiness or 
fulfillment. But can the value of a life also be determined on the basis of what drive rules the 
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 See 38a. 
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soul and how the drives are arranged? Can one‟s αίμξ and the underlying inner πμθζηεία 
determine our relation to the good? This is what we must now consider. 
 The texts often discuss how we should live and they defend that there is a way of life 
that is the best (ὁ ηνόπμξ ἄνζζημξ ημῦ αίμο).
2172
 This is intimately connected with our 
previous discussion about the greatest good, which in principle corresponds to what the best 
life desires. In contrast with such a life, the other have fundamental limitations and are seen 
as bad or defective (ηαηόξ). If one leads one of these lives, one will never be fully happy. In 
some cases, one will even be extremely miserable. Plato thus outlines a hierarchy of αίμζ. 
According to the Republic, the life of lawless pleasures is the worst life and the philosophical 
life is the best.
2173
 But what can the criteria for such a differentiation be? And what does the 
best life exactly consist in? The texts provide some indications which we will discuss in the 
following chapters, but there are some aspects we can anticipate here, in order to complement 
our analysis of Plato‟s concept of αίμξ. 
 First, it is easy to understand from the above discussions that for Plato the question of 
the best αίμξ does not primarily concern the particular contents of a life, but rather the inner 
disposition of the soul (i.e. the inner arrangement of the soul‟s drives). The best disposition of 
the soul will generate the best αίμξ. We must therefore determine which inner arrangement of 
the soul is the best and why. This implies determining which drive should rule the soul and 
how the other drives should be subordinated to it. In other words, we must define how the 
drives can be best combined and blended. But what are then the criteria to determine the 
quality of our inner πμθζηε῔αζ? 
 One possible criterion is the degree of order in the soul that results from each inner 
πμθζηεία. The different arrangements of the soul‟s drives can have different degrees of 
harmony, and therefore a particular arrangement may be more stable and immune (or almost 
immune) to inner conflicts (ζηάζεζξ), whereas others are more prone to conflicts. This seems 
to depend on how the drives affect each other, but also on which drive rules. According to 
Plato, the drives have intrinsic functions (ἔνβα) in the soul and one drive in particular – the 
philosophical drive – is better and naturally fit to rule, whereas the other two are not fit to 
rule and must obey. Thus, the drives may perform their role (ηὰ α὏η῵κ πνάηηεζκ – which is 
what justice consists in and what enables all other ἀνεηαί in the soul), or the inferior drives 
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 For such formulations of the question, cp. e.g. Grg. 492d (π῵ξ αζςηέμκ), 500c (ὅκηζκα πνὴ ηνόπμκ             
γ῅κ – which also appears in Rep. 352d), 500d (ὁπόηενμκ αζςηέμκ). For the notion of the best way of life, see 
Grg. 527e. 
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may usurp the functions of the superior drive and meddle in its business (which constitutes a 
form of πμθοπναβιμζύκδ and is identified as being what injustice in the soul consists in).
2174
 
In other words, if the best drive does not rule, the soul is in conflict with itself. The non-
philosophical πμθζηε῔αζ and the corresponding αίμζ are marked by a kind of constitutive 
ζηάζζξ, and this ζηάζζξ may easily bring about many particular conflicts between our drives 
and the views that correspond to them. 
 All this is essentially linked with the importance of knowledge in life. We need 
knowledge to pursue the superlative good and guide ourselves in life, but the rulers of 
different lives (as well as the αίμζ they constitute) bring about very different cognitive     
states – and they may lead us to pursue the wrong thing, or they may fail to guide us properly 
in this pursuit. Thus, Plato defends that the best life is the life ruled by the desire of 
knowledge. The philosophical way of life is maximally concerned with knowledge and this 
concern guides everything in this life. The other drives are subordinated to this desire, and 
according to Socrates they can be perfectly integrated in a philosophical life. To be sure, this 
integration is not instantaneous. The other drives must be weakened and sublimated (i.e., 
rendered more philosophical) and this requires much training. Likewise, we cannot 
immediately attain the good a philosophical drive strives for, even if we are ruled by it. We 
must insist and at the same time try to strengthen the philosophical drive, in order to be better 
able to attain the truth. All efforts must indeed be directed at this twofold goal of developing 
the philosophical drive and transforming the other drives.   
But this is still a very vague description. It does not specify what exactly the 
superlative good in question is (we only know that it is associated with knowledge), what is 
to be done, and how things are to be integrated in the general pursuit of knowledge. It is also 
not clear how exactly we can control the other drives and develop the love of knowledge. We 
will consider these and other related questions in more detail below.
2175
 But for now we have 
already caught a glimpse of the basic structure of the best life (i.e., of the life that is best able 
to fulfill our nature and our intrinsic possibilities). This is not by itself a perfectly happy life, 
since it does not immediately attain its goal, but it is structurally better than the others.  
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 See Rep. 443c-444e – especially 444d: “μ὎ημῦκ αὖ, ἔθδκ, ηὸ δζηαζμζύκδκ ἐιπμζε῔κ ηὰ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ ηαηὰ 
θύζζκ ηαεζζηάκαζ ηναηε῔κ ηε ηαὶ ηναηε῔ζεαζ ὏π᾽ ἀθθήθςκ, ηὸ δὲ ἀδζηίακ πανὰ θύζζκ ἄνπεζκ ηε ηαὶ ἄνπεζεαζ 
ἄθθμ ὏π᾽ ἄθθμο;     ημιζδῆ, ἔθδ.” Cp. also Phd. 79e-80a: “ὅνα δὴ ηαὶ ηῆδε ὅηζ ἐπεζδὰκ ἐκ ηῶ α὎ηῶ ὦζζ ροπὴ ηαὶ 
ζ῵ια, ηῶ ιὲκ δμοθεύεζκ ηαὶ ἄνπεζεαζ ἟ θύζζξ πνμζηάηηεζ, ηῆ δὲ ἄνπεζκ ηαὶ δεζπόγεζκ· ηαὶ ηαηὰ ηαῦηα αὖ 
πόηενόκ ζμζ δμηε῔ ὅιμζμκ ηῶ εείῳ εἶκαζ ηαὶ πόηενμκ ηῶ εκδηῶ; ἠ μ὎ δμηε῔ ζμζ ηὸ ιὲκ εε῔μκ μἷμκ ἄνπεζκ ηε ηαὶ 
἟βειμκεύεζκ πεθοηέκαζ, ηὸ δὲ εκδηὸκ ἄνπεζεαί ηε ηαὶ δμοθεύεζκ;     ἔιμζβε.     πμηένῳ μὖκ ἟ ροπὴ ἔμζηεκ;     
δ῅θα δή, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ὅηζ ἟ ιὲκ ροπὴ ηῶ εείῳ, ηὸ δὲ ζ῵ια ηῶ εκδηῶ.” 
2175
 See in particular Chap. 14, Sect. 5, and Chap. 17, Sect. 5. 
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But what does all this say about the other lives? Are they intrinsically defective? And 
what does that mean? Does it mean that they are undesirable or miserable lives? And how is 
this undesirability or misery experienced? This is what we will have to discuss in Part V. We 
will try to determine the value of the unexamined life, which is a designation that 
encompasses all non-philosophical forms of life. 
 
6.5. The problem of the “choice” of βίνο 
 
 One last question we must briefly discuss concerns the choice of life. We saw above 
how there are several passages in pre-Platonic literature that discuss two or more possible 
lives and often try to exhort us to choose one and reject the other(s). These passages, 
however, do not discuss in detail how this choice works and how free we are to choose a life 
different from the one we have. How does Plato then conceive of this choice in the 
framework of the tripartition? 
 The situation in which one is faced with different alternatives and chooses between 
them seems to imply that one is completely free to choose. One may perhaps be more 
inclined to one alternative, but one will ponder and see the advantages and disadvantages of 
each αίμξ. But are we ever in such a situation? Can we really talk of choice in this sense? If 
we look at the Platonic corpus, we find several meaningful passages. Plato describes a pre-
natal choice of lives in Republic X and he also speaks of a choice of life in the Phaedrus.
2176
 
The latter may well be conceived as a choice we make during life, which will determine our 
next incarnation (and in this sense it is not very different from what we also find in the above 
mentioned passages of Phaedo and Timaeus). In all these cases, one‟s choice is in a way pre-
determined by one‟s present state. This is particularly clear in the passage of the Republic, 
where Plato describes how for the most part each soul appraises and chooses its new life 
according to its character or past life.
2177
 In the framework of the tripartition, this means that 
each choice we make in life is intrinsically determined by one‟s inner πμθζηεία. We find 
ourselves in a particular αίμξ that results from our inner πμθζηεία and which we did not 
choose based on a comparison of possibilities. If we do compare different αίμζ, we tend to 
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 Cp. Rep. 617d ff., and Phdr. 249b. 
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 See in particular 620a: “ηαηὰ ζοκήεεζακ βὰν ημῦ πνμηένμο αίμο ηὰ πμθθὰ αἱνε῔ζεαζ.” The whole description 
between 619b-620d illustrates precisely this. 
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appraise them according to our inner πμθζηεία. As Socrates says in an earlier passage of the 
Republic, each human being thinks that their life is the best.
2178
 
 The question then is whether our inner arrangement of drives is somehow under our 
control. Can we choose to adopt a different inner πμθζηεία? Can we at least affect the inner 
balance of the soul‟s drives? How do we relate to it? And what determines the relation of 
forces between the drives? Does it somehow depend on us? Does it depend on the drives 
themselves (on one of them or all of them)? Or does it depend on something external to the 
soul? This is a very important question, since it concerns our responsibility for our life. If our 
every action is determined by our αίμξ and the inner πμθζηεία that underpins it, then how 
responsible are we for this inner πμθζηεία? Did we somehow choose it? Can we change it? 
And if we try to change it, can we preserve our choice, or are we liable to lose control (i.e., to 
be ἀηναηήξ) and fail to implement our choice? 
 Normally we lead an unexamined life, but it is not clear exactly what responsibility 
we hold for it, nor whether we have any leeway to leave the unexamined life. These are 
actually decisive questions for our problem, given the fact that Socrates‟ assertion about the 
unexamined life is also an exhortation to abandon it. We will thus return to this question in 
Chapter 17. We will see that it is very difficult to use the language of choice in this context, 
since a choice usually implies a free deliberation and decision, and normally we simply find 
ourselves in a particular life or find ourselves having already adopted it. In some cases, we 
may perhaps examine the question about which life is the best, but this already implies a 
certain development of the philosophical drive. As we will see, this is in fact the decisive 
factor in the adoption of a life: the state of our philosophical drive. However, it is not 
something to which we relate as if it were something external to us and about which we can 
make decisions. We are always already determined by the strength of our philosophical drive. 
But let us leave aside this question for now. We must first define in more detail the meaning 
of θζθμζμθία in Plato and we must also see the constitution of the αίμξ we usually find 
ourselves in. Then we will be better able to understand what determines our adoption of a 
particular αίμξ.  
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 See Rep. 581c-e: “μἶζε᾽ μὖκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ὅηζ εἰ „εέθμζξ ηνε῔ξ ημζμύημοξ ἀκενώπμοξ ἐκ ιένεζ ἕηαζημκ 
ἀκενςη᾵κ ηίξ ημύηςκ η῵κ αίςκ ἣδζζημξ, ηὸκ ἑαοημῦ ἕηαζημξ ιάθζζηα ἐβηςιζάζεηαζ; ὅ ηε πνδιαηζζηζηὸξ πνὸξ ηὸ 
ηενδαίκεζκ ηὴκ ημῦ ηζι᾵ζεαζ ἟δμκὴκ ἠ ηὴκ ημῦ ιακεάκεζκ μ὎δεκὸξ ἀλίακ θήζεζ εἶκαζ, εἰ ιὴ εἴ ηζ α὎η῵κ ἀνβύνζμκ 
πμζε῔;     ἀθδε῅, ἔθδ.     ηί δὲ ὁ θζθόηζιμξ; ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ· μ὎ ηὴκ ιὲκ ἀπὸ η῵κ πνδιάηςκ ἟δμκὴκ θμνηζηήκ ηζκα 
἟βε῔ηαζ, ηαὶ αὖ ηὴκ ἀπὸ ημῦ ιακεάκεζκ, ὅηζ ιὴ ιάεδια ηζιὴκ θένεζ, ηαπκὸκ ηαὶ θθοανίακ;     μὕηςξ, ἔθδ, ἔπεζ.     
ηὸκ δὲ θζθόζμθμκ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ηί μἰώιεεα ηὰξ ἄθθαξ ἟δμκὰξ κμιίγεζκ πνὸξ ηὴκ ημῦ εἰδέκαζ ηἀθδεὲξ ὅπῃ ἔπεζ ηαὶ 
ἐκ ημζμύηῳ ηζκὶ ἀεὶ εἶκαζ ιακεάκμκηα; η῅ξ ἟δμκ῅ξ μ὎ πάκο πόννς; ηαὶ ηαθε῔κ ηῶ ὄκηζ ἀκαβηαίαξ, ὡξ μ὎δὲκ η῵κ 









“Πάκηεξ ἄκενςπμζ ημῦ εἰδέκαζ ὀνέβμκηαζ θύζεζ.” 
Aristotle, Metaphysica, 980a21 
 
 
 Before making an assessment of this Part III and proceeding to the discussion of the 
unexamined life as such, there is one last question that we should consider and that allows us 
to connect the analysis of the soul‟s constitutive drives with what we saw in Part II about 
philosophical examination. The question we must now explore concerns the complexity of 
the term θζθμζμθία in the Platonic corpus. We saw in the previous chapter that θζθμζμθία 
designates an inborn or constitutive drive of the soul – namely, the soul‟s love of knowledge. 
We also saw that this drive pervades the other drives and our entire being. Indeed, any way of 
life depends on it (insofar as it always implies a system of views, which try to define how 
things are). However, we had also considered in Chapter 4 that the term θζθμζμθία is one of 
the designations for philosophical examination, which is a particular activity or practice to 
which human beings may dedicate themselves at some points, but is far from being a 
constitutive component of our being.
2179
 This other θζθμζμθία is something supervenient, 
sporadic and rare. Furthermore, the term θζθμζμθία is also associated with something that 
was just mentioned and that is even rarer: namely, a philosophical way of life. We must 
therefore determine the relation between these different senses of the term θζθμζμθία, and 
any other senses the word may have throughout the corpus. In particular, we must determine 
why our permanent love of knowledge normally does not translate into the practice of 
philosophical examination and much less into a philosophical way of life. This is indeed an 
important question and it will let us better prepare what follows. 
 This analysis of the different senses of the term θζθμζμθία is likewise important 
because of our familiarity with the word “philosophy”, which is still today an ambiguous 
word. Indeed, we may associate it with a certain activity, a method, a field of studies, a 
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doctrine or set of doctrines, and also with a certain attitude or even a way of life. However, 
this familiarity with the word and its complexity may also affect the way we understand 
Plato‟s use of the term θζθμζμθία. Above all, we may lose sight of the fact that for Plato the 
word primarily denotes something that has a passionate or desiderative character. We may 
also find it strange that Plato identifies such a passion or desire with something more than a 
supervenient activity. For Plato, θζθμζμθία lies at the heart of our ροπή. This deep-seated 
desire for knowledge is the essential manifestation of θζθμζμθία and all others are just 
variations of it.  
We must consider what all this means. However, before doing so, it is useful to 
briefly consider the history of the term and the cultural contexts it was associated with. This 
will give us a more solid basis for considering the different ways in which Plato uses the 
word. 
 
1. The pre-Platonic history of “θηινζνθεῖλ”, “θηιόζνθνο” and “θηινζνθία” 
 
 The word θζθμζμθία and its older cognates θζθμζμθε῔κ and θζθόζμθoξ were not 
coined by Plato. They appear a few times in pre-Platonic authors. However, the first attested 
uses of these words are somewhat vague and raise several questions that have been amply 
discussed in secondary literature.
2180
 We will not go into great detail here, but it is important 
to consider some of the main aspects of these first uses. 
 First of all, it is important to bear in mind that the words θζθμζμθε῔κ, θζθόζμθμξ and 
θζθμζμθία seem to admit a more general sense, insofar as they can be associated with 
                                                 
2180
 See e.g. O. MICHEL, θζθμζμθία, θζθόζμθμξ, in: TWNT, sub voce; A.-H. CHROUST, Philosophy, its 
Essence and Meaning in the Ancient World, The Philosophical Review 56 (1947), 19-58; W. JAEGER, Die 
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Présocratiques au IV
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Platon ou Pythagore? Héraclide Pontique, fr. 87-88 Wehrli, Latomus 114 (1970), 137-142; A. NIGHTINGALE, 
Genres in Dialogue. Plato and the Construction of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, 
14ff.; T. EBERT, Why Is Evenus Called a Philosopher at Phaedo 61c?, The Classical Quarterly 51 (2001),  
423-434; A. NIGHTINGALE, On Wandering and Wondering. Theôria in Greek Philosophy and Culture, Arion 
9 (2001), 23-58, C. MOORE, When “Philosopher” was a Bad Name. The Origins of Philosophos, 
http://www.personal.psu.edu/crm21/philosophos.htm, March 2011 (last consulted July 2017); B. SCHUR, “Von 
hier nach dort.” Der Philosophiebegriff bei Platon, Göttingen, V&R, 2013, 27-41. 
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different contexts and cultural practices that are only broadly related to one another. But we 
also find a more circumscribed sense that associates the term with a specific practice and a 
specific class of people. In addition, the broader and stricter meanings of the word can then 
be used as a self-description by those that practice or admire the practice of θζθμζμθία (and 
thus try to promote it), but it can also be used by those that criticize it and therefore use the 
term as a reproach.  
 The word does not seem to have been used by the first thinkers (i.e., those that are 
normally acknowledged as the first philosophers of our tradition). Their activity is rather 
associated with the broader context of ζμθία – and it is actually in this context that the term 
θζθμζμθία is developed, as is clear from its composition. Now, we saw earlier that the term 
ζμθόξ originally denoted an expert that had an exceptional insight in a certain domain of 
things, and this allowed him to intervene in this domain. ΢μθία was thus an equivalent of 
ηέπκδ. However, there are many ηέπκαζ, and ζμθία designates above all an extraordinary or 
superlative knowledge. In this sense, it may designate either the accumulation of ηέπκαζ or the 
most important ηέπκδ, which concerns the most important things – namely, how we are to 
live and how is the πόθζξ to be governed. The knowledge of these most important matters was 
originally the prerogative of certain classes, but then new forms of knowledge developed 
(such as medicine, history, sophistry, and so on) and they had their own claim to superlative 
knowledge or ζμθία. The context associated with the term ζμθία is therefore a context of 
complexity and conflict, and it is in this context that the term θζθμζμθία emerged.
2181
 
 As was said, θζθμζμθία and its cognates often have a generic sense. They designate a 
particular devotion to culture and learning, or to a form of liberal education that allows one to 
acquire παζδεία and become a fully-fledged citizen. It seems to be in this sense that the word 
is used in Thucydides, for instance. Pericles says that the Athenians “philosophize” without 
mollification of the mind (θζθμζμθμῦιεκ ἄκεο ιαθαηίαξ).
2182
 In other words, their dedication 
to knowledge and learning does not render them incapable of acting and performing their 
duties (which seems to be already recognized as a risk and a possible accusation against 
θζθμζμθία).
2183
 Isocrates also uses the word in this broad sense, and especially as a 
designation of the kind of παζδεία he offers, which is particularly concerned with political 
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 Indeed, the word later came to designate what was learned – and thus particular 
forms of knowledge and even sciences in general, such as mathematics. 
 This dedication to knowledge in general may be object of another criticism. Heraclitus 
speaks of θζθόζμθμζ that know many things and in other fragments he criticizes πμθοιαεία as 
a form of erudition that misses the essential – namely, the wisdom that everything is one and 
that θόβμξ rules everything.
2185
 But the term θζθμζμθία, like ζμθία, may also be applied to a 
more fundamental or more important form of knowledge, which goes beyond the surface of 
things. It is in this sense that the term seems to be used in the Hippocratic corpus. There it 
designates a form of knowledge (which the author of the text opposes) that first considers 
general questions about what the human being is or what its nature is, and only then considers 
empirical questions of medicine.
2186
 Empedocles is given as an example of such a procedure, 
and this brings us to the context of the so-called θοζζμθόβμζ, who tried to understand the 
structure of reality in general. 
The idea of pursuing a form of knowledge that goes beyond what is more immediate 
and familiar is also present in another earlier use of θζθμζμθε῔κ. In Herodotus, the word is 
associated with travels of exploration and contemplation (εεςνία).
2187
 One would temporarily 
abandon one‟s community, wander about, without a particular destination, in order to know 
different places and acquire knowledge.
2188
 This is what Solon is said to have done. It is also 
what Herodotus did, and it illustrates an essential aspect of the term θζθμζμθία, which 
becomes even more manifest later. The term is indeed associated with the pursuit of a broad 
or deep knowledge, pursued only for the sake of knowledge. This idea plays an important 
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 See e.g. Panegyricus, 47; Areopagiticus, 45; Antidosis, 266ff.  
2185
 Cp. DK B35, 40, 129. 
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 See De Prisca Medicina, 20: “Λέβμοζζ δέ ηζκεξ ηαὶ ἰδηνμὶ ηαὶ ζμθζζηαί ὡξ μ὎η ἔκζ δοκαηὸκ ἰδηνζηὴκ εἰδέκαζ 
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ὅζα ηζκὶ εἴνδηαζ ζμθζζηῆ ἠ ἰδηνῶ, ἠ βέβναπηαζ πενὶ θύζζμξ, ἥζζμκ κμιίγς ηῆ ἰδηνζηῆ ηέπκῃ πνμζήηεζκ ἠ ηῆ 
βναθζηῆ. Νμιίγς δὲ πενὶ θύζζμξ βκ῵καί ηζ ζαθὲξ μ὎δαιόεεκ ἄθθμεεκ εἶκαζ ἠ ἐλ ἰδηνζη῅ξ.” 
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 For more on this word, cp. Chap. 4, Sect. 2.3. 
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 See Historiae, 1.30.2: “εεδζάιεκμκ δέ ιζκ ηὰ πάκηα ηαὶ ζηεράιεκμκ ὥξ μἱ ηαηὰ ηαζνὸκ ἤκ, εἴνεημ ὁ 
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 Cp. Chap. 13, Sect. 6.1 f), and see the bibliographical references in footnote 2149. See also DIOGENES 
LAERTIUS, Vitae philosophorum, I.12. For a discussion of whether the story is true (at least to a certain extent) 
or rather a later creation, influenced by Plato‟s and Aristotle‟s thought, see the works mentioned in footnote 
2180 above (of which several deal exclusively with this question). 
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This story attributes the invention of the term θζθμζμθία to Pythagoras. When 
inquired by the king Leon of Phlius about what kind of expert knowledge he had, he said he 
had none, but was rather a philosopher. Leon was surprised and inquired about the meaning 
of the term. Pythagoras explained that only a god could be truly wise, and he was only 
someone who was fond of knowledge (ζμθίακ ἀζπαγόιεκμξ, as is said in Diogenes Laertius, 
or sapientiae studiosus, as appears in Cicero). In order to explain this better, Pythagoras 
compared human life to the Games, which are frequented by very different people, with very 
different goals. Some go there to make money, others to gain honor and glory, and still others 
simply want to see the spectacle, and especially all the fine and excellent deeds. Likewise, 
some come to life only to make profit, others to gain power and fame, and others (which are 
the freest people) come to contemplate things – and in particular to contemplate nature and 
the heavens. The latter are the philosophers.
2190
 
 Though it is not clear whether or not Pythagoras coined the term and gave it this 
precise meaning, it is nevertheless highly likely that the word came to be associated with the 
Pythagoreans at an early date. The above mentioned fragment of Heraclitus that says that 
philosophers know many things may well be referring to the Pythagoreans; Socrates, in 
Plato‟s Phaedo, may also have this association in mind when he first inquires about whether 
or not Evenus is a philosopher.
2191
 If this is so, the word θζθμζμθία was connected not only 
with the concern with seeing and understanding the nature of things, but also with a particular 
rule of life and particular spiritual concerns (including the concern with the afterlife). 
 However, even if the term primarily designated some particular class, it had also a 
broader meaning, and most people were not concerned with refined distinctions between 
intellectuals. For them, all intellectuals were the same. We find an example of this confusion 
in Aristophanes‟ Clouds. Despite Socrates‟ peculiarity, he was still identified with the 
Sophists and with natural scientists, since for most people there were no clear boundaries 
between these different figures.
2192
 They all looked the same, insofar as they were all opposed 
to traditional forms of wisdom and suggested a new way of seeing and doing things. In this 
sense, the word θζθόζμθμξ also came to have a strong negative connotation for many 
people.
2193
 The philosopher was extremely concerned with things that did not matter and 
                                                 
2190
 This story agrees with frs. 18 and 19 from Aristotle‟s Protrepticus (I. Düring‟s edition), according to which 
both Pythagoras and Anaxagoras said that we were born to contemplate the heavens (εεάζαζεαζ ηὸκ μ὎νακόκ).  
2191
 Cp. once more the bibliographical references in footnote 2180 – especially the work of T. Ebert. 
2192
 For more on this, cp. e.g. K. DOVER, Aristophanes Ŕ Clouds, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968 (repr. 1989), 
XXXV ff. 
2193
 For this common negative connotation, cp. Phd. 64b, Rep. 473e-474a, 487c ff. 
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often neglected both his private interests and public matters. He was a sort of vagrant, 
outsider or pariah. He was overtaken by an interest that others could not understand, and this 
could be further emphasized by the prefix θζθμ-, which as we saw was often used to describe 
excessive or compulsive behaviors.
2194
  
 All these elements seem to have been associated with the pre-Platonic use of 
θζθμζμθία and its cognates, though in some cases our interpretation of the meaning of these 
passages may be influenced by later authors – and especially by Plato. Indeed, we also find 
the aspects just mentioned in the Platonic corpus. Plato develops and interconnects them in 
his analyses, and this is what we must now consider. 
 
2. The different uses of θηινζνθία and its cognates in the Platonic corpus 
 
 As was said, Plato uses the terms θζθμζμθε῔κ, θζθόζμθμξ and θζθμζμθία in different 
senses. Some of the uses are more traditional, other are perhaps an innovation of his. At any 
rate, he constantly refers to these notions and in some passages he even tries to define the 
philosopher as such. We already considered several important passages and we also defined 
some of its main uses. But now we will consider the matter from a different angle, in order to 
better define the relation between the different senses of the word. Let us then see in more 
detail the ways in which Plato talks about θζθμζμθία. 
 In some passages, the term θζθμζμθία is used as an equivalent of knowledge. In 
Euthydemus, the term θζθμζμθία is even defined as possession of knowledge (ηη῅ζζξ 
ἐπζζηήιδξ).
2195
 This knowledge may be general, or it may refer to a particular field. In 
Theaetetus, Socrates refers to geometry as a form of θζθμζμθία.
2196
 In Protagoras, he 
mentions the laconic θζθμζμθία and describes it as a form of wisdom or ζμθία.
2197
 Other 
times, θζθμζμθία seems to be identified with education and culture in general – and in these 
cases it is brought into close connection with ιμοζζηή and the Muses.
2198
 But this seems to be 
a rather conventional association, which is promptly accept by Socrates‟ interlocutors. Also 
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 See C. MOORE, op. cit., and also Chap. 13 Sect. 3 above. 
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 See 288d: “἟ δέ βε θζθμζμθία ηη῅ζζξ ἐπζζηήιδξ· μ὎π μὕηςξ; ἔθδκ.     καί, ἔθδ.” 
2196
 See 143d: “εἰ ιὲκ η῵κ ἐκ Κονήκῃ ι᾵θθμκ ἐηδδόιδκ, ὦ Θεόδςνε, ηὰ ἐηε῔ ἄκ ζε ηαὶ πενὶ ἐηείκςκ ἀκδνώηςκ, 
εἴ ηζκεξ α὎ηόεζ πενὶ βεςιεηνίακ ἢ ηζκα ἄθθδκ θζθμζμθίακ εἰζὶ η῵κ κέςκ ἐπζιέθεζακ πμζμύιεκμζ (...).” 
2197
 See 342a-343a. 
2198
 In the Phaedo, θζθμζμθία is presented as the greatest ιμοζζηή (61a) and it is likewise associated with the 




conventional is the close relation between θζθμζμθία and ἀνεηή, which points to the 
importance of one‟s upbringing and one‟s education in order to become excellent.
2199
 
 In other passages, though, the terms θζθμζμθία, θζθόζμθμξ and θζθμζμθε῔κ are 
strongly contrasted with knowledge and ζμθία and rather imply the lack of such a knowledge 
or ζμθία. It is in this sense that those that are wholly ignorant or wholly wise are said not to 
philosophize.
2200
 It is also in this way that wonder is said to be the beginning of 
θζθμζμθία.
2201
 Philosophy is then a kind of pursuit that implies dedication and invention. One 
is required to examine things or to converse with others.
2202
 This can be done in different 
ways, which are not necessarily all equally good. Plato often distinguishes between authentic 
and inauthentic forms of philosophical examination or philosophical enquiry.
2203
 But if there 
are different kinds of θζθμζμθία, then this raises the question of what distinguishes the 
different forms of pursuit of knowledge from one another. One factor of differentiation seems 
to be one‟s commitment. One may invest one‟s life in it and also try to purify oneself from 
other interests (i.e., both from the bodily interests, as is said in Phaedo, and the social or 
political interests, as is stressed in Theaetetus).
2204
 This is something Socrates seems to do 
better than anyone else. However, there are other factors differentiating inauthentic from 
authentic philosophy. One of these factors seems to pertain the kind of object or reality these 
forms of philosophy are referred to. One of them is concerned with something illusory or 
particular beings, while the other is directed at the true beings.
2205
 Still, regardless of what 
kind of θζθμζμθία one practices, the word is here understood as an active pursuit of 
knowledge. 
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 Cp. e.g. Smp. 184c ff. and Euthd. 274e-275a. 
2200
 See Ly. 218a-b and Smp. 204a-b. 
2201
 See Tht. 155d. 
2202
 See Chap. 1. 
2203
 Plato often speaks of a genuine, correct, true, guileless, healthy, pure, just, or sufficient form of θζθμζμθε῔κ, 
which presupposes that there are also imperfect forms. Cp. Phdr. 249a, 261a, Phd. 64b, 64e, 66b, 67e, 80e, 82c, 
83b, Rep. 473d, 485e, 486b, 490d, 540d, Sph. 216c, 253e, Phlb. 57d, Ep. VII 326b. The imperfect forms of 
philosophy may include, among other things, those figures that resemble philosophers, but are different from 
them, such as θζθμεεάιμκεξ and θζθήημμζ (see Rep. 475d-e) or the sophist (see Sph. 216c-d, 230e-231a,      
253c-254a). But for a closer consideration of the difference between authentic and inauthentic “philosophy”, cp. 
Sect. 4 below.  
2204
 In Phaedo, philosophy is described as the practice of death (ιεθέηδ εακάημο), and death is conceived as the 
separation of the body (and thus of its way of seeing things and its desires). See in particular 67d-68a. In 
Theaetetus, Socrates describes philosophy as a concern with the whole, that goes far beyond political matters. 
See 172c ff. In both cases, θζθμζμθία is associated with having leisure (ζπμθή) from these other kinds of 
concern. The whole passage in Theaetetus is actually about ζπμθή, and Plato also mentions it in Phd. 66b-67b.  
2205
 This is what is implied in the Sophist, when the Visitor distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist  
(253c-254a), or in the Republic, when Socrates differentiates philosophers from lovers of sights and lovers of 
sounds (476b ff.). 
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 But the meaning of the word can also be broader. It may correspond to a particular 
relation to knowledge, regardless of whether we possess it or not (or better still, regardless of 
whether we think we possess it or not). This sense of θζθμζμθία is what we considered in the 
previous chapter.
2206
 We are not indifferent to whether we know things or not – and this lack 
of indifference may have different degrees or intensities. In order to identify it, Plato isolates 
strong modalities of non-indifference, which let our constitutive love of knowledge stand out. 
In the Republic, he stresses the prefix θζθμ- and associates θζθμζμθία with other words that 
designate excessive traits and compulsive behaviors.
2207
 Φζθμζμθία is also defined (both in 
the Republic and elsewhere) as a form of ἔνςξ. Philosophers are described as lovers of 
knowledge, truth and being.
2208
 They have a desire or longing for knowledge.
2209
 In fact, 
θζθμζμθία may even be characterized as a form of madness or divine possession 
(ααηπεία).
2210
 But this excessive form of desire does not seem to be something we all 
experience. Only a few of us seem to have such an exacerbated relation with knowledge, and 
these are often seen as useless, mad or fools.
2211
 Plato, however, describes this love of 
knowledge as something that up to a point characterizes all human beings. We all have an 
inborn love of knowledge, even if we do not notice it, and this is a constitutive part of our 
ροπή.
2212
 This desiderative sense of θζθμζμθία may then be presented as a trait of some 
people‟s character.
2213
 As such, it may also be associated with other qualities (both moral and 
intellectual) and contrasted with traits such as the love of lies or the hate of θόβμζ.
2214
  
 Our constitutive love of knowledge may thus have different degrees. It may manifest 
itself in simpler forms and be subordinated to other drives (being then employed to attain the 
particular goals of the latter).
2215
 But it may also define one‟s entire life – i.e., one may lead a 
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 See in particular Chap. 13, Sect. 3.  
2207
 See Rep. 474c ff. 
2208
 See in particular Phd. 66e, 68a, Rep. 501d. It is also important to note that the description of the philosopher 
in Smp. 204a-b is intrinsically associated with the description of ἔνςξ. 
2209
 The expressions ἐπζεοιία ημῦ εἰδέκαζ and πμεε῔κ ηὸ εἰδέκαζ appear in Hp. Ma. 297e and Men. 84c, 
respectively, and they both describe what is implied in θζθμζμθία. 
2210
 See Smp. 218b. Plato also refers to θζθμζμθία as something that may take hold of us. See Prm 130e: “(...) 
μὔπς ζμο ἀκηείθδπηαζ θζθμζμθία ὡξ ἔηζ ἀκηζθήρεηαζ (...).” 
2211
 See e.g. Rep. 487c-d. 
2212
 This is particularly clear in the Republic, where he also describes this love of knowledge as a love of 
learning (θζθμιαεία) or a love of θόβμξ (θζθμθμβία). See 475c, 485c-d, 581b, 582e. 
2213
 See Ly. 213d, Prt. 335d-e and Phdr. 279a-b. 
2214
 See in particular Rep. 485a ff. 
2215
 See e.g. Rep. 553d: “ηὸ δέ βε μἶιαζ θμβζζηζηόκ ηε ηαὶ εοιμεζδὲξ παιαὶ ἔκεεκ ηαὶ ἔκεεκ παναηαείζαξ ὏π᾽ 
ἐηείκῳ ηαὶ ηαηαδμοθςζάιεκμξ, ηὸ ιὲκ μ὎δὲκ ἄθθμ ἐᾶ θμβίγεζεαζ μ὎δὲ ζημπε῔κ ἀθθ᾽ ἠ ὁπόεεκ ἐλ ἐθαηηόκςκ 





 According to Plato, the kind of relation we have to knowledge is 
decisive. It determines the quality of our life and even our afterlife.
2217
 It is also decisive for 
public life, insofar as philosophers should rule the political communities or the rulers should 
philosophize properly.
2218
 Philosophy is thus not just directed at a different reality (or a 
different view of reality), but it is also a different mode of relation with reality in general, that 
will allow for a better life. 
 But how is this all to be connected? What is the precise relation between learning, 
philosophical examination, constitutive interest in knowledge, intense desire of knowledge 
and a philosophical life? This is what we must now consider. 
 
3. The relation between θηινζνθία as intrinsic drive of the soul and θηινζνθία as 
philosophical examination (ἐμέηαζηο) 
 
 The main problem we must consider concerns the relation between the constitutive 
θζθμζμθία of our soul and the mostly occasional practice of philosophical examination. We 
saw that there is an inborn, instinctive or compulsive love or desire of knowledge at the heart 
of what we are. We want to know how things are. But this is not our only desire. The soul is 
also directed at gain and honor, and these three constitutive desires or drives restrict and 
modify one another. This means that the soul‟s inborn θζθμζμθία can be repressed and it can 
acquire other forms. In many cases, however, our love of knowledge seems to be very small 
or even entirely absent. There are many things (both distant and close to us) that we do not 
know and we do not seem to mind not knowing them. Only a few things prompt our curiosity 
or our need to know. When that happens, we engage in philosophical activity or philosophical 
examination. Φζθμζμθία in this sense is thus something supervenient and acquired. It requires 
dedication and effort, but usually our dedication to it and the effort we invest in it are very 
limited. We use it solely to attain a particular goal, prescribed by the other drives of the soul, 
and then abandon it. Only in very rare cases (if at all) do we seem to desire to know 
everything just for the sake of knowledge. In those cases, the soul‟s innate philosophical 
                                                 
2216
 See e.g. Ap. 28e (θζθμζμθμῦκηά ιε δε῔κ γ῅κ), Phd. 63e (ἐκ θζθμζμθίᾳ δζαηνίαεζκ ηὸκ αίμκ), 68c (ἐκ 
θζθμζμθίᾳ γ῅κ), Phdr. 259d (ἐκ θζθμζμθίᾳ δζάβεζκ). 
2217
 For a discussion of the importance of knowledge for life, see Chaps. 18 and 19 below. On the importance of 
philosophy for our afterlife, see e.g. Phdr. 249a, Phd. 63e-64a. 
2218
 See Rep. 473c-d: “ἐὰκ ιή, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ἠ μἱ θζθόζμθμζ ααζζθεύζςζζκ ἐκ ηα῔ξ πόθεζζκ ἠ μἱ ααζζθ῅ξ ηε κῦκ 
θεβόιεκμζ ηαὶ δοκάζηαζ θζθμζμθήζςζζ βκδζίςξ ηε ηαὶ ἱηακ῵ξ, ηαὶ ημῦημ εἰξ ηα὎ηὸκ ζοιπέζῃ, δύκαιίξ ηε 
πμθζηζηὴ ηαὶ θζθμζμθία, η῵κ δὲ κῦκ πμνεομιέκςκ πςνὶξ ἐθ᾽ ἑηάηενμκ αἱ πμθθαὶ θύζεζξ ἐλ ἀκάβηδξ 
ἀπμηθεζζε῵ζζκ, μ὎η ἔζηζ ηαη῵κ παῦθα, ὦ θίθε Γθαύηςκ, ηα῔ξ πόθεζζ, δμη῵ δ᾽ μ὎δὲ ηῶ ἀκενςπίκῳ βέκεζ (...).” 
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drive becomes conspicuous, represses the other drives and dominates our life. But in general 
this is not what happens. What does this mean, then? Does our desire to know remain latent 
in those moments? And what happens when we start to examine? Does it then become 
active? Or is it somehow always active?  
We said above that the soul‟s constitutive drives are always active, but now we have 
to discuss the question in more detail. We have to see how we are always concerned with 
knowledge and never indifferent to it – even if we are not pursuing knowledge. In fact, the 
lack of philosophical examination is itself a manifestation of our inborn θζθμζμθία, as will be 
shown. Moreover, we must also see what happens when we start to examine – or, to be more 
precise, we must see how philosophical examination (in all its different modalities) is only a 
variation of our permanent concern with knowledge. 
 
3.1. The usual satisfaction of the philosophical drive as the main factor for not 
performing philosophical examination 
 
 Let us first briefly consider what happens when there is no philosophical examination. 
This question will be discussed in more detail in Part IV, since it is essential to define the 
unexamined life. We will have to see at that point in what way the unexamined life is still 
philosophical – i.e., in what sense our inborn θζθμζμθία still plays a constitutive role in it.
2219
 
But there are a few aspects we can already anticipate and that will help us better understand 
the concept of θζθμζμθία.  
 To be sure, most people (if not all) do not spend their life examining. Usually, we 
perform very few examinations. We only examine if we have doubts in important matters, but 
apart from that we do not concern ourselves with trying to know more. What is then the 
meaning of this lack of examination? Does it really express lack of interest in knowledge? Is 
it wholly non-philosophical? Does it lack any relation to knowledge? Not at all. Although we 
normally do not examine, we still make out what things are. We are able to ascribe predicates 
to them and we understand these predicates. Indeed, we have many knowledge claims (or 
many judgments), not only about things and general notions, but also about how we are to 
live. All our perceptions, all our thoughts, and all our actions are shaped by these knowledge 
claims, which constitute a very complex system, as was shown before.
2220
 This does not mean 
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 Cp. in particular Chap. 16. 
2220
 See in particular Chap. 6, Sect. 2. Cp. also Chap. 11, Sect. 3.3, and Chap. 12, Sect. 5. 
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that we are explicitly aware of the presence and content of these knowledge claims. As we 
saw above, they are mostly tacit.
2221
 However, this does not render them any less effective. 
They determine how we see things and seem obvious to us – so much so that we do not feel 
the need to question or examine them. 
 Philosophical examination is thus hindered by our knowledge claims. Examining 
implies doubting our views or putting them in question. It requires us to admit that we do not 
know things or at least that we might not know them as well as we think. In other words, we 
must admit that we still do not possess perfect knowledge. As is said in Lysis and Symposium, 
the only beings that philosophize are those that lie between full ignorance and full 
knowledge.
2222
 We, however, tend to think we are not in an intermediary state. This can 
either mean that we do not really lack any knowledge (at least in questions that matter the 
most for us), or it can mean that we have an empty conceit of knowledge. In fact, Plato tries 
to show that the latter is very often (if not always) the case. Our cognitive access to things is 
full of defects. We are far from possessing actual knowledge. As Plato says at the end of 
Republic V, our cognitive state is a state that lies between ignorance and knowledge – or, as 
he also says, it is a mere δόλα.
2223
 Yet, we do not notice that it is so. We forget our 
intermediate condition and are therefore satisfied with our way of seeing things. At least with 
respect to the most important matters (namely, those that we need to know in order to guide 
our life), we think we already know everything we need to know, and we do not need to 
pursue any knowledge. Hence, it is not necessary to examine things. We already have the 
knowledge we desire (or so we think). Our love of knowledge is already satisfied, and it does 
not require us to do anything. We may turn our attention to other things – namely, to those 
that we “know” are important. 
 This is why we perform only a very limited number of examinations. We may need to 
think about some things and find a solution for some practical problems, but apart from that 
philosophical examination seems useless to us. At best, it may play some role in education 
(insofar as it helps young people think about life) or it may be used as a pastime. However, 
after a point, too much philosophy would be detrimental and prevent us from doing what we 
must do in life.
2224
 At any rate, it would be superfluous. From our standpoint, our need of 
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 Cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 1. 
2222
 See once more Ly. 218a-b and Smp. 204a-b. 
2223
 See 476b ff. For an interpretation of this passage, cp. also Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4 above. 
2224
 Callicles expresses precisely this idea in Grg. 485e ff. See also 487c-d: “ηαί πμηε ὏ι῵κ ἐβὼ ἐπήημοζα 
αμοθεομιέκςκ ιέπνζ ὅπμζ ηὴκ ζμθίακ ἀζηδηέμκ εἴδ, ηαὶ μἶδα ὅηζ ἐκίηα ἐκ ὏ι῔κ ημζάδε ηζξ δόλα, ιὴ πνμεοιε῔ζεαζ 
εἰξ ηὴκ ἀηνίαεζακ θζθμζμθε῔κ, ἀθθὰ ε὎θααε῔ζεαζ πανεηεθεύεζεε ἀθθήθμζξ ὅπςξ ιὴ πένα ημῦ δέμκημξ 
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knowledge is already met and we regard ourselves as self-sufficient in cognitive matters. We 
do not need more.  
 None of this means that we are at any moment indifferent to knowledge. On the 
contrary, we are always very fond of knowledge. However, most of the time we think we 
have already attained it. We are strongly attached to it, but we do not need to pursue it. We 
only desire to keep it – i.e., we desire to keep our views or beliefs.
2225
 Our love of actual 
knowledge becomes a love of our supposed knowledge, and it is in this sense that Plato 
designates the lovers of sights and sounds as θζθμδόλμζ.
2226
 In fact, all non-philosophers are 
deeply attached to a particular way of seeing things that focus primarily on what things 
appear to be and is therefore defective.
2227
 We may not be explicitly aware of this way of 
seeing things, but if someone tries to rob us of our knowledge claims by putting them into 
question we strongly resist (as we see many characters doing throughout the Platonic corpus).  
 We can thus see how the unexamined life is also, to a certain extent, a philosophical 
life. We are still fundamentally concerned with what things are and how we are to live. It 
only seems not to be so because we think we do not need to inquire into those matters. We 
think we already know what we need to know. As such, the unexamined life is very different 
from a life completely indifferent to knowledge. The latter would have no relation to its own 
cognitive state and it would not be cognitively satisfied. Moreover, it would have no 
presumed knowledge to lose and it could not become restless because it does not know 
something. The same cannot be said of the unexamined life, as we will see. It only seems 
indifferent to knowledge because it is cognitively satisfied.  
A question one must raise, however, is how can such a life become satisfied with its 
knowledge claims. If these claims were solid, it would be easy to understand. But according 
to Plato, our knowledge claims are highly questionable and many of them (if not all) are 
false. There are many limitations in our way of seeing things. How can we then come to 
accept a distorted or even completely fictitious version of reality and be satisfied with it? To 
use an expression from Plato, how can we become rich only in dreams (ὄκαν πθμοηε῔κ) and 
                                                                                                                                                        
ζμθώηενμζ βεκόιεκμζ θήζεηε δζαθεανέκηεξ.” For the idea of a moderate use of philosophy, cp. also Euthd. 
305d-e and Rep. 487c-d, 497e-498b. 
2225
 As Plato stresses in Symposium, we may desire something we already have, but only in the sense that we 
desire to keep having it in the future. Cp. Smp. 200b-e. 
2226
 See Rep. 480a. 
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 What is the role played by the other drives of the soul in this process? And 
how much of this cognitive failure can be ascribed to the soul‟s constitutive θζθμζμθία?  
As we will see, our acceptance of questionable knowledge claims is only possible if 
our θζθμζμθία is weak in comparison to our other drives. When this happens, our θζθμζμθία 
is not entirely suppressed, but it becomes distorted, and as a result it does not perform its 
functions properly. It does not realize that its version of things is questionable and needs to be 
examined. But this is not all. The other drives also disguise themselves as θζθμζμθία and talk 
in a philosophical language, as it were. They create a defective version of things and deceive 
our love of knowledge. This is, in short, how the unexamined life works, but we will have to 
consider this entire mechanism in much more detail and we will also have to discuss what the 
ultimate cause of this process is.  
 
3.2. The awakening of θηινζνθία in the form of philosophical examination. The 
ἐμέηαζηο as a response to the perceived frustration of the soul’s intrinsic θηινζνθία  
 
 Our soul‟s constitutive θζθμζμθία may thus coexist with (and even explain) the lack 
of examination. However, it may also assume the form of philosophical examination. This is 
what we will now briefly discuss. What determines the awakening of philosophical 
examination?  
 In Theaetetus, Socrates says that wonder or astonishment (εαοιάγεζκ) is the beginning 
of θζθμζμθία (which is here understood precisely in the sense of philosophical 
examination).
2229
 The wonder in question is aporetic – i.e., it is essentially connected with 
ignorance. Something stands out and captures our attention because we cannot understand or 
explain it. It eludes our cognitive grasp. The thing in question may be something entirely new 
for us, which goes against our expectations, or it may be something with which we were 
previously familiarized, and which now reveals itself as problematic. The Platonic corpus 
constantly illustrates and causes the latter form of wonder.
2230
 The most familiar things reveal 
themselves to be the most obscure.
2231
 In other words, we realize that our knowledge claims 
                                                 
2228
 Cp. Ly. 218c and Tht. 208b. 
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 See 155d: “ιάθα βὰν θζθμζόθμο ημῦημ ηὸ πάεμξ, ηὸ εαοιάγεζκ· μ὎ βὰν ἄθθδ ἀνπὴ θζθμζμθίαξ ἠ αὕηδ (...).” 
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 Cp. e.g. Sph. 244a: “ἐπεζδὴ ημίκοκ ἟ιε῔ξ ἞πμνήηαιεκ, ὏ιε῔ξ α὎ηὰ ἟ι῔κ ἐιθακίγεηε ἱηακ῵ξ, ηί πμηε αμύθεζεε 
ζδιαίκεζκ ὁπόηακ ὂκ θεέββδζεε. δ῅θμκ βὰν ὡξ ὏ιε῔ξ ιὲκ ηαῦηα πάθαζ βζβκώζηεηε, ἟ιε῔ξ δὲ πνὸ ημῦ ιὲκ 
ᾠόιεεα, κῦκ δ᾽ ἞πμνήηαιεκ.” 
2231
 We can actually say about many things what Augustine says when trying to determine what is time: 
“Dicimus haec et audivimus haec et intellegimur et intellegimus. Manifestissima et usitatissima sunt, et eadem 
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are false, and we notice that we are actually in an intermediate position with respect to 
knowing something – namely, we already have some relation to it, but we still do not know it. 
As a result, we are mobilized to examine.
2232
 
Philosophical examination is thus based on the frustration of our love of knowledge. 
If we want to know something and realize (or even suspect) that we do not, we must inquire 
into it. It produces a longing or hunger for knowledge that is hard to repress. Of course, this 
does not mean that any perceived or suspected ignorance automatically mobilizes us to 
examine. In many cases, we do not mind not knowing something, but this is itself based on 
the knowledge claim that the matter at hand is just a small detail or, in any case, of little or no 
relevance for us. In other words, there are basic assumptions (὏πμεέζεζξ) that still remain 
valid for us and that restrict the cognitive crisis and the need to examine. However, these 
assumptions may also be unsettled – and in that case our love of knowledge will lead us to 
examine them. The outbreak of philosophical examination is thus a consequence of our 
cognitive circumstances. If we had a perfect access to reality (as we often think we do), our 
love of knowledge would simply translate into a contemplation of the truth, and we would act 
according to this truth. However, we often realize that things escape us – and this forces us to 
examine. We must pursue truth and take pains to find it.  
When we examine, different things may happen. In many cases, we may be easily 
satisfied with an apparent solution and thus adopt a new false knowledge claim. In other 
cases, we may be more demanding, and then we will notice just how difficult the acquisition 
of effective knowledge can be. It all seems to depend on the strength of our inborn 
θζθμζμθία. When it is weakened and ruled by the other drives, it is particularly difficult for 
us to notice our cognitive limitations and we can more easily accept bad solutions to our 
problems. If, however, we exercise and develop our love of knowledge (which probably 
requires us to somehow start examining things), then this love of knowledge becomes more 
able to perform its task – and as a result we will examine much more and much better than 
we normally do. The other drives will grow weaker and θζθμζμθία may even become the 
ruling love of our soul, thus determining our whole αίμξ.
2233
 In this case, we will be overtaken 
                                                                                                                                                        
rursus nimis latent et nova est inventio eorum.” See L. VERHEIJEN (ed.), Sancti Augustini Confessionum libri 
XIII, Turnhout, Brepols, 1981, XI.22.28. 
2232
 We find a good expression of this in Men. 84c: “[΢Ω.] Οἴεζ μὖκ ἂκ α὎ηὸκ πνόηενμκ ἐπζπεζν῅ζαζ γδηε῔κ ἠ 
ιακεάκεζκ ημῦημ ὃ ᾤεημ εἰδέκαζ μ὎η εἰδώξ, πνὶκ εἰξ ἀπμνίακ ηαηέπεζεκ ἟βδζάιεκμξ ιὴ εἰδέκαζ, ηαὶ ἐπόεδζεκ ηὸ 
εἰδέκαζ; [ΜΔΝ.] Οὔ ιμζ δμηε῔, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ.” 
2233
 This is, for instance, what is implied in the characterization of θζθμζμθία as a separation from the body and 




by the need to know and we will neglect everything else (which may precisely appear to 
others as a form of madness).
2234
  
We have thus seen how the constitutive θζθμζμθία of the soul may bring about 
philosophical examination and how the latter is a variation of the former. However, this 
explanation raises an important question – namely, the question of whether or not we have 
some control over the process we described. In general, we do not seem to be able to 
immediately start examining, especially because we are laden with knowledge claims. We 
must first question them, but are we free to simply start questioning them? By referring to 
wonder, Plato invokes an experience in which we are normally passive. He also presents the 
possibility of being released from our immediate convictions by another person who starts 
examining us (as Socrates normally does). We seem thus to need either luck or help – at least 
at first. 
We may also wonder about whether or not philosophical examination may be 
repressed after we start examining. If we realize that we do not know something important, it 
may be impossible to repress the examination. But, as was said, we may become too easily 
satisfied with a solution and our inquisitiveness may fade away. This then raises the question 
of how we can fully develop our love of knowledge and our ability to examine – and also the 
question of whether we should do it. We will not consider these questions now, but we will 





4. The different forms of θηινζνθία as philosophical examination. The distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic philosophical activity 
 
 One could easily be tempted to think that the alternative between examining and not 
examining is simple. We would either examine or not, but if we did we would always be 
doing fundamentally the same thing (even if we would examine different things, with varying 
degrees of success). However, it has already been indicated that the matter is more complex, 
and now it is time to develop such indications. There can be “weaker” and “stronger” forms 
of philosophical examination. Plato expresses this in different ways. He talks of a genuine, 
correct, true, guileless, healthy, pure, just, or sufficient θζθμζμθε῔κ, which he contrasts with 
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 See e.g. Phdr. 249c-d. 
2235
 See in particular Chap. 17, Sect. 5, and Chap. 19. 
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imperfect forms of θζθμζμθία.
2236
 This assumes that there can be sorts of θζθμζμθία that are 
still unphilosophical. But what exactly is the meaning of this?  
 We find in the Platonic corpus several references to the ambiguity or complexity of 
philosophical activity. For instance, Socrates says at the beginning of the Sophist that a 
philosopher may assume different masks and appear disguised of a sophist, a statesman or a 
mad man.
2237
 Later, however, the Visitor shows that the first two figures differ from 
philosophers, though they somehow resemble them. The same happens in the Republic, when 
Socrates distinguishes philosophers from lovers of sights and sounds.
2238
 Plato is indeed very 
careful in distinguishing the true philosopher from other cultural figures. Seen from the 
outside, these figures may be similar to philosophers or philosopher-like, and yet there may 
be a world of difference between them.  
 However, the question we are discussing does not refer to the fact that some practices 
resemble philosophy or philosophical examination. The problem is rather the fact that there 
can be different modalities of philosophical examination (i.e., different ways of performing it 
or relating to it), and these modalities do not all have the same value. Plato distinguishes 
between a proper and an improper philosophy (or a proper and an improper philosophical 
examination). In other words, philosophical activity can have different degrees. We can better 
understand this if we consider the difference between Socrates and the young men that follow 
him, according to the Apology.
2239
 Socrates is presented as the epitome of philosophical 
examination and he tries to explain its importance. The young men, in turn, are suggested to 
be superficial imitators of his behavior, without fully understanding the nature and 
importance of philosophical examination. We find an illustration of this in the figure of 
Apollodorus, whom we meet at the beginning of Symposium.
2240
 He follows Socrates and 
tries to imitate him, but lacks all the depth that characterizes the latter. We start therefore to 
understand that the improper forms of philosophical activity are a sort of image (εἴδςθμκ) of 
what philosophical activity is all about. They try to be like the real deal, but fall short of it, 
and if we are not careful, we might mistake them for proper philosophical activity. We may 
think we are really performing philosophy and at the same time we may still be largely 
unphilosophical. 
                                                 
2236
 Cp. footnote 2203 above. For more on these designations, see also e.g. K. NAWRATIL, Γκδζίςξ 
θζθμζμθε῔κ, Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie 8 (1975), 72-84. 
2237
 Cp. 216c-d. 
2238
 See 475d ff. 
2239
 See 23c and 33b-c 
2240
 See 172c-173a. 
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 But what exactly is the limitation of the weaker forms of philosophical activity? In 
some texts, we find explicit references to modalities of philosophy that go only up to a point 
and avoid going further. In Gorgias, for instance, Callicles recognizes the advantages of 
studying some philosophy and considers anything beyond that (especially after a certain age) 
detrimental in many ways.
2241
 In the Republic, Socrates talks about the possibility of 
philosophy being a side activity or hobby (πάνενβμκ).
2242
 In Euthydemus, we find the idea of 
limiting philosophy by combining it with another activity, namely politics.
2243
 All these 
passages imply a limited dedication and also a limited development of one‟s skills and 
philosophical knowledge. But this still does not let us see the limitation of these weaker 
forms of philosophical examination. 
 We may better understand this limitation if we consider the case of the young Socrates 
(who appears in Symposium and Parmenides) and of the young characters that are said to 
closely resemble Socrates (especially Theaetetus).
2244
 These characters are presented as 
immature philosophers, in whom we already find a strong desire for knowledge (indeed, they 
question many things, and display much talent), but whose philosophical impulse is still not 
fully developed (which is seen especially in the fact that there are still some fundamental 
assumptions that they do not question).
2245
 They are on their way to becoming consummate 
philosophers, but they still need practice and guidance – otherwise their development may be 
interrupted.
2246 
 There are thus different degrees of philosophical activity, and we can identify even 
more. For instance, Plato admits the possibility of someone having a limited love of learning 
(θζθμιαεία).
2247
 One can also have a limited or superficial love of θόβμξ (θζθμθμβία), as 
seems to be case with Phaedrus, who gladly listens to speeches, but does not question 
them.
2248
 In fact, there is something like a continuum that ranges from the complete 
indifference to philosophical examination (based on the belief that one already knows 
                                                 
2241
 See 484c ff. and 487c-d. 
2242
 See 498a. 
2243
 See 305c ff. 
2244
 See Smp. 201d ff., Prm. 127d ff., and Tht. 143e ff. 
2245
 See e.g. Prm. 130e: “κέμξ βὰν εἶ ἔηζ, θάκαζ ηὸκ Πανιεκίδδκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ηαὶ μὔπς ζμο ἀκηείθδπηαζ 
θζθμζμθία ὡξ ἔηζ ἀκηζθήρεηαζ ηαη᾽ ἐιὴκ δόλακ, ὅηε μ὎δὲκ α὎η῵κ ἀηζιάζεζξ· κῦκ δὲ ἔηζ πνὸξ ἀκενώπςκ 
ἀπμαθέπεζξ δόλαξ δζὰ ηὴκ ἟θζηίακ.” 
2246
 Plato gives the example of those who dedicate themselves to rational discussions, but do not do it properly, 
and as a result end up mistrusting all θόβμζ and becoming ιζζόθμβμζ. See 89d ff. Cp. also Rep. 539b-c. 
2247
 On a limited θζθμιαεία, see Rep. 474c ff. and 485c-e.  
2248
 Cp. Phdr. 228a-c, 234cff., For an analysis of Phaedrus‟ limited θζθμθμβία, in contrast with Socrates‟ own 
love of θόβμζ, see e.g. F. SERRANITO, Lovers and Madmen. The Μακία-Φνμκε῔κ Opposition in Plato‟s 
Phaedrus, Diss. Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2015, 23-29. 
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everything that matters) to the most developed form of it, illustrated by the mature Socrates. 
Between the two extremes there are many intermediary forms. Thus, the alternative before us 
is not just between philosophizing or not. There are many different ways of philosophizing. 
The difference between these ways of philosophizing is not primarily determined by 
one‟s external behavior or by the quantity of time one spends examining. It is also not 
primarily a matter of having more or less knowledge. Socrates himself, who seems to be 
portrayed as the consummate philosopher, admits that he knows only a few things or even 
nothing at all.
2249
 What seems to be decisive is thus the scope of examination – namely, 
whether one‟s focus is confined to a limited and derived domain, or whether one is able to 
move beyond it. In other words, when we examine something, we may still have many basic 
assumptions (὏πμεέζεζξ) that are left untouched or unexamined. This is precisely the problem 
with the young Socrates and Theaetetus.
2250
 It is also what characterizes the particular 
sciences, according to the Republic.
2251
 They are said to dream about being insofar as they do 
not examine the main ontological properties of their domain of study. In other words, the 
examination they perform is a kind of unexamined examination, and they may very well fail 
to realize it. They may believe that nothing important is being left out of consideration. 
Philosophical examination may thus have different stages and different depths (as is 
illustrated in the Simile of the Line and in the Allegory of the Cave). These differences, 
however, do not necessarily correspond to different degrees of positive knowledge or ζμθία. 
They rather correspond to different degrees of awareness of our ignorance and of what we 
must still discover or learn. 
But there is more. In some important passages, Plato connects the different degrees of 
perceived ignorance (and thus the scope of our philosophical examination) with the 
arrangement of the soul‟s constitutive drives. There may be different inner πμθζηε῔αζ, and our 
inborn θζθμζμθζα may play different roles in these πμθζηε῔αζ. The inauthentic or improper 
modalities of philosophical examination are thus the result of a weaker philosophical drive, 
which may even not dominate the soul. The other drives may still be strong and they may still 
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 See e.g. Ap. 23b and Euthd. 293b. 
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 At the beginning, Socrates had not sufficiently examined the notion of εἶδμξ and what it entails (see Prm. 
130b ff.), whereas Theaetetus was dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, but had not sufficiently examined what 
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ἀκηείθδπηαζ θζθμζμθία ὡξ ἔηζ ἀκηζθήρεηαζ ηαη᾽ ἐιὴκ δόλακ, ὅηε μ὎δὲκ α὎η῵κ ἀηζιάζεζξ· κῦκ δὲ ἔηζ πνὸξ 
ἀκενώπςκ ἀπμαθέπεζξ δόλαξ δζὰ ηὴκ ἟θζηίακ.” See also Tht. 162e: “κέμξ βὰν εἶ, ὦ θίθε πα῔· η῅ξ μὖκ δδιδβμνίαξ 
ὀλέςξ ὏παημύεζξ ηαὶ πείεῃ.” 
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 Cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 1.3 a) and Chap. 9, Sect. 3.1 d). 
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rule, which means that they can limit our philosophical activity and surreptitiously determine 
the course of the examination. In other words, the examination may still have a                 
non-philosophical end in sight. One may strive to achieve pleasure (as the young men that 
followed Socrates seemed to do) or one may try to defeat others.
2252
 As a result, one will not 
question several things or one will accept certain answers too readily. 
It is important to bear this in mind. Often it is difficult to discern our true motivations 
and it may happen that we have unphilosophical motivations even while doing philosophy. 
Our philosophical drive may still be strongly limited by the other drives and our life may still 
be unexamined, despite our belief to the contrary. As a result, we will only be able to 
properly philosophize when our θζθμζμθία is strong enough to dominate the other drives. 
When that happens, we will no longer lead an unexamined life. Instead, we will lead a life 
governed by our inborn θζθζμμθία, in which philosophical examination is fully developed 
and plays a central role. In other words, we will lead a philosophical life. The notion of 
“philosophical life” is thus important to determine the proper sense of philosophical 
examination and it also helps us better define the notion of θζθμζμθία as such. Hence, we 
must finish by briefly discussing this notion. 
 
5. The configuration of a βίνο θηιόζνθνο. The different shapes such a life may assume 
 
 What are then the most important traits of a philosophical life? The corpus provides us 
many indications about this notion. There are several important discussions that try to define 
the philosopher, and Socrates himself is portrayed as a good (if not perfect) embodiment of 
such a life. To be sure, some of these indications may seem somewhat contradictory at times, 
but we will see that there is a good reason for that. 
Let us then begin with what lies at the heart of the philosophical life. We saw that any 
αίμξ is essentially a form of pursuing what it perceives as the superlative good, and our 
representation of the superlative good is determined by the arrangement of the soul‟s inborn 
drives. A philosophical life is thus a life essentially ruled by our knowledge-loving drive or 
θζθμζμθία, which is then stronger than the other drives, and is not used or distorted by them. 
Instead, the soul‟s θζθμζμθία subdues, uses and transforms the other drives. This constitutes 
a philosophical πμθζηεία and gives rise to the philosophical life. To be sure, such a state is not 
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 On the possibility of examining for the sake of pleasure, see Ap. 23c, 33b-c. For the distinction between a 
way of examining matters that only seeks to defeat others and a way of examining that is interested in finding 
the truth about something, see e.g. Grg. 515b, Prt. 360e, Phlb. 14b.  
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easy to attain. It requires much discipline and intellectual training. However, once it is fully 
attained, it is the most stable πμθζηεία according to Plato. It will fully integrate the other 
drives and avoid conflicts.
2253
  
Such an inner πμθζηεία will then determine our representation of the superlative good 
and of happiness. We will want to possess, more than anything, knowledge and truth. We will 
want to see things as they really are – i.e., we will want to have access to reality. In other 
words, we will be obsessed with knowledge and this will be seen as what maximizes our life. 
Consequently, all our actions will be determined by this representation of the superlative 
good. We will either pursue truth or we will act according to it, if it shows us that we should 
do something. All other things will be seen as secondary, irrelevant or harmful. We will thus 
be free (or as free as we can be) from our concern with gain and with honor. Indeed, a 
philosophical life is marked by ζπμθή in this sense (which actually corresponds to a form of 
asceticism). One has leisure from those that are our normal concerns and one will only pursue 
them if the truth somehow requires us to do so.
2254
 
This is still a very generic description, but what was said is enough to notice that we 
are talking about a very unusual way to live. Normally, people are concerned with pleasure, 
money or honor, and there are very few exceptions. The philosopher thus appears to neglect 
all that matters in life, and as such he seems very strange, and perhaps even mad.
2255
 In fact, it 
may even be difficult to conceive what such a possibility entails. That is why Plato makes 
such an effort to present and define it. 
 But let us return to our description. We have seen the core of the philosophical life. 
Now we must consider how this core (the philosophical πμθζηεία) unfolds and creates a 
practical system, underpinned by a particular system of views or beliefs. It is, however, 
important to bear in mind that the general structure of the philosophical life admits two very 
different modalities, according to whether we are still pursuing actual knowledge or whether 
we have already attained it. Plato presents and describes the two modalities, and this may 
cause some confusion. We may indeed dedicate our lives to the pursuit of truth and thus to 
philosophical examination. This is what Socrates is shown doing, especially in the Apology 
and in the so-called Socratic dialogues. He is aware of his ignorance and does not seem to 
find full knowledge. He even imagines an eternal life of pursuit – which would also be a life 
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Tht. 172c-177b. 
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of eternal ἀπμνία and eternal wandering about (πθάκδ). Such a life could be called a αίμξ 
γδηδηζηόξ, and it stands in contrast with another possible philosophical life – namely, a life 
marked by the possession of knowledge and thus primarily dedicated to enjoying the 
contemplation of the truth. We find in the corpus several allusions to this possibility, which 
we could call αίμξ εεςνδηζηόξ in a strict sense.
2256
 Although Plato does not expressly 
distinguish these two possibilities, his analyses presuppose this distinction. We must 
therefore consider it in more detail, and see how these two possibilities correspond to two 
different configurations of the same fundamental structure or of the same kind of αίμξ. In 
order to do so, we will use some of the indications given about the philosopher in the texts. 
 Let us then start with the life of philosophical pursuit, which is also the life of 
philosophical examination. In normal conditions, truth is not immediately available. Indeed, 
if we train our philosophical drive and develop it, we realize that many (if not all) of our 
views are defective, and we are thus forced to examine things more closely. This examination 
may take almost all of our time and produce a state of extreme ἀζπμθία (as is illustrated by 
the case of Socrates).
2257
 We will have no time for anything else (unless it somehow helps us 
to find truth). All our actions will thus be somehow derived from our pursuit of the truth. We 
will lead a simple life and use every pretext to examine ourselves or others. Consequently, we 
will develop elaborate θόβμζ, most of them provisional, and we will probably follow those 
that seem more plausible.
2258
 This may determine further actions, but the latter will be in 
many cases the result of provisional views. As such, these actions may not correspond to 
what we should do, and we will not be fully certain of them. We will only be certain that we 
must pursue the truth – and in that extent we will know what to do.
2259
 Of course this also 
raises the question about the validity of one‟s view that knowledge is the good. Initially, at 
least, it is not clear that one really possesses a rational insight into the importance of 
knowledge. Its pursuit may be instinctive, and later one will perhaps be able to find the 
reasons why it is so important to attain it.  
 In this context, our way of seeing beings or of relating to them will also be very 
different from usual. We will be like the philosophical dogs described in the Republic, in the 
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assume that one would be able to see the truth and shape one‟s life according to it. 
2257
 Cp. e.g. Ap. 23b-c. 
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sense that all beings we come into contact with will be primarily seen as known or unknown, 
and this will determine our relation to them.
2260
 They will also be determined as helpful, 
indifferent or harmful according to how they influence our pursuit of truth. Apart from that, 
one will be pretty indifferent to what happens to one‟s body or in one‟s πόθζξ. One will 
probably spend one‟s life in some corner.
2261
 However, although one‟s body will be in the 
πόθζξ, one‟s mind will wander far and wide. As is said in Theaetetus, one will think about the 
whole of space, whole of time, and also the general predicates that pervade all individual 
beings.
2262
 But since one will still not have access to those broader domains which frame 
every particular being, the things that lie around oneself will be seen as problematic. In other 
words, one will regard the immediate reality as a kind of shadowy cave or the depth of the 
sea.
2263
 Everything will be unclear – i.e., a sort of degraded reality that refers to something 
else that locates and defines it. The life of the philosopher is thus constitutively referred to 
something beyond, which is not exactly a second world, different from this one, but rather the 
truth about this world of ours. 
 This shows us the basic structure of a αίμξ γδηδηζηόξ. It may admit many changes and 
developments, according to the results of one‟s examinations, and it may even contain 
moments of contemplating particular truths. But we may still conceive a different kind of 
philosophical life – namely, a life in which one has full assess to truth. In this case one would 
be able to see what the εἴδδ consist in, and one would also be able to properly attribute them 
to particular beings (which would therefore be seen as what they are – i.e., as instances of the 
truth). This vision of the truth is described by Plato as an intense experience. In fact, one 
would profoundly admire such a vision and be nurtured by it.
2264
 It would fully satisfy          
us – or, as Diotima says in Symposium when she is describing the vision of ηὸ ηαθθόξ, our 
life could only be worthwhile at that point.
2265
 We could even say that this would constitute 
the true or right way of living (i.e., the ἀθδε῵ξ or ὀνε῵ξ γ῅κ).
2266
 One would be truly free and 
have true ζπμθή (insofar as one would no longer have to pursue the good). 
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Μακηζκζηὴ λέκδ, εἴπεν πμο ἄθθμεζ, αζςηὸκ ἀκενώπῳ, εεςιέκῳ α὎ηὸ ηὸ ηαθόκ.” 
2266
 For the notion of ἀθδε῵ξ γ῅κ, see Rep. 490b and Lg. 730c. For the notion of ὀνε῵ξ γ῅κ, see Ap. 39d. 
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Such a life raises some questions, though. At first, Plato‟s descriptions may suggest a 
life in which one is always immersed in contemplation and would not notice or do anything 
else. But is that really the case? Can such a life be sustained? Wouldn‟t we need to care for 
the body to survive, and also for the πόθζξ, insofar as it is the context in which we normally 
live? And wouldn‟t we need to help the others learn the truth? In fact, it may happen that 
when we contemplate the truth we learn that we must still act in the world (as is the case with 
the guardians in the Republic). Thus, we would not be able to fully lose ourselves in 
contemplation. We may have to pursue other things (and perhaps even honor or pleasure, for 
some particular reason). We may have to perform many actions and use things in a particular 
way – and this will render the αίμξ εεςνδηζηόξ more complex.
2267
 
Of course, this whole description is contingent on us being able to attain the truth. But 
it is not clear that we can ever attain it. Some texts seem to admit this possibility, but in 
Phaedo, for instance, Socrates defends that it cannot be attained while we are alive, due to the 
body and its tensions – and in Phaedrus he says that we may not even be able to fully 
contemplate it after death (indeed, only godly souls have an unimpeded access to the 
truth).
2268
 Moreover, all this assumes that there is something like truth. However, the project 
of finding the truth may be unfeasible – either because we are not able to find it or because it 
is an absurd idea to begin with. In that case, the only philosophical life would be the life of 
pursuing the truth. But what is the value of such a life if it can never attain what it desires? 
The contemplative life seems to be the best life and the life of philosophical examination is a 
sort of second best (at least according to Plato‟s analyses).
2269
 But if there is no truth, then 
there is no good life or no happiness. We will be condemned to pursue something we will 
never attain. Life will be a fool‟s errand. But let us leave this question aside for now.
2270
 
We saw that the philosophical life may assume two different modalities. They are 
both completely regulated by our love of knowledge, and to this extent they differ radically 
from any form of unexamined life, as we will see. It is, however, important to bear in mind 
that this description is somewhat idealized. In general, there are no pure philosophical lives. 
There are only mixed forms – i.e., lives in which the rule of philosophical drive is not 
absolute. Plato is very aware of this, and at some points he even describes the other drives of 
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 We will leave aside the question of whether and how Plato‟s understanding of the contemplative life differs 
from what we find in Aristotle (see in particular Ethica Nichomachea, 1177a12 ff.). 
2268
 See Phd. 66b-67b, Phdr. 248a-b. 
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 For this idea, see Phlb. 19c: “(...) ηαθὸκ ιὲκ ηὸ ζύιπακηα βζβκώζηεζκ ηῶ ζώθνμκζ, δεύηενμξ δ᾽ εἶκαζ πθμῦξ 
δμηε῔ ιὴ θακεάκεζκ α὎ηὸκ α὏ηόκ.” 
2270
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 20, Sect. 3.4. 
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the soul as inextirpable, which means they will always contaminate the philosophical drive 
and prevent its perfect development. Still, we may try to perfect it and thus render our life 





CONCLUSION OF PART III 
 
 
 The long analyses performed in this Part III laid the groundwork for the discussion of 
the unexamined life. We saw the fundamental structures that – according to Plato – determine 
any way of life and are thus at the basis of the unexamined life. In order to identify these 
structures, we had to consider Plato‟s understanding of the kind of being that we are (i.e., 
human nature at large), which is in many respects extremely different from the way we 
normally understand ourselves. To be sure, the presentation of Plato‟s perspective is not 
without problems. One could even argue that the corpus does not communicate a coherent 
doctrine on this matter. However, we tried to conciliate the different passages as much as 
possible, in order to determine Plato‟s general understanding of the human being. 
 But let us recapitulate some of the main points. We saw that Plato mainly considers 
our being as ροπή, and this is a very meaningful word. Hence, we started by considering the 
history of the word and the reasons why Plato uses it (Chapter 10). We saw that the word 
expresses a mysterious component of our being (often associated with eschatological 
reflections), which is contrasted with the more immediate and obvious character of the body. 
In fact, the word ροπή implies a new way of looking at ourselves that raises the problem of 
what lies at the heart of our being. Plato tries to distinguish this component from the body, 
and in doing so he calls our attention to the central role of the ροπή in our way of seeing 
things and in our way of acting.  
 In the previous chapters we tried to determine the precise role the ροπή plays in 
cognition and in action – or, which is the same thing, we tried to determine the cognitive and 
the practical dimension of the ροπή. We started by seeing how the cognitive structure of our 
being is defined in the Platonic corpus (Chapter 11). The ροπή lets things appear, but it also 
tries to define them, and is thus essentially referred to the notions of knowledge, truth and 
objective reality. Moreover, the ροπή has several cognitive powers or capabilities, which 
produce different kinds of content, and together constitute our way of seeing things. At the 
core of this powers lies the power of judging, which is what constitutes our relation to the 
truth and what mediates our relation with the other powers and their cognitive contents. 
As for the practical dimension of the ροπή, we first considered how our actions and 
desires are not a mere aggregate, but are rather unified in a unitary pursuit of the good or of 
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happiness (Chapter 12). We also considered how this goodness or happiness are referred to a 
superlative good. This is what we always pursue, but we cannot immediately attain it, and 
hence our pursuit turns into a system of interrelated actions, underpinned by a complex 
system of views or beliefs, which is what actually corresponds to the notion of αίμξ.  
 However, Plato‟s analysis of the practical domain (and of the notion of αίμξ in 
particular) is much more complex. According to Plato, the ροπή is internally divided and 
characterized by three different drives, which are directed at three very different kinds of 
object: namely, gain, honor and knowledge. These drives (θζθμηένδεζα, θζθμηζιία and 
θζθμζμθία) are permanently active and inextirpable. They fight with each other for control 
and their relation of forces constitutes the inner arrangement (or the inner πμθζηεία) of the 
soul. In addition, the drives pervade and transform each other (also according to their relation 
of forces), which means, among other things, that they are all essentially philosophical. This 
combination and mutual contamination of the drives is then what determines the practical 
system of life (i.e., our αίμξ) and its underlying views or beliefs. The different inner πμθζηείαζ 
constitute different αίμζ and all diversity of human lives can be reduced to a few main 
configurations. In fact, they may be ultimately reduced to the contrast between the 
unexamined life and its opposite. 
 Finally, we considered in more detail the term θζθμζμθία, which is central for our 
whole analysis and for the characterization of the human soul. The term is somewhat 
ambiguous, but we saw how this ambiguity corresponds to different layers or different forms 
of the same thing. The fundamental meaning of the word is love of knowledge, and because 
we often think we already know what we need to know, we do not feel any need to examine 
things. If, however, we realize we do not know something, we will examine it (and this 
examination may also be called θζθμζμθία). Finally, we saw how the knowledge-loving drive 
may become the dominating drive of the soul and thus generate a philosophical life (which 
may be either a life dedicated to philosophical examination and the pursuit of truth, or a 
contemplative life). All the meanings of θζθμζμθία are thus interconnected.  
 This is the gist of the complex anthropology we can extract from the Platonic corpus. 
It is important to remark that these analyses show how the cognitive and the practical 
dimensions of the soul are closely intertwined. Our actions and our way of life are based on 
views or beliefs. In turn, these views or beliefs are the expression of a particular drive of the 
soul (namely, the philosophical drive) and are influenced by the other drives and the way we 
pursue the good. In fact, we can see even better the fundamental correlation between the 
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cognitive and the practical domains if we focus on the notion of θζθμζμθία. The word 
designates a practical tension, but it is directed at knowledge, and it expresses itself in a 
particular way of seeing things. This is very important, and Plato further stresses this 
importance by presenting θζθμζμθία as the fundamental trait of the soul. It pervades 
everything and our life is determined by its variations. It may be weaker or stronger, and this 
will determine everything else in our life.
2271
 In other words, our relation to knowledge or 
truth is at the center of what we are, and this relation is simultaneously cognitive and 
practical. Thus, any distinction between a cognitive and a practical side is artificial, and we 
only made such a distinction in order to better identify the inner complexity of our being.  
 By defining the inner structure of our being, we were able to define in great detail the 
term αίμξ. We saw that a αίμξ is a complex totality of meaning that is directed at a superlative 
good, and this totality is shaped by the inner arrangement of the soul‟s constitutive drives and 
the views outlined by them, which determine how we see things and how we live. This is the 
general structure of all lives, and the different combinations of drives outline the main 
possible αίμζ. Each particular life thus corresponds to one of the main αίμζ and is never 
completely individual, despite all its specificities. 
 One may of course wonder whether there really is a general structure of life, which 
only admits of a few variations (i.e., a few αίμζ), and one may also wonder whether Plato 
properly identified it. Furthermore, one may doubt this particular interpretation of            
Plato – especially insofar as it tries to combine very different texts and present a unitary 
conception of the human being. We brought together the epistemological considerations of 
the later dialogues, the intellectualist considerations of action that characterize the early, 
Socratic dialogues, and the tripartition of the soul that is found in Plato‟s mature works 
(according to the usual chronology of the texts). In so doing, we were able to better 
understand important aspects of our life. However, we may also have neglected particular 
aspects of each question. 
 At any rate, we should not lose sight of the fact that the analyses made implied a 
distinction between formal structures and their material identification. In other words, we saw 
that the soul is marked by a relation to truth, by the pursuit of the superlative good and by an 
inner πμθζηεία that configures a particular αίμξ. These structures, however, do not imply the 
particular identification of them that is presented (or at least suggested) in the Platonic 
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corpus. We may disagree with Plato‟s identification of the truth, the superlative good and the 
best αίμξ, and still agree with his description of the formal structures of our being. 
 Regardless of whether we agree with Plato or not, we are now in a position to see how 
he describes and appraises the unexamined life. Many important aspects of his description 
and appraisal were already alluded to, but we will still need to develop them, which is also 






The Platonic description of the unexamined life 
 
 
“(...) nos autem tenebras cogitemus tantas quantae quondam eruptione 
Aetnaeorum ignium finitimas regiones obscuravisse dicuntur, ut per biduum 
nemo hominem homo agnosceret, cum autem tertio die sol inluxisset tum ut 
revixisse sibi viderentur: quod si hoc idem ex aeternis tenebris contingeret ut 
subito lucem aspiceremus, quaenam species caeli videretur? sed adsiduitate 
cotidiana et consuetudine oculorum adsuescunt animi, neque admirantur neque 
requirunt rationes earum rerum, quas semper vident, proinde quasi novitas nos 
magis quam magnitudo rerum debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare.” 





After seeing the basic structures of human life according to the Platonic corpus, we 
must now consider what characterizes a life marked by the lack of philosophical examination. 
In other words, we have to determine what exactly is implied in the notion of “unexamined 
life” (ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ) and how such a life is constituted. As a particular kind of αίμξ, the 
unexamined life corresponds to a pursuit of the superlative good that unfolds in a certain kind 
of practical system, based on a system of beliefs of a certain kind. We will have to see how 
such a life unfolds (Chapter 15) and how it relates with knowledge (Chapter 16). We will also 
have to discuss what exactly is responsible for the occurrence of such a life and to what 
extent we may release ourselves from it (Chapter 17). All this will be essential for our 
subsequent discussion of Socrates‟ assertion about the worthlessness of the unexamined life 
and the importance of philosophical examination.  
 But before anything else, a few preliminary remarks about the notion of unexamined 
life (or ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ) are in order. First of all, we saw that Socrates, in the Apology, 
presents the alternative between the unexamined life and his own life (a life dedicated to 
philosophical examination) as a fundamental alternative in life.
2273
 However, this is not an 
alternative of which we are normally aware. Usually, we do think about the possibility of 
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dedicating our life to philosophical examination. Moreover, we can conceive of many 
different lives that may very well include some occasional examinations, but are not 
primarily concerned with examining things. We notice something similar in the Platonic 
corpus. The dialogues illustrate and mention many non-philosophical lives, which have their 
own values, their own goals and their own views. If we focus only on the Republic, Plato 
distinguishes five kinds of life and four of them are non-philosophical.
2274
 The difference 
between examining and not-examining is therefore far from being the only difference 
between lives or even the most recognizable. However, we can regard all lives that are 
opposed to the philosophical life as different modalities of the unexamined life. Despite all 
the differences, the notion of unexamined life actually expresses an essential trait of all these 
different lives, and their diversity only goes to show the variegated character of the 
unexamined life, or how it may assume many forms.  
 But this does not yet express the full malleability of the unexamined life. It is also 
important to note that we do not stop living an unexamined life just by performing some 
philosophical examinations. As we considered above, one may perform philosophical 
examination in an inauthentic or adulterated way.
2275
 More precisely, one may perform only a 
semblance of philosophical examination or one may still be immature and unable to fully 
develop it (as is the case with the young Socrates or Theaetetus). When this happens, one 
may already grant an important role to philosophical examination in one‟s life, but the 
examination in question is limited or defective. As a result, one‟s life is still unexamined. It is 
an unexamined life disguised as its opposite or a kind of unphilosophical philosophical life. 
In some cases, the inauthenticity in question may be immediately manifest, but in others it 
may be harder to identify. In fact, sometimes the boundaries between inauthentic and 
authentic philosophy may become blurry. This renders it all the more important to see in 
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 For a brief consideration of this and the other identifications of possible αίμζ in the corpus, cp. Chap. 13, 
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 See Chap. 14, Sect. 4. 
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 There are actually several reasons for doing this. Besides helping us draw the boundaries between the 
unexamined life and its opposite, it also let us understand the transition from one into another. Indeed, a partially 
examined life may develop our philosophical drive and, as a result, it may lead to a fully philosophical life. 
However, the life marked by inauthentic examination still shares many important features with the other kinds 
of unexamined life, and as such it also lets us understand not only how tenacious the unexamined life can be, but 
also how difficult it is to lead a philosophical life as Plato conceives it. 
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In sum, the unexamined life is more complex than we might have thought at first and 
it is important not to be deceived by the superficial differences between lives. Two particular 
ways of life may be extremely different and still be equally unexamined. We must therefore 
see which features are shared by all these lives as a result of their lack of examination, and 
since our main interest here is to identify the essential traits of the unexamined life, we must 
carefully separate what is specific of each kind of life from what may characterizes all forms 
of unexamined life as such.
2277
 
We must also note that the description of the unexamined life is not the description of 
some abstract or remote possibility. The unexamined life is very close and very familiar to 
most (if not all) people. Normally, people are born into it and spend their entire life without 
deeply examining things. This is also the life lead by most of the characters in Plato‟s 
dialogues (even though Socrates constantly tries to change that). The unexamined life is a 
constant presence in the texts, and the philosophical life itself grows out of it and is defined 
by it. However, despite all its pervasiveness and all its familiarity, it is difficult to say what 
exactly characterizes it. At first, the only thing we may know for sure is that such a life lacks 
examination. Whether we understand the word “ἀκελέηαζημξ” in a passive or active sense 
(i.e., as a life that is not submitted to philosophical examination or as a life that does not 
perform it), the ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ is nevertheless a life that has no contact with the particular 
kind of examination Plato presents throughout the corpus.
2278
 It may admit some brief and 
superficial examination, but it is not a life dedicated to it or defined by it.  
However, this is not all that is contained in the notion of unexamined life as it is used 
by Socrates. The lack of a particular kind of examination is not an incidental fact with no 
consequences for the life in question. On the contrary: the lack of examination is a form of 
defect and it can (and does) have very serious consequences on how we see things and on 
how we live. In other words, the term “unexamined life” is a pejorative term and it designates 
a defective kind of life. Thus, a life marked by perfection (both cognitive and practical) 
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At this point, we still do not know how serious are the consequences of leading an 
unexamined life. It seems to depend on how much of one‟s views are true or false. However, 
even if our views turn out to be right in many important things, we may still have a very 
defective access to things, which is something that may have serious consequences.
2280
 But 
let us leave this aside for now. In Part V, we will consider the badness or undesirability of the 
unexamined life as such, but in order to do so we must first identify the general structure of 
such a life, and this is our goal now.  
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 To be sure, the idea that the unexamined life involves a constitutive defect may seem paradoxical. We easily 
recognize that we do not perform the examination described by Plato, but we hardly see it as a defect (i.e., as 
something that brings about bad consequences). This means that there is a contrast between the structure of the 
unexamined life and its own self-interpretation, and we will have to account for such a contrast in what follows 
(i.e., we have to see how the defectiveness of the unexamined life comes to hide itself). 
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The formation or unfolding of the unexamined life 
 
 
“Pondus meum amor meus; eo feror, quocumque feror.” 





 We will begin by considering the way the unexamined life is formed. Although in 
general we are all very familiarized with such a life, it is usually (if not always) experienced 
as something already formed, whose mechanism or inner dialectics we do not follow. In fact, 
we tend not to be at all aware that there is something generating and sustaining the 
unexamined life. This is what we now have to explore. We must identify the basis or source 
of such a life, and see how it unfolds. In order to do so, we will refer back to many aspects of 
the analyses of αίμξ presented in Chapters 12 and 13.  
 
1. The predominance of a non-philosophical drive as the basis or source of the 
unexamined life 
 
The main trait of the unexamined life is obviously the lack of examination. This lack 
is not necessarily absolute. The unexamined life admits a certain degree of examination, but 
this examination is always circumscribed and subordinated to the particular goals of such a 
life. It is therefore very far from being a deep and global examination as the one we defined 
in Part II. The unexamined life does not perform such an examination and it is not submitted 
to it. This could be the result of such a life possessing a perfect or infallible knowledge. 
However, this is not case, as we will see. Then why does the unexamined life fail to examine? 
The framework of the Republic lets us better understand why this happens. We saw 
that according to this text each life is the expression of an inner πμθζηεία – i.e., of a particular 
arrangement of the soul‟s drives (i.e., an arrangement of its love of gain, its love of honor and 
its love of knowledge). These drives pull in different directions and they fight for control, but 
in general one of them prevails (to a greater or lesser degree) over the others and controls 
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them. This defines how each drive will affect the way we lead our life and also how they will 
affect each other (insofar as they are not only combined, but also contaminate and transform 
each other in a particular way). The submitted drives will be the most modified, and they will 
mirror to a great extent the ruling drive. The latter, in turn, will also be modified (even if to a 
lesser extent), according to the strength of the other drives. 
This is enough for us to identify the main feature of the unexamined life. The lack of 
examination is the result of the inner arrangement of the soul‟s drives (or of the soul‟s inner 
πμθζηεία). All the lives that are not decisively dominated by the love of knowledge, but rather 
by non-philosophical drives, are unexamined. The lack of examination is thus a consequence 
of one‟s limited interest in knowledge. One‟s philosophical or knowledge-loving drive does 
not prevail over the other drives. Instead, it becomes subject to them or controlled by       
them – and this is what blocks philosophical examination.
2282
 Indeed, the unexamined life 
does not consist in a permanent conflict of the soul‟s drives. Although it admits of certain 
conflicts and changes of arrangement, it nevertheless corresponds to a kind of inner πμθζηεία 
in which the love of gain or the love of honor prevails. The soul‟s θζθμζμθία is thus 
submitted to one of these other drives, and this submission transforms it and prevents it from 
functioning properly. One‟s mind becomes numb and to a great extent irrational and blind. 
This does not mean that one becomes totally indifferent to knowing what reality is. As we 
will see in the following chapter, the unexamined life is still full of beliefs or knowledge 
claims. However, one‟s relation with these beliefs or knowledge claims is weak. They are not 
the result of a careful examination and one does not feel the need to carefully examine them. 
Rather, one is credulous and easily accepts them. In many cases, they are dictated by the 
other drives, which assume a philosophical form and then determine how we see things. In 
other words, our non-philosophical drives create their own views and their own “truth”. 
These views may have many limitations or defects of which one is not aware, but we are 
nevertheless easily and strongly convinced of them.  
The basis of all forms of unexamined life is thus a particular kind of inner πμθζηεία or 
inner arrangement of the soul‟s drives. We may wonder about what brings about such an 
inner arrangement and thus causes the inborn θζθμζμθία to be weak and mastered by other 
drives. However, we will leave this question aside for now.
2283
 We will simply grant that the 
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soul may have a non-philosophical πμθζηεία and consider how such a kind of inner πμθζηεία 
may unfold into a complex way of life.  
 
2. The unfolding of the unexamined life. The unexamined superlative good and the 
unexamined practical system 
 
The unexamined life corresponds to a certain configuration of the inner structure of 
the soul. It is true that it may assume many concrete forms, but regardless of the particular 
contents of each unexamined life, they all share a common constitution, and this is what we 
must now identify. We must determine the unexamined life‟s core in more detail and see how 
it unfolds or spreads out, shaping one‟s life and all its moments. The unexamined life is 
indeed constituted by this dynamic process, even if we are not aware of it. For the most part, 
the process is inapparent and subterranean. It is an unexamined process. We do not need to 
think about it for it to occur. In some cases, the process may perhaps become more 
conspicuous – for instance, if there is an inner conflict (ζηάζζξ) or a change of inner πμθζηεία 
that forces us to change our course in life. But even at that moment we will probably pay 
little attention to the process that shapes our way of life. The constitution of all forms of 
unexamined life is mostly a blind process. We tend not to notice it, not to follow it and not to 
examine it. It merely occurs, as a manifestation of our being. We may pay closer attention to 
some of its moments and help shape them, but for the most part the process is tacit. 
We must now describe this mostly tacit process. In doing so, we will focus primarily 
on the practical side of the system of life. This means that for now we will pay little attention 
to its cognitive side, even if it is always present and underpins the whole practical system. It 
is true that the unexamined character of the unexamined life is directly referred to this life‟s 
views, but for now we will consider the practical tensions of such a life and how they restrict 
any examination. Then, in the following chapter, we will explore the cognitive side of the 
unexamined life.  
 
2.1. The unexamined identification of the superlative good 
 
We saw that each αίμξ corresponds to a particular form of pursuing the good, and such 
a pursuit is first of all based on a particular identification of the superlative good (i.e., of what 
will maximize its life and render it the best or happiest life). This identification is what allows 
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the soul to guide its own life. However, it is not automatically given to us. The soul is 
composed of three ineradicable drives and each of them is directed to a different kind of 
object. These drives thus pull us in different directions and fight for control. But in the case 
of the unexamined life, the soul is ruled by a drive that is in itself non-philosophical (even if 
it ends up being affected by the philosophical drive and, consequently, assumes some of its 
features). What does this mean for our identification of the superlative good?   
We saw that the interaction of drives creates a certain view (a δόλα) of what the 
superlative good is. This is not the only view of the soul, but it is a central one. It sets a target 
for the soul by defining what is most esteemed, and setting it apart from things that are 
indifferent or even despised. As a result, this view generates an intense love or desire (ἔνςξ) 
for what is seen as the good, and this love or desire tends to coincide with the soul‟s ruling 
drive – even if it may be partially transformed by the other drives. In fact, the object of love 
may be simpler or more complex. It all depends on the specific arrangement of the soul‟s 
constitutive drives.  
Now, since we are talking about the unexamined life, the particular object of desire 
will be some form of gain or honor. In order to identify one of them as the good, we may 
need several views about what they mean and what they imply. However, the unexamined 
life is characterized by the fact that this identification of the good is not the result of any 
explicit deliberation or rational discussion. In fact, it tends to be wholly tacit. We do not 
explicitly know that we have an identification of the good and we do not explicitly know 
what this identification is. Our tension towards it is rather experienced as a more or less 
immediate perception of what matters, and we are not able to say much about it. In some 
cases, we may perhaps have dedicated some thought to it, but this is still far from a complete 
examination. Our relation to the superlative good is fundamentally unexamined. However, 
this renders it no less effective. 
 
2.2. The unexamined pursuit of the superlative good and the constitution of an 
unexamined practical system 
 
Our relation with the superlative good, however, is not direct and simple. As we 
established before, the superlative good is not automatically available, and we need to pursue 
it. This pursuit may involve much work and painstaking, and it is essential to constitute a 
αίμξ. By pursuing the good our life becomes complex. But this is not all. Our identification of 
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the good also becomes complex. We may have to identify intermediate goods, which help us 
in our pursuit of the superlative good, as well as intermediate evils, which harm of chances of 
attaining what we desire. In fact, this may create very complex chains of referral. Many 
things may be pursued (or avoided) for the sake of something else, though ultimately they all 
refer to the superlative good. In other words, a complex practical system unfolds. We are 
always moved by our main love or desire, and this love or desire may direct us to many 
different targets (including our most immediate target – i.e., the action we are performing at 
any given moment).
2284
 However, our ultimate target is always the superlative good.  
The whole life is thus integrated in this pursuit of the superlative good, and the latter 
is defined by the soul‟s inner πμθζηεία or by the arrangement of the soul‟s constitutive drives. 
This πμθζηεία or arrangement determines which drive rules the soul, and the ruling drive then 
plays a central role in defining all life‟s pursuits – even if it is still affected (and partially 
transformed) by the other drives. These other drives, in turn, are also transformed by the 
ruling drive, and the inner πμθζηεία of the soul thus determines the way they are integrated (or 
how relevant they are) in one‟s life.
2285
 It is true that this inner arrangement is open to 
conflicts and may suffer some regional or even global variations, which will then change our 
particular routes or even our global destination in life. In fact, the whole practical system of 
life is being redefined at every moment, according to the circumstances we find ourselves in. 
However, the main lines of the system tend to be quite solid and to undergo very few changs. 
Be that as it may, the definition of our life‟s practical system depends on a very 
complex calculation or weighing. We must consider our possibilities and outline a 
meaningful plan. This is so even in the unexamined life. But in the latter, despite the 
constitutive calculation of how one is to live, we do not think things through. All the practical 
system is constituted almost automatically. In most cases, we did not even think about it 
explicitly. We have no clear relation to the constitution of our life‟s plan. The general 
direction of life and even all our particular steps tend to be (at least to a large extent) 
unexamined. They are quasi-instinctive or quasi-blind – even if they also have a cognitive 
structure, as we will see. We live without fully examining and justifying what we do. We do 
not demand much in terms of rational insight to be engaged in our life. We may not even 
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have a clear idea of what we hope to achieve by our actions. We do not even examine the 
particular interrelations between our acts and how we do some of them for the sake of others. 
We tend to have only a hazy notion of the whole path (or as Plato would say, we look at it 
from afar) – and this may end up causing crises or practical mistakes, when the orientation is 
revealed to be problematic or erroneous. 
It is true that at some moments one may employ or resort to some examination (and 
thus to some explicit calculation), but this examination is mostly instrumental. It serves 
practical purposes (namely, how to better achieve a particular goal we have, or even our 
general goal) and it is not concerned with attaining the complete truth of the matter. Thus, the 
examination in question is very limited. Even if one were to examine many more things, it 
would always fall short of a complete examination – especially because one does not have the 
time or the ζπμθή for it. In general, we must care for other things and we need to act with 
some urgency. We cannot spend much time examining our life and delay our action 
indefinitely. Our passions force us to act.
2286
 Moreover, the lack of examination is also 
important for us to be engaged and take pains in our life project. If we would question 
everything, we would most probably not be able to act resolutely.  
 
2.3. The unexamined integration of all beings in life’s practical “system” 
 
 We come into contact with many beings that are not the superlative good or the 
superlative evil. As Plato says, they are by themselves intermediate (ιεηαλύ) – i.e., neutral, 
neither good nor bad.
2287
 But this does not mean that we experience them as being absolutely 
neutral. On the contrary, they are subjected to demands and determined by the role they play 
in our life plan. They are helpful, harmful or indifferent. We may use them as instruments or 
they may be obstacles in our path. This also determines our relation to them. They become 
dear or hated, our own or alien. The process applies to things in a strict sense, to persons and 
even to the πόθζξ. They are all somehow integrated in our life and this determines them for 
us. Moreover, the process may be more or less complex. In some cases, it may include 
several layers. We may determine the value of something in general and also in a particular 
context (in which a thing may acquire a completely new – albeit temporary – value). But in 
all cases the functional role of things (and thus their immediate aspect and insertion in our 
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life) derives from the practical system and from the superlative good we ultimately pursue. 
The latter is what ultimately determines the way we relate to things and how they appear to 
us. In a sense, it creates the reality around us. 
This is very important, but normally the role things have in our life (and thus their 
aspect for us) is determined in a tacit manner. We do not need to examine these things in 
detail in order to see what role they might play. They are immediately regarded as helpful, 
harmful or irrelevant. Then, in some cases, we might examine them in some respect, and we 
may even try to know things good enough in order to manipulate them – i.e., we may develop 
an ἐιπεζνία or a ηνζαή. But the examination in question is partial and focused on what is 
relevant for the main drive of the soul.
2288
 This follows a general tendency of the unexamined 
life. Our contact with things is always shaped by our desires or interests. We look mostly at 
their possible relevance for our life. If they are irrelevant, we do not focus our attention on 
them. If they are relevant, we only consider the predicates that more directly concern us. We 
do not try to fully determine their identity and all their predicates. Thus, the way things 
appear to us is directly determined by our pursuit of the superlative good, and this produces 
an insufficient – and perhaps even greatly distorted – experience of things. 
 
2.4. Unexamined expectation and unexamined resignation as modes of appraising 
one’s life  
 
Our previous consideration of what characterized a particular αίμξ included one last 
important aspect – namely, the fact that we always have a diagnosis of our state or, to be 
more precise, a diagnosis of how our pursuit of the superlative good is going and what we 
might expect. We may have met more or less limitations and hindrances, and we may regard 
ourselves as having power (δύκαιζξ) to overcome our obstacles or we may think we are in a 
state of weakness (ἀζεέκεζα). In other words, we may have good expectations for the future 
(and live with hope) or we may be more despaired (and suffer something similar to the 
double pain mentioned in the Philebus).
2289
 In the latter case, we must then decide if life is 
still worth living or not. If we continue living, we may try to compromise or settle for less, 
and this will affect our practical system. We will have a weaker relation to the superlative 
                                                 
2288
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good and may rather focus on other things (such as safety or freedom from pain). This does 
not mean we will stop desiring the superlative good, but we will try to distract ourselves from 
it and guide ourselves to more modest goals (which will not fully satisfy us, though).  
To be sure, the process of compromising or settling for less is not something entirely 
under our control. We may be unable to distract ourselves from what we take to be the 
superlative good. But we may also settle for less without thinking much about it, and in the 
unexamined life the process actually tends to be tacit and automatic. As was said, we do not 
examine our desire of a superlative good and our relation to it. Moreover, we do not examine 
in full detail the happiness or misery of our state. We also do not examine our expectations or 
lack thereof, in order to see if they are legitimate or not. If we happen to think we will not 
achieve much, we do not fully examine whether or not we should go on living, and whether 
or not satisfy ourselves with what we got. Indeed, even if we try to distract ourselves from 
our superlative desire, we have no real justification for doing so (just like we have no real 
justification to do the opposite – i.e., to pursue the superlative good with all our strength). We 
simply do it, without wondering why. Thus, our appraisal of our life and our reaction to it 
tends to be unexamined, and in many cases we may not even be aware of it (i.e., we may not 
be aware of our resignation or of our expectations as such). 
 
3. The specific traits of the main kinds of unexamined life and their commonalities 
 
Up until this point, we have considered the general structure of the unexamined life in 
general and paid almost no attention to the fact that the unexamined life may assume many 
different shapes, according to the many different possible arrangements of the soul‟s drives. 
The different kinds of unexamined life share the structure we just described, but they also 
have particular features. This is not entirely negligible, especially because the dialogues often 
focus on particular modalities of the unexamined life and the kinds of person that correspond 
to them. We find ample discussion of these modalities, and their unexamined character is 
always stressed in one way or the other. Given this emphasis on the particular forms of 
unexamined life, it is important to consider them (even if only to see their most basic 
features). We will first focus on their pure forms (i.e., the ones in which the ruling drive more 
strongly prevails over the other drives), and then we will pay some attention to the mixed 
forms and their specificity. In doing so, we will be able to better understand what 




3.1. The different forms of gain-loving life 
 
One possible form of unexamined life is the one characterized by the love of gain. 
This life is ruled by the appetitive desires, and the other drives (namely, the love of honor and 
the love of knowledge) are subdued. The gain-loving life is thus primarily focused on our 
private or subjective sphere (i.e., our affective or bodily states) and it desires to achieve the 
best possible subjective state. But this is still a very generic description, and we have to see it 
in more detail. 
First of all, it is important to note that in several texts (such as Gorgias, Phaedo, 
Philebus), this is presented as a unitary form of life, and it even seems to encompass all    
non-philosophical lives (including the honor-loving life).
2290
 The gain-loving life is then 
characterized as a constant pursuit of pleasure, though one can also exercise some moderation 
(even if only for the sake of attaining more pleasure or avoiding pain).
2291
 In other texts (such 
as Phaedrus and the Republic), Plato sets it apart from an honor-loving life.
2292
 More 
importantly, Plato also distinguishes different kinds of gain-loving life, which have their own 
practical systems and their own views. As we saw, Plato identifies in the Republic three kinds 
of gain-loving life, which correspond to the oligarchic, the democratic and the tyrannical 
polities. Each of these lives pursues a different kind of desire or pleasure. The first kind of 
gain-loving life only considers our necessary desires (i.e., those that must be satisfied in order 
for us to survive) and tries to acquire all that assures its permanent satisfaction (namely, 
money or possessions).
2293
 The second kind of gain-loving life, in turn, pursues all sorts of 
pleasure (both necessary and non-necessary) and makes no distinctions among them.
2294
 
Finally, the third kind of gain-loving life is only concerned with the most intense pleasures, 




The rule of our gain-loving drive may therefore assume very different forms, 
depending on their ultimate goals, and one is bound to wonder what accounts for the different 
goals of these lives. Plato‟s model suggests that the difference may come from the 
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 See in particular Phd. 68b-c. 
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arrangement of the soul‟s drives. In the oligarchic life, the love of gain still seems to be 
opposed by the love of honor (and perhaps the love of knowledge), whereas in the tyrannical 
life all other drives seem to be reduced to their minimal forms. In addition, each of these 
three lives has its own view or understanding of what gain or pleasure is, as well as of how 
we may attain it, and this also plays an important role in distinguishing them.  
However, despite these differences, the three lives are ruled by the love of gain. This 
of course does not mean that other drives become inactive. Even the most tyrannical life is 
still somewhat concerned with how it is seen by others and with what the truth is. We are 
never indifferent to these questions. We are aware of others and of things in general, and so 
we want to be recognized by others and we want to have cognitive access to things. However, 
these urges are weakened and deeply transformed by the love of gain. As a result, they 
become integrated in a particular gain-loving project. One wants one‟s gain to be admired by 
others and one wants it to be true. In fact, the connection of our love of knowledge with the 
love of gain is particularly relevant. We always determine the subjective sphere and what is 
more closely connected to it. In other words, we have many views about it. The most 
important view of each gain-loving life, however, is the one that identifies the superlative 
good with having as much possessions as possible, having as much pleasure as possible, or 
having the most intense pleasures. These views of the good will then generate different kinds 
of pursuit. Each of them unfolds in a multitude of desires that are subordinated to the main 
desire of the soul. One will do many things to acquire possessions or pleasure, and everything 
will be seen or judged in light of its contribution to these goals.
2296
 However, in many cases it 
will not be easy to attain one‟s goal, and at that point one might have to compromise and 
settle for less (at least for a time). But still one will long for a superlative gain.  
It is important to note that this pursuit of the superlative gain (be it in the form of 
possessions or of pleasure) may imply very complex calculations. In Protagoras, Socrates 
points out that there is always some anticipation of future pains and pleasures.
2297
 In Gorgias, 
he admits that one may even develop a more elaborate view of things (and particularly of 
body and soul), although this is still a limited form of knowledge. Socrates calls this more 
elaborate view of things ἐιπεζνία, ηνίαδ, or ημθαηεοηζηή, and says that it is only concerned 
with what is relevant for one‟s pursuit of pleasure, and not with determining the nature of 
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things and taking proper care of them.
2298
 Thus, not even these more elaborate views change 
the fact that almost everything in the gain-loving lives is unexamined. One does not lose 
much time thinking about things. One automatically pursues possessions or pleasure, and 
there is no true examination of why they matter. One also fails to examine what exactly 
possessions or pleasures are, or what kinds of possession and pleasure there may be.
2299
 
Moreover, there is in general little examination of the best way to achieve them. One may 
calculate some ways of achieving them (and in this sense use some examination – especially 
in a life that pursues money), but this never includes a full inspection of how we should act 
and of the circumstances in which we find ourselves (i.e., of the beings around us and of how 
they can contribute to our main goal). These lives are mostly irrational, just like the drive 
they are based on. They imply many views, but their carelessness about the quality of these 
views leaves them open to all sorts of errors and distortions, which easily translates into 
practical failures and into misery. 
 
3.2. The honor-loving life 
 
A different kind of unexamined life is the one dominated by the spirited             
desires – namely, the love of victory and the love of honor. In the Republic, this is the life of 
the timocratic man, who is mostly concerned with whether or not he prevails over others and, 
in general, with how he appears to others. We all want to be admired and we want to avoid 
being ill-regarded, but for an honor-loving life this becomes the main goal and everything is 
directed at it. One wants to have as much honor or status as possible.
2300
 However, one 
cannot instantly attain this goal. It requires great efforts (such as contests, conflicts, or even 
wars). In fact, one may have to dedicate one‟s entire life to such a goal. Every action will 
then be integrated in the project of gaining honor. Everything will be done for the sake of 
honor, and everything will be seen in light of its contribution to one‟s main goal.
2301
 This is 
the general structure of the honor-loving life. There can be many variations of it (according to 
the context and to one‟s expectations or resignation), but they all differ significantly from the 
gain-loving life. Whereas the latter is mainly concerned with one‟s subjective sphere (and 
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thus with what one feels), the former are mostly concerned with the intersubjective sphere 
and with all that is relevant therein.   
But the prevalence of the honor-loving drive does not mean that the other drives 
become inactive. Although the love of honor rules the soul, there is still love of gain and love 
of knowledge, and they can modify or distort the love of honor in greater or lesser degree. As 
a result, we also want to take pleasure in being honored by others and we want our honor to 
be true. However, these desires for pleasure and knowledge are relatively weak and distorted. 
This becomes particularly relevant in the case of our love of knowledge. Despite some 
concern with truth, the honor-loving life is nonetheless unexamined. It might occasionally 
examine things (even in a more philosophical way), but this examination will only be a 
means to better achieve its goal. One does not deeply examine what the others are, how 
exactly they see us, what it is to be honored or admired, and why it matters so much. One also 
does not examine in full how one should pursue honor. For instance, one tends not to think 
about what competences one should acquire.
2302
 One also fails to fully examine one‟s 
circumstances and the beings around oneself, in order to better determine the role they could 
play in one‟s general pursuit of the good. All these things tend to be more or less 
automatically determined, and thus one is exposed to the possibility of making many 
mistakes. 
 
3.3. The inauthentic dedication to philosophical examination and the inauthentic 
philosophical life 
 
 All forms of unexamined life have a philosophical component, but (as we saw above) 
there is also a particular form of unexamined life that takes itself to be philosophical in a    
pre-eminent sense.
2303
 It occupies itself with philosophical examination, and it may even 
regard itself as devoted to this activity. In fact, this kind of life does not seem as concerned 
with gain or honor as the lives just considered. Rather, it seems to be ruled by the love of 
knowledge. Indeed, it has many cognitive desires, it undertakes many things for the sake of 
knowledge and apparently it regards beings in general as objects of knowledge. This is why it 
examines so many things. However, this life‟s dedication to philosophical examination is 
inauthentic. More precisely, it is based on something other than a genuine philosophical 
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2303
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interest. Its love of knowledge is still limited and thus it is not truly philosophical. It only 
resembles a philosophical life. 
 Plato is very aware of this possibility and he shows how it can still be regarded as a 
variation of the two other kinds of unexamined life: the gain-loving life and the honor-loving 
life. In other words, the false philosophical life is a mixed life, in which the philosophical 
drive is more developed than usual, but still not fully developed. Truth is still not pursued 
entirely for its own sake. Its pursuit is still subordinated to some other goal, even if one does 
not notice it. The philosophical drive is subverted and acts for the sake of gain or honor. 
Despite all the concern with knowledge, one‟s true priority is of a different kind. Pleasure or 
honor are ultimately at the center of the inauthentic philosophical life. In other words, the rule 
(and consequently the polity) of the soul is not truly philosophical. 
One of the most direct allusions to this possibility can be found in Phaedo, when 
Socrates says that people that are truly concerned with dying are not really philosophers.
2304
 
They may examine things in their free times, but their priorities change as soon as what they 
desire is not guaranteed. This is one important aspect of it, but there are several other 
important references to inauthentic philosophical lives in the Platonic corpus. For instance, 
Plato admits that the democratic man, who pursues pleasure above all, may also dabble in 
philosophy.
2305
 He also mentions the young that imitate Socrates‟ examination in order to 
have pleasure.
2306
 Other times he portrays someone that is only interested in defeating 
someone else‟s arguments or in being celebrated for his wisdom.
2307
 In fact, even if one‟s 
desires do not go so far, one may still be concerned with what others will think and this may 
limit one‟s ability to examine something.
2308
 
All these lives are thus unphilosophical and unexamined. Indeed, the examinations 
they carry out are all affected and even guided by the love of gain or the love of honor. This 
means that there are many things that one will accept without sufficient examination and 
there are also many things one will not truly question (especially one‟s most fundamental 
views).
2309
 Most importantly, this kind of life does not truly examine its motivations and is 
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not truly aware of what it really desires. Thus, despite all its philosophical concerns, this life 




3.4. Other mixed βίνη  
 
What we just saw points to an important aspect of Plato‟s model that largely 
multiplies the number of forms the unexamined life may assume. According to Plato, there 
can be mixed lives. It is true that in a sense all lives are mixed, insofar as they always imply a 
combination and mutual contamination of all the soul‟s drives. But in many cases there is still 
a prominent drive that rules the soul and gives it a relatively simple target in life. This is not 
the case in what we here call a mixed αίμξ. Plato speaks of outer πμθζηε῔αζ that are not clear, 
and we may assume the same applies to the inner πμθζηε῔αζ.
2311
 Indeed, even if Plato does not 
say much more about it, he seems to admit the possibility of lives in which no particular drive 
is clearly prominent. Two or even all three of them may have similar strength and may 
transform each other to a great degree. In fact, it is not clear whether one must still somehow 
prevail over the others or not. At any rate, the soul will apparently have a mixed ruler and a 
mixed goal in life. This will determine this life‟s practical system and the role each being 
plays in it. In other words, we are dealing with a particular way of life. It is only more 
difficult for us to describe it.  
One thing seems clear, though. Given the fact that these mixed lives are not 
dominated by the love of knowledge, they are just as unexamined as the lives we considered 
before. In general, they define themselves without much examination. They do not examine 
their ultimate goal or, to be more precise, they do not examine why this goal is important or 
how it is to be understood. They also do not examine their way of pursuing it and the role the 
different things may play in that pursuit. They do not even examine whether they should have 
high hopes or should settle for less. For the most part, everything will be automatically 
determined by the soul‟s ruling drives, and any examination these mixed lives might carry 
out will be very restricted in scope. Thus, the only difference between these and the 
previously considered lives lies in the number of drives that rule the soul. 
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3.5. Variability and constancy of the unexamined life 
 
As we saw above, there can be many changes in one‟s αίμξ, but for the most part these 
changes do not change the unexamined character of one‟s life.
2312
 Most changes tend to be 
superficial and concern only the more immediate questions (such as what we should do or 
how we should regard something). In fact, our life is in constant flux and our plans are 
constantly being adapted to the circumstances (either automatically or with the help of some 
circumscribed examination). However, the most basic assumptions of our life, and especially 
our view of the superlative good, tend to be very resistant. Still, it seems possible for our αίμξ 
to change. The relation of forces between the soul‟s drives can vary according to what we do 
or what we go through. In fact, there are always small variations in our inner πμθζηεία, but in 
some cases the change may be more significant and the soul may even start being ruled by a 
different drive. This will produce a radical change in one‟s life and everything will be 
affected by it. One will change one‟s conception of the superlative good and this will 
generate different pursuits and a different practical system. Consequently, one will look at 
everything differently and things will now play a different role in our life. In sum, our entire 
life and our entire world becomes different. However, such deep changes are not very 
frequent. Plato describes these processes as something that occurs very slowly and mostly in 
one‟s youth.
2313
 In general, our resistance to change increases with age, as we developed 
firmer habits. 
One could wonder what leads to such changes and how much control we have over it, 
but we will not consider this question at this point.
2314
 What we must now consider is how 
these changes are mostly marked by the lack of examination. Indeed, we usually leave a 
modality of unexamined life for another. Moreover, we normally do not examine different 
alternatives and the advantages of each, in order to make an informed choice. We are not like 
Odysseus in Republic X or like Heracles in Prodicus‟ story.
2315
 Even if we examine some 
aspects related with the change, we tend not to consider the whole. In fact, we may not even 
be fully aware of the change, or at least of what changed and why. Moreover, we tend not to 
be disturbed by the fact that our life has had two very different configurations at two different 
moments in time, and thus we do not question the present configuration and do not consider 
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that it may very well change again. We tend to simply go on living as if nothing had 
happened.  
 
3.6. Moments of crisis 
 
Until now, we assumed that our life is always defined in one way or another, but we 
may also go through moments of crisis. These crises may be superficial or deep. It is, for 
instance, possible that in particular circumstances two different drives fight each other in 
order to determine our action (as is illustrated and discussed in Republic IV).
2316
 But this kind 
of conflicts usually takes place within the framework of a certain αίμξ, which is determined 
by a certain arrangement of the soul‟s drives. Thus, our motivations in a particular situation 
are determined by the general arrangement of our motivations. However, there can also be a 
crisis at this level. Different drives may fight to control our soul and this may produce a state 
of indecision. One may be pulled in two directions, and our soul may thus fall into a civil 
strife (ζηάζζξ).
2317
 While the conflict lasts, there will be no ruling drive, and consequently one 
will have no clear goal in life, no path to follow, and the role of everything in one‟s life will 
be indeterminate. In sum, one will be in a state of global ἀπμνία and πθάκδ. 
During the conflict, we will not be leading an unexamined life in the strict sense. In 
fact, we will not have any defined αίμξ. Moreover, this kind of conflict will tend to bring 
about a great deal of examination. We must think about what we should do. However, this 
does not mean that our philosophical drive will be dominant and that we will fully embrace 
philosophical examination. We just want to solve the crisis quickly and go on with our life. 
Therefore, we tend to reduce the crisis to a particular problem and to simple alternatives, 
without considering its full scope. We will thus make many unexamined assumptions, which 
probably remain from the previous life and thus limit the potential for change. We may also 
be easily satisfied with the first solution that comes our way, and this solution will probably 
be dictated by a non-philosophical drive. Consequently, the unexamined life will reinstate 
itself and nothing significant will have changed. 
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3.7. The commonalities of all the forms of unexamined life 
 
 We saw that there can be many different forms of unexamined life, and each of them 
has its own goals, its own practical system, and its own experience of reality. However, they 
are not entirely different from one another. In fact, we even saw how Plato sometimes 
reduces all unexamined (or non-philosophical) lives to just one: the body-loving or    
pleasure-loving life. In doing so, he brings to the fore the contrast between pleasure and 
knowledge – i.e., between our subjective and our objective dimensions. But assuming we can 
make this reduction, there is still a variety of pleasures, and (as Plato stresses) some of them 
are better than others, which means that we could still identify different pleasure-loving lives. 
But usually Plato does not explore the question from this angle. Instead, he calls our attention 
to other differences, and with respect to the latter we must make some remarks. 
 First, according to Plato, not all forms of unexamined life have the same value. Some 
seem to be better than others, and apparently this depends on the role the philosophical drive 
plays in such lives. We will return to this question later.
2318
 Meanwhile, it is important to bear 
in mind that even if there is a scale of unexamined lives, Plato is not necessarily describing an 
itinerary we all must follow during our lives. We do not all begin at the bottom of the scale 
and we do not need to go through all stages. In fact, we may begin with any particular kind of 
inner πμθζηεία and thus with any particular kind of life.
2319
 Moreover, although Plato in the 
Republic describes the transitions from one life into another as a gradual process, it is not 
clear whether this is only a matter of presentation or if it really implies the view that the 
changes must always be the smallest possible.  
 Be that as it may, there are many different unexamined lives, which vary according to 
the inner arrangement of the soul and the particular kind of object one pursues in life. Insofar 
as these lives are unexamined, they all share common traits. They are all based on a weak 
love of knowledge, and thus they lack full knowledge and also lack any serious examination 
of themselves and everything that is relevant to them. These lives are not clearly aware of 
themselves and of what they come into contact with. Thus, they are to a great extent blind, 
irrational and rash (despite all knowledge claims that they may still contain and which will be 
discussed in the following chapter). 
 
                                                 
2318
 See Chap. 18. 
2319
 Plato even admits the possibility of having philosophical talent and being thus naturally inclined to lead a 
philosophical life (even though one will still have to train one‟s philosophical drive). Cp. Rep. 485a ff. 
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4. The self-interpretation of the unexamined life with respect to its cognitive status and 
its need to examine 
 
Before considering the cognitive nature of the unexamined life and how the desire of 
knowledge is always an essential trait of it, it is important to see how the unexamined life in 
general tends to understand or interpret itself, especially with respect to its cognitive state and 
to the possibility of examination. This is a difficult matter. Indeed, the unexamined life 
usually does not think about its own status and its self-understanding is often tacit. Moreover, 
given the intrinsic diversity of the unexamined life, it is difficult to determine a precise 
pattern that cuts across all forms of unexamined life. Still, we can identify general tendencies. 
We already made some references to them, but now we have to consider them more closely.  
 
4.1. The intuitive and “inspired” character of the unexamined life (according to 
its own interpretation) 
 
First of all, the unexamined life does not regard itself as having any special form of 
knowledge. It may admit to knowing some things, but it is not primarily concerned with 
knowledge. Thus, it also does not regard itself as unexamined (i.e., as failing to submit its 
views to examination). But despite its apparent epistemological humility, the unexamined life 
does not regard itself as being blind to itself and to things around it. On the contrary, the 
unexamined life believes it has contact with reality. From its standpoint, it immediately sees 
things as they are and it also immediately sees what it has to do. In other words, it thinks it 
has an intuitive character. All things are seen as being immediately given and this life relates 
to reality in a passive manner. It does not have to determine what things are – i.e., its 
experience does not depend on judgment or reason, and is thus free from being false or 
wrong. This does not exclude that there might be some cognitive mistakes and that 
appearances may sometimes be wrong. But these are rare occurrences and we are normally 
not concerned with them. 
In general, we are absorbed in our own unexamined life. As Plato sometimes says, we 
are spellbound or charmed (βμδηεοόιεκμζ) by what appears to us – and especially by what it 
makes us feel.
2320
 We are simply attracted by things and by what we desire, without thinking 
much about it. This comes directly from the soul‟s πμθζηεία, and mostly from the ruling drive 
                                                 
2320
 Cp. Phd. 81b-c, and Rep. 413c-d. 
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of the soul, which determines what we must pursue. Thus, we immediately see what is the 
good, what we must do to attain it and what role things may play in this pursuit. We also see 
without difficulty how this pursuit is going and whether or not we should settle for an inferior 
version of the good. All this is experienced as being already decided for us, and not as being 
the result of our own activity or judgment. 
Knowledge thus seem to play a very modest role in the unexamined life (at least 
according to the latter‟s self-interpretation). It is not decisive, and even if one admits that this 
life has cognitive components, the latter are still not viewed as something complex and 
requiring full rational insight. In fact, we tend to think that our views consist solely in the 
attribution of predicates. We may misattribute them or we may get things right (i.e., we may 
have ὀνεαὶ δόλαζ). In general, however, we think that most attributions are right (even if we 
have no deep insight into the predicate being attributed). If this is so, then – according to 
Plato – we live in a state of divine inspiration or possession (ἐκεμοζζάγεζκ or ηαηέπεζεαζ).
2321
 
We are not able to give an account of why we see things as we do or of why we do what we 
do, but we will think we are seeing them as they are and doing what we must do. 
 
4.2. The limited need for examination in the unexamined life (according to its 
own interpretation). The useless and even harmful character of philosophical 
examination 
  
 Finally, we must briefly discuss how the unexamined life tends to regard the 
possibility of examining things, and above all the possibility of carrying out something like a 
philosophical examination in the sense previously defined.
2322
 What is the examination‟s role 
in the unexamined life? What is its value?  
 We all have a tacit understanding of the possibility of examining things and we often 
carry out many ordinary examinations. They help us clarify things and better determine our 
course in life. However, these examinations are spasmodic and regional. They concern a 
particular doubt or a particular inner conflict we may have, but leave many things 
unexamined (and even things that may be decisive for what we are examining). Moreover, 
our examination normally does not examine itself – i.e., it does not try to understand what it 
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 On the notion of ὀνεὴ δόλα and its relation with divine inspiration or possession, see Men. 97a ff. (and 
especially 99c-d). Cp. also Ap. 22b-c. 
2322
 Cp. Part II. 
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exactly does and how important it is. We have an immediate understanding of when we must 
examine and we tend not to question it.  
 But what about the possibility of philosophical examination? In fact, we are normally 
not aware of such a possibility. We do not even have an explicit notion of most of our views, 
much less of the possibility of exhaustively examining them. Thus, if we are to meet some 
Socrates, we are bound to have difficulties understanding what he does and why he does it. 
But this does not mean that we will have no stance about it. Faced with the possibility of 
undertaking a philosophical examination, we will easily regard it as useless or fruitless.
2323
 
All that matters in life seems to be already decided. We already see what things are and what 
is to be done. Thus, the possibility of an extensive and deep examination of everything seems 
to be a strange project. At best, it suggests the possibility of a distant and transcendent truth, 
but such a truth is irrelevant for the here and now.  
 This is one possible reaction to philosophical examination, but it is not the worse one. 
The unexamined life may also regard such an examination as something intrinsically harmful, 
and there may be several reasons for that. First, philosophical examination tends not to be 
seen as a respectable practice.
2324
 Second, it is unpleasant to be examined and one would 
rather avoid it.
2325
 Third, it meddles with established practices and established truths.
2326
 
Fourth, it causes us to hesitate and can even paralyze us.
2327
 Fifth, even if philosophical 
examination does not cause us to have doubts about what we should do, it delays us and goes 
against the urgency of life.
2328
 Thus, we would rather avoid philosophical examination. At 
least, this is the general tendency of the unexamined life.  
 However, we saw that it is also possible to perform some philosophical examination 
without abandoning the unexamined life. For instance, one may perform it as a part of one‟s 
general education or as a pastime.
2329
 In this case, one admits that it is useful to think a little 
about life, even if only up to a point; after such a point, there are more serious matters we 
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 Cp. e.g. Rep. 487c ff., and Prm. 135d. 
2324
 Cp. in particular Grg. 484c ff. 
2325
 For the idea that philosophical examination causes anger or disturbance, and is something one will probably 
want to get rid of, cp. e.g. Ap. 23c, 39c-d, Tht. 168a-b. 
2326
 This is, for instance, what is implied in the older accusations against Socrates, according to the Apology. Cp. 
Chap. 1, Sect. 2 (especially 2.2) above. See also Rep. 538d ff. 
2327
 See in particular Men. 80a-d, where Socrates is compared to a sort of torpedo ray that paralyzes the mouth 
and the soul of his interlocutor. 
2328
 Indeed, our course of life and our course of action are usually clear and we have no time to examine things. 
The characters in the dialogues sometimes invoke this lack of time, by saying that it is time to leave or to act. 
Cp. e.g. Euthphr. 15e (where the conversation is interrupted with the words “ιμζ ὥνα ἀπζέκαζ), and Cri. 46a 
(where Crito says to Socrates: “μ὎δὲ αμοθεύεζεαζ ἔηζ ὥνα ἀθθὰ αεαμοθεῦζεαζ”).  
2329
 Cp. Grg. 484c ff., 487c-d, Rep. 487c, 497e f. 
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must concern ourselves with. But it is also possible to develop a strong dedication to 
philosophical examination – despite the fact that one‟s soul is still ruled by non-philosophical 
drives. One‟s examination will then be limited and somewhat superficial. We will easily 
accept what is dictated by the other drives (i.e., we will follow our non-rational inclinations). 
To be sure, we may also use this examination to develop more elaborate forms of empirical 
knowledge or perhaps even particular sciences. However, the main assumptions of our life 
and of reality will remain unexamined.
2330
 Moreover, this is not what normally happens when 
we start examining. In general, the beginning of philosophical examination is very difficult 
and we do not see much immediate progress. On the contrary: when we start questioning our 
views, we easily become dazzled (as is said in the allegory of the cave), and thus we tend to 
fall back in our previous views and practices.
2331
 As a matter of fact, our bad experience 




In sum, the unexamined life tends to be completely averse to philosophical 
examination and, even when it seems to accept some form of it, its relation to it tends to be 
superficial and precarious. 
 
                                                 
2330
 Cp. Grg. 463a ff. and Rep. 510c ff., 533a ff. 
2331
 Cp. Rep. 515c-e. 
2332





The philosophical character of the unexamined life. The complexity and all-
pervasiveness of its alleged “truth” 
 
 
“(...) sic amatur veritas, ut, quicumque aliud amant, hoc quod amant velint 
esse veritatem, et quia falli nollent, nolunt convinci, quod falsi sint (...)”  





We have made some references to cognitive elements while describing the formation 
of the unexamined life. Above all, it was mentioned that the soul‟s inner πμθζηεία determines 
one‟s identification of the good (i.e., one‟s δόλα about it). However, this is very far from 
being the only cognitive component of the unexamined life. As we saw above, any particular 
αίμξ is based on a system of views or beliefs. Many of these beliefs refer to how we should 
live and what we should do, but they go much further than that. Thus, all forms of 
unexamined life depend on a supposed knowledge. In other words, the unexamined life is 
always concerned with truth – i.e., with knowledge and being. It is always philosophical or it 
always desires to know. This is not a minor detail of this life, but rather one of its most 
essential features. All the parts of the practical system are philosophical – and they are so in 
many ways (i.e., they all involve many views). We will now focus on this and see how the 
unexamined life is pervaded from top to bottom by views or beliefs. This is especially 
important because it determines how much of it is not being examined, and it will also 
determine the consequences of such a lack of examination.  
In considering this question, we will have to revisit some of the previous analyses, 
although we will now see them in a different light. Thus, we will see how all the beliefs 
identified in Chapter 6 are formed within the unexamined life and thanks to it. Likewise, the 
unexamined life determines the entire cognitive structure of the soul we identified in Chapter 
11. This then raises the question about the quality of our views – which is thus a question 
about the quality of our entire life. The examination will in fact show that our views have 
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 See L. VERHEIJEN (ed.), Sancti Augustini Confessionum libri XIII, Turnhout, Brepols, 1981. 
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many limitations or defects, as we considered in Chapter 7, but now we will see how these 
limitations result from the soul‟s practical structure. 
 
1. The kind of presence of the philosophical drive in the unexamined life 
 
 At first sight, the philosophical drive may seem to have a very limited and 
circumscribed presence in the unexamined life. We need to know some things, and we may 
even examine them, but in general we appear to be much more concerned with pursuing other 
goals – namely, some form of gain or honor. This is so because at the core of the unexamined 
life lies a non-philosophical drive. The latter, in its pure state, has no relation to knowledge or 
truth (which is indeed the province of the philosophical drive). However, the soul‟s drives 
interact with each other, and the gain-loving drive or the honor-loving drive may thus use 
(and even require) knowledge in order to better attain their goals. Knowledge (and the love of 
knowledge) has then a certain presence in the unexamined life, even if it is wholly 
subordinated to the soul‟s non-philosophical drives. But is this all? 
 Such a description suggests that knowledge is something that may sometimes be used 
by the soul in the unexamined life. However, we saw above that the whole unfolding of a 
αίμξ (i.e., the practical system of life) is philosophical or supposedly cognitive. In other 
words, the unfolding of a αίμξ is at the same time the unfolding of a system of views or 
beliefs (i.e., of δόλαζ or knowledge claims). The former contains a version of truth or an 
unexamined “truth”. Thus, despite the apparently immediate presence of our desires and of 
things in general, we never come into contact with a simple αἴζεδζζξ or a purely subjective 
appearing. Everything is already pervaded and shaped by δόλαζ.
2334
 Even though most of 
these δόλαζ are tacit and we do not notice them, they nevertheless determine our entire life or 
make life clear for us, and this is an expression of our inborn love of knowledge. 
The truth status is therefore attributed to a version of things. This attribution or 
identification may be correct or incorrect – i.e., things may or may not be as they appear to be 
(or as we think they are). But be that as it may, the philosophical drive is omnipresent in the 
unexamined life, and it is normally satisfied. Indeed, we tend to think we have everything 
figured out. To be more precise, we have many views (even if most of them are tacit) and 
these views are not provisional. In many cases, it even seems that there is no alternative to 
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 There are always cognitive decisions or answers. The soul‟s scribe always writes down a version of things, 




how we see things, and it is precisely this that makes us skeptical about philosophical 
examination. Examining things seems useless. We already know all we need to know, and 
now it is time to act and live according to this knowledge. But how do we come to know 
these things? Obviously, most of these views are not the result of deep reflection. Rather, 
they are formed by some tacit process, or they are the result of some spontaneous (and 
probably not very rigorous) examination. The origin of our views is thus mostly unclear to us. 
We do not pay much attention to the process that forms them or we forget it, and this is why 
we may even be unaware that it happens and that we have knowledge claims at all. 
But we can better understand this process if we consider that, as was said above, the 
soul‟s constitutive drives always contaminate or transform each other, and we cannot 
represent something like a pure and blind instinct – i.e., a drive that is wholly indifferent to 
what things are. The drives that we experience (and that rule the unexamined life) are not 
wholly blind, but rather philosophical to a certain extent. In other words, the way we 
experience the love of gain and the love of honor already exceeds a simple appearing of 
something indeterminate. Our drives are already accompanied and shaped by our views or 
beliefs about what things are. These views or beliefs determine how we understand gain and 
honor, how we may pursue them, how things may contribute to this pursuit, and what things 
in general are. 
However, our love of gain and our love of honor are not just accompanied and 
affected by our love of knowledge and our views. The contamination works both ways, and 
this means that our love of gain and our love of honor affect our love of knowledge. More 
precisely, they create their own views and try to persuade us of them. At the same time, they 
become sensitive to arguments and able to be persuaded.
2335
 Thus, the conflicts (ζηάζεζξ) 
between drives actually become a conflict of views (and especially of the main views of each 
drive). These views fight to be accepted or, as Plato says, they fight to overtake the citadel of 
the soul and rule it.
2336
 The image is very expressive. The attacking views try to enter by 
force, and not by withstanding a rigorous examination. It is true that it is never a matter of 
brute force. As we will see in the following chapter, the soul (and its θζθμζμθία) must be 
persuaded. However, the views in question do not present any cognitive credentials, and their 
acceptance is therefore illicit. 
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 For more on this, cp. Chap. 13, Sect. 5.2 above. 
2336
 See Rep. 560b-d, and also 561b-c. 
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This is what characterizes the unexamined life. A non-philosophical drive comes to 
rule the soul and, as a result, it manipulates our love of knowledge. More precisely, this drive 
convinces us of its own views and defines the way we see everything. However, this is only 
possible because the philosophical drive is weakened or withered. It lacks rigor or has lower 
demands in terms of justification, clearness and consistency.
2337
 Hence, it easily accepts 
views that may be unjustified, unclear or inconsistent. Since it does not fully examine things, 
it does not fully exclude that things may be otherwise. But this is not all. Our love of 
knowledge may be so weakened that we do not even notice it as such. In other words, our 
concern with knowledge and truth may seem to be entirely absent, and our life may seem to 
be immediate and unreflected.  
However, this is not what is happening. Our soul does not stop aiming at the truth, nor 
does it confine the question of truth to some particular topics. The unexamined life contains a 
very complex system of views, as was mentioned, and these views are all intimately 
connected with what we just considered. Indeed, after installing its main views in the soul, 
the ruling drive develops a view of reality based on these views. In other words, everything 
comes to be seen in light of the soul‟s main desire, which thus creates a gain-loving or a 
honor-loving reality (as well as its underlying ontology). This is not simply a theoretical 
process apart from our life and the world we live in. It actually constitutes our life and our 
reality, and as such it is something to which we are deeply attached. This attachment results 
from the main drive or the main love of the soul and it corresponds to a form of erotic 
necessity that shackles us to a particular way of seeing things.
2338
 In the case of the 
unexamined life, this way of seeing things is extremely defective and coincides with what 
Plato calls δόλα. Consequently, in virtue of its main love, the unexamined life is also 
θζθόδμλμξ.
2339
 It takes place in the domain of δόλα and is fond of this domain (i.e., it takes it 
as its natural place).  
 Our experience of life and of reality in general is thus defined by the main drive or 
main love of the soul. This is very important to understand the Platonic conception of the 
unexamined life. In such a life, our love of gain or our love of honor becomes, in a way, the 
measure of all things. We take things to be as they appear to us in light of our interests. In 
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 It fails to live up to Locke‟s criterion (or “unerring mark”) of a lover of truth for truth‟s sake, namely “not 
entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant.” Cp. An Essay 
Concerning Human Uunderstanding, Book IV, Chapter 19 – here quoted according to: J. LOCKE, Works, vol. 
3, London, T. Tegg/etc., 1823 (repr. Aalen, Scientia, 1963), 147. 
2338
 On this idea of being imprisoned by our desires in a particular version of truth, see Phd. 82d-83a and 83d. 
On the idea of our desires as a form of prison, cp. also Cra. 403c-d. 
2339
 For this notion, see Rep. 480a. 
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other words, our views of things are fundamentally pragmatic. We find this idea expressly 
stated in the Phaedo, when Socrates says that our bodily desires make our ροπή share the 
views of the body (ὁιμδμλε῔κ ηῶ ζώιαηζ) – i.e., the views created by our bodily desires.
2340
 
Another passage that stresses the role our love plays in defining things for us can be found in 
Gorgias, when Socrates says to Callicles that both of them repeat what their beloved say and 
cannot contradict or oppose them.
2341
 In both cases, this love involves a component of 
blindness, corresponding to what is said in the Laws about the lover being blind about the 
beloved.
2342
 The fact that we love something makes us want it to be true and it also makes us 
take it to be true. The soul‟s intrinsic desires smuggle views into our way of seeing things 
without going through border control – i.e., through a full rational inspection. More precisely, 
the particular relation of forces of the soul allows for a non-philosophical drive to use the 
love of knowledge as its instrument or handmaiden. Our love of knowledge then creates or 
develops views to sustain and strengthen this drive and it also accepts them as good views.   
This is the origin of most (if not all) of our knowledge claims. Their genesis is highly 
defective, although we normally do not have any idea of this. The process occurs deep within 
our soul and we do not follow it. We only notice its effects, which we then interpret as 
something other than the views instigated by our non-philosophical drives. We see these 
effects simply as an immediate contact with things as they are. But if the present description 
is correct, then the way we experience things and life in general is highly questionable. It is 
marked by a deep (even if not complete) irrationality or ἀθμβία. More specifically, the 
irrational drives assume a rational form and our gaze becomes a mixture of θόβμξ and ἀθμβία. 
We see things, but this perception is selective and perhaps distortive. In other words, a drive 
that is originally blind creates our particular way of seeing things.
2343
 However, things may 
be otherwise. The unexamined life is constitutively exposed to the possibility of untruth. This 
characterizes such a life as a whole, as well as all of its components. Moreover, since each 
component of life is itself determined by several intertwined views, it is actually exposed to 
several forms of falsity. In sum, the unexamined life may be radically and thoroughly untrue. 
It may be no more than a dream state or a state of complete insanity. We may be totally 
unaware of our true situation. Given the origin of our views, this is a possibility we cannot 
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 See Grg. 481d-482a. 
2342
 See Lg. 731e: “ηοθθμῦηαζ βὰν πενὶ ηὸ θζθμύιεκμκ ὁ θζθ῵κ (...).” 
2343
 For the idea of a blind guide or leader of our life, cp. Rep. 554b. 
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exclude. Despite the permanent presence of our love of knowledge and of truth, we may be 
entirely deceived about everything. 
 
2. The complex system of beliefs that make up the unexamined life 
 
The description just made is still very generic and it is important to see in more detail 
the cognitive dimension of the unexamined life. More precisely, we must see how our love of 
gain or our love of honor use our love of knowledge in order to create a very complex system 
of views or beliefs that encompasses absolutely everything, thereby producing our usual 
experience of things. Many important features of this system were already considered in 
previous chapters.
2344
 Now, however, we must consider them from a different angle. The 
analyses of the soul‟s constitutive drives and of how they usually form an unexamined life 
will help us understand not only the origin or genesis of our views, but also their place or 
function in our life.   
 In the following analysis, we have to bear in mind the simultaneous unity and 
diversity of the unexamined life. Indeed, there can be many unexamined systems of beliefs 
(or, as we could also say, many unexamined versions of truth), and in a way they are 
constantly changing (at least in their most superficial aspects). However, there are also 
common features (and even a general structure) that are shared by all. We will first focus our 
attention on what is common to all kinds of unexamined life and later (Section 3) we will 
consider each of the main kinds of unexamined life in more detail. 
 
2.1. The beliefs about life or the practical domain 
 
 Let us start with the practical beliefs – i.e., those that concern the way a ροπή lives or 
the role different things play in the ροπή‟s life. The practical systems (i.e., the systematic 
pursuit of the superlative good) we considered in the previous chapter are all based on an 
intricate system of beliefs. The basic beliefs of this system concern the identity of the 
superlative good. We must establish something as being the good (for instance, gain or 
honor) and at the same time define it in some way (i.e., we must understand what gain or 
honor is). This is what determines one‟s desire and one‟s pursuits. Then, one must determine 
what one is to do in order to pursue this superlative good. In other words, one must have 
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beliefs about the courses of action to follow and how they relate to each other and to our 
general goal. This also requires us to determine the value of each thing for our general pursuit 
or for any of our courses of action. More precisely, we must have beliefs about whether 
things are useful, harmful or indifferent. Finally, we need to appraise our circumstances and 
our pursuit of the good. This means that we will have beliefs about our prospects of reaching 
the superlative good, about whether we should go on pursuing it, and also about whether or 
not we should settle for less.  
These practical views are at the center of our life. They are not absolutely isolated 
from our other beliefs (such as the beliefs about the εἴδδ or about what particular objects are). 
Actually, they depend on these other beliefs in many ways. But to a large extent, our practical 
beliefs are autonomous. They determine how we act and how we live. In other words, all the 
apparently automatic desires and actions are based on knowledge claims. We need some idea 
of what we are to do and why.
2345
 Our life is thus guided by our love of knowledge, and this 
affects all its parts. We want all our practical beliefs to be correct, we want to live correctly 
and we want to reach the true good or true happiness. 
However, if we consider what happens in the unexamined life, we notice that our 
practical beliefs are never the result of a rigorous examination of how we should live. Life 
always employs complex calculations and some examination, there is always some rationality 
at play, but our beliefs are not fully justified and often they are not even explicit (which 
makes it even harder to identify and justify them). We find an illustration of this in many 
dialogues. One of the best examples is perhaps Alcibiades, who wants to enter into politics in 
order to be admired by the whole world.
2346
 However, he has not properly examined what this 
course of action requires or whether this is really the best for him, and this is what Socrates 
endeavors to show throughout the dialogue. The same applies to all other forms of 
unexamined life. We rush into things before being cognitively prepared.
2347
 Consequently, it 
may happen that many (if not all) of our practical beliefs are wrong. We may commit many 
mistakes in our pursuit of the good, we may attain things that we do not truly desire and, in 
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ἀκαηεηναιιέκμξ ἂκ εἴδ η῵κ ἀκενώπςκ ηαὶ πάκηα ηὰ ἐκακηία πνάηημιεκ, ὡξ ἔμζηεκ, ἠ ἃ δε῔;” 
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2.2. Beliefs about particular beings (ηὰ πνιιά). The structure of predication and 
the attribution of predicates 
 
 Next, we must consider the beliefs that are not directly related to how we live. Many 
of these beliefs directly concern the concrete beings around us, which Plato calls ηὰ πμθθά. 
Our access to these beings is not immediate or simply perceptual. We must determine what 
they are (their ὅπεν ἐζηίκ) and what qualifies them (their πμ῔όκ ηζ), and we do so by 
attributing predicates to them.
2349
 Each particular being is thus the combination of many 
different predicates, which have their own content and determine the being in question as 
being so or so. This is what configures our experience of beings in general, and it even 
configures our experience of our own life, of what we do, and of the practical relevance of 
things.
2350
 Everything consists of attributions of predicates.  
 These attributions are not wholly unproblematic. They may be true or false – i.e., we 
may or may not attribute the correct predicate to things. Consequently, we should be careful 
about them, because we may commit many cognitive mistakes. However, the unexamined 
life is not very concerned about most of these attributions. There may be some moments of 
doubt, when one cannot make out what something is and feels the need to examine it more 
closely.
2351
 But for the most part we do not examine what predicates correspond or do not 
correspond to something, nor do we examine whether we are in a position to attribute them or 
not. Most of the attributions are automatic and we do not think much about them. We are sure 
we know things, even if we have not fully excluded the possibility that they are something 
other than what we think. Moreover, we tend not to fully determine things. We do not need to 
know all their predicates. We tend to focus on those that are more relevant for our life (and 
particularly for our ruling drive). This is also what happens when we try to examine things 
and their predicates. We tend to focus on what is practically relevant, leaving aside a full 
discussion of their identity and of all that qualifies them. 
We find several references to this in the dialogues. Plato sometimes explicitly calls the 
attention to the fact that one is trying to determine whether or not something is qualified in a 
                                                 
2349
 On the distinction between identity and the qualities or properties of something, cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 2.1. 
2350
 Indeed, one important predicate of all beings is their practical relevance for us (i.e., whether they are useful, 
harmful, or indifferent). 
2351
 Cp. Phlb. 38c-d, where Socrates gives the example of someone that sees something from afar and does not 
know whether it is a human being or a statue. 
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particular way without properly determining its identity first.
2352
 He also mentions the 
possibility of developing our way of seeing things, especially in order to better achieve what 
we want. We may for instance develop an ἐιπεζνία or ηνζαή, as is discussed in Gorgias. This 
allows us to attain more pleasure, without actually knowing what things really are and why 
we deal with them as we do.
2353
 In sum, our interest in beings tends to be very limited and we 
tend not to be very discerning. We usually confine our attention to the predicates that are 
more relevant from a practical standpoint and we even tend to absolutize them. 
 
2.3. Our beliefs about the εἴδε as the basis of all attributions of predicates 
  
 The attribution of predicates concerns concrete beings, but the predicates we attribute 
are not concrete or individual beings. They can be attributed to many different things and 
correspond to general modes of being or εἴδδ. These modes of being constitute the alphabet 
of reality and we can only see things as determined in some way if we have some 
understanding of them. Plato constantly calls our attention to this fact.
2354
 According to him, 
there are εἴδδ of different kinds (ontological, ethical, mathematical, and so on). Moreover, 
some of these εἴδδ relate to others or are predicated of one another in the ways we considered 
above.
2355
 There can even be a fundamental εἶδμξ that is somehow the basis for all others. 
According to the Republic, this role is played by the form of the good.
2356
 But whether this is 
so or not, there is a complex system of general predicates shaping our entire experience of 
things and we need to understand these predicates (or at least claim to understand them) if we 
are to see things as we do and live the way we do. 
Normally, this does not seem to be a problem. We are not only directed at the εἴδδ and 
trying to divine what they are, but we also have knowledge claims about them and we do not 
think we need to examine them any further. This is what characterizes the unexamined life 
and we find many examples of this in Plato‟s dialogues. When the characters are inquired 
about some general notion, they do not feel perplexed or confused. They rather presume to 
know it.
2357
 However, this understanding of the general predicates of things is not the result 
of any deep examination about these predicates. In fact, it is probably motivated by our main 
                                                 
2352
 Cp. e.g. Meno 71a-b, 86d-e, 100b, Rep. 354b-c. Although Plato is talking about general predicates in these 
passages, the same applies to any complex being we come into contact with. 
2353
 Cp. 464b ff. 
2354
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 2.2. 
2355
 See Chap. 6, Sect. 2.3. 
2356
 Cp. Chap. 12, Sect. 6.3. 
2357
 Cp. e.g. La. 190e, Hp. Ma. 286e ff. 
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interest in life (be it gain or honor). In other words, we probably see all εἴδδ in light of our 
main desires. This is perhaps clearer in the case of the ethical εἴδδ, which may often be 
immediately understood in gain-loving or honor-loving terms, but our understanding of all 
other εἴδδ may also be guided by the main love of our soul. Our love of gain or of honor may 
indeed determine the degree of abstraction or the degree of clearness of our understanding of 
any particular εἶδμξ. It will certainly be sufficient for us to see things and act, but it will not 
provide a fully transparent notion of what these εἴδδ consist in. Indeed, our relation to them 
tends to be very hazy. Usually, we do not think about them and we may not even be aware of 
the fact that we have some understanding of them (even if we are constantly applying them to 
individual beings). We normally focus our attention on individual beings. We have things to 
do, we must pursue the good, and we have no time to think about general predicates. In 
addition, if we ever come to think about them, we tend to focus on their particular 
qualifications (especially those that seem to be more directly relevant for our life) and not on 
their identity.
2358
 The latter is quite difficult to focus on and we cannot easily articulate it. In 
fact, our understanding of the identity of the εἴδδ is probably unclear or even self-
contradictory, as is often shown in the dialogues, and any defects it may contain affect our 
entire way of seeing things, insofar as all attributions of predicates depend on them.  
  
2.4. The beliefs about what reality in general is 
 
One other kind of belief we may consider here (and which we did not expressly 
discuss in Chapter 6) is intimately connected with what was just considered. Besides all 
beliefs about concrete things and about the different εἴδδ, we also have beliefs about what 
being in general is or about what reality is. In other words, we have an ontology. This 
ontology might be more implicit or more explicit, but it nevertheless affects the way we look 
at everything. It is indeed possible to have different views about being or about the general 
structure of reality, as is discussed in several passages of the corpus.
2359
 One may see reality 
as being static or in movement, and one may also recognize that things partake in general 
predicates or εἴδδ. However, this is not the ontology characteristic of the unexamined life. 
The unexamined life tends to see all beings as concrete or bodily (or at least it conceives the 
                                                 
2358
 Cp. the passages mentioned in footnote 2352. 
2359
 See e.g. Cra. 439b ff., Phd. 78b ff., Rep. 475e ff., Tht. 152d ff., 179d ff., Sph. 242c ff. 
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body as the clearest and the truest thing).
2360
 In other words, there is a tendency to reduce 
everything to the bodily domain – i.e., to what we can see, hear, touch or feel in any way.
2361
 
This does not mean that one only recognizes the existence of an individual body and what 
appears to it. One may, for instance, admit that there is a public domain and a shared 
appearing. However, everything will still be conceived as concrete and bodily.
2362
 In fact, the 
soul itself will tend to be reduced to the body.
2363
  
In sum, the ontology of the body is usually the basis and place of the unexamined life. 
We are usually convinced that reality is concrete or bodily and we act accordingly. But this is 
not necessarily so. In fact, conceiving reality as being bodily is a metaphysical decision. 
What is given to our senses does not allow us to exclude that there is more. But normally we 
do not pay much attention to this. The ontology of the body is not something about which we 
think much and it is not the result of an exhaustive examination of beings in general. Rather, 
it is motivated by the ruling drive of the soul. This is clearly stressed in Phaedo, where the 
ontology of the body is described as a direct consequence of our love of the body. It is this 
love that binds us (and even imprisons us) in a particular ontology or version of things.
2364
 
Using the model of the Republic, we could say that the inner arrangement of the soul‟s drives 
determines the kinds of reality we most promptly recognize, and all non-philosophical 
arrangements tend to give prominence to the bodily domain.
2365
 
However, this does not change the general structure of things. Even if we do not 
recognize the existence of εἴδδ, our life is still fully determined by our understanding of 
them. However, we will tend not to focus on them and rather turn our attention to individual 
beings. As a result, we may have a very distorted understanding of these εἴδδ and we may be 
in a state of dreaming – i.e., we may mistake some image or defective form of them for the 
                                                 
2360
 Cp. Phd. 83c. 
2361
 In fact, even if one admits that there is more than the body and what appears to it (if only because there are 
multiple bodies and a shared domain of reality such as the πόθζξ), one still tends to reduce everything to 
particular instances of beings and focus primarily on them.  
2362
 This is what is stressed in Theaetetus (172c ff.). One may see the πόθζξ as the center of reality, but this still 
implies focusing on the individual beings that are mediated by the body. To be more precise, one will consider 
particular instances of human being or of justice, and one will not consider these predicates in themselves 
(which is something only the philosopher does). See in particular 174b and 175c. 
2363
 Cp. e.g. Phdr. 246c. 
2364
 Cp. 81b-c, 82e, 83b-d. 
2365
 One may wonder whether the bodily ontology holds for all forms of unexamined life. We may indeed admit 
some differences, insofar as some ontologies are exclusively confined to the body and to sensible reality, 
whereas others may recognize the importance of a social sphere and a social truth, or they may have some 
notion of the εἴδδ. However, there is always a tendency to attach more importance to sensible reality and to 





 Likewise, even if we do not recognize our ροπή, we will still have the cognitive 
and practical dimensions we considered above. We will still be directed at truth and the 
superlative good. But let us leave this aside for now.  
 
2.5. The global character of the beliefs that compose the unexamined life 
 
 The previous analyses showed how the unexamined life is composed of a complex 
system of beliefs and it also showed how these beliefs are generated, motivated or at least 
strongly influenced by this life‟s inner motivations (i.e., its ruling drive or its arrangement of 
drives). This does not exclude that many of these beliefs are received from others around us 
through learning or through some other form of contact with them. However, the fact that we 
adopt these beliefs as ours requires an inner motivation. We must be moved by our love of 
gain or our love of honor (or some combination of these two with our love of knowledge). 
These drives and their arrangement determine not only the practical system of our life, but 
also our cognitive system. In other words, our drives determine not only how we act, but also 
how everything appears to us. 
 The arrangement of our soul‟s drives thus forms or affects many beliefs and these 
beliefs even go as far as giving us the impression of a homogeneous and perfect knowledge 
of things. At least we do not think there are any significant defects in how we see things. We 
may perhaps recognize that there are some things we do not know. For instance, we do not 
know what is happening far away from us, and there are many forms of expert knowledge or 
ηέπκδ we lack. But these and other lacks tend to be understood as mere gaps that are already 
located or integrated in a well-known reality. We hold the answer to the more important 
questions – and we do so in two respects. First, we know what matters in life and everything 
else is irrelevant. In fact, we know (i.e., we think we know) that we do not need to know 
those things, and this is already a form of alleged knowledge of them (insofar as we think we 
know enough about them to exclude that they might be important for us). Second, we think 
we know all the basic structures of reality (i.e., all basic ὏πμεέζεζξ) and thus there is nothing 
we are really ignorant of. We think we know what the most important predicates of things are 
and we also think we understand these predicates. Thus, despite all gaps in our cognitive 
                                                 
2366
 According to the Republic, one tends to focus on the many beautiful things and not on beauty itself (see 
476b ff.). This does not simply mean that we fail to realize that there is a general predicate that is common to all 
the instances of beauty, but it also implies that we are not really aware of what exactly beauty consists in. We 
always see it mixed with other things and thus we will only have a hazy understanding of it. For more on this, 
see Chap. 7, Sect. 2.4, and also Sects. 5.2 c) and 5.2 d) below.  
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system, we think we are functionally omniscient and do not recognize any significant defect 
or limitation in terms of knowledge.  
 It is, however, obvious that this impression or belief of having a knowledge of the 
whole of reality does not stem from a careful examination of our knowledge and of what 
reality in general might be. We do not consider whether something important might escape us 
or if things might actually be otherwise (either because absolutely all our beliefs are untrue, 
or because some basic beliefs are untrue and they then distort everything else). In general, we 
do not consider this possibility. We tend not to think about cognitive questions and when we 
do their scope tends to be very limited (and usually subordinated to some practical question 
and our practical interests). Our belief of knowing everything (i.e., everything that matters) is 
thus mostly tacit, which only renders it more effective. We have the impression that our life is 
entirely clear and we only need to attain what we pursue.   
 
3. The different unexamined lives and their respective versions of truth  
 
 In the previous sections we focused mostly on the common features of all forms of 
unexamined life, but it is also important to look more closely at the particular configurations 
this life may assume, in order to have a more concrete idea of the cognitive systems that 
characterize the unexamined life. Despite their structural resemblances, the different sorts of 
unexamined life correspond to different inner πμθζηε῔αζ, which constitute their own version of 
truth and their own world. We will now consider the main kinds of unexamined life and what 
their general beliefs might correspond to. This is still abstract, insofar as there are many 
subspecies, according to the different relations of force between the drives. However, it will 
provide us with a good idea both of the common traits and also of specificity of the 




3.1. The gain-loving systems of beliefs 
 
 When the love of gain controls the soul, it produces a gain-loving life. We saw that 
there may be different gain-loving lives, but at the center of such lives lies the belief that gain 
(i.e., the good of one‟s private sphere) is the best thing of all. This requires one to have at 
                                                 
2367
 This analysis will complement the analysis of the practical systems of each kind of unexamined life (cp. 
Chap. 15, Sect. 3). 
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least a tacit belief about what the private or subjective sphere is, and one must also have a 
belief about what its good consists in. If one regards the private or subjective sphere as a 
body with needs that must be satisfied in order to survive, one will see that which allows it to 
survive (namely austerity and thriftiness) as the good. If, however, one regards the body 
mainly as a sphere of feelings, one will regard pleasure as the greatest good. In addition, we 
must determine what exactly thriftiness and pleasure are, and what their superlative form 
amount to. Thriftiness in its superlative form corresponds to having as much wealth as 
possible, whereas pleasure may consist in the satisfaction of as many desires as possible or in 
the intense satisfaction of one major desire. These decisions are very important, but usually 
they are not submitted to any particular examination. One knows these things almost 
automatically – mostly because the inner arrangement of the soul produces and validates 
these beliefs. 
 The same holds for all other beliefs. One must have a plan of how to achieve what one 
desires, and this means one must have views about how best to acquire wealth or pleasure. 
These views will then determine one‟s actions and also the role things and people play in 
one‟s pursuits. This may require very complex calculations, but the latter are mostly 
automatic. In general, one does not have to carefully examine things and one‟s situation, and 
when one does so one tends to only pay attention to the aspects that are more directly relevant 




  But this is not all. One‟s love of gain also affects the understanding one has of       
εἴδδ – especially of those that are more directly connected with the practical domain. One 
will tend to interpret them in gain-loving terms and, moreover, one will tend to pay little 
attention to what is implied in them. This will render one‟s understanding of them vague and 
potentially distorted, which in turn will affect the whole attribution of predicates to things in 
general. The whole world will be seen in light of one‟s love of gain (or, to be more precise, in 
light of the precise modality of θζθμηένδεζα that rules the soul). As a result, the world will be 
reduced to the world of the body or a sensible world, which will constitute a sort of cognitive 
cave that will prevent us from seeing the real complexity of things. 
                                                 
2368
 This is so even if one develops the ἐιπεζνίαζ or ηνζααί that Socrates characterizes as ημθαηεοηζηή (i.e., as an 
expertise in flattery or adulation). They let us better understand things, but only insofar as they are relevant for 
someone to attain one‟s goal – namely, pleasure. They provide no real knowledge or real insight into what 
things are. Cp. Grg. 463a ff. 
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 Thus, even though the love of gain always speaks a philosophical language (i.e., even 
though its contact with everything is mediated by beliefs or knowledge claims), it still distorts 
our love of knowledge. It uses the latter in order to pursue its ends, just as it uses our love of 
honor. There may be different relations of forces between the three drives, but while one is 
mainly interested in gain, the other two drives are no more than instruments of our love of 
gain. 
 
3.2. The honor-loving systems of beliefs 
 
 The central belief of the lives ruled by the love of honor is the belief that honor (or 
victory, understood as a modality of honor) is the greatest good. This requires an 
understanding of what honor is. But we cannot understand honor as such if we do not 
understand the fact that there are others and that one may appear to them in different ways. 
The honor-loving life thus implies an understanding of what others in general are and of what 
constitutes the intersubjective appearing. Moreover, one‟s views are not restricted to this 
core. We must also have views about how we may come to be honored by others. In other 
words, we must have a plan of action, and this plan may be very elaborate. We may have to 
hone many skills and do many things. In fact, the honor-loving life seems to require constant 
effort and painstaking. But in general it is more or less clear what one has to do. We just have 
to pay attention to the others around us, what they do and what they value. Thus, we tend not 
to examine our honor-loving project (or we do so only if we have some particular doubt).
2369
 
For the most part, we are simply engaged in the pursuit. 
 This pursuit also determines how we see people and things around us. Everything is 
integrated in one‟s pursuit of honor and seen in light of it. More precisely, beings are seen as 
useful, harmful or indifferent for one‟s pursuit. In general, these pragmatic predicates are 
easily attributed. On rare occasions, one may need to examine things more carefully and 
develop one‟s knowledge about them, but one will still focus one‟s attention on the aspects of 
beings that are more directly relevant for one‟s pursuit. This is what Socrates describes in 
Theaetetus, when he contrasts the life of those dedicated to judicial or public contests with 
the life of philosophers.
2370
 The former will know (and perhaps even carefully examine) 
                                                 
2369
 We find a good example of this in Alcibiades I. Socrates begins by revealing Alcibiades‟ ambition (105a ff.) 
and then he focus on Alcibiades‟ plan of action (106c ff.), examining it in great detail (which is precisely what 
one normally does not do). 
2370
 Cp. 172c ff. 
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genealogies, possessions, and everything else insofar as it is relevant for life in the πόθζξ. The 
πόθζξ, as the intersubjective domain, will be the center of reality for them and everything else 
will be neglected. In particular, one will not consider (or even be aware of) general predicates 
as such. This means that one‟s view of reality will still be mainly sensitive or referred to the 
body – even thought we are always referred to the εἴδδ. One‟s understanding of them will be 
simply tacit, and probably very limited. In fact, one will tend to tacitly interpret them in 
honor-loving terms. The whole really will thus be seen in light of one‟s love of honor and 
only insofar as the love of honor needs to know it. This means one will still inhabit a kind of 
cognitive cave. One will have a limited access to reality, but one will take it as the world. 
 This is so because the honor-loving life has no actual interest in knowledge for its 
own sake. Although the love of knowledge permeates everything in such a life (insofar as 
everything is determined in a particular way), knowledge is only a means to acquire honor. 
Consequently, one is not very demanding with respect to knowledge. One is normally 
satisfied and only feels the need to examine when some problem appears or when one does 
not know how to proceed in order to attain honor. In some cases, one may perhaps be more 
concerned with knowledge and even use it as the very object for which one is honored. In 
these cases, one will try to know things better. But one‟s main interest is still to be admired 
by others or to defeat them in discussions, and as a result one is above all interested in 
appearing wise. In other words, the love of knowledge is still subordinated to the love of 
honor.  
 
3.3. The pseudo-philosophical systems of beliefs 
 
As we have seen, the inauthentic philosophical life (despite all its resemblance to the 
opposite of the unexamined life) is still a form of unexamined life. In fact, it is a variation 
either of the gain-loving life or of the honor-loving life.
2371
 This is reflected on the cognitive 
system that characterizes such a life. Its beliefs about the good, about how to pursue it, about 
the role things play in such a pursuit, and about reality at large closely resemble the views of 
a gain-loving life or of an honor-loving life. But there are some aspects that differentiate an 
apparently philosophical life and its beliefs from the purer forms of gain-loving or         
honor-loving life. To begin with, the inauthentic philosophical life is based on a stronger or 
more developed philosophical drive and, as a result, philosophical examination and rational 
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 Cp. Chap. 14, Sect. 4, and Chap. 15, Sect. 3.3. 
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discussion (θόβμξ) play a much more active role in it. We are thus dealing with a life that is 
partially examined and, as such, it may contain many more doubts and also much more 
refined views. It may even recognize that there are εἴδδ and that our view of everything 
depends on them. In sum, the beliefs of an inauthentic philosophical life are not so strictly 
determined by the ruling drive of the soul. This life may therefore understand itself better. Its 
views may be less defective or at least it may have less false conceit of knowledge.  
However, all this cognitive development is still motivated by the pursuit of some form 
of gain or honor. This means that the former is based on a set of beliefs about the importance 
of gain or honor and about how to pursue them. One will grant a very important role to 
knowledge and philosophical examination in this pursuit, and one may not even notice that 
they have no more than an auxiliary role. Nevertheless, the main cognitive decisions in this 
life (and even those made during the course of examination) are still made in name of gain or 
honor. One is still concerned with one‟s subjective state or with how one is seen by others, 
and this affects how one sees things. Ultimately, one‟s beliefs are not fully examined and 
they are not simply the result of philosophical examination. Many of them, and indeed the 
most central ones, will still have an irrational foundation. 
This holds both for the pseudo-philosophical lives based on the love of gain and for 
the ones based on the love of honor. At their core, they do not differ much. It is true that Plato 
recognizes that our love of honor is closer to our love of knowledge, insofar as the former can 
more easily listen to reason.
2372
 This is probably linked with the fact that its scope (namely, 
the intersubjective appearing) is broader and more complex that the scope of our love of gain 
(which is primarily focused on the subjective appearing). Moreover, one probably requires 
more knowledge to impress others and prevail over then than one requires to acquire pleasure 
or possessions. However, the pursuit of the two latter may also come to require knowledge as 
complex as the one required by the pursuit of honor. And even if that is not so, none of this 
changes the fundamental fact that both kinds of life and their cognitive systems are ultimately 
based on an irrational drive and are, therefore, still unexamined, despite all their 
philosophical interest and cognitive progress. 
                                                 
2372
 Cp. Phdr. 253d-e, Rep. 440a ff. 
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3.4. Mobility and rigidity of one’s beliefs within the unexamined life 
 
 In general, we always have a complex system of beliefs – at least if we are not 
completely disoriented and in the middle of a crisis (and even then there may still be a system 
of basic assumptions that is still active). However, this system is not rigid and unchangeable. 
There can be many changes and these changes may be superficial or profound, and they may 
also be for the better or for the worse. We can make discoveries, learn things, be persuaded, 
forget things, or be charmed by our feelings or our ambition.
2373
 However, despite all this, the 
unexamined life is marked by a tendency to avoid deep changes in one‟s beliefs. The main 
presuppositions (὏πμεέζεζξ) hardly ever change, especially the ones that concern one‟s views 
of the superlative good. In fact, for such views to change the inner πμθζηεία of the soul must 
change. Otherwise, all changes tend to be superficial, and we may even fail to notice them. If, 
however, the inner πμθζηεία somehow changes, then the whole practical and cognitive system 
(i.e. the whole αίμξ) will change. One will thus have new views about the good, about how to 
achieve it, about the role things play therein, about their predicates and about the meaning of 
these predicates. 
 Deep and extensive changes may therefore occur within the unexamined life. 
However, all the changes (including the deeper ones) tend to be unexamined. One may 
perhaps have thought a little about them. Many moments of crisis do lead us to examine some 
things. But this examination is usually very limited in scope and depth, and one does not 
simply adopt the most rational views in the end. One‟s love of knowledge is still limited and 
one is still guided or persuaded by irrational drives. Moreover, if any such a change happens, 
one will normally not think much about it. In particular, one will not consider how the new 
beliefs may themselves be transitory. One easily accepts them, and thus one is once more 
satisfied with one‟s way of seeing things.  
 
4. The problem of the unexamined life’s cognitive status  
 
 Each kind of unexamined life has its own system of beliefs, which is primarily 
determined by one‟s inner πμθζηεία, as we just saw. These systems may undergo changes 
(especially at a more superficial level) according to the circumstances of each individual life. 
But regardless of that, the unexamined life is always full of beliefs. One may be more or less 
                                                 
2373
 Cp. Rep. 412e-413c 
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explicitly aware of them, but they still pervade everything and provide us with a view of the 
whole of life. This pervasiveness and globalization of our beliefs is, however, very 
problematic, given the fact that these beliefs are mostly (if not all) accepted without proper 
examination. The unexamined life is marked by a weak love of knowledge, which tries to 
determine everything, but does so without much precision and rigor. More precisely, one‟s 
love of knowledge is particularly credulous and it easily accepts the views created and 
endorsed by drives that are not directly concerned with truth. This raises the important 
problem of the value of these views, which is also the problem of the unexamined life‟s 
cognitive status. We must indeed determine this cognitive status if we want to determine not 
only the structure, but also the value of the unexamined life (as we will try to do in Chapter 
18). Therefore, we will discuss this question now, even if briefly, and in order to do so, we 
will have to reconsider some aspects discussed in Part II above. 
 We saw before that our knowledge claims are marked by a formal defect. They were 
not examined and we cannot really exclude the possibility that things are otherwise. We can 
now better understand why this happens. The way we adopt most of our beliefs is highly 
questionable and this opens the door to many untruths. We may be deluded about many 
things and this means that we may be in a much worse condition than if we were simply 
ignorant of them and were aware of our ignorance. To be sure, this defective way of adopting 
beliefs does not necessarily mean that these beliefs are false. We do not have a full insight 
into their validity and often not even into their content, but it may happen that we somehow 
get things right – i.e., we may have a correct δόλα about many of these things. This is at least 
what we tend to think when we are faced with the question, and Plato himself discusses this 
possibility at some points. In many cases, we may lack expert knowledge (ηέπκδ), we may 
not understand what things are, we may not be able to account for how we should proceed, 
and still do things right. We do not need to have full knowledge in order to have practical 
success. This is, according to Plato, the case of poets, seers and statesmen.
2374
 It may also 
happen to judges that judge a case correctly without knowing the truth.
2375
 In all these cases, 
one somehow touches reality, even if in a defective manner. Plato describes this as a sort of 
divine inspiration. There is a superior form of access to things that is somehow 
communicated to us and that allows us to act. It is something that we do not control and that 
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we may easily lose, but in general it seems to be enough to guide ourselves in life.
2376
 In other 
words, our main beliefs about how to live may be correct and we may also correctly attribute 
predicates to things in general. The main problem will concern the understanding of these 
predicates (i.e., of the εἴδδ). We must have some representation of them if we are to attribute 
them to things, but we will lack real insight into them. This is already a kind of defect (and 
indeed the kind of defect that is implied in the notion of a correct δόλα).
2377
 Still, it will not 
be enough to affect our life, at least according to the possibility we are now considering. 
 The question, then, is what is the cognitive state or the cognitive competence of an 
unexamined life. How much cognitive defect can it have and how serious is it? Should we be 
concerned? What can be said on this matter? It is indeed difficult to make a general 
assessment, given the multiplicity and complexity of our beliefs. We normally do notice them 
and much less question them. However, the unexamined life‟s structure and its constitutive 
love of knowledge render this question particularly pertinent. We need to know if we know 
what is happening in our life. 
 At first sight, the quality of our beliefs and the extension of the defects may vary 
greatly. We already considered this above.
2378
 We easily admit that pretty much all of our 
knowledge claims are true and that our way of seeing things is fundamentally right. We may 
also admit that we do not know many things (even important things), but our knowledge 
claims are still sufficiently true for us to live and attain our practical goals. However, our 
knowledge claims may also be sufficiently wrong, or they may be essentially wrong (i.e., our 
basic beliefs may be wrong and this may affect everything else). It may even happen that all 
our beliefs are wrong. The range of possibilities is therefore wide. But what determines the 
diagnosis of our views? Does it vary from individual to individual, according to one‟s 
circumstances? Or does it hinge on one‟s inner πμθζηεία and the kind of life that one leads? 
Are there significant differences between the different forms of unexamined life as such? Or 
can we make a general diagnosis about the unexamined life as such?   
 Plato decidedly points in the latter direction. The differences between individuals or 
between the various forms of unexamined life are not significant enough. There is a 
fundamental cognitive defectiveness that is associated with the unexamined life as such. We 
have already considered some of the main traits of this defectiveness in Chapter 7 above, but 
now we must reconsider the question in light of our practical tensions.  
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5. The radical untruth of the unexamined life 
 
 There are different ways in which Plato‟s dialogues suggest or indicate that all forms 
of unexamined life are radically untrue. First, the different characters (who illustrate different 
forms of unexamined life) show how one‟s beliefs easily collapse when one submits them to 
examination. One easily contradicts oneself and in the end one does not know what to say. As 
we considered above, this is not simply a matter of temporary aphasia. It reveals one‟s 
conceited ignorance about a given question, and this conceited ignorance may in fact affect 
our whole system of beliefs. At some points, the dialogues consider precisely this possibility. 
For instance, there are a few images in the corpus that depict our normal life as being wholly 
illusory or untrue. Other times, the characters provide conceptual indications or even reflect 
in a conceptual manner about the possibility of a global defect and what characterizes it. Let 
us then consider these two kinds of approach in turn and see how they complement each 
other. 
 
5.1. The images of the unexamined life’s untruth 
 
An important indication about the cognitive defects of the unexamined life can be 
found in allegories and myths that are intended as images of the human condition. The 
clearest examples of this are found in the myths of Phaedrus and Phaedo, as well as in the 
allegory of the cave in the Republic. These passages portray our way of seeing things as 
being profoundly defective and the reality that appears to us as being completely distorted. It 
is true that these are only images and, as such, they do not fully explain why that is so. But as 
images they let us visualize in a very effective manner the kind of distortion that may be 
implied in all forms of unexamined life. 
It is important to note that Plato does not expressly speak of “unexamined life” in any 
of these passages and one could perhaps wonder whether these portraits apply to all forms of 
unexamined life. However, the three images directly associate our limitations with the lack of 
philosophy or philosophical examination. Moreover, the above description of the unexamined 




Let us then consider the aspects of these images that are more directly relevant to the 
question at hand. This consideration will be very incomplete, given the complexity of these 
passages, but it will nevertheless give us a good idea of the kind of distortion involved in the 
unexamined life as such. 
 
a) Like wingless birds. The portrait of the unexamined life in the myth of 
Phaedrus 
 
In Phaedrus 244a-257a, Socrates presents a very elaborated myth that, among other 
things, helps us understand the way in which our life may be affected by the lack of 
philosophical examination. We will now briefly consider this, but in order to do so we will 
have to consider once more some aspects that were already mentioned above.
2379
   
Socrates introduces a complex model of reality, according to which there is the place 
where we presently dwell – namely, earth – and a complex region above it, which 
encompasses not only the heavens, but also the region above the heavens (὏πενμονάκζμξ 
ηόπμξ). The latter constitutes the highest domain of reality and it contains the perfect or 
superlative beings. As we saw, the latter correspond to what Plato calls εἴδδ, and they are also 
what our soul intimately desires or longs for. To be more precise, the soul is said to be 




Socrates also describes how the souls are like a winged team of horses and their 
charioteer.
2381
 The wings are an essential component of this combination, insofar as they 
allow the soul to ascend to the supracelestial region and contemplate the true beings.
2382
 The 
horses are equally important, since they condition the way the charioteer guides the soul. In 
the case of the godly souls, the horses are good and they easily obey. This means the gods can 
easily reach the supracelestial region. As for the other souls (including those that will become 
human beings), the task of the charioteer is more complicated, since one of the horses is good 
and obedient, but the other is bad and recalcitrant.
2383
 This renders the ascent particularly 
difficult and, at best, these souls catch only a glimpse of the perfect beings.
2384
 But they may 
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also fail to see these beings and start to forget them. As a result, their wings will start to 
wither, and they will be more and more subject to gravity. Eventually, they come to lose their 
wings and fall into earth, where they hold on to a body.
2385
 
This is where human life starts. This life is marked by many limitations and it actually 
constitutes a form of imprisonment.
2386
 One cannot do what one actually desires – that is, one 
cannot ascent to the top of the heavens in order to see the superlative beings. One no longer 
has wings (only the corresponding stumps), and one is confined to the body and its own 
possibilities of movement. In sum, one has become a wingless bird.
2387
 However, our 
limitations go much further than this. One has forgotten what the true beings or εἴδδ look like 
(i.e., what they consist in), even though one must see all beings in light of them or as 
instances of them.
2388
 This means that our understanding of everything around our body and 
of our own possibilities of action is distorted. Our sense organs are dull and fail to see things 
as they are.
2389
 In addition, we also forget that we forgot the εἴδδ – in fact, we forget that we 
are a soul directed at the contemplation of the true beings. We think we are a body that moves 
itself, we think the domain of this body is all the reality that matters, and consequently we 
become fully engaged in our regular pursuits (the ἀκενώπζκα ζπμοδάζιαηα).
2390
  
Our ordinary, non-philosophical life (i.e., the unexamined life) is thus marked by a 
radical distortion of our access to everything and by a completely false interpretation of our 
condition. In this sense, this life and the domain of reality that corresponds to it become a 
kind of substitute home or substitute destination. But we never entirely lose our connection to 
the supracelestial region. There is still some tacit recollection and the wings are still 
somehow present (even if only as stumps). We still long for the true beings, since they are 
still what truly nurtures us. Hence, the substitute region is constitutively insufficient or 
defective, even if we normally do not notice it. But we can also notice it – i.e., we may 
remember what we really desire. Socrates considers two possibilities of this happening. First, 
one may see someone that fully embodies beauty and thereby start remembering the vision of 
beauty itself.
2391
 Second, one may philosophize and try to determine what things really are – 
which constitutes a form of active longing (πόεμξ) for the perfect beings.
2392
 These two 
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experiences allow us to overcome the limitations of our immediate condition (i.e., they allow 
our wings to start growing back) and, even if they do not fully release us, at least they make 





b) Like fishes at the bottom of a pond. The portrait of the unexamined life in the 
myth of Phaedo (108d ff.) 
 
In Phaedo, after much discussion about the immortality of the soul, Socrates ends up 
considering the different destinies souls may have after dying.
2394
 Some souls return to the 
bodily domain, whereas others go to a better region, where they live with the gods.
2395
 
Socrates then tries to describe this other region in geographical terms. In order to do so, he 
presents a complex description of earth and its regions, which completely redefines the 
domain in which our life usually takes place and introduces other regions we are not aware 
of. But Socrates does not simply reveal that the earth is larger than we thought. He also 
establishes important cognitive and ontological contrasts between the different regions, and in 
order to render these contrasts clearer, he compares our own situation with the situation of 
fish in the sea. This is what we must now consider.  
Socrates begins by saying that he is going to describe the earth as he thinks it really is. 
After describing his shape and position in space, he says that the known world at the time 
(namely, the region “from the Phasis up to the pillars of Heracles”, which surrounds the sea) 
is only a very small part of the real earth or earth itself.
2396
 This renders the region we inhabit 
(and even ourselves) insignificant. We are just like ants or frogs around a pond.
2397
 To make 
matters worse, our region is not even on the surface of the earth, but rather in one of its many 
hollows.
2398
 This means that there is a vast and superior region beyond everything we know, 
and our region is thus disqualified. We think we live in a vast region and on the surface, but 
we are actually in a small and inferior region, and we have no idea of this.
2399
 In other words, 
we have no idea of what our situation actually is.  
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To help us understand this, Socrates says that our situation is just like the situation of 
someone who, like fish, happened to live in the middle of the seabed and, due to their 
slowness (αναδοηήξ) and weakness (ἀζεέκεζα), had no idea of what lies above the sea.
2400
 
Like such a person, we are not aware that there is a reality beyond what we take to be the 
highest and truest reality. This is actually an instance of the above mentioned “Heraclitean 
thought pattern”.
2401
 Our condition is described as the intermediate between two extremities, 
and in order to reveal our limitations, we are compared to the bottom extremity. By 
considering the limitations of the latter condition in comparison with our own, we come to 
better understand the kind of limitations that we ourselves have and how there can be a 
condition superior to our own. But what are then the limitations or defects of our present 
condition and how do they resemble the situation of fish?  
The first point to consider concerns our position. Although we think we dwell on the 
surface of the earth, we actually live in a hollow. As a result, we think the upper limit of our 
region is the real top – i.e., the sky. It is just as if someone in the sea were to think that the 
surface of the water was the actual sky, without realizing that the sky lies beyond it. Due to 
our slowness and weakness, we do not realize that there is a region above what we represent 
as being on the top.
2402
 We are therefore marked by strong cognitive limitations. Normally we 
cannot turn our head up and see what lies beyond our present circumstances.  
But this is not all. Just like fish live in water, our dwelling is filled with air, whereas 
the region above (i.e., the true surface of the earth) is filled with aether. This then accounts 
for the quality of the objects or of the reality present in each of these regions, as well as the 
kind of life one may live in those regions. Plato calls our attention to how things at sea are 
muddy, dirty and eaten away by brine; he also says that nothing of worth grows there.
2403
 In 
comparison with things in our region, they are full of flaws or corrupted. But something 
similar happens with things in our region when we compare them with the superior region. 
Reality around us is also deformed and tainted. Plato, indeed, imagines someone doing what 
fish do – i.e., just like fish are able to reach the top of the sea and look outside, someone 
would go to the top of air (for instance, by acquiring wings) and turn their gaze to the 
superior place, in order to see the true surface of the earth and the true heaven.
2404
 This vision 
would be difficult to endure, but if one could endure it, one would see how things are much 
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more perfect and much more beautiful there. Indeed, Plato initially speaks of earth itself and 
its stones, and says that they are smoother, more colorful, shinier, purer, and more beautiful. 
He also mentions how plants, animals, human beings, and everything else are in better 
condition than here. In general, there is no distortion, unshapeliness or illness.
2405
  
Finally, Plato briefly compares the cognitive abilities of human beings that live in the 
superior region with our own. Like all other things, their perceptions and wisdom far exceed 
our own.
2406
 Moreover, they can see and hear the gods (which means that they can learn from 
them), and they can contemplate the real celestial bodies.
2407
 In sum, their access to reality 
and the kind of reality they have access to are far superior to our own. This is very important. 
Life in the superior region is described as a state of complete happiness, and its cognitive and 
ontological superiority lie at the heart of this happiness.
2408
  
Plato thus describes a life that is very different from our own. But he seems to admit 
the possibility of a transition to such a place.
2409
 If we dedicate ourselves to philosophy 
during our life and abandon all other concerns, we may come to experience this happiness.
2410
 
If, however, we fail to examine things as much as we can, our life will lack all this perfection. 
In other words, we will have a very defective gaze and the reality we will deal with will be 
much inferior. We will not live among the true things, but rather in a very distorted version of 
everything we think we have. Indeed, the consequences of the lack of examination are global 
and pervade everything – just like the different elements (namely, water, air, aether) shape 
the different levels of reality in the myth we just considered.  
 
c) Like prisoners in a cave. The portrait of the unexamined life in the Republic 
 
 Despite all the interesting aspects of the two myths we have just considered, the most 
expressive image of the unexamined life‟s cognitive limitations can be found in the allegory 
of the cave. The allegory is presented as an image of our nature with respect to education 
(παζδεία) and the lack thereof.
2411
 Socrates asks Glaucon to imagine prisoners at the bottom 
of a cave. He thus invokes the image of cave dwellers or primitive human beings that are 
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marked by extreme brutishness and ignorance. These ideas are further stressed by their 
circumstances. Socrates says the prisoners are chained up or strapped to their seat (ε᾵ημξ) 
from childhood, with their backs against the entrance of the cave, and they can only see in 
front of them.
2412
 This means they have no idea of what lies behind their back. In fact, they 
do not even know that there is reality behind their back. More than that, they have no idea of 
the prison as such. They are not aware of their limitations and for them the world is what lies 
before them. But this world of theirs constitutively depends on what is behind them. The wall 
in front of them is lit by a fire that burns behind them and all they see is the shadows, 
projected on the wall, of artifacts and statues passing behind them, carried by some other 
people.
2413
 These other people also talk to each other, and the prisoners hear the echo of these 
conversations. However, since the prisoners have no notion of the fire and the people behind 
them, they think the shadows and the echo that seems to come from them is all that there is. 
They mistake a very deficient reality for what things really are, and they may even develop a 
wisdom about the shadows, by making out what these shadows supposedly are and 
considering how they normally precede, accompany or follow each other.
2414
 But regardless 
of how complex the beliefs about their world are, they still do not have any knowledge. 
Everything they come into contact with is entirely distorted and has no real consistency.  
 Glaucon admits that this is a strange image and these are strange people, but Socrates 
immediately says that they are like us, and this is a very important indication.
2415
 The 
prisoners are not someone who knows less than us and is not yet educated. They correspond 
to the state we are in. This means that we are not spectators who look at prisoners knowing 
that they are prisoners and that there is a world behind them. We are within the cave, 
everything we see is shadows, and we have no idea that there is a cave and that we only see 
shadows. Thus, we have no idea of the outside (i.e., of what things truly are). Our entire 
world (i.e., the entire reality as it appears to the unexamined life) is as distorted as the world 
of the prisoners in the cave. We think we are seeing things as they are, but our gaze only sees 
images – i.e., a poor or defective version of things that is constitutively referred to something 
different from it. In other words, we are not where we think we are, we do not have what we 
think we have, but reality corresponds to something else. We have no knowledge whatsoever 
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and this is why we are in extreme need of education. But what does this education consist in 
and what does it reveal about our ordinary condition? 
 Plato describes our normal way of seeing things as a stagnated and imprisoned gaze. 
We cannot look around and we cannot move in order to see things from different angles. But 
Plato also admits the possibility of being released – although this release entails many 
difficulties. One may be set free by someone else and compelled to turn around and walk. 
However, one is deeply attached to the shadowy version of things, and this means that one 
will at first resist to any attempt to change one‟s perspective.
2416
 Moreover, if one happens to 
turn one‟s gaze, one will initially become dazzled by light and will not be able to see any 
alternative version of things.
2417
 Consequently, one will retain one‟s beliefs. It is only after 
much insistence that one starts to realize that things are actually different from what one 
thinks.
2418
 But this is not all. It is also important to bear in mind that the release is rather 
complex and involves many stages. More precisely, one will first see statues, then one will 
realize that these statues are also images of persons, then one will see that this is only a cave 
and that there is a world outside, and even then one will first see the images in water and only 
in the end will one be able to see the highest reality – the sun.
2419
 These different stages 
replicate the model of imprisonment that characterizes the initial condition of the prisoners. 
One does not see – and may not be aware – that they are defective and constitutively refer to 
something else (i.e., that they are still images). In other words, until the final stage is reached, 
one still has strong cognitive limitations.
2420
 
 Exiting the cave (and consequently the unexamined life) requires this complex 
process. But this is not something we normally undertake. In general, we are simply absorbed 
in the shadowy or imagetic world, even if we carry out some examination. This means that 
we completely misunderstand reality and everything we deal with, and have no idea of what 
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things really are. This is our pitiable cognitive condition.
2421





d) The common features and the common meaning of these images of the 
unexamined life 
 
 At first sight, there are many differences between these three images. Many of their 
details vary and their main focus is also different. This is partly owing to the different 
contexts in which they appear and the goal these images are meant to achieve. However, 
despite all the differences, there are also significant points of contact, and the previous 
analyses tried to highlight some of them – namely, those that concern the cognitive 
limitations that are connected to the lack of philosophical examination. But let us now 
systematize these points of contact, in order to prepare for a more conceptual analysis of the 
question. 
First of all, it is important to note that these images talk of places or regions, as well 
as of the beings that are found in them. In doing so, Plato seems to neglect the subjective or 
cognitive component. However, the quality of the different places and beings also expresses 
our different cognitive states. In particular, the defectiveness or deformity of a particular 
reality expresses how defective (i.e., how distorted or hazy) our views of this reality are. 
Moreover, the fact that Plato talks of regions also stresses the global character of what is 
being discussed. The defects alluded to in each image do not affect some things or some 
questions, but they pervade everything. In other words, the defect affects the region as such. 
This global defect is represented by the fact that the region we normally find ourselves 
in lies below some other region in which beings are more perfect. Indeed, the contrast 
between up and down expresses the superiority and inferiority (or the greater perfection and 
the greater degradation) of the different regions of reality. But, in addition, Plato represents 
our usual place as some strange form of reality. It is a kind of pit in which we fall, a small 
pond or sea, or a cave full of shadows. Andrea Nightingale describes this as a “rhetoric of 
estrangement”, in which Plato “attempts to make what is familiar strange and what is strange 
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familiar, thus dislodging the reader from his ordinary beliefs.”
2423
 The reality we see and the 
way we see it are, in fact, portrayed as something strange and inferior to what we think, and 
this also points to something beyond it and to a different version of things that may replace it. 
The reason why Plato needs to do this is also explained in the images. There is a 
fundamental forgetfulness or a fundamental ignorance of what our situation is and of what 
things really are. We think we already have a perfect version of things, but this version is 
defective and it is constitutively referred to a better version of the same things. In this sense, 
what lies beyond our usual life is not just something besides what we already know, but it is 
what we and everything around us are immediately referred to. The “real world” is what the 
inferior world claims to be. The former is revealed when we discover the limitations of the 
latter and the attempt to reach it is not simply a journey into a distant land, but rather a radical 
transformation of the unexamined world. This is particularly clear in the allegory of the cave, 
insofar as what we reach at the end (the outside world and the sun) is what we normally think 
we know. In Phaedrus and Phaedo, Plato describes a distant and unknown region, but the 
model is still fundamentally the same. These regions correspond to what we usually think we 
already know and possess – to wit, the real beings and the real nurture in Phaedrus, and the 
real earth and the purest things in Phaedo. The fundamental component of the three passages 
is therefore the global revelation of how defective our immediate way of seeing things is.  
 
5.2. Conceptual analysis of the untruth of the unexamined life 
 
 We must now inquire into the meaning of these images and try to determine the 
cognitive defects that characterize the unexamined life as such. More precisely, we must see 
how any form of unexamined life is marked by defects that affect everything we come into 
contact with. In order to do so, we will reconsider some aspects we considered in Chapter 7, 
when we discussed the limitations of our beliefs. 
 
a) The uncertainty and imprecision of the unexamined knowledge claims  
 
One kind of defect was already considered in Section 4 above. Since we did not fully 
examine our knowledge claims, we cannot exclude the possibility that they are wrong. But in 
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general we do not admit the possibility of any significant defect in our beliefs (and especially 
in the most important ones). In fact, most of them are tacit and we hold them without 
expressly thinking about their content, their validity, or their origin. But, as we saw, the 
origin of our beliefs renders them very questionable. From an external standpoint, we take as 
certain what is very uncertain. There is a formal defect in our beliefs and this opens the door 
to many material defects – i.e., to many errors and misunderstandings. To be sure, this does 
not imply that there are any material defects. In principle, our beliefs could all be correct (i.e., 
all our δόλαζ could be ὀνεαί). Still, the formal defect in question already implies a certain 
degree of distortion. There may be some contact with reality, but as Plato stresses in Meno, 
one does not know the cause of something being as it is.
2424
 Our beliefs are in themselves 
defective and our notion of what they refer to is therefore imprecise or unclear. As we will 
see, this is particularly problematic in the case of our understanding of predicates (i.e., of the 
εἴδδ), given their fundamental role in how we see things in general. But first, let us consider 
in more detail the problems with the attribution of predicates. 
 
b) The errors in the unexamined attributions of predicates 
 
 We attribute many predicates to beings in general. More precisely, we determine their 
identity (their ὅπεν εἶκαζ) and their attributes in a strict sense (their πμ῔όκ ηζ), and thus each 
being is subject to many attributions of predicates. This applies to things, animals, and 
persons, but also to situations and actions. Our entire course of life is based on many 
attributions of predicates – especially in the attribution of the predicates good and bad. 
However, these attributions of predicates are mostly unexamined. They are often motivated 
by our irrational drives, and we do not consider things very closely. Even if we may think 
about some attributions (especially if we experience difficulties in making out what 
something is), we are very far from fully verifying if they are correct. This means that they 
have the formal defect just mentioned. We cannot be sure of these attributions, and many of 
them may be (and often are) wrong. In addition, we saw that we are often far from 
determining all predicates of things. There are many things to which we do not pay attention, 
and we tend to focus only on the predicates that we think are more relevant for us. Our access 
to things is therefore hazy, and even if many of the attributions of predicates are correct, this 
may still easily produce a wrong impression about things. In other words, it may lead to 
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wrong attributions of predicates – especially of those that concern the role things may or 
should play in our life. 
 
c) The lack of clearness and the inner contradictions of the unexamined claims to 
understanding 
 
 As we saw, the attributions of predicates presuppose a certain understanding of these 
predicates (i.e., of the general modes of being or εἴδδ). But the unexamined life does not 
carefully examine the predicates it uses to determine things (in fact, it tends not to reflect 
about them at all). Its understanding of them is mostly automatic and influenced by the drive 
that rules the soul. This means that this understanding may contain many defects. It may be 
unclear and even self-contradictory. And this is not just a remote possibility. Plato‟s 
dialogues show how many people cannot explain the content of the general predicates they 
use to determine things in general (and especially those that more directly determine their 
actions and the way they live). At first, they tend to be unable to say anything at all about 
them, and when they start identifying the way they understand them, they easily contradict 
themselves. But this is not just something that affects the characters in Plato‟s dialogues. In 
general, we would all suffer the same fate, because we all have a vague notion of these 
predicates. We are permanently referred to them (or, as Plato says, we have some recollection 
or some premonition of what they are), but we cannot see them clearly (and in this sense we 
are partly forgotten of them – i.e., they still elude us).
2425
  
 This is indeed the essential problem for Plato, and the one that more directly justifies 
the portraits of the unexamined life we considered above. Our defective understanding of the 
general predicates is not confined to them, but it affects all attributions of predicates, and thus 
it spreads untruth throughout our whole way of seeing things. Many of these attributions will 
automatically be wrong.
2426
 Moreover, even if some attributions of predicates happen to be 
correct, they will still include great distortions. One will get some things right (i.e., one will 
have correct δόλαζ), but one will not exactly understand what one got right. It is therefore 
clear that a defective understanding of the εἴδδ has the most serious consequences for our 
way of seeing things in general. But let us consider this in more detail by focusing on other 
                                                 
2425
 The problem applies not only to all individual predicates as such, but also to their relations to one another 
(cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 2.3). We do not clearly understand these interrelations either, and we cannot fully explain 
them. 
2426
 For instance, we may think that something is just, but only because we have a distorted understanding of 
what justice is. 
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aspects highlighted by Plato when he discusses the most essential cognitive defects that beset 
the unexamined life. 
 
d) The constitutive unclearness (ἀζάθεηα) of the bodily ontology 
 
 Our relation to the εἴδδ is decisive, but the unexamined life is characterized by a 
partial amnesia (i.e., a partial ignorance) of the εἴδδ. We know something about them and see 
everything according to them, but our notion of them is wholly unclear. Moreover, we are 
ignorant of our ignorance or we forget our forgetfulness. To be more precise, we do not 
realize that we have an insufficient understanding of the εἴδδ. In fact, we even tend not to 
recognize that there are εἴδδ and that they shape our entire experience of life. As we 
considered above, the unexamined life is usually characterized by a version of reality 
according to which everything (or at least what is most real) is somehow bodily. This notion 
of body refers to our domain of subjective appearing and to the sensible reality that appears to 
us. Our experience of all concrete and individual beings is related to the body in this sense, 
and we may consider these beings as all that there is. In other words, we will not notice the 
large quantity of general predicates that determine our experience of everything and we will 
not focus on these predicates as such. This contributes decisively for our defective 
understanding of the general predicates. We do not consider them and thus we do not notice 
how hazy or how self-contradictory our notions of them are. As a result, our access to the 
individual beings will also be distorted and we will live in a defective world or a world of 
δόλα in the pejorative sense of the word.
2427
  
 We saw above that this ontology of the body is the result of our own inner πμθζηεία. 
We somehow love the body or something that is referred to the bodily domain. This is the 
case of gain and also of honor, which is constitutively related to individual or concrete beings 
and situations. Since we are moved by these interests, we pay little attention to what 
individual things are (aside from what is more directly relevant for our interests) and to the 
predicates that determine them. The love of the body thus constitutes a kind of prison, as is 
mentioned in Phaedrus and developed in Phaedo.
2428
 This love rivets us to the body and 
makes us believe that what affects it is what is most clear and true.
2429
 We could also say that 
                                                 
2427
 This applies not only to things around us, but also to our own being, as we will see in the following 
subsection.  
2428
 See Phdr. 250c, Phd. 81e, and especially 82e-83d. 
2429
 As Plato also says in Phd. 83d, the soul says the same things or holds the same δόλαζ as the body. 
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we become riveted to δόλα in the pejorative sense, although we do not experience this as a 




 The attachment to the body is thus the attachment to a particular way of seeing things, 
and this way of seeing things is essentially marked by haziness or confusion. In Gorgias, 
Plato associates the views of the body with Anaxagoras‟ idea of confusion. From the 
standpoint of the body, everything is jumbled together (“ὁιμῦ ἂκ πάκηα πνήιαηα ἐθύνεημ ἐκ 
ηῶ α὎ηῶ”) and indiscernible (ἄηνζηα).
2431
 This can be understood in an absolute sense, insofar 
as the body corresponds primarily to the domain of sensation and sensation by itself is 
indeterminate.
2432
 But it also applies to a kind of perspective that only makes a few functional 
distinctions, based on one‟s main interest in life, and neglects all other distinctions. This does 
not render all things indistinct, but it produces a very hazy way of seeing things. One will not 
have a clear access to the εἴδδ and consequently one will also not have a clear access to the 
concrete beings. Everything will be simplified and seen in the light of gain or honor. 
  
e) Self-ignorance as an essential feature of the unexamined life 
 
This description applies to everything around us, but also to our own self. Indeed, we 
also tend to identify ourselves with the body and the bodily domain.
2433
 This means that we 
do not notice or do not pay attention to the ροπή and the role it plays in our life. We do not 
see beneath the surface of our being and do not see what really determines our knowledge 
and our actions. Consequently, we also do not know that our inner being may have different 
modalities (i.e., it may be characterized by ἀνεηή and ηαηία), nor that these modalities 
determine the quality of our life. In fact, often we are not even aware of whether we are 
happy or miserable, or we have a false view about it, since we are not really aware of what 
we truly desire.  
In sum, we tend to be ignorant of ourselves, of our own ροπή, of the role knowledge 
plays in it, of our own cognitive limitations, and of the need to care for ourselves (i.e., to care 
for our ροπή).
2434
 We simply care for what belongs to us (namely, our body) or for what 
                                                 
2430
 See 480a. 
2431
 See 465d. 
2432
 As is said in Phd. 65b, sensation is not accurate or clear.  
2433
 Cp. e.g. Phdr. 246c and Phd. 85e ff.  
2434
 This is, for instance, the condition Alcibiades finds himself in, as Socrates tries to show him in Alcibiades I. 
See in particular Alc. I 127d ff. 
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belongs to what belongs to us (i.e., our possessions). To use the model of tripartition, we care 
only for gain or honor. This means that we simply rush into things without realizing that we 




f) The unexamined life as a form of sleep and as a dream 
 
 What we saw up to this point allows us to understand a set of images used by Plato to 
describe the cognitive status of the unexamined life. In the Apology, Socrates compares 
ordinary life to a form of dozing off or being half asleep (κοζηάγεζκ).
2436
 One is not fully 
aware of what is happening nor of oneself, and only philosophical examination can wake us 
up. In the Republic, the way we normally live is presented as a form of slumbering or 
sleep.
2437
 This is a very diminished form of being and comparable to death. In Gorgias, Plato 
even quotes Euripides and says that perhaps “being alive is being dead and being dead is 
being alive.”
2438
 However, even if life is a sort of death, this death does not correspond to a 
dreamless night. On the contrary, we are surrounded by oneiric images (εἴδςθα) and we are 
ourselves a sort of image.
2439
  
This is very important. We saw above that for Plato an image is something whose 
identity refers to something else, but falls short of that to which it refers. In other words, the 
identity of an image is intrinsically referential and lies outside of itself. This means that the 
appearing of an image is always the defective appearing of something else to which it 
refers.
2440
 But we can relate to this defective and referential being in two different ways. On 
the one hand, we can understand that the image is an image, i.e., that it is not what it appears 
to be, but rather refers to something else and falls short of it. On the other hand, we may fail 
to see the image‟s defectiveness and its referral to something else – i.e., we may see the 
image as if it were a self-contained identity, even though that is not the case, and thus we 
mistake the image for the thing itself whose image it is. This kind of mistake actually 
corresponds to Plato‟s notion of dreaming (ὄκαν). Dreaming, according to him, consists in 
“believing a likeness of something to be not a likeness, but rather the thing itself to which it is 
                                                 
2435
 Cp. Alc. I, 118b. 
2436
 See 31a. 
2437
 See 534c. 
2438
 See 492e. 
2439
 In fact, the unexamined life is comparable to life in Hades insofar as everything in it is but an unsubstantial 
shadow. 
2440





 This means that a life full of images that are not recognized as such is a life 
full of dreams or a complete dream state. But exactly in what sense is the unexamined life full 
of images that are mistaken for the real things? And what kind of images in this sense can be 
found in the unexamined life? 
We can say that any defective belief is an image in the negative sense, insofar as it 
mistakes a defective version of something for the real thing. On this basis, we can say that 
there are several different kinds of images (and several kinds of dreams) in the unexamined 
life. First of all, we often attribute wrong predicates to things and this creates an illusory 
image of them, which we mistake for the real thing. Moreover, all concrete beings are images 
of the εἴδδ, insofar as the former are constitutively referred to the latter. But, in virtue of the 
body-loving ontology, we also think that the particular instances of the εἴδδ are the things 
themselves, and fail to realize that they are just images. However, the decisive kind of image 
and dream concerns our understanding of the εἴδδ themselves, which is very defective, but 
we normally take it to be appropriate. In this sense, our understanding of the εἴδδ is purely 
imagetic and oneiric, and this affects or distorts everything else we deal with. Finally, we 
could also say that our understanding of ourselves is imagetic and oneiric, insofar as it is 
distorted and does not see the real structure of our being.
2442
  
This mistake, along with all others, makes us think we are directed at something other 
than what we truly desire, and causes us to be unhappy, even if we do not notice it. But let us 
leave aside this question for now. The important thing here is the fact that the unexamined 
life is full of images in a negative sense, and is therefore constantly dreaming. Plato even 
says, in Statesman, that “each of us knows everything as if in a dream and then again is 
ignorant of everything as it is in waking”.
2443
 Life is indeed a dream – not in the sense that 
everything it deals with is only a fancy of our imagination, but in the sense that everything is 





                                                 
2441
 See Rep. 476c. For an analysis of this whole passage (including the notion of dreaming), cp. Chap. 7, Sect. 
2.4 above. 
2442
 In fact, our being, insofar as it is essentially determined by desire (and in fact the desire of a superlative 
good), has itself the structure of an image. Indeed, desire is something that refers to something else or wants to 
be like it (i.e., wants to possess it), but falls short of the thing it desires – and this is precisely what characterizes 
the notion of image.   
2443
 See 277d: “ηζκδοκεύεζ βὰν ἟ι῵κ ἕηαζημξ μἷμκ ὄκαν εἰδὼξ ἅπακηα πάκη᾽ αὖ πάθζκ ὥζπεν ὕπαν ἀβκμε῔κ.” 
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5.3. Assessment of the truth and untruth of the unexamined life  
 
The different forms of unexamined life seem to have serious cognitive limitations and 
these limitations do not simply concern a few details or some complex theoretical questions. 
Although one is normally convinced of knowing everything that matters, Plato‟s dialogues 
raise the possibility and argue that we have no knowledge at all – i.e., that the unexamined 
life is an entirely distorted way of seeing things. This may imply that every single belief we 
have (i.e., every attribution of a predicate and every claim to understanding a predicate) is 
untrue. But we do not have to go that far. We have seen that our beliefs are intertwined in 
very complex ways and some of them are the basis (or ὏πμεέζεζξ) for the others. This means 
that even if some beliefs are somehow correct, they may still be affected by other beliefs that 
are untrue (especially if the latter constitute the basis for those correct beliefs).  
According to Plato, this is precisely what happens. We think we understand the 
general predicates or εἴδδ, but this is far from being the case. As a result, all attributions of 
predicates involve a distortion, and thus our access to everything is distorted. Although things 
appear to us and we think we see them as they are, the entire reality actually eludes us. 
Things are not as we think they are and we are not where we think we are. This is what is 
alluded to in the myths of Phaedrus and Phaedo, as well as in the allegory of the cave. The 
reality we deal with is a second-rate reality and truth is something else. This does not imply 
that there is a metaphysical world that is completely unrelated to this one. Indeed, how could 
such a world be the truth of the world we find ourselves in? Plato is rather referring to a 
radically different view of this world, which recognizes that it has a completely different 
structure (namely, one in which general predicates or εἴδδ are its basic components). We are 
far from recognizing this, and thus we are very far from knowing where we are and what we 
should do. Despite our complex system of beliefs, we are ignorant of everything. 
This does not mean that we have absolutely no relation to truth. We are not 
completely unconscious and we are not simply related to indeterminate sensations. Insofar as 
the soul loves knowledge and is not indifferent to it, we always have some relation to truth 
and to what things are. But this is not the same as revealing the truth and what things are. Our 
relation to them is blocked. In other words, things elude us and our way of seeing things is 
thus a complex mixture of ἀθήεεζα and θήεδ or, as Plato says, it lies between the two. In fact, 
this would be so even if we were fully aware of not knowing what things are. But in the case 
of the unexamined life, we think we know things. Thus, the fact that they elude us also eludes 
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us. We are twice removed from the truth and the degree of θήεδ that characterizes such a life 
is much greater than in the case of simple ignorance. We are related to the truth, but we live 
in a completely distorted or fictitious version of it. In Plato‟s words, our life is “a day that is 
like night” (κοηηδνζκὴ ἟ιένα).
2444
 We think we are seeing things but we are not. We are just 
dreaming. 
We can therefore see how there is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the 
unexamined life, and this will be very important in the following, when we will discuss 
whether or not such a life is desirable and whether or not we need philosophical examination. 
But before we do so, we must still consider in more detail one other question. 
 
                                                 
2444





The question of the responsibility for the unexamined life and the possibility of 
abandoning such a life 
 
 
“Il est bien malaisé (...) d‟ôter à des insensés des chaînes qu‟ils révèrent.” 





In the previous chapters we considered the formation and structure of the unexamined 
life. We saw that this life is based on a particular arrangement of the soul‟s drives in which 
one‟s love of knowledge is weakened and plays a subordinate role. However, this does not 
yet fully account for the occurrence of such a life. We must still consider what exactly 
determines this inner arrangement of drives. In other words, we must identify what (or who) 
is responsible for the unexamined life. This is very important, because it shows how we relate 
to the unexamined life – i.e., whether we are somehow forced or constrained to live such a 
life, or if this somehow is a choice and an act of ours. In short, we will see whether and to 
what extent we are free and autonomous while living an unexamined life. In doing so, we will 
develop our previous discussion about the choice or adoption of a particular αίμξ.
2446
 
Moreover, we will also be able to determine whether or not it is under our control to abandon 
the unexamined life. This is an important question, and it will have important consequences 
for the following discussion of whether or not we should examine, because it determines 
whether or not we can embrace philosophical examination by ourselves. 
Let us then see what is said (or what can be inferred from what is said) about this 
problem in the Platonic corpus. There are indeed several indications about the origin of the 
unexamined life and of all the defects (i.e., all badness) associated with it. We will try to 
combine these indications and see how the problem can be conceived within the framework 
of the tripartition. But before considering the Platonic answer to the problem, it is important 
to define the problem better and also to briefly see the cultural background against which 
Plato discusses the matter.  
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 See VOLTAIRE, Œuvres, vol. 29, Paris, Armand-Aubrée, 1829, 335. 
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1. Fall, imprisonment, and the problem of the soul’s responsibility therein 
 
 We will try to determine who or what is responsible for the occurrence of the 
unexamined life. In doing so, it is important to bear in mind that we are not just considering 
one possible way of life. Based on the previous chapters, we can already understand that the 
unexamined life is a life marked by many cognitive defects, which easily translate into many 
practical defects.
2447
 This fact then determines the whole question of this life‟s origin and of 
what is responsible for it. Plato renders this especially clear in the way he portrays our 
relation to such a life. In Phaedrus, Plato presents the origin of the unexamined life as a fall 
from a superior condition into an inferior one.
2448
 This means that one loses sight of the true 
beings (i.e., the εἴδδ) and holds on to the domain of the body (i.e., the domain of concrete 
beings and the way we normally see them). In addition, one forgets that there are true beings 
and that we are directed at them, and one pursues other things. The unexamined life is thus 
the result of this fundamental movement of falling. But the unexamined life is not simply the 
result of a fall. Besides falling, we are also retained there. Apparently, we cannot simply 
leave this life at any point. Inspired by Orphism, Plato portrays the unexamined life as a 
prison.
2449
 We are prisoners of our body and, more than that, we are prisoners of its way of 
seeing things. The cognitive nature of the prison becomes particularly clear in the allegory of 
the cave. One is strapped down and forced to look at shadows, and this prison is so effective 
that one does not even know that one is a prisoner. 
 These two images stress the fact that the unexamined life is constitutively limited. To 
be more precise, the unexamined life is marked by loss and by the impossibility of 
immediately recovering what was lost. But how is this possible? How can we pursue an 
unexamined version of the good and create a practical system of pursuit, based on a system of 
unexamined views? And admitting that such a life is marked by many cognitive limitations, 
how can we accept these views and be engaged in this life? What is the ultimate origin of this 
defective mode of being? 
 It is important to note that these questions may be understood in two different senses, 
which actually correspond to the two different images used to describe our relation to the 
unexamined life. On the one hand, we may wonder what is responsible for the fall – i.e., why 
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 For a more close consideration of these defects, see Chap. 18. 
2448
 Cp. Sect. 3.1 b) below. 
2449
 Cp. Grg. 493a, Cra. 400c, Phd. 62b, 81d-e, 82e ff. 
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we adopted an unexamined life in the first place. On the other hand, we may inquire into 
what causes the imprisonment – i.e., why we remain in it and do not abandon it. Plato 
discusses both questions. The second one is perhaps the most important, because this 
imprisonment is what prevents us from adopting a philosophical life, but we can find 
important indications about this also in the discussion of the first question. Both these 
questions ask about the possibility of the unexamined life and both help us understand what 
ultimately causes it, so it is important to consider them together.  
 We must thus try to determine what is responsible for the adoption of the unexamined 
life – i.e., what can be blamed for it or what is objectively at fault for it. In short, we must 
find the αἴηζμκ. In particular, we must determine our own responsibility or the responsibility 
of our ροπή. Are we completely passive in the process? Or is it rather an act of ours? And 
even if there is some passivity involved, can it be the result of some inner activity? Moreover, 
if some inner activity of ours causes the unexamined life, does this mean that we are entirely 
to blame, or can this be an activity of which we are not entirely aware and which does not 
depend on us as other activities of ours do? In other words, what exactly is our relation with 
what happens in us, how is our own self and its agency to be conceived, and what are the 
implications of this for the question about our own responsibility in the life we adopt (and 
consequently in everything that comes with it: namely, all the views and acts that stem from 
it)? If we look at the corpus, we see that Plato uses many terms that are associated with our 
agency – such as ἑηώκ, ἄηςκ, ἐεέθεζκ, αμύθεζεαζ, ἐπζεοιία, ἔνςξ, ὀνέβεζεαζ, ηναηε῔κ, 
ἐβηνάηεζα, ἀηνάηεζα, ἐλμοζία, ἐθεοεενία, δμοθεία. But what understanding of our own 
activity and responsibility underlies the use of these terms? And what does that understanding 
imply for our relation with the unexamined life? 
 The consideration of our agency in a broad sense is indeed very important for the 
question at hand. If we simply adopt our normal conception of agency and responsibility, 
then it seems obvious that we cannot be blamed for the unexamined life at all. In general, we 
do not think about adopting it and remaining in it. We do not see it as a possibility among 
others and we do not remember choosing it at any moment. We are not even aware that we 
lead an unexamined life as such. We simply live it. Furthermore, admitting that the 
unexamined life is full of defects, choosing it would imply making a bad choice and a 
practical error. But many passages in the dialogues are adamant about the impossibility of 
choosing something bad. No one errs willingly. We are always guided by our representation 
of the best, and thus any bad choice is always the result of our ignorance. It is not something 
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we truly desire, but rather something we do in spite of ourselves or malgré nous.
2450
 Finally, 
if we consider the above mentioned images, we notice that both the fall and the imprisonment 
imply constraint. One is forced by gravity and by one‟s shackles or prison to adopt a certain 
position. Thus, we seem to be exonerated from any responsibility with respect to the 
unexamined life. We are constrained, forced or compelled to live such a life. But are we 
really unaccountable? What exactly compels us?  
 Our ignorance seems to play an important role here. We are not aware of the choice 
and of what we are choosing. But is this ignorance just something that happens, or can we 
somehow be to blame for it? Plato does qualify our ignorance or stupidity (ἀιαεία) as 
reprehensible (ἐπμκείδζζημξ), and this seems to involve the idea that we should know what we 
are ignorant of, or at least we should know that we are ignorant of it, instead of having a false 
conceit of knowledge.
2451
 Moreover, Plato constantly stresses our own role in deciding how 
we live, both during the conversations (which are full of protreptic appeals to examine things 
thoroughly) and when he presents eschatological myths (in which the soul chooses its life and 
is then judged for the life it chose in the end). All this suggests that our ροπή (or something 
that happens in it) might be the main responsible for the life we lead, after all. But how can 
this be? 
 As we saw before, the cognitive limitations of the unexamined life, as well as its 
general practical structure, derive from a particular arrangement of the soul‟s                  
drives – namely, an arrangement in which our inborn love of knowledge is weak and 
subordinated to other drives. The unexamined life is thus directly associated to what happens 
within us. But what exactly determines the relative strength of the soul‟s inborn drives? Is it 
determined (or at least influenced) by something outside the soul? Or is it determined solely 
by the soul itself? And if the latter is true, in what way? Is the inner arrangement of drives the 
result of the struggle of the drives themselves? Or is it determined by a particular part of the 
soul?  
 The answer to these questions is very difficult, especially because they concern 
something that happens in the depths of our being. We will have to see what can be said 
about this in light of Plato‟s dialogues, and in doing so we will be able to better understand 
the role we play in our life and the way we relate to it. In fact, the following analyses will 
allow us to better understand the sense in which we can talk of the self – as well as of will, 
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 For more on this, cp. Chap. 12, Sect. 5.5. 
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 See Ap. 29b, Alc. I 118a, and cp. the preface to Chap. 7, Sect. 1. 
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responsibility, autonomy and freedom – in the framework of Plato‟s thought. To this extent, 
the problem of our responsibility for the unexamined life is also decisive for our own        
self-understanding. 
 
2. Brief consideration of the pre-Platonic understanding of human responsibility  
 
Before seeing how the question of the responsibility for the unexamined life can be 
conceived in Platonic terms, it is helpful to briefly consider the pre-Platonic conceptions of 
human responsibility and of related notions such as blame, merit, freedom, autonomy, and so 
on. These conceptions constitute the backdrop against which Plato develops his own 
understanding of human responsibility and they can therefore render Plato‟s ideas clearer.
2452
 
We must, however, bear in mind that this backdrop is quite complex. It includes ideas and 
texts from different periods and different contexts – such as literature, religion, science, 
philosophy, politics, jurisprudence and everyday life. We will not consider all these contexts 




Let us begin with Homer, who provides us with important indications about human 
responsibility. Homer conceives reality as a system of forces and human beings themselves 
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 It is important to note that these Pre-Platonic conceptions are not concerned with the responsibility one may 
have for the unexamined life as such. They are usually more concerned with our actions (especially the most 
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seem to correspond to an internal system of forces, composed of multiple inner agents. The 
unity of the human being is thus problematic, especially with respect to action. Often there 
seems to be some inner division, and deliberation is itself conceived as a discussion of inner 
agents.
2454
 Thus, although the source of action seems to be within each human being, the real 
cause of action is often unclear. Moreover, human motivations are not strictly internal. 
Human beings are affected by others and things around them, and there is also a frequent 
interaction with gods and divinities in general. In fact, there is even a notion of fate as 
something to which the gods themselves must obey.
2455
 But the most relevant problem 
concerns the relation between human and divine responsibility. In some cases, one may 
blame the gods for what one did.
2456
 It is particularly relevant in this context the conception 
of temporary madness (or loss of one‟s wits) as something that is caused by the gods and 
leads to disaster.
2457
 These may be only exceptional occurrences, but they are always 
possible. Human beings thus seem to be subjected to the caprices of the gods, who are 
responsible both for good and for bad things.
2458
 But despite this vulnerability, human beings 
may also try to affirm themselves, show their strength and ἀνεηή. The Homeric world is not 
fatalistic. The influence of the gods is not enough to annul one‟s blame or take away one‟s 
merit. Human beings are still responsible for what happened and, in particular, they are to 
blame for their evils.
2459
 In sum, the models of inner responsibility and external intervention 
seem somehow to coexist, although this coexistence is not clearly defined. 
It is thus clear that Homer‟s conception of human action is affected by his conception 
of the gods. However, Homer‟s gods are not moral beings, and thus their intervention in 
human life is not directly connected with moral questions. It is only in Hesiod and in later 
authors that we find the idea that Zeus is essentially concerned with justice. Zeus guarantees 
justice in the cosmos and punishes injustice. This points to a greater social concern with the 
cooperative virtues – i.e., with those virtues that are oriented towards others and towards the 
community in general. But Hesiod describes his own age as an age of injustice, and thus very 
different from the Golden Age and the ease that characterized it. Furthermore, he warns that 
things will become even worse. Consequently, one should choose the path of justice.
2460
 This 
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 For more on this, see Chap. 10, Sect. 1.1. Cp. also footnote 1626. 
2455
 Cp. A. ADKINS, op. cit., 17ff. 
2456
 See e.g. Iliad, XIII.222- 227. 
2457
 This madness and this disaster were often associated with the word ἄηδ. For more on this, cp. e.g. R. 
DAWE, op. cit., J. STALLMACH, op. cit.   
2458
 Cp. Iliad, XXIV.527-32. 
2459
 Cp. Odyssey I.32-34. 
2460
 See Opera et dies, 109ff. 
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appeal plays a central role in Hesiod and it seems to presuppose that we can control our 
actions. Likewise, the idea of a divine punishment seems to assume that one is somehow 
responsible for what one did (i.e., one must somehow have intended it), although this may 
also be related with the traditional conception of objective blame. 
The idea of objective blame is based on a magical understanding of reality. According 
to it, certain actions cause pollution (ιίαζια). If, for instance, one is in contact with 
something unholy (and especially with blood), one will have a material or physical infection, 
which may fester and produce greater evils (such as the plague at the outset of Oedipus 
Tyrannus). It may even pass from generation to generation. Thus, one needs to be cleansed or 
purified. Otherwise, what one did in the past may have serious consequences in the future. 
This protracted effectiveness is indeed an important trait of these popular conceptions. It also 
seems to have been at the basis of Orphic doctrines that speak of an ancient crime of the soul 
that caused it to be incarcerated in the body. Empedocles, for instance, presents himself as a 
fallen δαίιςκ that must pay for this crime.
2461
 We also find in Ancient sources the idea that 
human beings are born from the ashes of the Titans, who dismembered and ate Dionysus, and 
were punished by Zeus. For this reason, we also contain a part of Dionysus within us, and we 
must nurture it. This means once more that we must purify ourselves, but now in the sense of 
purifying our soul and releasing it from the body.
2462
 It seems therefore that we may choose 
between freeing ourselves or continuing to be attached to the titanic element (i.e., the body). 
But we do not seem to be entirely free to choose, because we are still constrained by the past 
action of the soul and by our embodiment. In fact, it is not very clear how we can purify 
ourselves and achieve true liberation. But there is at least the appeal to do so. 
We can also find meaningful reflections about human agency in tragedy, which 
develops some aspects that were already considered. On the one hand, there is the idea that 
one is responsible for what is later called (based on Aristotle‟s analysis in his Poetics) the 
tragic error (ἁιανηία). In other words, one unwittingly leads oneself to one‟s own ruin.
2463
 On 
the other hand, the gods also seem to contribute to this ruin (especially by causing madness, 
as we see in Sophocles‟ Ajax). In addition, there are many references to pollution and even to 
ancestral guilt. Thus, the idea that one is responsible for something seems to be once more 
conciliated with higher powers or with the idea of an indirect responsibility (insofar as an act 
only produces consequences much later). In these cases, one is no longer fully at fault for 
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 See DK B115. 
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 Cp. O. KERN (ed.), Orphicorum fragmenta, Berlin, Weidmann, 1922, fr. 220. 
2463
 Cp. e.g. J. BREMER, op. cit., T. STINTON, op. cit. 
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what happens. The same applies to the passages in which Euripides seems to admit the 
possibility of being controlled by passions.
2464
 But this does not mean one is fully exonerated. 
One may at least be responsible for coming to the point where one loses control. Indeed, there 
are many passages in which we are advised to be aware of our human limitations, think 
mortal thoughts, avoid excesses, and so on.
2465
 Such advices to moderate ourselves clearly 
presuppose that we always had a certain degree of freedom. Thus, according to Greek 
Tragedy, we are always at least partly responsible for what happens to us.  
These are the more traditional conceptions of the problem of human responsibility. 
But there are some later innovations that are also important for Plato. For instance, the idea of 
being controlled by passions also plays an important role in rhetoric and sophistical thought. 
Gorgias in particular is very aware of the power of love, and also of how θόβμξ may charm us 
and manipulate our πάεδ, thereby placing us under the control of whoever is able to master 
this θόβμξ.
2466
 In this framework, the orator (i.e., the one that possesses a sophistic education) 
seems to be the only one that is fully free, and thus fully responsible for what he does.  
The medical texts also lay out interesting innovations in the understanding of human 
beings and their actions. Diseases and madness, which strongly restrict our agency, are no 
longer seen as the result of an external intervention of the gods. Rather, they are determined 
by our inner disposition and by our interaction with our environment. In turn, the action of 
these two determinants decidedly depends on the particular regimen of life we adopt. We 
may indeed determine our behaviors and habits in different ways, and in doing so we also 
determine much of what happens to us – especially at the level of the body. 
All these literary, religious and technical or scientific conceptions recognize 
constraints that limit our responsibility for some actions, but in general they see us as beings 
that are free – i.e., autonomous or self-determined. This is fully in keeping with the Greek 
understanding of freedom in the social and political domains. A citizen is free if he takes part 
in the govern of the πόθζξ. He may still be slave to the law, but he is not submitted to another 
man (which would be a slavish and wholly undignified condition). Likewise, a πόθζξ is free if 
it is sovereign – i.e. not controlled by another state. In this sense, the highest freedom of a 
πόθζξ or a citizen corresponds to the ideal of α὎ηάνηεζα. One will not need anything from 
other states or other people, and thus one will not depend on them.  
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In this framework, every action of a citizen presupposes that he is in control of his 
life. He is a sort of pilot or steersman. He decides the course and is able to implement            
it – both in his house (where he is an undisputed authority) and in the πόθζξ (where he may 
not rule the others, but is also not ruled by them). However, in order to do determine one‟s 
course effectively, one must know what one is doing. One needs rational insight as to where 
one is going and how one can get there. In short, one needs intelligence or lucidity 
(θνμκε῔κ).
2467
 Moreover, one must be able to control oneself (i.e., control one‟s passions). 
Otherwise, if one is a slave to one‟s desires, one may easily commit serious blunders and ruin 
one‟s life. Both in private and in public life, one must be able to follow one‟s best judgment. 
This is the only way of properly attaining the ideal of ἀνεηή, which is what all human beings 
should strive to attain. 
To be sure, many human beings are not citizens in the Greek world and their freedom 
is therefore severely limited. Likewise, many citizens do not attain the ideal of ἀνεηή. 
According to some (especially those with aristocratic proclivities), this may be determined by 
one‟s birth or θύζζξ. But there were also many advocates of democratic ideas, according to 
which all have the same potential. In fact, medicine and sophistry recognized that all human 
beings have a common constitution.
2468
 Everyone may thus be educated and overcome one‟s 
natural limitations. Consequently, one may gain control not only over one‟s life, but also over 
one‟s πόθζξ (at least as far as a democratic regime allows). 
In conclusion, we see that the discussion about human agency and about our 
responsibility for our own life often stresses our freedom, autonomy and self-determination, 
even if it still recognizes that there are many sources of constraint. Plato follows the same 
general pattern, although he also introduces many significant changes in light of his own 
understanding of human life.  
 
3. Plato’s conception of the soul’s responsibility for the unexamined life 
 
 Let us then start by looking at how Plato conceives of our self-determination, and thus 
of our responsibility for the unexamined life.
2469
 The Platonic corpus lays out a complex 
answer to the question about what is ultimately responsible for the unexamined life. This 
answer has two main components: the first is mythological, and the second is conceptual. The 
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mythological component is important, because it clearly points towards the answer to the 
problem. However, it does not properly explain what is implied in this answer, and therefore 
we must complement the mythological consideration of the problem with a more conceptual 
analysis, based not only on what is said in other passages, but also on what can be inferred 
from general aspects of Plato‟s thought.  
 
3.1. The mythological presentation of the soul’s responsibility for the 
unexamined life 
 
 We find many indications about the unexamined life in the different myths of the 
corpus, but only a few of these myths discuss why we fall into such a life and why we 
normally do not abandon it. The two most important myths in this context are those from 
Republic X and Phaedrus, and we will therefore focus primarily on them. We will also 
consider what is said in Timaeus, which has a semi-mythological character. 
 Each of these three texts presents an elaborate etiological account of our life as it is 
now, and this includes an account of what caused us to adopt an unexamined life in the first 
place. We will focus our attention precisely on the most important aspects of the latter 
account and reflect on their possible meaning. It is true that the mythological character of the 
passages in question renders them particularly problematic, but they can nevertheless teach us 
something about the way we relate to the unexamined life and about the role our ροπή plays 
in determining it. 
 
a) The choice of lives in Republic X 
 
In 614a ff., Socrates tells the story of Er, who was dead for several days, and during 
this time made a journey to the place where human souls go after dying. Then, he came back 
to life with a report of what he saw.
2470
 This story is introduced as an account of the rewards 
and punishments for being just or unjust.
2471
 The souls are said to be judged after dying and, 
according to whether they were just or unjust, they make a thousand-year journey through 
heaven (where they are rewarded with delights and beautiful sights for being just) or earth 
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 Er is thus a sort of εεςνόξ, who travels outside the familiar domain and comes back with a report that may 
change the way people normally understand themselves. For more on the practice of εεςνία, cp. Chap. 4, Sect. 
2.3. 
2471
 See 614a. 
741 
 
(where they are punished with suffering for being unjust).
2472
 In addition, the story describes 
how the souls return to life after their long journey, and this includes an elaborate ritual of 
choosing one‟s future αίμξ. Indeed, Socrates says that after their long journey the souls come 
to a place where they see a light that holds the heaven together and also the spindle of 
necessity, by which the celestial revolutions are turned.
2473
 Here, the souls meet the three 
Fates (namely, Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos), who are associated with past, present and 
future, respectively.
2474
 This place lies therefore at the center of space and time, it determines 
the whole of reality, and it is precisely here that the souls have to decide their life. Everything 
else that happens in their lives after this will just be the unfolding of this decision.  
According to Socrates, the souls have to draw lots in order to determine their turn and 
then they can choose from many different models of life (ηὰ η῵κ αίςκ παναδείβιαηα).
2475
 The 
order in which they choose determines the number of lives available to them at the moment 
of choice, but even the last one will still have good options available.
2476
 Thus, despite the 
constraints, there is always room to choose.  
As for the αίμζ available, they are of all sorts. Some are animal and others are human. 
Not much is said about the animal lives. They seem to correspond to some human traits 
(which is why some souls choose them).
2477
 The human lives, in turn, correspond to a 
particular set of contents (such as money, health, natural talents, repute, family, events), 
which are mixed with one another in order to compose each particular life.
2478
 When a soul 
chooses a life, all its contents will be determined, and the soul will not be able to change them 
later. The only thing that is not directly determined by this choice is the inner arrangement or 
inner disposition (ηάλζξ) of the soul, which seems to be a consequence of the different lives a 
soul chooses.
2479
 It is not clear whether this means that the contents of a particular life end up 
determining the character of the soul that chose it, or whether this character is actually 
determined by the successive choices of the soul. At any rate, the choice is primarily focused 
on the contents of a life, which is what we first notice when we consider a life. But this does 
not mean that the content of a life is wholly clear for the souls at the moment of choosing it.  
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Plato admits that one can rush one‟s choice and fail to consider all that is contained in a 
particular life. 
2480
 It is therefore important to examine the available lives very carefully and 
determine whether they are good or bad, in order to avoid having a bad life and terrible 
punishments in afterlife.
2481
 Above all, one must pay attention to what contributes to one‟s 
ἀνεηή (i.e., one must honor it), otherwise one will not be able to attain it.
2482
 Our choice is 
thus decisive, and our merit or blame depends on it. No other factors will affect it. As is said 
by the spokesman, “the blame belongs to him who chooses; god is blameless.”
2483
 
Thus, the soul is primarily active and it determines itself. This does not exclude a 
component of passivity or constraint. Indeed, one will be accompanied by a guarding spirit 
(δαίιςκ) that will enforce one‟s choice throughout one‟s life.
2484
 But this constraint is the 
result of an active choice of the soul.
2485
 It is determined by the soul at the beginning, before 
one‟s life starts unfolding. In other words, the passive elements are based on one‟s activity. 
We choose the general conformation of our life and then everything is automatic. In other 
words, there is a basic decision or a basic choice that underpins and pervades the whole life, 
and everything else is an indirect result of this choice. 
But what about the choice itself? How does Plato describe it? Is one completely free 
to choose any life whatsoever, or is this choice determined in some way? 
Plato‟s description is not entirely clear. At the moment of choosing, one can compare 
lives and appraise them (at least if one does not rush it).
2486
 This seems to suggest a 
completely free choice. But there are some factors that limit this freedom. Socrates says that 
most choices are made according to the habits the soul had in its previous life (i.e., by their 
previous choices).
2487
 Choices are also determined by the soul‟s post-mortem experiences. 
Those souls that were rewarded with enjoyments and beautiful sights may pay less attention 
to the choice (such as the soul that chose the life of a tyrant in Socrates‟ narration) and those 
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that were punished with sufferings will tend to be more careful.
2488
 Odysseus, for instance is 
said to choose a simple life because of all his past labors (πόκμζ).
2489
 But this does not mean 
his choice is fully free. In fact, according to Socrates, the only kind of soul that seems able to 
overcome any conditioning is the soul of someone who philosophized in a healthy way 
during life.
2490
 This is the only kind of soul who will properly examine the lives available. As 
for the others, their choice will be more or less unexamined, and this has important 
consequences for the question we are considering. If the souls choose to live an unexamined 
life (as most – if not all – the souls mentioned in the text appear to do), then this unexamined 
life will itself be based on the lack of examination. In other words, the adoption of an 
unexamined life already presupposes an unexamined life. However, this does not really 
explain how we come to adopt such a life in the first place. If anything, it only renders such a 
life more problematic. 
But let us leave this aside for now. The most important aspect of the myth is how it 
describes the whole process of adopting a life as a process that takes place before our own 
lives begin. The souls choose a life, this life becomes their destiny, and then they go to the 
plain of Forgetfulness and drink the water of the river of Carelessness.
2491
 This makes them 
forget the choice, the life chosen, and what will happen to them. They will then believe that 
they make many choices during their lives. However, all those supposed choices will be 
merely apparent. Everything was already determined in a previous stage, in which the soul 
itself determined its destiny. To be sure, the soul that determines its own destiny in this way 
is not the soul as we normally experience it during life. It is rather a deeper layer of the soul, 
which in the myth is presented as having an increased awareness of itself and of the whole of 
its existence. This stands in clear contrast with our usual condition, which is marked by lack 
of transparency and forgetfulness of all this. We do not have this basic choice in mind, and 
we do not see it as ours. Instead, we see our own life and our own destiny as something we 
are not wholly responsible for. Thus, we do not really blame ourselves (or, to be more 
precise, we do not blame the dimension of ourselves that makes such a choice), nor do we 
think of caring for ourselves in order to make the best possible choice. We are careless and 
                                                 
2488
 See 619c-d (and cp. once more the description of the soul‟s post-mortem experiences in 614d-616a). 
2489
 See 620c. 
2490
 See 619d-e. 
2491
 See 621a-b. 
744 
 





b) The fall of the soul and the adoption of βίνη in Phaedrus 
 
  In Phaedrus 246a ff., we find a somewhat different (and in many aspects more 
complex) perspective about the adoption of the unexamined life. This perspective 
distinguishes two moments. The first moment is the fall of the soul in the cycle of 
incarnations and the second corresponds to the process of adopting a particular αίμξ within 
this cycle of incarnations. 
 Let us start with the fall of the soul. Several of the important aspects were already 
considered above.
2493
 Socrates describes a mythical time and mythical events that account for 
our present condition. He says that the souls are like a winged team of horses and their 
charioteer, and in the past they roamed free through the heaven.
2494
 From time to time they 
made a procession towards the region above the heavens (὏πενμονάκζμξ ηόπμξ), where they 
could attain what they really long for or what really nurtures them: namely, the contemplation 
of the true and perfect beings.
2495
 However, not all souls are equally able to arrive at this 
destination. The divine souls can ascend with ease because their charioteer and their horses 
are good.
2496
 In turn, the other souls are composed of a good and a bad horse (which roughly 
correspond to the soul‟s love of honor and its love of gain), and their charioteer (i.e., the part 
that is concerned with knowledge) is not necessarily good (i.e., competent).
2497
 This renders 
the soul‟s driving and its ascent to the supracelestial region particularly difficult. In fact, these 
souls may fail to properly contemplate the true beings.
2498
 They will then start to forget them 
and this forgetfulness, along with their badness, may cause the souls to be weighted down, 
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not care for what helps us make a better choice. Hence, we keep leading an unexamined life or we keep 
choosing it. 
2493
 See Chap. 12 Sect. 4.3, Chap. 13 Sect. 2.3, and Chap. 16 Sect. 5.1 a). 
2494
 See 246a-b. 
2495
 See 246d ff. 
2496
 See 246a and 247b. 
2497
 See 246b and 248b. 
2498
 See 248b.   
2499
 See 246c and 248c. 
745 
 
This is what leads these souls to assume a particular αίμξ. They must still act and 
pursue things, but they can no longer fly through the heavens and contemplate the truth. The 
souls are now imprisoned in the body and they must live through it. Thus, they can only 
pursue deficient instances of the beings they once contemplated. In other words, the souls 
must now deal with a defective reality. However, they do not notice this, because they are to 
a great extent forgotten of what they saw and what they long for. To be sure, the souls are 
still somehow directed toward the true and perfect beings and still long for them, but they got 
used to this new domain and now mistake it for their home. Consequently, they fully engage 
in human – i.e., finite or mortal – pursuits (ἀκενώπζκα ζπμοδάζιαηα).
2500
 This is precisely 
what characterizes the unexamined life, as we saw in the previous chapter. 
But what are the reasons for such a fall and such an imprisonment, and what do these 
reasons tell us about our relation to the unexamined life? We saw that the immediate cause is 
the fact that the soul fails to attain its goal – i.e., it fails to contemplate the truth and becomes 
full of forgetfulness. But what causes this inability to attain the truth? 
At first sight, one may think that the text presents more than one answer. On the one 
hand, the fault of what happens seems to lie with the soul‟s bad horse. This horse is poorly 
trained by the charioteer, and as a result it weights the soul down and causes the soul‟s 
driving to be quite difficult.
2501
 On the other hand, Socrates also describes how there is a 
great confusion when the souls try ascend, which causes them to trample each other and, due 
to the lack of competence (ηαηία) of some charioteers, some souls end up damaging their 
wings.
2502
 We may therefore wonder whether the fall is caused by the bad horse or by the 
conditions in which the souls try to ascend. However, upon closer inspection, we notice that 
both problems refer to the same cause: namely, the incompetence of the charioteer. It is the 
charioteer who fails to train or to educate the bad horse, and it is also the charioteer who 
drives the soul in a very poor fashion and fails to avoid the reciprocal trampling of souls. 
Consequently, the charioteer seems to be responsible for the fall.  
Of course, one may still wonder what the causes of the charioteer‟s incompetence are. 
It is not clear whether this incompetence is based on ignorance (which implies some previous 
failure to contemplate the true beings) or if it is a problem regarding the inner quality of the 
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 For this expression, see 249d. 
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 See 247b: “(...) ανίεεζ βὰν ὁ η῅ξ ηάηδξ ἵππμξ ιεηέπςκ, ἐπὶ ηὴκ β῅κ ῥέπςκ ηε ηαὶ αανύκςκ ᾧ ιὴ ηαθ῵ξ ἤκ 
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 See 248a-b: “αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄθθαζ βθζπόιεκαζ ιὲκ ἅπαζαζ ημῦ ἄκς ἕπμκηαζ, ἀδοκαημῦζαζ δέ, ὏πμανύπζαζ 
ζοιπενζθένμκηαζ, παημῦζαζ ἀθθήθαξ ηαὶ ἐπζαάθθμοζαζ, ἑηένα πνὸ η῅ξ ἑηέναξ πεζνςιέκδ βεκέζεαζ. εόνοαμξ μὖκ 




charioteer. If the former is true, then we must determine why the charioteer fails to 
contemplate the true beings in the first place. If, in turn, the problem is some inner defect of 
the charioteer, we must ascertain what kind of defect this is. But the myth presented by 
Socrates offers no answer to any of these questions. It only points to the fact that the origin of 
all human lives (and thus of all forms of unexamined life) is essentially connected to the 
charioteer – i.e., to the part of us that is related to knowledge and that guides the whole soul. 
All this is just the first of the two moments mentioned above. The second moment 
concerns what happens after the fall, and more specifically the way the soul adopts a 
particular αίμξ. As was pointed out above, the soul becomes attached to the body, comes into 
relation with the many concrete beings, and engages in human pursuits. This does not mean 
that it completely forgets the region above the heavens. In fact, the soul can only become a 
human being if it still retains some recollection of the true beings, because this recollection is 
necessary to identify things as we do (i.e., we must see them as instances of the εἴδδ).
2503
 In 
addition, the kind of recollection we have determines the kind of αίμξ we adopt after the fall. 
According to Socrates, each individual soul may have seen more or less of the true beings, 
and it may have become more or less forgetful of them.
2504
 Based on this, he distinguishes 
different degrees of recollection (i.e., different degrees of insight into what the true beings 
are), which he correlates with a nine-level scale of αίμζ (here understood mostly in the broad 
sense of livelihoods or occupations).
2505
 The first level includes the philosopher, the lover of 
beauty, as well as people devoted to the muses or to love. These seem to be conceived as 
different experiences of radical truth, and they stand in contrast with all the other levels. 
These other levels range from the law-abiding king to the tyrant. They imply more and more 
forgetfulness and distortion, and they constitute different forms of unexamined life. But we 
will not consider the particular levels of the scale. The important thing here is how this 
constitutes a kind of necessity.
2506
 As Plato says, if a soul sees the truth, it remains unharmed. 
If, in turn, it becomes full of forgetfulness and deficiency, it falls to earth and its first birth is 
then determined by how much truth it saw and still retains.
2507
 
                                                 
2503
 See 249b-c: “μ὎ βὰν ἣ βε ιήπμηε ἰδμῦζα ηὴκ ἀθήεεζακ εἰξ ηόδε ἣλεζ ηὸ ζπ῅ια. δε῔ βὰν ἄκενςπμκ ζοκζέκαζ 
ηαη᾽ εἶδμξ θεβόιεκμκ, ἐη πμθθ῵κ ἰὸκ αἰζεήζεςκ εἰξ ἓκ θμβζζιῶ ζοκαζνμύιεκμκ· ημῦημ δ᾽ ἐζηὶκ ἀκάικδζζξ 
ἐηείκςκ ἅ πμη᾽ εἶδεκ ἟ι῵κ ἟ ροπὴ ζοιπμνεοεε῔ζα εεῶ ηαὶ ὏πενζδμῦζα ἃ κῦκ εἶκαί θαιεκ, ηαὶ ἀκαηύραζα εἰξ 
ηὸ ὂκ ὄκηςξ.” 
2504
 See 248a and 250a. 
2505
 See 248d-e. 
2506
 Plato designates it as the ordinance of Necessity (εεζιὸξ Ἀδναζηείαξ). For more on this designation, see e.g. 
F. SERRANITO, Lovers and Madmen. The ιακία-θνμκε῔κ Opposition in Plato‟s Phaedrus, Diss. Univ. Nova de 
Lisboa, 2015, 494ff. 
2507
 See 248c-d. 
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But this is not all. In the end of their first life (and most likely also in the end of the 
following lives), the souls will be rewarded or punished according to how justly or unjustly 
they lived.
2508
 Then, after a thousand years, there is a new draw and a new choice of life. The 
souls choose the lives they want and they may change from human into animal form and from 
animal into human form (provided they had some access to truth before falling, otherwise 
they cannot become human).
2509
 In this respect, what is said in Phaedrus is very similar to 
what we find in the Republic. However, after ten thousand years, the souls will be released 
from the cycle of incarnations, or perhaps even earlier, if they happen to adopt three times in 
a row the best life – i.e., a philosophical life without guile or a life of pederastic love (here 
understood as the most sublime form of ἔνςξ) accompanied by philosophy.
2510
  
But how does the soul relate to the different lives it adopts? The first birth is 
automatically determined by how much recollection the soul has. What about the others? Is 
the soul entirely free to determine its life afterwards? The language of choice may suggest so, 
but one is probably conditioned by one‟s previous life. Indeed, one had to have a certain 
degree of recollection to adopt such a life, and what happened during one‟s life (especially 
how just or unjust one was) may have improved or worsened one‟s recollection.
2511
 For 
instance, Socrates mentions that one‟s companies can increase one‟s forgetfulness of the true 
beings. More importantly, the experience of romantic love has the power to awaken our 
memory of the supracelestial region (although its potential can also be squandered if one 
follows the advices of the bad horse and satisfies one‟s lower impulses).
2512
 The dialectic 
between the different parts of the soul will actually determine the soul‟s trajectory and the 
lives it will adopt. But this is perhaps not the ultimate factor in determining one‟s life. The 
dialectic in question seems to depend most of all on the charioteer and on his ability to guide 
the soul. Nevertheless, the text is not fully clear on this point, and we will have to see the 
question from a different angle. 
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 See 249a-b: “(...) ὅηακ ηὸκ πν῵ημκ αίμκ ηεθεοηήζςζζκ, ηνίζεςξ ἔηοπμκ, ηνζεε῔ζαζ δὲ αἱ ιὲκ εἰξ ηὰ ὏πὸ β῅ξ 
δζηαζςηήνζα ἐθεμῦζαζ δίηδκ ἐηηίκμοζζκ, αἱ δ᾽ εἰξ ημ὎νακμῦ ηζκα ηόπμκ ὏πὸ η῅ξ Γίηδξ ημοθζζεε῔ζαζ δζάβμοζζκ 
ἀλίςξ μὗ ἐκ ἀκενώπμο εἴδεζ ἐαίςζακ αίμο.” 
2509
 See 249b: “ηῶ δὲ πζθζμζηῶ ἀιθόηεναζ ἀθζηκμύιεκαζ ἐπὶ ηθήνςζίκ ηε ηαὶ αἵνεζζκ ημῦ δεοηένμο αίμο 
αἱνμῦκηαζ ὃκ ἂκ εέθῃ ἑηάζηδ· ἔκεα ηαὶ εἰξ εδνίμο αίμκ ἀκενςπίκδ ροπὴ ἀθζηκε῔ηαζ, ηαὶ ἐη εδνίμο ὅξ πμηε 
ἄκενςπμξ ἤκ πάθζκ εἰξ ἄκενςπμκ.” 
2510
 See 249a: “(...) εἰξ ιὲκ βὰν ηὸ α὎ηὸ ὅεεκ ἣηεζ ἟ ροπὴ ἑηάζηδ μ὎η ἀθζηκε῔ηαζ ἐη῵κ ιονίςκ μ὎ βὰν πηενμῦηαζ 
πνὸ ημζμύημο πνόκμο – πθὴκ ἟ ημῦ θζθμζμθήζακημξ ἀδόθςξ ἠ παζδεναζηήζακημξ ιεηὰ θζθμζμθίαξ, αὗηαζ δὲ 
ηνίηῃ πενζόδῳ ηῆ πζθζεηε῔, ἐὰκ ἕθςκηαζ ηνὶξ ἐθελ῅ξ ηὸκ αίμκ ημῦημκ, μὕης πηενςεε῔ζαζ ηνζζπζθζμζηῶ ἔηεζ 
ἀπένπμκηαζ.” 
2511
 Socrates alludes several times to the relation between knowledge and justice, though he does not develop it. 
See in particular 248e. 
2512




c) The embodiment of the divine soul in Timaeus 
 
 There are also some interesting indications about the fall of the soul and the adoption 
of a life (and more specifically of an unexamined life) in Timaeus. It is true that these 
indications do not have a strictly mythological character. Plato lays out an elaborate 
cosmology and tries to rationally explain the structure of the universe in general and the 
human being in particular. However, this explanation is presented as problematic and as 
having the status of a likely myth (εἰηὸξ ιῦεμξ).
2513
 This means that it provides a middle term 
between the mythological presentations we just considered and the conceptual analyses we 
will develop in the following. Let us then see the indications we can find in the text. In order 
to isolate them, we will have to reconsider some aspects already mentioned above, but now 
we will look at them from a different angle.
2514
 
 Among other things, Timaeus describes the creation of the human soul. More 
precisely, he considers how our soul is actually composed of two different parts or two 
different souls: one that is immortal and another that is mortal.
2515
 The immortal soul is 
created by the Demiurge with the same materials he used to compose the world soul and to 
bring order to the universe – namely, sameness, alterity and being.
2516
 Thus, the soul contains 
the revolutions of the same and the other, which – if functioning properly – allow the soul to 
know things.
2517
 In addition, the Demiurge revealed to these immortal souls (after distributing 
them throughout the stars) the nature of the universe and the laws of destiny that determine 
the incarnations – thereby rendering himself blameless (ἀκαίηζμξ) for any future badness or 
evil (ηαηία), because we have all the knowledge we need within us.
2518
 Then, he sew the 
souls on Earth and other planets, where they ended up being implanted in the bodies 
fashioned by the created gods.
2519
 Timaeus says that this implantation happens necessarily (ἐλ 
ἀκάβηδξ), and this probably means that it is just a part of the Demiurge‟s process of creating 
                                                 
2513
 For this expression, see 29d, 68d. For more on the status of this cosmology as a likely account, see 29b-d, 
30b, 48d, 59c-d. 
2514
 For more on Timaeus, see Chap. 12, Sect. 6.2, and Chap. 13, Sect. 2.3. 
2515
 See 41c-d, 69c-e. 
2516
 See 35a-b and 41d.  
2517
 Cp. 37a-c, 43e-44b. It is important to notice that Timaeus expressly says that the ingredients used to fashion 
the immortal soul were no longer completely pure (41d). This means that there is a defect at the very core of the 
immortal soul, which helps account for the possibility of cognitive mistakes (i.e., of mistaking what is the same 
for what is other and vice-versa). However, this is not the only (and perhaps not even the main) cause of our 
cognitive limitations, as we will see. 
2518
 See 41e-42d. 
2519
 See 42a and 42d. 
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an universe that is as perfect as possible.
2520
 Human souls are therefore not to blame for their 
“fall into the body.” But does this mean that they are entirely blameless for what happens in 
their life? What exactly is the role played by the body, and by the other part of the soul we 
have not yet considered?  
 Indeed, human beings are not just composed of an immortal soul and the body. The 
immortal soul is weaved together with a different kind of soul, which – just like the body – is 
fashioned by the created gods. Both the body and the mortal soul are thus more imperfect 
than what is directly created by the Demiurge, and insofar as they are brought into connection 
with the immortal soul, they play a role in limiting its perfection.
2521
 The body, for one, is 
described as a chaotic river, with elements always flowing in and out, and this greatly 
disturbs the inner revolutions of the soul, causing it to have a distorted access to things.
2522
 As 
for the mortal part of the soul, it contains many affections (such as pleasure, pain, boldness, 
fear, expectation, anger, αἴζεδζζξ and ἔνςξ).
2523
 All these affections (which constitute the 
spirited and the appetitive parts of the soul) try to control us and control our rational part (i.e., 
the immortal soul). This means that they try to lead us into an unexamined life, and as a 
result, they make it all the more difficult for the soul to be educated and develop its 
rationality (i.e., to restore its inner revolutions and attain the truth). 
 Our way of life and its quality is thus determined by all these conflicts. Indeed, 
Timaeus is very emphatic about the fact that it all depends on whether or not one develops 
one‟s rationality (i.e., whether one returns it to its original healthy state) and brings under 
control the irrational turbulence of the body and the irrational affects of the mortal soul.
2524
 
This will affect not only how one lives, but also what happens after one dies. If one‟s 
rationality (i.e. one‟s immortal soul) is fully developed and one lives well, one will return to 
one‟s star. If, however, one leads a bad life (and this includes all forms of unexamined life, 
insofar as they do not fully develop our rationality or intelligence), one will change into 
inferior forms of life (including all sorts of animals).
2525
 It is important to note that Plato no 
longer speaks of choosing lives, but rather of simply changing from one into the other. 
                                                 
2520
 On the need for creating such beings, cp. 41b-c.  
2521
 The fact that the body and the mortal soul are fashioned by the created gods and not by the Demiurge is 
actually what renders these beings mortal (and therefore unlike gods). Cp. 41c. 
2522
 See 43a-44a. 
2523
 See 69d, and cp. 42a-b, where these affections are directly associated with the body. 
2524
 See 44b-c, 87b, 90a-d. 
2525
 See 42c and 90e-92c. We will leave aside the distinction between men and women, for which Plato presents 
no arguments, and which seems to be only a manifestation of general prejudices of the time. The important 
distinction here is between degrees of rationality or intelligence, self-control, and justice. 
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 But what exactly determines whether one develops one‟s rationality or not? Is this the 
result of how the various parts of our being relate to one another? Does it depend solely on 
the immortal soul? Or does something else determine how we live? 
The text is not entirely clear about this. It says that one may be willing to follow 
justice and the created gods, or one may become the cause of evils for oneself.
2526
 Moreover, 
one may make an effort to be educated or one may neglect oneself.
2527
 This means that we are 
not subjected to any external power. We are the ones that determine our own life. But it is not 
clear what exactly in us determines our choices. Timaeus admits that, at the begin of our life, 
the body disturbs the revolutions of the immortal soul, and the affections corresponding to the 
mortal soul increase this disturbance. With the passage of time, the inner revolutions become 
more orderly and one becomes more aware of what things are.
2528
 However, one still needs to 
be educated or to train the immortal soul in order for it to govern the mortal soul and the 
body.
2529
 This does not seem to depend entirely on oneself. At least at first, one‟s education is 
determined by one‟s family and one‟s πόθζξ.
2530
 Later one may perhaps make all efforts to 
learn, and the text seems to exhort us to do so.
2531
 But what determines these efforts and the 
decision to undertake them (and thus to abandon the unexamined life)? The text suggests that 
it depends on each individual, and the part of them that may decide these things is precisely 
the part that raises us up – namely, the rational or immortal soul.
2532
 This would then be the 
part responsible for what happens to us and for how we live. 
In this context, it is also important to mention Timaeus‟ analysis of how one‟s bodily 
condition may cause diseases of the soul. He says that the disease of the soul is mindlessness 
or folly (ἄκμζα) and it can be of two kinds: namely, madness (ιακία) and stupidity 
(ἀιαεία).
2533
 He then goes on to show how excessive pleasures and pains, especially the ones 
associated with sexual desire, can make us lose control of ourselves and can affect the soul‟s 
intellectual abilities.
2534
 Then, he considers how there can be a proportion or a disproportion 
between body and soul, and if the body is too strong, it renders the soul dull, stupid and 
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 It seems therefore that the badness of the soul can come from the body and the 
soul is not responsible for it.
2536
 The body seems to have a certain autonomy and it seems to 
be able to prevent the soul from improving itself. 
However, throughout these considerations, Timaeus makes several references to the 
importance of education and exercises (especially exercises of the soul) in order to counteract 
or even avoid these diseases of the soul.
2537
 This means that, at least up to a point, one may 
control the body and how it affects one‟s life. Moreover, this seems to be up to us. One may 
choose between one‟s appetites (ἐπζεοιίαζ) or one‟s ambitions (θζθμηζιίαζ), and the pursuit of 
knowledge (which is what allows us to gain control over our entire being).
2538
 As was said 
above, this choice seems to be connected with the immortal soul (which would therefore 
decide between neglecting itself or nurturing and developing itself). Yet, the text is not 
entirely clear on this point.  
 
d) Comparison and assessment of the myths 
 
 The myths (or semi-mythological texts as the Timaeus) are always difficult to 
interpret, especially because they can be read in many different ways. Above all, they can be 
taken in a more literal or in a more figurative sense, and this affects the entire interpretation.  
In the present case, we considered three complementary mythical versions of our fall 
and our imprisonment in the unexamined life (i.e., of how we come to adopt and maintain a 
defective way of life). These versions differ in some important respects. For instance, the 
myth of the Republic makes no explicit reference to a fall from a superior condition, whereas 
in Phaedrus and Timaeus the soul is initially outside the cycle of incarnation and then falls 
into it – either because of its inner constitution (as we saw in Phaedrus) or because of some 
outer necessity (as seems to be the case in Timaeus).  
However, the most important aspect of these texts is the idea of choice – and 
particularly the choice of life. We can also find significant differences in this respect. In 
Timaeus, there are some references to one‟s responsibility in the way of life one leads, while 
in the Republic and in Phaedrus Plato expressly speaks of a choice of life and places the 
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 See 87c-88b. 
2536
 In 86e, badness is also explicitly attributed to a corrupt condition of the body (πμκδνὰ ἕλζξ ηζξ ημῦ ζώιαημξ), 
and not just to an uneducated upbringing. Both factors account for how badness is not willing (ηαηὸξ ἑηὼκ 
μ὎δείξ). However, there is a way in which both factors are willing. We already saw how this may be said of 
one‟s education, and now we will see how, in a way, the bodily influence also depends on us. 
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 See once more 87b and 89d-90d. 
2538
 See in particular 90b-c. 
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moment of choice at a time before our birth.
2539
 The latter possibility, however, is very 
problematic, because we have no memory of such a time or of making such a choice. We did 
not compare the life we lead, which is usually a form of unexamined life, with other forms of 
unexamined life or with the possibility of leading a philosophical life, and we did not decide 
to adopt the life we lead. Moreover, even if we somehow forget the process of choice, there is 
still another problem. Since the soul cannot desire anything bad and the unexamined life 
seems to be intrinsically defective, then such a life cannot be consciously chosen by the soul. 
One must somehow be ignorant of its defects, and this means that one must have an 
unexamined relation to it. In other words (and as was said above), the unexamined life must 
somehow presuppose itself. We need to assume at the origin what we are trying to explain, 
and thus we end up dodging the question. 
It is perhaps better if we read what is said in the Republic and Phaedrus simply as a 
description of how we relate to our present state (thereby bringing these texts closer to what 
we saw in Timaeus). This would mean that the unexamined life is something we are 
constantly choosing, although this choice is very different from the ones we normally make. 
It somehow underlies all our regular choices, and the latter are an expression of it. We cannot 
understand these usual choices without understanding the other kind of choice. Indeed, by 
referring to a distant time and a distant place, Plato is pointing to the fact that we cannot 
explain our present situation with the means normally available to us. Something else is 
happening, even if we have no clear notion of it (i.e., even if we forget it). We are somehow 
adopting an unexamined life, but we are oblivious of the fact that we adopt it. What is this 
adoption, then? What exactly corresponds to this other kind of choice? And what determines 
it?  
Plato seems adamant that the soul cannot be forced to live an unexamined life. The 
latter is always an inner choice, determined by one‟s inner state. In other words, the soul is 
always responsible for the unexamined life. But in what sense can it be said to be responsible 
for it? And if the soul is responsible for it, does this also mean that it is free to abandon it at 
any time? Plato seems to think so. In the Republic, one may decide to be careful in one‟s 
choice. In Phaedrus and Timaeus, one may try to live a better life and acquire more 
knowledge. This may lead to the adoption of a different kind of life – either immediately or in 
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 It is true that in Phaedrus we do not choose our first life after the fall, but we may choose the following 
lives. See once more 249b. 
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the following incarnation. However, regardless of what we do, the life we adopt always 
seems to hinge on one‟s relation to knowledge.   
 
3.2. Conceptual analysis of the soul’s responsibility for the unexamined life  
 
The analyses of Plato‟s myths gave us some important indications about the question 
of the ultimate responsible for the unexamined life. Now, however, we must translate these 
indications into a more conceptual form, and combine them with Plato‟s description of the 
soul‟s tripartite structure. This will provide us with a more accurate answer to the question we 
are discussing. However, this does not mean that we will be able to lay out a completely 
univocal and unproblematic doctrine. As we saw while considering the myths, the question is 
particularly difficult, and Plato‟s answer refers to something that happens in the depths of our 
inner being. Since we do not have a direct and clear access to these depths, we cannot be fully 
certain or fully clear about what happens there. Yet, we may infer much from the more 
immediate manifestations of life and from the model used to interpret them. This is what we 
will now try to do. Let us then see what can be said about how we relate to the unexamined 
life. 
 
a) The soul as what is responsible for the unexamined life 
 
It was already mentioned that the unexamined life is described using two apparently 
contradictory ideas. On the one hand, Plato speaks of weight, prison, necessity or constraint. 
On the other hand, he admits that there is choice and that we are responsible for the life we 
adopt. But how can both things be reconciled?  
In general, Plato never assigns the blame for the unexamined life to external factors. It 
may be necessary for us to have a body, but this does not force us not to examine things. 
Likewise, we are not forced by our affections, by the others around us, by god or by chance. 
The responsibility lies within us, in our own ροπή – which is precisely defined as self-
movement.
2540
 The soul is, thus, not just something that moves. It is the very act of moving 
itself – i.e., of determining itself. In this sense, it is both active and passive, or – as we could 
also say – it reconciles in itself freedom and constraint. But, since the constraint in question is 
not motivated from the outside, the fall and the imprisonment in the unexamined life also 
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 See Phdr. 254c ff. and Lg. 895c-896b. 
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cannot be motivated from the outside. The soul is responsible for all that happens to it – or, as 
Plato says, all good and all bad things come from ροπή.
2541
  
However, we also saw that, according to Plato, the soul never errs – or never does 
anything wrong – willingly (ἑηώκ).
2542
 If the unexamined life is an inferior form of being and 
does not correspond to the soul‟s true desire (as we will consider in the following chapter), 
then the soul cannot consciously choose it. It can only do so out of ignorance. What does this 
then mean for the question of the soul‟s responsibility for the unexamined life? It all seems to 
hinge on what causes this ignorance. We saw that it is associated with a particular 
arrangement of the soul‟s drives in which the love of knowledge is inhibited and ruled by 
another drive. This is what allows the soul to accept false beliefs as being true, and thus it is 
also what leads us to do or attain something bad. But what causes the arrangement of the 
soul‟s drives (and, consequently, the beliefs, actions and the life that results from it)?  
  According to Plato, this arrangement is not forced upon the soul. Even if it may be 
somehow affected by external factors, it is still something that comes from within. It is a 
manifestation of the soul‟s self-movement and self-determination. This means that the soul is 
the true responsible for the unexamined life. But how exactly does the soul come to have an 
arrangement of drives that leads into an unexamined life? 
 
b) Φηινζνθία as the central component of the self and as the agent ultimately 
responsible for the unexamined life 
 
The arrangement of drives that brings about and sustains the unexamined life is not 
random. It is determined by the soul itself and, more precisely, by an essential component of 
it – namely, the soul‟s inborn love of knowledge (θζθμζμθία). Indeed, although the three 
drives always restrict and contaminate each other, Plato recognizes that our love of 
knowledge plays a central role in this interaction. So much so that Plato even presents it as 
the essential part of our being or what we most properly are. According to the Republic, if 
one wants to see the true nature of the soul, one must look at its inborn θζθμζμθία.
2543
 It is 
also represented as a human being within the soul, whereas the other drives are represented as 
irrational animals.
2544
 This does not mean that our soul‟s identity can be reduced to its love of 
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 See e.g. Chrm. 156e ff. 
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 See Chap. 12, Sect. 5.5 above. 
2543
 See 611d-612a.  
2544
 See 588c ff. 
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knowledge. Our soul has several other essential features, such as its relation to the superlative 
good or even the domain of sensation. However, both these things are pervaded and 
transformed by our desire to know things and by the views produced by this desire. Our 
θζθμζμθία is therefore at the basis of our whole experience of ourselves and of reality in 
general. It determines everything in our life, and this includes the other drives, their general 
arrangement and the αίμξ that results from it.  
This means that the ultimate responsible for the fall and the imprisonment in the 
unexamined life is the soul‟s inborn love of knowledge. In fact, we had already seen that the 
unexamined life is based on the fact that our soul‟s love of knowledge is inhibited, 
underdeveloped or untrained. Plato directly alludes to this in the Phaedrus, by depicting the 
fall of the soul as being ultimately caused by the incompetence (ηαηία) of the charioteer, who 
is identified with the soul‟s love of knowledge.
2545
 Indeed, the soul does not adopt an 
unexamined life (as well as all the beliefs associated with it) after much reflection. On the 
contrary, the soul does not have a clear idea of what such a life is or what it entails. One is 
guided by other drives and the beliefs they install in the soul, and this installation is possible 
only because the soul easily accepts those beliefs and does not submit them to a rigorous 
examination. This is what allows the soul to forget what things really are and to be satisfied 
with a defective view of them. The soul neglects itself and this allows it to live and keep 
living an unexamined life. 
But this is not all. A weak love of knowledge does not only affect the views we adopt. 
It also allows the other drives to grow. As is said in Phaedrus, the lack of training of the bad 
horse (which corresponds to our love of gain) renders it unruly and affects the entire soul.
2546
 
The same may be applied to our love of honor. One of these drives (or even the two) become 
stronger and more uncontrolled. Hence, they are better able to convince us of their own views 
(i.e., of the views they create in order to better attain their goals). In fact, the strengthening of 
the other drives and the acceptance of their views are two sides of the same process that 
brings about and sustains the unexamined life. The entire process is ultimately rooted in the 
weakness of our θζθμζμθία (i.e., in our weak Wille zur Wahrheit). In other words, everything 
in life (i.e., one‟s inner πμθζηεία, the practical system of life, its cognitive system) is 
fundamentally determined by our relation to knowledge. The fall and imprisonment is 
actually the fall and imprisonment of the soul‟s θζθμζμθία. 
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This latter aspect deserves special attention. The very notions of fall and 
imprisonment are to be understood from the standpoint of our love of knowledge. It is our 
love of knowledge that assumes an inferior form and becomes subordinated to something that 
is inferior to it. If our love of gain or our love of honor happen to assume a philosophical 
form and we end up adopting a philosophical life, this is not seen as a constitutive limitation 
(i.e., as a fall or an imprisonment) by Plato. Likewise, if we fail to attain gain or honor, this is 
not conceived as a constitutive limitation. The cognitive limitations, however, are essential 
for the appraisal of our life, as we will see in the following chapter. Our relation to 
knowledge is essential and therefore any defect in it is seen as a strong limitation of our own 
being. This may be surprising, since we are not very aware of our desire of knowledge, but 
Plato‟s texts try to reveal not only what happens at the depths of our being, but also how we 
are in contradiction with ourselves (and more precisely with our love of knowledge) when we 
lead an unexamined life. 
 
c) The autonomy or self-determination of the soul’s inborn θηινζνθία 
 
It is not enough to point to the fact that the soul‟s love of knowledge is responsible for 
the unexamined life. We have to define what kind of responsibility we are talking about, and 
this requires us to find out how our inborn θζθμζμθία functions and how it determines our 
life. More precisely, we have to see how it comes to be inhibited or weak. Is this a 
spontaneous manifestation of this drive, a way in which it determines itself? Or is this 
weakness determined by some other factor? In short, is our inborn θζθμζμθία autonomous or 
heteronomous?  
This is not an easy question, especially because we cannot easily dissociate the 
philosophical drive from the non-philosophical drives, nor can we directly see what 
constitutes and determines any of our inner drives. We can, however, consider in more detail 
the model of drives and see some implications of how they are conceived. 
We saw that the soul is composed of different drives, and these drives are irreducible 
to each other. This means our love of knowledge always coexists with other kinds of desires 
(namely, with our love of gain and our love of honor). Moreover, these drives oppose each 
other and fight to control our soul. We could therefore think that θζθμζμθία‟s weakness is the 
direct result of the other drives‟ strength. Φζθμζμθία would be forcibly limited by these other 
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drives and, consequently, it would not be the ultimately responsible for the fall and for the 
imprisonment in the unexamined life. 
However, we saw that we never experience the non-philosophical drives in their pure 
state. They are always contaminated by the love of knowledge and thus intrinsically referred 
to views or beliefs. They assume a logical form, present arguments and try to persuade the 
rest of the soul. Indeed, it is only by speaking the language of θζθμζμθία that they can move 
the soul, especially given the fact that we always act based on our views.
2547
 Consequently, 
all drives are mediated by θζθμζμθία. To use the language from Phaedrus, the horses (even 
the bad one) are always molded (i.e., trained or educated) by the charioteer, and their actual 
manifestation depends on how the charioteer determines them. The horses may be more 
docile or more recalcitrant, but this always depends on the charioteer, and it is the 
charioteer‟s fault if the horses happen to oppose him. The power of the other drives always 
stems from the philosophical drive, and this means that any conflict between the “irrational” 
drives and θζθμζμθία is, in a way, an inner conflict of θζθμζμθία itself.
2548
 Only θζθμζμθία 
can resist itself, and this resistance is what causes the fight between our drives. In other 
words, our love of knowledge must be somehow defective, and this defect cannot come from 
the outside. The other drives may be strong, but it is the philosophical drive that renders them 
strong. 
Thus, although the other drives may grow and come to limit the soul‟s θζθμζμθία, this 
is only possible if θζθμζμθία lets them grow. By themselves they cannot force our love of 
knowledge. As Plato says, θζθμζμθία is a divine part of us.
2549
 As such, it cannot be 
controlled by the mortal and irrational parts, because the difference in quality between them 
is very significant. The soul‟s inborn θζθμζμθία must therefore limit itself and “fall” – i.e., it 
must let itself be guided by other drives. This is the only way it can be controlled by them. It 
can do their bidding, but this requires it to submit itself to these other drives. In other words, 
it can become limited and imprisoned, but it must contribute to its imprisonment.
2550
 We 
could even speak of a self-imposed servitude of the soul‟s θζθμζμθία. This is what renders 
the soul “weaker than itself” or what makes it lose its rational control. One‟s love of 
knowledge (or the part of the soul that corresponds to it) must surrender, yield, concede (ἐ᾵κ 
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 Then it may be dragged (ἕθηεζεαζ) or carried along (ἄβεζεαζ) by the 
other parts.
2552
 However, these passive or affective modalities of our being (in which our love 
of knowledge or our rational capacity seems to obey other drives) are in fact an inner 
variation of the rule of θζθμζμθία.
2553
 The philosophical drive is still present and it is decisive 
for the ruling non-philosophical drive, though at this point it is modified and very weak.
2554
  
The decisive role of the soul‟s θζθμζμθία can also be seen in the fact that, according 
to Plato, the soul‟s love of knowledge is able to regain actual control of the soul, as we will 
see in Section 5 below. As is presupposed by the constant appeals or exhortations to examine, 
our love of knowledge may grow stronger and start examining things. This examination may 
then render it stronger and stronger, until it is able to control the other drives. At this point, 
the other drives will not be able to control the soul‟s θζθμζμθία in any way. This does not 
mean that they will be eradicated. Rather, they will be perfectly integrated in the rule of our 
love of knowledge. They will not oppose the soul‟s θζθμζμθία, because the soul‟s θζθμζμθία 
will not oppose itself or weaken itself. Our love of knowledge will be fully developed – and 
thus it will be fully autonomous and free. 
In turn, when our love of knowledge is not fully developed and, consequently, does 
not rule the soul, it can accept false beliefs or lose the true beliefs it has.
2555
 The other drives 
will be able to create views and pass them off as knowledge. This is how they can become 
stronger and start ruling the soul. The non-rational drives must deceive the soul‟s    
θζθμζμθία – or, as we could also say, the philosophical drive must deceive itself.
2556
 
However, the latter will not be conscious of doing so. The philosophical drive cannot go 
against its own nature and desire something else than knowledge (or what appears to be so). 
Thus, it must be convinced or persuaded of the views it adopts. These views must appear to 
be true. Indeed, the soul‟s θζθμζμθία must always determine itself, and this means it must 
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2554
 This means that we can only be enticed, seduced or charmed by our affections because our philosophical 
drive makes it possible. Those moments in which we lack rational control or follow our irrational impulses are 
still a form of rationality (albeit a very defective one). All momentary lapses and all moments of apparent 
madness are somehow based on θζθμζμθία. Even the most tyrannical inner πμθζηεία, which is only concerned 
with lawless pleasures, is still characterized by θζθμζμθία‟s constant self-surrender (i.e., by its constant decline 
or fall). Reason surrenders the rule to the other drives, keeps supporting this rule, and thus blocks itself. It then 
makes more and more mistakes, and these mistakes weaken it more and more, and at the same time strengthen 
the other drives more and more. The latter become more and more blind, though they never become totally 
irrational or unphilosophical.  
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 As is said in the Republic, it can be robbed, forced or bewitched. Cp. Rep. 412e-413c 
2556
 For the idea of self-deception, cp. Cra. 428d: “ηὸ βὰν ἐλαπαη᾵ζεαζ α὎ηὸκ ὏θ᾽ α὏ημῦ πάκηςκ παθεπώηαημκ· 
ὅηακ βὰν ιδδὲ ζιζηνὸκ ἀπμζηαηῆ ἀθθ᾽ ἀεὶ πανῆ ὁ ἐλαπαηήζςκ, π῵ξ μ὎ δεζκόκ;” 
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always follow what appears to be true. The other drives may try to convince it, but they must 
always do so in θζθμζμθία‟s own terms. The inner dialogue of drives is never between 
equals. Rather, one drive dominates this dialectic and lends its voice to the others, which 
means that in a way it discusses with itself, and it must also convince itself. 
In sum, our inborn θζθμζμθία can become weaker or stronger, it can wither or grow, 
but whether it does so or not is never a direct result of the other drives. It depends only on 
this drive. This is what is shown in the corpus. However, saying this is still not enough to 
fully understand how the philosophical drive works. It may determine itself and determine its 
force, but this does not mean that its strength or weakness depends on a deliberated choice on 
the part of the soul‟s θζθμζμθία. Plato does not say that this drive deliberates about its own 
power and consciously decides to surrender itself to the other drives. It does not persuade 
itself to do so. In fact, its weakness or strength seem to be a fact that we cannot fully explain. 
What we can say, based on the Platonic corpus, is that there is no element that directly 
controls the development of our θζθμζμθία (i.e., whether it is weaker and submitted to other 
drives or whether it is strong and in control of them).  
 
d) The soul’s freedom and spontaneity 
 
Let us now see what all this means for us, insofar as we are responsible for the fall 
and the imprisonment in the unexamined life. Indeed, Plato‟s model is in keeping with some 
of the most important conceptions of human agency in Greek culture. One‟s soul is 
autonomous and it determines itself, insofar as its love of knowledge determines its own 
strength and thus everything else. But what exactly does all this mean in terms of freedom? 
Are we free to choose between limiting our θζθμζμθία or not – and, consequently, between 
leading an unexamined life or not? Or are we free in some other way? 
According to Plato, there is no indeterminate will that considers different possibilities, 
deliberates and chooses between them without having any inner inclination that would 
determine its choice. This may be how we often interpret empirical decisions, but it is not 
how we choose things, nor is this the way we adopt the unexamined life. We are always 
determined by our views, which are the result of the soul‟s inner πμθζηεία, and the latter is in 
turn primarily determined by the soul‟s θζθμζμθία. As for the philosophical drive, it is not 
conceived as having to choose between being strong or being weak, or between exercising 
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itself or neglecting itself. In fact, it is not clear what determines it – or, to be more precise, it 
is not clear how it determines itself.  
Our choices thus refer back to something we cannot truly determine. It somehow 
determines itself in a spontaneous manner, and in doing so it also determines everything else 
in our life. It may therefore seem that we have no freedom and we cannot really be 
considered responsible for what happens. Whatever is responsible for this is something that 
lies in the depths of our being. However, this is actually the deepest essence of what we are 
and also the essence of our soul‟s self-movement. It is in a way an action of ours, though very 
different from our regular actions. It does not lie at the surface of our life, and it is not an 
action we recognize as ours. But it cannot come from the outside. It is at the core of our being 
and has its own necessity or its own law. Thus, it is an autonomous, free or spontaneous 
action. Moreover, it is not just one more action we perform. It is a sort of transcendental 
action, and in this sense it is more concrete than all other actions, which are always mediated 
by it and a result of it.  
To be sure, we have no clear awareness of performing this action. We somehow forget 
it (just as the choice of life described in the myths is forgotten). But this forgetfulness is 
nothing extraordinary, given the fact that our access to the depths of our soul is very deficient 
and only indirect. We do not see what exactly happens there, and this is also why it is 
difficult to prevent this basic action from happening or to change it. We somehow determine 
ourselves behind our backs. This is why we are responsible for the unexamined life and, at 
the same time, we can also say that no one errs willingly, since there is no clear awareness of 
any of this. One always does what seems best and this is based on θζθμζμθία‟s self-
determination. This may go against our θζθμζμθία‟s own tendency and against what we 
really want, but that happens only because our love of knowledge may contradict itself – i.e., 
it may be weak, careless, and fail to exercise itself.   
At any rate, there is no fatalism in our adoption of the unexamined life and all that 
results from it. According to Plato‟s conception, we cannot exculpate ourselves, despite our 
lack of clarity about what happens. It is true that this conception changes our usual 
understanding of our actions and has strong ethical implications. It introduces a component of 
necessity in our most immediate acts, insofar as they are the result of a basic action of ours or 
a basic choice. This basic action or basic choice, in turn, is not something we can 
immediately determine as we determine (or seem to determine) other things. As a result, we 
could perhaps think that our action is irrelevant and we are not really responsible for anything 
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we do. But things are more complicated than that. The basic action we identified – i.e., our 
θζθμζμθία weakening itself or exercising itself – belongs to us in a more fundamental way 
than any of our other actions. It is what we most properly do. Hence, everything we do is 
somehow connected with an action of ours and expresses it. Furthermore, the way θζθμζμθία 
determines itself can change, as we will see. It normally make us passive (insofar as it 
surrenders us to other drives), but it can also make us highly active and autonomous. Indeed, 
we can gain control over ourselves, strengthen our θζθμζμθία, and make it more and more 
demanding.
2557
 This in turn will make us examine things in more detail, and it may change 
many of our empirical decisions. Our entire life will be directly connected with our basic 
action. It will become an expression of our self-affirming spontaneity. We will be truly free 
and truly coincide with our acts, which will then be fully determined by the idea of objective 
truth. Thus, we cannot really say that our empirical decisions and our empirical actions are 
irrelevant. In one way or the other, they are always related to our basic action and they 
always accompany it.  
 
4. The different forms of constraint (ἀλάγθε) that characterize the unexamined life and 
their derived character  
 
After seeing how the soul (through its inborn θζθμζμθία) determines itself and how 
this is the ultimate origin of the unexamined life, we must now consider the different 
components of constraint (ἀκάβηδ) that Plato associates with such a life. According to several 
passages in the corpus, there are some other factors that seem to determine our inner πμθζηεία 
when we lead an unexamined life – and by affecting our πμθζηεία, they also affect the way we 
see things and the way we live. These factors are somewhat external, or at least they are 
different from our own self-determination, and thus they do not seem to depend on us or to be 
under our control. But how can this be reconciled with the soul‟s self-determination? The 
latter is essential for us to adopt an unexamined life. This means that all other sources of 
determination cannot explain why we lead an unexamined life. Their strength is rather based 
on the fact that we adopt such a life. Indeed, these external factors must conspire with the 
internal factors, and they receive their power from the latter. The unexamined life is 
composed of a mixture of autonomy (or self-determination) and constraint, but the latter is 
derived or has a subordinate role. Our inborn θζθμζμθία must determine itself to be 
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constrained, and this marks the entire development of the unexamined life. Things that are 
not under our control help shape our life, but this passivity of ours is still subsidiary of the 
soul‟s self-determination. The soul and its θζθμζμθία must surrender their                         
self-guidance – which, in a way, is still a form of guiding one‟s life. Thus, our experiences of 
ἀκάβηδ are not incompatible with the soul‟s spontaneity, but are actually made possible by it. 
They are the result of the soul‟s fall or of the decay of its θζθμζμθία. 
But let us see these heterogeneous factors in more detail. We have to consider how 
each of them seems to force us to live in a certain way and to remain in the unexamined life, 
and we also have to consider how they are actually derived from the way our constitutive 
love of knowledge determines itself.  
 
4.1. Our affections (πάζε) 
  
The Platonic corpus often mentions how our affections (i.e. pleasure and pain) can 
determine us – and, most importantly, how they can disturb or oppose our love of 
knowledge.
2558
 Affections are connected with the body or, more precisely, with the 
immediate sphere of appearing or sensation.
2559
 This sphere can have different contents and 
these contents may be better or worse. According to what is said in Philebus, there is 
something like a right condition, and we may move away from it (which causes pain) or 
towards it (thereby having pleasure).
2560
 These movements are always happening, even 
without our intervention, and according to other dialogues they may determine our actions, 
our views and even the inner arrangement of our constitutive drives or their relation of forces. 
But how exactly is this possible?  
 According to Plato, our affections do not influence us directly. They can only 
constrain or influence us because we are not indifferent to these affections. We are sensitive 
to them or interested in them, in virtue of our inborn θζθμηένδεζα. The latter is concerned 
with our preservation and also with our best subjective state, which is often identified with 
the greatest possible pleasure. We want to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and this gives our 
affections power over us. The greater our love of gain, the greater the power of our affections 
over us. They will control our pursuits and actions more directly, and they will subjugate and 
use our love of knowledge to better manipulate our subjective state. In this case, our 
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affections may also strongly influence our views. In the Republic, Socrates considers how the 
latter may change – and change for the worse – because we are forced by pain or bewitched 
by pleasure or pain.
2561
 We will lose the good views we had and adopt other more closely 
motivated by our affections. But there is more. Besides affecting our views, strong pleasures 
and pains (especially if they are frequent) may also change our inborn drives and our inner 
πμθζηεία. They feed our love of gain, make it stronger, make it the ruling drive of our soul or 
solidify its rule.
2562
 But, as was said, all this is only possible because our love of gain is 
strong in the first place – otherwise the affection as such would not change anything in us.  
 What is then the cause of our strong love of gain? We already saw that it can only be 
strong if the inborn θζθμζμθία is weak, and this weakness cannot come from outside the 
philosophical drive. Our affections cannot directly influence it. Our love of knowledge must 
determine itself to be less demanding, and as a result it can develop uncritical views that 
strengthen the love of gain and make us value our affections. In other words, the 
philosophical drive must make the gain-loving drive strong. It must imprison itself in our 
love for our affections or for our body.
2563
 The power of θζθμηένδεζα and the importance of 
our affections are always an expression of our θζθμζμθία and intrinsically determined by it. 
Thus, if our love of knowledge had determined itself to be strong and had fully 
developed itself, we would not be able to be constrained, seduced or impelled by our 
affections (or by the promise of pleasure and the threat of pain). We can only be controlled by 
our affections if our love of knowledge lets it – and in this sense we are not truly controlled 
by them. It is true that once opened to affections, they can make us more and more forgetful, 
and our θζθμζμθία becomes weaker and weaker. But in general we can still liberate ourselves 
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one‟s soul may become incurable (see e.g. Grg. 525c, Phd. 113e, Rep. 615e). However, these are extreme cases. 
Let us then leave aside this question for now. For more on it, see Sect. 5.1 below. 
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4.2. The others and the πόιηο 
 
Until now, we have considered our relation with the unexamined life mostly as a 
private matter, but we are also surrounded by others (such as our family, our friends, the 
whole community), and these others seem to influence us in many ways. They have their own 
views, their habits, their occupations, their ways of life, and their inner arrangements of 
drives – and all these possibilities may be transmitted to us through our upbringing (ηνμθή) 
and general education (παζδεία), or simply through our constant contact with them. Plato 
often stresses this, as we saw above.
2565
 We receive many views from others, especially when 
we are children (and thus more credulous) or when these views are frequently repeated 
around us. Likewise, our constitutive drives are affected by others around us, and their ruling 
drives tend to work as allies of the same drives in us.
2566
 As a result, they change our inner 
πμθζηεία, and this then determines our whole αίμξ and our whole way of seeing things. We 
seem therefore to be deeply influenced by others, and one could therefore assume that the 
others can also be the reason why we lead an unexamined life.
2567
  
But how can one soul be influenced by another soul or a group of souls? Is there 
really an external influence that forces us to see things in a certain way or forces our inner 
πμθζηεία to change? One may be tempted to think so. We may indeed seem passive with 
respect to this external influence. However, this is only possible if the internal forces of the 
soul conspire with the external forces. The inner arrangement of the soul is always the 
primary factor. We need to be open to external influences, and this requires our love of 
knowledge to be weak. As our love of knowledge grows weaker, the influence of others 
becomes stronger. Our soul will be ruled by the love of gain or the love of honor, and the 
others will be important insofar as they affect our gain and our honor. We may guide 
ourselves by them because we want pleasure and fear pain, because we want to survive, or 
because we want to be admired by them. But they do not influence us directly. Their 
influence is always based on the state of our inborn θζθμζμθία. If the latter were not weak, 
they would never transform us – i.e., they would not convince us of any views or affect the 
strength of our drives. Moreover, even if our love of knowledge is weak and allows others to 
influence us in a negative way, we may nevertheless counteract these influences. Plato admits 
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that one may become a true philosopher even in a bad πόθζξ, though this is very difficult, and 




Finally, it is also important to mention in this context that the action of others is not 
necessarily negative. As we will see below, Plato also admits the possibility of a positive 
external influence, which helps one to release oneself from the unexamined life – either by 
limiting our other drives or by inspiring our love of knowledge. The latter is precisely what 
Socrates tries to do when he examines others. However, the external impulse as such is never 
enough to liberate us. We must always determine ourselves – i.e., our inner θζθμζμθία must 
determine itself and become stronger. Only then will we start examining and strengthen our 




4.3. Other possible constraints: one’s θύζηο, god(s) and chance  
 
There are still other factors that could be regarded as constraining us into leading an 
unexamined life. One of these factors is one‟s nature or θύζζξ. As we saw above, the term 
θύζζξ designates what is automatically given to a being (as opposed to what depends on 
nurture, practice, habit, ηέπκδ, etc.). It may apply either to our shared condition as human 
beings (which determines our range of possibilities) or to our optimal form. But it may also 
designate the natural tendencies or predispositions of a particular human being, and even 
one‟s particular abilities and talents.
2570
 Plato often uses the term in these latter senses, in 
order to distinguish individuals. In particular, we may have more or less talent for philosophy 
and have a greater or smaller bent towards knowledge. This may render it easier or harder to 
examine and to have a stronger inborn θζθμζμθία. Thus, some natures may be predisposed 




But how is this natural bent to be understood? Does it entail that we are predestined to 
live an unexamined life or the opposite? Or is this no more than a predisposition for one thing 
or the other? Certainly, it seems that one‟s θύζζξ can make it easier or harder for us to 
develop our inborn θζθμζμθία. However, our natural constitution does not seem to be an 
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absolute constraint. For one, it seems impossible to have such a nature that one is completely 
immune to the possibility of falling into the unexamined life. Even when the most perfect 
state is attained, there is still the possibility of degeneration.
2572
 On the other hand, a bad 
θύζζξ does not seem to fully exclude the development of θζθμζμθία. Since one‟s θζθμζμθία 
is never fully inhibited, it can still grow. The predisposition is thus not enough. 
But this is not all. We may also wonder if there is some metaphysical entity or power 
that determines our θζθμζμθία (and is thus responsible for the kind of life we lead), either 
directly or indirectly. At some points, Plato seems to refer to entities of this kind. For 
instance, sometimes he seems to admit the possibility of a godly influence or intervention.
2573
 
We will not discuss here Plato‟s understanding of god or the gods, but it is important to make 
some remarks about how Plato‟s conceives of their interaction with human beings. 
Traditionally, the gods were seen as sending human beings good and bad things.
2574
 Plato, 
however, says that god cannot be the cause of bad things.
2575
 In fact, the gods have no ill-will 
towards human beings.
2576
 Moreover, Plato stresses that god cannot be blamed for the αίμξ 
we choose.
2577
 Even in Timaeus, where Plato describes the whole universe as created by the 
divine Demiurge, we find no reference to god constraining us. The most Plato seems to admit 
is the possibility of a divine dispensation that turns us towards philosophy. But the nature of 
this divine dispensation is problematic. It might be above all an admission of the fact that one 
does not know why it happened. Indeed, the strengthening of our philosophical drive is not 
simply something we decide to do. It is not a choice like our other choices. It comes from the 
depths of our being. Thus, even if there is some external factor, its influence must still be 
confirmed by our own inborn θζθμζμθία. One cannot simply be forced by god to 
philosophize. 
Finally, there is also the possibility of our fall being determined by pure chance or an 
absolute randomness.
2578
 At some points, Plato seems to allude to something of the kind. For 
instance, Plato does admit that there is something like a material element and this element is 
absolutely chaotic. It contains no order or form.
2579
 However, this material element does not 
affect our soul directly. In Timaeus, it may disturb us while we are small children, but it is 
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unable to force us to follow our affections and to live in a certain way.
2580
 The soul must 
always conspire with it, and it can also limit its influence over us. Thus, our life is not 
submitted to this kind of randomness. But Plato alludes to other kind of chance – namely, to 
the idea of a cosmic cycle that causes things to inevitable decay after a time.
2581
 This is what 
causes the downfall of the perfect city in the Republic, and it could also be responsible for us 
not being able to remain always perfect. Indeed, we are constitutively finite, especially 
insofar as we have a body – i.e., a sphere of sensation. However, it is not clear that this cycle 
is something external to our love of knowledge, which will then constrain it to become weak. 
It may be conceived as something that pervades our whole being, including our inborn 
θζθμζμθία. As such, it would not change the fact that our love of knowledge determines itself 
and our entire life. 
 
5. Plato’s conception of the release from the unexamined life 
 
After considering the reason that leads us to adopt an unexamined life, it is now 
important to discuss the possibility of abandoning it. The main question is whether we are 
free to leave such a life and what kind of control we have over this possibility. In addition, we 
also need to consider how difficult any release from the unexamined life is and how there 
may be relapses. All these questions will help us understand our relation with the unexamined 
life and the kind of responsibility we have for leading such a life. They also have important 
implications for the discussion of whether we should dedicate ourselves to philosophical 
examination (i.e., whether there is some sort imperative of philosophical examination). 
Indeed, the value of this imperative is very different according to whether or not we have 
control over the kind of life we lead. We must therefore see how the release from the 
unexamined life can be conceived within the framework hitherto described. 
 
5.1. The possibility of abandoning the unexamined life 
 
 In general, the unexamined life is our default setting. We fall into it and we tend to 
remain in it. There is a sort of inertia. Our philosophical drive remains restrained and ruled by 
a non-philosophical drive. Thus, it may seem we have no control over whether or not we 
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abandon the unexamined life. Usually we do not even think about this possibility, and if we 
happen to think about it, there seems to be a sort of resistance (or a sort of ἀηνάηεζα) that 
prevent us from simply leaving. Plato, however, admits the possibility of a release or a 
deliverance (ἀπαθθαβή or θύζζξ). We can unstrap ourselves and abandon our seated position 
in the cave. We can gain wings and fly. We can separate ourselves as much as possible from 
the body-loving drive, and develop our philosophical drive. In sum, we can perform a 
cleansing (ηάεανζζξ), both in the sense of removing our false views and in the sense of 
cancelling the rule of non-philosophical drives (thereby changing our αίμξ).
2582
 But how does 
this happen? What are the conditions for this cleansing? And can we bring it about at any 
moment, or does it require some preconditions? How much control do we have over the 
entire process?  
 In order to answer these questions, we must start by considering what the release from 
the unexamined life consists in. Given the fact that the imprisonment in the unexamined life 
is based on the weakness of philosophical examination, the release from such a life requires 
our philosophical drive to be developed and to gain control over our soul. In other words, our 
love of knowledge will have to be trained or exercised, and this requires us to embrace 
philosophical examination. The latter will allow us to review our views and realize our empty 
conceit of knowledge. It will also show us the need to inquire further, in order to discover 
how things really are. In other words, it will attack the unexamined life and make us more 
aware of the importance of philosophical examination. Our love of knowledge will thus 
become more demanding and more rigorous, and this change will also affect the other 
constitutive drives of the soul. They will not be extirpated, but they will be increasingly 
weaker (not only because the philosophical drive will grow stronger, but also because more 
and more of the views these other drives were associated with will be refuted).
2583
 As a result, 
our inner πμθζηεία and the αίμξ based on it (i.e., our whole practical system and the system of 
views that underpins it) will be transformed or reshaped. This whole process is therefore 
necessary for us to abandon the unexamined life. But how does this process begin? What is 
the ultimate reason for us to start examining?  
We saw above that the fall in the unexamined life was caused by the way our 
θζθμζμθία determines itself. We adopt an unexamined life if our love of knowledge 
determines itself to be weak. Thus, we may release ourselves from the unexamined life if our 
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love of knowledge determines itself to become stronger. But, as was said, this is not a 
possibility to which we relate consciously. We do not deliberate about it and we do not 
choose to embrace it. The strengthening of the philosophical drive and consequently the 
release from the unexamined life are rather a matter of self-affirmation of our being and its 
most important part – our inborn θζθμζμθία. The latter becomes stronger and more 
demanding, and as a result it starts to see the pertinence of philosophical examination. 
Abandoning the unexamined life seems therefore to depend solely on the 
philosophical drive. This means that we may release ourselves at any moment – at least in 
normal conditions. As was mentioned, Plato admits in some passages the possibility of the 
soul having such an unjust (or perverted) inner arrangement of drives and committing so 
many injustices that it will become incurable.
2584
 In this case, it seems that the soul‟s 
θζθμζμθία will become so weak that it will no longer be able to strengthen itself. However, 
this is a very extreme case, and very different from what normally happens. Moreover, it is 
not clear what exactly Plato has in mind. He mentions this possibility only when he is 
describing an eschatological judgment. He considers it a state of extreme misery and even 
extreme suffering, but this is a very vague description, and apart from that it is difficult to 
imagine what such a state would actually amount to. Usually, our circumstances are very 
different and we are still able (with more or less difficulty) to revert the fall into the 
unexamined life, if our love of knowledge so determines it. 
 
5.2. The external and internal sources of philosophical examination 
 
We have outlined the basic structure of our release or escape from the unexamined 
life. However, this is still not enough to determine the way the release (or at least the 
beginning of a release) normally occurs and how we normally relate to it. Despite the fact 
that the ultimate origin of this release lies in the depths of our being (i.e., in the way our 
inborn love of knowledge determines itself), we can still distinguish different immediate 
circumstances in which we begin to examine and to abandon the unexamined life. These 
circumstances may be external to us (or, to be more precise, they may depend on others 
around us and the way they influence us), but they may also be internal (i.e., they may be the 
result of the way we relate to things). Let us then consider each of them in turn and see how 
they relate with the self-determination of our love of knowledge. 
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a) The possibility of being instigated by others to examine 
 
 As Plato often points out, we receive much from others. Both our education and our 
constant contact with others provide us with views and help determine our soul‟s inner 
arrangement. These processes are usually uncritical and passive, and they tend to solidify the 
unexamined life. However, we may also be instigated by others to examine things, and this 
examination may ultimately lead to a release from the unexamined life. We find a clear 
reference to such an “external release” in the allegory of the cave. Socrates raises the 
possibility of someone being released (θοεείδ) and forced or constrained to rise, turn around, 
walk, and look to the light behind him.
2585
 In fact, the released prisoner must be dragged by 
force (ἕθημζ αίᾳ) through much of the ascent.
2586
 In addition, the person who liberates the 
prisoner also explains what is happening and questions him.
2587
 To be sure, at the later stages 
of the process there is no more references to the instigator of the process, and the prisoner 
reflects by himself about the meaning of his experience. However, much of the process does 
not seem to have been the choice of the prisoner.
 
Indeed, the whole passage stresses how 
these prisoners tend to strongly resist any attempt at releasing them.
2588
 As prisoners, they 





This passage is very relevant, but we find many other illustrations of this throughout 
the dialogues. We often see Socrates perform the role of the external instigator. He is a gadfly 
that awakens others from their drowsiness.
2590
 He interrupts them when they are in the middle 
of something and examines their beliefs and their lives. Often, he lets them see how baseless 
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their beliefs are and how problematic their way of living is.
2591
 In doing so, he tries to 
motivate them to continue examining.
2592
 The process is long, but by increasing one‟s 
exigency and creating an acute awareness of one‟s ignorance, Socrates is trying to inflame his 
interlocutors‟ inborn love of knowledge – and this may indeed be a decisive impulse to leave 
the unexamined life. 
 However, there can be different reactions to this external effort to release us, as Plato 
sometimes points out. The external intervention disturbs us, but one can interpret this 
disturbance in different ways. One may assign the blame for it to someone else, or one may 
notice that this disturbance is the result of one‟s cognitive limitations – and thus it is one‟s 
own fault. Consequently, one may also direct one‟s anger in two different directions: namely, 
towards the other or towards oneself.
2593
 According to Plato, this is partly determined by the 
way the examination is carried out. Indeed, the examiner must help the examinee realize his 
own ignorance.
2594
 But carrying out the examination in the correct way is not enough. The 
external influence cannot force us to examine and keep examining. This is illustrated by the 
fact that many characters in the dialogues keep leading an unexamined life, even if they 
happen to have some contact with Socrates. There is an inalienable component of              
self-determination. One is never purely passive, not even if one is instigated to examine by 
someone else. One must have interest, follow the arguments, think of answers; one must also 
realize the importance of this and persevere in the pursuit of the truth. This is only possible if 
one‟s inborn θζθμζμθία has already become stronger, in order for one to appropriate the 
external impulse and integrate it in one‟s life. Some previous tension is necessary and this 
cannot simply be forced from the outside.
2595
 It must come from within the soul and its most 
fundamental part. In other words, one must turn oneself to philosophical examination, and 
before that happens all external intervention can be nothing more than a protreptic appeal or 
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b) The possibility of examining by one’s own initiative and the factors that may 
condition this examination 
 
 Plato does not consider only the kind of examination that is instigated by someone 
else. There are also some important indications about the possibility of starting to examine 
things by one‟s own initiative. Whether examining oneself or examining another, one will be 
fully active. But is this a possibility available to us at all times? And how much control do we 
have over it? Is it simply a matter of intention and decision? Can we be blamed for not 
adopting it?  
 As we saw, we can only start examining (or at least fully engage in this examination) 
if our love of knowledge becomes more demanding than it normally is. We will then suspect 
that our beliefs might be wrong, we will notice that we are ignorant of more things than we 
think, and we will feel the need to keep examining.
2597
 But how exactly does our love of 
knowledge grow stronger? As we saw, these significant variations of our inborn θζθμζμθία 
cannot be ascribed to anything else. Our philosophical drive determines itself and this 
constitutes a sort of transcendental act, which precedes any empirical moment of our being. 
In other words, the self-determination of our love of knowledge is the ultimate ground of our 
life and it constitutes a mystery. We do not control it and we can only infer its existence and 
activity from its effects.  
Still, the fact that we must be moved by our love of knowledge, over which we have 
no control, does not imply that nothing else is relevant to whether we examine or not, or to 
how we examine. Plato admits that there are some conditions that influence whether or not 
we dedicate ourselves to philosophical examination. For instance, we need to have a 
minimum of knowledge (such as knowledge of language and of how to examine).
2598
 We also 
need to have leisure (ζπμθή) – i.e., we need not to be concerned with gain or honor.
2599
 This 
will make it easier to examine, but it is not what ultimately leads us to abandon the 
unexamined life and dedicate ourselves to philosophical examination. Finally, Plato also 
associates philosophical examination with some πάεδ. In Theaetetus he says that wonder 
(εαοιάγεζκ) is the starting-point of philosophy.
2600
 In Phaedrus and Symposium, he seems to 
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relate philosophy with the outbreak of ἔνςξ, insofar as the latter is an experience of truth and 
may lead us to inquire further into what reality is.
2601
 However, these experiences do not 
necessarily produce philosophical examination, and much less a release from the unexamined 
life. In general, they tend to be easily integrated in our usual way of life. 
We can therefore see that the decision to examine (and even the decision to pursue the 
conditions that help us to examine) essentially depends on what happens in the depths of our 
being. Our circumstances may make it easier to examine, but they cannot force us to start 
examining things and much less to abandon the unexamined life. We must decide to examine, 
and we can only do so if our philosophical drive determines itself to examine. When this 
happens, we might still need the help of others to strengthen our love of knowledge – at least 
at first. After a while, we will probably be able to examine by ourselves. But during this 
whole process we cannot be forced by anything – be it others or the circumstances we go 
through.  
This might seem very arbitrary, but it also means that nothing can prevent us from 
examining and abandoning the unexamined life. Our love of knowledge is entirely free to 
determine itself as it pleases. This is why Socrates may try to convince others to examine, and 
why Plato‟s dialogues may try to convince the reader to adopt an examined life. The 
exhortation or appeal is not necessarily effective, but the one that is faced with it may 
determine oneself to examine (even if one does not simply control this self-determination, 
given the fact that it happens in the depths of one‟s soul). 
 
5.3. The slowness of the release process and the possibility of a relapse 
 
The previous considerations were still too vague, because we did not distinguish 
sufficiently between beginning to examine things and being fully released from the 
unexamined life. The release requires a long process of struggling against our defective views 
and altering the relation of forces between the soul‟s drives. This long process is expressed in 
the image of a difficult ascent, with several stages. The unexamined life resists examination 
and a full release is very hard to achieve. In the beginning, philosophical examination will 
tend to be superficial and inauthentic. It will leave many views unexamined (and especially 
the most important ones), and it will still be guided by non-philosophical drives.
2602
 Thus, 
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although one is already examining, there is still no real release from the unexamined life. We 
are only freed from the unexamined life if we examine our views deep enough and if this 
corresponds to a real strengthening of our love of knowledge. The latter must come to rule 
the soul and subjugate the other drives. If this happens, the practical and cognitive systems of 
our life will be reconstructed, and we will live a philosophical life. As we saw, this life does 
not necessarily involve finding the truth, but at least one would fully long for it and one‟s life 
will be determined by this longing.
2603
 In other words, the core of our being (i.e., our love of 
knowledge) will fully express itself or it will be fully free. 
Now, we may wonder whether it is really possible to attain a full release from the 
unexamined life, or whether we are always partly limited by our other drives. In Phaedo, for 
instance, a full release seems to be impossible during life.
2604
 But in Republic V-VII, Plato 
seems to admit that one‟s philosophical drive may fully rule the soul and even attain perfect 
knowledge. This apparent contradiction goes to show how difficult the question is. In fact, it 
can only be truly decided by trying to achieve a full release and seeing what happens then. 
But in any case, it seems perfectly possible to attain a large degree of release and to live a 
predominantly philosophical life. 
The release may be slower or faster, and it may also be partial or (at least ideally) 
complete. But regardless of the kind of release we attain, there is still one problem: namely, 
the possibility of relapse. Our being is in flux and our views, as well as our inner arrangement 
of drives, are constantly changing. We may attain better views and strengthen our 
philosophical drive, but there is also the possibility of backsliding or falling back again.
2605
 In 
Phaedo, Plato even outlines the possibility of an inverted Penelope, that breaks the ties to the 
body and its desires, only to redo the shackles in secret, thus performing an endless job.
2606
 
Indeed, the release can be no more than an Adonis‟ garden – i.e., a short-lived transformation 
of our being that soon fades away.
2607
 This applies not only to the small outbreaks of 
philosophical examination, but even when there were great efforts and many results (i.e., 
many new views – or at least new doubts – and a great strengthening of one‟s inborn 
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θζθμζμθία), the past condition may still be reinstated. The unexamined life resists and fights 
back, thus making the release from it an uphill battle, in which one is very liable to relapse. 
But what motivates this relapse, according to Plato? We find several reasons in the 
corpus. For instance, we can be overwhelmed with difficulties when we try to ascend to the 
truth (or, as Plato says in the allegory of the cave, we can become dazzled), and as a result we 
may come back to our previous seat.
2608
 We can also be seduced by pleasures, forced by 
suffering, or overtaken by external influences.
2609
 This is so because the philosophical drive 
does not immediately gain full control over the other drives. When we start examining, the 
other drives still retain considerable force. We are still sensitive to pleasure or honor, and we 
may give in to them, thereby changing the inner πμθζηεία back again. However, this act of 
giving in to our other drives is not something to which we relate as a simple possibility that 
we can choose and adopt. We do not simply decide to repress philosophical examination and 
return into the unexamined life. Likewise, we are not forced by the circumstances we find 
ourselves in. Just like the imprisonment and the release, this relapse does not come from the 
outside or from our irrational drives. It all happens in the depths of our being, and it 
ultimately depends on our philosophical drive and the way it spontaneously determines itself. 
Such a drive will not directly desire the opacity of the unexamined life, but it may become 
less demanding and less acute, and this will slowly invert the release process. The effects of 
examination will slowly fade away and one will slowly fall asleep again. What can one then 
do to avoid the return to the unexamined life? Is there anything that helps or ensures one‟s 
freedom? It is difficult to say. Apparently, the only thing we can do is to keep exercising our 
love of knowledge (i.e., to keep examining), though this is not exactly a choice of ours. Our 
inborn θζθμζμθία must actually embrace this possibility and try to fully develop itself. Before 
doing so (i.e., before θζθμζμθία becoming fully-fledged and assuming full control of the 
soul), the possibility of relapse is constantly present.   
But, assuming a full release from the unexamined life is possible, what happens then? 
Is this release permanent? Do we become fully immune to the possibility of relapse? Or can 
one‟s θζθμζμθία become weak again?  
The dialogues are not absolutely clear about this, perhaps because it is not easy to 
conceive such a state. Plato usually refers to it in mythological terms. His description of the 
fall of the soul in Phaedrus seems to admit that one is always liable to fall back again. 
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 Cp. e.g. Rep. 412e-413c and Alc. I 135e. 
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Likewise, in the Republic he seems to admit a sort of unavoidable entropy, which never let us 
be assured of any progress made. Even the strongest love of knowledge does not seem 
impervious to change and fall. It is (as the best political state) only hard to move or disturb 
(παθεπὸκ ηζκδε῅καζ). It retains some frailty or weakness, and this can cause at first a small 
relapse, which with the passing of time will bring us back to an unexamined life.
2610
 Still, the 
possibility of relapse always depends on one‟s love of knowledge. The latter is always at the 
center of our life. This is indeed the main aspect of the considerations we find in the Platonic 
corpus about the fall in the unexamined life, the release from it, and the possibility of a 
relapse.   
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CONCLUSION OF PART IV 
 
 
The goal of this Part IV was to define the general structure of the unexamined life, 
regardless of the many different forms it may assume. In Chapter 15, we saw how this life is 
formed and we determined the kind of practical system that corresponds to it. In Chapter 16, 
we considered the cognitive structure of the unexamined life and the cognitive limitations 
that stem from this cognitive structure. In Chapter 17, we discussed why we adopt such a life 
and also the possibility of abandoning it. In sum, we identified the main features of such a life 
and also the way we relate to it. We are thus able to better understand the place where we 
usually begin and where we usually find ourselves. In most cases, this is also the place where 
we spend our whole life, and even if we happen to escape it, we are still likely to relapse into 
it. We could therefore say that we are constitutively attracted to the unexamined life.  
This does not mean that we can easily identify the structure of such a life or recognize 
the validity of its conceptual description. In fact, our understanding of it is usually very 
different from what we just saw. This raises an additional challenge. If the description is not 
immediately recognized, we could perhaps wonder whether it is appropriate or even 
plausible. But it is important to keep in mind that the Platonic conception of the unexamined 
life also tries to account for the usual interpretation of it. The unexamined life is fully 
convinced of possessing the truth about itself and all that matters. Consequently, it does not 
recognize any problems or limitations. This explains why one hardly recognizes this 
description as the description of one‟s own life. Moreover, this conception of the unexamined 
life seems to be the result of a very developed form of philosophical examination and it 
requires much philosophical examination in order to be understood. But this is precisely what 
the unexamined life in general lacks. Thus, even if Plato is correct, it is difficult to fully 
recognize it if we are still living an unexamined life. 
We can approach the problem of the validity of this conception from yet another 
angle. This seems to be only one possible description of the unexamined life – i.e., of the life 
that lacks or opposes philosophy. Other thinkers have presented different descriptions of such 
a life. We may then ask what the basis and validity of Plato‟s description are. But if we look 
at our analysis, we can easily see that this whole description is based on Plato‟s description of 
the general structure of our being and on how this structure accounts for the way we live. 
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More precisely, it implies that our soul is constitutively directed to the superlative good and 
also that it has a constitutive relation to knowledge and a constitutive interest in it. In fact, the 
soul is composed of three different drives that interact with each other and fight for control. 
These drives (one of which is our love of knowledge) establish a particular political order 
within the soul and if our love of knowledge does not rule the soul we live an unexamined 
life. We can therefore clearly see that the conception of the unexamined life stands and falls 









“ἠ θζθμζμθδηέμκ μὖκ ἠ παίνεζκ εἰπμῦζζ ηῶ γ῅κ ἀπζηέμκ ἐκηεῦεεκ, ὡξ 
ηὰ ἄθθα βε πάκηα θθοανία ηζξ ἔμζηεκ εἶκαζ πμθθὴ ηαὶ θ῅νμξ.” 





 After seeing the structure of life in general and of a life without philosophical 
examination in particular, we can finally return to Socrates‟ assertion that “the unexamined 
life is not worth living” and reconsider the meaning of these words, now within the 
framework of the whole Platonic corpus. Indeed, we can now understand the standpoint and 
the criteria that allow us to appraise such a life. We will thus see how the unexamined life 
falls seriously short of what we desire, and how this deficiency is essentially connected with 
the lack of philosophical examination. We will also consider the consequences of Plato‟s 
diagnosis or how this diagnosis should affect our life. In particular, we will see how, 
according to Plato, we should reject the unexamined life and devote ourselves to 
philosophical examination. The latter point is very important. Plato‟s appraisal of the 
unexamined life also outlines the need for philosophical examination – or, as we could say, a 
sort of imperative of examination. We will have to discuss this imperative, and see what its 
exact basis and its status are. In addition, we will have to consider the possible outcomes and 
the risks of philosophical examination. In other words, we will try to appraise philosophical 
examination, in order to see whether or not it is able to correct the defects of the unexamined 
life and render our life desirable and good. Then, we will have to consider whether this 
appraisal of philosophical examination (especially if it turns out to be negative) somehow 
affects the rejection of the unexamined life and the imperative of philosophical examination. 
 The goal of all these analyses is twofold. On the one hand, we want to see what is or 
can be said about these matters in the framework of the Platonic corpus. On the other hand, 
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we will try to determine both the inner coherence and the validity of the Platonic views. The 
latter question is particularly difficult, but even if we cannot reach a definite decision about 
the validity of the Platonic views, we will at least become better aware of how complicated 
the problem is and how we cannot naively accept or easily dismiss Plato‟s assertion about the 









The badness and misery of the unexamined life  
 
 
“Πάθαζ βάν, εἶπε, θέβς, ζὺ δὲ μ὎η ἀημύεζξ, ὅηζ ζὺ α὏ηῶ ιάθζζηα 
ἔπεζζημξ εἶ ηαὶ πμθειζώηαημξ, ιέπνζ ἂκ ᾖξ ηαηὸξ ηαὶ ἀκόδημξ.”  





 In Part IV, we considered the general structure of the life we usually lead – the 
unexamined life. We did not discuss its value or desirability, though, nor the criterion or 
criteria we might use to appraise its worth. This is what we must now explore. We have to see 
how it is to live a life and what that means for beings such as we, which are characterized by 
the complex structure we considered in Part III. Indeed, we are concerned with ourselves and 
we want to attain something good – or, to be more precise, we want to attain something 
maximally or superlatively good. Moreover, we are characterized by having three constitutive 
drives, and one of these drives – our love of knowledge – plays a central role in our soul and 
our life in general. In a way, it always determines itself and determines all other drives. 
 We must now appraise the unexamined life on the basis of this description of our 
inner constitution or our θύζζξ as human beings, and we must see if this life is marked by 
constitutive deficiencies that seriously affect its worth or desirability. Socrates, in the 
Apology, is adamant about the fact that such a life is not worth living, and we considered in 
Part I how the entire text can be read as a discussion of this view. But now we have to 
consider the entire Platonic corpus and formulate the full accusation against such a life. We 
have to see what exactly its defects and limitations are, how serious they are, and how they 
derive from the lack of examination. Moreover, assuming Plato is right, we must also 
consider why according to him one does not normally notice any of this. Finally, we must 
determine whether it is important to notice these defects, or if it may be preferable to be 
deluded about the unexamined life‟s worth. 
 It is important to bear in mind that we will be appraising the unexamined life as such. 
This means that we will not focus on the qualitative differences between particular forms of 
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Weidmann, 1893-1896 (repr. 1962). 
782 
 
unexamined life, even if Plato often does so. Indeed, some of his discussions (especially 
those in Gorgias and in Republic II-IX) seem to be mostly concerned with showing that a 
particular life – to wit, the life of a tyrant – is the worst possible life. This, however, is an 
extreme and rare kind of life. In general, people live calmer and more inconspicuous lives, 
which seem to be better. Plato even admits that some kinds of unexamined life may have 
many correct δόλαζ and a popular form of ἀνεηή.
2613
 At any rate, he grants that some lives are 
better than others and in Phaedrus he even outlines a ranking of lives that shows that there 
are many intermediate lives between the life of a tyrant and the life of a philosopher.
2614
 But 
we will not be primarily concerned with these differences. According to Plato‟s analyses, 
even the best unexamined life is still marked by significant defects. Thus, we will try to 
determine why all forms of unexamined life (even the better ones) can still be considered 
worthless or undesirable, regardless of all the differences between them. 
 In doing so, we will not yet try to determine whether there is any alternative to this 
way of life that is not worthless or undesirable. More precisely, we will not yet consider 
whether a life devoted to philosophical examination can actually overcome the limitations we 
will consider and is thus absolutely desirable. Regardless of whether or not the alternative to 
the unexamined life has its own limitations, the diagnosis of the unexamined life stays the 
same. Let us then try to determine the value of such a life in light of what is said in the 
Platonic corpus.  
 
1. The “unlivable” (ἀβίσηνο) character of the unexamined life 
 
 Let us start by considering once more the terms of the accusation against the 
unexamined life and what is implied in them. Socrates says that such a life is not αζςηόξ. This 
expression, along with the equivalent ἀαίςημξ, denote that certain circumstances (as well as a 
life that is marked by them) are extremely undesirable or bad – so much so that our life 
becomes unfit or unsuitable to be lived (i.e., it becomes miserable).
2615
 This is of course 
based on the fact that we are not indifferent to our life and to how it turns out. We want to 
have a good life, and in fact the best possible life. We are permanently moved by this desire 
and, as a result, we are also constantly appraising our life, in order to determine its quality. 
This appraisal is actually quite complex, as we saw above. We must determine whether or not 
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783 
 
it is the best life. If it is not, we must then determine whether we expect to attain the best life 
or not. If we have no hope of attaining the superlative good we desire, we must then decide 
whether or not we compromise or settle for less. This implies that we must decide whether 
we should accept life (γ῅κ δέπεζεαζ). We must see whether it is better for us to live or to die. 
Indeed, when we do not attain the good we desire and have no expectation of attaining it, the 
question of why we should live or what we gain by living, becomes particularly pressing. We 
must see if our life is worth living (ἄλζμκ γ῅κ) or not – i.e., if it is meaningful.
2616
 
 When we lead an unexamined life, this appraisal is mostly a tacit process. We are not 
aware of it and we do not think deeply about it. However, it still takes place and determines 
our relation to ourselves and our life. In general, while we lead an unexamined life, we are 
convinced that life is worth living, and there may be several reasons for this. We may resign 
ourselves to what we have and think that, although it is not great, we nonetheless have all we 
need. We may also have the expectation of attaining the superlative good. Finally, we may 
think that our life is already the best possible life. In any of these cases, we will probably 
think we are happy (ε὎δαίιμκαξ δμηε῔κ εἶκαζ).
2617
 But this is not always the case. We may 
experience bad things and they may render our life patently bad and miserable. We may then 
want to reject our life – either by deeply changing it or by abandoning it altogether. We find 
many examples of such situations in Greek literature. Life may become unacceptable or 
unbearable (ἀαίςημξ) if one is deprived of something one deems an important (or even the 
best) thing in life – such as pleasure, a beloved one, the trust of others, and so on.
2618
 In fact, 
the term is particularly suited to express a tragic situation, in which our life becomes 
unbearable in virtue of some personal loss. What we lose (i.e., what we value the most) may 




 Plato also recognizes this common structure and its variability. Throughout the 
corpus, he uses the word ἀαίςημξ (as well as equivalent expressions, such as “not accepting 
life” or “being better to die than to live”) several times, and we may systematize these usages 
according to the different kinds of object we value, and whose loss may render one‟s live 
“unlivable” in one‟s own eyes. For instance, we may value our bodily condition or material 
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conditions in general, and thus disease or precariousness will render life difficult to 
accept.
2620
 In addition, one may consider that life is not worth living without pleasure.
2621
 We 
may also be mostly concerned with honor (i.e., with being well-regarded by others), and its 
loss will then render our life unbearable.
2622
 These are actually the concerns that may lie at 
the center of the unexamined life. But one may also prize knowledge and real excellence 
above all, and then one‟s life will not be bearable without these things.
2623
 In sum, it all 
depends on what we attain and its relation to what we desire. The content of our life may 
satisfy our desires or not. If it seems to do so, we will deem ourselves happy. If it does not 
(and if, moreover, we have no expectation of coming to attain what we want), our life is then 
considered bad and miserable – and it is at this point that we may declare it worthless or say 
that it is not worth living. Although these appraisals are mostly tacit, they are nevertheless a 
structure of our life, and Socrates‟ statement in the Apology is making a clear reference to it. 
 All this seems pretty straightforward. However, we must also consider the possibility 
(already mentioned above) that we might not understand ourselves and what we really desire, 
which will certainly contribute for our failure in attaining it. Indeed, we might desire 
something bad, and we might expect to attain it or we might already have attained it without 
noticing its badness. In the latter case, we will think we are happy, though we are not. In 
other words, we will be miserable without knowing it. We will be ignorant of how far we are 
from the good and from happiness. In fact, this ignorance even increases our distance from 
them, insofar as it closes us off to them and prevents us from pursuing them. But this does not 
annul our relation to them. Our desire is still directed at the good and at happiness. This is 
what we truly want, even if other things may seem to us to be best.
2624
 At first sight, it might 
not be clear how this can happen, and why we do not notice this discrepancy. This is, at any 
rate, something we often experience. After attaining something, we may notice it does not 
satisfy us as we thought it would, but it is also possible for us to attain it without noticing that 
it does not fulfill us.
2625
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 Socrates‟ assertion about the worthlessness of the unexamined life must be understood 
in light of this possibility. As we will see, Plato shows that the unexamined life fails to attain 
the good. It only attains bad things and is therefore miserable. However, we fail to notice any 
of this (or at least we fail to realize the full extent of this), and this ignorance about our real 
state only makes this life worse and more unacceptable, since it distances us more from the 
good. This, at least, is the formal structure of Plato‟s argument. But such an argument will 
nevertheless come as a surprise to most of us. Even if we admit the possibility of sometimes 
being ignorant of what we really want, it is difficult to accept that this happens in all forms of 
unexamined life. Many people are satisfied with their lives, either because they settle and do 
not want more, because they have high expectations, or because they think they have attained 
a superlative good. There is a strong conviction that many such lives are meaningful. We 
would therefore not reject them en bloc, as Plato does. In many cases we would perhaps 
change some things, but not the general way of life as such, and certainly not by devoting 
ourselves to philosophical examination. The unexamined life (or certain modalities of it, at 
least) is regarded as our natural place. It may have some circumstantial problems, but it is not 
bad in itself. In sum, we are convinced that many things may render our life bad and 
miserable, but not the lack of examination. At best, some may be displeased for not knowing 
– but not everybody. 
 Plato, however, is talking about human beings in general. We all have a common 
constitution and a common desire, and the unexamined life fails to correspond to it, even if 
we do not realize it (which is possible only because we do not really know what such a life 
amounts to and what we really desire). Plato‟s judgment is thus valid for everybody and the 
criterion for this judgment is supposed to be immanent. But what is it then that we objectively 
desire, and what is the real value of the unexamined life as such? How can we know this? 
Moreover, even admitting Plato‟s appraisal is correct, what is the importance of all this? If 
normally we are not aware of falling short of our true desire (i.e., we are not aware of the 
badness and misery of the unexamined life), why should we care about it? In other words, the 
fact that something is in itself bad also means that it is bad for me? If we do not know, why 
should we care? Why don‟t we simply go on thinking we are happy or on our way to 
happiness? 
 We must therefore consider two different questions in this chapter. We have to see 
how Plato shows that the unexamined life is objectively bad and miserable, even if we are not 
aware of it. Then we have to consider the meaning of this for us – and whether this means 
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that we should reject such a life. But before addressing these questions, and in order to 
prepare their discussion, we must start by looking more closely at the Platonic understanding 
of the notions of badness (or defectiveness) and misery.  
 
2. Plato’s understanding of badness and misery 
 
 As was indicated above, badness and misery are two fundamental notions for the 
appraisal of the unexamined life. As Plato tries to prove, the unexamined life possesses or 
attains many bad things (ηαηά) and is therefore a bad or miserable (ἄεθζμξ) life. In fact, one 
not only fails to attain what one pursues, but also becomes unable to attain it. But this is only 
a generic or formal description, and it still does not clarify what exactly badness and misery 
are or what they consist in. Therefore, we must now consider these notions, and we must also 
determine how it is possible to misidentify them and regard a bad or miserable state as a good 
and happy state. 
 Some important aspects of the notions of badness and misery were already mentioned 
above, when we considered the notions of goodness (ηὸ ἀβαεόκ) and happiness 
(ε὎δαζιμκία).
2626
 But now we must primarily focus on the negative notions. We have to 
determine what is bad for us and in what way it renders our life miserable (i.e., in what way it 
prevents us from attaining the superlative good we desire), and this requires us to consider 
several questions. First, we have to see how, according to Plato (and in contrast with the 
common understanding of badness), badness and misery are essentially connected with our 
ροπή or our inner being. Badness lies within us or at least it comes primarily from within. 
Second, we have to consider how this badness is not simple. Plato identifies two forms of 
inner badness or ηαηία that are irreducible to each other, though intimately connected. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider how these two forms of badness, as well as the misery 
caused by them, can be either patent or latent. This whole analysis will thus provide us with 
the basis to see how the lack of philosophical examination causes badness and misery – i.e., 
how it distances us from goodness and happiness, thus rendering our life “unlivable” or 




                                                 
2626
 See in particular Chap. 12, Sects. 3.1, 3.2 and 4.3. 
787 
 
2.1. The inner origin of all badness and all misery 
 
 First of all, it is important to bear in mind that the badness we are talking about is 
experienced by a being that is interested in its own life and wants this life to be good and 
happy, which implies attaining good things (in a broad sense of the word “things”, which 
may include good actions or good inner states). Indeed, we are primarily marked by our 
desire for the good (or, to be more precise, by a desire for the superlative good), and 
everything that falls short of what we desire, as well as everything that prevents us from 
attaining it, is to some extent bad, and renders our life lacking – and therefore miserable. This 
is the core of badness and misery, and it is in keeping with what we considered above. We 
saw that “being bad” (ηαηόξ, πμκδνόξ) in Plato does not have a primarily moral sense. 
Badness is to be understood in a functional sense, as defectiveness.
2627
 A bad tool is a tool 
that fails to perform its task (ἔνβμκ). This refers to its role in human life. Bad things (such as 
beings, actions or states) are thus something harmful, that prevent us from attaining what we 
want. But the word can also be applied to living beings – and particularly to human beings. In 
this case, the criterion is clearly immanent, and badness means that this being falls short of its 
proper or best condition. In this sense, every state we find ourselves in that falls short of the 
superlative state is to a certain extent a bad state – even if there can be different degrees of 
distance from the superlative good and, consequently, different degrees of badness (and of 
misery). In sum, the core of badness is the disagreement or contradiction between what we 
desire and what we attain. But what exactly brings about this disagreement or contradiction? 
What is its source? 
In general, we might be tempted to think that if our life is not perfect, that is only due 
to external causes. Something on the outside prevents us from attaining the good, or even 
moves us further away from it. This was also a common view in Greek culture.
2628
 We 
considered above how Greek culture in general recognizes that we are responsible for what 
we do (though with some restrictions).
2629
 However, this does not mean that all badness 
comes directly from us. We may be harmed by the gods, by our guarding spirit (δαίιςκ), by 
destiny, by what others do – and these harms may not be directly connected with what we did 
or with who we are. Of course, this presupposes that the quality of our life can be affected by 
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these external agents. According to the prevailing view, we want to have external           
goods – i.e., health, material possessions, a prosperous household, a good family, friends, and 
an honorable life.
2630
 This leaves us open to the attacks of other beings and even of       
chance – to what the day (any day) may bring. We are ephemeral beings and our life can be 
turned upside down at a moment‟s notice.
2631
 Hence the importance of how our life turns out 
or ends. It is only in the end that we can know if our life was happy.
2632
 But until we die, 
other beings can cause us to be in a bad or miserable state. To be sure, pre-Platonic thinking 
also recognizes that we may try to develop ourselves, educate ourselves, attain ἀνεηή, and 
thus we may turn the others and perhaps even the gods in our favor. If we are ignorant and 
vicious, we will bring much greater harm to ourselves. However, even if we greatly improve 
ourselves, our effectiveness (and thus our possibility of ensuring our happiness and escaping 
misery) is always limited by external factors. 
This is not the prevailing view in the Platonic corpus, where we actually find much 
criticism of the externalist model of badness and misery. This is intimately connected with 
the conception of the good we considered above.
2633
 We saw that the good depends 
essentially on our inner disposition and whether it is marked by excellence (ἀνεηή) or 
badness (ηαηία). Without entering into much detail, this means that things, states and actions 
are in themselves neutral. Their goodness or badness depends on our ροπή. It is our inner 
being that determines what we attain and the role everything plays in our life. Thus we cannot 
be harmed or become miserable in virtue of external factors. Badness and misery come 
exclusively from our inner disposition, which is what determines how we see things, how we 
act and how we live. This also seems to imply that the superlative good we desire is not 
something external that can be taken away from us. Whether our ultimate goal is to 
contemplate the truth or to act and live based on that knowledge, it always depends on us to 
attain it. We need to develop our ροπή as much as possible, which implies developing its 
ability to know. If we do not do this and become bad, we will only attain bad things and, 
consequently, we will be miserable. Badness is thus primarily inner or psychic badness, and 
this is what causes us to be miserable. 
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Normally, however, we are unaware of this (which is precisely the problem, as we 
will see). We do not notice that the value of our life depends essentially on our inner quality 
(i.e., our intrinsic goodness and badness), and we are not even clearly aware of how good or 
how bad we are. Consequently, we think that it is not entirely under our control whether we 
live a good or a bad life. Plato, however, tries to show that the opposite is the case, and that 
we must therefore be very attentive to our inner disposition and not neglect it. 
 
2.2. Reconsideration of the two forms of badness of the soul: illness and 
deformity. Their commonalities and interconnection 
 
 What we just saw does not specify what exactly constitutes the inner badness that 
makes us miserable. Plato discusses this in several different passages. One of them is 
especially illuminating and may be used as the basis for our analysis. In Sophist 227d ff., the 
Visitor distinguishes and characterizes two forms of psychic badness (ηαηία). We briefly 
considered this distinction above, although we followed the tendency of the text and focused 
mostly on one of these forms of badness.
2634
 Now, however, we must reconsider some of the 
aspects we saw and develop them.  
 Putting aside the context in which this distinction emerges, the Visitor starts by saying 
that there are two forms of badness (or defectiveness, ηαηία) in the soul, and he compares 
them to two forms of badness or defectiveness that affect the body: namely, illness (κόζμξ) 
and deformity (αἶζπμξ).
2635
 Then, he considers each of these defects in turn. 
 First, he characterizes illness in general as a form of sedition or a civil war 
(ζηάζζξ).
2636
 As Plato says, it is “variance (δζαθμνά) of the naturally akin that comes from 
some kind of corruption”.
2637
 The soul has indeed a multiplicity of elements that belong 
together. The Visitor mentions beliefs, desires, anger, pleasures, reasoning, pains. These 
elements may agree or disagree with each other, and when they disagree (i.e., when there is 
no inner harmony, but rather a conflict) the soul is ill.
2638
 This is somewhat vague, but Plato 
seems to be referring primarily to different motivations of our action and to the fact that they 
                                                 
2634
 See Chap. 8, Sect. 1.2. 
2635
 See 227d-228a: “[ΞΔ] δύμ ιὲκ εἴδδ ηαηίαξ πενὶ ροπὴκ ῥδηέμκ. [ΘΔΑΙ] πμ῔α; [ΞΔ] ηὸ ιὲκ μἷμκ κόζμκ ἐκ 
ζώιαηζ, ηὸ δ᾽ μἷμκ αἶζπμξ ἐββζβκόιεκμκ.” 
2636
 See 228a: “κόζμκ ἴζςξ ηαὶ ζηάζζκ μ὎ ηα὎ηὸκ κεκόιζηαξ;” 
2637
 See 228a: “[ΞΔ] Πόηενμκ ἄθθμ ηζ ζηάζζκ ἟βμύιεκμξ ἠ ηὴκ ημῦ θύζεζ ζοββεκμῦξ ἔη ηζκμξ δζαθεμν᾵ξ 
δζαθμνάκ; [ΘΔΑΙ] O὎δέκ.” 
2638
 See 228b: “[ΞΔ] ηί δέ; ἐκ ροπῆ δόλαξ ἐπζεοιίαζξ ηαὶ εοιὸκ ἟δμκα῔ξ ηαὶ θόβμκ θύπαζξ ηαὶ πάκηα ἀθθήθμζξ 
ηαῦηα η῵κ θθαύνςξ ἐπόκηςκ μ὎η ᾐζεήιεεα δζαθενόιεκα; [ΘΔΑΙ] ηαὶ ζθόδνα βε. 
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may come into a violent conflict, thus paralyzing us. We can reinterpret this in light of the 
soul‟s tripartition (even if it is not expressly mentioned in the Sophist). The soul is composed 
of different drives (which associate with each other and pervade each other), and they may 
come into conflict. When this happens, the soul disagrees with itself, is internally divided, 
and therefore finds itself in a bad inner state. It is, however, important to note that the Visitor 
not only alludes to states of conflict, but also to bad dispositions of the soul that may express 
themselves in many actions and even in one‟s whole life. Indeed, he associates sedition and 
illness in the soul with forms of moral defect or vice, such as cowardice, unrestraint, and 
injustice.
2639
 In addition, he says that such an illness is supposed to be corrected by 
chastisement (ημθαζηζηή).
2640
 At any rate, the conflict in question makes us attain bad things 
and renders our life miserable. A good life would thus require a good arrangement of drives 
and internal harmony. This would produce psychic health and moral excellence (i.e., courage, 
sound-mindedness and justice). 
 As for the other form of psychic badness, it is compared with deformity in the body. 
According to the Visitor, the main feature of the latter is ἀιεηνία – i.e., disproportion, 
unfitness or disagreement.
2641
 This implies a relation between two things, and the Visitor 
goes on to explain (with the help of Theaetetus) that the soul is like a projectile that sets out a 
target for itself, tries to hit it, and may either be successful or stray away from it.
2642
 If this 
projectile hits the target, this is a form of proportion, fitness or agreement. If it misses, it is 
the opposite. In the case of the soul, the target in question is truth.
2643
 The Visitor is thus 
alluding to the fact that the soul is constitutively characterized by love of knowledge or 
θζθμζμθία. It is directed at reality and it may either hit it (i.e., have access to it, know it as it 
is) or miss it (in which case it will be ignorant of what things are or, as Plato says, it will 
deviate from understanding or ζύκεζζξ, and be in a state of derangement, παναθνμζύκδ).
2644
 
It is important to bear in mind that there can be two different forms of ignorance. We can be 
simply ignorant of things (by being completely oblivious to them or by being aware that we 
are ignorant of it), and we can also suffer from a double ignorance (i.e., we may be ignorant 
                                                 
2639
 See 228e: “(...) ηαὶ δεζθίακ ιὲκ ηαὶ ἀημθαζίακ ηαὶ ἀδζηίακ ζύιπακηα ἟βδηέμκ κόζμκ ἐκ ἟ι῔κ (...).” 
2640
 See 229a. 
2641
 See 228a: “ἀθθ᾽ αἶζπμξ ἄθθμ ηζ πθὴκ ηὸ η῅ξ ἀιεηνίαξ πακηαπμῦ δοζεζδὲξ ἐκὸκ βέκμξ;” 
2642
 See 228c: “ὅζ᾽ ἂκ ηζκήζεςξ ιεηαζπόκηα ηαὶ ζημπόκ ηζκα εέιεκα πεζνώιεκα ημύημο ηοβπάκεζκ ηαε᾽ ἑηάζηδκ 
ὁνιὴκ πανάθμνα α὎ημῦ βίβκδηαζ ηαὶ ἀπμηοβπάκῃ (...).” 
2643
 See 228c-d: “(...) ἐπ᾽ ἀθήεεζακ ὁνιςιέκδξ ροπ῅ξ (...).” 
2644
 See 228c-d: “ηό βε ιὴκ ἀβκμε῔κ ἐζηζκ ἐπ᾽ ἀθήεεζακ ὁνιςιέκδξ ροπ῅ξ, παναθόνμο ζοκέζεςξ βζβκμιέκδξ, 
μ὎δὲκ ἄθθμ πθὴκ παναθνμζύκδ.” 
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and think we know, which corresponds to the notion of stupidity or ἀιαεία).
2645
 But 
regardless of this distinction, the soul is always trying to hit things as they are and all 
ignorance it may have is unwilling.
2646
 In other words, if the soul fails to attain the truth, it 
will not satisfy its desire. Ignorance is an undesired state and it makes the soul miserable. 
By stressing these two forms of badness, Plato shows how decisive inner order and 
truth are for our soul and our life. We need both of them to be happy. If, however, our soul is 
ill and deformed (and we will see that this is precisely what happens when we lead an 
unexamined life), then our life will be bad and miserable. We may then wonder which of 
these forms of badness is worse. As we will see in the following, Plato‟s texts seem to point 
in different directions. Sometimes the greatest problem seems to be injustice (which is 
intrinsically connected with the soul‟s illness), while other times the major problem in our 
life seems to be ignorance and untruth. However, this discrepancy may perhaps be explained 
by the fact that the two forms of badness have an intimate connection. On the one hand, they 
have a similar structure, insofar as both consist in an inner disagreement or inner conflict.
2647
 
In this sense, they also correspond to the definition of badness and misery in general, which 
consists in a disagreement or conflict between what we desire and what we attain. On the 
other hand, they not only resemble one another in a certain respect, but they often accompany 
each other and also increase each other. In fact, they share a common root. They are both 
based on a weak or self-inhibited philosophical drive.
2648
 This is what allow the different 
drives to fight for control, and it is also what causes our ignorance.  
 But how exactly do these defects characterize the unexamined life? It is not 
immediately clear that all unexamined lives are in a constant inner conflict and that they are 
ignorant of everything (or at least of everything that matters). In some cases, these forms of 
psychic badness may be very contained, and one‟s soul may be mostly healthy and shapely. 
At least this is what we tend to think. However, we must also consider that for Plato these 
forms of badness may be – and almost always are – hidden from us. The characterization we 
                                                 
2645
 The latter is indeed the form of ignorance that the Visitor goes on to single out as the most frequent and the 
most difficult to handle. See 229c: “[ΞΔ] ἀβκμίαξ βμῦκ ιέβα ηί ιμζ δμη῵ ηαὶ παθεπὸκ ἀθςνζζιέκμκ ὁν᾵κ εἶδμξ, 
π᾵ζζ ημ῔ξ ἄθθμζξ α὎η῅ξ ἀκηίζηαειμκ ιένεζζκ. [ΘΔΑΙ] πμ῔μκ δή; “[ΞΔ] ηὸ ιὴ ηαηεζδόηα ηζ δμηε῔κ εἰδέκαζ· δζ᾽ μὗ 
ηζκδοκεύεζ πάκηα ὅζα δζακμίᾳ ζθαθθόιεεα βίβκεζεαζ π᾵ζζκ. [ΘΔΑΙ] ἀθδε῅. [ΞΔ] ηαὶ δὴ ηαὶ ημύηῳ βε μἶιαζ 
ιόκῳ η῅ξ ἀβκμίαξ ἀιαείακ ημὔκμια πνμζνδε῅καζ.” For more on the distinction between simple and double 
ignorance, as well as on the notion of ἀιαεία, cp. Chap. 7 Sect. 1, and Chap. 8 Sect. 1.2. 
2646
 See 228c: “ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ροπήκ βε ἴζιεκ ἄημοζακ π᾵ζακ π᾵κ ἀβκμμῦζακ.” 
2647
 This structural resemblance between the two forms of badness perhaps explains why ignorance (and 
especially double ignorance) is sometimes described as a form of disease (see e.g. Ti. 86b ff.). This happens 
even in the passage of the Sophist we are considering, as we saw above (cp. Chap. 8, Sect. 1.4). 
2648
 Interestingly enough, what causes these two forms of badness is also what causes the unexamined life, and 
we will see that this is no accident. The three things are intimately connected according to Plato.  
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gave of them already alluded to this possibility, but now we have to see it in more detail, and 
briefly discuss its meaning.  
 
2.3. Patent and latent forms of badness. Patent and latent misery  
 
 As we will see, the Platonic corpus shows how our usual way of living (i.e., the 
unexamined life) is full of disagreements and contradictions – and particularly the 
disagreements and contradictions that correspond to the illness and the deformity of the soul. 
However, these self-disagreements or self-contradictions can have different modes of 
presence in our life. Some of them are immediately patent or manifest – i.e., we automatically 
notice them and we automatically notice that they are bad. Others, however, are usually latent 
or hidden. They usually escape our notice and, in fact, escaping our notice is an important 
condition for their occurrence. In the case of psychic illness, this means that even when we 
are not torn apart between drives (and therefore do not notice any conflict between them), 
these drives may still be somehow in conflict with each other, and thus their relation will not 
be completely harmonious. In other words, they may be arranged in some way, but this 
arrangement may still be wrong and prevent them from fully working together. It is not 
immediately clear what this means, but we will consider this possibility in detail below. As 
for a latent psychic deformity, we have already a pretty good idea of what it corresponds to. 
We saw that we may be aware of our ignorance, but we may also be ignorant of something 
and at the same time be convinced of knowing it – i.e., we may have false or baseless 
knowledge claims, and thus be in a state of stupidity (ἀιαεία). This unconscious ignorance 
(or double ignorance) actually constitutes an increased (or even extreme) form of psychic 
deformity, and we already saw that it pervades the unexamined life. Now we will have to 
consider what this means for the value of such a life. 
 But whatever this may mean, it seems clear that we may notice only a part (and in fact 
a very small part) of the illness and deformity of our soul. This also determines our 
experience of them. Whereas patent or perceived badness disturbs us (especially if it concerns 
something important) and thus renders our own misery visible and felt (even if we do not 
interpret it as such), latent badness leaves us undisturbed and at peace. As a result, we may 
easily convince ourselves that we are in a good state, and that our life is good and happy. As 
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is said in the Apology, we may seem to be happy, though we are not.
2649
 We are miserable, 
but this misery is latent.  
 As mentioned above, the notion of latent misery (based on the notion of latent 
badness) plays a central role in Plato‟s analyses. This can perhaps be more clearly seen in 
Plato‟s Gorgias, where we find several allusions to this idea. The most obvious allusion is 
made by Polus in an ironical manner. When faced with Socrates‟ views about the importance 
of justice, he says about Archelaus (whom he presented as the epitome of injustice) that 
“although he‟s committed these crimes, he remains unaware of how „miserable‟ he‟s become, 
and feels no remorse either.”
2650
 Socrates, in turn, refers several times to the possibility of this 
occurring both in the body and in the soul. He speaks, for instance, of a bodily condition that 
is only apparently good (δμημῦζα ε὎ελία, μὖζα δ‟ μ὎). In this case, one may think everything 
is alright with one‟s body, and only a doctor or a gymnastics teacher will know the real 
condition of the body.
2651
 The same happens with the soul. It may seem alright, although it is 
actually in a bad state. Something similar happens in the case of the forms of adulation or 
flattery (ημθαηεία) considered by Socrates. They pass themselves off as real forms of caring 
for our body and soul, but are only concerned with giving them pleasure.
2652
 They thus 
produce the impression that our body and our soul are in a good state, even if they are not. 
For instance, he opposes cosmetics to gymnastics, and says that the former “make[s] people 
assume an alien beauty and neglect their own, which comes through gymnastics.”
2653
  
 The most important notion in this context, however, is the notion of festering soul 
(ροπὴ ὕπμοθμξ). Socrates is considering what happens to a soul that commits many injustices 
and does not get treated (i.e., punished) for it. This behavior and the lack of treatment will 
render the soul more and more unjust, and finally it will become festering and incurable.
2654
   
The notion of festering soul clearly indicates that one‟s soul is affected by badness, but this 
badness is hidden, and thus one does not notice how ill – and how miserable – one‟s soul 
is.
2655
 This is precisely what is expressed by the adjective ὕπμοθμξ. In its literal sense, it 
                                                 
2649
 See once more Ap. 36d. 
2650
 See 471b: “ηαὶ ηαῦηα ἀδζηήζαξ ἔθαεεκ ἑαοηὸκ ἀεθζώηαημξ βεκόιεκμξ ηαὶ μ὎ ιεηειέθδζεκ α὎ηῶ (...).” I 
follow D. Zeyl‟s translation (see PCW). 
2651
 See 464a.  
2652
 Cp. 464b ff. 
2653
 See 465b: “(...) ὥζηε πμζε῔κ ἀθθόηνζμκ ηάθθμξ ἐθεθημιέκμοξ ημῦ μἰηείμο ημῦ δζὰ η῅ξ βοικαζηζη῅ξ ἀιεθε῔κ.” 
2654
 See 480a-b: “ἐὰκ δέ βε ἀδζηήζῃ ἠ α὎ηὸξ ἠ ἄθθμξ ηζξ ὧκ ἂκ ηήδδηαζ, α὎ηὸκ ἑηόκηα ἰέκαζ ἐηε῔ζε ὅπμο ὡξ 
ηάπζζηα δώζεζ δίηδκ, πανὰ ηὸκ δζηαζηὴκ ὥζπεν πανὰ ηὸκ ἰαηνόκ, ζπεύδμκηα ὅπςξ ιὴ ἐβπνμκζζεὲκ ηὸ κόζδια 
η῅ξ ἀδζηίαξ ὕπμοθμκ ηὴκ ροπὴκ πμζήζεζ ηαὶ ἀκίαημκ (...).” 
2655
 It is true that this passage talks only of justice and, as such, it seems to refer (even if only loosely) to the 
form of badness characterized as illness in the Sophist. However, this injustice also involves ignorance. 
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denotes a festering or purulent scar – i.e., a sore that is only apparently healed, but actually 
extends under the skin.
2656
 The contrast between surface and depth is thus at the center of the 
notion. This is also the basis for its figurative sense, which can be found in several texts. 
Ὕπμοθμξ is used to qualify the good order of a state (ε὎κμιία), the Trojan horse, someone‟s 
peace or quiet (἟ζοπία), an oracle (ιάκηεοια), the mud at the edge of a riverbank (ηέθια), 
and even persons.
2657
 In these uses, “ὕπμοθμξ” has the sense of unsound, hollow, unreal, 
treacherous, false or deceitful. Something is not what it claims to be. It deceives us, presents 
itself as good, beautiful or safe, although it is actually the opposite.  
We find a similar idea in Sophocles‟ Oedipus Tyrannus, which comes very close to 
the question we are considering. After discovering that he was the killer of his father and the 
husband of his mother, Oedipus describes his previous condition, which seemed very good (if 
not superlatively so), as “a beauty festering with evils” (ηάθθμξ ηαη῵κ ὕπμοθμκ).
2658
 Indeed, 
he seemed to have a superlatively good life. He had a good family, he was the king, and he 
was celebrated as the savior of Thebes. Yet, his apparent good fortune or happiness was 
hiding many evils – namely, his evil deeds (which were “the most shameful deeds among 
men”), the pollution caused by them and all subsequent consequences.
2659
 When these evils 
were revealed, they became unbearable to him, and he had to blind himself – an action he 
justifies by saying that it is “sweet when our mind dwells outside its evils.”
2660
 This 
sweetness was what characterized his state before discovering what his real condition was. 
When he made this discovery, he realized how he was completely deluded about his 
condition. He was miserable and did not know it. 
 According to Plato, something similar may happen to someone who is leading an 
unexamined life. When we lead such a life, our inner being may seem to be in a good 
condition, although it is actually in a bad state, and we are therefore miserable, even if we do 
                                                                                                                                                        
Moreover, the most relevant aspect of the notion of ροπὴ ὕπμοθμξ is the fact that it lets us better understand the 
notion of latent misery, and it is in this respect that we will now consider it. For a very similar analysis of this 
notion, on which the following analysis is based, see: H. TELO, Can One Be Miserable Without Knowing it. 
The problem of ροπὴ ὕπμοθμξ in Plato‟s Gorgias, in: M. de CARVALHO & T. FIDALGO (eds.), Plato’s 
Gorgias. Labyrinth and Threads, Coimbra, Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2016, 125-151. 
2656
 Cp. HIPPOCRATES, De medico, 11.1-6. 
2657
 See THUCYDIDES, Historiae, 8.64, SOPHOCLES, fr. 1105, DEMOSTHENES, De corona, 307, 
PAUSANIAS, Graeciae descriptio, 3.7.3, PLUTARCHUS, Romulus, 18.4, and MENANDER, Sententiae, 587 
(Meineke). 
2658
 See v. 1396. I follow a common interpretation of the passage. Others defend that ηαη῵κ goes with ηάθθμξ 
and not with ὕπμοθμκ, thus having the sense of “superlative evil”. For more on this, see e.g. J. BOLLACK, 
L’Oedipe roi de Sophocle. Le texte et ses interprétations, vol. 4, Lille, Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1990, ad 
loc. 
2659
 See v. 1408: “(...) αἴζπζζη‟ ἐκ ἀκενώπμζζζκ ἔνβα (...).” 
2660
 See v. 1389f.: “(...) ηὸ βὰν/ ηὴκ θνμκηίδ‟ ἔλς η῵κ ηαη῵κ μἰηε῔κ βθοηύ.” 
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not realize it. To be sure, this badness or misery may still manifest itself in some way. Plato 
considers this possibility when he speaks about a festering and swelling πόθζξ, which is filled 
by its statesmen with everything it desires, but has no justice or sound-mindedness.
2661
 This 
πόθζξ is ill, even if it does not notice it. But one may come to notice it, if this illness produces 
some crisis. As Socrates says, the πόθζξ may suffer a fit or an attack of this illness (ηαηααμθὴ 
η῅ξ ἀζεεκείαξ).
2662
 This is for instance what happened when Athens lost the war and its 
empire (which is what Plato is alluding to in this passage). The cause of this loss was the 
πόθζξ‟ inner state, which had been determined by the previous statesmen, and not those in 
charge at the time of the crisis. However, as Socrates says, people do not perceive this (μ὎η 
αἰζεάκμκηαζ). They only notice the crisis.  
Something similar may happen in the soul. It may be in a bad condition, and we may 
fail to notice it. Then, a crisis (i.e., some patent badness) may happen, and we will notice that 
there is a problem (i.e., that there is badness affecting our life). However, even in that case we 
will tend not to understand exactly what this problem is and how it comes from our inner 
state. This is due to the fact that we usually have very little self-knowledge. Consequently, we 
do not notice much of our inner badness, and even what we notice tends to be misinterpreted. 
In addition, we do not have a clear understanding of what we truly desire, or of what we have 
truly attained. Thus, we tend not to know exactly how miserable we are. We may easily deem 
ourselves happy or close to a happy state, even if we are very far from it. But this is not all. 
Even if we are faced with a description of badness and misery (and especially of latent 
badness and latent misery), we may still be unable to recognize the defects Plato is 
describing. We may perhaps recognize Plato‟s description of the patent defects, but it is not 
easy to see our latent defects or render them somehow patent, since they lie in the depths of 
our soul.  
In the following, we will try to determine the real extent of these defects or these 
forms of badness in the unexamined life. We will first consider the soul‟s patent badness (i.e., 
those moments of inner conflict or ignorance which the soul promptly identifies) and then we 
will consider the badness of the soul that is normally latent and hidden, especially when we 
lead an unexamined life. We will also consider how these two forms of badness (i.e., how the 
two forms of illness and the two forms of deformity) relate to each other. Finally, we must 
consider the importance of latent badness and latent misery. As was said above, one could 
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 See 518e-519b. 
2662




perhaps be tempted to think that since they lie in the depths of our soul, they are irrelevant 
and our life cannot be undesirable or worthless because of them. We should only concern 
ourselves with patent badness and patent misery. Plato‟s argument, however, goes in the 
opposite direction, and we must understand why.  
 
3. The soul’s patent badness as a usual feature of the unexamined life 
 
 Let us then start by considering the kind of inner badness most promptly identified by 
us when we lead an unexamined life – namely, the one that is patent or manifest, that 
produces a crisis we recognize, that disturbs us, and that is clearly undesirable. In general, 
these are the only kinds of inner disagreement or inner contradiction that are recognized in 
the unexamined life, and one might be tempted to think that this is what Plato is alluding to 
when he attacks the unexamined life. Indeed, throughout the dialogues he identifies many 
forms of patent illness and patent deformity of the soul – i.e., moments in which one 
consciously deals with them. In a way, this is already indicative of how problematic the 
unexamined life is. But the fact that one consciously experiences an inner sedition or 
ignorance does not ensure that one will interpret these phenomena in Platonic terms. Indeed, 
we will probably disregard them. Hence it is important to consider them in some detail. This 
will allow us to see how there can be many manifestations of the soul‟ inner badness in the 
unexamined life, and it will also allow us to better understand what characterizes the soul‟s 
illness and the soul‟s deformity (thus making it easier to identify it in the depths of the soul). 
Moreover, we will be able to clearly see how averse the soul is to these kind of inner 
disagreements, how they disturb or unsettle us, and how they make our life worse, perhaps 
even undesirable or worthless – depending on the frequency and scope of these inner 
disagreements. Indeed, they may be more or less frequent, as well as more or less localized, 
and they may also concern more or less important aspects of our life. But regardless of this 
variation, they show that we are still distant from the superlative good – and this makes them 
particularly important, even if they are not what Plato is primarily referring to.  







3.1. The patent illness of the soul 
 
 The illness of the soul is described by Plato as a sedition or civil war (ζηάζζξ), which 
happens when people or classes that live together fight with one another for control. This is 
something we can easily see happening within us. The different constitutive drives of the soul 
can enter into declared conflict and fight for control over particular actions or even over our 
life in general. When this kind of conflict happens (be it in the πόθζξ, in a smaller group, or in 
one‟s soul), it is difficult not to notice it, since the entities in question can no longer function 
properly. They become internally divided, they lose their inner harmony and oneness of mind 
(ὁιόκμζα), and become unable to act.
2663
 Thus, such conflicts are something of which we 
become painfully aware. We are split apart, pulled in different directions, and we do not 
know what to do. 
 Plato supplies many examples of this. Most of them are restricted to a particular 
action or a particular situation (even though they may have broader consequences), but he 
also considers the possibility of a deep conflict emerging and affecting our whole life.  
Let us start with the localized conflicts (i.e., with the localized forms of patent illness 
of the soul). The most elaborate consideration of this kind of conflicts can be found in 
Republic IV, in a passage we already considered above.
2664
 Plato uses particular situations of 
inner conflict in order to differentiate our inborn drives. Indeed, we may be thirsty but 
calculate that it is better not to drink.
2665
 We may desire to do something ignoble and be 
angry at ourselves, or we may endure something unpleasant out of our sense of honor or 
justice.
2666
 Finally, we may argue with our anger, or our ability to calculate may oppose        
it – such as Odysseus does when he controls his anger against the suitors.
2667
 But this is not 
all. Later in the Republic, Plato also considers tragedies (whether they happen on stage or in 
real life). He gives the example of someone who lost his son and is pulled apart by the desire 
to cry (which is associated with the appetitive part) and by the law or reason, which says he 
shouldn‟t do it.
2668
 Tragic situations in general present such a kind of conflict. One simply 
                                                 
2663
 Cp. in particular Rep. 351c ff., where Socrates argues that no entity (be it individual or collective) can act if 
it does injustice to itself. It can only be unjust towards other entities. For this idea of division, cp. also Rep. 
422e: “ἑηάζηδ βὰν α὎η῵κ πόθεζξ εἰζὶ πάιπμθθαζ ἀθθ᾽ μ὎ πόθζξ, ηὸ η῵κ παζγόκηςκ. δύμ ιέκ, ηἂκ ὁηζμῦκ ᾖ, 
πμθειία ἀθθήθαζξ (...).” 
2664
 Cp. in particular Chap. 13, Sects. 1 and 2.3. 
2665
 See 439c-d. 
2666
 See 439e-440e. 
2667
 See 440e-441c. 
2668
 See 603c ff. 
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does not know what to do. But this may also happen in situations that we tend to recognize as 
good or meaningful. Even the experience of being fascinated with someone or falling in love 
(ἔνςξ) may imply strong conflicts between our drives, as Plato illustrates in Phaedrus, when 
he portrays our bad horse and the charioteer arguing with each other, bargaining, and even 
trying to force the other to obey.
2669
  
 It is important to bear in mind that, although these conflicts tend to be described as 
pure manifestations of our drives, these drives are always affected and transformed by each 
other – and this means that they all have a philosophical or logical character.
2670
 This is 
particularly clear in the passage from Phaedrus, where even the bad horse is depicted as 
presenting arguments. The inner conflict is thus a conflict between views or standpoints that 
are motivated by different drives, and our weak love of knowledge does not allow us to solve 
the contradictions. We do not know what to do, we become disoriented or paralyzed and we 
may even despair. Our pursuit of the good becomes blocked and we do not know how to 
proceed. And this is not the only problem. As Plato stresses, we may be convinced of certain 
views at some point and our views may change or fluctuate, according to the situation and 
how it stimulates our drives (particularly the non-rational ones). Thus, despite always 
following our views about what is best, we may come to regret what we did and interpret the 
situation as a loss of control (ἀηνάηεζα) or as a case of being weaker than oneself (ἣηηςκ         
ἑαοημῦ), and this may cause us to be deeply disappointed with ourselves.
2671
  
 In sum, these inner conflicts may paralyze us and they may also lead us to bad actions. 
This is already very significant, especially since we often experience such an inner illness in 
the unexamined life. As Plato writes in the Republic, our life is full of these conflicts.
2672
 
However, they are for the most part circumstantial, localized, and temporary, and their 
immediate consequences also tend to be circumscribed. In general, they do not significantly 
change the inner arrangement of drives (i.e., our inner πμθζηεία), and thus they do not affect 
the system of our life (i.e., our representation of the good and of how we should pursue it, as 
well as the role things around us should play in this pursuit). The particular modality of 
                                                 
2669
 See 253d ff. 
2670
 Cp. Chap. 13, Sect. 5.1. 
2671
 See e.g. Prt. 352d ff. and Rep. 430e ff. For more on the topic of ἀηνάηεζα, cp. Chap. 12 Sect. 5.5, and Chap. 
13 Sect. 5.3. 
2672
 See 603d: “ (...) ιονίςκ ημζμύηςκ ἐκακηζςιάηςκ ἅια βζβκμιέκςκ ἟ ροπὴ βέιεζ ἟ι῵κ.” 
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unexamined life we adopted is not brought into question. We keep pursuing gain or honor, 
although the weaker drives may sometimes cause temporary problems.
2673
  
 Yet, the patent conflicts between our drives (i.e., the patent illness of our soul) does 
not need to be so localized. Plato also considers in the Republic a much deeper patent 
conflict, which may affect one‟s whole life. When describing the changes of political regime, 
Plato considers the case of young men who – influenced by those around them – are initially 
torn apart between two drives and two inner πμθζηε῔αζ, and at least for a while they are unable 
to decide how they should live.
2674
 In this case, one‟s entire life and the whole pursuit of the 
good will be indeterminate. To be sure, Plato is here talking about young people, but this may 
happen also when we are older (even though our inner πμθζηεία tends to be relatively stable). 
A possible example of this can be found Alcibiades‟ speech in Symposium, where he 
describes how he is often divided between philosophy (represented by Socrates and his θόβμζ) 
and his pursuit of honor.
2675
 At these moments, one is wholly paralyzed and there is a sort of 
complete breakdown of the unexamined life. One may then return to the previous 
configuration or adopt a new one (which will usually be as unexamined as the previous).
2676
 
 The patent illness of the soul may thus be more superficial or deeper, and this affects 
its intensity or how much it disturbs us. However, this kind of conflict is always difficult to 
bear, even if it concerns only a particular action. An ill soul is at war with itself, and its 
ability to act (i.e., to pursue or preserve what is perceived as good) is severely diminished. 
One can thus recognize one‟s own misery. In fact, if this kind of conflict becomes common 
enough and attacks the most important structures of our life, we may even start considering 
that our life is worthless and wholly undesirable. Plato‟s description of the life of a tyrant 
sometimes seems to suggest precisely this. His life will be full of disturbances, regrets, pains 
and wailing.
2677
 However, not all unexamined lives come to this extreme, and for many of 





                                                 
2673
 This already indicates that there might be a deeper conflict or problem in our soul (as we will consider in 
Sect. 4.1 below), but this problem does not become patent as such. 
2674
 See e.g. 549e-550b, 559d ff. 
2675
 See Smp. 215e-216c. 
2676
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 13 Sect. 4.4 c), and Chap. 15 Sects. 3.5 and 3.6. 
2677
 See in particular Rep. 577a ff. 
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3.2. The patent deformity of the soul 
 
 We saw that the deformity of the soul is characterized as a deviation or swerving off 
of the soul in its movement towards the truth. The soul fails to hit its target, which means that 
there is something that eludes it or that it does not know. This ignorance is something of 
which we are often aware. Indeed, there are many things that we are conscious of not 
knowing. We may see something from afar and not know what it is, we may notice that we 
do not know certain attributes of things, we may ask ourselves what someone is thinking, we 
hear languages we do not know, and we are also faced with the fact that there are certain 
forms of expert knowledge that we do not possess. However, if we consider these frequent 
experiences of ignorance, we see that in many cases we do not appear to be particularly 
disturbed or unsettled by them. This only happens if not knowing something directly 
interferes with our pursuits. If that is not the case, we tend not to think much about this 
ignorance, and we certainly do not deem ourselves miserable because of it. 
 But we saw that this is not the only form of ignorance we have. We also possess false 
knowledge claims, which constitute a form of double ignorance, and according to our 
previous analysis, the unexamined life is full of this form of ignorance.
2678
 The problem with 
this ignorance, however, is that we are unable to perceive that we are actually ignorant. We 
are convinced of knowing it and the soul simply regards itself as shapely or as commensurate 
with truth. It thinks it is simply seeing things as they are or seeing life as it is, without any 
distortion.  
Yet, we may also become conscious of our false knowledge claims. We may realize 
that what we previously supposed to know (either tacitly or expressly) actually eludes us. 
Things (and even the most important things) may suddenly reveal themselves as an enigma 
we cannot solve. This happens frequently in everyday life. For instance, we often realize we 
were deceived by appearances or by what others said.
2679
 Still, such discoveries of our false 
conceit of knowledge tend to be very localized, and most of our false knowledge claims 
remain untouched. But there is another form of discovering our false knowledge claims that 
may reveal how we lack knowledge even in the most important matters – namely, by 
submitting our beliefs to philosophical examination. This is precisely what we see illustrated 
                                                 
2678
 For the notion of false knowledge claims, see Chap. 7 Sect. 1, and for its presence in the unexamined live, 
cp. Chap. 16, Sect. 5. 
2679
 Cp. e.g. Prt. 356d: “(...) αὕηδ [sc. ἟ ημῦ θαζκμιέκμο δύκαιζξ] ιὲκ ἟ι᾵ξ ἐπθάκα ηαὶ ἐπμίεζ ἄκς ηε ηαὶ ηάης 




throughout the Platonic corpus. Many characters are asked to put forward and explain their 
views, and they end up not knowing what to say.
2680
 Philosophical examination produces 
astonishment and perplexity, and it may also produce the suspicion that we are ignorant of 
many other things besides those that were directly examined.
2681
 
 The way this process is depicted in Plato‟s writings is very revealing about our 
relation to the patent deformity of our soul. As the examination proceeds, the characters grow 
frustrated and angry. The examination produces a state of disturbance and perplexity (ηαναπὴ 
ηαὶ ἀπμνία), from which one needs a release (ἀπαθθαβή).
2682
 One may blame the examiner, 
which implies disregarding one‟s ignorance, or one may accept that one had a false 
knowledge claim. In the latter case, one will be worried.
2683
 In fact, Plato even stresses that in 
this case one will long for knowledge and start inquiring and seeking out what one does not 
know.
2684
 It is true that the intensity of the experience may vary according to the scope and 
importance of the matters in question. Moreover, one may try to avoid the experience of 
being faced with one‟s ignorance and try to avoid Socrates and his kind of examination (as 
Alcibiades confesses he does).
2685
 We may indeed distract ourselves from the disturbance 
caused by the contemplation of our ignorance. But we cannot simply accept it. 
This is an important manifestation of our love of knowledge (θζθμζμθία). There are 
many things that we want or need to know, and when we realize we do not know them, we 
become very dissatisfied. We regard ourselves as being in a bad state, and if the matter at 
hand is important enough, and we have no expectation of discovering the truth about it, we 
may even regard ourselves as miserable. But even if the experience is normally much less 
intense, it still reveals that we care about knowledge and truth. To be sure, there are many 
things whose ignorance apparently does not bother us, as was mentioned above. But even 
those cases of apparent indifference are problematic. It is possible that we are still being 
guided by the tacit knowledge claim that these things are actually irrelevant, which would 
                                                 
2680
 For an analysis of this process, see Chap. 7, Sect. 1.2 above. 
2681
 Cp. Sph. 267e-268a: “(...) δζὰ ηὴκ ἐκ ημ῔ξ θόβμζξ ηοθίκδδζζκ ἔπεζ πμθθὴκ ὏πμρίακ ηαὶ θόαμκ ὡξ ἀβκμε῔ 
ηαῦηα ἃ πνὸξ ημὺξ ἄθθμοξ ὡξ εἰδὼξ ἐζπδιάηζζηαζ.” 
2682
 Cp. Tht. 168a and Ap. 39c-d. 
2683
 Cp. in particular Tht. 148e: “ἀθθ᾽ εὖ ἴζεζ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, πμθθάηζξ δὴ α὎ηὸ ἐπεπείνδζα ζηέραζεαζ, ἀημύςκ 
ηὰξ πανὰ ζμῦ ἀπμθενμιέκαξ ἐνςηήζεζξ. ἀθθὰ βὰν μὔη᾽ α὎ηὸξ δύκαιαζ πε῔ζαζ ἐιαοηὸκ ὡξ ἱηακ῵ξ ηζ θέβς μὔη᾽ 
ἄθθμο ἀημῦζαζ θέβμκημξ μὕηςξ ὡξ ζὺ δζαηεθεύῃ, μ὎ ιὲκ δὴ αὖ μ὎δ᾽ ἀπαθθαβ῅καζ ημῦ ιέθεζκ.” 
2684
 See Men. 84c: “[΢Ω.] μἴεζ μὖκ ἂκ α὎ηὸκ πνόηενμκ ἐπζπεζν῅ζαζ γδηε῔κ ἠ ιακεάκεζκ ημῦημ ὃ ᾤεημ εἰδέκαζ μ὎η 
εἰδώξ, πνὶκ εἰξ ἀπμνίακ ηαηέπεζεκ ἟βδζάιεκμξ ιὴ εἰδέκαζ, ηαὶ ἐπόεδζεκ ηὸ εἰδέκαζ; [ΜΔΝ.] μὔ ιμζ δμηε῔, ὦ 
΢ώηναηεξ.” For more on this, cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 1.2 e) above. 
2685
 Cp. Smp. 216b: “(...) ἐβὼ δὲ ημῦημκ ιόκμκ αἰζπύκμιαζ. ζύκμζδα βὰν ἐιαοηῶ ἀκηζθέβεζκ ιὲκ μ὎ δοκαιέκῳ ὡξ 
μ὎ δε῔ πμζε῔κ ἃ μὗημξ ηεθεύεζ, ἐπεζδὰκ δὲ ἀπέθες, ἟ηηδιέκῳ η῅ξ ηζι῅ξ η῅ξ ὏πὸ η῵κ πμθθ῵κ. δναπεηεύς μὖκ 
α὎ηὸκ ηαὶ θεύβς, ηαὶ ὅηακ ἴδς, αἰζπύκμιαζ ηὰ ὡιμθμβδιέκα.” 
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mean that our indifference to our ignorance is actually based on supposed knowledge. Thus, 
if we were to lose this supposed knowledge, we would be much more disturbed by not 
knowing these allegdly irrelevant things. 
It seems therefore clear that knowledge is very relevant for us and that we abhor 
ignorance. This becomes even clearer if we suddenly find ourselves not knowing what to do. 
In such moments of disorientation, we realize how far we are from attaining what we         
desire, and we may even fear we will never be able to attain it. Our misery thus becomes 
patent. Now, this is something that may happen in any modality of unexamined live, no 
matter how weak its love of knowledge might be. The disturbance caused by ignorance may 
be directly related with the ruling drive of the soul, or at least it may be amplified by it. It is 
because we are deeply interested in gain or honor (i.e., because we identify them with the 
good) that we become so concerned with our ignorance in certain cases – namely, when it 
harms our possibilities of attaining what we desire. Moreover, we may also become quite 
disturbed if we suddenly realize that we do not really know what we desire in life – i.e., that 
we do not know what is the real good. This disturbs us so much because, as is stressed in the 
Republic, we do not just want apparent goods – we want what is really good.
2686
  
 Thus, despite having other interests, we are also deeply interest in truth – at least in 
those matters that regard as being more directly relevant for our life. We need at least a 
certain degree of truth. Adopting indeterminate or false views is not sufficient for us. In fact, 
Plato affirms that we would never willingly accept a falsehood or lie.
2687
 This shows how 
there is always some θζθμζμθία present in our soul and how it pervades everything. 
However, Plato is also aware of how this love of knowledge (and consequently our soul) is 
usually very weak (or maimed). As he says, one‟s soul “hates the willing lie [or falsehood: 
ρεῦδμξ], both finding it hard to endure in itself and becoming incensed when others lie, but is 
content to receive the unwilling lie and, when it is caught somewhere being ignorant, isn‟t 
vexed but easily accommodates itself, like a swinish beast, to wallowing in ἀιαεία.”
2688
 This 
does not mean that we can easily and consciously accept something untrue, because 
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 See 505d: “ηί δέ; ηόδε μ὎ θακενόκ, ὡξ δίηαζα ιὲκ ηαὶ ηαθὰ πμθθμὶ ἂκ ἕθμζκημ ηὰ δμημῦκηα, ηἂκ εἰ ιὴ εἴδ, 
ὅιςξ ηαῦηα πνάηηεζκ ηαὶ ηεηη῅ζεαζ ηαὶ δμηε῔κ, ἀβαεὰ δὲ μ὎δεκὶ ἔηζ ἀνηε῔ ηὰ δμημῦκηα ηη᾵ζεαζ, ἀθθὰ ηὰ ὄκηα 
γδημῦζζκ, ηὴκ δὲ δόλακ ἐκηαῦεα ἢδδ π᾵ξ ἀηζιάγεζ;     ηαὶ ιάθα, ἔθδ.”  
2687
 See in particular 382b: “(...) ἐβὼ δὲ θέβς ὅηζ ηῆ ροπῆ πενὶ ηὰ ὄκηα ρεύδεζεαί ηε ηαὶ ἐρεῦζεαζ ηαὶ ἀιαε῅ 
εἶκαζ ηαὶ ἐκηαῦεα ἔπεζκ ηε ηαὶ ηεηη῅ζεαζ ηὸ ρεῦδμξ πάκηεξ ἣηζζηα ἂκ δέλαζκημ, ηαὶ ιζζμῦζζ ιάθζζηα α὎ηὸ ἐκ ηῶ 
ημζμύηῳ.” 
2688
 See 535d-e: “μ὎ημῦκ ηαὶ πνὸξ ἀθήεεζακ, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ηα὎ηὸκ ημῦημ ἀκάπδνμκ ροπὴκ εήζμιεκ, ἡ ἂκ ηὸ ιὲκ 
ἑημύζζμκ ρεῦδμξ ιζζῆ ηαὶ παθεπ῵ξ θένῃ α὎ηή ηε ηαὶ ἑηένςκ ρεοδμιέκςκ ὏πεναβακαηηῆ, ηὸ δ᾽ ἀημύζζμκ 
ε὎ηόθςξ πνμζδέπδηαζ ηαὶ ἀιαεαίκμοζά πμο ἁθζζημιέκδ ιὴ ἀβακαηηῆ, ἀθθ᾽ ε὎πεν῵ξ ὥζπεν εδνίμκ ὕεζμκ ἐκ 
ἀιαείᾳ ιμθύκδηαζ;     πακηάπαζζ ιὲκ μὖκ, ἔθδ.” 
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according to Plato we are not able to willingly deceive ourselves. Rather, Plato is here 
alluding to the fact that we are not very demanding with our views. We normally do not 
examine them and even if others show us our ignorance, we can easily disregard it and pay no 
attention to it. Thus, we unwillingly (i.e., unwittingly) accept being deceived or we 
unwittingly deceive ourselves. Our ignorance goes unnoticed, and we keep thinking we know 
things. This is precisely what characterizes the unexamined life. 
This unwilling acceptance of falsehood is, however, very problematic. It might 
suggest that we do not really have a love of knowledge. As Nietzsche says, our will to truth 
may be based on a will to appearance (Schein), illusion (Illusion) or deception 
(Täuschung).
2689
 If the problem is only becoming aware of our deformity in some important 
matters, then this is all we would require to be happy – namely, deceptions strong enough for 
us never to realize that something is amiss. In particular, we would need the illusion that we 
really attained what we really desire – i.e., the real good.  
The question, then, is what happens when we do not realize the deformity of our soul. 
When we lead an unexamined life and do not examine things, thus being convinced that we 
know much more than we really do, are we also leading an undesirable life, simply in virtue 
of our soul‟s cognitive defects and latent deformity? This kind of latent inner disagreement 
(as well as the latent disagreement corresponding to the soul‟s illness) is what we must now 
consider. 
 
4. The soul’s latent badness as an essential feature of the unexamined life 
 
 Although the unexamined life is exposed to experiences of patent badness, which 
reveal the soul‟s disagreement with itself, it may however happen that these experiences are 
localized and weak. One may also have some success steering clear of them. Therefore, we 
cannot say that all modalities of unexamined life are undesirable or “unlivable” just on the 
account of such self-disagreements. If this were what Socrates means when he says that the 
unexamined life is not worth living, he would be wrong.  
However, Plato also recognizes the possibility of latent badness (or latent self-
disagreements). Our soul may be terribly ill or full of deformity without realizing it. This 
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 See KSA 13, 522: “Der Wille zum Schein, zur Illusion, zur Täuschung, zum Werden und Wechseln (zur 
objektive Täuschung) gilt hier als tiefer, ursprünglicher, metaphysischer als der Wille zur Wahrheit, zur 




illness and this deformity may have different degrees, and they may be much worse in certain 
cases (such as when one is a tyrant). But all modalities of unexamined life are significantly 
marked by these defects, and this is what renders them miserable. The problem is that we are 
normally ignorant of our own state and have a bad self-diagnosis.
2690
 In other words, we do 
not know ourselves and do not know our own defects. It is indeed difficult to look at the soul 
and see the exact state it is in. The inner arrangement or πμθζηεία of the soul, which 
determines our life, lies in the depths of our being (i.e., we do not see it directly, even if it 
underpins our whole life), and most of our views are tacit and unexamined. Consequently, we 
do not see any inner disagreements. We simply consider whether or not we attain our 
declared goals, or whether or not we expect to attain them in the future. In some cases, we 
may be satisfied with what we have and deem ourselves happy. But, as will be shown, this 
diagnosis is already an expression of the soul‟s latent illness and deformity, which prevent us 
from recognizing our state. We can only recognize it if acquire a different perspective over 
ourselves – one that is aware of our inner constitution and is able to see what happens with 
us. This is precisely what the Platonic corpus tries to present.  
Let us then see Plato‟s description both of the soul‟s latent illness and of its latent 
deformity, and also how this description determines his appraisal of the unexamined life. 
 
4.1. The latent illness of the soul 
 
 In most moments of the unexamined life, one‟s inner being seems to be completely 
free from seditions (ζηάζεζξ), and one is not at risk of losing control (or at least appearing to 
lose control) and being guided by one‟s irrational parts. One‟s soul is apparently healthy, our 
inner πμθζηεία seems stable, our constitutive drives have a stable arrangement, and our 
actions take place without problems or conflicts of motivations. It is true that there can be 
many different arrangements, and some of them (especially the life controlled by the love of 
gain) are more prone to seditions than others. But there can also be arrangements that can 
avoid most, perhaps even all seditions. 
 If this were the only form of sedition or inner conflict Plato had identified, then we 
would not be able to say that all modalities of unexamined life are essentially ill. But Plato 
considers another form of inner sedition or inner illness, which lies deeper and is more 
decisive. We saw that the unexamined life is always characterized by a weak love of 
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 See e.g. Alc. I 127d: “(...) ηζκδοκεύς δὲ ηαὶ πάθαζ θεθδεέκαζ ἐιαοηὸκ αἴζπζζηα ἔπςκ.” 
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knowledge (θζθμζμθία). This means that the soul is ruled by a non-philosophical drive (either 
one‟s love of gain or one‟s love of honor), and the philosophical drive is subordinated to this 
ruling drive and helps it attain its ends. Indeed, one‟s love of knowledge helps the ruling 
drive create a certain way of seeing things and a certain way of living. This inner 
arrangement, however, is characterized by Plato as a form of illness. It constitutes a different 
form of inner conflict or, as Plato says in the Republic, a form of inner injustice. This 
becomes particularly clear in 444b, when Socrates says: “Mustn‟t it, in its turn, be a certain 
faction (ζηάζζξ) among those three [namely, the three parts of the soul] – a meddling, 
interference, and rebellion of a part of the soul against the whole? The purpose of the 
rebellious part is to rule in the soul although this is not proper, since by nature it is fit to be a 
slave to that which belongs to the ruling class. Something of this sort I suppose we‟ll say, and 
that the confusion and wandering of these parts are injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, lack 
of learning [or, more properly, stupidity: ἀιαεία], and, in sum, vice [ηαηία] entire.”
2691
 The 
problem, therefore, is the fact that all non-philosophical πμθζηε῔αζ go against our inner 
constitution and the constitution of the soul‟s drives. Our different parts or our different 
drives do not all have the same abilities and value. Some are better than others and θζθμζμθία 
in particular is the best. Consequently, this outlines which one should rule and what the 
proper or the best inner πμθζηεία is.
2692
 If this is the πμθζηεία of our soul and the best part 
rules, our soul is healthy. If, however, we go against our constitution (θύζζξ) and the best part 
is ruled by one of the worst, then our soul is ill.
2693
 
But why is our love of knowledge the best part of the soul? This is partially owed to 
its object of desire. Our love of knowledge is directed at objectivity or true being, which 
transcends our self-interest and its limitations, whereas the object of the other drives (gain 
and honor) is much more limited. But their difference in value is also determined by their 
ability to rule and to guide us to the superlative good. Whereas the other drives are 
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“Ο὎ημῦκ ζηάζζκ ηζκὰ αὖ ηνζ῵κ ὄκηςκ ημύηςκ δε῔ α὎ηὴκ εἶκαζ ηαὶ πμθοπναβιμζύκδκ ηαὶ 
ἀθθμηνζμπναβιμζύκδκ ηαὶ ἐπακάζηαζζκ ιένμοξ ηζκὸξ ηῶ ὅθῳ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ, ἵκ᾽ ἄνπῃ ἐκ α὎ηῆ μ὎ πνμζ῅ημκ, ἀθθὰ 
ημζμύημο ὄκημξ θύζεζ μἵμο πνέπεζκ α὎ηῶ δμοθεύεζκ, ηῶ δ᾽ μ὎ δμοθεύεζκ ἀνπζημῦ βέκμοξ ὄκηζ; ημζαῦη᾽ ἄηηα μἶιαζ 
θήζμιεκ ηαὶ ηὴκ ημύηςκ ηαναπὴκ ηαὶ πθάκδκ εἶκαζ ηήκ ηε ἀδζηίακ ηαὶ ἀημθαζίακ ηαὶ δεζθίακ ηαὶ ἀιαείακ ηαὶ 
ζοθθήαδδκ π᾵ζακ ηαηίακ.” I follow once more A. Bloom‟s translation. 
2692
 See e.g. Rep. 431a and Phd. 79e-80 (taking into consideration that the soul is here identified with the love of 
knowledge). Cp. also Chap. 13, Sect. 6.5 above. 
2693
 Plato expressly states this immediately after the passage just quoted, in 444d-e: “ἔζηζ δὲ ηὸ ιὲκ ὏βίεζακ 
πμζε῔κ ηὰ ἐκ ηῶ ζώιαηζ ηαηὰ θύζζκ ηαεζζηάκαζ ηναηε῔κ ηε ηαὶ ηναηε῔ζεαζ ὏π᾽ ἀθθήθςκ, ηὸ δὲ κόζμκ πανὰ θύζζκ 
ἄνπεζκ ηε ηαὶ ἄνπεζεαζ ἄθθμ ὏π᾽ ἄθθμο.     ἔζηζ βάν.     μ὎ημῦκ αὖ, ἔθδκ, ηὸ δζηαζμζύκδκ ἐιπμζε῔κ ηὰ ἐκ ηῆ ροπῆ 
ηαηὰ θύζζκ ηαεζζηάκαζ ηναηε῔κ ηε ηαὶ ηναηε῔ζεαζ ὏π᾽ ἀθθήθςκ, ηὸ δὲ ἀδζηίακ πανὰ θύζζκ ἄνπεζκ ηε ηαὶ 
ἄνπεζεαζ ἄθθμ ὏π᾽ ἄθθμο;     ημιζδῆ, ἔθδ.     ἀνεηὴ ιὲκ ἄνα, ὡξ ἔμζηεκ, ὏βίεζά ηέ ηζξ ἂκ εἴδ ηαὶ ηάθθμξ ηαὶ 
ε὎ελία ροπ῅ξ, ηαηία δὲ κόζμξ ηε ηαὶ αἶζπμξ ηαὶ ἀζεέκεζα.     ἔζηζκ μὕης.” 
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constitutively blind, the love of knowledge is what allows us to see where we are going. In 
this sense, it is more fit to rule. In fact, we saw in the previous chapter that it always rules 
somehow, insofar as it determines itself and thus determines the whole inner arrangement of 
the drives. However, it can relinquish control, and in that case it will be controlled by the 
other drives. When this happens, it still shapes our way of seeing and acting, but it will do so 
in a limited or distorted manner. In other words, it will be contradicting itself. It is still related 
to knowledge, but it follows the dictates of something other than reality as if it were reality. 
The other drives, in turn, also contradict themselves. Although they are blind and unfit to 
rule, they come to control the soul. They rise above their station, they do not mind their 
business, and are marked by πμθοπναβιμζύκδ and ἀθθμηνζμπναβιμζύκδ. These terms have 
strong political connotations and imply an overturn of the social order.
2694
 The people less 
qualified to govern take control, and this corresponds to a kind of rebellion or insurrection 
(ἐπακάζηαζζξ).  
In sum, the unexamined life is essentially characterized by the fact that the soul does 
not follow its proper guide. The other parts (although blind) resist this guide, and start 
controlling the soul.
2695
 The best part is then enslaved to one of the other two, which are 
worse, and this enslavement renders the whole soul slavish. As Plato says, the soul is weaker 
than itself and cannot control itself.
2696
 In a way, it is in a permanent state of ἀηνάηεζα (even 
though the ruling drive is always contaminated by the love of knowledge and, in this sense, 
our soul never loses rational control and is never purely controlled by irrational drives, as we 
saw above).
2697
 The soul is thus poorly governed, and it becomes a soul that governs and 
cares badly. This means that it is unable to correctly perform its function (ἔνβμκ), which 
according to the Republic lies precisely in taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and 
living.
2698
 Indeed, the wrong arrangement of drives has an impact on the whole pursuit of the 
good – i.e., on the practical system of life, as well as the cognitive system that underlies it. 
                                                 
2694
 For more on πμθοπναβιμζύκδ, see footnote 188 above. 
2695
 The soul has thus a ηοθθὸξ ἟βειώκ, as is said in Rep. 554b. Although Plato is here talking about the pursuit 
of possessions, this applies in a way to all unexamined forms of life. 
2696
 For the notion of being weaker than oneself (ἣηηςκ ἑαοημῦ) in the context of the tripartition, see in particular 
Rep. 430e-431b. 
2697
 Cp. Chap. 13, Sect. 5.3. 
2698
 See 354d: “ἴεζ δή, ιεηὰ ηαῦηα ηόδε ζηέραζ. ροπ῅ξ ἔζηζκ ηζ ἔνβμκ ὃ ἄθθῳ η῵κ ὄκηςκ μ὎δ᾽ ἂκ ἑκὶ πνάλαζξ, 
μἷμκ ηὸ ημζόκδε· ηὸ ἐπζιεθε῔ζεαζ ηαὶ ἄνπεζκ ηαὶ αμοθεύεζεαζ ηαὶ ηὰ ημζαῦηα πάκηα, ἔζε᾽ ὅηῳ ἄθθῳ ἠ ροπῆ 
δζηαίςξ ἂκ α὎ηὰ ἀπμδμ῔ιεκ ηαὶ θα῔ιεκ ἴδζα ἐηείκδξ εἶκαζ;     μ὎δεκὶ ἄθθῳ.     ηί δ᾽ αὖ ηὸ γ῅κ; μ὎ ροπ῅ξ θήζμιεκ 
ἔνβμκ εἶκαζ;     ιάθζζηά β᾽, ἔθδ.” 
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One‟s whole life is turned upside down.
2699
 On the surface everything will appear to be fine, 
the soul will appear to be healthy, but at its core it will be profoundly ill.
2700
 
 According to the Republic, this is precisely what injustice in human soul consists in, 
and it is also the basis of all other forms of badness or vices (ηαηίαζ): namely, unrestraint, 
ignorance, and cowardice.
2701
 It is true that there are still degrees of vice, and only the worst 
soul (the one where the worst drive has the greatest power) reaches the height of vice.
2702
 
However, all non-philosophical or unexamined lives are marked by a constitutive badness or 
defectiveness – and this is then expressed in all views and acts of those lives. All the acts of 
the souls leading an unexamined life will be to a certain extent unjust, since they are based on 
this inner disposition (even if there are degrees of injustice, and only the most extreme forms 
of injustice and the acts resulting from it tend to be regarded as unjust or vicious by us). To 
make matters worse, any unjust act tends to render the soul‟s inner disposition even more 
unjust, by stimulating its worst parts.
2703
 This is more clearly seen in the case of the most 
unjust actions, which nurture our love of gain, and end up rendering one‟s soul tyrannical. 
Thus, an apparently healthy course of life may actually correspond to a constant increase of 
the soul‟s illness. 
 We have thus identified a modality of latent badness. Because of the θζθμζμθία‟s 
weakness, one‟s soul becomes worse than it could be and even slavish, and this inner state is 
then reflected in one‟s whole life. Everything will be an expression of one‟s badness, and 
thus one will be miserable, even if one does not notice it. This is why Plato says that injustice 
is the greatest evil.
2704
 It is indeed the cause of the greatest misery, as can be seen in the case 
                                                 
2699
 Cp. e.g. Rep. 442a-b: “ηαὶ ημύης δὴ μὕης ηναθέκηε ηαὶ ὡξ ἀθδε῵ξ ηὰ α὏η῵κ ιαεόκηε ηαὶ παζδεοεέκηε 
πνμζηήζεζεμκ ημῦ ἐπζεοιδηζημῦ – ὃ δὴ πθε῔ζημκ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ἐκ ἑηάζηῳ ἐζηὶ ηαὶ πνδιάηςκ θύζεζ ἀπθδζηόηαημκ 
– ὃ ηδνήζεημκ ιὴ ηῶ πίιπθαζεαζ η῵κ πενὶ ηὸ ζ῵ια ηαθμοιέκςκ ἟δμκ῵κ πμθὺ ηαὶ ἰζπονὸκ βεκόιεκμκ μ὎η αὖ ηὰ 
α὏ημῦ πνάηηῃ, ἀθθὰ ηαηαδμοθώζαζεαζ ηαὶ ἄνπεζκ ἐπζπεζνήζῃ ὧκ μ὎ πνμζ῅ημκ α὎ηῶ βέκεζ, ηαὶ ζύιπακηα ηὸκ 
αίμκ πάκηςκ ἀκαηνέρῃ.” 
2700
 This corresponds precisely to what Socrates says in Grg. 464a-b: “[΢Ω.] ηί δέ; δμημῦζακ ιὲκ ε὎ελίακ, μὖζακ 
δ᾽ μὔ; μἷμκ ημζόκδε θέβς· πμθθμὶ δμημῦζζκ εὖ ἔπεζκ ηὰ ζώιαηα, μὓξ μ὎η ἂκ ῥᾳδίςξ αἴζεμζηό ηζξ ὅηζ μ὎η εὖ 
ἔπμοζζκ, ἀθθ᾽ ἠ ἰαηνόξ ηε ηαὶ η῵κ βοικαζηζη῵κ ηζξ. [ΓΟΡ.] ἀθδε῅ θέβεζξ. [΢Ω.] ηὸ ημζμῦημκ θέβς ηαὶ ἐκ ζώιαηζ 
εἶκαζ ηαὶ ἐκ ροπῆ, ὃ πμζε῔ ιὲκ δμηε῔κ εὖ ἔπεζκ ηὸ ζ῵ια ηαὶ ηὴκ ροπήκ, ἔπεζ δὲ μ὎δὲκ ι᾵θθμκ.” 
2701
 See 444b. The relation between the inner ζηάζζξ and vices in these sense is also stressed in the Sophist (see 
228e), as we saw in Sect. 2.2 above.  
2702
 See in particular the description of a tyrannical soul and the catalogue of its vices in Rep. 589c ff. 
2703
 See e.g. Grg. 480a-b (which can be interpreted in light of what Plato says in the Republic about the soul‟s 
inner sedition and illness): “ἐὰκ δέ βε ἀδζηήζῃ ἠ α὎ηὸξ ἠ ἄθθμξ ηζξ ὧκ ἂκ ηήδδηαζ, α὎ηὸκ ἑηόκηα ἰέκαζ ἐηε῔ζε 
ὅπμο ὡξ ηάπζζηα δώζεζ δίηδκ, πανὰ ηὸκ δζηαζηὴκ ὥζπεν πανὰ ηὸκ ἰαηνόκ, ζπεύδμκηα ὅπςξ ιὴ ἐβπνμκζζεὲκ ηὸ 
κόζδια η῅ξ ἀδζηίαξ ὕπμοθμκ ηὴκ ροπὴκ πμζήζεζ ηαὶ ἀκίαημκ (...).” 
2704




of the tyrant, according to Gorgias and the Republic.
2705
 But even the less unjust lives will be 
seriously harmed by their inner injustice, which will compromise their ability to attain the 
superlative good they desire. The soul will have no true harmony, no true oneness of mind 
(ὁιόκμζα), no true unity. This would only be the case if each part were to perform its proper 
role and were not in contradiction with itself. Only then would the soul be truly one and truly 
healthy.  
 This also means that only at this point would the soul be completely free from the 
patent illness or the patent seditions we considered above. Indeed, although an unjust life 
may spend much time without being manifestly torn apart by its drives, its inner πμθζηεία will 
still be defective and in conflict with itself, and thus it will still be exposed to the possibility 
of patent seditions, which are actually a sort of fit or attack (ηαηααμθή) of the soul‟s latent 
illness. As Plato says in the Republic, “a sick body needs only a slight shock (ιζηνὰ ῥμπή) 
from the outside to become ill and is sometimes at civil war with itself even without this.”
2706
 
Likewise, one‟s soul may easily fall in a patent and intensely felt civil war. But this is not the 
only problem. The latent illness of the soul is also directly connected with the soul‟s 
deformity, insofar as our inner πμθζηεία expresses itself in our beliefs. However, our inner 
πμθζηεία is also affected by the beliefs we have, and the badness of the latter has its own 
specific traits and its specific importance. Hence, it is important to consider it in isolation 
from what we just saw. 
 
4.2. The latent deformity of the soul  
 
 The second kind of latent badness – namely, the soul‟s latent deformity – is easier to 
conceive. Indeed, it does not necessarily presuppose the partition of the soul, and although in 
some texts (such as the Republic) it is directly connected with what was just seen (especially 
with the weakness of the soul‟s love of knowledge), it can also be conceived independently of 
this conception of inner illness. This is why we find many more references to it throughout 
the corpus. In a way, all Plato‟s texts are concerned with this kind of latent badness.  
                                                 
2705
 See in particular Rep. 580b-c: “ιζζεςζώιεεα μὖκ ηήνοηα, ἤκ δ᾽ ἐβώ, ἠ α὎ηὸξ ἀκείπς ὅηζ ὁ Ἀνίζηςκμξ ὏ὸξ 
ηὸκ ἄνζζηόκ ηε ηαὶ δζηαζόηαημκ ε὎δαζιμκέζηαημκ ἔηνζκε, ημῦημκ δ᾽ εἶκαζ ηὸκ ααζζθζηώηαημκ ηαὶ ααζζθεύμκηα 
α὏ημῦ, ηὸκ δὲ ηάηζζηόκ ηε ηαὶ ἀδζηώηαημκ ἀεθζώηαημκ, ημῦημκ δὲ αὖ ηοβπάκεζκ ὄκηα ὃξ ἂκ ηονακκζηώηαημξ ὢκ 
ἑαοημῦ ηε ὅηζ ιάθζζηα ηονακκῆ ηαὶ η῅ξ πόθεςξ;     ἀκεζνήζες ζμζ, ἔθδ.” 
2706
 See 556e: “(...) ὥζπεν ζ῵ια κμζ῵δεξ ιζην᾵ξ ῥμπ῅ξ ἔλςεεκ δε῔ηαζ πνμζθααέζεαζ πνὸξ ηὸ ηάικεζκ, ἐκίμηε δὲ 
ηαὶ ἄκεο η῵κ ἔλς ζηαζζάγεζ α὎ηὸ α὏ηῶ (...).” 
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 Let us then see what characterizes the soul‟s latent deformity and how it affects the 
unexamined life. Some important aspects of this question were already considered. We saw 
that in the Sophist, Plato says that the soul is directed at truth, but it may miss its target, and 
this deviation constitutes ignorance – which is what the soul‟s deformity consists of. One 
may be aware of this deviation (i.e., one‟s deformity may become patent). However, the soul 
is not necessarily aware of having missed the target and lacking knowledge of things. In fact, 
Plato stresses how most of our ignorance is unconscious or latent – and not because we are 
totally oblivious to the things in question, but rather because we have the firm conviction (be 
it express or tacit) that we know them. We are full of knowledge claims and many (perhaps 
even most or all of them) are false or baseless. We have much conceit of wisdom – i.e., we 
are full of folly or stupidity (ἀιαεία). Moreover, this is not just another form of ignorance. It 
actually constitutes the highest form of deviation from the target. Stupidity is a hidden (and 
therefore double) ignorance. We are much further away from things than if we were simply 
ignorant of them, and we are not even able to seek them out them, because we do not notice 
any defect in our access to them.
2707
 We mistake a mere image (i.e., a defective version of 




 It is also important to remember that, according to Plato‟s diagnosis, one is not just 
dreaming about a few things when one leads an unphilosophical life. The whole unexamined 
life is a dream. We attribute many predicates wrongly, we do not have a clear understanding 
of what they consist in, and our entire ontology (which tends not to recognize the existence 
the general predicates or εἴδδ) is incorrect. This is not only a cognitive problem, but it also 
has strong practical implications, insofar as the whole complex system of practical beliefs 
that compose our life and guide our every step (namely, the beliefs about what is the good, 
how we can achieve it, and what role everything plays in this pursuit) is distorted. There is 
thus a global concealment (θήεδ). Our access to things, to life in general, and to ourselves is 
defective, and the reality that appears to us is to a great extent a mere illusion. Everything is 
                                                 
2707
 When this happens, we become a particular form of being in-between (ιεηαλύ). We saw above that the 
soul‟s desire is characterized in Symposium as lying between several pairs of opposites, including simple 
ignorance and full knowledge. This latter intermediacy corresponds to the soul‟s desire for knowledge 
(θζθμζμθία), but in the case of knowledge claims, the soul already thinks it possesses full knowledge – hence it 
becomes a stationary in-between or a intermediate being that has forgotten its intermediate status. For more on 
this, cp. Chap. 12 Sect. 4.3, and Chap. 14 Sect. 3.1. 
2708
 As we saw, for Plato the dream state consists precisely in this mistake. Cp. Chap. 7 Sect. 2.4, and Chap. 16, 
Sect. 5.2 f). 
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shadowy (including ourselves), and we live in a sort of Hades – i.e., our life is a sort of 
death.
2709
 In sum, we are not what we think we are and we are not where we think we are. 
 Yet, our ignorance escapes our notice (θακεάκεζ).
2710
 We do not know ourselves and 
how deficient our cognitive state is.
2711
 Our weak love of knowledge is not strong enough to 
notice this, and the ruling drive of the soul also prevents us from noticing it. Consequently, 
we are not disturbed or distressed by this ignorance, and we are also not ashamed of it. There 
seems to be no problem. Our love of gain or our love of honor may be satisfied (or at least 
they may think they are satisfied), even if we do not possess actual knowledge. In other 
words, we can think we are happy or on our way to happiness, despite the latent deformity of 
our soul.  
 But is this really something to which we are indifferent? The characters in the 
dialogues state several times that we desire truth and knowledge and reject untruth and 
ignorance. A few of these passages were already considered above. In the Sophist, he writes: 
“every soul is unwillingly ignorant of everything.”
2712
 In the Republic, it is said that everyone 
would least accept (and in fact hates) having a falsehood in the soul.
2713
 Later in the same 
text, it is also agreed (among other things) that being deceived about the truth is bad, and to 
possess the truth is good.
2714
 A false δόλα (at least if it is about the most important things in 
life) is even considered the greatest evil for human beings.
2715
 Inversely, things becoming 
manifest is a good for all human beings.
2716
 In Philebus, it is said that θνόκδζζξ and κμῦξ 
(usually understood as forms of perfect knowledge or perfect access to the truth) are never 
                                                 
2709
 Cp. e.g. Men. 100a, Grg. 492e, Rep. 534c-d. 
2710
 Cp. Sph. 249e: “ὦ ιαηάνζε, μ὎η ἐκκμε῔ξ ὅηζ κῦκ ἐζιεκ ἐκ ἀβκμίᾳ ηῆ πθείζηῃ πενὶ α὎ημῦ, θαζκόιεεα δέ ηζ 
θέβεζκ ἟ι῔κ α὎ημ῔ξ;” 
2711
 For the relation between knowing oneself and one‟s ignorance, cp. in particular Phlb. 48c-49a. 
2712
 See 228c: “ἀθθὰ ιὴκ ροπήκ βε ἴζιεκ ἄημοζακ π᾵ζακ π᾵κ ἀβκμμῦζακ.” I follow once more S. Benardete‟s 
translation: S. BENARDETE, The Being of the Beautiful. Plato‟s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, 
Chicago/London, The University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
2713
 See 382b: “ἐβὼ δὲ θέβς ὅηζ ηῆ ροπῆ πενὶ ηὰ ὄκηα ρεύδεζεαί ηε ηαὶ ἐρεῦζεαζ ηαὶ ἀιαε῅ εἶκαζ ηαὶ ἐκηαῦεα 
ἔπεζκ ηε ηαὶ ηεηη῅ζεαζ ηὸ ρεῦδμξ πάκηεξ ἣηζζηα ἂκ δέλαζκημ, ηαὶ ιζζμῦζζ ιάθζζηα α὎ηὸ ἐκ ηῶ ημζμύηῳ.” 
2714
 See 413a: “ἠ μ὎ ηὸ ιὲκ ἐρεῦζεαζ η῅ξ ἀθδεείαξ ηαηόκ, ηὸ δὲ ἀθδεεύεζκ ἀβαεόκ;” Cp. also Euthd. 281e: “(...) 
η῵κ ιὲκ ἄθθςκ μ὎δὲκ ὂκ μὔηε ἀβαεὸκ μὔηε ηαηόκ, ημύημζκ δὲ δομ῔κ ὄκημζκ ἟ ιὲκ ζμθία ἀβαεόκ, ἟ δὲ ἀιαεία 
ηαηόκ (...).” 
2715
 See Grg. 458a-b: “μ὎δὲκ βὰν μἶιαζ ημζμῦημκ ηαηὸκ εἶκαζ ἀκενώπῳ, ὅζμκ δόλα [458α] ρεοδὴξ πενὶ ὧκ 
ηοβπάκεζ κῦκ ἟ι῔κ ὁ θόβμξ ὤκ.” Cp. also Phd. 83c: “(...) ὃ πάκηςκ ιέβζζηόκ ηε ηαη῵κ ηαὶ ἔζπαηόκ ἐζηζ, ημῦημ 
πάζπεζ ηαὶ μ὎ θμβίγεηαζ α὎ηό.     ηί ημῦημ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ; ἔθδ ὁ Κέαδξ.     ὅηζ ροπὴ πακηὸξ ἀκενώπμο ἀκαβηάγεηαζ 
ἅια ηε ἟ζε῅καζ ζθόδνα ἠ θοπδε῅καζ ἐπί ηῳ ηαὶ ἟βε῔ζεαζ πενὶ ὃ ἂκ ιάθζζηα ημῦημ πάζπῃ, ημῦημ ἐκανβέζηαηόκ 
ηε εἶκαζ ηαὶ ἀθδεέζηαημκ, μ὎π μὕηςξ ἔπμκ· ηαῦηα δὲ ιάθζζηα ηὰ ὁναηά· ἠ μὔ;     πάκο βε.” 
2716
 Cp. Chrm. 166d: “ἠ μ὎ ημζκὸκ μἴεζ ἀβαεὸκ εἶκαζ ζπεδόκ ηζ π᾵ζζκ ἀκενώπμζξ, βίβκεζεαζ ηαηαθακὲξ ἕηαζημκ 





 In Laws, truth is said to be not only the greatest good, but also what 
renders us happy.
2718
 There are also several other passages that declare that those that have 
θνόκδζζξ are good and those that have ἀθνμζύκδ are bad.
2719
 In fact, θνόκδζζξ and 
knowledge in general is associated with ἀνεηή, practical success and happiness.
2720
 
Several of these passages seem to be mostly concerned with the usefulness of truth for 
our practical success or our happiness, and they stress the fact that our psychic deformity is 
not just something that is hidden from us – it can actually have very serious practical 
consequences. We may commit serious mistakes that prevent us even from attaining what we 
think we want. Moreover, we may have a very wrong idea of what we really want.
2721
 In sum, 
our life is guided by a blinded principle and not by true insight.
2722
 We rush into things 
without proper education, just like Alcibiades.
2723
 Consequently, we may easily fail to attain 
the good we so deeply desire.  
To be sure, we may fail to notice any practical mistakes, or we may not associate them 
with ignorance, and instead blame other things. In fact, much of our satisfaction with gain or 
honor (if we have any) depends on our ignorance. Therefore, it may seem that we can be 
benefited by this ignorance, and also that we are not necessarily miserable in virtue of it.  
However, according to Plato, this is not the case. Our relation with truth runs much deeper. 
We may have a wrong idea of what we really want and we may think we attain it, but as is 
emphasized in the Republic, we do not pursue apparent goods, but rather the real good.
2724
 
We may thus be missing out and failing to fulfill ourselves, even if we are convinced we are 
attaining what we desire and are therefore happy. The state in which we just think we are 
happy (i.e., the state of δμηε῔κ ε὎δαίιμκα εἶκαζ, as is said in the Apology) is an inferior state 
and it falls very short of the true best state. To use Plato‟s image in the Republic, this state is 
at best a relative upper region (i.e., an intermediate state, better than others), and not the true 
                                                 
2717
 See 65e: “ἀθθ᾽ μὖκ θνόκδζζκ ιὲκ ηαὶ κμῦκ, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, μ὎δεὶξ πώπμηε μὔε᾽ ὕπαν μὔη᾽ ὄκαν αἰζπνὸκ μὔηε 
εἶδεκ μὔηε ἐπεκόδζεκ μ὎δαιῆ μ὎δαι῵ξ μὔηε βζβκόιεκμκ μὔηε ὄκηα μὔηε ἐζόιεκμκ.” 
2718
 See 730c: “ἀθήεεζα δὴ πάκηςκ ιὲκ ἀβαε῵κ εεμ῔ξ ἟βε῔ηαζ, πάκηςκ δὲ ἀκενώπμζξ· ἥξ ὁ βεκήζεζεαζ ιέθθςκ 
ιαηάνζόξ ηε ηαὶ ε὎δαίιςκ ἐλ ἀνπ῅ξ ε὎εὺξ ιέημπμξ εἴδ, ἵκα ὡξ πθε῔ζημκ πνόκμκ ἀθδεὴξ ὢκ δζααζμ῔.” 
2719
 See Cri. 44d, Alc. I 121a, Cra. 386b, 398b, Grg. 489e,  
2720
 See Chrm. 173b-d, Men. 88c ff., Euthd. 281a-c,  
2721
 Cp. the distinction between what one wants and what seems best or what one thinks is best for oneself, in 
Grg. 466b ff. 
2722
 Cp. Rep. 554b. 
2723
 See Alc. I 118b: “αααα῔ ἄνα, ὦ Ἀθηζαζάδδ, μἷμκ πάεμξ πέπμκεαξ· ὃ ἐβὼ ὀκμιάγεζκ ιὲκ ὀηκ῵, ὅιςξ δέ, 
ἐπεζδὴ ιόκς ἐζιέκ, ῥδηέμκ. ἀιαείᾳ βὰν ζοκμζηε῔ξ, ὦ αέθηζζηε, ηῆ ἐζπάηῃ, ὡξ ὁ θόβμξ ζμο ηαηδβμνε῔ ηαὶ ζὺ 
ζαοημῦ· δζὸ ηαὶ ὿ηηεζξ ἄνα πνὸξ ηὰ πμθζηζηὰ πνὶκ παζδεοε῅καζ.” 
2724
 See once more 505d: “ηόδε μ὎ θακενόκ, ὡξ δίηαζα ιὲκ ηαὶ ηαθὰ πμθθμὶ ἂκ ἕθμζκημ ηὰ δμημῦκηα, ηἂκ εἰ ιὴ 
εἴδ, ὅιςξ ηαῦηα πνάηηεζκ ηαὶ ηεηη῅ζεαζ ηαὶ δμηε῔κ, ἀβαεὰ δὲ μ὎δεκὶ ἔηζ ἀνηε῔ ηὰ δμημῦκηα ηη᾵ζεαζ, ἀθθὰ ηὰ 
ὄκηα γδημῦζζκ, ηὴκ δὲ δόλακ ἐκηαῦεα ἢδδ π᾵ξ ἀηζιάγεζ;     ηαὶ ιάθα, ἔθδ.” 
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upper region, which corresponds to real fulfillment or fullness (πθδνώζζξ).
2725
 Thus, if the 
soul does not attain knowledge and being (i.e., if it is still deformed and its love of knowledge 
is frustrated), it cannot be satisfied. It still lacks the knowledge it longs for, but it does not 
realize it, and thus it does not seek the truth. In this sense, our soul is in a bad state. It lacks 
knowledge, and this is a form of emptiness with respect to what it wants and needs.
2726
 All 
this means that knowledge does not only help us attain the superlative good we desire – it is 
an essential part of the good. Plato goes even further, and seems to affirm that what we really 
desire and what really fulfils us (and to this extent, what corresponds to the real upper region) 
is also that which partakes more in pure being – namely, the εἴδδ.
2727
 This strongly suggests 
that, according to him, we can only be happy (and our life can only be really worth living) if 
we are contemplating the truth – and especially εἴδδ such as the good and beauty.
2728
 But 
whether or not this is the superlative good, we are directed at truth, and if the soul fails to 
attain it, it will be miserable and its life will be undesirable or worthless. We will be like 
shadows in Hades, or our life will be a sort of sleeping state.
2729
 We will not be really here, 
and we will not be fully what we are. An essential component of our desire – our love of 
knowledge – will contradict itself, and so will we. 
It is, of course, easy to accept this state, but only because we are not aware of it. At 
best, we have an abstract notion of its possibility. But according to Plato, we would never 
accept it if we were to recognize it.
2730
 We would not be able to consider ourselves fulfilled 
without possessing the truth and without possessing a real superlative good. Lacking truth is 
always a deep frustration of our being. We want to possess it – or at least we want to be as 
close to it as possible. Thus, being convinced that we know what we do not know only makes 
matters worse, since we grow more distant from the truth. As seems to be indicated in 
Philebus, the best thing is to know everything, and the second best thing is not to be unaware 
of oneself – i.e., to be aware of one‟s ignorance.
2731
 This state of conscious ignorance is 
characteristic of Socrates, and he clearly states in the Apology that this is a better state – even 
                                                 
2725
 Cp. Rep. 583b ff. (and especially 584d-585a). 
2726
 See Rep. 585b: “ἄβκμζα δὲ ηαὶ ἀθνμζύκδ ἆν᾽ μ὎ ηεκόηδξ ἐζηὶ β῅ξ πενὶ ροπὴκ αὖ ἕλεςξ;     ιάθα βε.” 
2727
 See Rep. 585b ff. 
2728
 See in particular Smp. 211c-d: “(...) ἐπ᾽ ἐηε῔κμ ηὸ ιάεδια ηεθεοη῅ζαζ, ὅ ἐζηζκ μ὎η ἄθθμο ἠ α὎ημῦ ἐηείκμο 
ημῦ ηαθμῦ ιάεδια, ηαὶ βκῶ α὎ηὸ ηεθεοη῵κ ὃ ἔζηζ ηαθόκ. ἐκηαῦεα ημῦ αίμο, ὦ θίθε ΢ώηναηεξ, ἔθδ ἟ Μακηζκζηὴ 
λέκδ, εἴπεν πμο ἄθθμεζ, αζςηὸκ ἀκενώπῳ, εεςιέκῳ α὎ηὸ ηὸ ηαθόκ.” 
2729
 Cp. once more Rep. 534c-d. 
2730
 This is precisely what is expressed in Rep. 382b and 535d-e (as we saw in Sect. 3.2 above). 
2731




in comparison with a state that has some knowledge, but also much conceit of wisdom.
2732
 It 
is also said in Gorgias that it is better to be refuted and thus delivered from false beliefs.
2733
 
Finally, in Charmides Socrates declares his fear of not noticing that he does not know what 
he thinks to know.
2734
 In sum, patent deformity – i.e., simple ignorance – is preferable to 
latent ignorance. It is closer to truth and it allows us to search for it. We are thus less 
miserable if we are aware of not knowing. Inversely, we are extremely miserable when we 
wrongly think we know everything (or at least everything that matters) – and this is precisely 
what happens in the unexamined life.  
This is decisive for Plato‟s judgment of this life as worthless, undesirable or 
unacceptable, and we can already see why. Still, it is important to reconsider all the inner 
disagreements (both patent and latent) we just considered, discuss their meaning in more 
detail, and consider how the unexamined life tends to react to such a diagnosis (as well as 
what guides this reaction). In doing so, we will be able to determine more clearly the true 
meaning of Plato‟s appraisal of the unexamined life. 
 
5. The significance of this diagnosis for us 
 
 According to the Platonic corpus, the unexamined life is a life full of bad things 
(ηαηά), which are primarily based on the inner badness, defectiveness or vice (ηαηία) of the 
soul that leads such a life. Most of this ηαηία is latent, and the misery of such a life is also 
mostly latent. We fail to attain what we desire, we are very far from the superlative good – in 
fact, we are not even on our way to it. Because of our inner state, we are completely deviated 
from what we desire and going on the opposite direction. Our access to the good is blocked 
and we can only attain bad things – i.e., attain things we do not really desire and that help 
prevent us from attaining what we desire. 
 This inner defectiveness of the unexamined life derives from its own               
structure – namely, from the weakness of its love of knowledge, which results in a complete 
(or almost complete) absence of philosophical examination. One is ruled by a                    
non-philosophical drive and simply accepts the views suggested by it. As a result, one is 
often faced with cases of inner sedition and ignorance – and, more than that, one‟s soul is 
                                                 
2732
 See Ap. 22e: “(...) ὥζηε ιε ἐιαοηὸκ ἀκενςη᾵κ ὏πὲν ημῦ πνδζιμῦ πόηενα δελαίιδκ ἂκ μὕηςξ ὥζπεν ἔπς 
ἔπεζκ, ιήηε ηζ ζμθὸξ ὢκ ηὴκ ἐηείκςκ ζμθίακ ιήηε ἀιαεὴξ ηὴκ ἀιαείακ, ἠ ἀιθόηενα ἃ ἐηε῔κμζ ἔπμοζζκ ἔπεζκ. 
ἀπεηνζκάιδκ μὖκ ἐιαοηῶ ηαὶ ηῶ πνδζιῶ ὅηζ ιμζ θοζζηεθμ῔ ὥζπεν ἔπς ἔπεζκ.” 
2733
 See Grg. 458a, 461a.   
2734
 See Chrm. 166d: “(...) θμαμύιεκμξ ιή πμηε θάες μἰόιεκμξ ιέκ ηζ εἰδέκαζ, εἰδὼξ δὲ ιή.” 
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constitutively marked by sedition and the worst kind of ignorance. As we will discuss in the 
following chapter, if one were to devote oneself to philosophical examination, much of this 
could perhaps change. But as it is (and if we are to trust this description), the soul‟s case 
seems hopeless. 
 The Platonic diagnosis of the unexamined life is therefore very harsh. But what 
exactly does this mean for us – i.e., for human beings in general, who for the most part (if not 
in their entirety) lead an unexamined life? One will hardly agree with the diagnosis, and even 
if one admits that it might be right, one might still be tempted to think that, since most of the 
badness and misery in question are latent, they are not really important, and it is actually 
better not to be aware of them. This is how the unexamined life tends to react to its own 
diagnosis. To a certain extent, we already considered this reaction and tried to show its 
senselessness, but now we have to consider in more detail the significance the patent and the 
latent conflicts have (or should have) for us. We must also consider one last time the criteria 
and motivations behind the unexamined life‟s reaction to the diagnosis and see how Plato 
challenges their validity. 
 
5.1. The significance of the soul’s patent badness 
 
 Let us start by considering once more the patent forms of inner badness. We saw that 
we can experience patent seditions and patent ignorance, and when this happens we cannot 
deny our inner defects or inner badness. However, these experiences can vary greatly, we can 
interpret them in different ways, and we can also react to them in different ways. First of all, 
patent sedition and patent ignorance can have very different scopes. They can concern some 
moment or question of our life that we regard as important, or they can concern something 
we deem irrelevant, and this determines their impact on us. In some cases, we may be greatly 
unsettled, because our ability to attain the good we desire is seriously limited or destroyed by 
these inner defects, while in others we will not be worried at all, and we will not think much 
about the matter. The former are thus the most significant cases for us. They render us 
patently miserable, and if we do not find a solution, they can lead us to reject our life. But this 
is not what normally happens. These problems tend to be easily overcome. The patent 
conflict between our drives is usually solved by the victory of one drive or by a change of 
circumstances. As for our ignorance (and especially the realization that we had false 
knowledge claims about something, which is what tends to unsettle us the most), it can also 
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be overcome by adopting new views or even by readopting one‟s old views. Thus, the patent 
badness of the soul may seem to be something that is in general not very relevant for us – and 
even when it is relevant, we seem to be more concerned with what results from it than with 
the inner badness itself. 
 Plato, however, calls our attention to the fact that this patent badness is indicative of a 
kind of badness that is usually latent. This is particularly clear in the case of patent seditions. 
According to Plato‟s description, our drives would not fight with each other if our love of 
knowledge happened to rule the soul. In the case of patent deformity, the matter is more 
complex. To be sure, it does not always presuppose latent badness. We may simply not know 
something and be aware of our ignorance. But this is not what usually disturbs us. We are 
particularly unsettled by the discovery of our false conceit of knowledge, and this discovery 
is only possible because the deformity of our soul was latent. Moreover, we tend only to 
notice a small part of our ignorance and our vain conceit of knowledge, although these 
experiences should make us wonder what else we do not know. Plato indeed calls attention to 
the way these patent self-disagreements may reveal something more important about us. 
 
5.2. The significance of the soul’s latent badness 
  
 What about the latent badness of the soul? Does it make one‟s life undesirable, and 
should it cause us to reject it? It constitutes a kind of latent misery, but one may still wonder 
whether latent badness and latent misery should be a matter of concern for us. If we become 
aware of them or if they manifest themselves in localized moments or questions, we may be 
disturbed by them and we may even come to regard our life as bad and miserable. But what 
happens when we are not aware of any of this? Should we bother with a badness and misery 
that are latent or hidden? Our inner being may seem healthy and shapely. Our motivations 
may seem harmonious and we may think we have a clear access to reality and a clear 
awareness of what matters in life. Moreover, our life as a whole may seem to be good, and 
we may have attained many things that we regard as good. Then why should we reject it? 
Assuming Plato is right, wouldn‟t it be acceptable (and perhaps even preferable) simply to 
avoid becoming aware of our latent badness and latent misery, and go on living as we do? It 
might be true that we would never accept psychic illness or psychic deformity if we were 




 Plato strongly denies this possibility. Being oblivious to our inner badness does not 
render our life good or desirable, and much less happy. This would actually be worse than 
realizing our inner defectiveness or inner badness, because it only increases it. The state of 
oblivious satisfaction or oblivious hope is therefore an intrinsically bad and undesirable state. 
The unexamined life is in itself not worth living, regardless of how we experience it or how 
we interpret it. We may or may not suffer fits or attacks of our latent illness and our latent 
deformity. Our badness may or may not reveal itself and disturb us. It may or may not cause 
suffering, loss, and dishonor. It may or may not keep us from what we think we desire. But 
none of this is the real problem. Our soul‟s latent illness and deformity are in themselves 
undesirable. They are a state of inner disagreement or self-contradiction. We do not attain 
what we desire and we are not who we think we are. We are in a state that is in itself 
miserable and pitiable. 
In this respect, the Platonic perspective follows a general trait of Greek culture. One‟s 
life is objectively good or bad, regardless of what one thinks of it. If we look at Sophocles‟ 
plays, we notice that Oedipus and Ajax are equally miserable and their lives are equally 
undesirable whether they know what they did and what their current state is or not. The 
tragedy of their situation does not lie solely in the eye of the beholder. It lies in this life itself 
and in the way it fails to satisfy its constitutive desire. This failure does not need to be seen 
by oneself or others in order for one‟s life to be miserable. The criterion is objective, given by 
life itself, and it is not affected by one‟s self-diagnosis and one‟s self-deception. Life may 
have a merely apparent value, but this is always referred to its true value and must get 
mistaken for it.  
The same pattern is found in the Platonic appraisal of the unexamined life. We saw 
that the unexamined life is characterized by constitutive badness, and this renders it worthless 
and miserable. Indeed, any soul that lives an unexamined life is ill and in a permanent state of 
sedition, insofar as its best drive, the one that is more fit to rule, is removed from power and 
subjugated to a less able drive that revolts against the proper state of the soul. This is a state 
of permanent inner injustice, and Plato endeavors to show that the problem with injustice is 
not only its consequences. Injustice is its own punishment, insofar as it shapes one‟s whole 
life and prevents it from being much better. Moreover, the unexamined life is also marked by 
a deep deformity or ignorance, which is heightened by the fact that we have no awareness of 
it. But our life is philosophical, we are directed at truth, we desire it, and we do not want to be 
deceived. We need knowledge, both to guide ourselves in life and simply for its own sake. 
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Consequently, our soul‟s latent deformity goes against our desire and against our constitution 
(θύζζξ). The vain conceit of knowledge is an extremely bad state, and it is actually better to 
be aware of one‟s own ignorance. In sum, latent illness and latent deformity (i.e., the vain 
conceit of knowledge) are intrinsically undesirable and much worse than any intense 
manifestation they may have.  
We can thus understand why Plato rejects all modalities of unexamined life. As we 
saw, they all have an unjust inner arrangement of drives and a completely distorted way of 
seeing things. To be sure, there can be many differences between them, and especially 
differences in the degree of injustice and of untruth that characterizes them. To this extent, 
there can also be degrees of misery, and some of them may be more easily “cured” and 
enlightened than others. Some may even be incurable, as we considered above.
2735
 However, 
this does not change the fact that they are all defective, they all fall short of what we desire, 
and they all prevent us from ever attaining it. None of them can satisfy our desire (namely, 
the ημῦ ὅθμο ἐπζεοιία ηαὶ δίςλζξ mentioned in the Symposium) and none of them can provide 
us a superlative good.
2736
 They can only give the appearance of doing so or of being able to 
do so. But we do not want an apparent good, as was said. We can only be happy if we attain 
the real good, and this depends essentially on the soul‟s justice and its education, as Socrates 
stresses in Gorgias.
2737
 Only with justice and knowledge can we fulfill our θύζζξ and lead a 
properly human life. Only then can we be fully free and fully what we are. 
 The criterion for the quality or worth of one‟s life is thus objective, and this appraisal 
requires an objective standpoint that is not affected by the illusions of the unexamined life. 
Such a standpoint is sometimes represented in the dialogues – and especially in the 
eschatological myths of Gorgias and the Republic – by the figure of a judge who is able to 
see the soul of someone and suitably decide whether it deserves punishment or rewards.
2738
 
But Plato himself tries to present such a standpoint by defining our inner constitution or 
θύζζξ. Thus, he is not simply referring to a standpoint that is external to our own (and as such 
apparently arbitrary). He is describing a possibility of transformation of our own     
standpoint – namely, the possibility of we coming to know ourselves. Moreover, what he tries 
to do (namely, to make an objective judgment about the value of our life) is something we are 
                                                 
2735
 Cp. Chap. 17, Sect. 5.1. 
2736
 See Smp. 192e-193a, and for the analysis of the whole passage, see Chap. 12, Sect. 4.2 above. 
2737
 See 470e: “[ΠΩΛ] δ῅θμκ δή, ὦ ΢ώηναηεξ, ὅηζ μ὎δὲ ηὸκ ιέβακ ααζζθέα βζβκώζηεζκ θήζεζξ ε὎δαίιμκα ὄκηα. 
[΢Ω] ηαὶ ἀθδε῅ βε ἐν῵· μ὎ βὰν μἶδα παζδείαξ ὅπςξ ἔπεζ ηαὶ δζηαζμζύκδξ. [ΠΩΛ] ηί δέ; ἐκ ημύηῳ ἟ π᾵ζα 
ε὎δαζιμκία ἐζηίκ; [΢Ω] ὥξ βε ἐβὼ θέβς, ὦ Π῵θε· ηὸκ ιὲκ βὰν ηαθὸκ ηαὶ ἀβαεὸκ ἄκδνα ηαὶ βοκα῔ηα ε὎δαίιμκα 
εἶκαί θδιζ, ηὸκ δὲ ἄδζημκ ηαὶ πμκδνὸκ ἄεθζμκ.” 
2738
 See Grg. 523b ff., and Rep. 614c. 
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always doing (or to be more precise, it is something we always think we are doing). This is a 
structural component of our life. Plato is simply revising the way we normally appraise it, 
and he is also saying that we would never gladly accept it if we were clearly aware of its true 
worth. At best, we would resign ourselves to living such a life, if we were absolutely 
convinced that there was no chance of attaining something better – i.e., no chance of attaining 
truth and the real superlative good.
2739
 However, we would not be able to fully extirpate our 
love of knowledge. Therefore, we would also be aware of the fact that this life is defective, 
and this would makes us wonder whether such a life really is good enough for us to go on 
living.  
 All this means that the soul‟s illness and its deformity can never be the real object of 
our desire. They are always undesirable and a form of misery – even if we do not notice them 
and they produce no noticeable bad effects. It is true that latent illness and latent deformity 
may not disturb us directly, but they are much worse than their manifestations (i.e., the 
different occurrences of patent illness and the patent deformity), and the fact that we do not 
notice them only makes us more miserable, and not less. Indeed, if we notice the problem we 
will already have strengthened our love of knowledge and decreased our ignorance 
(otherwise we would not be able to notice it). Moreover, noticing the problem is necessary 
for us to do something about it and try to solve it – i.e., try to cure us. As Epicurus 
supposedly said, “[i]nitium est salutis notitia peccati.”
2740
 Therefore, we have the greatest 
interest in rendering our latent badness as patent as possible, in the hope of correcting it – i.e., 
of strengthening our inborn θζθμζμθία and reducing the distortions of our way of seeing 
things.
2741
 This requires us to submit and even devote ourselves to philosophical examination, 
as we will discuss in the follow chapter. But before considering this in more detail, it is still 
important to consider one last time the basis of our natural resistance to such a diagnosis and 
how Plato tries to disarm it.  
 
5.3. The questionable basis of the unexamined life’s reaction to its own diagnosis 
 
 We made constant reference to the way we (i.e., human beings in general, who usually 
lead an unexamined life) react to these analyses. We tend to resist Plato‟s entire diagnosis and 
                                                 
2739
 We will consider this question in more detail below. See Chap. 20, Sect. 3.3 and 3.4. 
2740
 See fr. 522 in H. USENER (ed.), Epicurea, Leipzig, Teubner, 1887 (repr. Cambridge/etc., Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
2741
 For this idea of being better to render our badness manifest, cp. in particular Grg. 480a-d. 
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its implications, and Plato is very aware of this. In fact, he tries to disarm the prejudices or 
assumptions that cause us to resist such a characterization and appraisal. Let us then briefly 
see how he does this. 
 The main reason for resisting this diagnosis is precisely the fact that we normally do 
not examine ourselves. Thus, we tend do not notice any limitations or defects of the kind 
Plato is talking about, and it is even difficult for us to understand what he might be referring 
to. We tend to see his arguments as abstract or fallacious. If, however, we happen to catch a 
glimpse of what he is talking about, it will still be difficult for us to see the real magnitude of 
the problem – i.e., of our psychic illness and our psychic deformity. This illness and this 
deformity may be more obvious in some cases, but we become easily convinced that some of 
the lives that are not devoted to philosophical examination are already sufficiently guided by 
the love of knowledge and possess enough correct δόλαζ for them to attain what they desire. 
It is only a matter of trying to attain it or trying to preserve it. 
 Yet, when we look at the question from this angle, we are still being guided by our 
love of gain or our love of honor, and this is also what normally guides our appraisal of our 
life. We desire above all pleasure, wealth, victory or honor, and our life will be good or bad 
according to whether we attain it or not. Hence, we only regard psychic illness and psychic 
deformity as something that renders our life undesirable and miserable if they manifest 
themselves as something that blocks our pursuit of gain or honor, or as something that we see 
as the opposite of a gain and of honor – for instance, if they cause pain or dishonor. In this 
case, we will tend to regard patent badness as worse than latent badness, and the latter will 
seem insufficient for making us unhappy. Hence, it is very important to render our inner 
defects patent – although the Platonic corpus also shows how being faced with one‟s bad 
inner state is not sufficient to change our state and to cause us to abandon the unexamined 
life. Indeed, Socrates revealed Alcibiades how ignorant and slavish his soul was (as we see in 
Alcibiades I), he was convinced of this, and still (as he himself confesses in Symposium) he 
tried to avoid him and not to think about this, instead pursuing honors.
2742
  
 But there is more. Besides denouncing our love of gain and our love of honor as the 
causes of our resistance to his diagnosis of the unexamined or unphilosophical life, the 
Platonic corpus also directly criticizes these criteria, by arguing that they are not good criteria 
to decide the value of anything – and much less of our life in general. We saw many aspects 
of this above, especially in Chapters 15 and 16. By themselves, our love of gain and our love 
                                                 
2742
 Cp. 216b-c. 
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of honor are too imprecise and even blind. They can only guide our life and our perspective if 
they use our love of truth. In particular, we need knowledge to be aware of what gain and 
honor are, and to pursue them. Indeed, if we were to be guided exclusively by gain and 
honor, we would miss out on the greatest gains and the greatest honor. They are thus bad 
rulers and bad criteria to guide our appraisal of the unexamined life. 
 Still, we are sensitive to gain and honor, and we dislike pain and dishonor. This means 
that in some cases we may be tempted to avoid the pursuit of truth – especially if it causes us 
pain or shame, and seems to offer no truth and no superlative good in return. But this is a 
question to which we will have to return below, after considering what this diagnosis means 





The imperative of philosophical examination 
 
 
“(...) pereat mundus, fiat philosophia, fiat philosophus, fiam!...” 





After seeing in what sense the unexamined life can be considered “not worth living” 
or undesirable, we must now consider what seems to be the direct consequence of this harsh 
appraisal – namely, that we need to examine or, to be more precise, that we need to devote 
ourselves to philosophical examination. Socrates himself stressed this in the Apology, 
immediately before condemning the unexamined life, by saying that “this does happen to be 
the greatest good for a human being, to talk every day about excellence and the other things 
about which you hear me conversing and examining myself and others”.
2744
 It is indeed 
important to remember that Socrates‟ attack on the unexamined life is part of his own defense 
and the defense of his life. Socrates is trying to justify his devotion to philosophical 
examination, as well as his attempt to extend this examination to people around him. But this 
kind of argument is not exclusive of the Apology. Throughout the corpus, Socrates often tries 
to convince others to examine or to keep examining particular matters.
2745
 At some points, he 
even says that something must be examined. In other cases, he formulates it in a broader 
manner – for instance, by saying that we must philosophize or it is necessary to 
philosophize.
2746
 He also speaks of the need to examine or inquire things in general – and 
especially what we do not know.
2747
 These and other passages directly allude to a command, 
a prescription, or an “ought”, and they are not isolated moments in Plato‟s writings. The 
whole corpus tries to show that there is a sort of duty (as McPherran says) or an imperative to 
                                                 
2743
 See KSA 5, 351. 
2744
 See 38a: “(...) ἐάκη᾽ αὖ θέβς ὅηζ ηαὶ ηοβπάκεζ ιέβζζημκ ἀβαεὸκ ὂκ ἀκενώπῳ ημῦημ, ἑηάζηδξ ἟ιέναξ πενὶ 
ἀνεη῅ξ ημὺξ θόβμοξ πμζε῔ζεαζ ηαὶ η῵κ ἄθθςκ πενὶ ὧκ ὏ιε῔ξ ἐιμῦ ἀημύεηε δζαθεβμιέκμο ηαὶ ἐιαοηὸκ ηαὶ ἄθθμοξ 
ἐλεηάγμκημξ, ὁ δὲ ἀκελέηαζημξ αίμξ μ὎ αζςηὸξ ἀκενώπῳ (...).” The translation is mine.  
2745
 See e.g. Men. 96d (γδηδηέμκ) and Rep. 599a (ἐλεηαζηέμκ). 
2746
 See in particular Euthd. 275a (πνὴ θζθμζμθε῔κ), 282d (ἀκαβηα῔μκ εἶκαζ θζθμζμθε῔κ) and 288d 
(θζθμζμθδηέμκ). 
2747
 See e.g. Men. 86c: “(...) γδηδηέμκ πενὶ μὗ ιή ηζξ μἶδεκ (...)”. 
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examine, and that this duty or imperative is embedded in our own constitution or θύζζξ.
2748
 
To be sure, such a terminology may suggest models of morality from later authors that are 
not (or at least seem not to be) present in Plato‟s texts, but these terms are not supposed to be 
taken in such a strict and technical sense here. Their ordinary usage aptly expresses the fact 
that, according to Plato, philosophical examination is something required of us, something we 
need to do, although we are not inclined to do it. In fact, we strongly resist doing it. In other 
words, Plato‟s indications on the importance of philosophical examination are indications on 
how we should live, and even on how we should relate to others (in short, they are ethical in a 
broad sense of the word), but they are far from being obvious and easily accepted. Thus, 
Socrates and Plato are required to explain themselves and to show why we should examine. 
 This is what we must now consider. In order to do so, we will not direct our attention 
to the different texts and try to see how the need to examine is explained in each one. We will 
rather try to identify what results from the combination of the different relevant          
passages – i.e., we will try to see how the imperative of philosophical examination works and 
what is its basis according to the Platonic corpus. Moreover, we must consider what is 
contained in the imperative – in particular, the kind of examination it requires, the protreptic 
strategies it calls for, the way it determines our relation with others, and the need for 
effectiveness. All these aspects will allow us to better understand not only the role 
philosophical examination should play in our life, but also who we are – or, better still, who 
we should be. 
 
1. The conflict between a religious and a rational foundation of the imperative in the 
Apology 
 
 Before considering the general basis of the imperative of philosophical examination, it 
is important to consider a problem that emerges from the way Socrates presents the 
imperative in the Apology. There is indeed a tension between the personal experience that led 
Socrates to fully embrace philosophical examination – which is, among other things, a 
religious experience – and the conclusions he takes from this experience, which he presents 
as valid for all human beings. Since we took the Apology as our point of departure, we need 
to better understand the relation between the religious and the rational domains, and also how 
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this relation determines the imperative of philosophical examination. This will prepare us to 
consider the foundation of the imperative in the broader framework of the Platonic corpus. 
 Let us first consider the problem in more detail. During the whole Apology, Socrates 
tries to explain why he must examine himself and others. This is something he understood 
after learning about the oracle given by the God at Delphi. By declaring that no one is wiser 
than Socrates, the oracle ultimately validated Socrates‟ self-examination and, according to 
Socrates, ordered him to continue examining himself, as well as to extend philosophical 
examination to others.
2749
 In fact, he argues that his activity was “ordered by the god (...) both 
in oracles and in dreams and in every way in which any other divine dispensation has 
commanded a man to do anything at all” – and thus he stands in direct contrast with the 
youths that examine others simply because it is fun to refute them.
2750
 This description 
reminds us of the beginning of Phaedo, when Socrates says that throughout his life he was 
ordered by dreams to do ιμοζζηή (which here has the broad sense of devoting oneself to 
culture), and he regarded this as an order to do philosophy.
2751
 In sum, Socrates says he 
received divine instructions about the necessity of examining things, and in this sense his 
activity had (at least in his own eyes) an absolute or infallible basis. Indeed, he took god to be 
wise and not deceitful.
2752
 Hence, if the god ordered him to examine, this is what he should 
do.  
But what was really Socrates‟ motivation? Why did he examine himself and others? 
Was it simply because he was told to – and hence out of piety or respect for the god? Or was 
it because he understood (even if with the help of the god) that examining was the best thing 
to do? And what does this mean for other people? If Socrates examines because he was 
ordered to do so, it is not clear why others should examine, unless they were also ordered to 
do so. If, however, the oracle led him to understand the importance of philosophical 
examination, then we can see how this could also be valid for others, if they are in similar 
circumstances. Why does Socrates examine, then? And what does this mean for us? 
                                                 
2749
 See e.g. 28e: “(...) ημῦ δὲ εεμῦ ηάηημκημξ, ὡξ ἐβὼ ᾠήεδκ ηε ηαὶ ὏πέθααμκ, θζθμζμθμῦκηά ιε δε῔κ γ῅κ ηαὶ 
ἐλεηάγμκηα ἐιαοηὸκ ηαὶ ημὺξ ἄθθμοξ (...).” 
2750
 See 33c: “(...) ἀημύμκηεξ παίνμοζζκ ἐλεηαγμιέκμζξ ημ῔ξ μἰμιέκμζξ ιὲκ εἶκαζ ζμθμ῔ξ, μὖζζ δ᾽ μὔ. ἔζηζ βὰν μ὎η 
ἀδδέξ. ἐιμὶ δὲ ημῦημ, ὡξ ἐβώ θδιζ, πνμζηέηαηηαζ ὏πὸ ημῦ εεμῦ πνάηηεζκ ηαὶ ἐη ιακηείςκ ηαὶ ἐλ ἐκοπκίςκ ηαὶ 
πακηὶ ηνόπῳ ᾧπέν ηίξ πμηε ηαὶ ἄθθδ εεία ιμ῔να ἀκενώπῳ ηαὶ ὁηζμῦκ πνμζέηαλε πνάηηεζκ.” I follow Stokes‟ 
translation (M. STOKES, Plato Ŕ Apology of Socrates, Warminster, Aris & Phillips, 1997). 
2751
 See 60d-61a. Although Socrates does not say it explicitly, it is strongly suggested that he regarded this 
dream as having a divine origin. 
2752
 See 21b: “μ὎ βὰν δήπμο ρεύδεηαί βε· μ὎ βὰν εέιζξ α὎ηῶ.” 
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A full discussion of this question would require a consideration of how divinity (and 
especially the god at Delphi), religion and piety are understood both in Plato‟s Apology and 
throughout the corpus. However, that would take us too far afield, and therefore we will 
confine ourselves to a few brief remarks that are more directly relevant for our question.  
 It is true that we find in the Apology and in other works a tendency to accept certain 
aspects of traditional religion. However, the corpus treats religious matters as something that 
must also be rationally examined – i.e., Socratic and Platonic religion is a rational religion. 
Therefore, any signs given by the gods must be deciphered and rationally interpreted. This is 
also what happens in the Apology. Socrates is left perplexed with the oracle and is unable to 
understand its meaning. Consequently, he examines it by examining other people and their 
claims to wisdom, and this is how he comes to understand central aspects of human life, such 
as our false conceit of knowledge, our self-neglect, the drowsy state we find ourselves in, and 
our false semblance of happiness. Furthermore, he understands that the only way to 
counteract this bad state is by doing precisely what he did – to examine. This is precisely why 
everybody should examine. We can therefore see that rational insight is the ultimate basis for 
his devotion and for his attempts to convince others that they should examine. This insight 
can very well be separated from religious questions (even if both things are closely connected 
in the Apology and in other passages of Plato‟s writings), and everybody may understand it, 
even without having Socrates‟ religious experiences.  
 This is in keeping with what we saw in Part I above, where we tried to identify this 
insight. However, we also saw that Plato‟s arguments in the Apology were somewhat vague. 
Thus, we must now consider how the question is posed in the whole Platonic corpus. 
 
2. The complex basis of the imperative of philosophical examination and the ethical 
status of this imperative 
 
 Let us try to determine why, according to the Platonic corpus, we need to examine. As 
was said, we will not consider in detail all passages that argue about the need to examine, but 
we will try to identify the firmest basis for an imperative of philosophical examination. In 
order to do so, we will have to reconsider some of the analyses we previously made – in 
particular the analyses of the soul‟s desire, of the soul‟s relation to knowledge, and of the 





2.1. The need for the superlative good and for real happiness 
 
 The soul is constitutively marked by desire and it can only be happy if it satisfies this 
desire. But it is necessary to bear in mind that the soul does not simply desire something 
good. The soul wants something maximally or superlatively good, and this want can only be 
fulfilled if the soul attains such a good.
2753
 Otherwise, one will be miserable (even if there can 
be different degrees of misery, according to how distant one is from what one desires). It is 
true that we are normally not aware of having such an oversized desire. We tend to distract 
ourselves from this pursuit and we tend to settle for less – often thinking that we are leading a 
good life and that we are happy (or at least thinking we know what a good life is and how to 
attain it). But this does not mean we are ever truly settled. If something we recognize as 
better overall comes along, we accept it without hesitation, and the process can repeat itself 
innumerable times. This means that we only thought we were settled. Indeed, we may think 
we are happy, or at least that we are on our way to the satisfaction of our desires, but we may 
have (and in general we do have) a wrong understanding of what we desire. What we 
experience as the good (and perhaps even as the superlative good) is only a surrogate of the 
real superlative good. Hence, we cannot be really satisfied with it, since such a surrogate 
good is not what we really desire. 
This is the ultimate basis for the rejection of the unexamined life. As was shown, from 
Plato‟s perspective, the unexamined life is constitutively bad and miserable. It has an 
improper arrangement of drives, and it has a deeply distorted way of seeing things – and this 
is actually worse than having no inner arrangement at all or having no views, because the 
wrong arrangement and the wrong views actually move us further away from the good and 
prevent us from properly pursuing it. Thus, we cannot attain what we desire if we lead an 
unexamined life. In light of our desire for a superlative good, the unexamined life is 
undesirable and worthless, and if we become aware of what we truly desire, we will realize 
that it is so. Moreover, we will also become aware that we do not want to be deceived about 
this. We do not want to think we are happy – we want to be happy. Our relation to knowledge 
and reality is thus at the center of the rejection of the unexamined life and, consequently, of 
the imperative of philosophical examination. 
 
                                                 
2753
 For more on this, cp. Chap. 12 Sect. 4 above. 
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2.2. The need for knowledge and for a stronger philosophical drive 
 
 Our relation to the good clearly points to the fact that the soul is essentially 
characterized by its love of knowledge (θζθμζμθία). We saw above several passages in which 
Plato stresses that the soul does not want to be deceived, and that knowledge or truth is 
always good, whereas ignorance or untruth is always bad for the soul.
2754
 Therefore, one 
cannot really desire to be ignorant or to be falsely convinced of knowing something, since 
that would contradict the soul‟s inner structure. The soul desires knowledge and this renders 
knowledge good in itself. In other words, we do not just want to know for certain that 
something is the superlative good. The superlative good we desire must necessarily include 
truth, and truth is part of happiness. Inversely, not finding out the truth implies not attaining 
the good the soul desires. An ignorant soul is constitutively unhappy and a deceived soul 
(insofar as deception is an increased form of ignorance) is even more unhappy.  
 This means that our interest in knowledge and truth is not purely instrumental. We do 
not want knowledge and truth simply as means to pursue and attain a particular good that is 
independent from them (even if this is what is stressed in several passages of the corpus).
2755
 
Knowledge and truth are an essential part of the good we desire. This does not necessarily 
mean that our interest in them is purely contemplative or speculative – i.e., that all we want 
from life is to know the truth. Our constitutive relation to truth may include an active 
dimension, but that active dimension will have to be constitutively pervaded by knowledge or 
truth. Moreover, it is also not clear whether we need to know absolutely everything (i.e., the 
whole truth), or just the most important things (which would then require us to define the 
criterion according to which we can determine the value of the objects of knowledge). The 
corpus often points to the latter alternative, and it presents two criteria that may, to a certain 
extent, be reconciled: we need to know what is most relevant for our life and we need to 
know what is most true or most real.  
 In any case, truth is indispensable for us. This is the structure of our desire. We may 
be deceived and think we are happy without knowledge and truth, and we may unconsciously 
accept much ignorance and many deceptions, but our love of knowledge can never be fully 
extirpated, and this means that any cognitive defect is a form of inner contradiction. Indeed, 
cognitive defects stem from the weakness of one‟s love of knowledge, which surrenders the 
                                                 
2754
 Cp. Chap. 18 Sects. 3.2 and 4.2. 
2755
 Cp. e.g. Men. 88c: “[΢Ω.] μ὎ημῦκ ζοθθήαδδκ πάκηα ηὰ η῅ξ ροπ῅ξ ἐπζπεζνήιαηα ηαὶ ηανηενήιαηα 
἟βμοιέκδξ ιὲκ θνμκήζεςξ εἰξ ε὎δαζιμκίακ ηεθεοηᾶ, ἀθνμζύκδξ δ᾽ εἰξ ημ὎κακηίμκ; [ΜΔΝ.] ἔμζηεκ.” 
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control of the soul to other drives and lets them dictate how we see things. Hence, one fails to 
realize the soul‟s illness and its deformity. However, we are still directed at truth and we need 
to find it, which implies (since both things are intimately connected) strengthening our love 
of knowledge and changing our inner πμθζηεία. There is, therefore, an imperative of 
knowledge or truth in our soul, which is also an imperative of inner health (i.e., of inner order 
or inner justice, which corresponds to an inner πμθζηεία ruled by the love of knowledge). If 
we are to fulfill our soul‟s deepest longing and be happy, we need to pursue and attain 
knowledge, and we also need to pursue and possess the best inner arrangement of drives. 
Normally, however, we tend to resist doing so, especially because we are not aware of 
lacking truth and the best arrangement of drives. Hence, Plato tries to show us that we are 
marked by an imperative of knowledge and truth, which is also an imperative of being ruled 
by the philosophical drive. 
 
2.3. The need for philosophical examination 
 
 Speaking of an imperative of knowledge or an imperative of truth presupposes that 
knowledge and truth are not something we already possess and at our disposal. It is true that 
normally we think we already possess all the knowledge and all the truth we need – which 
makes speaking of an imperative somewhat strange. However, we saw in Chapters 7 and 16 
that the life almost all of us (if not all of us) lead – the unexamined life – is full of cognitive 
defects or distortion, and that there is even the possibility that we do not know anything at all. 
Thus, the imperative of knowledge is the imperative of something absent, something we lack, 
and this is decisive for our question. If we do not possess knowledge, we must seek it, and in 
order to seek knowledge we must examine. Indeed, philosophical examination is the best 
instrument we can use to pursue knowledge.
2756
 It is the basis of all real learning – at least 
with respect to the most important matters. Moreover, philosophical examination is also the 
way to exercise or strengthen our love of knowledge, thereby counteracting or weakening our 
other drives and changing both the inner πμθζηεία of the soul and the kind of life we live. But 
this is not all. As was said, normally we do not notice the soul‟s illness and its deformity. 
Despite all our false conceit of wisdom and being ruled by inferior drives, we think that we 
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 Even other experiences of truth mentioned by Plato, such as art, romantic love or religion, are intrinsically 




are living as we should. Hence, we must first realize the significant defects or the deep-lying 
badness of our soul – and this requires philosophical examination. 
 In sum, philosophical examination allows us to realize what we need and it also 
allows us to pursue and possibly attain it. This is why we need philosophical examination. 
The need for philosophical examination – or the imperative of philosophical examination – is 
based on our need for knowledge and, ultimately, on our need for happiness. Philosophical 
examination is conducive to happiness and indispensable for us to be happy. We need it in 
order to overcome the limitations of the unexamined life and thus render our life intrinsically 
valuable or desirable. Only by examining can we hope to satisfy or fulfill ourselves, and thus 
be truly happy. 
This certainly implies that philosophical examination has only an instrumental value, 
and to be able to examine is not – in the strict sense of the word – the greatest good, as 
Socrates expressly says in the Apology, and as is suggested by his description of the afterlife 
in the same text.
2757
 It would be better to be in such a state that one‟s philosophical drive is 
fully developed and one fully possesses the truth. This would probably imply the 
contemplation of the εἴδδ (and especially of the most important εἶδμξ), which seems to be 
what constitutes the happiness of philosophers, at least according to the Republic.
2758
 
Likewise, Diotima says in Symposium that human life is only worth living (if at all) when one 
is contemplating ηὸ ηαθόκ.
2759
 This does not necessarily exclude action. One may still try to 
generate something based on this knowledge.
2760
 In fact, one may even be required to engage 
in politics, although this limits one‟s ability to contemplate and is thus a limitation of one‟s 
happiness.
2761
 At any rate, the state of happiness clearly presupposes a fully successful 
examination. Philosophical examination in itself is not the absolute greatest good. It is only 
the best thing available to us at the moment, given our circumstances. If we are to have hope 
of finding the truth and being happy, we absolutely need to examine. Our real goal is thus 
something beyond philosophical examination, and the latter is just a promise of        
happiness – or the hope of happiness. It awakes us from our dream, it makes us aware of what 
we really lack, and it allows us to pursue it. In this sense, it renders our life less ἀαίςημξ and 
less miserable. However, within this framework, philosophical examination cannot be 
                                                 
2757
 See 38a and 40e-41c, and cp. also Chap. 3 Sects. 2 and 3.1 above. 
2758
 Cp. 498b-c and 519b-c. 
2759
 See 211d: “ἐκηαῦεα ημῦ αίμο, ὦ θίθε ΢ώηναηεξ, ἔθδ ἟ Μακηζκζηὴ λέκδ, εἴπεν πμο ἄθθμεζ, αζςηὸκ ἀκενώπῳ, 
εεςιέκῳ α὎ηὸ ηὸ ηαθόκ.” 
2760
 See Smp. 212a, where Diotima says that at that point we will give birth to true excellence. Cp. also 206c ff., 
where Diotima explains that all living beings are pregnant and need to give birth to something. 
2761
 For more on this, cp. Sect. 5.2 below, as well as Chap. 12 Sect. 6.2. 
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conceived as an end in itself, because that would imply severing our relation to what we 
actually desire. We would never be able to say, like Lessing, that we are not interested in the 
truth, but only in its pursuit.
2762
 The meaning of the pursuit is intrinsically referred to 
possession of what we pursue. 
 
2.4. The ethical or moral status of the imperative of philosophical examination 
 
 The question of our relation to philosophical examination is clearly an ethical 
question, as is stressed by the very notion of “imperative.” It directly concerns how we 
should act or behave, and even how we should live. We should not accept the state we are in, 
but we should care for ourselves, try to improve ourselves, and this requires above all 
philosophical examination. The imperative of philosophical examination thus determines our 
relation to ourselves – and, as we will see below, it also determines how we should relate to 
others, or how and why we should care for them.
2763
 The ethical meaning of these reflections 
is therefore undeniable.  
But what is the status of this imperative? It was shown that is not simply an external 
commandment that one must follow blindly. It is something we can identify and justify 
rationally. But what kind of imperativeness is here implied? To borrow Kant‟s terminology 
(though employing it in a looser sense), is this a sort of categorical imperative (i.e., 
something required only for its own sake) or is it a hypothetical imperative (i.e., something 
we must do for the sake of something else)?
2764
 
In a way, the need to examine is based on our own constitution or θύζζξ, and we could 
therefore say it is objectively required. However, it is at the same time based on our          
self-interest and on what we want to attain. To be more precise, we need to examine because 
                                                 
2762
 See G. LESSING, Eine Duplik, in: IDEM, Werke und Briefe, edited by W. Barner et al., vol. 8, Frankfurt, 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, 510: “Nicht die Wahrheit, in deren Besitz irgend ein Mensch ist, oder zu sein 
vermeinet, sondern die aufrichtige Mühe, die er angewandt hat, hinter die Wahrheit zu kommen, macht den 
Wert des Menschen. Denn nicht durch den Besitz, sondern durch die Nachforschung der Wahrheit erweitern 
sich seine Kräfte, worin allein seine immer wachsende Vollkommenheit bestehet. Der Besitz macht ruhig, träge, 
stolz -     Wenn Gott in seiner Rechten alle Wahrheit, und in seiner Linken den einzigen immer regen Trieb nach 
Wahrheit, obschon mit dem Zusatze, mich immer und ewig zu irren, verschlossen hielte, und spräche zu mir: 
wähle! Ich fiele ihm mit Demut in seine Linke und sagte: Vater gib! Die reine Wahrheit ist ja doch nur für dich 
allein!” 
2763
 See Sect. 5 below. 
2764
 Cp. e.g. I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in: IDEM, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4, Berlin, 
Georg Reimer, 1903, 414: “Alle Imperativen nun gebieten entweder hypothetisch, oder kategorisch. Jene stellen 
die praktische Notwendigkeit einer möglichen Handlung als Mittel, zu etwas anderem, was man will (oder doch 
möglich ist, daß man es wolle), zu gelangen, vor. Der kategorische Imperativ würde der sein, welcher eine 
Handlung als für sich selbst, ohne Beziehung auf einen andern Zweck, als objektiv-notwendig vorstellte.”  
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we need knowledge or truth (along with the inner arrangement of drives that allows us to 
attain knowledge or truth), and also because we need the superlative good, which includes or 
requires truth. Philosophical examination is above all an instrument to attain truth and the 
good, and this means that the imperative of philosophical examination is hypothetical. 
This would become particularly clear if we were to attain knowledge or truth. At that 
point, we would not need to examine any longer. In fact, we would probably realize what we 
must truly do in life, and thus the ethics of philosophical examination would be replaced by 
the ethics of truth. The former is indeed a sort of provisional ethics or a second-order ethics, 
and it shows us what to do until we reach the truth, which will then dictate a first-order ethics. 
This is the formal model that pervades the corpus and it is also what accounts for Socrates 
strong moral convictions, despite his lack of knowledge. His devotion to philosophical 
examination is precisely the necessary result of his lack of knowledge, but not yet a full-
blown knowledge of things and of what we should ultimately do in life. 
In this context, it is also important to briefly consider the question of whether and in 
what sense not following the imperative may render us morally reproachable. As we saw 
above, we are to blame for adopting the unexamined life – or, to be more precisely, our 
inborn θζθμζμθία determines itself and thus determines whether or not we examine. But this 
is not an act like our other acts, and we do not fully control it. On the contrary, we ourselves 
are the result of this act and in a way it controls us. Thus, we are not guilty of not following 
the imperative in the sense in which we normally talk of guilt. It is rather a question of being 
intrinsically bad (i.e., having a bad love of knowledge, that does not determine itself to fully 
examine things). The decision happens ultimately at the depths of our being, though it affects 
our entire life. However, this also means that examining or not depends solely on our inner 
being, and if the latter is good (i.e., if it determines itself to be good), we may also do the 
right thing and live the right way.  
 
3. The kind of examination required by the imperative and the difficulties it entails 
 
 We have shown that there is some need for philosophical examination, but we have 
not yet determined exactly what kind of philosophical examination is required by the 
imperative. This opens the door to a defective understanding of what this need entails. To be 
more precise, we may have a naive conception of the commitment, range and methodology of 
examination required. There can indeed be many ways of philosophizing. The history of 
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philosophy offers us many possibilities, and the kind of philosophical examination we 
outlined in Part II is just one among them. So we must consider what indications on this 
matter are given by the arguments above mentioned or what kind of requirements can be 
inferred from the structure of the imperative of philosophical examination – i.e., we must see 
(even if only in a brief manner) whether or not the structure of our life requires an 
examination as complex as the one described in Part II. 
 
3.1. The insufficiency of the modalities of examination found in the unexamined 
life 
 
 We considered above that the unexamined life admits many forms of ordinary 
examination. We may think about many things, especially if we do not know exactly how to 
pursue our goals. To be more precise, our ruling drive often examines in order to better attain 
pleasure or honor, and it can easily recognize the usefulness of philosophy and philosophical 
examination – though it will also strongly limit one‟s dedication to this examination. One 
may thus dabble in philosophy in one‟s youth, but this will go only up to a point, as Callicles 
says it should be.
2765
 One may also develop elaborate forms of empirical knowledge (such as 
the forms of ἐιπεζνία or ηνζαή mentioned in Gorgias), but only in order to better attain one‟s 
non-philosophical goals.
2766
 Finally, one may even devote oneself to philosophical 
examination, but in an inauthentic manner – i.e., while one is still guided by one‟s love of 




 All these forms of examination are thus limited or defective, and to a certain extent 
they are no different from performing no examination at all. In other words, a partially 
examined life is still a form of unexamined life. It employs some examination and this 
examination may allow us to improve our life (or at least think we have improved it), it may 
even give rise to a more genuine form of examination in some cases, but in general things 
stay fundamentally the same. These unexamined forms of examination are not enough to 
strengthen and empower our philosophical drive, and hence they do not allow philosophical 
examination to attain what is required by the imperative – namely, truth and the superlative 
good.  
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 See Grg. 484c ff. 
2766
 See Grg. 463a ff. 
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3.2. The commitment required by the imperative 
 
 Let us then consider the kind of examination that is required by the imperative. One 
central aspect of this examination is our mode of relation to it. Indeed, examining things in 
the proper manner requires a certain inner disposition. In particular, our love of knowledge 
cannot be weak and ruled by other drives. It must start developing, and it must be trained, in 
order to become strong and come to rule the soul – thereby rendering the soul less ill. At the 
same time, the other drives must also grow weaker, which means that we must abstain from 
their objects of desire. In other words, we need to have leisure (ζπμθή) from all other pursuits 
(such as the pursuit of necessary things, of appetites, and of honor) and pay attention only to 
philosophical examination. This will become – as much as possible – our only occupation or 
ἀζπμθία, we will spend all our time examining, and this will be all that matters. We will lead 
a philosophical life and everything will be determined according to whether or not we know 
it, or whether or not it helps us to know other things. Only when this happens will 
philosophical examination be completely free from the rule and the practical goals of the 
other drives, as well as from the distortion caused by them. One will be guided solely by the 
pursuit of knowledge and by the knowledge one finds.  
 Such a state is not attained immediately, though. The dedication to philosophical 
examination requires several stages of development. At first, one will probably be unable to 
start or continue examining things by oneself. One will be mostly passive and need to be 
examined by others. Then, after much practice, one will become more able to guide the 
examination. But even this is not enough. More than knowing what to do, one must desire to 
do it. This requires one to realize how ignorant one is, how much one needs to attain 
knowledge, and how that is much more important than our other pursuits. Thus, one cannot 
immediately follow the imperative, at least not entirely. One can start examining things 
philosophically, but this is a long process – and one will be constantly tempted to give up and 
follow other interests and their views.  
 
3.3. The range and methodology of examination required by the imperative  
 
 The mode of relation to philosophical examination is not the only thing determined by 
the imperative. The latter also outlines the scope of the examination. Indeed, we could think 
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that the examination concerns only some matters – especially what we should do in life and 
what our immediate situation is. However, even these matters can be very complex, and we 
saw above that our beliefs are intrinsically intertwined and constitute an extremely complex 
system. Hence, we cannot simply examine some practical questions and leave others 
completely untouched, because they affect each other in a decisive manner. This is 
particularly true of the εἴδδ, which determine the way we see everything else (including what 
we should do in life). Moreover, the εἴδδ themselves relate to each other in a complex 
manner and some of them are also more fundamental than others. Plato even admits a sort of 
first principle.
2768
 Consequently, even if we do not need to examine absolutely everything 
(for instance, it may not be necessary to know all the details of particular beings), we will 
need to consider many questions in order to decide any particular one (including whether or 
not something is irrelevant for us). In other words, the imperative demands us to perform an 
extraordinarily vast examination, and this is another reason why we need to have leisure 
(ζπμθή) from other occupations. 
 It is also important to bear in mind the fact that we cannot simply start examining 
things as if it was absolutely obvious what we have to examine. Examination requires θόβμξ, 
which renders matters clear and discusses them rationally. However, most of our beliefs are 
tacit, as was shown above, and we need to make a significant effort to identify them and 
render them explicit.
2769
 Furthermore, we will have to put them to the test and see if they 
withstand scrutiny. If they do not (which will often be the case), we will have to expel them 
from our soul, and then we will have to seek out the truth about things. The latter task implies 
methods such as the ones we described in Chapter 9 – especially the hypothetical method, 
which may allow us to identify more plausible views and use them to make progress in our 
search for the truth. But this will not be enough, since we actually need to attain truth and the 
superlative good. The problem, then, is whether we can really bring the whole process of 
examination to its end. As was already mentioned, a good outcome seems necessary for 
philosophical examination to make sense. We must acquire knowledge and our life must 
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 For more on the complex intertwinement of our beliefs, cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 2. 
2769
 Cp. Chap. 6, Sect. 1. 
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3.4. The difficulties entailed in the imperative of philosophical examination 
 
 From what was just said, we start to understand the extraordinary demands that the 
imperative of philosophical examination places on us. The active pursuit of truth and of the 
superlative good requires many sacrifices and risks. It is, however, very difficult to abandon 
the unexamined life, its priorities and its beliefs. We may try, but we continue to be disturbed 
by the other drives and their views.
2770
 We must insist, in order to gradually reshape our inner 
πμθζηεία and our life. At the same time, we must identify many views, examine them, and 
reformulate them. This requires an extremely long process. As Plato portrays it, we will be 
lost at sea, roaming about, and being blown by the wind from one place to the other.
2771
 To 
put it differently, philosophical examination is a labyrinth and – as we will see in the 
following chapter – it is not even clear whether we can ever exit it.
2772
 The difficulty of what 
is required of us is extreme, and it is not clear whether anyone was ever able to fully carry out 
such a project (i.e., whether anyone ever attained full inner health and full inner shapeliness).  
But fully carrying out the examination is not the only problem. It is also very difficult 
to start examining, and – as was shown – this is not immediately under our control. Our love 
of knowledge must determine itself to be more demanding – and it is not clear how this 
happens. Moreover, we will be constantly tempted to return to the unexamined life. Indeed, 
philosophical examination may require us to suffer greatly or be shamed by others, and at that 
point the other drives will press us to abandon the examination. We will also be discouraged 
by the difficulty in seeing things clearly – as the prisoner in the cave, who is dazzled by the 
excess of light when he turns around, and feels inclined to return to his place and believe that 
his previous views were true and that reality was as he saw it.
2773
 In sum, any attempt to 




                                                 
2770
 Cp. e.g. Phd. 66d-67b. 
2771
 Plato constantly uses these images when referring to philosophical examination. Cp. Chap. 4, Sect. 2.4 
above. This brings to mind all the hardships involved in Odysseus‟ travels, as well as Odysseus‟ own words 
about wandering about, which stress how difficult it is to endure this state. See HOMER, Odyssey, XV.343: 
“πθαβηημζύκδξ δ᾽ μ὎η ἔζηζ ηαηώηενμκ ἄθθμ ανμημ῔ζζκ (...).”  
2772
 For the idea of labyrinth, cp. Euthd. 291b. 
2773
 See Rep. 515e. 
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4. How to convince someone of the imperative. Plato’s protreptic strategies and the 
question of their effectiveness 
 
After considering why we need to devote ourselves to philosophical examination and 
how difficult it is to do so, we must now consider the question of how the imperative can be 
communicated to someone that is not yet following it – and, more specifically, we have to 
consider how this imperative is communicated in the Platonic corpus. Indeed, the situations 
portrayed in the corpus usually have a protreptic character, and the corpus itself tries to “turn” 
(i.e., to urge, incite or convert – πνμηνέπεζκ) its readers to philosophical examination, and 
thus change their life. In other words, the corpus has a strong rhetoric component, insofar as 
it tries to convince us of the importance of philosophical examination. But this does not mean 
that the corpus simply presents the arguments we considered above. In fact, Plato employs 
several different protreptic strategies, and the arguments we identified are just one of them. 
We will not be able to consider here all questions associated with Plato‟s protreptic, but it is 
important to see at least some aspects of the relation between Plato‟s arguments for the 
importance of philosophical examination and the other protreptic strategies of the Platonic 
corpus, because that will let us better understand Plato‟s presentation of these arguments.
2774
   
 
4.1. The different protreptic strategies of the corpus  
 
The whole corpus seems to be meant as an attempt to convince people to examine 
things. In fact, these writings may have been written with the intention of recruiting students, 
affecting society in general, or simply as manual for students, in order to prepare them for 
more advanced doctrines. But regardless of the real intentions behind them, the texts 
showcase a complex set of protreptic techniques, which constitute a complex ηέπκδ 
πνμηνεπηζηή – and this is what we will now try to identify. 
 First of all, it is important to consider that Plato‟s strategies are not as direct as, for 
instance, what we find in the fragments of Aristotle‟s Protreptics, which present a series of 
arguments of why we should devote ourselves to philosophy.
2775
 It is true that Plato also 
                                                 
2774
 There are several important studies on the matter. See e.g. K. GAISER, Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon. 
Untersuchungen zur Form des platonischen Dialogs, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1959; S. SLINGS (ed.),           
Plato Ŕ Clitophon. Cambridge, University Press, 1999; J. COLLINS II, Exhortations to Philosophy. The 
Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle, Oxford/etc., Oxford University Press, 2015. 
2775
 See e.g. I. DÜRING (ed.), Aristotle’s Protrepticus. An Attempt at Reconstruction, Stockholm/etc., Almqvist 
& Wiksell, 1961. 
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presents arguments for the need to examine – both direct and indirect.
2776
 But Plato also 
depicts many situations in which someone (usually Socrates) tries to make other people feel 
the need to examine things without fully explaining why they should do so. In fact, by 
refuting others and showing them their ignorance, Socrates (as well as the other characters 
that perform a similar role) is also trying to convince them to continue the examination. 
Socrates may then add some reflections about what is happening and what they need to do, 
but usually these reflections are brief and superficial.  
 It is true that there are also many passages in which Socrates and the other main 
interlocutors present arguments to convince others to examine. However, these arguments 
vary greatly. Some of them are closely associated with images of the philosopher or of the 
unphilosophical life, in order to show the glamour of the former and the repellant character of 
the latter. The myths in particular often portray philosophers as having the best life and, 
especially, the best destiny after death.
2777
 Indeed, Plato often uses contrasts to show the 
importance of philosophical examination, and he also explicitly opposes philosophy to other 
cultural practices, such as poetry or sophistry, which he strongly criticizes. 
Some dialogues, such as Alcibiades I and Euthydemus, have a more explicit protreptic 
nature – and they include both a series of acts and a series of arguments to convince others to 
examine. But there are many other passages that present more elaborate arguments on why 
we should examine. Many of these arguments seem to be specifically directed to the 
interlocutor and his interests, since they argue that examining things will bring either much 
gain or much honor.
2778
 There are also some arguments that seem to be more straightforward 
and come closer to what we discussed above. This happens especially in those situations in 
which Socrates must justify himself or his views (such as in the Apology, in Phaedo, and in 
the Republic). In these cases, he tends to consider our inner constitution, in order to show 
why we need to devote ourselves to philosophical examination.   
 This is what we find at the level of the conversations portrayed by Plato. In addition, 
some of the literary devices employed by Plato to depict these conversations have themselves 
                                                 
2776
 Indeed, Plato employs not only an explicit protreptics, but also an implicit protreptics, to use S. Slings‟ 
distinction. Slings says: “Any argument, description of behavior, apology, myth or other type of philosophical 
text can be designed to cause its readers or characters to change their moral conduct or to pursue philosophy. I 
call „explicit protreptic‟ all texts which purport to state, prove or convince by other methods that one must adopt 
a certain line of behavior or pursue philosophy; all texts which have a similar intention but in which these aims 
are achieved indirectly will be called „implicit protreptic‟.” Later, when discussing an example, he clarifies what 
this indirectness consists in by saying: “the conclusion that philosophy is necessary in order to obtain happiness 
is here left to the reader.” See S. SLINGS, Plato Ŕ Clitophon. Cambridge, University Press, 1999, 61f.  
2777
 See e.g. Grg. 526c and Rep. 619d-e. 
2778
 See e.g. Prt. 351b ff. and the entire Alcibiades I. 
837 
 
a protreptic character (regardless of how aware of this Plato was). For instance, the way he 
portrays Socrates‟ character and presents him as a kind of a hero is very alluring and easily 
motivates us to try to imitate Socrates‟ example. Moreover, the fact that Plato shows Socrates 
in different phases of his life (and especially as an immature philosopher) helps us understand 
that the figure of Socrates is not an unattainable ideal, but rather a possibility of ours that we 
can attain if we put as much effort into it as he did. But we do not identify only with Socrates 
when we are reading the dialogues. We may easily see much of us in the other characters, and 
when their views are refuted, we may be surprised and forced to question any similar views 
we may have. In addition, the very structure of the arguments presented throughout the 
corpus has a provocative nature. We have already considered this.
2779
 We saw that, among 
other things, the language used is ambiguous, the arguments are full of fallacies, and often 
passages of the same dialogue or of different dialogues directly contradict each other. This, 
along with the fact that we do not know what exactly the character Socrates (and much less 
the author Plato) thought, forces us to be very attentive to everything that is said and to 
double-check everything. In other words, these and other features of the corpus force us to 
examine the texts (and consequently ourselves) much more than what we would normally do 
while we read a philosophical text. 
 The explicit and implicit arguments for the need of examining things are thus just a 
part of this complex network of protreptic strategies. All these strategies help us readers 
understand the importance of philosophical examination, and they also help us start and 
continue examining – i.e., they let us train our philosophical ability and develop our 
philosophical drive. As a result, we will be better able to understand the more complex 
arguments that are presented in the corpus, or the arguments that we can infer from it by 
comparing the different passages and thinking about their meaning. Indeed, in order to 
understand arguments such as the ones we considered above, we need to already have had 
much philosophical training, and at that point we may also examine these arguments and see 
their possible weaknesses (as we will try to do in the following chapter). 
 
4.2. The factors that condition the effectiveness of Plato’s protreptic strategies 
 
 All these strategies raise the question of their effectiveness – both in the dramatic 
situations portrayed in the corpus, and over us as readers. We must therefore consider 
                                                 
2779
 See Sect. 4.1 of Introduction. 
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whether they are really able to convince us that we need to devote ourselves to philosophical 
examination, and also whether they are all equally effective. The question is difficult, because 
this effectiveness may be influenced by many different factors. Still there are a few general 
remarks we can make, especially in light of what we saw in Chapter 17, when we discussed 
what is the ultimate responsible for our adoption of an unexamined life. We saw that 
philosophical examination, the growth of our love of knowledge (θζθμζμθία), and the 
adoption of a philosophical life cannot be forced from the outside. It depends on the way our 
own inborn θζθμζμθία determines itself, and this self-determination is what may allow us to 
listen to others, follow what they say, think about it, and perhaps notice our ignorance and the 
need to examine further. Consequently, the effectiveness of protreptic strategies is always 
limited, and this may even suggest that they have no effectiveness at all, since it all depends 
on what happens at the depths of our being.  
 However, the central role of our θζθμζμθία‟s self-determination does not mean that 
protreptic strategies are totally irrelevant, because they may still facilitate or help another 
soul‟s self-determination. Thus, the question of their effectiveness concern their ability to 
help someone turn to philosophical examination – and in this respect it is important to note 
that the different strategies do not all have the same effectiveness. Indeed, if characters (and 
we ourselves as readers) do not already have a sufficiently strong love of knowledge, abstract 
arguments about the need to examine tend not to be accepted or even understood. This is 
directly related to Plato‟s criticism of the written word and its ability to communicate 
complex ideas.
2780
 If one is not prepared to understand the arguments, one will have a 
distorted access to them and, as a result, one will easily attack them. In the case of writings, 
this will almost certainly happen, because they are not able to defend themselves. It is only in 
conversation that one can apply other techniques. But what are these other techniques?  
The dialogues show us that direct strategies (such as teaching, arguing, advising or 
chastising) tend not to be very effective. Indirect strategies are actually preferable – in 
particular, trying to submit someone else to philosophical examination without exhaustively 
arguing for the need to do so. If others accept the examination and are able to follow it, then 
it is possible to reveal their ignorance and produce an internal crisis. It all depends on 
whether the examination is done properly (without simply trying to refute the others at all 
costs) and on whether the examinees realize that their inability to answer is their own fault 
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 For more on this criticism and for bibliographical references, see the end of Section 4.1 of Introduction. 
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and not the fault of the examiner.
2781
 If this happens, the examinees (be they characters in the 
dialogues or readers who are led to examine what they are reading) will hate themselves and 
try to change. Of course, the extent of this crisis will vary according to the importance of the 
views under scrutiny. Hence, it is important to attack the most fundamental views (i.e., our 
basic assumptions or ὏πμεέζεζξ) – and especially the views that guide our life. This will make 
us feel a strong need for further examination, and it will also allow us to better understand the 
arguments that show that we should devote ourselves to philosophical examination. 
Yet, this is still not sufficient to ensure that one will adopt a philosophical life – and 
the Platonic corpus considers two ways the process can go wrong. First, it is possible to attain 
only a superficial understanding of what philosophical examination consists in, and as a result 
one will do a bad or superficial imitation of it. In particular, one will gladly refute others and 
oneself, and this may ultimately lead to misology, skepticism, or a sort of nihilism, as Plato 
warns.
2782
 Second, we may follow the example of Alcibiades. He was submitted to much 
examination (as is shown in Alcibiades I) and he realized the bad state he was in. He was also 
fascinated with Socrates and his θόβμζ, as he himself confesses in Symposium. However, he 
was still internally divided and this led him to run away from Socrates and from 




 These possibilities show how important it is to exercise and fortify one‟s love of 
knowledge, in order to avoid a superficial understanding of what one is doing. If one 
examines sufficiently, one will then be able to understand the arguments that show why we 
should examine, and these arguments may then guide one‟s activity. One will be able to 
understand how and why one should examine. It is true that this does not yet guarantee that 
one will live a philosophical life (since the other drives may still resist or grow back again), 
but at least it will make it easier for that to happen. 
 
5. The relation with others in the framework of the imperative of philosophical 
examination 
 
 The question of the protreptic character of the corpus and of the different ways of 
trying to exhort others to philosophy is closely associated with another important question. 
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 Cp. e.g. Tht. 167d-168b. 
2782
 See in particular Rep. 538d ff. 
2783
 See 215d-216b. 
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We saw that the imperative of philosophical examination gives us a clear indication of how 
we should live and what we should do. In order to attain the superlative good, we must care 
for ourselves, and we do so by examining our beliefs. However, this indication concerns only 
one‟s own life, and it may therefore seem to be self-centered and egoistic. One will care for 
oneself, and apparently nothing else will matter. However, we are surrounded by many others 
and we interact with them. In fact, we may interact with others in different ways, and this 
may have different effects on their life. We may harm them, we may benefit them, or we may 
leave them as they were. But this is not simple, because we may for instance set out to harm 
them and actually benefit them, or we may appear to be benefitting others when we are 
actually harming them. The latter is the case of what Plato calls adulation (ημθαηεία), which 
stands in contrast with the proper care of others – i.e., with a care that properly benefits or 
improves them. But this is not all. We deal with many individuals, and we may also engage 
politically and affect the whole political community in some way. There are, therefore, many 
possibilities of interaction with others. But what results from the imperative of philosophical 
examination with respect to this question? How does the imperative affect or determine our 
individual relation to others and what might it require from us in political terms? The Platonic 
corpus gives many indications about these questions, and this is what we must now briefly 
consider. 
 
5.1. The problem of whether we should try to persuade others to examine 
 
 We saw that the unexamined life is constitutively bad and undesirable, and because 
we want to be happy, we must examine ourselves. Since we all have a similar constitution or 
θύζζξ, this applies to everybody. Thus, if some of us realize their own deficiencies and adopt 
philosophical examination, they will be faced with the fact that others have similar 
deficiencies, and should likewise devote themselves to philosophical examination in order to 
attain what they desire. Assuming that this whole diagnosis is correct, should one then try to 
submit others to philosophical examination or try to convince them to examine? Is the 
imperative of philosophical examination associated with an imperative to intervene and try to 
change other people‟s lives? What would be the exact foundation for such an imperative? 
And what would its scope be? Would it be restricted only to a group of people (such as those 
closest to us, or the most talented people)? Or would it require us to try to extent 
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philosophical examination to everybody in our political community, or even the whole of 
humanity? 
 These are difficult questions, and a satisfactory answer to them would require us to 
consider what our motivation to help others can be – especially in a context in which we 
recognize philosophical examination and knowledge as fundamental goods. If we look at the 
Platonic corpus, it seems that we can have several motivations to lead others to philosophical 
examination. First, we may be moved by self-interest. Others may indeed help us examine, 
and thus they may help us attain truth and be happy.
2784
 Second, we may be moved by 
benevolence (εὔκμζα) or compassion (ἔθεμξ).
2785
 It is true that in many cases our benevolence 
or compassion may still be conciliated with our self-interest.
2786
 However, it may also require 
us to sacrifice our own good for the good of others. Third, we could try to help others because 
we owe them something.
2787
 Fourth and finally, we could discover by examination that 
helping others is what we must objectively do – i.e., it is a sort of duty. This duty could be 
based on anthropological, political, cosmic, religious, or even eidetic considerations (and the 
dialogues seem to point in all these different directions).  
All these possibilities are somehow suggested in the Platonic corpus, and we would 
have to examine them in full detail in order to decide if and to what extent we should try to 
lead others to examine themselves. We will not be able to enter into this question here, but it 
seems at any rate clear that the imperative of philosophical examination may require us to 
intervene in other people‟s lives.  
If this is the case, there are still other problems we must consider. For instance, we 
may wonder how effective our intervention must be. Must we really convince others to 
examine, or is it only important for us to try? And how far may we go when trying to 
convince them? Should we try to release them at all costs, employing all methods (including 
more violent ones), or are there limits? And what if the others resist, become aggressive, and 
try to get rid of us? Should we go as far as Socrates and die trying to examine them? What if 
this attempt conflicts with one‟s own pursuit of the good (for instance, by causing our death 
before we find the truth)? 
These are all complicated questions, and we must examine them very carefully in 
order to determine our behavior towards others. This is, indeed, the most direct indication 
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given by the imperative of philosophical examination: we must examine our relation to 
others. 
 
5.2. The problem of whether the philosopher should enter politics 
 
 A problem closely connected with this one concerns the relation between the 
imperative of philosophical examination and one‟s political engagement. Does the imperative 
exclude political engagement (insofar as it does not directly increase one‟s knowledge), or is 
one still required (and perhaps even more required) to partake in politics if one embraces 
philosophical examination? Is the imperative of philosophical examination associated with an 
imperative of political action?  
 In this respect, the corpus is once more ambiguous. On one hand, some passages 
suggest that one should live a quiet life, and devote oneself to contemplation. This is 
particularly clear in Theaetetus. One will contemplate the whole cosmos, and pay no attention 
to what happens in the πόθζξ.
2788
 On the other hand, we also find the idea of being engaged in 
the πόθζξ, as well as the discussions about what true politics consists in. In some passages, 
Socrates suggests that true politics is to submit others to philosophical examination and to try 
to improve them.
2789
 Thus, one would improve all or at least those that are more able to 
govern. In other texts (and especially in the Republic), Plato defends that philosophers should 
rule the πόθζξ – which is indeed an outrageous idea, insofar as philosophers seem useless and 
blind to more immediate practical matters.
2790
 However, Plato defends politics should be 
based on knowledge, and the only way to attain it is by devoting oneself to philosophical 
examination. Those that examine should then abdicate from the contemplation of truth and 
govern the political community. This of course presupposes that these philosophers have 
already found the truth and can guide themselves by it. Otherwise, they would not be 
qualified to govern.  
But what could be the motivations for governing one‟s political                   
community, especially given the fact that one would have to abdicate from what seems to 
constitute happiness – namely, the contemplation of truth? The Republic gives several 
indications, which are similar to those we considered in the previous subsection. One could 
accept to rule out of self-interest, because one is more qualified to rule than others and does 
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 See 172c ff. 
2789
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not want to suffer the consequences of being ruled by those less qualified.
2791
 One could do it 
out of benevolence or compassion, because one saw that others need help.
2792
 It could be out 
of gratitude, because one‟s philosophical development and one‟s contemplation was only 
possible thanks to others, and now it is time to give something in return.
2793
 Finally, it could 
also be a sort of duty (for instance, insofar as it is the just thing to do) – i.e., it may be 
something required by one‟s constitution or by the structure of reality.
2794
 
But this is not all. The imperative to rule raises several other questions. For instance, 
must one really become the ruler of the political community, or is it sufficient to try to do so 
– i.e., try to convince others that ruling should be based on knowledge and that one should 
rule them? And how much effort should one put into trying to become the ruler? If the others 
resist, should one fight for control? These questions are never raised in the Republic, because 
the existence of a philosophical state is already presupposed, but in other states the question 
becomes relevant. Furthermore, it is important to always bear in mind that this imperative 
only applies if we really acquire knowledge and are thus qualified to correctly guide the 
πόθζξ. However, since we are usually full of false knowledge claims, we may easily deceive 
ourselves into thinking that we are qualified to rule, and if this is the case, the consequences 
may be catastrophic. It is therefore crucial to wonder whether we examined in the proper 
manner and whether we really attained truth. 
Finally, if we depart from the Republic, we must also face another question: namely, 
once we were to attain power – or at least political influence – what should we do? Should we 
simply tell others what to do or, at best, impart them correct views, without caring for the fact 
that they do not have actual knowledge and do not dedicate themselves to philosophical 
examination (which would imply that they would never be truly happy), or should we try to 
use our power to free other people from the shackles of the unexamined life? The second 
possibility seems to be clearly preferable, but such a universal liberation may be undesirable 
or unfeasible for several reasons. The question is very complicated, and it is closely related to 
the question of whether we should restrict the imperative of philosophical             
examination – which is precisely what we must consider in the following section, in order to 
conclude our analysis of the imperativeness of philosophical examination.  
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6. The possible restriction of the universality or even of the validity of the imperative 
 
 If we consider the foundation of the imperative of philosophical examination, it seems 
clear that the imperative applies to all human beings – at least insofar as they lead an 
unexamined life. The unexamined life is structurally defective, it lacks inner justice and truth, 
and it cannot be the superlative good we desire. Hence, we all need to examine in order to 
correct these defects. However, this does not necessarily mean that there are no restrictions to 
the imperative. In fact, the argument that justifies the need to examine also requires 
philosophical examination to be effective in its efforts to attain knowledge and the good. 
Consequently, we must wonder whether we are really able to attain these goals. If for some 
reason some of us – or even all of us – are not able to do so, then the validity of imperative 
may have to be restricted. This is the question we must now consider, both to determine the 
imperative in more detail and to prepare the following chapter, where we will consider the 
question of the effectiveness of philosophical examination in more detail. 
  
6.1. The possibility of restricting the universality of the imperative and the 
problematic character of such a restriction 
 
 Let us start with the possibility that some people (or even many people) might not be 
required to examine. There is indeed a tension in the Platonic corpus between texts in which 
the imperative of philosophical examination seems to be universal (such as the Apology) and 
others where it seems to be confined to a particular class in the πόθζξ, and all other people are 
actually supposed not to examine (as is the case in the Republic). But what allows these 
people to override the imperative? Why are there any exceptions? 
 There are two possible explanations, which to a certain extent may be conciliated. 
First, one may restrict the imperative based on pragmatic considerations. Indeed, we all need 
to satisfy our basic needs, and this requires much work, which might be incompatible with a 
universal dedication to philosophical examination. Hence, there can be only a few 
philosophers in each community in order for people to survive and have at least some quality 
of life. This argument would be particularly strong in Ancient times. In the present day, 
industrialization and technology allow us to work much less. We can have much more ζπμθή 
and thus there can be many more philosophers. Moreover, it is possible to conceive a time in 
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which we will all be free to examine – and if the reason for restricting the imperative is only 
pragmatic, then we should all do so. 
 But this is not the only reason used to justify the restriction of the imperative in the 
Republic. Plato bases the division of work in the πόθζξ on the fact that, despite all our 
similarities, human beings can also be said to have different constitutions or θύζεζξ. Indeed, 
we may be born and grow with different aptitudes and predispositions – i.e., we may have 
more or less intellectual talent, and we may be more inclined to one or other arrangement of 
drives. This means that some of us will more easily examine things and adopt a philosophical 
life, while others would find it very difficult to start examining things and would be very 
ineffective at it. This distinction is primarily based on empirical observation, but it may very 
well be a constant of human life, and Plato seems to assume so in the Republic. We cannot 
really be forced to examine, we must determine ourselves to examine, and apparently some 
would always resist doing so. This, of course, would not change the imperative as such, 
insofar as one would still needphilosophical examination in order to find truth and be happy. 
Some, however, would not be able to do so, and they would therefore be constitutively 
condemned to a bad and miserable life (although the degree of badness and misery in their 
lives could still vary). 
 It is, however, important to bear in mind that both these reasons for restricting the 
imperative of philosophical examination present their own problems. The first reason raises 
the question of how we should decide who must work and who can philosophize, and what 
allows us to exclude some from what seems to be the only doorway to the superlative good 
we desire. If we appeal to the second reason, we are also faced with several questions. First, 
we must wonder whether there really are different constitutions or θύζεζξ and whether we 
can properly identify them. Second, we must consider whether they really determine how 
good one can be at examining things. Third, we must determine whether they really are 
unchangeable. Plato admits that one may try to raise children in the best way possible, but he 
places limits on one‟s ability to change their natural constitution – and this is what we must 
examine. These are indeed important questions in this context, especially because hindering 
someone who is able to examine from doing so (and even not helping them, if we were able) 





6.2. The possible general ineffectiveness of philosophical examination and the 
problem of its meaning for the imperative  
 
 We saw that philosophical examination is required for us to develop our philosophical 
drive, to find the truth, and thus to attain the superlative good and be happy. But, as was 
mentioned, this complex structure raises several questions, which cast doubt on the validity 
of the imperative. For instance, we must wonder whether philosophical examination really 
allows us to find out the truth, or at least come closer to it. Likewise, we must wonder if 
pursuing and attaining truth will also allow us to attain the superlative good. If any of these 
two clauses is wrong, then we would lose the reason we had for examining. Of course, we 
may still find some reason for examining in these circumstances, but this reason would be 
very different from what we just considered, and the kind of examination required by it could 
also be very different. It is, therefore, very important to know what we can attain through 
philosophical examination – and especially whether we can really find truth and the 
superlative good by examining things. However, this is not an easy thing to do, especially 
before carrying out the examination in question. In such a situation, we can only consider 
different possibilities and see how they would affect the imperative of philosophical 






The possible outcomes and the risks of philosophical examination 
 
 
“Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst 






 In the previous chapters we discussed why, according to the Platonic corpus, we 
should reject the unexamined life and devote ourselves to philosophical examination. But we 
also saw that the imperative of philosophical examination requires philosophical examination 
to be effective in its pursuit of truth and the superlative good. Thus, if philosophical 
examination is unable to attain its goals, the imperative of examination (and perhaps even the 
rejection of the unexamined life) becomes problematic. Hence, it is important to consider this 
question in more detail. Assuming we really embrace philosophical examination and adopt a 
philosophical life, what might happen? What can philosophical examination attain?  
 In the following, we will briefly discuss the possible outcomes of philosophical 
examination (i.e., what we might discover if we examine), and afterwards we will specifically 
consider the risks we incur if we abandon the unexamined life and dedicate ourselves to 
philosophical examination (or, to be more precise, we will see what might go wrong and 
prevent philosophical examination from having the outcome it aims at). This will allow us to 
consider the effects philosophical examination may have in our life – namely, whether it 
leads to a desirable state or rather to something bad, perhaps even worse than the unexamined 
life. It will also allow us to discuss the meaning of these possibilities for the imperative of 
philosophical examination, and for our decision of whether or not we should devote ourselves 
to this examination.  
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1. The map of possible outcomes of philosophical examination according to Plato 
 
Let us then start by considering the possible outcomes of philosophical      
examination – namely, what we might find out if we examine. We already tackled some 
aspects of this question in Part II above, but now we will have to complement the previous 
considerations, in order to outline (even if only in broad strokes) a full map of 
possibilities.
2796
 Such a map will help us understand the many roads philosophical 
examination may follow and the different destinations it may have. We must, however, 
remember that philosophical examination is a long and complex process, and it may have 
different stages. This means, for instance, that some negative results may be only provisional. 
Likewise, we may be deluded and think we have attained good results, only to later discover 
that this was not the case. However, these illusory results are not what we will consider here. 
We will focus on the real results of a correctly performed philosophical examination.  
As we saw in Chapter 8, the initial phase of philosophical examination tries to identify 
the defects of the views or beliefs that we espouse. In general, these views contain a formal 
defect, because we did not fully examine them and did not really exclude the possibility that 
things could be different from what we think.
2797
 Then, upon close inspection, we may 
identify many material defects. We may have attributed wrong predicates to things and we 
may have failed to understand these predicates. These cognitive defects may affect just some 
of our beliefs or many of them. In fact, it is even possible that they are all distorted – either 
because every single one of them is in itself defective, or because some fundamental beliefs, 
which underpin all others, are defective and thus extend their defect to all other beliefs. We 
will then have to abandon the views that are defective, which will produce a decrease in 
ignorance and a negative expansion of our knowledge, insofar as we will at least be aware of 
what we do not know. 
But this is only the negative part of the examination. We must also inquire into things 
and try to discover the truth about the things we do not know. This positive part of the 
examination is indeed essential, because according to Plato our beliefs are globally 
defective.
2798
 This means that our ability to attain the superlative good and be happy depends 
on our ability to find the truth via philosophical examination. But here there are also several 
possibilities. We may be completely at a loss and unable to find anything; we may find some 
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plausible views; we may find some truths (either more peripheral or more central to our way 
of seeing things and to our life); and we may find all the truth. All these possibilities are open 
and it is difficult to know what exactly may result from this positive or constructive 
examination. We do not even know if someone has carried it out to the end, and it is not clear 
whether Plato himself did so (or even if he thought he did). We have no way of knowing this 
about him, given the lack of direct communication. However, he isolates some meaningful 
possibilities in the corpus, and this is what we must now briefly explore. 
 
2. Plato’s elaboration of some possible outcomes 
 
 Plato presents various possible outcomes of philosophical examination in different 
passages of the corpus, and we will consider three in particular, which show us how different 
the outcomes of philosophical examination can be and how they can affect our life in very 
different manners. 
 
2.1. Human wisdom (ἀλζξσπίλε ζνθία) 
 
One possible result of philosophical examination is the realization that we do not 
know anything – or at least that we do not know any of the most important things (ηὰ 
ιέβζζηα). This seems to correspond to Socrates‟ self-presentation in the Apology and in other 
texts. Despite devoting his life to philosophical examination, he disavows any         
knowledge – or at least any important knowledge.
2799
 He has simply realized his ignorance, 
and this is all the wisdom he has. As we saw, he calls this the human wisdom (i.e., the 
wisdom proper of the finite or mortal being), and it stands in contrast not only with the 
wisdom of those that allegedly know what ἀνεηή is (who have, therefore, a more than human 
knowledge), but especially with the wisdom of the god.
2800
 To be sure, we may question 
whether Socrates is really being sincere when he professes his ignorance, but this is in any 
case a possible result of philosophical examination. We may simply realize that we do not 
know anything. 
Such a result may still have different meanings, though, because it may be regarded as 
either provisional or definitive. This is precisely what corresponds to the difference between 
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 See e.g. Ap. 21b, 23b, Euthd. 293b. 
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 See Chap. 2 Sect. 1.3 above. 
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the Skeptics and the Academics, according to Sextus Empiricus. The first still seek out the 
truth and are marked by a persistence of inquiry (ἐπζιμκὴ γδηήζεςξ), whereas the second 
declare that truth cannot be grasped.
2801
 We could also borrow Kant‟s terms and speak of a 
suspensio judicii indagatoria and a suspensio judicii sceptica.
2802
 The question, then, is 
whether we are in a position to declare that we will never be able to know anything. Plato 
never fully develops the possibility that we might be constitutively unable to know, but he 
sometimes points in that direction (for instance, when he presents Protagoras‟ radical 
relativism in Theaetetus or when Socrates suggests in Phaedo that we will not be able to 




2.2. Τέρλε πεξὶ ηὸλ βίνλ 
 
In general, Plato gives more attention to positive outcomes of philosophical 
examination – i.e., to the possibility of attaining knowledge. In this respect, he considers two 
distinct possibilities. The first one, which we will now consider, admits that we may attain a 
core of knowledge that allows us to guide life effectively and attain what we desire. Plato 
normally presents this kind of knowledge as a ηέπκδ (and in this sense he anticipates the later 
notion of ηέπκδ πενὶ ηὸκ αίμκ).
2804
 Σέπκαζ are based on an insight into the θύζζξ of the things 
they deal with, which allows them to intervene effectively (or infallibly) in a particular 
domain of reality. In other words, they know what things are, and hence they can change 
them in order to improve them or improve our own life. This is what a ηέπκδ is and in certain 
passages Plato assumes that something of this sort can be found with respect to how we live. 
The presentation of this idea may vary, though. Sometimes, Plato simply considers the 
possibility of a particular ηέπκδ that will allow us to guide our actions and attain what we 
desire – such as the measuring ηέπκδ in Protagoras.
2805
 Other times, Plato recognizes that 
there are many restricted domains of knowledge or many ηέπκαζ, but he also considers the 
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 See Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes, I.1, in: H. MUTSCHMANN (ed.), Sexti Empirici opera, vol. 1, Leipzig, 
Teubner, 1912, 4. 
2802
 See in particular I. KANT, Logik, in: IDEM, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 9, Berlin, Georg Reimer, 1923, 74: 
“Die Zurückhaltung des Urtheils kann in zwiefacher Absicht geschehen: entweder, um die Gründe des 
bestimmenden Urtheils aufzusuchen, oder um niemals zu urtheilen. Im erstern Falle heißt die Aufschiebung des 
Urtheils eine kritische (suspensio judicii indagatoria), im letztern eine skeptische (suspensio judicii sceptica). 
Denn der Skeptiker thut auf alles Urtheilen Verzicht, der wahre Philosoph dagegen suspendirt bloß sein Urtheil, 
wofern er noch nicht genugsame Gründe hat, etwas für wahr zu halten.”  
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 Cp. Tht. 152d ff., and Phd. 66d-67a. 
2804
 For more on this notion, see e.g. J. SELLARS, Art of Living. The Stoics on the Nature and Function of 
Philosophy, London, Bristol Classical Press, 2009
2
 (Aldershot/etc., Ashgate, 2003
1
), 5f., 55f. 
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 See 356a ff. 
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possibility of a guiding or royal knowledge (ηέπκδ ααζζθζηή) that will allow us to use them in 
our advantage.
2806
 This is a variation of the sophistic idea of rhetoric as a ηέπκδ that is able to 
rule the other ηέπκαζ, insofar as it convinces everybody to act in a certain way.
2807
 Plato, 
however, is more concerned with the fact that the individual ηέπκαζ cannot determine what 
they should be used for, and this means that they may either benefit us or harm us. Therefore, 
one needs a ηέπκδ that is able to determine what we need and, in light of this knowledge, may 
direct and rule all ηέπκαζ, thereby rendering them beneficial and improving our life.  
We will not explore this idea here, but there is one other question associated with it 
that we must nevertheless consider. In order to guide our life, we need to have some 
knowledge of the circumstances we find ourselves in and also of what we need to attain. 
Plato, however, seems to be talking about a minimalistic version of knowledge in these 
passages. There are many things one will not be required to know, or at least things one will 
not be required to know in detail – such as the εἴδδ. At the most, one will have knowledge of 
the forms of excellence, and it may be the case that we just need to have some correct δόλαζ 
about them. But is it really so? Can we really guide our life with a minimalistic knowledge? 
Or can it be that in order to guide our life effectively we need to know a great number of 
things or even everything? In the Republic, Plato considers the fact that sailing (itself a model 
of a practical knowledge) requires us to know many things that may seem useless, including 
astronomy.
2808
 Thus, the extent of knowledge we would require in order to attain the 
superlative good is unclear.    
 
2.3. The highest form of knowledge (ἐπηζηήκε) 
 
 Another possible outcome of philosophical examination (and indeed the best possible 
outcome) is to attain the highest form of knowledge. This may correspond to a perfect and 
full knowledge of everything, but usually Plato conceives it as a knowledge of the 
fundamental beings of reality – namely, the general predicates (εἴδδ) that pervade 
everything.
2809
 If one attains such a knowledge, one will understand the content of these 
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predicates, how they relate to each other, and what they are based on (i.e., what the first 
principle of reality is).
2810
  
The representation of this knowledge of the fundamental structures of reality presents 
several problems, though. From our usual standpoint, it is difficult to see what exactly it 
corresponds to. Plato often refers to this in the context of myths, and he seems to describe it 
as a contemplation or εεςνία of some ineffable truth. On the other hand, he also presents this 
as the cornerstone of dialectics, which means that it is something must attain through θόβμξ. 
But regardless of how we attain knowledge of the εἴδδ and what it consists in, it is important 
to bear in mind that this knowledge does not concern a different world, completely separated 
from our own. The εἴδδ are presented as objective and even unchangeable contents, but they 
are also something that pervades everything, and thus the access to the εἴδδ also concerns the 
appearance of all empirical reality. Everything is transformed by this access – including our 
own understanding of what we should do in life. This does not exclude that there will be 
some problems of application of this eidetic knowledge to empirical beings, and that some 
non-eidetic knowledge of the empirical domain may be required. But these are still questions 
one must solve through philosophical examination – and their solution will then be an 
important part of the highest form of knowledge. 
 Plato describes the possession of this knowledge – and especially the knowledge of 
the most important εἶδμξ (be it goodness or beauty) – both as a state of wakefulness and a 
state of fullness or perfect (i.e., proper) happiness. It is the best state one can attain. It is also 
described as the highest pleasure in the Republic.
2811
 In Symposium, Diotima says that life can 
only be worth living (if at all) when we come to contemplate ηὸ ηαθόκ.
2812
 This may then be 
conceived as a state of mere contemplation, or it may also include some action. For instance, 
one may need to generate something, as is said in Symposium.
2813
 It may even imply political 
engagement, as we considered above (with all the problems that this engagement raises).
2814
 
Be that as it may, if one attains such a knowledge, one will then lead a philosophical life in a 
new sense of the word – i.e., one will no longer lead a life of pursuing the truth, but a life of 
full knowledge, which is actually the best (or, as Plato says, the true) life.
2815
 Thus, one‟s 
experience will be wholly transformed. One‟s soul will be healthy (because it will be 
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 The question of the first principle is indeed very important in this context, as was shown above. See Chap. 9 
Sect. 3.2. 
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 Cp. footnote 2760 above.  
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completely ruled by the love of knowledge) and shapely (because its way of seeing things 
will include no deviation or distortion), and one will have attained the superlative good one 
constitutively longs for – all this owing to the performance of philosophical examination.  
The question, then, is whether a state with these characteristics is really within the 
reach of philosophical examination. 
 
3. The map of risks involved in the abandonment of the unexamined life and their 
presuppositions 
 
 We have seen how philosophical examination admits very different outcomes, and 
these are not simple academic possibilities (as if it were at any rate clear what the real 
outcome of philosophical examination is). Before undertaking the examination we cannot 
really know the outcome. Many factors may influence the result and they may also seriously 
restrict the effectiveness of philosophical examination. In other words, several things may 
prevent philosophical examination from reaching the truth and the superlative good. Thus, we 
may remain ignorant and miserable. This calls into question the decision to abandon the 
unexamined life and to embrace philosophical examination. Are the rejection of the 
unexamined life and the imperative of philosophical examination still valid in face of these 
possibilities or these risks? To what extent? 
 This is what we will now focus on. We will outline a map of the main risks associated 
with the philosophical enterprise, and we will see how they may affect the imperative of 
philosophical examination and the rejection of the unexamined life. In order to identify these 
main risks, we will consider not only what is said in the Platonic corpus, but also some 
analyses of notorious critics of Platonism, which help us cover possible blind spots in Plato‟s 
thought.  
 
3.1. The risks associated with one’s personal circumstances 
 
 At first, we might be inclined to think that philosophical examination will always 
have the same outcome, regardless of who performs it and the circumstances one finds 
oneself in. In other words, we easily assume that if all of us were to devote ourselves to 
philosophical examination, then we would all be equally successful or equally unsuccessful. 
However, it is not necessarily so. The effectiveness of philosophical examination may depend 
854 
 
on one‟s personal circumstances.
2816
 Obviously, the circumstances in which one examines 
may vary greatly from person to person, and some of them may prevent us from examining in 
a proper manner and thus reaching the truth. In this case, philosophical examination would 
still be undeniably good for human beings in general, but its value would be problematic for 
those that were not able to carry it out properly.  
 Plato clearly admits this possibility in several passages, and he identifies several 
reasons for it. First, one may not have the necessary material conditions, such as health and 
leisure.
2817
 Second, one‟s milieu, education and cultural background may also render it 
particularly difficult for us to examine.
2818
 Third, one may already be too old to begin 
examining.
2819
 Fourth (and perhaps most importantly), one may have a natural constitution or 
θύζζξ that renders one unfit to examine. Indeed, human beings seem to be born and to grow 
with different characteristics – and some of them make it easier for us to examine.
2820
 Plato 
calls the attention to this by saying that philosophical examination requires us to have a 
certain moral character. Among other things, one should be steadfast, courageous, keen at 
studies, a lover of hard work, moderate and averse to lies. Moreover, one should have good 
intellectual capabilities – such as good memory or quickness of apprehension.
2821
 
 These four factors, and especially our natural disposition, may thus prevent us from 
attaining truth and the superlative good, and it may be important to take this into 
consideration when determining both whether or not we should examine and whether or not 
we should urge others to examine.
2822
 However, it is also important to bear in mind that some 
of these personal limitations may change. We may acquire better material conditions, we may 
change our milieu or overcome its influence over us, and we may perhaps change our natural 
features (at least up to a point). Moreover, as far as we know, these factors may still be 
insufficient to condemn our efforts of examining things to failure. Even age may be no 
obstacle. Indeed, it may happen that we are never too old to philosophize and be happy, as 
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Epicurus says (even though his philosophical project is very different from Plato‟s).
2823
 
Likewise, the other limitations do not immediately determine how far we may come. Hence, 
none of this immediately invalidates the rejection of the unexamined life and the imperative 
of philosophical examination. Finally, the fact that one is not able to find truth does not 
change the fact that the unexamined life cannot satisfy our desires, and philosophical 
examination may still bring us closer to the truth, at least insofar as it allows us to become 
aware of our ignorance. We may therefore have no reason to abandon philosophical 
examination, although in this case our reason for performing it will no longer be the same.  
 
3.2. The risks associated with the time available to examine 
 
 The second kind of risk we incur when we devote ourselves to philosophical 
examination concerns all human beings. There may indeed be a constitutive disproportion 
between the duration of our life and the time required to bring philosophical examination to a 
satisfactory conclusion. As Hippocrates says: “[ὁ] αίμξ αναπὺξ, ἟ δὲ ηέπκδ ιαηνὴ (...).”
2824
 
This is particularly valid for philosophical examination. We saw above that the kind of 
examination required by the imperative is extremely vast and difficult.
2825
 It may therefore 
take us our entire life, or it may even be a task for many people and multiple generations. 
However, the general duration of our life time is not the only problem. Human beings are 
ἐθήιενμζ and, as we saw, this does not just mean that our life is relatively short. We are also 
fragile beings, exposed to what the day may bring. Our life may change at any time, and in 
fact every moment may be our last.
2826
 Hence, we can never guarantee that we will live long 
enough to discover the truth. The time available may be insufficient, and we must still factor 
in the time we need to take care of other things – especially our survival.  
 Furthermore, we do not just want to attain truth and the superlative good at the end of 
our life. We want to have it now. Our desire is urgent and extreme. We want to guide 
ourselves correctly and see things as they are, and this is only possible at the end of the 
examination. But philosophical examination (at least as Plato conceives it) does not promise 
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 See Ad Menoeceum, in: H. USENER (ed.), Epicurea, Leipzig, Teubner, 1887, 59: “Μήηε κέμξ ηζξ ὢκ 
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La. 188b. 
2824
 See Aphorismi, 1.1. 
2825
 See Chap. 19 Sect. 3. 
2826
 For more on this, cp. the preface to Part III above. 
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to be quick. It will probably take long and we may never conclude it. In the meanwhile, our 
life will have been put on hold. Indeed, we cannot simultaneously examine and go on with 
our life. Examination causes us to delay action, and as a result we may fail to do many 
important things, or we may do them too late, because we had not yet established that we 
should do them. We may thus make serious mistakes or miss out on important things. 
 Finally, the question of time affects not only the relation between life and 
philosophical examination, but also philosophical examination itself. We may not be sure that 
we should examine, and we may spend most of the time examining this question. We may 
also be already devoted to philosophical examination, and still fail to see what we should 
examine first and in what way. As a result, we may spend much time examining the very 
process of examination, and this may greatly increase the time we need to find out the truth.  
 In sum, philosophical examination may be an endless process and this may prevent us 
from ever attaining the truth and the superlative good. We may invest our whole life in a 
project that will never come to fruition, or that will do so only too late. If this happens, we 
may at that point think that it would have been better not to examine at all and to have 
enjoyed life while we could. However, such a view is very different from Plato‟s. As was 
said, the unexamined life is still unsatisfactory, and philosophical examination may at least 
remove our delusions. The question that we have to consider then is whether that is enough 
for us to accept a life of unsuccessful philosophical examination.  
 
3.3. The risks associated with the possibility of a bad or tragic truth 
 
 The previous risks concerned the possibility of failing to complete philosophical 
examination, and thus failing to attain the truth and the superlative good we desire. Now, we 
must consider risks that are related to what we might attain at the end of the examination. We 
may start by considering a particular risk that pertains to the relation between truth and the 
superlative good we desire. Indeed, the imperative of philosophical examination was based 
on the view that truth allowed us to attain and was also part (perhaps even the essential part) 
of the superlative good we desire. However, there is also the possibility that truth might 
somehow be bad and undesirable. This is something we can clearly see in everyday life (i.e., 
in the context of the unexamined life), and it was also at the center of many Greek tragedies 
(such as Sophocles‟ Ajax and Oedipus Tyrannus). Many empirical truths are very far from 
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corresponding to a good or desirable state, and much less to a superlatively good state. 
Knowing the truth may then cause great suffering, and one may even desire to die.
2827
  
It is true that, in most of these cases, such empirical truths are only undesirable and 
tragic because our soul is ruled by a non-philosophical drive. For a philosophical soul, these 
truths could be much less dramatic or even irrelevant. However, the possibility we are now 
considering might not be circumscribed to empirical truths. The philosophical or real truth 
might also be tragic or terrible, and cause great frustration and suffering. In the context of 
Plato‟s thought, this could happen if we ended up discovering that there is actually no 
superlative good, that this is nothing more than a mirage, and that we are condemned to an 
eternal or transcendental dissatisfaction. This would render our life self-contradictory or 
absurd, and being fully conscious of this would render life unbearable.  
At this point, we could doubt whether having devoted ourselves to philosophical 
examination was really what we should have done. We could indeed be tempted to agree with 
what Erasmus writes in Moriae encomium id est stultitiae laus – namely, that it is bad to be 
deceived, but it is superlatively bad not to be deceived.
2828
 Throughout her whole self-praise, 
Folly (or, as it could perhaps be better rendered, of stupidity or ἀιαεία) tries to show the lack 
of meaning of all of life‟s pursuits and how we can only find any joy in life because of our 
stupidity. In other words, we can only accept life if we are deceived about it. Hence, even if 
being deceived is not the greatest good, it would still be preferable to a complete rejection of 
life, and we could therefore settle for a deceived life – at least according to the 
personification of Folly. But according to Plato‟s thought, this does not seem to be a 
meaningful possibility. Our inborn love of knowledge would not be able to expressly desire 
not to know (not even to satisfy our love of gain and the desire not to suffer) – also because 
this would not really make our life worth living. At best, it would only make it seem worth 
living. 
But if the realization that we cannot be happy is all that expects us at the end of the 
examination, should we still examine? Does it make any difference whether we examine or 
not? Probably not. In such a context, probably nothing would be worth our effort. However, 
we must bear in mind that from our standpoint this is only a possibility and before confirming 
it (i.e., before knowing whether it is so or not), Plato‟s imperative still applies. We still have 
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to examine in the hope of finding the truth and thus attaining the superlative good. Indeed, 
this is too important a pursuit to neglect or give up on because there is a possibility that it 
might all be in vain. 
 
3.4. The risk associated with the possibility that truth is inaccessible or that there 
is no truth 
 
 In the possibility previously considered we would still be able to determine how 
things are and – more importantly – what is our situation. Now, however, we will discuss the 
possibility that we cannot even do that. This may happen in two different ways. 
 First, it is possible that all philosophical examination only allows us to realize our 
own cognitive limits – i.e., that we cannot attain the truth. This partly corresponds to the 
above considered possibility of ἀκενςπίκδ ζμθία (i.e., of scepticism in general) as an 
outcome of philosophical examination – although, as we saw, ἀκενςπίκδ ζμθία may be both 
a provisional or a definitive outcome. If it were provisional, one could still continue to 
examine. But the possibility we are now considering involves the discovery of a constitutive 
limitation that prevents us from knowing things. We would only know that we cannot know, 
and we would therefore be certain that we cannot attain truth nor the superlative good we 
desire. This would render the imperative of philosophical examination weaker. We could still 
reduce our ignorance by examining, and this would still be better than being deluded, but our 
life would not become truly happy and truly worth living by examining. Consequently, we 
would have to consider whether a small improvement of our situation is worth the effort (i.e., 
whether we would resign ourselves to it and accept to live in such conditions). 
 But this is not the only way in which philosophical examination may fail to attain 
truth. The other way is even more aggressive and its consequences much deeper, because it 
attacks the very notion of truth – not just the Platonic identification of truth (to wit, that there 
are εἴδδ, that they have certain features, that they pervade empirical reality, and so on), but 
also truth in general (i.e., any knowledge and any reality we may conceive in any way). 
Indeed, one may find that there is no truth at all, no true version of things. One may even find 
that the very notion of truth is absurd or self-contradictory. In a way, such a possibility was 
outlined by Gorgias in his work on non-being, which argued that nothing is, and if something 





 One of the greatest developments of this view, however, can be found in 
Nietzsche‟s works. Nietzsche criticizes not only what we normally represent as truth, but he 
also tries to show that our conceptions of knowledge, truth, and reality is full of      
absurdities – such as the idea of something existing objectively or “in itself”, when all we can 
conceive are perspectives and the relations established in the these perspectives.
2830
 These 
and other arguments present an interesting challenge to the Platonic philosophical project, but 
we will not be able to discuss them here. We will just consider some of the consequences of 
Nietzsche‟s criticism, and especially its consequences for the imperative of philosophical 
examination.  
 The first thing we must consider is that this is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to 
conceive, in virtue of the essential role the notions of truth, knowledge and reality play in our 
experience of things. If these notions were to be invalidated, our entire way of seeing things 
would collapse. It would not simply happen that all our views would be false and all things 
would be mere appearances. As Nietzsche stresses, the very notion of mere appearance (and 
thus the associated notions of falsehood or untruth) would also be invalidated.
2831
 What 
would be left then? And would a state without truth be bearable for us?
2832
 What would that 
mean for our superlative desire? Would we be able to satisfy it in a different way, or would 
this desire of ours also be invalidated in virtue of the collapse of truth? It is very difficult to 
tell. As far as we know, we could become entirely rudderless, or our own identity could 
collapse.  
If this were the case, would it not be better to be deceived and think that there is truth? 
In the context of Plato‟s thought, we would never be able to say such a thing, because we 
would always be contradicting ourselves. We would love knowledge, but this love would 
never be fulfilled. The only possibility left would be to extirpate our love of knowledge, 
although it is not clear how we could ever do so. At any rate, if truth really is an illusion, then 
philosophical examination as the pursuit of truth would become absurd. At best, it could only 
serve as a way to extirpate our love of knowledge. But we also do not know if this is possible 
                                                 
2829
 See DK B3: “ἐκ βὰν η῵ζ ἐπζβναθμιέκςζ Πενὶ ημῦ ιὴ ὄκημξ ἠ Πενὶ θύζεςξ ηνία ηαηὰ ηὸ ἑλ῅ξ ηεθάθαζα 
ηαηαζηεοάγεζ, ἓκ ιὲκ ηαὶ πν῵ημκ ὅηζ μ὎δὲκ ἔζηζκ, δεύηενμκ ὅηζ εἰ ηαὶ ἔζηζκ, ἀηαηάθδπημκ ἀκενώπςζ, ηνίημκ ὅηζ 
εἰ ηαὶ ηαηαθδπηόκ, ἀθθὰ ημί βε ἀκέλμζζημκ ηαὶ ἀκενιήκεοημκ η῵ζ πέθαξ.” 
2830
 See e.g. KSA 12, 140-141, 353, 580. 
2831
 See KSA 6, 81: “Die wahre Welt haben wir abgeschafft: welche Welt blieb übrig? die scheinbare 
vielleicht?... Aber nein! mit der wahren Welt haben wir auch die scheinbare abgeschafft!” 
2832
 Cp. F. NIETZSCHE, KSA 2, 53-54: “Eine Frage scheint uns die Zunge zu beschweren und doch nicht laut 
werden zu wollen: ob man bewusst in der Unwahrheit bleiben könne? oder, wenn man diess müsse, ob da nicht 
der Tod vorzuziehen sei?” 
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or more desirable than our current state. In fact, it could simply be the case that life is 
altogether absurd and unviable, and so it does not really matter what we do.  
If, however, we are just talking about the possibility that truth might be an illusion and 
have not yet confirmed it, then the imperative of philosophical examination seems to hold. It 
is not be certain that we will ever be able to attain truth and the superlative good by following 
the imperative, but we must still try, under pain of missing out on a good life.  
  
3.5. The risk of having misdiagnosed the unexamined life  
 
 All the risks hitherto considered were concern the question of whether or not 
philosophical examination is able to provide what it is supposed or expected to provide, 
thereby allowing us to overcome the constitutive limitations of the unexamined life. In doing 
so, we did not question the diagnosis of the unexamined life (i.e., its defectiveness and 
undesirability). But if we did not yet complete philosophical examination, how can we be 
sure that the appraisal of the unexamined life, as well as the identification of our ροπή on 
which it is based, are correct? Is it not possible that the previous analyses were somehow 
distorted or were still unexamined in some respect? 
 If we take a cursory glance at the history of philosophy (and even at some passages of 
the Platonic corpus), we find that there are many other ways of understanding our inner 
constitution and, consequently, many other appraisals of the unexamined life. We will not 
consider most of these possibilities here. We will just name a few, to see how this is also a 
risk we incur when we devote our lives to philosophical examination.  
 First, it is possible to conceive that there is no common and stable human constitution 
or θύζζξ, as we assumed. We may be different from one another, and our constitution may be 
fluid and malleable. If this is the case, then any analysis similar to the one we carried out 
would have a restricted validity or it would even be invalid.  
Second, it may also happen that we do not actually have a desire of a superlative 
good, or if we do, it may be something we may change. If this is the case, then we could be 
satisfied with something that is defective. It would depend on what we would then desire.  
Third, it is possible that the love of knowledge is actually not that central in our life or 
at least not irreducible to the other drives. In other words, Nietzsche may be right in saying 
that our will to truth (i.e., our love of knowledge) is a variation of a more fundamental     
drive – namely, what he calls “will to power” (which, as a drive, has some affinity to the love 
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of gain and the love of honor, but cannot be identified with one or the other).
2833
 This would 
mean that our love of knowledge is actually irrational and even self-contradictory, insofar as 
it fights against irrationality. In fact, we could argue (following Nietzsche) that an excessive 
development of our love of knowledge is actually a form of disease of the will, because it 
consists in a self-contradiction of the will to power.
2834
 One should therefore submit this will 
to power to therapy and try to develop a form of wisdom that accepts this irrationality. Such a 
wisdom could resemble (at least formally) what we find in Euripides‟ Bacchae, where two 




Fourth and finally, it is also possible that the unexamined life (at least in some of its 
modalities) has much more truth than we admitted. In particular, it may have many ὀνεαὶ 
δόλαζ and this may be enough for it to guide itself correctly and attain what it desires. This is 
actually the way traditions and religions are often understood (which is particularly relevant, 
since this was at the basis of the accusations against Socrates). Artistic experiences may also 
be interpreted in light of such categories. Indeed, art and religion make constant appeal to 
inspiration and possession, and correct δόλαί are understood by Plato precisely in these 
terms.
2836
 Thus, by rejecting the unexamined life in all its forms, we may also be losing other 
forms of truth. 
All these possibilities present a challenge to the imperative of philosophical 
examination, at least in the terms it was presented above. If they were confirmed, they could 
refute the imperative. But it is not easy to confirm them. They are not absolutely self-evident, 
and our reflection about them may very well be based on false knowledge claims. Therefore, 
any serious decision on these matters would require much more examination. Still, the mere 
possibility that these and other alternatives to Plato‟s views might be right (or at least have 
some truth in them) should lead us to examine more carefully what was said before, in order 
to confirm the appraisal of the unexamined life and the imperative of philosophical 
examination. In fact, this is required by the very imperative of philosophical examination. 
 
                                                 
2833
 See e.g. KSA 5, 145: “Ihr „Erkennen‟ ist Schaffen, ihr Schaffen ist eine Gesetzgebung, ihr Wille zur 
Wahrheit ist – Wille zur Macht. – Giebt es heute solche Philosophen?” 
2834
 This is one of the main arguments of the third essay of Zur Genealogie der Moral – see KSA 5, 339ff. Cp. 
also e.g. KSA 3, 581-583. 
2835
 See v. 395. 
2836
 Cp. Chap. 7 Sect. 2.3 above. 
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4. The risks involved in remaining in the unexamined life and not embracing 
philosophical examination 
 
Before concluding this analysis, it is important to consider one final time the opposite 
risks – namely, the risks we incur if we remain in the unexamined life. According to Plato, 
this is a bad and miserable life, essentially marked by illness and deformity, and it 
constitutively prevents us from attaining what we really desire. Hence, by remaining in it, we 
lose the possibility of having a truly meaningful life and of satisfying our desire. We will be 
frustrated and not even realize it. We may think we are leading the best life possible and be 
very far from doing so. We may be completely deluded with respect to ourselves and 
everything else. We may be in a state of madness, but at peace with ourselves, which will 
prevent us from any significant change. The only possibility of realizing this may be by 
embracing philosophical examination. But by turning our back to it, we will be condemning 
ourselves to a life of inapparent, but all-pervasive self-disagreement or self-contradiction. 
It is also possible that we will come to be convinced of this one day, but that by then it 
will be already too late to fully carry out the examination. As we saw, philosophical 
examination is extremely demanding, and it is very important to begin it as soon as possible. 
Hence, by resisting it, we might be losing precious time and condemning ourselves to failure. 
However, we may also stop examining because we become conscious of one – or 
even several – of the risks mentioned above. But these may be false risks – i.e., it may be 
possible for us to attain truth and the superlative good via philosophical examination. It is 
true that at many points the examination may seem hopeless, but we never know what will 
happen at the next turn, and any sudden discovery may change everything. 
In sum, philosophical examination is in itself very difficult, and the fact that we must 
perform it without being assured of a good outcome renders it even more difficult. However, 
the fact that somthing is difficult does not mean it is not good and desirable. It is always 
important to remember a saying that Plato sometimes quotes – namely, that “admirable things 
are difficult” (παθεπὰ ηὰ ηαθά).
2837
 This is a common trait of Greek thinking. Life is not 
supposed to be easy. If all desires were to be automatically satisfied, then we would have no 
pleasure and there would be no merit. We are supposed to break a sweat in order to succeed. 
                                                 
2837
 See Hp. Ma. 304e, Cra. 386a-b, Rep. 435c-d, 497d. On the meaning of the saying, see e.g. A. ADLER (ed.), 
Suidae Lexicon, 5 vols., Leipzig, Teubner, 1928-1938, sub voce; W. GREENE (ed.), Scholia Platonica, 
Haverford (PA), American Philological Association, 1938, ad Cra. 384b, Hp. Ma. 384e, Rep. 435c. Cp. also Α. 
ΜΙΝΣΕ, “Chalepa Ta Kala”, “Fine Things are Difficult”. Socrates‟ Insights into the Psychology of Teaching 
and Learning, Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (2010), 287-299. 
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Life is supposed to be difficult. This does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to be 
successful or to attain what we desire. However, we will only be able to be happy if we admit 
that it is possible. We must have hope of finding the truth and attaining the superlative good. 










Let us briefly reconsider the main results of this dissertation, focusing particularly on 
its final part, where we tackled the central questions concerning the unexamined life. The 
whole discussion was centered on the problematic assertion that the unexamined life is not 
worth living. Our goal was to see what is implied in this assertion and to determine its 
validity. In order to do so, we started by considering what is said in the Apology, but then we 
extended our consideration to the whole Platonic corpus, which allowed us to develop a much 
more refined discussion of the problem.  
 The main structure of the argument can already be found in the Apology, though. As 
we saw in Part I, Socrates shows that the life we ordinarily live is characterized by having 
many false knowledge claims, by neglecting the quality of our ροπή or its ἀνεηή, and by 
being a bad life overall (although we may interpret it as being a good and happy life). Indeed, 
such a life is not what it normally seems and it is very far from attaining what it wants. This 
is why philosophical examination is so important. By examining, we may counteract these 
defects. Philosophical examination brings awareness of one‟s ignorance and of the need to 
pursue knowledge, it shows us the need to care for our ροπή and its ἀνεηή, and it may 
therefore lead us to a better and happier life.  
In order to gain a deeper understand of this, we identified several main questions and 
tried to see how these questions are handled in the entire Platonic corpus. Such an approach is 
somewhat problematic, especially because the indications given by Plato‟s texts can be quite 
diverse, and sometimes even contradictory. However, we tried to bring these different 
indications together and identify the main tendencies of Plato‟s writings. 
In Part II, we tried to define the notion of philosophical examination, which is what is 
supposed to determine the value of one‟s life, according to the Apology. We saw that when 
we look at the dialogues, there seem to be many different forms of examination, but they can 
all be understood as belonging to the same unitary project of examination. Indeed, they all 
have the same object – to wit, views in general, and especially to the views we adopted (i.e., 
our beliefs). These views determine how we see things, and they are much more numerous 
and much more complex than we may immediately think. Moreover, they can be (and often 
are) defective. In fact, our access to things can be entirely distorted, especially if we fail to 
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understand the main predicates of reality (i.e., the εἴδδ). Hence, it is important to examine our 
whole way of seeing things, and this examination has a negative (or destructive) and a 
positive (or constructive) side. On the one hand, we must verify the views we adopted and 
cast away all those that are defective. On the other hand, we must find new and better views. 
These two sides of philosophical examination are constitutively interrelated, although the 
negative side has precedence, especially because all the beliefs we already have when we 
start examining may distort any positive examination we undertake. 
This whole discussion of philosophical examination showed how complex and 
difficult the examining process is according to Plato. We may carry out some philosophical 
examinations without ever being aware of how complex this examination is supposed to be. 
This means that the examined life is also much more difficult to reach than we may think.  
But how exactly is the difference between the unexamined life and the examined life 
to be understood? To answer this question, we had to consider the kind of being that we are 
and the main structures of life. This was precisely the subject of Part III. We started by seeing 
that according to Plato we are primarily a soul (ροπή). This term denotes a sort of inner 
being, which cumulates several functions, both cognitive and practical. We considered each 
kind of function separately, but we also saw how they are deeply intertwined. 
First, we focused our attention on the cognitive structure of the soul. We saw that the 
soul always includes the appearing of something that is primarily indeterminate. But at the 
same time, the soul moves beyond this simple appearance, and determines what appears as 
being something determinate – i.e., it determines a certain version of truth. This means that 
the soul is related to some being and its access to it is seen as knowledge. In fact, even if the 
soul is not able to determine what appears to it, it is still related to truth (i.e., to being and 
knowledge) as what is to be determined. Next, we saw that the soul‟s access to things is 
based on several cognitive powers. Besides having sensation and memory, the soul makes 
judgments (δόλαζ) – i.e., it tries to determine things – and it also has δζάκμζα, θμβζζιόξ or 
κμῦξ, which is what allows us to know the general predicates (εἴδδ) we use to determine 
things. 
Second, we focused on the practical side and determined the fundamental structure of 
our desire according to Plato – namely, the fact that we are always directed at a superlative 
good, whose attainment would make our soul actually happy. This fundamental desire is the 
basis of all our other desires and pursuits. Everything is integrated in the pursuit of the 
superlative good, as a moment of it, and everything is seen in light of this pursuit. Thus, the 
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pursuit of the good brings about a kind of practical system, which – as was shown – is also 
dependent on a complex system of views. These two systems are indeed a central structure of 
the soul and together they are what constitutes a life or a αίμξ. 
Third, we considered how Plato sometimes describes our soul as having different 
constitutive drives. We paid special attention to the distinction of three main drives: namely, 
love of gain, love of honor, and love of knowledge or θζθμζμθία. These drives deeply shape 
our pursuit of the good. They are always combined in some way, under the dominance of one 
of them, and this constitutes the inner arrangement or inner πμθζηεία of the soul. Moreover, 
they are never experienced in their pure state. Rather, they deeply “contaminate” or transform 
each other. This means that they can assume many different shapes, according to the relation 
of forces between them, and it also means that the love of knowledge or θζθμζμθία pervades 
the entire soul, including the other drives. Everything is somehow related to views and to 
truth (or at least to the desire of truth). This is an essential characteristic of the ροπή, and it 
also shows how the cognitive and practical sides of the ροπή are deeply intertwined. 
These are the main traits of Plato‟s philosophical anthropology. We are constitutively 
related to the truth and to the good, and we can make different identifications of them, mostly 
due to the fact that the soul‟s drives may be arranged in different ways. But Plato not only 
alludes to this diversity of identifications. He also tries to determine the proper identification 
of the truth and of the superlative good, in order to determine what is the best possible        
life – i.e., the life we constitutively desire.  
It is precisely in this framework that the whole appraisal of the unexamined life and of 
philosophical examination must be understood. But in order to consider such an appraisal, we 
still had to define what exactly constitutes an unexamined life, and this was the objective of 
Part IV. We saw that the notion of unexamined life is quite complex. It encompasses many 
different lives, including lives that have some dedication to philosophical examination. 
However, all these lives are characterized by a particular arrangement of the soul‟s          
drives – namely, one in which the soul‟s love of knowledge is weak and dominated by a   
non-philosophical drive. This constitutes a particular identification of the good and a practical 
system that do not result from examination and do not give any special role to examination. 
But this does not mean that such a life is irrational, because the drive that rules it is still 
pervaded by love of knowledge and, as a result, it creates many views, which not only 
underpin the practical system of such a life, but also constitute a general way of seeing things. 
These views are accepted by the soul‟s love of knowledge due to the weakness of the latter, 
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but they can well be – and in general are – defective. In fact, according to Plato, the 
unexamined life is full of distortions, especially because it cannot grasp the meaning of the 
main predicates of reality, and it is precisely in this sense that it is compared to an               
all-encompassing dream state, in which nothing is seen as it really is. 
In this context, we also discussed the question of what is ultimately responsible for the 
unexamined life. We saw that what decides the kind of life the soul lives is the soul itself, and 
more precisely the soul‟s θζθμζμθία. The latter cannot be directly determined by anything 
else. It determines itself to be stronger or weaker, and this in turn determines the soul‟s 
arrangement of drives, our desires or “will”, and the way we see things. The origin of the 
unexamined life lies therefore at the depths of our being. We do not directly control it, but 
this also means that nothing external to us can prevent us from abandoning the unexamined 
life. Just as our love of knowledge determines itself to lead an unexamined life, it may also 
determine itself (with or without external stimuli) to become stronger and abandon such a 
life. This confirms once more the central important of the soul‟s love of knowledge and how 
our entire life depends on it. 
Finally, in Part V, we discussed once more Plato‟s appraisal of the unexamined life, 
now in light of what is said in the entire corpus. According to Plato, the unexamined life is a 
bad or undesirable life, and therefore not worth living. This means that such a life does not 
allow us to attain what we desire (namely, the superlative good), even if we think that we 
already attained it or are on our way to attaining it. Indeed, the badness and misery of the 
unexamined life tend to be inapparent or latent, but this makes them no less real. As we saw, 
the badness in question comes from within, and it assumes two forms. On the one hand, there 
is a form of badness that is like a disease or a sedition and ultimately consists in the fact that 
our drives do not perform their natural functions (i.e., the parts that should be ruled try to rule 
the soul, whereas the love of knowledge, which should rule the soul, submits itself to a     
non-rational drive). On the other hand, there is a form of badness that is like deformity or 
unfitness and comes from the fact that our soul fails to attain the truth to which it is 
essentially directed, being instead full of false knowledge claims. Because of these two forms 
of badness that are characteristic of the unexamined life, our soul is found to be in 
disagreement or in contradiction with itself, and this self-disagreement or self-contradiction 
pervade the whole unexamined life, in all its forms. This is why such a life cannot correspond 
to what the soul desires and is always miserable, even if we do not realize it.  
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This diagnosis of the unexamined life thus outlines a particular kind of imperative of 
philosophical examination, as we saw in Chapter 19. Although Plato‟s writings present 
several different arguments why we should philosophize, the most developed argument we 
can extract from these writings is the one that grounds the need to examine on the soul‟s 
intrinsic desire for a superlative good, as well as for the truth as a fundamental component of 
the good (and this is precisely what the unexamined life is constitutively unable to provide). 
Philosophical examination is therefore the means to attain the truth and the superlative good 
(which also implies strengthening the soul‟s love of knowledge and bringing about the best 
and most healthy arrangement of the soul‟s drives). In sum, it is our inner structure, as well as 
the constitutive defectiveness of the unexamined life, that require us to examine things (and 
to examine them so exhaustively as we saw in Part II). 
This is the justification we find in the whole Platonic corpus for Socrates‟ assertion in 
the Apology. However, this justification also raises a question that casts doubt on the 
imperative of philosophical examination as it is conceived by Plato. The argument we laid 
out assumes that philosophical examination can be effective and can actually help us attain 
the truth and the superlative good. This is why an examined life is better than the unexamined 
life. However, we saw in Chapter 20 that the effectiveness of philosophical examination is 
quite problematic. The Platonic corpus admits that philosophical examination can have a 
negative or a positive outcome, and we cannot know how it will turn out before actually 
carrying it out. We may thus be unable to find the truth and the superlative good only by 
examining things, and there are several factors that may be responsible for this: our 
circumstances may be inadequate, we may not have sufficient time, the truth may not give us 
access to a superlative good (in fact, it may even show that there is no such a thing), the truth 
may be inaccessible, or it may even be something that does not exist. In addition, there is also 
the risk that Plato‟s identification of life‟s structures and his diagnosis of the unexamined life 
is somehow wrong. All this renders the imperative of examination highly              
questionable – although there is still the possibility that Plato is right and that our life can 
only be meaningful if we devote ourselves to philosophical examination. We are thus forced 
to continue examining the problem of the unexamined life, at least if we want our life to have 
a solid ground. It is true that we may miss out on may important things (and even on the most 
important things) while we do this. However, it is also important to bear in mind that the 
dedication to the examination that is thus required is not unconditional, but rather provisional. 
We must question the very imperative to examine. This does not mean we will be any less 
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committed to it. In fact, examining the imperative to examine is a way of remaining faithful 
to the very idea of examination and what it requires of us. The result of the whole dissertation 
is thus partially aporetic, but it also shows what we should do if we really want to find out 
what we should do in life. According to Plato, this is not something to which we can 
renounce or which we can choose not to know, but in general we are already convinced of 
knowing it. We must therefore asks ourselves if we can trust our knowledge claims in such an 
important matter. 
Regardless of this, one thing seems to have become absolutely clear: namely, that the 
problem we have been discussing is very important. We mentioned this in the Introduction, 
and now we can better understand what was then said. Plato shows how the decision on 
whether or not to examine shapes our entire life – i.e., both everything we do and the way we 
see everything. Moreover, he shows that such a decision determines the value of our life. This 
is so even if Plato is wrong and we should not examine. Now, it is true that according to Plato 
this decision does not exactly depend on us, as if we were completely free to choose one way 
or the other. The kind of life we lead stems from the way our soul‟s love of knowledge 
determines itself. However, even if this is the case, it does not mean that thinking about it is 
irrelevant, because doing so may somehow prompt our love of knowledge to determine itself 
differently. 
 It has likewise become clear that this problem is at the center of Plato‟s writings. It is 
directly considered in several passages, and it is related to many others. Indeed, most of the 
Platonic corpus contributes decisively to the discussion of this question. In addition, the 
status of the whole corpus and of what is presented in it is fundamentally determined by this 
question. It is because we need to philosophize that all the discussions in the dialogues are 
important, and it is also because we need to philosophize that the whole corpus tries to 
stimulate the readers to dedicate themselves to this examination.  
Finally, it was also mentioned at the beginning that this problem is at the center of 
philosophy in general, and we now can better understand why it is so. Plato shows that this 
problem is crucial to determine the kind of being that we are and what our life is about. As 
we could also say, it is a central problem of philosophical anthropology.
2838
 At the same time, 
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 It is no accident that Plato defines the human being as the animal that reviews what it sees – i.e., that 
examines. Examination in general and philosophical examination in particular are indeed at the center of what 
we are, even if only as a rejected possibility. Cp. Cra. 399c: “ζδιαίκεζ ημῦημ ηὸ ὄκμια ὁ „ἄκενςπμξ‟ ὅηζ ηὰ ιὲκ 
ἄθθα εδνία ὧκ ὁνᾶ μ὎δὲκ ἐπζζημπε῔ μ὎δὲ ἀκαθμβίγεηαζ μ὎δὲ ἀκαενε῔, ὁ δὲ ἄκενςπμξ ἅια ἑώναηεκ – ημῦημ δ᾽ 
ἐζηὶ ηὸ „ὄπςπε‟ – ηαὶ ἀκαενε῔ ηαὶ θμβίγεηαζ ημῦημ ὃ ὄπςπεκ. ἐκηεῦεεκ δὴ ιόκμκ η῵κ εδνίςκ ὀνε῵ξ ὁ ἄκενςπμξ 
„ἄκενςπμξ‟ ὠκμιάζεδ, ἀκαεν῵κ ἃ ὄπςπε.” 
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he shows how any philosophical examination is essentially determined by its relation to our 
own life. More precisely, he shows how the inner arrangement of our drives and the strength 
of our love of knowledge determine both the way we perform the examination and the final 
content of any inquiry. Hence, philosophical anthropology (and within it the question of what 
role philosophical examination plays – or should play – in human life) is a decisive (even if 
mostly tacit) component of any philosophical inquiry.  
The problem of the unexamined life is thus very far from being an invented problem. 
We may normally not be clearly conscious of it, but it shapes who we are and what we do, 
even after we decide to dedicate ourselves to philosophical examination. This, of course, only 
renders the inconclusive character of this dissertation all the more frustrating. Our results 
were only provisional and called for more examination, but we will not be able to continue 
examining the question at this moment. What we can still do is briefly consider the directions 
in which this dissertation could be developed, which also allows us to better situate and 
appraise what has been done. 
First of all, there is still much we could explore in Plato‟s writings. Many of the 
passages we considered are more complex than what was shown in the previous analyses. A 
deeper analysis or an analysis from different angles could therefore reveal important aspects 
that we did not take into account, and these aspects could render Plato‟s arguments clearer, 
more persuasive, or more nuanced. Furthermore, there are many passages to which we did 
not pay close attention (especially passages concerning political, cosmological and religious 
matters), and these could also be brought into the discussion. 
But this is not all. We should also go beyond the Platonic corpus and see how other 
authors develop or oppose Plato‟s perspectives. The whole history of philosophy can indeed 
be read as a long discussion of this problem (or at least of questions that are directly relevant 
to this problem). Some authors and movements, as for instance Aristotle, Stoicism, 
Neoplatonism, Scholasticism, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, German Idealism, Husserl 
attempted to establish some sort of absolute or perfect knowledge, on which our life could be 
grounded. It would therefore be quite instructive to see how these attempts relate to the 
question of the unexamined life. On the other hand, there are many authors who do not think 
we can attain real knowledge, but nevertheless try to determine how we should live (or at 
least give some indications about it). One of the best examples of this is Kant‟s moral project. 
Pragmatist and existential philosophers have also tried to determine how we should live 
without resorting to such a complex cognitive project. Some authors, both Christian (such as 
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Pascal and Kierkegaard) and non-Christian, tried to find religious solutions to life, while 
others (such as Nietzsche) defended a kind of redemption through art. It would be interesting 
to see what these and many other authors have to say and how they conceive the role 
philosophical examination should play in our life. Finally, we should also consider if there is 
any significant possibility that has not yet been explored by any philosopher. 
One might certainly wonder why we need such an exhaustive analysis, especially 
because nothing seems to prevent us from solving the problem we must solve without 
considering all possible perspectives. However, when we try to do so, we realize how 
difficult the problem of the unexamined life is. Moreover, it is very easy to become falsely 
convinced of having solved the problem. To avoid this, it is important to confirm that our 
solution can resist all possible attacks and that we have no blind spots. It is the very idea of 
philosophical examination that demands this, and Plato‟s dialogues render this very clear. If 
we want to have a full insight into how we should live, we must question everything, 
including examination itself, and we must consider all possible views, insofar as it is 
possible. In this sense, the Platonic corpus is not only at the basis of pretty much all 
subsequent history of philosophy (at least in its Western variant), but it also requires us to 
seriously engage with this history (including what came before Plato and what is not related 
to him in any way), in order to develop (and perhaps one day complete) the discussion we 
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